G.R. No. L-38434 December 23, 1933
00
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCIANO MEDINA y DIOKNO (alias MARIANO MEDINA, alias ALEJANDRO DOLA), defendant-
appellant.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of Judge Anacleto Diaz in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
finding the defendant guilty of robbery in an inhabited house and of being a habitual delinquent,
and sentencing him to suffer a principal penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor and
additional penalty of ten years of prision mayor because of being four times a recidivist, to indemnify
James C. Rockwell in the sum of P320, and to pay the costs.
Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in finding and concluding that the finger prints which were found
impressed on the small silver box of the complainant James C. Rockwell were identical to the
fingerprints of the accused.
2. The trial court erred in findings and concluding that it was the accused-appellant who took
away the said small silver box from the room of Mrs. Rockwell and the valuables worth P320
belonging to James C. Rockwell.
3. The trial court erred in finding and concluding that the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime
of robbery as defined in article 299, No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code for which the trial court
sentenced the accused to imprisonment of ten years and one day plus an additional
imprisonment of ten years of prision mayor as recidivist and to indemnify the said James C.
Rockwell in the amount of P320 and to pay the cost of the action.
The defendant was tried on a plea of not guilty to the following information:
The undersigned accuses Marciano Medina y Diokno alias Mariano Medina alias Alejandro Dola
of the crime of robbery in an inhabited house, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of February, 1932, during the nighttime which was purposely
sought, in the municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, within two and one-half
miles from the limits of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the said Marciano Medina y Diokno alias Mariano Medina alias Alejandro Dola did then
and there willfully , unlawfully, and feloniously, and with intent of gain, break into and enter
through the window by tearing the wire screen thereof, an opening not intended for entrance or
egress, of house No. 1155 F.B. Harrison Street, in said municipality of Pasay, the dwelling house
of James C. Rockwell, and, once inside said premises, take steal, and carry away without the
consent of the owner thereof the following personal property, to wit:
One (1) watch "Howard", gold, with an outside monogram containing
the initials "JCR" valued at P200.00
One(1) "Green" wrist watch with a leather strap, valued at 120.
Total 320.00
belongings to James C. Rockwell, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner thereof in the
afore-mentioned sum of P320, Philippine currency.
That, at that time of the commission of this offense, the said accused Marciano Medina y
Diokno alias Mariano Medina alias Alejandro Dola has already been convicted three (3) times of
the crime of theft by virtue of final judgments rendered by competent courts and is, therefore,
a habitual delinquent, his last date of conviction being on October 23, 1924 and his date of
release being on October 26, 1927.
At the trial the defendant admitted that Mr. Rockwell's house was robbed on the night of February
12, 1932, as alleged in the information, but denied that he was the author of the crime; admitted
that a silver box, which had been taken from the room of Mrs. Rockwell on the night of the robbery,
was found in the garden the next morning, and that when it was examined in the Intelligence
Division of the Constabulary it showed a finger print on the top. The defendant further admitted
the competency of the witness, Agripino Ruiz, as a finger print expert; and the lastly the defendant
admitted that he had been convicted three times of theft, his last conviction being on October 23,
1924 and his release on October 26, 1927.
It appears from the evidence that while Agripino Ruiz, a Constabulary agent and finger print expert,
was investigating the robbery in question he went to see the accused, who was under arrest for
breaking into the house of Capt. Davidson in Parañaque. Ruiz took the finger prints of the accused,
and found when he compared them with his records that the accused had served three terms in
Bilibid prison theft. Ruiz then compared a photograph of the impression of the middle finger of
defendant's right hand with a photograph of the finger print on the top of the silver box stolen from
the bedroom of Mrs. Rockwell, and found that they coincided in ten points. He concluded that the
two impressions were from the same person, and that the finger print on the box was that of the
defendant.
The defense of the accused was an alibi. He asserted that on the night of the robbery in question
he was at home with a sore foot. This contention of the defendant rests on his uncorroborated
testimony.
It is now well settled that evidence as to the correspondence of finger prints is admissible for the
purpose of proving identity (Moon vs. State, Arizona Supreme Court, June 7, 1921, 198 Pac., 288;
16 A.L.R., 362, and the authorities there cited). The history of the finger print system of identification
is stated in one of the leading cases, People vs. Sallow (165 N.Y. Supp., 915, 918), as follows:
Scientific authority declares that finger prints are reliable as a means of identification. (10 Ency.
