EN BANC Promulgated:

ANAK MINDANAO PARTY-LIST G.R. No. 166052 August 29, 2007

GROUP, as represented by Rep.
Mujiv S. Hataman, andMAMALO Present: x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DESCENDANTS ORGANIZATION,
INC., as represented by its
Chairman Romy Pardi,
PUNO, C.J.,
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, J.:

- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA, Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo

Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of
CARPIO MORALES, Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364 and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.
AZCUNA,

TINGA,
THE EXECUTIVE E.O. No. 364, which President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued on September
CHICO-NAZARIO, 27, 2004, reads:
SECRETARY, THE HON.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, and THE GARCIA,
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN/LAND
REFORM, THE HON. RENE C. VELASCO, JR., EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364
VILLA,
NACHURA, and
Respondents.
REYES, JJ.

1|Page
TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM
WHEREAS, one of the five reform packages of the Arroyo
administration is Social Justice and Basic [N]eeds;
WHEREAS, one of the five anti-poverty measures for social
justice is asset reform;
WHEREAS, asset reforms covers [sic] agrarian reform, urban
land reform, and ancestral domain reform;
WHEREAS, urban land reform is a concern of the Presidential
Commission [for] the Urban Poor (PCUP) and ancestral
domain reform is a concern of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP);
WHEREAS, another of the five reform packages of the Arroyo
administration is Anti-Corruption and Good Government;
WHEREAS, one of the Good Government reforms of the
Arroyo administration is rationalizing the bureaucracy by
consolidating related functions into one department;
WHEREAS, under law and jurisprudence, the President of
the Philippines has broad powers to reorganize the offices
under her supervision and control;
NOW[,] THEREFORE[,] I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by the
powers vested in me as President of the Republic of
the Philippines, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is
hereby transformed into the Department of Land Reform. It
shall be responsible for all land reform in the country, including
agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain
reform.
SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby placed under the
supervision and control of the Department of Land
Reform. The Chairman of the PCUP shall be ex-officio
Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform
for Urban Land Reform.
SECTION 3. The NCIP is hereby placed under the supervision
and control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman
of the NCIP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the
Department of Land Reform for Ancestral Domain Reform.
SECTION 4. The PCUP and the NCIP shall have access to
the services provided by the Departments Finance,
Management and Administrative Office; Policy, Planning and
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 Legal Affairs Office, Field Operations and Support Services NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
Office, and all other offices of the Department of Land Reform. President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws, do
hereby order:

SECTION 5. All previous issuances that conflict with this

Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364.
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364, dated September 27,
2004 shall now read as follows:
SECTION 6. This Executive Order takes effect immediately.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 3. The National Commission on

Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall be
E.O. No. 379, which amended E.O. No. 364 a month later or an attached agency of the Department of Land
on October 26, 2004, reads: Reform.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 379 Section 2. Compensation. The Chairperson shall suffer no
diminution in rank and salary.

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 ENTITLED

TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN Section 3. Repealing Clause. All executive issuances, rules
REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM and regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with
this Executive Order are hereby revoked, amended or
modified accordingly.

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8371 created the National

Commission on Indigenous Peoples;
Section 4. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, the

President has the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the National Government.

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Petitioners contend that the two presidential issuances are unconstitutional for and control of the DAR, and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
violating: (NCIP) under the DAR as an attached agency.

- THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF Before inquiring into the validity of the reorganization, petitioners locus
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND OF THE RULE OF standi or legal standing, inter alia,[4] becomes a preliminary question.
LAW[;]

- THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME AND POLICIES

FOR AGRARIAN REFORM, URBAN LAND REFORM, The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of respondents, concedes
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS AND ANCESTRAL that AMIN[5] has the requisite legal standing to file this suit as member[6] of
DOMAIN[; AND] Congress.

- THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE

AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS TO EFFECTIVE AND
REASONABLE PARTICIPATION IN DECISION- Petitioners find it impermissible for the Executive to intrude into the domain of
MAKING, INCLUDING THROUGH ADEQUATE the Legislature. They posit that an act of the Executive which injures the
CONSULTATION[.][1] institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress.[7] They add that to the
extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise
of the powers of that institution.[8]

By Resolution of December 6, 2005, this Court gave due course to the Petition
and required the submission of memoranda, with which petitioners and
respondents complied on March 24, 2006 and April 11, 2006, respectively. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.[9]

The issue on the transformation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

into the Department of Land Reform (DLR) became moot and academic,
however, the department having reverted to its former name by virtue of E.O. The OSG questions, however, the standing of MDOI, a registered peoples
No. 456[2] which was issued on August 23, 2005. organization of Teduray and Lambangian tribesfolk of (North) Upi and South
Upi in the province of Maguindanao.

As co-petitioner, MDOI alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of

The Court is thus left with the sole issue of the legality of placing the NCIPs becoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing of
Presidential Commission[3] for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under the supervision

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ancestral domain claims. It fears that transferring the NCIP to the DAR would
affect the processing of ancestral domain claims filed by its members.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[10]
It has been held that a party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must
have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or
is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or
that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.[11]
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must
show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action.[12]
An examination of MDOIs nebulous claims of negative impact and probable
setbacks[13] shows that they are too abstract to be considered judicially
cognizable. And the line of causation it proffers between the challenged action
and alleged injury is too attenuated.
Vague propositions that the implementation of the assailed orders will
work injustice and violate the rights of its members cannot clothe MDOI with
the requisite standing. Neither would its status as a peoples organization vest
it with the legal standing to assail the validity of the executive orders. [14]
La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,[15] which MDOI cites
in support of its claim to legal standing, is inapplicable as it is not similarly
situated with the therein petitioners who alleged personal and substantial injury
resulting from the mining activities permitted by the assailed statute. And so
is Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, [16] for the
indigenous peoples leaders and organizations were not the petitioners therein,
who necessarily had to satisfy the locus standi requirement, but were
intervenors who sought and were allowed to be impleaded, not to assail but to
defend the constitutionality of the statute.
Moreover, MDOI raises no issue of transcendental importance to justify a
relaxation of the rule on legal standing. To be accorded standing on the ground
of transcendental importance, Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita[17] requires
that the following elements must be established: (1) the public character of the
funds or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of government, and (3) the lack of any other party
with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised. The presence of these elements MDOI failed to establish, much less
allege.
Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando[18] more specifically declares that the
transcendental importance of the issues raised must relate to the merits of the
petition.
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This Court, not being a venue for the ventilation of generalized grievances,
must thus deny adjudication of the matters raised by MDOI.
Now, on AMINs position. AMIN charges the Executive Department with
transgression of the principle of separation of powers.
Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the President,
and the Judiciary may not encroach on fields allocated to each of them. The
legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the
enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to
cases and controversies.The principle presupposes mutual respect by and
between the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the government
and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. [19]
AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by
statutes,[20] they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not
by mere executive orders.
While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the
President[21] who, as Chief Executive, holds the power of control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices,[22] it posits that this broad power
of control including the power to reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot
be exercised in a manner contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty[23] of the
President to ensure that the laws, including those creating the agencies, be
faithfully executed.
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly
an extension of the President, and the creation of the NCIP as an independent
agency under the Office of the President.[24] It thus argues that since the
legislature had seen fit to create these agencies at separate times and with
distinct mandates, the President should respect that legislative disposition.
In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these administrative
agencies should be the subject of a statute.
AMINs position fails to impress.
The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control
over executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And
it lays down a limitation on the legislative power.
The line that delineates the Legislative and Executive power
is not indistinct. Legislative power is the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.The
Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The
legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of
civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In
fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends
to matters of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. The executive power is vested
6|Page
 in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the
Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole
and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that
he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising and enforcement
of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public
order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his
duties effectively.[25] (Italics omitted, underscoring supplied)
The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President
justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a
broad authority of law.[26]
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full
knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. [27] It is thus
reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under
the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and
jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature
necessarily ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of
administrative structure.Such determination is primary, [28] but subject to the
Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As
far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned,
the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a
particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad
authority to carry out reorganization measures.[29] The Administrative Code of
1987 is one such law:[30]
SEC. 30. Functions of Agencies under the Office of the
President. Agencies under the Office of the President
shall continue to operate and function in accordance with their
respective charters or laws creating them, except as
otherwise provided in this Code or by law.
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize
his Office. The President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following
actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating,
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit
to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions
to the Office of the President from other Departments and
Agencies; and
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(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to
any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies
to the Office of the President from other departments or
agencies.[31] (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is best equipped
to assess whether an executive agency ought to continue operating in
accordance with its charter or the law creating it. This is not to say that the
legislature is incapable of making a similar assessment and appropriate action
within its plenary power. The Administrative Code of 1987 merely underscores
the need to provide the President with suitable solutions to situations on hand
to meet the exigencies of the service that may call for the exercise of the power
of control.
x x x The law grants the President this power in recognition
of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his
office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The
Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive
Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the
President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by
the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is
the command post of the President. This is the rationale
behind the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.[32]
The Office of the President consists of the Office of the President proper and
the agencies under it.[33] It is not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were formed
as agencies under the Office of the President.[34] The Agencies under the
Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of
the President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those
under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those
attached to the Office for policy and program coordination, and those that are
not placed by law or order creating them under any special department.[35]
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the
Office of the President to any other department or agency, subject to the policy
in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. Gauged against these guidelines,[36] the challenged executive
orders may not be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion or
in violation of the rule of law.
The references in E.O. 364 to asset reform as an anti-poverty measure for
social justice and to rationalization of the bureaucracy in furtherance of good
government[37] encapsulate a portion of the existing policy in the Executive
Office. As averred by the OSG, the President saw it fit to streamline the
agencies so as not to hinder the delivery of crucial social reforms.[38]
The consolidation of functions in E.O. 364 aims to attain the objectives of
simplicity, economy and efficiency as gathered from the provision granting
PCUP and NCIP access to the range of services provided by the DARs
technical offices and support systems.[39]
The characterization of the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office
of the President does not remove said body from the Presidents control and
supervision with respect to its performance of administrative functions. So it
has been opined:
8|Page

