Near infrared multifactor identification tags

Elisabet Pérez-Cabré1*, María S. Millán1, Bahram Javidi2

1
Dep. Optics & Optometry, Technical University of Catalonia, Violinista Vellsolà 37, 08222 Terrassa (Spain)
2
Electrical & Engineering Dept. University of Connecticut, 371 Fairfield Road, Storrs CT 06269-2157, USA
* Corresponding author: elisabet.perez@upc.edu; www.goapi.upc.edu

Abstract: We propose a compact technique for encryption-verification that

relies on the following elements: multifactor encryption, which permits the
simultaneous verification of up to four factors; distortion-invariant ID tag
for remote identification; near infrared (NIR) writing and readout of the ID
tag signal for invisible transmission; and optical processor, based on joint
transform pattern recognition by optical correlation, for automatic
verification of information. A highly-reliable security system is obtained by
joining the advantages of all these elements for the first time. A novel NIR
ID tag is designed and built by using commonly available materials. The
very ID tag content cannot be visually perceived at naked eye; it cannot be
either copied, scanned, or captured by any conventional device.
Experimental results based on the NIR ID tag are shown. The satisfactory
results obtained demonstrate a new insight into the applications of the
compact and efficient technique for high-secure identification systems.
© 2006 Optical Society of America
OCIS codes: 070.0070 (Fourier optics and optical signal processing); 070.5010 (Pattern
recognition and feature extraction); 070.4550 (Optical correlators); 100.0100 (Image
processing); 100.1160 (analog optical image processing); 120.0280 (Remote sensing);
040.3060 (Infrared detectors)

References and links

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1. Introduction
In the last decade, optical technologies have largely contributed to improve security systems
in terms of proposing new methods for information encryption and designing identification
(ID) tags for object surveillance or tracking, among other aspects.
Regarding cryptology, special attention has been paid to develop new encryption methods
that ensure information confidentiality during the complete process of host encryption,
transmission and client decryption. Since the optical encryption scheme based on double
random phase keys was proposed in [1] some modifications of this initial proposal [2-6] and a
number of other ciphering techniques have been developed [7-12]. Recently, a report on
cryptanalysis [13] has shown certain vulnerability of double random phase based ciphering
techniques to some given attacks due to the linearity of the encryption scheme. For this
reason, thorough analysis of ciphering techniques and further development of encryption
methods are required to consider a system to be secure.
The common objective of the aforementioned contributions is to keep a piece of
information in secrecy. Other research papers have pointed out the need of encoding multiple
primary images either for holographic optical storage [2,4,14-17] or, very recently, for
increasing the reliability of the security system [18]. Focusing on this latter contribution,
different categories of identity signals or factors are combined to produce a multifactor
authentication that only gives positive verification when the whole set of signals are identified
[18,19] achieving an attractive proposal for high-security applications with strict identification
requirements.
In a close field, optical identification (ID) tags [20] have been introduced for robust, real-
time and remote identification to enable surveillance or tracking of moving objects, such as
vehicles or parcels on a conveyor belt. From the development of the first proposal, specific
designs for distortion-invariant ID tags were presented [21,22] to allow remote information
readout under the effects of scale variations or/and in-plane rotations. A review of the ID tag
design as well as the influence of different sources of noise can be found in [22,23].
None of the optical techniques introduced in the literature so far handles the situation as a
whole, but partial aspects. As it has been mentioned, some contributions focus on the

