Schematic Nerves

What are the “nerves” of a schema?

An inquiry into Structures of Patterns, Essences of Forms, Nuclei of Systems, and
Nexuses of Meta-systems.

Kent Palmer Ph.D.

kent@palmer.name
http://kdp.me
714-633-9508
Copyright 2016 KD Palmer1
All Rights Reserved. Not for Distribution.
PrinciplePattern_01_20161026kdp04a
Started 2016.10.24-26; Draft Version 03; unedited
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5298-4422
http://schematheory.net
Researcher ID O-4956-2015

There is a concept in Chinese called LI. 理 https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Li_(Neo-

Confucianism)

This term means both principle and pattern. The example of pattern is the exact configuration
of content on the surface of a jade stone.

1 http://independent.academia.edu/KentPalmer See also http://kentpalmer.name

http://www.christies.com/media-library/images/features/articles/2016/01/22/archaic-
jades/A-very-rare-and-unusually-large-dark-green-jade-bi.jpg

Notice how the content of the stone has various colors which have particular qualities that
appear as dark and light veins in the substance of the jade. This is Li as specific concrete
pattern. The patterns are always unique.

Li also means Principle in which case it means how the unique patterns are generated. In other
words, before the pattern appears there are constraints on what sort of pattern could possibly
appear in the circumstances. You will notice that the pattern that does appear could have
been slightly different in many ways but overall given the circumstances in the jade formation
certain types of pattern are probable and among those one gets actualized.
Patterns that do appear take time to manifest, but the Principle of generation is there prior to
the actual pattern appearing and the principle is embodied by the pattern that does appear. In
different circumstances different types of LI apply, and thus there are myriad Li for every type
of possible pattern.

The actual development of the pattern Li based on the principle Li is brought about by Chi
which is the subtle energy by which the content is moved to its final configuration through the
process of development. For instance, the growth of the living tree that produces the rings in a
tree due to growth patterns in different seasons over the years.

We mostly understand these ideas based on Complexity Theory and Chaos Theory, as well
Dynamics of various kinds. But our view tends to be abstracted from the concreteness of the
patterns and principles at work in the Chinese perspective. To us Principle and Pattern are
different things. But the Chinese saw them as two aspects of the same thing.

However, it seems to me that it is useful to think of Principles as generators of instances of

schemas. Principles are always concepts for us which are abstracted from particular situations
given a specific perspective. But concepts are understood in terms of exemplars and prototypes
as well as abstractions. Thus we can think of the principles as being concepts, abstracted from
a situation given a particular perspective in a specific domain that generate exemplars and
prototypes that have in their concrete realization specific patterns of content. Content is
monadic, i.e. bundles of qualia in concrete configurations. Those configurations are the
patterns which are myriad and specific to the circumstance of their realization. But this content
tends to be seen as something that fills the form, and thus gives a pattern of content that is
exposed on the surface of the form.
http://www.loupignoletbowls.com/siteimages/img_1927.jpg
http://www.loupignoletbowls.com/Pages/Examples.aspx

The form is the overall shape of the thing, for instance a bowl made of a burl of wood. The
content is determined by the substance, in this case burl maple wood that goes all the way
through the bowl, but the content is exposed on the surface of the bowl to give patterns
determined by the grain of the wood which exhibits the growth and force patterns that played
out in the development of the tree to produce the burl that gives us its unique pattern of content.
In this case the cellulose wood cells are the monads, that make up the content of the form, and
produce a pattern on the surface of the form of the bowl.

Li is the specific pattern in this case that is the frozen result of the dynamics of Chi that
produced the pattern during the growth of the tree.

But the underlying principle LI is what is behind the growth of the Burl on trees that produced
that specific pattern.