That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the
control of the President in all instances is evident in the IPRA
itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be appealable to
the Court of Appeals, like those of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the
NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed
by Congress under the office of the President and, as such,
is still subject to the Presidents power of control and
supervision granted under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution with respect to its performance of administrative
functions[.][40] (Underscoring supplied)
In transferring the NCIP to the DAR as an attached agency, the President
effectively tempered the exercise of presidential authority and considerably
recognized that degree of independence.
The Administrative Code of 1987 categorizes administrative relationships into
(1) supervision and control, (2) administrative supervision, and (3)
attachment.[41]With respect to the third category, it has been held that an
attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department
to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and
control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the lateral
relationship between the Department and the attached agency. The
attachment is merely for policy and program coordination.[42] Indeed, the
essential autonomous character of a board is not negated by its attachment to
a commission.[43]
AMIN argues, however, that there is an anachronism of sorts because there
can be no policy and program coordination between conceptually different
areas of reform.It claims that the new framework subsuming agrarian reform,
urban land reform and ancestral domain reform is fundamentally incoherent in
view of the widely different contexts.[44] And it posits that it is a substantive
transformation or reorientation that runs contrary to the constitutional scheme
and policies.
AMIN goes on to proffer the concept of ordering the law[45] which, so it alleges,
can be said of the Constitutions distinct treatment of these three areas, as
reflected in separate provisions in different parts of the Constitution. [46] It
argues that the Constitution did not intend an over-arching concept of agrarian
reform to encompass the two other areas, and that how the law is ordered in
a certain way should not be undermined by mere executive orders in the guise
of administrative efficiency.
The Court is not persuaded.
The interplay of various areas of reform in the promotion of social justice is not
something implausible or unlikely.[47] Their interlocking nature cuts across
labels and works against a rigid pigeonholing of executive tasks among the
members of the Presidents official family. Notably, the Constitution inhibited
from identifying and compartmentalizing the composition of the Cabinet. In
vesting executive power in one person rather than in a plural executive, the
evident intention was to invest the power holder with energy. [48]
AMIN takes premium on the severed treatment of these reform areas in
marked provisions of the Constitution. It is a precept, however, that inferences
drawn from title, chapter or section headings are entitled to very little
9|Page
weight.[49] And so must reliance on sub-headings,[50] or the lack thereof, to
support a strained deduction be given the weight of helium.
Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create
doubt.[51] AMINs thesis unsettles, more than settles the order of things in
construing the Constitution. Its interpretation fails to clearly establish that the
so-called ordering or arrangement of provisions in the Constitution was
consciously adopted to imply a signification in terms of government hierarchy
from where a constitutional mandate can per se be derived or asserted. It fails
to demonstrate that the ordering or layout was not simply a matter of style in
constitutional drafting but one of intention in government structuring. With its
inherent ambiguity, the proposed interpretation cannot be made a basis for
declaring a law or governmental act unconstitutional.
A law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For it to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt.[52] Any reasonable doubt should, following the universal rule of legal
hermeneutics, be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law. [53]
Ople v. Torres[54] on which AMIN relies is unavailing. In that case, an
administrative order involved a system of identification that required a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies properly lodged in the
legislative arena. It was declared unconstitutional for dealing with a subject
that should be covered by law and for violating the right to privacy.
In the present case, AMIN glaringly failed to show how the reorganization by
executive fiat would hamper the exercise of citizens rights and privileges. It
rested on the ambiguous conclusion that the reorganization jeopardizes
economic, social and cultural rights. It intimated, without expounding, that the
agendum behind the issuances is to weaken the indigenous peoples rights in
favor of the mining industry. And it raised concerns about the possible
retrogression in DARs performance as the added workload may impede the
implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform program.
AMIN has not shown, however, that by placing the NCIP as an attached
agency of the DAR, the President altered the nature and dynamics of the
jurisdiction and adjudicatory functions of the NCIP concerning all claims and
disputes involving rights of indigenous cultural communities and
indigenous peoples. Nor has it been shown, nay alleged, that the
reorganization was made in bad faith.[55]
As for the other arguments raised by AMIN which pertain to the wisdom or
soundness of the executive decision, the Court finds it unnecessary to pass
upon them. The raging debate on the most fitting framework in the delivery of
social services is endless in the political arena. It is not the business of this
Court to join in the fray.Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving
political questions and, as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of
speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and cases that have
become moot.[56]
Finally, a word on the last ground proffered for declaring the unconstitutionality
of the assailed issuances ─ that they violate Section 16, Article XIII of the
Constitution[57] on the peoples right to participate in decision-making through
adequate consultation mechanisms.
The framers of the Constitution recognized that the consultation
mechanisms were already operating without the States action by law, such
that the role of the State would be mere facilitation, not necessarily creation of
these consultation mechanisms. The State provides the support, but
eventually it is the people, properly organized in their associations, who can
assert the right and pursue the objective. Penalty for failure on the part of the
10 | P a g e
government to consult could only be reflected in the ballot box and would not
nullify government action.[58]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Executive Order Nos. 364 and
379 issued on September 27, 2004 and October 26, 2004, respectively, are
declared not unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152845. August 5, 2003]
DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY TAGABAN,
RICARDO SARANDI, SUSAN IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN DEMDEM,
RODOLFO DAGA, EDGARDO BACLIG, GREGORIO LABAYAN,
HILARIO JEREZ, and MARIA CORAZON
CUANANG, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION, represented by ANTONIO DE GUZMAN and
PERLITA BAULA, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
President Joseph Estrada issued on 30 September 1998 Executive Order
No. 29, entitled Mandating the Streamlining of the National Tobacco
Administration (NTA), a government agency under the Department of
Agriculture. The order was followed by another issuance, on 27 October 1998,
by President Estrada of Executive Order No. 36, amending Executive Order
No. 29, insofar as the new staffing pattern was concerned, by increasing from
four hundred (400) to not exceeding seven hundred fifty (750) the positions
affected thereby. In compliance therewith, the NTA prepared and adopted a
new Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP) which, on 29 October
1998, was submitted to the Office of the President.
On 11 November 1998, the rank and file employees of NTA Batac, among
whom included herein petitioners, filed a letter-appeal with the Civil Service
Commission and sought its assistance in recalling the OSSP. On 04
December 1998, the OSSP was approved by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) subject to certain revisions.On even date, the NTA
created a placement committee to assist the appointing authority in the
selection and placement of permanent personnel in the revised OSSP. The
results of the evaluation by the committee on the individual qualifications of
applicants to the positions in the new OSSP were then disseminated and
posted at the central and provincial offices of the NTA.
On 10 June 1996, petitioners, all occupying different positions at the NTA
office in Batac, Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of termination of their
employment with the NTA effective thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof. Finding themselves without any immediate relief from their dismissal
from the service, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batac,
Ilocos Norte, and prayed -
1) that a restraining order be immediately issued enjoining the respondents
from enforcing the notice of termination addressed individually to the
petitioners and/or from committing further acts of dispossession and/or
ousting the petitioners from their respective offices;
2) that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the respondents,
commanding them to maintain the status quo to protect the rights of the
petitioners pending the determination of the validity of the implementation of
their dismissal from the service; and
3) that, after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered declaring the notice of
termination of the petitioners illegal and the reorganization null and void and
ordering their reinstatement with backwages, if applicable, commanding the
11 | P a g e
respondents to desist from further terminating their services, and making the
injunction permanent.[1]
The RTC, on 09 September 2000, ordered the NTA to appoint petitioners
in the new OSSP to positions similar or comparable to their respective former
assignments. A motion for reconsideration filed by the NTA was denied by the
trial court in its order of 28 February 2001. Thereupon, the NTA filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not respondents submitted evidence as proof that
petitioners, individually, were not the best qualified and most
deserving among the incumbent applicant-employees.
II. Whether or not incumbent permanent employees, including
herein petitioners, automatically enjoy a preferential right
and the right of first refusal to appointments/reappointments
in the new Organization Structure And Staffing Pattern
(OSSP) of respondent NTA.
III. Whether or not respondent NTA in implementing the mandated
reorganization pursuant to E.O. No. 29, as amended by E.O.
No. 36, strictly adhere to the implementing rules on
reorganization, particularly RA 6656 and of the Civil Service
Commission Rules on Government Reorganization.
IV. Whether or not the validity of E.O. Nos. 29 and 36 can be put in
issue in the instant case/appeal.[2]
On 20 February 2002, the appellate court rendered a decision reversing and
setting aside the assailed orders of the trial court.
Petitioners went to this Court to assail the decision of the Court of
Appeals, contending that -
I. The Court of Appeals erred in making a finding that went beyond
the issues of the case and which are contrary to those of the
trial court and that it overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion;
II. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding Executive Order Nos.
29 and 36 of the Office of the President which are mere
administrative issuances which do not have the force and
effect of a law to warrant abolition of positions and/or
effecting total reorganization;
III. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners removal
from the service is in accordance with law;
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent NTA was
not guilty of bad faith in the termination of the services of
petitioners; (and)
V. The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring case law/jurisprudence in
the abolition of an office.[3]
In its resolution of 10 July 2002, the Court required the NTA to file its comment
on the petition. On 18 November 2002, after the NTA had filed its comment of
23 September 2002, the Court issued its resolution denying the petition for
failure of petitioners to sufficiently show any reversible error on the part of the
appellate court in its challenged decision so as to warrant the exercise by this
Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. A motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners was denied in the Courts resolution of 20 January 2002.
On 21 February 2003, petitioners submitted a Motion to Admit Petition
For En Banc Resolution of the case allegedly to address a basic question, i.e.,
the legal and constitutional issue on whether the NTA may be reorganized by
an executive fiat, not by legislative action.[4] In their Petition for an En
Banc Resolution petitioners would have it that -
1. The Court of Appeals decision upholding the reorganization of the National
Tobacco Administration sets a dangerous precedent in that:
a) A mere Executive Order issued by the Office of the President and
procured by a government functionary would have the effect of a blanket
authority to reorganize a bureau, office or agency attached to the various
executive departments;
12 | P a g e
b) The President of the Philippines would have the plenary power to
reorganize the entire government Bureaucracy through the issuance of an
Executive Order, an administrative issuance without the benefit of due
deliberation, debate and discussion of members of both chambers of the
Congress of the Philippines;
c) The right to security of tenure to a career position created by law or statute
would be defeated by the mere adoption of an Organizational Structure and
Staffing Pattern issued pursuant to an Executive Order which is not a law
and could thus not abolish an office created by law;
2. The case law on abolition of an office would be disregarded, ignored and
abandoned if the Court of Appeals decision subject matter of this Petition
would remain undisturbed and untouched.In other words, previous doctrines
and precedents of this Highest Court would in effect be reversed and/or
modified with the Court of Appeals judgment, should it remain unchallenged.
3. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 245 dated July 24, 1987 (Annex D,
Petition), issued by the Revolutionary government of former President
Corazon Aquino, and the law creating NTA, which provides that the
governing body of NTA is the Board of Directors, would be rendered
meaningless, ineffective and a dead letter law because the challenged NTA
reorganization which was erroneously upheld by the Court of Appeals was
adopted and implemented by then NTA Administrator Antonio de Guzman
without the corresponding authority from the Board of Directors as mandated
therein. In brief, the reorganization is an ultra vires act of the NTA
Administrator.
4. The challenged Executive Order No. 29 issued by former President
Joseph Estrada but unsigned by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
would in effect be erroneously upheld and given legal effect as to supersede,
amend and/or modify Executive Order No. 245, a law issued during the
Freedom Constitution of President Corazon Aquino. In brief, a mere
executive order would amend, supersede and/or render ineffective a law or
statute.[5]
In order to allow the parties a full opportunity to ventilate their views on
the matter, the Court ultimately resolved to hear the parties in oral
argument. Essentially, the core question raised by them is whether or not the
President, through the issuance of an executive order, can validly carry out the
reorganization of the NTA.
Notwithstanding the apparent procedural lapse on the part of petitioner to
implead the Office of the President as party respondent pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 3, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, [6] this Court resolved to
rule on the merits of the petition.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora[7] ruled that the President, based
on existing laws, had the authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch
or agency of the executive department. In said case, Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB challenged the issuance, and sought the nullification, of Executive Order
No. 191 (Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau)
and Executive Order No. 223 (Supplementary Executive Order No. 191 on the
Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau and for
Other Matters) on the ground that they were issued by the President with grave
abuse of discretion and in violation of their constitutional right to security of
tenure. The Court explained:
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is
lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the
power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either
created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except
where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by
the same legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department are concerned, the Presidents power of control may
justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may
grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The case
in point is Larin v. Executive Secretary [280 SCRA 713]. In this case, it was
argued that there is no law which empowers the President to reorganize the
BIR. In decreeing otherwise, this Court sustained the following legal basis,
thus:
`Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President to
issue E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize the BIR.
`We do not agree.
13 | P a g e
 `x x x x x x
`Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
``Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the
Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and
agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are
no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may
be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and
regulations. x x x.Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the
activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President.
`Said provision clearly mentions the acts of `scaling down, phasing out and
abolition of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer
of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included
in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which provides that:
``Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. Unless otherwise created
by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit
or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized
in their respective organization structures and be funded from appropriations
by this Act.
`The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to
effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the
department or agency concerned.
`x x x x x x
`Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292
which states:
``Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not
specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law.
`This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under
the law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential
Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These
decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to
standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees are
unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that `all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letter of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked. So far, there is yet no law