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encryption procedure to keep information confidential, others on the object surveillance at a
distance. This paper suggests a new scenario in securing techniques involving remote
identification. We propose a new combination of the multifactor encryption procedure and
optical ID tags to take full advantage of both techniques. Moreover, the reliability of the
security system can be increased by using infrared techniques working together with the
previous ones. We design a novel compact technique for encryption-verification that relates
for the first time the following four elements: multifactor encryption, distortion-invariant ID
tag, near infrared (NIR) readout, and optical processor. A highly-reliable security system is
obtained by joining the advantages of these four elements as it is described in detail in Section
2. In addition to this, the paper also aims to show the remarkable characteristics that the
designed NIR ID tag exhibits, namely distortion-invariance, easy and economical tag building
and increased robustness. They are pointed out by the verification results provided in this
work.
This security system is addressed to tackle situations such as that illustrated in Fig. 1,
which we consider a representative case of others with similar level of complexity and
requirements. Let us consider the surveillance and tracking of classified parcels that have been
confiscated and which are located on a conveyor belt for inspection. This situation may
require the control of a number of elements: the person who is responsible for delivering the
parcels, their origin, their content, and also the destination (place and/or time). Only by
assuring the whole control of all these features, one can be sure that there has not been any
unauthorized manipulation. In this identification task, the four factors to verify belong to both,
the person and the parcel involved in the control process. Regarding the person, a biometric
signal such a retinal scanning can be used as a very stable signature. Information about the
origin and content of the parcel can be stored either in a database or a card. At the same time,
one of the factors of the encryption method can be used as a random key that, for instance,
controls the access of one person to a given area or for a given period of time.

Fig. 1. (1.4 Mb) Movie of classified parcel surveillance by using multifactor authentication and
NIR distortion-invariant optical ID tags (4.4 Mb version).

The information corresponding to the set of chosen factors or primary images has to be
previously encrypted and then, introduced into a NIR ID tag so that it is not recognizable at
the naked eye or using conventional cameras in the visible spectrum. The distortion-invariant

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NIR ID tag will permit the readout of the information from different distances or points of
view, due to the fact that parcels may have different sizes and orientations when passing
through the control machine. In the case shown in Fig. 1, the verification task implies the
multiple AND-validation of the set of input images with respect to the set of primary images
obtained from the ID tag deciphering. The set of input images consists of a biometric, some
signals about the parcel and a random key and they are captured in situ from the person, the
card and a database. Only the satisfactory validation of the whole set of input images will
provide a positive verification. As shown in Fig. 1, tolerance to scratches or other sources of
noise needs to be considered to a certain extent. On the other hand, a system for an automatic
destruction of the ID tag must be applied to prevent tags and parcels from unauthorized
manipulation or tampering.
2. Principles of NIR multifactor ID tag
The main aspects of the compact encryption-verification procedure are presented in detail in
this section. Multifactor encryption permits the simultaneous verification of a number of
factors. This technique has no a priori constraint on the piece of information taken into
account. The images on which the identification is based can be of different category (e.g.
biometric, signatures, matrix bar codes, and alphanumeric sign) and/or imaged in different
spectral bands (e.g. Visible, IR, UV) by using the proper cameras. Remote identification is
achieved using distortion-invariant ID tags. The processor gathers information from different
sources such as from the NIR region. A similar principle inspires the multidimensional optical
sensor described in [24]. The optical processor is based on joint transform pattern recognition
by optical correlation to verify the information. The novel NIR ID tag is experimentally built
and read out. By using commonly available materials, distortion-invariant NIR ID tags are
built so that their content is visible just in the NIR region. It cannot be either copied, scanned,
or captured by any conventional device. Only a receiver with sensitivity to NIR can read out
the NIR ID tag and send the information acquired for decoding, decryption and verification.
Figure 2 depicts a schematic diagram of the procedure steps for the sake of clarity. The
multifactor encryption method is firstly introduced [Fig. 2(a)]; secondly, the distortion-
invariant NIR ID tag design is described; and finally, the information readout and verification
process is presented [Fig. 2(b)].
2.1 Multifactor encryption
The selection of authenticators is a crucial step because the identification of an element
(object or person or both) is based on them. They must uniquely represent the element whose
identity is to be validated on a basis of signal recognition. Frequently, the authenticators are
images such as logotypes, bar codes, alphanumerical signs, signatures, biometric information,
and random sequences. Combining information from different sources reinforces system
security. The principles and the mathematics of the method for a four-factor authentication
were described in [18]. Considering the situation we described in Section 1, our aim is to
simultaneously control and verify classified parcels along with the person responsible for their
delivering. In our system, we choose up to four signatures or factors that contain relevant
information to identify both the person and the parcel, regarding its origin, content and
destination. The primary images to be considered as distinct features to identify a given parcel
and its holder are the following [Fig. 3(a)]:

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 ENCRYPTION + CODIFICATION
Primary Images
N
Biometric Key code E I
N Ciphered Multifactor E Distortion-invariant R
Distribution - NIR Multifactor ID tag
C N ID tag
R C P
Y Magnitude Phase O Rotation-inv. R
s( x) b( x) P D I
Content Origin T I ψ (t ) φψ (t ) N
I N
ψ ( x)
T
O φψ ( x ) G Scale-inv. I
Invisible sign
N N
G
r ( x) n( x )

(a)
N
I
Ciphered Multifactor R
D Distortion-invariant
Distribution - NIR Multifactor ID tag
E ID tag C
C
Magnitude Phase O
A
Rotation-inv.
P
D
I ψ (t ) φψ (t ) T
U
N
ψ ( x) φψ ( x ) G Scale-inv.
R
I
Invisible sign

N
G
Multifactor
Verification Output Input Images
V
Positive Validation E Biometric Key code
R
I
F
I
C q( x) d ( x)
A Content Origin
Not Valid or Tampering Optical T
processor I
O
N
p( x) m( x)

DECODING + VERIFICATION

(b)
Fig. 2. (a) Encryption of multiple primary images and codification into an invisible sign (NIR
ID tag). (b) Readout and verification process.

First, a person biometric, such as fingerprint, face, hand, iris, retinal scan, which are
considered stable biometric signals as they are relatively constant in time. However,
handwriting, voice, gait, are easily alterable. Among all these biometric signals, retina scan is
considered one of the most reliable biometrics, very stable and difficult to alter, so it is taken
into account in our example as one of the identifying factors used to verify the identity of the
person [function s ( x ) in Fig. 3(a)]. This piece of information can be obtained in situ from the
person using a retinal camera in order to check its coincidence with the corresponding
biometric encrypted in the ID tag. Only the most relevant features of the retina scan, which
correspond to the spatial distribution of vessels, are considered in a binary image.
Secondly, two factors may refer to the parcel. One signal to be considered is its content
[ r ( x ) in Fig. 3(a)]. Hazardous substances, explosives, narcotics, fragile items and so on must
be precisely labeled and carefully handled. The origin of the parcel is another data [ n ( x ) in
Fig. 3(a)] to consider, for instance, whether it has been confiscated by the police, at customs,

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or it has been produced in a specific center, etc. This parcel information can be supplied by
the parcel holder using either a card or a database.
Finally, a key code [ b ( x ) in Fig. 3(a)], which is a random phase sequence, is needed to
give the final noisy appearance of the encrypted distribution. It can be used to control the
destination, that is, the unlimited or restricted access to a place on set days, and it is provided
from a database.
Let the four s ( x ) , r ( x ) , b ( x ) and n ( x ) be the set of reference primary images, in one-
dimensional notation for simplicity, to be encrypted in the ID tag as the secret information for
multifactor verification. All the four reference primary images are normalized positive
functions distributed in [0,1]. The complex-amplitude encrypted function ψ ( x) containing
the multifactor authenticators is given by the equation

ψ ( x) = tr + 2 b ( x ) t s ( x )
∗ ∗ F−1 tn ( x) ,
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
(1)

where t f ( x ) = exp { jπ f ( x )} defines the phase-encoded function of image f ( x ) (being

f = s, r, b, n or lineal combinations of them), F
−1 indicates inverse Fourier transform, and *
the convolution operation. The computed complex-valued encrypted distribution ψ ( x)
accomplishes the main features for an encrypted function to be reliable in terms of security:
the set of four signals [Fig. 3(a)] are scrambled together and they remain invisible in the
resulting distribution [Fig. 3(b)], the encrypted function is easy to be computed and
reproduced, and at the same time it is difficult to fake. The ciphered function ψ ( x ) will be
organized in an ID tag that is to be attached to the item (parcel) as we will explain in the
following subsection.