Brit. [11th ed.], 376.) The first recorded finger prints were used as a manual seal, to give a
personal mark of authenticity to documents. Such prints are found in the Assyrian clay tablets in
the British Museum. Finger prints were first used to record the identity of individuals officially by
Sir William Herschel, in Bengal, to check forgeries by natives in India in 1858. (C. Ainsworth
Mitchell, in "Science and the Criminal" 1911, p. 51.) Finger print records have been constantly
used as a basis of information for the courts since Sir Francis Galton proved that the papillay
ridges which cover the inner surface of the hands and the soles of the feet form patterns, the
 main details of which remain the same from the sixth month of the embryonic period until
decomposition sets in after death, and Sir Edward Henry, the head of the Metropolitan Police
Force of London, formulated a practical system of classification, subsequently simplified by an
Argentine named Vucetich. The system has been in general use in the criminal courts in England
since 1891. It is claimed that by means of finger prints the metropolitan police force of London
during the 13 years from 1901 to 1914 have made over 103,000 identifications, and the
Magistrates' Court of New York City during the 4 years from 1911 to 1915 have made 31,000
identifications, without error. (Report of Alfred H. Hart, Supervisor, Fingerprint Bureau, Ann. Rep.,
N.Y. City Magistrates' Courts, 1915.) Their value has been recognized by banks and other
corporations, passport bureaus of foreign governments, and civil service commissions as a certain
protection against impersonation.
It was held in 1909 by the Lord Chief Justice of England that the court may accept the evidence
of finger prints, though it be the sole ground of identification. (Castleton's Case, 3 Crim. App. C.,
74.)
In the case at bar the principal contentions of appellant's attorney are that the identification was
incomplete and unreliable because the imprint of only one finger was found on the box, and that
was blurred, and could not served as a basis of comparison. There is a little merit in this argument.
Although a portion of the impression on the box was somewhat blurred, it did not seriously interfere
with the comparison of the two finger prints. It would of course have been more satisfactory for the
purpose of comparison if there had been an impression of all the fingers of the thief on the box, but
we are not justified in rejecting the evidence of record merely because it might be more complete.
Referring to the care necessary in photographing accidental imprints, Wentworth and Wilder in
their work, "Personal Identification" (1932), say that these imprints at best will be poor; that one
will never find an accidental imprint that is absolutely perfect; that it is seldom, indeed, that a very
good one is found (p.260).
The only important question is whether or not the evidence identifies the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt as the person whose finger print appears on the box, because the box was taken
from the bedroom of Mrs. Rockwell on the night of the robbery, and the finger print thereon, if that
of the accused, could have been made only on the occasion when the robbery was committed.
It might be here stated that the finger prints of the persons living in Mr. Rockwell's house were
taken, but that they did not correspond to the impression in question.
A photograph showing an enlargement of the finger print found on the box was marked at the trial
Exhibit A. Further enlargements of it are shown in Exhibits A-1 and
A-2. Exhibit B is an enlargement of a photograph of the impression of the middle finger of
defendant's right hand, taken while he was a prisoner in Bilibid.
When asked which were the ten points of agreement between the two impressions in question, the
finger print expert replied that there were three classes of characteristics, namely: the endings of
the ridges, the bifurcation of the ridges, and the core. The ten points of identity, which were marked
on the photographs, are as follows:
1. Upward end of a ridge,
2. Core,
3. Both ends of a short ridge,
4. Both ends of a short ridge,
5. Downward end of a ridge,
6. Upward end of a ridge,
7. Bifurcation,
8. Upward end of a ridge,
9. Upward end of a ridge,
10. Bifurcation.
The witness stated that in his opinion eight characteristics are sufficient to identify a person.
According to Frederick Kuhn of the Bureau of Criminal Identification, Police Department of the City
of New York, in the "Finger Print Instructor", p.12, "characteristics" are the peculiarities of the
ridges, such as abrupt endings, bifurcations, the formation of what is termed an island, short ridge
lines, ridge dots, some peculiarity as to the information of the delta or core; in fact any peculiarity
out of the ordinary may be considered a characteristic point, and serve as a positive means of
identification.