amending or repealing said decrees.
Now, let us take a look at the assailed executive order.
In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored
his authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745 (FY 1999
General Appropriations Act), a provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645
quoted in Larin, thus:
`Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed
by the President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or
organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their
respective organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided
by this Act.
We adhere to the x x x ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the
authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the department
or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in
Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the
Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of this
respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects,
activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which are no
longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled
down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the
streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their
respective agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual
14 | P a g e
streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization and
operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President. The law has spoken clearly. We are
left only with the duty to sustain.
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize
any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end
here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which
constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado vs.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312], we ruled that reorganization involves the reduction
of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The
EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the
Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize.
It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry
out reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department,
what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is
valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in
`good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances
which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil
service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there
is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern
of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and
another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where
incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of
offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices
perform substantially the same functions as the original offices,
and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.[8]
The Court of Appeals, in its now assailed decision, has found no evidence
of bad faith on the part of the NTA; thus -
In the case at bar, we find no evidence that the respondents committed bad
faith in issuing the notices of non-appointment to the petitioners.
Firstly, the number of positions in the new staffing pattern did not
increase. Rather, it decreased from 1,125 positions to 750. It is thus natural
that ones position may be lost through the removal or abolition of an office.
Secondly, the petitioners failed to specifically show which offices were
abolished and the new ones that were created performing substantially the
same functions.
Thirdly, the petitioners likewise failed to prove that less qualified employees
were appointed to the positions to which they applied.
x x x x x x x x x.
Fourthly, the preference stated in Section 4 of R.A. 6656, only means that old
employees should be considered first, but it does not necessarily follow that
they should then automatically be appointed. This is because the law does
not preclude the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or necessary
talents into the government service, provided that the acts of the appointing
power are bonafide for the best interest of the public service and the person
chosen has the needed qualifications.[9]
These findings of the appellate court are basically factual which this Court must
respect and be held bound.
It is important to emphasize that the questioned Executive Orders
No. 29 and No. 36 have not abolished the National Tobacco
Administration but merely mandated its reorganization through the
streamlining or reduction of its personnel. Article VII, Section 17,[10] of the
Constitution, expressly grants the President control of all executive
departments, bureaus, agencies and offices which may justify an executive
15 | P a g e
action to inactivate the functions of a particular office or to carry out
reorganization measures under a broad authority of law. [11] Section 78 of the
General Provisions of Republic Act No. 8522 (General Appropriations Act of
FY 1998) has decreed that the President may direct changes in the
organization and key positions in any department, bureau or agency pursuant
to Article VI, Section 25,[12] of the Constitution, which grants to the Executive
Department the authority to recommend the budget necessary for its
operation. Evidently, this grant of power includes the authority to evaluate
each and every government agency, including the determination of the most
economical and efficient staffing pattern, under the Executive Department.
In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo D.
Zamora, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, et al.,[13] this Court has
had occasion to also delve on the Presidents power to reorganize the Office
of the President under Section 31(2) and (3) of Executive Order No. 292 and
the power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. The Court has
there observed:
x x x. Under Section 31(1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the
Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units,
or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under
Section 31(2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to reorganize offices
outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the
Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
The provisions of Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10, of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987), above-referred to, reads thusly:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other departments and agencies.
The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of
a continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the
nature of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to the
President of the power to reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance
therewith. Section 31(1) of Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the
Presidents power to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units hereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another, while Section 31(2) and (3)
concern executive offices outside the Office of the President Proper allowing
the President to transfer any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency
under the Office of the President to any other department or agency and vice-
versa.[14]
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of
offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general
provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest
of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of
President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate
court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but
accept.[15]
In passing, relative to petitioners Motion for an En Banc Resolution of the
Case, it may be well to remind counsel, that the Court En Banc is not an
appellate tribunal to which appeals from a Division of the Court may be
taken. A Division of the Court is the Supreme Court as fully and veritably as
the Court En Banc itself and a decision of its Division is as authoritative and
final as a decision of the Court En Banc. Referrals of cases from a Division to
the Court En Banc do not take place as just a matter of routine but only on
such specified grounds as the Court in its discretion may allow.[16]
16 | P a g e
 WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and
the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry
of judgment be made in due course. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993.
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and VIOLETA L. GARCIA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Raul R. Estrella for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 649; REORGANIZED
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION TO NALTDRA; EXPRESSLY
PROVIDED THE ABOLITION OF EXISTING POSITIONS. — Executive
Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the now defunct
LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the
NALTDRA. The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of
legislative intent about which there can be no controversy whatsoever if there
is an explicit declaration in the law itself. A closer examination of Executive
Order No. 649 which authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in express terms, provided
for the abolition of existing positions. Thus, without need of any
interpretation, the law mandates that from the moment an implementing
order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration Commission are
deemed non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a
position does not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal
implies that the post subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom.
(Arao vs. Luspo, 20 SCRA 722 [1967]) After abolition, there is in law no
occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise. (De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 [1982])
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION, VALID WHEN PURSUED IN GOOD
FAITH; CASE AT BAR. — Nothing is better settled in our law than that the
abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in
good faith suffers from no infirmity. Two questions therefore arise: (1) was
the abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in good
faith? There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid
reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government. Under Section 9,
Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution. The power to reorganize is, however;
not absolute. We have held in Dario vs. Mison that reorganizations in this
jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith. This court has pronounced that if the newly created office has
substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it
may be said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even
though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be
considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different
one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of
economy are given to an existing officer or office. Executive Order No. 649
was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the operation of
the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is carried out in good
faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key
17 | P a g e
positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances
and new development of the times. Private respondent Garcia who formerly
held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such
qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the
NALTDRA, The additional qualification was not intended to remove her from
office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid
reorganization measure.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS NO VESTED PROPERTY RIGHT TO BE RE-
EMPLOYED IN A REORGANIZED OFFICE; CASE AT BAR. — There is no
such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute
right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary. None of the exceptions to this rule are
obtaining in this case. To reiterate, the position which private respondent
Garcia would like to occupy anew was abolished pursuant to Executive Order
No. 649, a valid reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to
be re employed in a reorganized office. Not being a member of the Bar, the
minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for permanent
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her
former position without violating the express mandate of the law.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether or not
membership in the bar, which is the qualification requirement prescribed for
appointment to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission
(LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or
NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied only to new applicants and
not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy register of
deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the abovesaid
Executive Order.
The facts, as succinctly stated in the Resolution ** of the Civil Service
Commission, are as follows:
"The records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws
graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy
Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later
reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which
position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent status up to
September 1984. She was for two years, more or less, designated as Acting
Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive
Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which authorized the
restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the
Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy
Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not
being a member of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of
Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for
reconsideration but her motion remained unacted. On October 23, 1984,
petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending decision, her
temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum
dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified
petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of
Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Said
Memorandum of Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the
subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn
referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
In its Order dated July 6, 1987, the MSPB dropped the appeal of petitioner
Garcia on the ground that since the termination of her services was due to
the expiration of her temporary appointment, her separation is in order. Her
motion for reconsideration was denied on similar ground." 1
However, in its Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988, the Civil Service
Commission directed that private respondent Garcia be restored to her
position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. It
held that "under the vested right theory the new requirement of BAR
membership to qualify for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of
Deeds II or higher as mandated under said Executive Order, would not apply
to her (private respondent Garcia) but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer
positions on or after February 9, 1981, the date said Executive Order took
effect." 3 A fortiori, since private respondent Garcia had been holding the
18 | P a g e
position of Deputy Register of Deeds II from 1977 to September 1984, she
should not be affected by the operation on February 1, 1981 of Executive
Order No. 649.
Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the
above Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. It contends that Sections
8 and 10 of Executive Order No. 649 abolished all existing positions in the
LRC and transferred their functions to the appropriate new offices created by
said Executive Order, which newly created offices required the issuance of
new appointments to qualified office holders. Verily, Executive Order No. 649
applies to private respondent Garcia, and not being a member of the Bar,
she cannot be reinstated to her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds
II.
We find merit in the petition.
Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the
now defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all
employees of the NALTDRA.
The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of legislative
intent about which there can be no controversy whatsoever if there is an
explicit declaration in the law itself. 4 A closer examination of Executive
Order No. 649 which authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in express terms, provided
for the abolition of existing positions, to wit:
Sec. 8. Abolition of Existing Positions in the Land Registration Commission . .
. different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the
All structural units in the Land Registration Commission and in the registries
of deeds, and all Positions therein shall cease to exist from the date specified
in the implementing order to be issued by the President pursuant to the
preceding paragraph. Their pertinent functions, applicable appropriations,
records, equipment and property shall be transferred to the appropriate staff
or offices therein created. (Emphasis Supplied.)
Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law mandates that from the
moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land
Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. This, however, does not
mean removal. Abolition of a position does not involve or mean removal for
the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely
separated therefrom. 5 After abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus,
there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from the standpoint
of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not
arise. 6
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within
the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. Two questions therefore arise: (1) was the abolition carried out by a
legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in good faith?
There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid reorganization in
any branch or agency of the Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII of the
1973 Constitution, the applicable law at that time:
Sec. 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the
Republic of the Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
law or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials
whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister
shall vacate their respective offices upon the appointment and qualifications
of their successors.
The power to reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held in Dario vs.
Mison 7 that reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. This court has pronounced 8 that if
the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional
functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office
duties of the old office it will be considered as an abolition of one office and
the creation of a new or different one. The same is true if one office is
abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing
officer or office.
Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better
systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. 9 A
19 | P a g e
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy
or to make bureaucracy more efficient. 10 To this end, the requirement of Bar
membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to G.R. No. 101251 November 5, 1992
meet the changing circumstances and new development of the times. 11
Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register ELISEO A. SINON, petitioner,
of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot vs.
hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The additional qualification was not CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-
intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed REORGANIZATION APPEALS BOARD AND JUANA
concomitant with a valid reorganization measure. BANAN, respondents.

