CIVIL LAW REVIEW
PROPERTY
I.IMMOVABLE VS MOVABLE
Art. 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or
form an integral part of an immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that
it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration
of the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed
in buildings or on lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it
reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner
of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building
or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of
similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the
intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a
permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the
bed, and waters either running or stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature
and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over
immovable property. (334a)
Board of Assessment Appeals vs Manila Electric Comp.
Article 415 of the Civil Code: Real Property
Facts:
Meralco constructed 40 steel towers within Quezon City, which carry electric
transmission wires attached to insulators from its hydro-electric plant located in the
province of Laguna to the City of Manila. The City Assessor of Quezon City
declared Meralco's steel towers for real property tax.
Issue: Whether or not Meralco's steel towers are considered real properties so that
they can be subject to real property tax.
Held: No, Meralco's steel towers are not considered real properties that can be
subject to real property tax.
Article 415 of the Civil Code states the following are immovable properties:
(1) Land, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it
cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the
object;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works, which may be carried in a building or on a piece
of land, and which tends directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
The steel towers do not come within the objects mentioned in above paragraphs.
They are not construction analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. They are
removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which
when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.
They are also not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be
separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to
which they are attached.
They are not machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended for
industry or works on the land. Meralco is not engaged in an industry or works on
the land in which the steel towers are constructed.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, which ordered the cancellation of the tax
declarations, were affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Prudential Bank vs Panis
Facts:
The spouses Magcale obtained a Php 70, 000 loan from Prudential Bank secured by
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a 2-storey, semi-concrete residential building
including the right of occupancy on the land.
When the spouses Magcale executed this mortgage, the land still belonged to the
government as the Sales Patent over the lot applied for by the spouses Magcale was
not yet issued.
Issue: Whether or not a real estate mortgage over a building erected on the land
belonging to another is valid.
Held: Yes, a real estate mortgage over a building erected on the land belonging to
another is valid.
Article 415 of the Civil Code provides the inclusion of "building" separate and
distinct from the land, which can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable
property.
A mortgage of land necessarily includes buildings unless otherwise stipulated. A
building by itself, however, may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has
been built. Such a mortgage would still be a real estate mortgage for the building
alone would still be considered an immovable property.
Leon Sibal vs Emiliano Valdez (ungathered products-growing crops/ Art 465,
NCC;334 CC) Art 415(2)
Facts:
On 11 May 1923, the deputy-sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution in
civil case 20203 of the CFI Manila (Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Leon Sibal), levied an attachment
on Leon Sibal’s 8 parcels of land for the sum of P4,273.93. 2 months later, or on 30 July 1923,
Macondray & Co., Inc., bought said parcels of land, at the auction held by the sheriff of the
Province of Tarlac. Within 1 year from the sale of said parcels of land, or on 24 September 1923,
Sibal paid P2,000 to Macondray for the account of the redemption price of said parcels of land,
without specifying which said amount was to be applied. The redemption price of the parcels
was reduced to P2,579.97 including interest.
On 29 April 1924, the deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution in
civil case 1301 of the Province of Pampanga (Emiliano J. Valdez vs. Leon Sibal 1.º), attached
the personal property of Sibal located in Tarlac, among which was included the sugar cane in
question in the 7 parcels of land described in the complaint. He also attached Sibal’s real
property in Tarlac, including rights, interest and participation therein, which consists of 11
parcels of land and a house and camarin situated in one of said parcels. On 9-10 May 1924, the
deputy sheriff sold at public auction said personal properties to Emiliano J. Valdez, who paid
therefor the sum of P1,550, of which P600 was for the sugar cane. On 25 June 1924, 8 of the 11
parcels, including the camarin and the house were bought by Valdez at the auction held by the
sheriff for the sum of P12,200. The 3 remaining parcels were released from attachment by virtue
of claims presented by Cayugan and Tizon. On the same date, Macondray sold and conveyed to
Valdezfor P2,579.97 all of its rights and interest in the 8 parcels of land acquired by it in
connection with civil case 20203 of the CFI Manila.
On 14 December 1924, action was commenced in the CFI of the Province of Tarlac. The
plaintiff alleged that the deputy sheriff of Tarlac Province attached and sold to Valdezthe sugar
cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on 7 parcels of land, and that within 1 year from the
date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff ordered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to
Valdezthe amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, with taxes and interests, and
that Valdez refused to accept the money and return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. After hearing
and on 28 April 1926, the judge (Lukban) rendered judgment in favor of the defendant holding
that the sugar cane in question was personal property and, as such, was not subject to
redemption; among others. Hence, the appeal.
Paragraph 2, Article 334 of the Civil Code interpreted by the Tribunal Supremo de Espana as
that growing crops may be considered as personal property
Sugar cane may come under the classification of real property as "ungathered products" in
paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code, which enumerates as real property as "Trees, plants,
and ungathered products, while they are annexed to the land or form an integral part of any
immovable property." That article, however, has received in recent years an interpretation by the
Tribunal Supremo de España, which holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may be
considered as personal property. (Decision of March 18, 1904, vol. 97, Civil Jurisprudence of
Spain.) Thus, under Spanish authorities, pending fruits and ungathered products may be sold and
transferred as personal property. Also, the Supreme Court of Spain, in a case of ejectment of a
lessee of an agricultural land, held that the lessee was entitled to gather the Products
corresponding to the agricultural year because said fruits did not go with the land but belonged
separately to the lessee. And further, under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1909, as amended, the
mortgage of a piece of land does not include the fruits and products existing thereon, unless the
contract expressly provides otherwise.
Manresa admits growing crops as personal property
Manresa, the eminent commentator of the Spanish Civil Code, in discussing section 334 of the
Civil Code, in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, admits that growing
crops are sometimes considered and treated as personal property.
Paragraph 2, Article 344 of the Civil Code corresponds to Article 465 of the Civil Code of
Louisiana
Article 465 of the Civil Code of Louisiana, which corresponds to paragraph 2 of article 334 of
the Civil Code, provides: "Standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered, and trees before
they are cut down, are likewise immovable, and are considered as part of the land to which they
are attached."
Louisiana jurisprudence: Growing crop’s mobilization by anticipation
Standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered and trees before they are cut down are
considered as part of the land to which they are attached,' but the immovability provided for is
only one in abstracto and without reference to rights on or to the crop acquired by others than the
owners of the property to which the crop is attached. The existence of a right on the growing
crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop
movable quoad the right acquired therein. Jurisprudence recognizes the possible mobilization of
the growing crop. (Citizens' Bank vs. Wiltz, 31 La. Ann., 244; Porche vs. Bodin, 28 La. Ann.,
761; Sandel vs. Douglass, 27 La. Ann., 629; Lewis vs. Klotz, 39 La. Ann., 267.; as cited in
Lumber Co. vs. Sheriff and Tax Collector [106 La., 418], c.f. Citizen’s Bankv. Wiltz [31 La.
Ann., 244])
Louisiana jurisprudence: Standing crops as immovable or movable based on owned and
leased premises; seizure by creditors
Standing crops are considered as immovable and as part of the land to which they are attached,
and the fruits of an immovable gathered or produced while it is under seizure are considered as
making part thereof, and inure to the benefit of the person making the seizure. But the evident
meaning of these articles is, where the crops belong to the owner of the plantation, they form
part of the immovable, and where it is seized, the fruits gathered or produced inure to the benefit
of the seizing creditor. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the
immovable. It belongs to the lessee, and may be sold by him, whether it be gathered or not, and
it may be sold by his judgment creditors. (Porche vs. Bodin [28 La. An., 761])
and personal, shall be liable to execution." The Supreme Court of California, under section 688
of the Code of Civil Procedure of that state, to which the Code of Civil Procedure was pattered,
has held, without variation, that growing crops were personal property and subject to execution.
Chattel Mortgage Law recognizes growing crops as personal property
Act 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognizes that growing crops are personal property.
Section 2 of said Act provides that "All personal property shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably
to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a
chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides that "If growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage
may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend. care for
and protect the crop while growing." The above provisions of Act 1508 were enacted on the
assumption that "growing crops" are personal property.
Personal property includes ungathered products; Paragraph 2, Article 334 of the Civil
Code modified by Act 190 and 1508
Paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of Act No. 190
and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as mentioned in said article of the
Civil Code have the nature of personal property; or that in the sense that, for the purposes of
attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered
products" have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase "personal property"
should be understood to include "ungathered products." In the case at bar, the sugar cane in
question was personal property and was not subject to redemption.