The Galton details, the ends, forks, islands and so on, are so numerous and so variable that even in
a small area a duplication is impossible; so far as we know all the infinite possibilities in the
formation of the ridges are widely open in each individual case, so that it is quite safe to say that no
two people in the world can have, even over a small area, the same set of details, similarly related
to the individual units; the only possible confusion might result from an area so small and so
featureless as to show nothing but complete and parallel ridges, and without details, and could
never occur in connection with the formation of a pattern, where the ridges are called upon to make
eccentric turns, and to fill up spaces of irregular shape (Wentworth & Wilder, p. 126).
Explaining the ten points of identity, the expert witness in the case at bar testified that he found
four endings of ascending ridges in Exhibit B that corresponded exactly to those of Exhibit A; that as
to the number and location with respect to the core, which he marked 2 in both photographs, he
found that they agreed; that he found in Exhibit B two bifurcations or forks that corresponded
exactly to those in Exhibit A as to number and location; that he found in Exhibit B a short ridge, the
two ends of which he marked 3 and 4, that was identical with the corresponding short ridge in
Exhibit A, which he also marked 3 and 4.
The attorney for the appellant calls attention to the fact that there was the impression of another
finger on the that was not identified. That is true, but as it was the impression of only a small part
of the ball of a finger and was blurred, the expert did not make any particular study of it. It may
have been made by the person who picked up the box in the garden. In any event it does not alter
the fact that a finger print identical with that of the defendant in ten homologous points of
comparison was found on the box.
Although there is some differences of opinion among the authorities as to what constitutes proof
of identity, the older writers regarding twelve points as necessary to prove certain identity; and
more than that for absolute identification, the more recent writers think that six or eight
homologous points of comparison leave no room for reasonable doubt. "In the end it is the
microscopic identity of the ridge characteristics (Galton's minutiae) that settles the question."
(Personal Identification, p. 263.)
In the present case the qualifications of the expert witness were admitted. He stated under oath
that in his opinion the finger print in question is that of the defendant, and gave the reasons for his
conclusion, which seem to us to be reasonable and to be sustained by the best authorities available.
No reason has been adduced that would justify us in rejecting his findings and conclusion. We wish
to add, however, that the prosecuting attorney ought to have addressed further questions to the
expert witness to show how he arrived at his findings, that is, his method of examination and
comparison, his measurements, and other pertinent facts. Another competent and experienced
specialist might well have been called to verify the findings of the Constabulary expert.

The only evidence for the defendant was his uncorroborated testimony that on the night in question
he was at home in San Luis, Batangas. In weighing the testimony of the defendant it is proper to
take into account the fact that he has already been convicted three times of theft.

Robbery in an inhabited house is punished by prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, if the value of the property taken exceeds P250, if the malefactor
entered the house by breaking a window, as in the present case, but when the offender does not
carry arms, as in this case, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed (article 299 of the
Revised Penal Code). The penalty next lower in degree is prision correccional in its medium period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, or from two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional to eight years of prision mayor. In the present case in fixing the principal penalty, we
must take into account the aggravating circumstances of recidivism and nocturnity. The principal
penalty imposed on the accused is therefore reduced to six years and a one day of prision mayor.

The additional penalty of ten years imposed by the lower court is the maximum of the maximum
for a fourth conviction. We think that under the circumstances of this case the minimum authorized
by law would be sufficient, and the additional penalty of the appellant is accordingly reduced to six
years and one day.

Modified as hereinabove stated, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the
appellant.
G.R. No. 192274 February 8, 2012
NORBERTO LEE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALLIED BANK, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Through this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Norberto Lee (Lee) assails the October 26, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
SP No. 106247, which dismissed his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and affirmed the two (2)
questioned interlocutory orders2 of the public respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati
City (RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. 00-1809 to 00-1816.
In the questioned interlocutory orders, the RTC denied Lee’s Motion for Document and Handwriting
Examination by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and his subsequent motion for the
reconsideration of the denial.