The difference between Schemas and the Chinese concept is the level of abstraction. Schemas
cover all instances of a particular dimensional configuration. There is just one pattern schema
that can be either one or two dimensions. And that fits into a Form schema which is of two or
three dimensions. Everything which is one or two dimensions can be seen as a pattern and
everything that is two or three dimensions can be seen as a form. We see two dimensional
pattern and form together in a watercolor painting for instance.

http://fineartblogger.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/tree-watercolor-painting.jpg

The difference between Schemas and the Chinese concept of Li is that Pattern schemas are
universals within specific dimensions covering all things within spacetime in that dimension
as either one schema or another in a given dimension. Schemas are holonic in that they face
two different schemas and they relate part to whole. They are templates of Understanding of
spacetime configurations that are immediately intelligible. We look at the painting and we
immediately see the patterning of colors within the outlines of the form of the branches. Every
bit of color soaked into a particular spot on the paper are monadic qualia content, in the case
of water color seen as mass effects.

Schemas are phenomenological in the sense that as you look out on the world -- the schemas
are the things you naturally see if you are brought up within the auspices of the Western
worldview. Whether they are more general beyond our culture is an open question. But within
our cultural tradition within the West they are well defined philosophically and historically
within our tradition of aesthetic connoisseurship and artisan-ship.

Once we realize that within our tradition there are a series of schemas ... monad, pattern, form,
system, ... that nest and between which there are no gaps and are thus are well
defined phenomenologically in practice, then it is possible to see what the term Software
Pattern means, which is a pattern of forms. In other words, we can read the hierarchy of
schemas in two directions. Normally we consider a pattern of monads as we have been
considering. But we can also read the series in the other direction as Alexander did who created
the Pattern Language in the context of his Timeless way of Building that produces a quality
with no name. The quality with no name is what you are aiming for in each case if you are to
build something aesthetically pleasing as a living environment for human beings. Engineers
are inherently crippled in this respect as they have no idea at all concerning the quality with
no name. The best they can do is sense smells. But that of course is merely a way to talk
indirectly about Li. Primordial natural pattern generation by humans that give configurations
that fit human beings in all possible ways as living environments that are not just aesthetically
pleasing but brings the best out of the experience of life in terms of affordances within the
lifeworld. Patterns Languages concern the patterns of forms that produce the quality with no
name at various scales based on some amorphous undefined principles rooted in our inherent
knowledge of human dwelling. [https://www.academia.edu/9965868/Living_Spaces]
Alexander specifically told the software community that their use of his idea of ‘Pattern
Languages’ did not capture its essence and were not what he was talking about in his books.
But this reduction from what Alexander was indicating that goes beyond words to Software
Pattern languages ends up being their reduction to patterns of forms which capture
configurations of forms that turn up often and seem to work well in Architectural Design of
Software Systems.

But what this alerts us to is the fact that we can have monads of patterns, and forms of systems,
as well as patterns of forms. The reversal of the normal series of the schemas and their pairing
lead to new ways of looking at things as Alexander discovered. The monad of the pattern is
very much like the Chinese concept of Li. It is an irreducible pattern generator that is unique
in terms of organization and quality [Grenander, Ulf, and Michael I. Miller. Pattern Theory: From Representation
to Inference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. ]. The form of a system is more or less the kind of a
system. That is to say one particular systemic configuration that is different from other
systemic configurations. We might think of them as something along the lines of Isomorphies
in Len Troncale's sense.

Forms have essences traditionally. The essence is the constraints on the attributes of the form.
Attributes are parameters that characterize the content of the form. The equivalent of the
essence of forms at the pattern level could be called the Li, i.e. the principle by which the
pattern is generated. In the West we do not have a general term for it. But instead we use the
term “structure” which is static rather than dynamic. We consider the structure of a pattern the
underlying rules or algorithm that constrains the generated pattern. Example
is Mendeleev's periodic table of elements.
Within our tradition generally we can say Essences are to Forms what Structures are to Patterns
of content, i.e. Monads.

At this point we get to Hegel's fundamental critique of Formalism in Kant, which is that if
forms do not comprehend their contents then the contents are in themselves, but if forms
comprehend their contents then the contents are for the other. i.e. the form. And forms cannot
be for themselves unless the others are for them. Self-knowledge only comes through the
mediation of the other. This critique was the beginning of taking seriously the need for
structuralism within our tradition. If forms do not care about their contents and are blind to
them then they lack understanding of their content and therefore they are not truly forms but
some degenerate type of comprehension that exemplifies ignorance of what is contained in the
form. Basically, Hegel was saying that for form to be for itself it needs to comprehend the
structure of the content within it. Everything needs take into account for self, for other, in self
and in other for full comprehension that can call itself self-conscious knowledge. If content is
in itself, but not for form, and form is in itself and not for content, then this is not real
knowledge. Only if the content is for the other of form, and the form is for the other of content,
only then can content be through its structure for itself, and form through its essence be for
itself. In other words the essence of form mediates the structure of content and the structure of
contents mediates the essence of form to each other. That is self-conscious knowledge as
opposed to mere consciousness. Only completely self-conscious knowledge can be fully
rational.