Biometric Parcel Random Parcel

(retinal scanning) content key code origin
s ( x) r ( x) b( x) n ( x)

(a)

Encrypted function ψ ( x) Encrypted function ψ ( x)

(magnitude) (phase distribution)

(b)
Fig. 3. (a). Signatures and key code to be encrypted; (b) Magnitude and phase distribution of
the encrypted multifactor function.

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2.2 Distortion-invariant NIR ID tag
We aim to achieve detection and verification of the encrypted distribution ψ ( x ) , which will
be included in an ID tag, even when the receiver captures it from an unexpected location or
orientation. To do so, the proposed ID tag, which will be attached to the item under
surveillance, should be invariant to distortions such as scale variations and rotations.
Reference [22] offers a deeper insight of the main characteristics that meet the need for more
useful and robust optical ID tags.
Distortion-invariance is achieved by both multiplexing the information included in the ID
tag and taking advantage of the ID tag topology, without unnecessarily increasing the system
complexity [21-22]. The complex-valued function ψ ( x ) obtained from Eq. (1) is to be fully
grayscale encoded. It is convenient to print the phase content of ψ ( x ) in grayscale variations
rather than in phase. Otherwise, the phase content of the encrypted distribution could be easily
neutralized and the ID tag sabotaged if an adhesive transparent tape were stuck on it. For this
reason it is useful to further encode the phase content of the signal in intensity variations.
Thus, we consider encoding both the magnitude and phase in grayscale values [22]. Let us
consider the encrypted function ψ ( x ) in array notation ψ (t ) = ψ (t ) exp { jφψ (t )} where
t = 1, 2,... N and N is the total number of pixels of the ciphered function. We build two real
valued vectors that are to be encoded grayscale: the magnitude vector ψ (t ) and the phase
vector φψ (t ) . The information included in the ID tag can be distributed either in a single [21],
or in two optical codes [22]. In the latter, the real-valued magnitude function and the phase
distribution of ψ (t ) are separately reproduced in the final ID tag. This second representation
makes the authentication process more robust.
The information included in the ID tag is distributed in two circles. Different possibilities
can be considered to rearrange the information contained in these two circles. Fig. 4(a) shows
a possible arrangement of both circles fully reproduced in amplitude. One of them
corresponds to the magnitude of the encrypted function [left circle in Fig. 4(a)]. The other
contains its phase distribution [right circle in Fig. 4(a)]. In both circles the information is
distributed similarly to the structure of a wedge-ring detector. One half of each circle [upper
semicircles in Fig. 4(a)] includes either the magnitude of the phase distribution written in a
radial direction and repeated angularly so that rotation-invariance can be achieved. The other
semicircle of both circles [bottom semicircles in Fig. 4(a)] contains either the magnitude or
the phase written circularly and repeated in concentric rings. Therefore, the information of a
given pixel of the encrypted function will correspond to an angular sector in the optical code.
Thus, the readout of the ciphered information will be tolerant to variations in scale. For
encrypted functions with a large number of pixels, such as our example in Fig. 4(a),
information of the scale-invariant ID tag have to be distributed by using different concentric
semicircles to assure a minimum number of pixels for each sector to recover the information
properly. Consequently, the tolerance to scale variations will be affected in accordance to the
number of concentric circles used in the ID tag.
In an alternative rearrangement, one circle allows the rotation-invariant readout of both
magnitude and phase of the encrypted function and the other circle the scale-invariant readout
of the same signal [23]. The choice of a particular distribution of the signal information
depends on practical considerations of a given problem. A mathematical description of the
distortion-invariant ID tag can be found in [22].
As an additional degree of security we aim to increase the system robustness to
counterfeiting by gathering the data of the ID tag from the NIR region of the spectrum. In
such a way, data is no longer visible at naked eye and only by using the adequate sensor it is
possible to grab the correct information.

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 (a)

(b) (c)
Fig. 4. Optical distortion-invariant ID tag (rotation angle 7 degrees) experimentally captured by
using (a) a NIR XEVA camera and (b) a visible SONY 9100P camera. (c) Reference isosceles
triangle of white spots.