The Facts
Lee was the New Account Service Representative of Manager’s Check and Gift Check Processor at
the Cash Department of Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank). The bank filed a complaint against
him alleging that, on several occasions, he forged the signatures of responsible bank officers in
several manager’s checks causing damage and prejudice to it.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, he was charged with Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents which were committed on separate dates involving separate instruments
in eight (8) Informations.3 Except for the details, the Informations were uniformly worded as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of May 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [petitioner], being then
the New Account Service Representative of Manager’s Check and Gift Check Processor at Cash
Department of complainant Allied Banking Corporation, herein represented by Ketty Uy and taking
advantage of his position, by means of deceit and false pretenses and fraudulent acts, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said complainant in the following manner, to wit:
the said accused forged and falsified the signatures of Ketty Uy, Tess Chiong, Manuel Fronda, the
approving officers of complainant of the Man[a]ger’s Check No. MC 0000473205 in the amount of
₱ 200,500.00 dated May 20, 1999 payable to Noli Baldonado which was issued by complainant-bank
in favor of Filway Marketing, Inc., which is a commercial document, by then and there making it
appear that the approving officers of complainant-bank had signed and approved the said
Manager’s Check when in truth and in fact said accused knew, that the approving officers had not
participated or intervened in the signing of said manager’s check, thereafter the accused encashed
the said Manager’s Check and represented himself as the payee thereto and received the amount
of ₱ 200,500.00 from complainant-bank and then and there misappropriate, misapply and convert
the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Allied
Banking Corporation, herein represented by Ketty Uy in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On February 12, 2007, after the trial had started, Lee filed his Motion for Document and Handwriting
Examination by the NBI.5 In his motion, he claimed, among others, that:
1. The record of the preliminary investigation of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati shows
that Document Report No. 065-2000, dated 16 June 2000, prepared by the officials of the Crime
Laboratory of the National Headquarters of the Philippine National Police at Camp Came, Quezon
City, excluded and failed to examine the questioned and standard signatures of the accused in
relation to the questioned and standard documents and signatures of the other signatories of the
subject Allied Bank checks, application forms and related documents.
xxxx
6. The accused [petitioner] is suspicious of the credibility, neutrality and sincerity of the PNP Crime
Laboratory examiners who had submitted the Report because they seemed to have been prevailed
upon and influenced by the officers of the Bank to conduct the partial, biased and prejudiced
examination without the participation of and said notice to the accused.
7. In the interest of justice and fair play, there is a need for the forensic laboratory of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a new, confirmatory and independent document and
handwriting signature examination of the questioned and standard documents and signatures of
the concerned officers and staff of the Bank and the Filway Marketing Inc., on one hand, and of the
accused, on the other, in a manner that is complete, comprehensive, fair, neutral, transparent and
credible.6
On August 22, 2007, the RTC, presided by Judge Tranquil P. Salvador, Jr., denied Lee’s motion,
stating that:
After due assessment of the assertions of the contending counsels, the Court is disinclined to grant
instant motion. First, the trial of the case is already on-going and the accused has the option to
utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation of defense evidence. And
second, the Court is called upon to conduct its own evaluation of the questioned signature even
with the opinion on the matter coming from an NBI expert. For this purpose, the Court may utilize,
among others, the provisions of Sections 20 and 22, Rules of Court, on the rules in authentication
of private documents [Rule 132].
"It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the NBI and
the PC, are not binding upon [the] courts.
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged Documents because of the
technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting (Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio vs.
CA, 300 SCRA, December 1998) A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination on the
questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. (Boado,
‘Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code,’ 2004 Ed., p. 428)."
Accordingly, defense motion for document and handwriting examination by the NBI is hereby
DENIED.7
Undaunted, Lee filed his Motion for Reconsideration8 on September 26, 2007, or two (2) days after
the reglementary period of 15 days. For Lee’s failure to comply with the rules, the RTC, through
Presiding Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, denied his motion for reconsideration.
In his petition before the CA, Lee raised the sole issue of whether or not the two questioned
interlocutory orders should be nullified for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and in the interest of fair play, justice, due process, and
equal protection of the law.
Without disputing the late filing of his motion for reconsideration, Lee sought the CA’s liberal
interpretation of the rules and the need to decide his case on the merits. He insisted that it was
legally and physically impossible for him to secure an NBI witness without a compulsory judicial
process or order.