Louisiana jurisprudence: Law cannot be interpreted result in absurd consequences

If crop necessarily forms part of the leased premises the result would be that it could not be sold
under execution separate and apart from the land. If a lessee obtain supplies to make his crop, the
factor's lien would not attach to the crop as a separate thing belonging to his debtor, but the land
belonging to the lessor would be affected with the recorded privilege. The law cannot be
construed so as to result in such absurd consequences.

American jurisprudence: growing crops by yearly labor and cultivation personal property
The settled doctrine followed in the State of California and other states in connection with the
attachment of property and execution of judgment is, that growing crops raised by yearly labor
and cultivation are considered personal property. All annual crops which are raised by yearly
manurance and labor, and essentially owe their annual existence to cultivation by man, may be
levied on as personal property. Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be
harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty. They are, therefore,
liable to voluntary transfer as chattels. It is equally well settled that they may be seized and sold
under execution.

Source of provisions on execution of judgment in Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190);

Growing crops are personal property
Section 450 and most of the other sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the
execution of judgments were taken from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. Section 450
of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the property of a judgment debtor which may be
subjected to execution, and reads as "All goods, chattels, moneys, and other property, both real
Davao Sawmill Co. vs Castillo (equipment is movable when placed by the XPN: When the tenant had promised to leave the machinery on the tenement at
tenant only) the end of the lease, or when he acted only as agent of the owner of the land.
Facts:
Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government
of the Philippine Islands. However, the land upon which the business was conducted
belonged to another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which
housed the machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly
personal property, the conflict concerning machines which were placed and mounted
on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease between the sawmill company and
the owner of the land there appeared the following provision: That on the expiration of
the period agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by
the party of the second part shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the lessor without
any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings;
which do not include the machineries and accessories in the improvements.

In another action wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the
Davao, Saw, Mill Co., Inc., was the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff in that action against the defendant; a writ of execution issued thereon, and the
properties now in question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No third party
claim was filed for such properties at the time of the sales thereof as is borne out by the
record made by the plaintiff herein

It must be noted also that on number of occasion, Davao Sawmill treated the
machinery as personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third
persons. One of such is the appellee by assignment from the original mortgages.

The lower court rendered decision in favor of the defendants herein. Hence, this instant
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the machineries and equipment were personal in nature.

Ruling/ Rationale: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a
plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a
usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted
as the agent of the owner.