The same is true for Systems and Forms. We don't have a term for the equivalent of the essence
of a system or the structure of a pattern. But in physics the inner structure of the atom composed
of different fundamental particles which is stable is called the nucleus, so we could use that
term for the core of the system. This is of course an analogy. Systems are gestalts, i.e.
backgrounds on which forms appear, that background can be conceived as the boundary of the
system, that contains several forms within it that each can be figures on the ground of the
system for our inspection. The dual of the System is the Meta-system, i.e. what lies beyond the
boundary to the horizon of the environment. Systems also have a dual which is the process
with its meta-process. The duality of system and process is constrained by the nucleus of the
system/process. Once we have a name corresponding to essence (form) or structure (pattern)
in this case "nucleus" of the system/process as well as the meta-system/meta-process then it is
possible to apply Hegel's criteria to the relation of forms to system.

Nucleus is to the System what Essence is to Form and Structure is to Pattern.

Therefore, forms within a system can be in themselves, for themselves, for others, or in others
and the same thing is true of the system.

If a system does not comprehend its forms then the forms are in themselves, and the system is
in itself. This state is called extension or what reigns is pure substitutability. But that means
that the forms are blind to the system and the system is blind to the forms it contains. But this
is a degenerate condition which lacks complete knowledge of both the forms and the system.
Forms need to be understood by the system that contains them, just as systems need to
comprehend the systems that contain them. Thus, the forms of the system need to be for the
other (system), and the system also needs to be for the other (forms). And they do this through
the essence and the nucleus. The nucleus of the system needs to comprehend the essences of
the forms within them, and the essences of the form need to comprehend the nucleus of the
system that contains them. If both sides do this then they are both for themselves by being for
others. I.e. the System that has a nucleus that comprehends the essences of the forms in
contains is for itself, i.e. self-conscious at the system level. And on the other hand, the Form
needs to have an essence that comprehends the nucleus of the system that contains it in order
to be for itself, i.e. self-conscious at the form level.

Notice that essence of form is a holon because it needs to comprehend the structure of its
content looking down and the nucleus of its system, if it is in a system, looking up in the
hierarchy of schematic containment. And it is this holonic nature of the essence that makes
them like concrete universals, i.e. exhibiting internal relations between the contents it contains
and the system that contains it as mediated by form through this essence.

With regard to the System level, which is a whole, then we get the internal relations between
the parts of the system which is the way that the nucleus of the system manifests. Internal
relations appear as negative information within the closure of the system.

But wholeness is not specific just to the System Schema as Hegel thought. Wholeness applies
to every schema with regard to its closure and therefore negative information can appear at
any schematic level, not just the system level as Hegel thought.

When we say that an essence is a constraint on attributes of a form, that constraint is

negative information, i.e. a counterfactual. Similarly, when we talk about structure as a
constraint on the characteristics of a pattern, that constraint is negative information, i.e. also a
counterfactual. The same is true of the nucleus of the system that constraints the features of a
system, the constraint is negative information and thus counterfactual. Counterfactuals appear
at the level of hyper-intensional logics.

Essences to a certain extent are intensional in as much as they are like templates with slots for
attributes that have variation, in which different elements that mean the same thing can be
substituted, for instance red and green are both colors. Based on these intentional attributes
and their substitutions we generate possible worlds. And thus possible worlds theory is the
outgrowth of the problem of intensionality, i.e. that extensional substitution does not explain
everything.

Counterfactuals are things that are not the case. We can define impossible worlds at the
hyperintensional level that are totally based on counterfacturals. Worlds are schemas so in
general there are counterfactual impossible schemas that need to be defined
hyperintensionally. Belief is one of those hyperintensions. In hyperintensions we are
substituting noesis rather than equivalent noema and thus getting differences.