In the assailed October 26, 2009 decision, the CA dismissed Lee’s petition and affirmed the RTC
orders. It stated that procedural rules are not stringently applied when an imperative exists and a
grave injustice may be committed if applied otherwise. Since, however, no such imperative and
grave injustice appeared in the case, the RTC clearly did not gravely abuse its discretion on this
point.
The CA further stated that the RTC did not err in denying petitioner’s motion for document and
handwriting examination by the NBI, as said motion was intended only to dispute the examination
of documents and handwritings conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory, which was a matter that
may be exercised during the presentation of defense evidence.
The CA added that Lee could not claim deprivation of his life, liberty and property with the denial of
his motion as both Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 115(g) of the Rules of
Court guarantee his right to the court’s compulsory processes to ensure the attendance of his
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
Lastly, the CA stated that the trial court did not err, much less gravely, when it denied Lee’s motion
for consideration because it was filed out of time.
Persistent, Lee interposed this petition for review on certiorari raising the following:
ISSUES9
1. Whether or not the RTC and the CA gravely erred in ignoring the traditional "doctrine of
liberality" in the interpretation and application of mechanical rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not the petitioner was legally entitled to a new and credible NBI document and
handwriting examination of all the relevant and material documents relative to the allegedly
falsified bank documents and checks with his full participation and submissions, as part of his
right to constitutional due process and equal protection rights.
3. Did the RTC and CA gravely err in denying the petitioner’s motion for a credible NBI document
and handwriting examination?
4. Whether or not the RTC and the CA gravely erred in concluding that the two (2) questioned
interlocutory orders had attained "finality," as if they partook of the legal nature of a "final and
executory judgment" or of a "final order."
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion in denying the subject motion and that the CA was correct in affirming the denial. The
RTC did not err either in turning down Lee’s motion for reconsideration for being filed two days late.
Contrary to the claim of Lee, the RTC and the CA did not "ignore" the traditional "doctrine of
liberality" but merely relied upon the guidelines as to when it is applicable and, after being so
guided, chose not to apply it under the existing circumstances. It is true that rules of procedure may
be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure for persuasive and weights reasons. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation
of the rules of procedure, however, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.10 In this case, however, Lee did not
bother to offer any convincing reason for this Court to relax the rules and just plainly sought its
liberal interpretation. The Court, in Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc v. Alberto J. Raza, 11 stated:
To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any valid reasons proffered
for or underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-
compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition
would defeat the administration of substantive justice.12 Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly
rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.13
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/181688.htm - _ftn
At any rate, the Court does not perceive any injustice in the denial of Lee’s motion. In fact, the RTC
wrote that "the accused has the option to utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the
presentation of defense evidence."14 When his time comes to present evidence, Lee can utilize the
NBI by availing of the coercive power of the court.
The Court had the occasion to rule on an almost similar issue in Joey P. Marquez v. Sandiganbayan,15
where the Court ordered the Sandiganbayan to act favorably on the motion of the accused therein
to cause the NBI to examine the documents already submitted to the court. In said case, the Court
wrote:
In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his signatures in the
disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that
as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his signatures were
indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he must be afforded reasonable
opportunity to present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual
examination of the signatures he is questioning by no less than the country’s premier investigative
force – the NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is negative
testimonial evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he cannot submit any other
examination result because the signatures are on the original documents which are in the control
of either the prosecution or the graft court.

At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft court.1âwphi1 It will still be subject
to its scrutiny and evaluation in line with Section 22 of Rule 132. Nevertheless, Marquez should not
be deprived of his right to present his own defense. How the prosecution, or even the court,
perceives his defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his defense may seem feeble and his strategy
frivolous, but he should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not
control how he will defend himself as long as the steps to be taken will not be in violation of the
rules.

The Marquez ruling, however, cannot be applied in this case. In Marquez, the accused had
requested for the examination of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization
requests by the NBI from the beginning. Records of the case showed that right upon his alleged
discovery of the forged signatures, while the case was still with the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), the accused already sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorization requests to the NBI for examination. At that stage, OSP denied his plea. In the case at
bench, the trial had already started and, worse, the accused’s motion for reconsideration was filed
beyond the reglementary period.

At any rate, as earlier pointed out, the denial of his motion was without prejudice as the RTC stated
that he could utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation of defense
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 26, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP No. 106247 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.