As a rule, the machinery should be considered as personal, since it was not placed on
the land by the owner of the said land. Immobilization by destination or purpose cannot
generally be made by a person whose possession of the property is only
TEMPORARY, otherwise we will be forced to presume that he intended to give the
property permanently away in favor of the owner of the premises.
REGALIAN DOCTRINE Ruling:
The feudal principle that private title to land must emanate, directly or
The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can
indirectly, from the Spanish crown with the latter retaining the underlying title.
register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by
Lands and resources not granted by the Crown remain part of the public
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous,
domain over which none but the sovereign holds rights.
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a
Republic vs Lao bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse
possession over the land for at least 30 years and the land subject of the
Facts: application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner
Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a was right to contend that the respondent did not prove by incontrovertible
parcel of land. She allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings evidence that she possessed the property in the manner and time required by
Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from law. She did not provide the exact period when her predecessors-in-interest
Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose started occupying the property. No extrajudicial settlement of the property
Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer. She prayed from its previous owners was shown and she did not show any relationship
that the land be registered in her name under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public between the parties where she obtained her deed of sale. She further did not
Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interests’ open, public, actual, present any certification from appropriate government agency to show that the
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She presented It is incumbent for an applicant of a land registration to provide these
witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical incontrovertible evidences to support her claim for her application. In the
description of property and tax declarations in her and her predecessors’ absence of these evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the petition was
names. The court approved the application. The petitioner represented by the granted and her application was denied.
Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the
lower court decision, hence this petition for review before the SC. The
petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance
of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods
and acts of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent sufficiently provided evidence that she meets
the qualifications required by law on the manner of possession (continuous,
adverse, notorious, etc..) and the period of time (30 years) necessary to have a
bonafide claim of ownership under C.A. 141?
Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her
application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain?
Celestial vs Cachopero- (dried up creek; public domain; not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription)
FACTS: Petitioner Rachel Celestial is the sister of defendant Jesse Cachopero. They
had a dispute over a piece of land which was a dried-up creek, as Cachopero was trying
to obtain a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) alleging that he had been the owner of that land whereon
he built a house and other improvements. However, Celestial protests that she has
preferential right over the land because it is adjacent to and is the only outlet from her
house. According to the Bureau of Land, the land in dispute was a creek and is therefore
outside the commerce of man. The first MSA was denied by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) prompting Cachopero to obtain another MSA which was granted by the DENR.
Due to conflicting interests of the parties, the land in dispute must be sold in a public
auction.
Cachopero then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
DENR with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) but was denied. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Celestial contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Cachopero‘s petition for
certiorari as it is in the nature of an appeal falling within the jurisdiction of the CA and
that the Cachopero has not exhausted all administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
(b) Whether or not the land in question owned by one of the parties when it is classified
as outside the commerce of man
HELD:
A dried up creek is property of public dominion and not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription
As for Celestial‘s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of
the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of
her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when
she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under
Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the
same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible
to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may
be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government
has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of
entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of
an imperfect title.
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in
the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the
same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of
the area occupied by the new bed. (370a)
NATURAL BED OF RIVERS
Hilario vs City of Manila
Doctrines:
All riverbanks, as part of the riverbeds, are of public ownership Under the old Civil Law
and the Law of Waters, all riverbanks are of public ownership,
including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through
a private estate. Artcile 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear. Without any qualifications, it
provides that “that devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character” are
property of public ownership. Further, the riverbank is part of the riverbed. Article 73 of the Law
of Waters which provides that the phrase “banks of a river” is understood those lateral strips of
zones of its beds which are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause
inundations. The use of the words “of its bed [de sus alveos] “ clearly indicates the intent of the
law to consider the banks for all legal purposes, as part of the riverbed. Thus, the banks of the
River are part of its bed. Since undeniably all beds of river are of public ownership, it follows that
the banks, which form part of them, are also of public ownership.
Natural bed or channel of a creek or river defined
The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during
the highest [ordinary] floods (Article 70 of the Law of the Waters).
New bed, when river changes course, is of public ownership; Means to recover
Article 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that “whenever a navigable or floatable
river changes its course from natural causes and opens a new bed through a private estate, the new
