Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs Act Theater Inc, 432 SCRA 418 - Geanelle Rican

Custodia vs CA, GR No. 116100, Feb 9, 1996

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision [1] dated January 31, 2001
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581, which affirmed the civil aspect of the Decision[2] dated
May 5, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, directing the petitioner MWSS to
pay the respondent Act Theater, Inc. damages and attorneys fees.
The present case stemmed from the consolidated cases of Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412
entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Tabian, et al., for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 401, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 876, and Civil Case No. Q-88-768 entitled Act Theater,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System. The two cases were jointly tried in the court a
quo as they arose from the same factual circumstances, to wit:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo
Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by members of
the Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 876. The respondents employees were subsequently criminally charged
(Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412) before the court a quo. On account of the incident, the respondents
water service connection was cut off. Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for injunction with
damages (Civil Case No. Q-88-768) against the petitioner MWSS.
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the court a quo that the petitioner
acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondents water service connection
without prior notice. Due to lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of the respondents patrons
but in the surrounding premises as well, were adversely affected. The respondent prayed that the
petitioner be directed to pay damages.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

In Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412

WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the four (4) above-named Accused are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. [3]

In Civil Case No. Q-88-768

...

1. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay plaintiff actual or compensatory damages in the amount
of P25,000.00; and to return the sum of P200,000.00 deposited by the plaintiff for the
restoration of its water services after its disconnection on September 23, 1988;

2. Defendants counterclaim for undercollection of P530,759.96 is dismissed for lack of merit;

3. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay costs of suit;

4. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees;

5. Making the mandatory injunction earlier issued to plaintiff Act Theater, Inc. permanent.

SO ORDERED.[4]
 Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the aforesaid decision to the CA. The
appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. According to the CA, the court a quo correctly found
that the petitioners act of cutting off the respondents water service connection without prior notice was
arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the latter justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the
Civil Code.
Undaunted, the petitioner now comes to this Court alleging as follows:
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] VALIDLY AFFIRMED THE

DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN RESOLVING THE PETITIONERS APPEAL;

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY UPHELD THE AWARD
OF ATTORNEYS FEES;

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] CORRECTLY APPLIED THE

PROVISION OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
APPLICABLE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 429 OF THE SAME CODE.[5]

Preliminarily, the petitioner harps on the fact that, in quoting the decretal portion of the court a
quos decision, the CA erroneously typed P500,000 as the attorneys fees awarded in favor of the
respondent when the same should only be P5,000. In any case, according to the petitioner, whether
the amount is P500,000 or P5,000, the award of attorneys fees is improper considering that there was
no discussion or statement in the body of the assailed decision justifying such award. The petitioner
insists that in cutting off the respondents water service connection, the petitioner merely exercised its
proprietary right under Article 429 of the Civil Code.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Article 429 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the petitioner in justifying its act of disconnecting the
water supply of the respondent without prior notice, reads:

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonable to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law,
or recognized as a result of long usage,[6] constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person
against the other.[7]
Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers
including the respondent, had the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be
confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised.[8]
Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of ones rights:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
 When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another,
a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable.[9] In this case, the petitioner failed
to act with justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off
the respondents water service connection. As correctly found by the appellate court:

While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior to the
disconnection of the latters water services, this was done only a few hours before the actual
disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the matter, Act sent its assistant
manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the MWSS office but he was treated badly on the flimsy excuse that
he had no authority to represent Act. Acts water services were cut at midnight of the day following the
apprehension of the employees. Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee was denied due process when it was
deprived of the water services. As a consequence thereof, Act had to contract another source to
provide water for a number of days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with MWSS the
sum of P200,000.00 for the restoration of their water services.[10]

There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of the court a quo and
the appellate court that the petitioners act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the respondent,
justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Finally, the amount of P500,000 as attorneys fees in that portion of the assailed decision which
quoted the fallo of the court a quos decision was obviously a typographical error. As attorneys fees, the
court a quo awarded the amount of P5,000 only. It was this amount, as well as actual and
compensatory damages of P25,000 and the reimbursement of P200,000 deposited by the respondent
for the restoration of its water supply, that the CA affirmed, as it expressly stated in its dispositive portion
that finding no cogent reason to reverse the appealed Decision which is in conformity with the law and
evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.[11]
The award of P5,000 as attorneys fees is reasonable and warranted. Attorneys fees may be
awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an
unjustified act of the other party.[12]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 31,
2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as
well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1

On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico
Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C.
Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.2

The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:

Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency
of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].

The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P.
Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property
through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last
September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to
defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff's
property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then
that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of
defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos Street from
plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one
meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is
passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3
meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters.
In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6
meters in length, has to be traversed.

When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the remises and who
were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said
tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there
had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence
was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first
passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a
way that the entire passageway was enclosed. (Exhibit "1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. "D" for
plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1-E") And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment
vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because
there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the
tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences
of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and
would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. . . .3 (Emphasis in original
text; corrections in parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:

Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access ingress and egress,
to the public street;

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos
(P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.

The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.4

Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to the Court
of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of
the trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION
only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders
defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as
Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000)
Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.5

On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.6 Petitioners then took the
present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private
respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.

With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not
appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are
presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to
petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.

For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any
affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below has
become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in
this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed
may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the
lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the
appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is
required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be
considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the
purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.7

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in
awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A
reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the
fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the
tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To
warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong,
does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.8
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.9

In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to
the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.10 The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not
sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and
suffering.11

Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to
another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his
favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy
for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.12

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.13 If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains
actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act
or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.14

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the
principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the
following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. 15

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence
not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.16 It is within the right of petitioners,
as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement
of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents
had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a
compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave
private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a
corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and
enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right.
To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the
rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.17

A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the
purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for
acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally
cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. 18 When
the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used,
such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because
the incovenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life. 19
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, 20 although the
act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. 21 One may use any lawful means to
accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of
action arises in the latter's favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The
courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve
a lawful means. 22

WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly
REINSTATED.

Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., took no part.