1. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION v.

REYNOLD CALUMPANG
GR No. 219435, JANUARY 17, 2018

FACTS: Petitioner Allied Banking Corporation, and Race Cleaners, Inc., a corporation
engaged in the business of janitorial and manpower services, had entered into a
Service Agreement whereby the latter provided the former with messengerial,
janitorial, communication, and maintenance services and the personnel therefor.

On September 28, 2003, respondent Reynold Calumpang was hired as a janitor by

RCI and was assigned at the Bank's Tanjay City Branch. He was tasked to perform
janitorial work and messengerial/errand services. His job required him to be out of
the Branch at times to run errands such as delivering statements and checks for
clearing, mailing letters, amongst others.

Petitioner, however, observed that whenever respondent went out on errands, it

takes a long time for him to return to the Branch. It was eventually discovered that
during these times, respondent was also plying his pedicab and ferrying passengers.
Petitioner also found out through several clients of the Branch who informed the Bank
Manager, that respondent had been borrowing money from them. For these acts, the
bank manager informed respondent that his services would no longer be required at
the Branch.

Respondent thereafter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and underpayment of

wages against petitioner before the NLRC.

In his position paper, respondent asserted that the four-fold test of employer-
employee relationship is present between him and the Bank. The Bank claims
otherwise.

ISSUE: Has the CA erred in affirming the NLRC Decision which declared that RCI is
a labor-only contractor, and in ordering the Labor Arbiter to re-compute the award
of backwages and separation pay? PARTLY.

LAW: The Labor Code of the Philippines.

CASE HISTORY: Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent. The NLRC affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter in its Decision. The CA denied the petition and upheld
the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

RULING: The petition is partly meritorious. The Court ruled the following: (1) RCI is
a labor-only contractor. The petitioner failed to establish that RCI is a legitimate labor
contractor as contemplated under the Labor Code. Except for the bare allegation of
petitioner that RCI had substantial capitalization, it presented no supporting evidence
to show the same.

Aside from this, petitioner's claim that RCI exercised control and supervision over
respondent is belied by the fact that petitioner admitted that its own Branch Manager
had informed respondent that his services would no longer be required at the

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Branch. This overt act shows that petitioner had direct control over respondent while
he was assigned at the Branch. Moreover, the CA is correct in finding that
respondent's work is related to petitioner's business and is characterized as part of
or in pursuit of its banking operations.

(2) An employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and respondent.

Petitioner bank is the principal employer and RCI is the labor-only contractor.
Accordingly, petitioner and RCI are solidarily liable for the rightful claims of
respondent.

(3) Petitioner had valid grounds to dismiss respondent. At the very first instance,
petitioner had already stressed in its position paper that respondent was found
committing conduct prejudicial to the interests of the Branch when it was discovered
that 1) respondent was plying his pedicab and ferrying passengers during his work
hours and 2) he had been borrowing money from several clients of the Branch.
Nowhere in the records was it shown that respondent denied these imputations
against him. Absent any denial on the part of respondent, the Court is constrained to
believe that respondent's silence can be construed as an admission of these
accusations against him.

(4) Respondent's right to procedural due process was violated. It is uncontested that
petitioner failed to give respondent ample opportunity to contest the legality of his
dismissal since he was neither given a notice to explain nor a notice of termination.
The first and second notice requirements have not been properly observed; thus,
respondent's dismissal, albeit with valid grounds, is tainted with illegality.

(5) The award of backwages and separation pay is deleted but respondent is entitled
to nominal damages. Considering that there were valid and substantive grounds to
terminate respondent's employment, the award of backwages and separation pay is
deleted. However, petitioner's violation of respondent's right to statutory procedural
due process warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.

OWN OPINION:

I felt that the Supreme Court was only fair with their decision to cancel the separation
pay due the respondent and have the Bank be liable to pay for nominal damages
only. I even wanted them to make the respondent pay as well for besmirching the
reputation of the Bank to its clients when he willfully decided to borrow money from
the latter’s clients, and for abusing the trust given to him by the same after being
employed for more than 10 years. However, getting laid off is sufficient consequence
for his actions.

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 2. ARMANDO M. TOLENTINO v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 218984 JANUARY 24, 2018

FACTS: Tolentino was hired by respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a flight
engineer on 22 October 1971. By 16 July 1999, Tolentino had the rank of A340/A330
Captain. As a pilot, Tolentino was a member of the Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines (ALPAP), which had a CBA with PAL.

On 5 June 1998, ALPAP members went on strike. On 7 June 1998, the Secretary of
Labor issued an Order requiring all striking officers and members of ALPAP to return
to work within 24 hours from receipt of the Order and requiring PAL management to
accept them under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike.
On 8 June 1998, the Secretary of Labor served the Order on the officers of ALPAP.
While the union officers and members had until 9 June 1998 to comply with the
directive of the Secretary of Labor, some pilots - including Tolentino - continued to
participate in the strike.