bed shall be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate shall recover it in the event that the
waters leave it dry again either naturally or as the result of any work legally authorized for this
purpose.” Banks are not mentioned in the provision, as the nature of banks follows that of the bed
and the running water of the river.
A river is a compound concept consisting of running waters, bed, and banks
A river is a compound concept consisting of three elements;
(1) the running waters,
(2) the bed and
(3) the banks.
All these constitute the river. American authorities are in accord with this view, as that
“‘ River’ consists of water, bed and banks”; and that “A ‘river’ consists of water, a bed and banks,
these several parts constituting the river, the whole river. It is a compound idea; it cannot exist
without all its parts. Evaporate the water, and you have a dry hollow. If you could sink the bed,
instead of a river you would have a fathomless gulf. Remove the banks, and you have, a boundless
flood”
6. River is of public ownership, elements follow same nature of ownership; Law explicit
Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should
either be totally public or completely private. Since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit
that all the three component elements be of the same nature also. Still, the law expressly makes all
three elements public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are public under Artciles 339 and 407,
respectively, of the Code, while the flowing waters are declared so under Articles 33, par. 2 of the
Law of Waters of 1866.
7. Natural is not synonymous to original or prior condition “Natural” is not made
synonymous to “original” or “prior condition”. On the contrary, even if a river should leave its
original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall within the
scope of the definition provided by the Diccionario de La Real Academia Española. Hence, the
law must have used the word “natural” only because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and
concept of a river always to have a bed and banks.
Limits of banks of rivers
Article 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the limits of banks of rivers “By the
phrase ‘banks of a river’ is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are washed by
the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. The farthest extremity of the
bank on the west side would, therefore, be that lateral line or strip which is reached by the waters
during those high floods that do not cause inundations. In other words, the extent reached by the
waters when the River is at high tide.
11. Banks of river different in topography
There is a difference between the topography of the two sides immediately adjoining the
River. The line indicated as “primary bank,” which is on the east, is about 3 meters high and has
a steep grade right at the edge where it drops almost vertically to the watercourse level. The
opposite side, on the other hand, has no such steep acclivity. The bank near the water edge, is
about 30 to 50 cms. high only, and gradually slopes up to a height of about 2 to 2-1/2 meters along
the line indicated as “secondary bank”, which is quite far from the waterline. Considering the
peculiar characteristics of the two sides banking the river, the rise in the waterlevel would not have
the same effect on the two sides. Thus, on the east, the water would rise vertically, until the top of
the “primary bank” is reached, but on the west, there would be a low angled inclined rise, the water
covering more ground until the “secondary bank” line is reached. In other words, while the water
expansion on the east is vertical, that on the west is more or less lateral, or horizontal.
12. Ordinary and extraordinary flood
There are two types of floods in the area during the rainy season. One is the so-called
“ordinary” flood, when the river is swollen but the flowing water is kept within the confines of the
“primary” and “secondary” banks. This occurs annually, about three to four times during the
period. Then there is the “extraordinary” flood, when the waters overflow beyond the said banks,
and even inundate the surrounding areas. However, this flood does not happen regularly. From
1947 to 1955, there were only three such floods.
13. Movement of the river, west bank, from 1945-1955
From 1945 to 1949, the west bank of the River extended westward up to the “secondary
bank” line; from 1950 to 1952, this bank had moved, with the River, to the east, its lateral borders
running along a line just 20 meters west of the camachile tree; and from 1953 to 1955, the
extremities of the west bank further receded eastward beyond the camachile tree, until they lay
just about 20 meters east of said tree.
14. Floodings not accidental as they are annual; Government v. Colegio de San Jose does not
apply
Evidence shows that the River floods with annual regularity during the rainy season.
These floods can hardly be called “accidental”. The Colegio de San Jose case is not exactly in
point. What was mainly considered there was Article 74 of the Law of Waters relating to lakes,
ponds and pools. In the present case, none of these is involved.
15. Movement of the river not due to excavation and extraction of materials
The excavations and extractions of materials, even from the American period, have been
made only on the strip of land west of the River. Under the “following-the nature-of-things”
argument advanced by plaintiff, the River should have moved westward, where the level of the
ground had been lowered. But the movement has been in the opposite direction instead. Therefore,
it cannot be attributed to defendants’ operations. Moreover, Hilario’s own evidence indicates that
the movement eastward was all due to natural causes. The movement eastward of the channel by
as much as 31 meters, from 1950 to 1953, was due to two typhoons which caused the erosion of
the east bank and the depositing of materials on the west side which increased its level from as
much as .93 to 2 meters.
16. River of different width; claim of unnatural widening unfounded
Reliance is made on the finding by the lower court that in 1943, the river was only 60
meters wide, whereas in 1950, it was already 140 meters wide. Such area sampled shows only the
width of the River near the southwestern boundary of the Hilario estate. It does not indicate how
wide it was in the other parts, especially up north.
17. Extraction confined on the banks of the river and not beyond limits of the west bank to
invade his private estate; Hilario cannot recover damages from defendants
From 1947 to the early part of 1949, the defendants conducted their operations only in
the New Accretion Area along a narrow longitudinal zone contiguous to the watercourse then.
This zone, City Engineer Manila, is about 1 km. long and extends northward up to pt. 50.35.
However, no extractions nor excavations were undertaken west of this zone, i.e., above the
“temporary bank” line. This line is located east of the “secondary bank” line, the lateral extremity
of the west bank then. In the latter part of 1949, plaintiff prohibited the defendants from extracting
along the New Accretion Area and constructed a fence across the same. This forced the defendants
to go southeast of the “Excavated Area”. From 1954 to 1955, defendants’ area of operation was
still farther east of the New Accretion Area. They were. working within a confined area along the
west waterline, the northern and western boundaries of which were 20 meters away east from the