A final word, on the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent Civil

Service Commission. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate
in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices CAMPOS, JR., J.:
which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the following Resolutions of the
be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. 12 None of the
public respondents Civil Service Commission (the "CSC") * and Department
exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case.
of Agriculture Reorganization Appeals Board (the "DARAB"), ** to wit:
To reiterate, the position which private respondent Garcia would like to
occupy anew was abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid 1. Resolution No. 97 dated August 23, 1989, issued by
reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to be re employed respondent DARAB which revoked petitioner's permanent
in a reorganized office. Not being a member of the Bar, the minimum appointment as Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO) and
requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for permanent appointed, in his stead, private respondent Juana Banan
(Rollo 17);
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her
former position without violating the express mandate of the law.
2. Resolution dated February 8, 1991 issued by the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby GRANT the petition and respondent CSC affirming the aforementioned Resolution of
respondent DARAB (Rollo 22);
SET ASIDE the questioned Resolution of the Civil Service Commission
reinstating private respondent to her former position as Deputy Register of
3. Resolution dated July 11, 1991 issued by the respondent
Deeds II or its equivalent in the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
CSC which denied petitioner's motion for the reconsideration
Administration.
of the respondent Commission's Resolution dated February
SO ORDERED. 8, 1991. 1

Republic of the Philippines The antecedent facts are as follows:

SUPREME COURT
Prior to the reorganization of the then Minister of Agriculture and Food (the
Manila
"MAF"), the private respondent Juana Banan was the incumbent Municipal
EN BANC Agricultural Officer (MAO) of the aforesaid Minister in Region II, Cagayan,
while the petitioner Eliseo Sinon occupied the position of Fisheries Extension

20 | P a g e
Specialist (FES) II in the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) 16. Callangan, Napoleon 65.45%
in the same region.
17. Fiesta, Felicisimo 65.29%
However, the reorganization of the MAF into the Department of Agriculture
(the "DA"), with the issuance of Executive Order No. 116 dated 30 January 18. Alvarez, Benefranco 64.99%
1987, called for the evaluation of the following employees for twenty nine
position of MAO in Region II, Cagayan. The list as prepared by the 19. Baggayan, Samuel O. 64.42%
Placement Committee included the herein petitioner Sinon but excluded the
respondent Banan: 20. Umbay, Pedro T. 64.01%

1. Binoya, Vicente 76.20% 21. De la Cruz, Florencio M. 62.07%

2. Cabana, Isidro 75.01% 22. Leonador, Ernesto T. 61.88%

3. Sebastian, Alice 74.18% 23. Miguel, Jose 61.86%

4. Zingapan, Benjamin 70.73% 24. Berlan, Herminia C. 61.76%

5. Guzman, Wilhemina de la P. 70.50% 25. Soliman, Clemente 61.52%

6. Gervacio, Agnes 69.86% 26. Llopis, Lino 61.47%

7. Somera, Hilario S. 68.13% 27. Baliuag, Felicidad 61.39%

8. Tolentino, Julian R. 67.64% 28. Aresta, Leticia 60.67%

9. Guillermo, Pedro 67.22% 29. Sinon, Eliseo A. 60.66% 2

10. Tambio, Rodolfo 67.00% (Emphasis supplied)

11. Aquino, Martina 66.94% Thus, respondents Banan filed an appeal with the DARAB for re-evaluation
of the qualification of all those included in the aforementioned list made by
12. Bassig, Pio P. 66.84% the Placement Committee.