[https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Transparent_Intensional_Logic]
[https://www.academia.edu/7994695/Counterfactual_Reasoning]

[http://substantialmatters.blogspot.com/2009/03/age-of-hyperintensionality.html]

Once we have seen that we need a concept related to a system that is equivalent but different
from essence, i.e. unique to the emergent level of the system because it deals with features not
attributes, that is to say the idea of the NUCLEUS of the System. Then we can recast the whole
question in terms of these various types of schematic "essences" by asking what is the relation
of structures of patterns, to essences of form, to nuclei of systems. The best example of a formal
structural system that contains all these three schematic levels is Architecture of Systems
Problem Solving by George Klir.

Klir bases his theory at the level of pattern and talks about configurations of variables, and he
uses these configurations of variables to describe the level of forms and system. Thus in a
sense he reduces form and system to pattern, the lowest common denominator. This makes his
Systems Theory primarily structural. What if we don't want to do this reduction but instead
want each schematic level to stand by itself as well as to interrelate with the others in a nested
fashion. Then we would have to complicate the picture given by Klir by introducing essences
and nuclei of the system. Klir more of less assumes that variables can stand for any of these
levels which is true but still this is a reductionistic account.

Structures organize all the possible characteristics within patterns. Essences organize all the
possible combinations of attributes within forms. Nuclei organize all possible features of
Systems. But organizing the characteristics, Structures allow all possible patterns of a certain
sort to be generated. By organizing the attributes, Essences allow all possible forms to be
generated. By organizing the features, nuclei allow all possible systems of a specific type to
be generated.

This pretty well means that Principle, in the sense of Li can be thought of as the meta-structure
of structure. And by analogy there may be a set of principles related to forms, that are
quintessences, or meta-essences. And also there may be principles that are meta-nuclei of
systems. These second order structures, essences or nuclei only have a name with respect to
form which is quintessence, that is traditionally related to ether as opposed to the four
normal Greek elements of earth, air, fire, water. In other words, it is though as a sublimation.
Essentially these are meta-constraints on constraints which are rules that constrain rules that
constrain characteristics, attributes or features. This sublimation at the higher degree of the
structure, essence or feature has the right to be called a principle in all cases. Interestingly there
is no general term for what is called here structure, essence and nucleus. But we can call them
a "Nerve". [https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Nerve_(category_theory)] So a principle governs
a nerve which in turn governs the wholeness of the schema. This essentially gives us then the
equivalent of the Chinese Li in our Western thought structures except for the fact that the
Chinese work up from the concrete case to the abstraction rather than starting from the
abstraction and working down.
Notice that these powers of the sublimation could go up several levels. These specifically are
articulated in the design field in my second dissertation. See http://emergentdesign.net. There
is essentially a Cartesian cross of the Philosophical Principles and the Meta-levels of Being.
But we can simplify this with regard to nerves by marking the level of their powers: Nerve^p.
A lot of times in Science the Nerve^3 level are called Laws, as in laws of nature. Laws are
necessary, and in this sense the constraints are constrained by necessity.

Our point here is that All schemas have nerves, and that the nerves have powers. Nerve^1 is
the nerve itself which organizes the content of the schema giving it structure, essence or a
nucleus in the cases of pattern, form, and system. Nerve^2 are nerve related constraints of
constraints called principles, and Nerve^3 are constraints on constraints of constraints called
Laws. All schemas have the equivalent of nerves, and the meta-levels of constraints up to the
definition of contingency and necessity. A good source for this kind of model is Monod Chance
and Necessity. Monod constricts a teleonomic system by interleaving layers of constraint and
necessity which is how he thinks evolution works. But between contingency and necessity
there is also conditionality which means that things are not random nor determined but
conditional based on circumstances.