camachile tree. It appears sufficiently established, therefore, that defendants have not gone beyond
the receding western extremities of the west riverbank. They have confined their extraction of
gravel and sand only from which the banks of the River, which constitute part of the public domain
wherein they had the right to operate. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that
defendants have gone beyond the limits of the west bank, as previously established, and have
invaded his private estate. He cannot, therefore, recover from them.
II. OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
A. HOW OWNERSHIP IS TRANSFERRED
Ten Forty Realty & Devt. Corp. vs Marina Cruz
Doctrine: Execution of Deed of Sale; Not sufficient as delivery. Ownership is
transferred not by contract but by tradition or delivery. Nowhere in the Civil
Code is it provided that the execution of a Deed of Sale is a conclusive
presumption of delivery of possession of a piece of real estate. The execution
of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery.
Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected, because of a
legal impediment. Such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely
presumptive, was deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold. Disqualification from Ownership of Alienable
Public Land.
Private corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain, as provided under Section 3 of Article XII of the Constitution. While
corporations cannot acquire land of the public domain, they can however
acquire private land. However, petitioner has not presented proof that, at the
time it purchased the property from Galino, the property had ceased to be of
the public domain and was already private land. The established rule is that
alienable and disposable land of the public domain held and occupied by a
possessor — personally or through predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously, and exclusively for 30 years — is ipso jure converted to private
property by the mere lapse of time.
B. PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP
Concordia Laluan , et al vs Apolinario Malpaya
There is a presumption that property is conjugal if acquired during marriage.—
It needs no emphasis to point out that the court a quo committed no error in
declaring that the parcel of land subject to the “Absolute Deed of Sale” belongs
to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya. Indeed, the
spouses Laluan and Malpaya acquired the said parcel of land from Eustaquio
Marquez “sometime in 1912” or, specifically, during the marriage. Following
the rule then that proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during the
marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative, it seems clear
enough that the parcel covered by the “Absolute Deed of Sale” pertains to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya.
C. TAX DECLARATIONS
Heirs of Clemente Ermac vs Heirs of Vicente Ermac
Doctrine: Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and
unsubstantiated testimony of respondents, as well as on tax declarations and realty tax
receipts, in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac.
We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for
respondents is a factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the
appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in
appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court’s findings of
fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.19
Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove
ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied
by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.20 Considering that
respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time, there is
legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional
evidence to support their claim of ownership.
DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP
RA 386, Article 429 The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property. (n)
If the propety is immovable, there should be no delay in the use of
force to recover it; a delay, even if excusable, such as when is due to
the ignorance of the dispossession, will bar the right to the use of force.
Once the usurper's possession has become firm by the lapse of
time, the lawful possessor must resort to the competent authority to
recover his property."
German Management & Services Inc. vs CA
No. The Doctrine of Self-help is not applicable because at the time when German
Management excluded the farmers, there’s no longer an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation. That actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion by the farmers have already lapsed 12 years ago when they
began occupying the said land. In fact, they were already peaceably farming the
land.
What should have been the remedy by German Management?
German Management should have filed either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria to lawfully eject the farmers.
But the farmers are not the real owners and in fact, the spouses Jose have a
lawful title over the land?
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in H. RIGHTS INCLUDED IN OWNERSHIP
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or 1) JUS UTENDI-right to use
terror. Further, there is now a presumption of ownership in favor of the farmers 2) JUS FRUENDI-right to the fruits
since they are the ones occupying the said property. They can only be ejected 3) JUS ABUTENDI-right to consume
either by accion publicianaor accion reivindicatoria through which the spouses 4) JUS DISPONENDI-right to dispose
Jose’s better right may be proven. 5) JUS VINDICANDI-right to recover
6) JUS POSSIDENDI-right to possess
D. RIGHT TO FENCE I. OTHER SPECIFIC RIGHTS
Aneco Realty vs Landex Development 1) RIGHT TO EXCLUDE- ART 429
Property; Ownership; Every owner has the right to enclose or fence his Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
land or tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
means—the right to fence flows from the right of ownership. — thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
fence his land or tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
other means. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. As property. (n)
owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the 2) RIGHT TO ENCLOSE OR FENCE- ART 430
limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and Art. 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or
enforceable right, as here, we will not interfere with the exercise of an tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or
essential attribute of ownership. by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted
thereon. (388)
E. PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION 3) RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION-ART 435
Jacinto vs Director of Lands Art. 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except by
4. Director of Land has duty to receive purchase money payable under Act competent authority and for public use and always upon payment
1120 of just compensation.
By section 14 of Act No. 1120 the Director of Lands is charged with the duty Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shall
of receiving the purchase money payable under that Act and may therefore be
protect and, in a proper case, restore the owner in his
compelled by mandamus to receive, as a purely ministerial act, such purchase
money when tendered. possession. (349a)