13. Rumpon, Danilo P. 65.61% On August 23, 1989, the DARAB released Resolution No. 97 in which the
ranking for 29 MAO prepared by the Placement Committee was re-evaluated
14. Zareno, Bernardo 65.57% as follows:

15. Madrid, Angel S. 65.57% 1. Binoya, Vicente 76.20%

21 | P a g e
2. Cabana, Isidro 75.01%
3. Sebastian, Alice 72.18%
4. Zingapan, Benjamin 70.73%
5. Guzman, Wilhemina de la P. 70.50%
6. Gervacio, Agnes 70.04%
7. Somera, Hilario S. 68.13%
8. Tolentino, Julian Jr. 67.22%
9. Guillermo, Pedro 67.22%
10. Tambio, Rodolfo 67.00%
11. Aquino, Martina D. 66.94%
12. Bassig, Pio P. 66.84%
13. Rumpon, Danilo P. 65.61%
14. Madrid, Angel 65.57%
15. Callangan, Napoleon 65.45%
16. Fiesta, Felicisimo 65.29%
17. Alvarez, Benefranco 64.99%
18. Baggayan, Samuel O. 64.42%
19. Umbay, Pedro T. 64.01%
20. De la Cruz, Florencio M. 62.07%
21. Leonador, Ernesto T. 61.88%
22. Miguel, Jose L. 61.86%
23. Berlan, Herminia C. 61.76%
24. Soliman, Clemente 61.52%
25. Zareno, Bernardo 61.50%
26. Llopis, Lino 61.47%
27. Baliuag, Felicidad 61.39%
28. Aresta, Leticia 60.67%
29. Banan, Juana 59.32% 2
(Emphasis supplied)
In this re-evaluation, petitioner Sinon was displaced by the respondent
Banan and this same resolution was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture, Carlos G. Dominguez, who also affixed his
signature on the same date.
However, on August 30, 1988, Sinon received an appointment as MAO for
Region II in Cagayan as approved by Regional Director Gumersindo D.
Lasam on the basis of the first evaluation made by the Placement
Committee.
Thus, Sinon filed an appeal docketed as Civil Service Case No. 573 on
November 22, 1989 to the CSC. This appeal was granted mainly for two
reasons: first, the respondent DARAB failed to file its Comment within the
period required; and second, the evaluation of the qualification of the
employees is a question of fact which the appointing authority or the
Placement Committee assisting him is in a better position to determine.
Hence, the Resolution dated 28 February 1989 of the DARAB was set
aside. 4
On March 19, 1990, Banan filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which she
pitted her qualifications against Sinon for the last slot in the 29 available
22 | P a g e
MAO positions. At the same time, she pointed out that to allow the findings of
the Placement Committee to supersede the DARAB resolution which the
Secretary of Agriculture had approved would be tantamount to giving
precedence to the Placement Committee over the head of the agency.
Finally, on February 8, 1991, CSC, after reviewing the Comment filed by the
DARAB which had not been considered earlier in the Civil Service Case No.
573, the CSC granted respondent Banan's Motion for Reconsideration and
gave due course to her appointment by the DARAB.
On March 21, 1991, Sinon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the February
8, 1991 Resolution which however was denied by the CSC in its assailed
Resolution dated July 11, 1991.
According to the respondent CSC:
Mr. Sinon strongly argued that the findings of the Placement
Committee on the qualifications of the parties should be
accorded deference and greater weight over that of the RAB.
Under the Placement Committee's evaluation, Mr. Sinon
garnered 60.66 while Ms. Juana Banan earned 57.32 after
assessing the contending parties qualification in education,
relevant experience, eligibility and other factors. Following
the request of several parties for reevaluation, the RAB in
their decision gave Mr. Sinon 57.66 while Ms. Banan
obtained 59.32. Seemingly the findings of the two bodies are
in conflict. Mr. Sinon argues that the findings of the
Placement Committee should prevail since it is specially
mandated by RA 6656.
We disagree. The Placement Committee's function is recommendatory in
nature. The agency's Reorganization Appeals Board was specially created
by the Circular of the Office of the President dated October 2, 1987 and
conferred with authority to review appeals and complaints of officials and
employees affected by the reorganization. the decision of the agency RAB
has the imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and is therefore
controlling in matters of and is therefore controlling in matters of
appointment. Under this principle, the decision of the DARAB in this case
enjoys precedence over the Placement Committee. 5
Hence, this petition was filed with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order to enjoin the execution of the assailed resolutions.
Without giving due course to the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction,
the court required the parties to file their respective Comments. 6
On 12 November 1991, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. 7
The main issue for Our consideration is this: whether or not the CSC
committed grave abuse discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the ring or
qualification of the petitioner Sinon.
The arguments of the petitioner can be summed up as follows:
1). In issuing the Resolution of 8 February 1991, the CSC in
effect revoked the appointment that the petitioner received
as early as 30 August 1989 and which was deemed
permanent by virtue of the approval of the Regional Director
of the Department of Agriculture:
2). In giving petitioner a rating of only 57.66%, 8 from his
previous rating of 60.66% and at the same time according a
rating of 59.32% to private respondent from a rating of only
57.32%, the CSC departed from its power which is limited
only to that of "review", and hence encroached upon the
power of appointment exclusively lodged in the appointment
authority;
3) In giving due course to the appointment of respondent
Banan in its Resolution of 8 February 1991, CSC was
directing the appointment of a substitute of their own choice
when the power to appoint was exclusively lodged in the
appointing authority.
We rule as follows.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
23 | P a g e
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.9
Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, We do not find any evidence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC when it issued Resolution
dated 8 February 1991 which in effect approved the appointment of
respondent Banan over petitioner Sinon.
With the reorganization of the MAF into the DA with Executive order No. 116,
it became imperative to "protect the security of tenure of Civil Service
Officers and employees in the implementation of government
reorganization". Thus, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6656. 10
It was under the same law of R.A. 6656 that the Placement Committee was
created:
Section 6. In order that the best qualified and mot deserving
persons shall be appointed in any reorganization, there shall
be created a Placement Committee in each department or
agency to assist the appointing authority in the judicious
selection and placement of personnel. The Committee shall
consist of two (2) members appointed by the head of the
department or agency, a representative of the appointing
authority, and two (2) members duly elected by the
employees holding positions in the first and second levels of
the career service: Provided, that if there is a registered
employee association with a majority of the employees as
members, that employee association shall also have a
representative in the Committee: Provided, Further, that
immediately upon the approval of the staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned, such staffing pattern shall
be made known to all officers and employees of the agency
who shall be invited to apply for any of the positions
authorized therein. Such application shall be considered by
the committee in the placement and selection of personnel.
(Emphasis supplied).
To "assist" mean to lend an aid to, 11 or to contribute effort in the complete
accomplishment of an ultimate purpose intended to be effected by those
engaged. 12
In contrast, to "recommend" 13 is to present one's advice or choice as having
one's approval or to represent or urge as advisable or expedient. It involves
the Idea that another has the final decision.
Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with the duty of exercising
the same discretionary functions as the appointing authority in the judicious
selection and placement of personnel when the law empowered it to "assist"
the appointment authority.
The same law also allows any officer or employee aggrieved by the
appointments to file an appeal with the appointing authority who shall made a
decision within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. If the same employee is
still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing authority, he may further
appeal within ten (10) days from the receipt thereof the CSC. 14
In the case at bar, the Circular dated October 2, 1987 of the Office of the
President created the agency Reorganization Appeals Board to address the
problem of the employees affected by the reorganizations.
The foregoing legal measures spell out the remedies of aggrieved parties
which make it impossible to give the status of finality to any appointment until
all protests or oppositions are duly heard.
Thus, while it is true that the appointment paper received by petitioner Sinon
on 30 August 1989 for the position of MAO had not conferred any permanent
status and was still subject to the following conditions attached to any
appointment in the civil service:
Provided that there is no pending administrative case
against the appointee, no pending protest against the
appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that
will adversely affect the approval of the appointment . 15
Hence, for as long as the re-evaluation of the qualification filed by Banan was
pending, the petitioner cannot claim that he had been issued with a
24 | P a g e
"complete" appointment. Neither is there any point in asserting that his
appointment had "cured" whatever changes was subsequently
recommended by the DARAB. 16
The fact that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the findings of the
Placement Committed only to find that Sinon is not qualified should no be
taken as a grave abuse of discretion.
It must be recalled that the whole purpose of reorganization is that is it is a
"process of restructuring the bureaucracy's organizational and functional set-
up, to make it more viable in terms of the economy, efficiency, effectiveness
and make it more responsive to the needs of its public clientele as authorized
by law." 20 For as long as the CSC confines itself within the limits set out by
law and does not encroach upon the prerogatives endowed to other
authorities, this Court must sustain the Commission.