So let us extend this idea to the level of Meta-system (OpenScape). This schema is what exists
from the boundary of the system to the horizon in the landscape in which the system exists. It
is detotalized and disunified and a general economy rather than a restricted economy in the
sense of Bataille. It is based on compementarities and is formally defined by the Universal
Turing machine as opposed to the normal Turing machine. It can be described by rules just
like the system, but the rules have to do with the allotment of resources and signaling using
protocols between systems within the meta-system and also to the meta-system by the
contained systems. Meta-systems a lot resources to Systems within their arena. Meta-systems
are composed of source, horizon origin and arena. Systems and anti-systems appear from
sources within the arena at origin points and they move through and interact with each other
and their environment within the arena until they exit through anti-origins (sinks) and return
to the source. Object Oriented programming systems are an example. The source is the object
template. This object template gets instantiated and then is executed interacting with other
objects within the system, until the various instances are killed off. The objects interact by
calling each others methods with parameters which then allow the objects to change their state
of internal data based on the interactions and call other objects. All the objects in the same
application together are called a system. Our question is what is the nerve of the meta-system
or open-scape. There is no name for it. In general meta-systems are invisible to us within our
tradition. The only way we can see them is producing the inverse dual of the system realizing
that the system is not self-dual. What is the non-self-dual dual of the System. We call it the
Meta-system or OpenScape.

But the Meta-system schema’s nerve has no name, but we can call the nerve of this schema a
“NEXUS” in the Meta-system or OpenScape. This is because the nexus of a meta-system is
normally a constraint on complementary opposites that characterize the field of the arena
within the meta-system. We will call what the nexus controls by its constraints field properties.
In meta-systems these field properties are complementary like between electricity and
magnetism. Once we have the name of the nexus that constrains the field properties then we
can consider the relation of the meta-system to the systems that it contains in terms of Hegel’s
critique. If the systems are in themselves and not for the other then we are merely conscious
but not self-conscious of them. Thus we need to make the systems for the other of the meta-
system and the meta-system for the other of the system. And if they are for each other then the
system and the meta-system are for themselves rather than just in themselves. You can only
be for yourself through the other, being either the contained or the container.

This plays out in an interesting way in relation to the system and meta-systems because either
may be either emergent or de-emergent. Emergent Systems are wholes greater than the sum of
their parts and they overflow supervenience, isomorphic relations between superstructure and
base. De-emergent systems are taken apart by analysis and thus do not have their emergent
properties that they would have if properly assembled. This is like the difference between a
car taken apart or put together by the mechanic. But interestingly usually the meta-system is
considered de-emergent, in other words it is the field or proto-gestalt within which the parts
are arranged in relation to each other when taken apart, i.e. the floor of the garage on which
the parts are strewn. To the mechanic this is a field in which the parts have dispositions to go
back together to make the car work. To an ordinary person they are just junk thrown out on
the floor with no implications with respect to each other. But there is a possibility of an
Emergent Meta-system, i.e. a meta-systemic field with its own emergent properties. And this
is produced by a combination of the special systems (that appear in the interstice between
system and meta-system) along with the normal system which gives an Emergent Meta-
system. We can characterize the difference between emergence and de-emergence in terms of
the realization of inner relations between parts. Thus we can characterize the difference
between in itself and for itself of Hegel, along with for others and in others as the means to
distinguish emergence from de-emergence, or what we have known up till now as the blindness
to content or the blindness of the content. So when the systems are in themselves and the meta-
system is in itself then it is merely supervenitent. But if the system contents become for the
other of the meta-system, and the meta-system becomes for the other of the system, then they
escape supervenience. The system then becomes a whole greater than the sum of its parts, and
the addition is what the system knows about its contents beyond the mere containment of them.
We can use the term “knows” because the schemas are templates of intelligibility of spacetime
configurations. Schemas are a kind of knowledge of things organized in spacetime. In other
words the system schema, it knows and responds to the essence of its forms. And the same
thing can be said of the meta-system except it is always a whole less than the sum of its parts.
That means that what it knows of and responds to the nucleus of its constituent systems that is
always less than the sum of its parts. But if the meta-system is emergent then it knows more
despite having holes in the meta-system, i.e. niches for systems, and this appears as its own
counter organization that complements the system. Now special systems are supervenient. And
that means they have a special knowledge that balances for itself and for others, with in itself
and in others, and this is called in-and-for-itself. Special Systems are in and for themselves.
This makes them examples of Concrete Universals or in another terminology Holons.