4) RIGHT TO HIDDEN TREASURE- ART 438-439

F. EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
City of Manila vs Gerard, et. Al Art. 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land,
building, or other property on which it is found.
G. DEFINITION (Art 427 & 428)
ART. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights. Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another,
ART. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without or of the State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half
other limitations than those established by law.
thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he
shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the
thing in order to recover it.
 If the things found be of interest to science of the arts, the State may
acquire them at their just price, which shall be divided in conformity
with the rule stated. (351a)
Art. 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and
unknown deposit of money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the
lawful ownership of which does not appear. (352)
5) RIGHT TO RECOVER POSSESSION AND/OR
OWNERSHIP (jus vindicandi)
J. PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP-ART 160
Concordia Laluan, et al vs Apolinario Malpaya
K. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO OWNERSHIP
1) GENERAL LIMITATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE
STATE
i. EMINENT DOMAIN refers to the power of the State
to take private property for public use upon payment
of just compensation.
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized
by competent
authority in the interest of health, safety or securit
y, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to
compensation, unless he can show that such
condemnation or seizure is unjustified. (n)
Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of
its surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works
or make any plantations and excavations which he
may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes
and subject to special laws
and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation. (350a)
ii. POLICE POWER
Police power in real estate takes power out of the hands of
property owners and places it in the hands of the government.
refers to the right of the State to enact laws or regulations in relation to
persons and property as may promote public health, public morals,
public safety, and the general welfare and convenience of the people. It
is also imposed towards one’s personal liberty or property to promote
the general welfare. It may be through an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property for the purpose of promoting the common good.
iii. TAXATION
refers to the power of the State to impose charge or burden upon
persons, property, or property rights, for the use and support of
the government and to enable it to discharge its appropriate
functions.
2) SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY LAW
i. LEGAL EASEMENTS
Exclusive right granted by law or deed, and
exercisable by the grantee over the land or property of
another person. A legal easement is enforceable
against 'the whole world.
ii. LIMITATIONS TO AVERT INJURY TO RIGHT
OF THIRD PERSONS- ART 431
Art. 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such manner as to injure the rights of a third
person. (n
iii. ACTS DURING STATES OF NECESSITY- ART
432
Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit
the interference of another with the same, if the
interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger
and the threatened damage, compared to the damage
arising to the owner from the interference, is much
greater. The owner may demand from the person
benefited indemnity for the damage to him. (n)
 such a manner that to separate the principal from the accessory
3) LIMITATIONS OF OWNER/PARTY TRANSMITTING would result in substantial injury to either.
PROPERTY d. Bad faith as liability for damages He who is in bad faith may
i. BY WILL be penalized. Bad faith of one neutralizes the bad faith of
another; He who is in good faith may be held responsible, but
ii. MORTGAGES, PLEDGES, LEASES he should not be penalized.

III. RIGHT OF ACCESSION Depra vs Dumlao

A. ART 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or Del Campo vs Abesia
attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES Paz Mercado vs CA
a. Accessory follows the principal (accesio cedit principali)
“To the owner of the principal must belong also the
accessions.”
ART 441. To the owner belongs:
(1) The natural fruits
(2) The industrial fruits
(3) The civil fruits
ART 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil,
and the young and other products of animals
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind through
cultivation of labor.

ART 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the
expenses made by third person in their production, gathering, and
preservation.
ART 444. Only such as are manifest or born are considered as natural
or industrial fruits.

With respect to animals, it is sufficient that they are in the womb of the
mother, although unborn.

b. No just enrichment No one should enrich himself unjustly at

the expense of another.
c. Accessory incorporated to principal The union or
incorporation must, with certain exceptions, be effected in