We cannot subscribe to petitioner Sinon's insistence that the public
respondent CSC had disregarded the findings of the Placement Committee.
The truth is, these findings of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these
findings were re-evaluated and the report after such re-evaluation was
submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture. The CSC affirmed
the findings of the DARAB.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Nocon
and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Because of all the foregoing circumstances, the jurisprudence cited by the Narvasa, C.J. and Medialdea, JJ., is on leave.
petitioner Sinon appears to be incorrect. 17
Bidin, concur in the result.
Neither do we find in the Resolution of 8 February 1991, any statement by
the CSC directing the appointment of the respondent Banan. Hence, there
was no directive from the CSC that may be misinterpreted as a usurpation of
any appointing power. 18 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Besides, in affirming the appointment of Banan as recommended by the Manila
DARAB and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, the CSC is only being
consistent with the law. Section 4 or R.A. 6656 mandates that officers and EN BANC
employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for
appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable G.R. No. 93355 April 7, 1992
to their former positions. Also, the term incumbent officer and the privileges
LUIS B. DOMINGO, petitioner,
generally accorded to them would more aptly refer to Banan and not to
vs.
petitioner Sinon whose appointment was never confirmed
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and CIVIL SERVICE
completely. 19 There is no dispute that the position of MAO in the old staffing
COMMISSION, respondents.
pattern is most comparable to the MAO in the new staffing pattern.