See . . .
http://archonic.net/rastnopY.pdf
https://www.academia.edu/3795281/Special_Systems_Theory

In general we can say that it is important to identify the equivalent of the “essence of the form”
for all the schemas. We have identified these as the ‘structure of the pattern’, the ‘nucleus of
the system’, and the ‘nexus of the meta-system’. And once we have these various nerves
defined then we have the ability to think about the knowledge that each of them has about the
other, in other words does the contained know about the container and does the container know
about the contained in each case. They know about each other by their response to the nerve
of each. And these nerves can reach deep through their various levels of sublimation.

Patterns know about the content of its monads via the nerve of the monads that it contains.

Form knows about the content of its patterns of monads via the structure of the patterns of the
monads.

System knows about the content of its forms of patterns via the essence of the forms of the
patterned monads.

Meta-system knows about the content of its systems of its forms via nuclei of the systems of
and the essences of the forms and the structures of the patterns of monads it contains.

Likewise Pattern knows about its form container through understanding and responding to the
essence of the form that contains it.

Form knows about its system container through understanding and responding to the nucleus
of the system that contains it.

System knows about its meta-system container through understanding and responding to the
nexus of the meta-system that contains it.

Meta-system knows about its Domain container through understanding and responding to the
nerve of the Domain that contains it.

In each case the relation between the nerves of the schemas make explicit the implicit internal
relations between the elements at each schematic level to the other schematic level. These
internal relations appear as negative information at each level within the whole of the schema.
In this way we address the criticism of Kant and all purely formal systems by Hegel. Every
schema has an internal set of constraints that govern its functioning. These internal constraints
may function at different levels of sublimation. As we go up these levels they become less
correlations and more like causes, less like principles and more like laws. Therefore, when we
ask what is a principle or what is a pattern there is a wider framework given by Schemas
Theory in which these questions can be answered. We do not just have to answer these
questions a vacuum where principle and pattern stand in opposition to each other without
considering anything else. Rather, it is much better to consider this question in a context where
it can have an answer that is not arbitrary or just conventional. We live in a philosophical and
scientific community that tends to be purely formal since B. Russell attempted to kill the idea
of Bradley of Internal Relations taken from Hegel. But Hegel’s critique still stands as valid in
relation to all kinds of formalists. But how does this apply when we recognize more types of
schemas than merely form? We have to identify the nerve of every schema. We have identified
nerves for Pattern (Structure), Form (Essence), System (Nucleus) and Meta-system (Nexus).
Then we see that the understanding of one schema in relation to another means to come to
terms with its nerve, i.e. to recognize it and respond to it coming to know it. Unless you
understand the structure generating the patterns then you will never be able to account for it as
a container form. And pattern unless it understands the essence of the form will never be able
to respond to it properly within its context. So the connection of nerves of each schema to each
other is their proper knowledge of the other, and it is only through knowledge of the other that
it can have complete knowledge of itself. So basically a given schema is only in itself unless
it comprehends and reacts to the nerves of its adjacent schemas, both those it contains and
those it is contained by, its containers. But this is the same as having internal relations at each
schematic level where each level is treated as a whole itself that is only really known through
the other adjacent levels but not purely on its own as a formalism of a given schematic level.

See https://thinknet.quora.com/System-%E2%80%98Essence%E2%80%99-balances-
Features-and-Capabilities

See http://think.net/system-essence-balances-features-and-capabilities/

Systems ‘Essence’ balances Features and Capabilities

Definitely we distinguish, or should between systems features and systems capabilities.

In what I said for the Systems Schema there must be something like an essence which I call here
the "nucleus".

The nucleus is about the internal relations within the whole of the System Schema just like the
schema itself is about External Relations. Among these Internal Relations are the ones relating
features, which are like attributes, to capabilities which are internal infrastructural functionality of
the system.