On 26 June 1998, when Tolentino and other striking pilots returned to work, PAL
refused to readmit these returning pilots. Thus, they filed a complaint for illegal
lockout against PAL. On 20 July 1998, Tolentino reapplied for employment with PAL
as a newly hired pilot, and thus voluntarily underwent the six months probationary
period. After less than a year, Tolentino tendered his resignation effective 16 July
1999.

Meanwhile, on 1 June 1999, the Secretary of Labor issued a Resolution declaring the
strike conducted by ALPAP on 5 June 1998 illegal for being procedurally infirm and in
open defiance of the return-to-work order of 7 June 1998. Members and officers of
ALPAP who participated in the strike in defiance of the 7 June 1998 return-to-work
order were declared to have lost their employment status. This resolution was
affirmed by this Court on 10 April 2002.

Tolentino worked for a foreign airline, and thereafter returned to the Philippines. Upon
his return, he informed PAL of his intention of collecting his separation and/or
retirement benefits under the CBA. PAL refused to pay Tolentino the separation
and/or retirement benefits as stated in the CBA. Tolentino filed his complaint against
PAL for non-payment of holiday pay, rest day pay, separation pay, and retirement
benefits with prayer for the payment of damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE: Has the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred and committed grave
abuse of discretion when it failed to award the petitioner of his retirement benefits?
NO.

LAW: Article 282 of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY: The Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision dismissing the complaint
of Tolentino. The NLRC affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The CA affirmed,

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with modification, the Resolution of the NLRC. The CA found that under the CBA,
Tolentino was entitled to the payment of his vacation time and days off earned but
not taken.

RULING: The SC denied the petition. The Court held that, an employee who
knowingly defies a return-to-work order issued by the Secretary of Labor is deemed
to have committed an illegal act which is a just cause to dismiss the employee under
Article 282 of the Labor Code, “The loss of employment status results from the
striking employees' own act - an act which is illegal, an act in violation of the law and
in defiance of authority.”

Similar to the retirement benefits under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan, it is clear
that the pilot must have retired first before he receives the full amount of the
contribution or the equity of the retirement fund. As earlier established, Tolentino
never retired. As Tolentino was not a retiring pilot, he was not entitled to receive the
return of equity in the retirement fund.

OWN OPINION:

Dura Lex Sed Lex. The law may be harsh but it is the law. The moment Tolentino
decided to defy the Return-To-Work Order is the instant he cemented his fate of not
being properly compensated for all his years of service to the corporation. At one
point, I do understand that the strikers are fighting for their cause but at the same
time they should have not abused the opportunity given to them and should have
respected the Order they have been given. They were properly informed and notified
but their resistance only brought Tolentino what could have been an avoidable injury,
which is security on his future. Hence, I agree with the wisdom of the Supreme Court.

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 3. ST. PAUL COLLEGE, PASIG, and SISTER TERESITA BARICAUA, SPC, v.
ANNA LIZA L. MANCOL and JENNIFER CECILE S. VALERA
G.R. Nos. 222317, JANUARY 24, 2018

FACTS: Respondents Mancol and Valera were both hired as pre-school teachers of
petitioner St. Paul College, Pasig (SPCP), Mancol having been employed on June 1,
2004 and Valera having been employed sometime in 2003.

Mancol, on May 18, 2010, filed a leave of absence for the period May 21 to June 18,
2010 as she was to undergo a fertility check-up in Canada. When she returned to the
Philippines, Mancol received a letter dated June 10, 2010 from the Directress of SPCP,
petitioner Sister Baricaua, requiring her to explain why she should not be dismissed
for taking a leave of absence without approval. Mancol reported back to SPCP, but
she was allegedly barred by SPCP and Sister Baricaua from teaching in her class,
entering her classroom, from doing her otherwise official duties and functions.

Valera, on the other hand, took a leave of absence without pay from April 13 to June
11, 2010 to undergo surgical operation for scoliosis. On June 15, 2010, Valera
received a letter from Sister Baricaua advising her to file a leave of absence (Sick
Leave) for the entire school year 2010-2011; otherwise, she will be reassigned to a
higher grade level where the students are more independent learners. The letter also
required her to submit a waiver absolving SPCP from any liability in case of any
untoward incident that may take place while ·in the performance of her teaching
duties as well as notarized certification of her physician as to her fitness to resume
work.

Thus, Mancol and Valera alleged that all these acts constitute constructive dismissal.

The parties having failed to strike an amicable settlement during the scheduled
mandatory conference, respondents filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, non-
payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, service
incentive leave, 13th month pay, nightshift differential overload pay, damages and
attorney's fees against SPCP and Sister Baricaua in her personal and official capacity
as Directress of SPCP.

ISSUE: Were Mancol and Valera constructively dismissed? YES.