Finally, the Solicitor General in behalf of the CSC correctly noted that the
petitioner Sinon had conveniently omitted the then Secretary of Agriculture
REGALADO, J.:
who had affixed his approval on the findings of the DARAB. Petitioner Sinon
knew fully well that as head of the agency, the Secretary of Agriculture was This special civil action impugns the resolution 1 of respondent Civil Service
the appointing authority. Commission (CSC) promulgated on April 10, 1990 in CSC Case No. 473
25 | P a g e
setting aside its earlier resolution of November 27, 1989 and affirming the
separation of petitioner Luis B. Domingo as Senior Training and Career
Development Officer of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and Career
Development Officer on permanent status from February, 1979 to December
1986.
On December 3, 1986, Executive Order No 81 (The Revised Charter of DBP)
was passed authorizing the reorganization of DBP in this wise:
Sec. 32. Authority to Reorganize. — In view of the new
scope of operations of the Bank, a reorganization of the
Bank and a reduction in force are hereby authorized to
achieve simplicity and economy in operations, including
adopting a new staffing pattern to suit the reduced
operations envisioned. The formulation of the program of
reorganization shall be completed within six months after the
approval of this Charter, and the full implementation of the
reorganization program within thirty months thereafter.
Further, Sections 33 and 34 thereof provide:
Sec. 33. Implementing Details; Organization and Staffing of
the Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
In the implementation of the reorganization of the Bank, as
authorized under the preceding section, qualified personnel
of the Bank may be appointed to appropriate positions in the
new staffing pattern thereof and those not so appointed are
deemed separated from the service. No preferential or
priority rights shall be given to or enjoyed by any officer or
personnel of the Bank for appointment to any position in the
new staffing pattern nor shall any officer or personnel be
considered as having prior or vested rights with respect to
retention in the Bank or in any position as may have been
created in its new staffing pattern, even if he should be the
incumbent of a similar position therein.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 34. Separation Benefits. — All those who shall retire
from the service or are separated therefrom on account of
the reorganization of the Bank under the provisions of this
Charter shall be entitled to all gratuities and
benefits provided for under existing laws and/or
supplementary retirement plans adopted by and effective in
the Bank: . . .
Pursuant thereto, DBP issued Board Resolution No. 304-87 allowing the
issuance of temporary appointments to all DBP personnel in order to fully
implement the reorganization. The resolution states in part:
It is understood that pursuant to Section 32 of the new DBP
Charter full implementation of the reorganization program
shall be completed within a period of thirty-six (36) months
from the approval of this Charter. In this connection, the
plantilla approved and appointments issued are purely
interim and the Bank is reserving its right to put in place the
permanent structure of the Bank as well as the permanent
appointments thereto until the end of the 36-month period. 2
In effect, said resolution authorized the issuance of temporary appointments
to all DBP personnel to allow maximum flexibility in the implementation of the
reorganization. Such temporary appointments issued had a maximum period
of twelve (12) months during which period the performance of the
incumbents were assessed on the basis of the results of their evaluation.
With the passage of Executive Order No. 81 and Board Resolution No. 304
87, DBP undertook the evaluation and comparative assessment of all its
personnel under the CSC approved New Performance Appraisal System, a
peer and control rating process which served as an assessment tool of
DBP's screening process.
26 | P a g e
Petitioner Domingo was issued a temporary appointment on January 2, 1987
for a period of one (1) year, which was renewed for another period up to
November 30, 1988. Thereafter, in a memorandum 3 dated November 23,
1988 issued by the Final Review Committee, petitioner got a performance
rating of "below average," by reason of which his appointment was "made to
lapse."
Consequently, petitioner, together with a certain Evangeline Javier, filed with
the CSC a joint verified complaint 4against DBP for illegal dismissal. The
complainants therein alleged that their dismissal constituted a violation of the
Civil Service Law against the issuance of temporary appointments to
permanent employees, as well as of their right to security of tenure and due
process.
On November 27, 1989, CSC issued a resolution 5 in CSC Case No. 473
directing "the reappointment of Mr. Domingo and Ms. Javier as Senior
Training and Career Development Officer and Research Analyst or any such
equivalent rank under the staffing pattern of DBP." The order for
reappointment was premised on the findings of the CSC that "(t)he action of
the DBP to issue temporary appointments to all DBP personnel in order to
allow for the maximum flexibility in evaluating the performance of incumbents
is not in accord with civil service law rules," in that "(t)o issue a temporary
appointment to one who has been on permanent status before will deprive
the employee of benefits accorded permanent employees and will adversely
affect his security of tenure," aside from the fact that such an act is contrary
to Section 25 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807.
DBP filed a motion for reconsideration 6 on December 27, 1989 alleging, inter
alia, that the issuance of temporary appointments to all the DBP employees
was purely an interim arrangement; that in spite of the temporary
appointment, they continued to enjoy the salary, allowances and other
benefits corresponding to permanent employees; that there can be no
impairment of herein petitioner's security of tenure since the new DBP
charter expressly provides that "qualified personnel of the bank may be
appointed to appropriate positions in the new staffing pattern and those not
so appointed are deemed separated from the service;" that petitioner was
evaluated and comparatively assessed under a rating system approved by
the respondent commission; and that petitioner cannot claim that he was
denied due process of law considering that, although several appeals were
received by the Final Review Committee from other employees similarly
situated, herein petitioner never appealed his rating or the extension of his
temporary appointment although he was advised to do so by his direct
supervisor.
On April 10, 1990, CSC rendered the questioned resolution setting aside its
previous decision and affirming the separation of herein petitioner. In so
ruling, CSC explained that:
While it is true that this Commission ruled that the issuance
of temporary appointment to all DBP personnel in order to
allow "for maximum flexibility" in evaluating the performance
of incumbents is not in accord with civil service laws and
rules, however it cannot lose sight of the fact that appellants
are among those who indeed got a below average rating
(unsatisfactory) when their performance were reevaluated
and comparatively reassessed by the Final Review
Committee of the Bank approved by the Vice Chairman.
xxx xxx xxx
In effect, the determinative factor for retention and the
separation from the service is the individual performance
rating.
While the Commission supports the principle of merit and
fitness and strongly protects the security of tenure of civil
service officials and employees which are the essence of
careerism in the civil service, it does not however, sanction
the reappointment of said officials and employees who have
fallen short of the performance necessary in order to
maintain at all times efficiency and effectiveness in the
Office.
It bears stressing that the DBP submitted the records and
documents in support of its allegations that Mr. Domingo and
Ms. Javier have indeed got(ten) a below average rating
(unsatisfactory) during the filing of the instant motion for
reconsideration. Had DBP promptly submitted the
27 | P a g e
 records/documents supporting its allegations, this
Commission at the outset should have sustained the
separation of the appellants from the service on ground of
poor performance (below average rating, unsatisfactory)
after the reassessment and re-evaluation by the Bank
through the Final Review Committee. The CSC could not
have guessed that such was the basis of the DBP's
termination of Domingo and Javier until the papers were
submitted to it. . . .
It must be pointed out that appellants' separation from the
service was the lapse of their temporary appointment. The
non-extension or non-issuance of permanent appointments
were principally based on their below average rating
(unsatisfactory) performance after they were reevaluated
and comparatively reassessed by the Final Review
Committee of the Bank. After all, the 1986 DBP Revised
Charter (E.O. No. 81) gives the Bank a wide latitude of
discretion in the reappointment of its personnel, subject to
existing civil service laws, rules and regulations.
There is no doubt that the DBP conducted a reevaluation
and comparative reassessment of its employees for
placement/retention (for permanent) and for separation from
the service and found out that appellants are wanting of
performance, having been rated as "Below Average." 7
Hence this petition, whereby petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Petitioner's tenure of office was violated by respondents;
2. Petitioner was not afforded a day in court and was denied
procedural due process in the unilateral evaluation by his
peers of his efficiency ratings for the years 1987 and 1988;
3. Average and below average efficiency ratings are not
valid grounds for termination of the service of petitioner;
4. Section 5 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6656
is repugnant to the constitutional mandate that "no officer or
employee of the Civil Service be removed or suspended
except for causeprovided by law;" and
5. Section 16, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the New
Constitution was also violated by respondents. 8
I. Petitioner puts in issue the validity of the reorganization implemented by
DBP in that the same violates his right to security of tenure. He contends that
government reorganization cannot be a valid ground to terminate the
services of government employees, pursuant to the ruling in the case
of Dario vs. Mison, et al.9
This statement of petitioner is incomplete and inaccurate, if not outright
erroneous. Either petitioner misunderstood or he totally overlooked what was
stated in the aforecited decision which held that "reorganizations in this
jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith." As we said in Dario:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as
valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases
to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a
Chinese wall.
Clearly, from our pronouncements in Dario, reorganization is a recognized
valid ground for separation of civil service employees, subject only to the
condition that it be done in good faith. No less than the Constitution itself in
Section 16 of the Transitory Provisions, together with Sections 33 and 34 of
Executive Order No. 81 and Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6656, support this
conclusion with the declaration that all those not so appointed in the
implementation of said reorganization shall be deemed separated from the
service with the concomitant recognition of their entitlement to appropriate
separation benefits and/or retirement plans of the reorganized government
agency.
28 | P a g e
The facts of this case, particularly the evaluation process adopted by DBP,
bear out the existence of good faith in the course of reorganization.
As a tool in the assessment process, a bank-wide peer and control rating
process was implemented. Under this process, the peers and supervisors
rated the DBP employees. 10
To make the reorganization as open, representative and fair as possible, two
principal groups were formed: (1) the Group Placement Screening
Committee (GPSC) and (2) the Central Placement Screening Committee
(CPSC), to review all recommendations (for retention or separation) prior to
submissions to the Chairman an the Board of Directors. The members of the
two screening committees were the Department and Group Heads and
representatives from the Career Officials Association and the DBP
Employees Union. The CPSC was further represented by the DBP Civil
Service Officer, who sat as consultant to help resolve questions on Civil
Service rules and regulations.
As an assessment tool to the Bank's screening process, a peer and control
rating process was implemented bank-wide, the results of which were used
as a gauge to determine the suitability of an employee to stay in the Bank.
Through this rating, the Bank determines the value of the individual
employee to the Bank with the help of his peers (peer rating) and his
supervisors (control
rating). 11
Also, as part of the evaluation process, a Final Review Committee,
composed of the group, department or unit head, the heads of the Human
Resource Center and of the Personnel Services, and representatives from
the Career Officials Association and the Employees Union, was created to
screen further and to recommend the change in status of the employee's
appointment from temporary to permanent beginning 1988. For the rank and
file level, the committee was chaired by the Vice-Chairman while the officer
level was presided over by the Chairman of the Bank. 12
The performance rating system used and adopted by DBP was duly
approved by the Civil Service Commission. Herein petitioner was evaluated
and comparatively assessed under this approved rating system. This is
shown by the memorandum to the Vice-Chairman from the DBP Final
Review Committee wherein petitioner, among other DBP employees, was
evaluated and rated on his performance, and was shown to have gotten a
rating of "below average." 13
In the comment 14 filed by DBP with the CSC, respondent bank explained the
procedure it adopted in the evaluation of herein petitioner, together with one
Evangeline Javier, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
4. During the second phase of the screening process, the
Bank used several instruments for determining proficiency or
skills on the job. More than skills, however, the evaluation
also covered trait factors to determine a positive work
attitude. The Bank placed a premium on work attitude
because it believes that technical and professional skills can
easily be acquired by an ordinary normal individual as long
as he has the right attitude towards learning.
5. These attitudes are part of the new corporate culture
outlined in the corporate philosophy instituted for the Bank
and disseminated thru the various corporate culture
seminars, monthly tertulias, speeches of the Chairman and
numerous various internal communications and bulletins.
One of the most important values emphasized was
TEAMWORK due to the very lean personnel force that the
Bank was left with and the competition it has to contend with
in the industry.
6. Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were subjected to this rating
process as all other employees of the Bank were.
xxx xxx xxx
8. Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were recommended for a
renewal of temporary status after assessment of their
performance because of several indications of lack of skill
and their inability to work with others in the department
where they were stationed. In a compassionate stance, it
29 | P a g e
 was considered in the Central Personnel Committee to
transfer them to another department or unit of the Bank
where they may be more effective and productive, but they
expressed preference to stay in the training unit of the Bank,
the Human Resource Center.
9. Along with others whose performance for 1987 was found
wanting, Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier were recommended
for reappointment as temporary for another period from
January to November 1988 to give the Bank sufficient time
to consider their cases. However, in an evaluation of
performance for all extendees in November 1988, Mr.
Domingo and Miss Javier were again found wanting having
both acquired a rating of "Below Average."
In addition, it is not disputed that DBP now has less than 2,000 employees
from a former high level of around 4,000 employees in 1986. And, under
Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Government is authorized to
lay off employees in case of a reduction due to reorganization, thus:
Sec. 27. Reduction in Force. — Whenever it becomes
necessary because of lack of work or funds or due to a
change in the scope or nature of an agency's program, or as
a result of reorganization, to reduce the staff of any
department or agency, those in the same group or class of
positions in one or more agencies within the particular
department or agency wherein the reduction is to be effected
shall be reasonably compared in terms of relative fitness,
efficiency and length of service, and those found to be least
qualified for the remaining positions shall be laid off.
Lastly, petitioner failed to invoke the presence of any of the circumstances
enumerated under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 which would show or
tend to show the existence of bad faith in the implementation of the
reorganization.
Quintessentially, the reorganization having been conducted in accordance
with the mandate of Dario, it can safely be concluded that indeed the
reorganization was attended by good faith, ergo, valid. The dismissal of
herein petitioner is a removal for cause which, therefore, does not violate his
security of tenure.
As a final note on this issue, we quote with approval the statement of Mme.
Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in her dissenting opinion in the
above-cited case:
To be sure, the reorganization could affect the tenure of
members of the career service as defined in Section 5,
Article IV of Presidential Decree No. 807, and may even
result in the separation from office of some meritorious
employees. But even then, the greater good of the greatest
number and the right of the citizenry to a good government,
and as they themselves have mandated through the vehicle
of Proclamation No. 3, provide the justification for the said
injury to the individual. In terms of values, the interest of an
employee to security of tenure must yield to the interest of
the entire populace and to an efficient and honest
government.
II. Petitioner also maintains that "average" and "below average" efficiency
ratings are not valid grounds for his termination from the service.
It has become a basic and primordial concern of the State to insure and
promote the constitutional mandate that appointments in the civil service
shall be made only according to merit and fitness pursuant to its adopted
policy of requiring public officers and employees to serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 15 As a matter of fact,
the development and retention of a competent and efficient work force in the
public service is considered as a primary concern of the
Government. 16 Hence, employees are selected on the basis of merit and
fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the position to
which they are appointed. 17Concomitantly, the government has committed
itself to engender a continuing program of career and personnel development
for all government employees, 18 by establishing a performance evaluation
system to be administered in such manner as to continually foster the
improvement of individual employee efficiency and organizational
effectiveness. 19
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All these abundantly show that the State puts a premium on an individual's
efficiency, merit and fitness before one is accepted into the career service. A
civil service employee's efficiency rating, therefore, is a decisive factor for his
continued service with the Government. The inescapable conclusion is that a
"below average" efficiency rating is sufficient justification for the termination
of a government employee such as herein petitioner. This is the reason why,
painful as it may be, petitioner's separation must be affirmed if public good is
to be subserved. In the words of respondent commission in its questioned
resolution, it cannot "sanction the reappointment of said officials and
employees who have fallen short of the performance necessary in order to
maintain at all times efficiency and effectiveness in the Office." 20
III. Petitioner finally contends that where the purpose of the evaluation
proceeding is to ascertain whether he should be retained or separated from
the service, it is a proceeding to determine the existence of a ground for his
termination and, therefore, he should be afforded a day in court, pursuant to
the requirements of procedural due process, to defend himself against any
adverse findings in the process of evaluation of his performance.
Petitioner's contention cannot be sustained.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 provides that "no officer or employee in
the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due
notice and hearing." Thus, there is no question that while dismissal due to
a bona fide reorganization is recognized as a valid cause, this does not
justify a detraction from the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing.
However, it is equally true and it is a basic rule of due process that "what the
law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence
thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard." 21 There is no violation of
procedural due process even where no hearing was conducted for as long as
the party was given a chance to present his evidence and defend himself.
The records show that petitioner had the opportunity to present his side
and/or to contest the results of the evaluation proceedings. In DBP's motion
for the reconsideration of the original decision of respondent commission,
respondent bank averred:
It may be stated that although several appeals were received
by the Final Review Committee from other employees
similarly situated (i.e., also given temporary appointments for
1988), Mr. Domingo and Miss Javier never appealed their
ratings or the extension of their temporary appointments in
1988. Even at this writing, the Bank has not received any
formal appeal from them although they were advised to do
so by their direct supervisor. 22
The fact that petitioner made no appeal to the Final Review Committee was
duly considered by respondent commission in resolving said motion for
reconsideration and in affirming the separation of petitioner from the service,
noting that "appellants Mr. Domingo, and Miss Javier did not file or submit
their opposition to the motion for reconsideration." Consequently, petitioner
cannot, by his own inaction, legally claim that he was denied due process of
law.
Considering petitioner's years of service, despite the unfortunate result of the
reorganization insofar as he is concerned, he should be allowed separation
and other retirement benefits accruing to him by reason of his termination,
as provided for in Section 16, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, as well
as in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6656 and Section 34 of Executive Order
No. 81.
WHEREFORE, no grave abuse of discretion having been committed by
respondent Civil Service Commission, its challenged resolution of April 10,
1990 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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 All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil
Service Commission2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:

RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359

WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil

Service shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commission, . . .;

WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution provides that "The Civil Service Commission, as
the central personnel agency of the government, is
Republic of the Philippines mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures
SUPREME COURT to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
Manila progresiveness and courtesy in the civil service, . . .";

EN BANC WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 grants the Commission the
power, among others, to administer and enforce the
constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system
G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995
for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
vs.
Administrative Code of 1987 Provides, among others, that
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. &
The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.
based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as
practicable by competitive examination, or based highly
technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to
PUNO, J.: higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure;

The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive
Service Board is challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES)
Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES
eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President
for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. 1
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
administrative Code of 1987 provides that "The third level
shall cover Positions in the Career Executive Service";
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need
to consolidate, integrate and unify the administration of all
levels of positions in the career service.

32 | P a g e
 WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A.
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 confers on the
Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its
organization as the need arises.
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution
provides that the Civil Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy and the necessary implications thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Civil Service Commission hereby resolves to streamline
reorganize and effect changes in its organizational structure.
Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall
now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of
the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing
personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career
Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for
Career Executive Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of
petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated
June 7, 1994, the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential legal
Counsel, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued
CSC Resolution No. 93-4359 which abolished the Career
Executive Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance
of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, including whether the Civil
Service Commission has authority to abolish the Career
Executive Service Board. Because these issues remain
unresolved, the Office of the President has refrained from
considering appointments of career service eligibles to
career executive ranks.
xxx xxx xxx
You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court
to settle the legal issues arising from issuance by the Civil
Service Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, for
guidance of all concerned.
Thank You.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive
Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished,
petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No.
93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following arguments:
A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT
COMMISSION USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN
OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE
OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY
AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY,
THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO.
93-4359.
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the
contentions of petitioner. Respondent Commission, however, chose to
defend its ground. It posited the following position:
ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC
I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.
33 | P a g e
 II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK OF
PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A VALID ACT OF THE
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY
DEFECT.
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED
FROM QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS
PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4)
OFFICIALS SIMILARLY SITUATED AS SAID PETITIONER.
FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO CONSTITUTE
A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO QUORUM, IS
NOT THE FAULT OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE PRESIDENT WHO
HAS THE POWER TO APPOINT THE OTHER MEMBERS
OF THE CESB.
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE
COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title
I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of the 1987).
THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD ALREADY BEEN
SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED
THE PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY:
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R. BELMONTE,
JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R.
NO. 114380. THE AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS
ALSO QUESTIONED THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB
WITH THE COMMISSION.
We find merit in the petition.3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was
created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 19744 which
adopted the Integrated Plan. Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said
Plan provides:
Article IV — Career Executive Service
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a
continuing pool of well-selected and development oriented
career administrators who shall provide competent and
faithful service.
2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this
Chapter as the Board, is created to serve as the governing
body of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall
consist of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as
presiding officer, the Executive Secretary and the
Commissioner of the Budget as ex-officio members and two
other members from the private sector and/or the academic
community who are familiar with the principles and methods
of personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and
procedures on the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of members of the Career
Executive Service. The Board shall set up the organization
and operation of the service. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of
rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution,
the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative
function. In so far as the legislative power in this respect is
not restricted by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and
the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable,
necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of
government it is necessary to create and define duties, the
legislative department has the discretion to determine
34 | P a g e
 whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these
duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of
existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly
within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode
of filling the office and the powers and duties of the
incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing
the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations
Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation
of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3,
Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of
its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the
Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one
Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are
necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission
may effect changes in the organization as the need arises.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17
must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates
the offices under the respondent Commission, viz:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission
shall have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an
Executive Director, with a Deputy Executive Director shall
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission; coordinate the programs of
the offices of the Commission and render periodic reports on
their operations, and perform such other functions as may be
assigned by the Commission.
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a
Chairman and two (2) members shall have the following
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman
with legal advice and assistance; render counselling
services; undertake legal studies and researches; prepare
opinions and ruling in the interpretation and application of
the Civil Service law, rules and regulations; prosecute
violations of such law, rules and regulations; and represent
the Commission before any court or tribunal.
(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate
development plans, programs and projects; undertake
research and studies on the different aspects of public
personnel management; administer management
improvement programs; and provide fiscal and budgetary
services.
(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the
Commission with personnel, financial, logistics and other
basic support services.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate
and implement policies, standards, rules and regulations
pertaining to personnel records maintenance, security,
control and disposal; provide storage and extension
services; and provide and maintain library services.
(7) The Office of Position Classification and
Compensation shall formulate and implement policies,
standards, rules and regulations relative to the
administration of position classification and compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and
Placement shall provide leadership and assistance in
developing and implementing the overall Commission
programs relating to recruitment, execution and placement,
and formulate policies, standards, rules and regulations for
the proper implementation of the Commission's examination
and placement programs.
35 | P a g e
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall
provide leadership and assistance in the formulation and
evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to
performance appraisal, merit promotion, and employee
incentive benefit and awards.
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall
provide leadership and assistance in the development and
retention of qualified and efficient work force in the Civil
Service; formulate standards for training and staff
development; administer service-wide scholarship programs;
develop training literature and materials; coordinate and
integrate all training activities and evaluate training
programs.
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall
develop policies, standards, rules and regulations for the
effective conduct or inspection and audit personnel and
personnel management programs and the exercise of
delegated authority; provide technical and advisory services
to Civil Service Regional Offices and government agencies
in the implementation of their personnel programs and
evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide
leadership and assistance in the development and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations
in the accreditation of employee associations or
organizations and in the adjustment and settlement of
employee grievances and management of employee
disputes.
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations
governing corporate officials and employees in the areas of
recruitment, examination, placement, career development,
merit and awards systems, position classification and
compensation, performing appraisal, employee welfare and
benefit, discipline and other aspects of personnel
management on the basis of comparable industry practices.
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be
responsible for the enforcement of the constitutional and
statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation
for the effective implementation of the retirement of
government officials and employees.
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. — The Commission
shall have not less than thirteen (13) Regional offices each
to be headed by a Director, and such field offices as may be
needed, each to be headed by an official with at least the
rank of an Assistant Director.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent
Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its
control as enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its inception, the
CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As
conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be
autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive
outlook." 6 The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not
negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government
agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination." This
is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the
aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship
between the department or its equivalent and attached
agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of
the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as
a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by
36 | P a g e
 the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect
the progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general policies through
its representative in the board, which shall serve as the
framework for the internal policies of the attached
corporation or agency.

Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al.,

vs. Civil Service Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition assailing
the abolition of the CESB was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice
to state that the reliance is misplaced considering that the cited case was
dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause of
action.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of

the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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