Since Russell rejected Bradley's Hegelian Internal Relations Analytic Philosophy has only been
concerned with External Relations and Internal Relations have been Taboo. And this shows up in
the fact that all our modeling with UML/SysML are about binary external relations. The weakness
of UML/SysML is the fact that it does not comprehend multi-relations. This causes design
descriptions to be overly verbose. But what is completely missing is any notion of Internal
Relations.
When you think about it Designs must be a balance of internal and external relations. So half the
design representation is missing. This is another blindspot in our thinking, like the forgetting of
Mass and over concentration on Sets. Or the ignoring of Meta-system and the over emphasis on
Systems. Whenever we find a blindspot in our thinking then we find a resource that is relevant that
we are not using. Internal Relations are a resource for thinking about designs of Systems Syntheses.
Essentially the Internal Relations is what makes the synthesis and binds it together. All current
modeling methods are extensional. We do not even try to produce intensional design
representations which would lead to possible worlds approaches. And we have not even conceived
of hyper-intensional aproaches2. The design element must have relations with other design
elements that are external relations. And other systems which are also external relations. But each
of those design elements needs to have internal relations within itself that responds to where it is
in the system as a whole and defines the essence of the particular design element. We might argue
that this might be approximated by nested patterns (patterns within components within patterns of
components) but this is still an external way of looking at essence, attempting to reduce it to
external relations which is the Analytic philosophical traditions approach which only concedes
that intension is necessary when reduction to extension fails, just like admitting the necessity of
hyperintension is only admitted after intensional possible world approaches fail. This is a limit
progression which will never reach meaning. On the contrary Husserlian Phenomenology starts
with meaning as a first class object and works out from meaning to understand everything else.
And at the heart of Phenomenology is essence perception, the idea that essences are fundamentally
different from abstractions (general or universal) or ideas (illusory continuities based on infinity).
Since we are reinventing the wheel we should at least be aware of the route that Analytical
Philosophy has gone before us from extension to intension, to hyper-intension and still not being
able to account for meaning. Essences are the meanings of things. Better to start with attempting
to understand the meaning of designs and working out from there rather than to start with
extensional approaches which will never arrive at meaning as Analytical Philosophy has done.

You will notice that patterns only talk about external relations between pattern components.
Pattern components are described but their internal relations are not specified.

Pattern Languages are patterns of forms. We use these patterns of forms to give slices through a
system that contains these forms. A system might be structured based on a number of patterns.
Patterns are supposed to capture what has worked, what has been invented to solve specific
problems in actual systems. A system might encompass a whole set of Pattern Language constructs
which have worked previously to solve problems. However, this approach to defining Systems is
more or less like Klir's Architecture of Systems Problem Solving that reduces Form and System
to the Structure of Patterns. It is an excellent approach but it does not tell us anything about the
essences of the forms (components) of the system, nor anything about the nucleus of the system
itself. In other words in a pattern which is a relation among forms, the essence of the form is
described but not explained, similarly the system is built up by an aggregation of patterns but the
nucleus (essence) of the system is approximated but not explained. We are taking explanation here
to be a stronger specification than a description, i.e. an explanation says how something works and

2 https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Transparent_Intensional_Logic
perhaps why it works. A description just says what something is on the outside, or superficially in
terms of its appearances.

Answering the question what is a principle. Principles are powers of essences. With a principle we
say what something must be. It is a command to make it so. But principles are general and have
exceptions. Beyond Principles at higher powers of constraint we have Laws. Laws are universal
and necessary, like Physical Laws. Design Principles are heuristics about how to use patterns of
forms to make systems. They say things like simplify as much as possible. Or always consider
performance. Patterns are solutions to problems that have worked well in the past and have been
captured by practitioners.

In my previous post I was alluding to the fact that in Chinese there is a concept LI that combines
principle and pattern with each other in an interesting way that we do not have in the Western
tradition which might be relevant. One of the things that considering LI leads to in the context of
Schemas Theory is that we would have to distinguish between form and essence of form with
respect to each schema and thus consider the relations between what Hegel would call Internal
Relations and what we all know as External Relations. It turns out that in our tradition now Internal
Relations is a blindspot. We don't talk about them and we have no way of representing them. Yet
we know that everything has a What, a Kind, specified by its essence. We talk about designs as if
they were composed entirely of external relations between components and minimal methods
(UML profiles). This suggests that we are not capturing the essence of designs.