LAW: Labor Code of the Philippines

CASE HISTORY: The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondents were constructively
dismissed from their employment and ordered their immediate reinstatement and
payment of monetary awards. NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
CA granted respondent's petition and reversed the decision of the NLRC.

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that it is clear that petitioners employed means
whereby the respondents were intentionally placed in situations that resulted in their

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being coerced into severing their ties with the same petitioners, thus, resulting in
constructive dismissal. An employee is considered to be constructively dismissed
from service if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer
has become so unbearable to the employee as to leave him or her with no option but
to forego with his or her continued employment.

As to the claim of petitioners that respondent Mancol was not constructively

dismissed but the latter abandoned her job, such was not duly proven. For a
termination of employment on the ground of abandonment to be valid, the employer
"must prove, by substantial evidence, the concurrence of [the employee's] failure to
report for work for no valid reason and his categorical intention to discontinue
employment." In this case, there is no proof that respondent Mancol abandoned her
work, instead, evidence show that she wanted to return to work but was prevented
by the respondents. In the same manner, petitioners also failed to prove that
respondent Valera abandoned her work.

OWN OPINION:

I am in full agreement with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case. Mancol
and Valera were improperly treated by their employer regarding the leave of
absences they took. No employee ever deserved to be subjected in such harsh
manner of dismissal done by the employer in this case. Both employees exerted effort
in attempting to report back to their work but were rejected accordingly, such
disrespect warranted strained relations between the employer and the employee that
having them reinstated is no longer a viable option. The SC is fair for awarding the
employees for what they have endured.

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 4. LEO V. MAGO and LEILANIE E. COLOBONG v. POWER
MANUFACTURING LIMITED
G.R. No. 210961 JANUARY 24, 2018

FACTS: The petitioners are former employees of Jobcrest, a corporation duly

organized under existing laws of the Philippines, engaged in the business of
contracting management consultancy and services. During the time material to this
case, the petitioners co-habited together.

On October 10, 2008, Jobcrest and Sunpower entered into a Service Contract
Agreement, in which Jobcrest undertook to provide business process services for
Sunpower. Jobcrest then trained its employees, including the petitioners, for
purposes of their engagement in Sunpower. Leo was tasked as a Production Operator
in the Coinstacking Station while Leilanie was assigned as a Production Operator,
tasked with final visual inspection in the Packaging Station. Jobcrest's On-site
Supervisor, Allan Dimayuga, supervised the petitioners during their assignment with
Sunpower.

It was alleged that Sunpower conducted an operational alignment, which affected

some of the services supplied by Jobcrest. Sunpower decided to terminate the
Coinstacking/Material Handling segment and the Visual Inspection segment.
Meanwhile, Leo and Leilanie were respectively on paternity and maternity leave
because Leilanie was due to give birth to their common child.

Upon returning, Jobcrest’s HR Manager, Noel J. Pagtalunan served Leo with a "Notice
of Admin Charge/Explanation Slip." The notice stated that Leo violated the Jobcrest
policy against falsification or tampering because he failed to disclose his relationship
with Leilanie. On the other hand, Leilanie, was informed by one of the Jobcrest
personnel that she will be transferred to another client company. She was likewise
provided a referral slip for a medical examination, pursuant to her new assignment.

Leo and Leilanie filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and regularization.

ISSUE: Were Leo and Leilanie regular employees of Jobcrest? YES.

LAW: Labor Code of the Philippines

CASE HISTORY: The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC declaring Mago and
Colobong as employees of Sunpower Philippines Manufacturing Limited and
consequently, holding that Jobcrest Manufacturing, Incorporated was a labor-only
contractor. The NLRC in tum reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the
petitioners' complaint for illegal dismissal.

RULING: Yes, the Court concluded the following: (1) Jobcrest has substantial capital.
For the year ended December 31, 2011, the paid-up capital of Jobcrest increased to
Php 8,000,000.00,71 notably more than the required capital under DOLE DO No. 18-

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A; (2) Suncrest does not control the manner by which the petitioners accomplished
their work. The Court finds that the evidence clearly points to Jobcrest as the entity
that exercised control over the petitioners' work with Sunpower. The petitioners' very
own sworn statements further establish this point; and (3) The petitioners were
regular employees of Jobcrest. On December 27, 2010 and January 25, 2011, Leilanie
and Leo were respectively confirmed as regular employees of Jobcrest. Jobcrest did
not even deny that the petitioners were their regular employees. Consequently, the
petitioners cannot be terminated from employment without just or authorized cause.

All things considered, Sunpower is not the statutory employer of the petitioners. The
circumstances obtaining in this case, as supported by the evidence on record,
establish that Jobcrest was a legitimate and independent contractor. There is no
reason for this Court to depart from the CA's findings.

OWN OPINION: I concur with the SC’s decision. The two corporations in an effort
to evade responsibility of compensating Leo and Leilanie pointed fingers as to who
between them is the employer of the laid off employees. Through the wisdom of the
SC, they were able to identify who is the liable employer of Leo and Leilanie.