Let me suggest that the difference between features of a system and the capabilities of a system
are controlled by its nucleus, i.e. its essence at the system schema level. We talk about features
and capabilities but we do not talk about what connects them which surely is the essence of the
system, its nucleus. Features are like a superstructure built on the infrastructure of capabilities.
Work on a system must be split between adding features that the user sees and the capabilities that
make those features possible. And both Features and Capabilities may be based on patterns, known
solutions to problems that work. But what constrains all features to be based on capabilities is the
essence of the system being built. Unless there are capabilities in the infrastructure we will not be
able to express features in the superstructure of the application, or system. The set of constraints
that makes it necessary for features to be grounded in capabilities are the essence of the system.
And that is made up of a set of internal relations that govern the use of external relations among
the components of the system (internally) and other systems (externally).

This should give a basis to consider the importance of Internal Relations to Design.

A book that makes these distinctions clear is Harris, Errol E. Formal, Transcendental, and
Dialectical Thinking: Logic and Reality. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987

See Schematic Nerves by Kent Palmer on Thinknet

See http://think.net/schematic-nerves/

Features and Capabilities Defined

A capability is the ability to do something, normally it is provided by the infrastructure of the software system and
makes features possible. I am not using it in the sense of a high level possible goal to be achieved using the system,
but rather as an enabler that makes features and high level possible goals capable of being accomplished through their
existence. In other words I am not using the term here as a collection of features that might be used to achieve
something. That is another meaning of the term.

A feature is something that the system does that is visible to the user and thus part of the superstructure of the system
normally associated with the user interface.

Features are possible but Capabilities as enablers of Features are necessary. That is why I distinguish them in terms
of being either in the superstructure or infrastructure of the software system.

Features may be collected together to make high level capabilities that aim to achieve goals or missions possible.

Both are captured by functional requirements of the system normally, but they may be associated with non-functional
requirements as well. Traditionally we would just talk about different types of functional requirements.

This term Feature has come to prominence in Agile terminology because the focus is on adding features in sprints, but
many times features cannot be added until capabilities as enablers are added to the infrastructure of the software that
allow for the features.

This feature oriented software development [https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Feature-oriented_programming] can be a

big problem if the necessity to design the capabilities of the infrastructure are ignored and features outrun capabilities
of the system.

There is a difference between the capability of the software as an enabler for actions based on exposed features and
the capabilities given to users through providing infrastructural support for the accomplishment of high level goals or
missions.

This terminology I happen to be using here has its roots in Agile development and the idea that stories capture features
but normally Epics address instilling the capabilities in the infrastructure that makes the features possible.
See http://scaledagileframework.com/features-and-capabilities/ Notice here what I am calling a infrastructural
functional capability is called an enabler.

Using this distinction between superstructural features and infrastructural functional capabilities is just a very crude
and simple way to talk about what is essential to systems, i.e. the systems nucleus that has internal relations and
connects features and capabilities. Features relate to what is beyond the system, and capabilities as enablers are what
relate to the internal necessities of the functioning of the system. Both of these are related to External relations either
with other systems or among components of systems. Neither of these really address internal relations which must
exist for the system to have an essence of its own which here we are calling its 'nucleus' for a lack of a better term.

The whole purpose of making this distinction is to point out what is missing that is not captured by the external
relations among components of the infrastructural support, and the external relations between other systems to which
the superstructure of features appear. What is missing is the internal relations of the 'nucleus' of the system that
interfaces between these two sets of external relations at different levels of differentiation.

There is a difference between the capabilities of a system and the capabilities of the users of a system. Here I am
talking about the capabilities of the system that make features possible. Based on features of the system supplied to
the Users as affordanances they then become capable of accomplishing goals and missions. Note that the term
affordance normally refers to the emergent properties of the system and things made possible that without the system
would remain impossible to accomplish for users. The term affordance indicates that the users are relating to the
essence of the system and its emergent properties. See https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Affordance
I would like to note that this distinction between features and capabilities as functional enablers within the
infrastructure of the software taken from Agile Software Development and turned to my own purposes is inessential
to my argument.

References:

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Software_feature

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Capability

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Functional_requirement