The NIR ID tag is built by printing the ID tag gray level distribution with a common laser
printer on a black cardboard. In the visible spectrum, the whole information is completely
hidden to either the naked eye or common cameras operating in the visible region of the
spectrum [Fig. 4(b)]. In such a way it is not possible to know neither the kind of information
included in the ID tag nor the exact position of this ID tag over the item under surveillance.
Only NIR InGaAs cameras or conventional monochrome CCD cameras without the IR cut-off
filter are able to detect the appropriate information to decode and verify the multifactor
information. Figure 4(a) shows the distortion-invariant ID tag as it is experimentally captured
by a camera sensitive to the NIR spectrum. Scale and rotation invariant regions are clearly
detected. Incandescent illumination was used to capture the images shown in Fig. 4.
Looking again at the movie of Fig. 1, there is a parcel whose ID tag shows some scratches
due to common friction. The redundant information multiplexed in the tag allows signal
verification despite the scratches. On the other hand, there is a different case for which the
parcel suffered an attempt of tampering and the ID tag was cut. In such a case, there is an
auto-destruction mechanism of the ID tag. For example, we have designed a reservoir of black
ink (black in terms of NIR illumination) under the ID tag. When the tag is cut, the ink is
spread throughout it, the tag cannot be properly read, and the processor gives an alarm. The
sequence of images displayed in Fig. 1 shows the last two cases.
2.3 Information readout
The encrypted information is recovered by the procedure described in Fig. 2(b). First, the NIR
ID tag is captured by a NIR sensitive device. Since the receiver resolution is not generally
known a priori, the image of the triangular-shaped pattern consisting of three white spots [Fig.
4(c)] can be used as a reference to know if the receiver has enough resolution to read the
encrypted information. Since the triangle pattern can provide information about scale and
rotation, therefore, one could object that there is no need to codify the encrypted distribution
in the distortion-invariant ID tag. However, we must take into account that if the encrypted

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function, written in a matrix array, is affected by rotation and/or scale variations, then it needs
to be sampled again and rearranged into the matrix form before decryption. This operation
entails interpolations that can produce errors such as aliasing. For this reason we consider that
the distortion-invariant ID tag, provided it is correctly built, allows more accurate readouts of
the encrypted information under rotation and/or scale variations.
The triangular-shaped pattern permits to allocate the two circles [Fig. 4(c)]. The base of
the isosceles triangle determines the border line between the two sectors of each circle. The
vertex of the triangle distinguishes between the semiplanes where rotation invariance [upper
semiplane in Fig. 4(c)] and scale invariance [bottom semiplane in Fig. 4(c)] are achieved. The
ciphered information in vector notation ψ (t ) can be decoded by reading out the information
of the optical code from either the rotation-invariant or the scale-invariant areas. The
magnitude and phase of the encrypted function are extracted from both circles of the ID tag.
From the semicircles corresponding to the rotation-invariant areas, the magnitude and the
phase could be read out by using a linear array detector placed in any radial direction of the
imaged semicircles [22]. Not only is a single pixel value read along a unique radius, but a set
of different radial codes are read and their median value is computed to increase noise
robustness. From the semicircles corresponding to the scale-invariant areas, the magnitude
and phase in vector notation are recovered by reading out the pixels of the ID tag in
semicircular rings. To minimize errors in the reading process, the median value of a set of
pixels located in neighbor concentric rings in the radial direction are considered. The retrieved
information of the pixels should be written back into matrix notation prior to verify the
multifactor authentication. Following this procedure, the encrypted distribution will be
recovered when the ID tag is captured in its original orientation and size or in rotated or scaled
formats.
Previous works have shown that information redundancy in the design of the ID tag allows
a certain tolerance to the presence of additive noise [22, 23] in the capturing process.
2.4 Verification
Once the encrypted multifactor distribution is retrieved, the verification step is carried out.
Let q ( x ) , p ( x ) , d ( x ) and m ( x ) denote the positive and normalized input images to
compare with the set of reference primary images obtained after deciphering the ID tag.
Simultaneous verification of the complete set of images is done by an optical processor that
combines a nonlinear JTC and a classical 4f-correlator as it is described in Ref. [18]. A variety
of nonlinear techniques [25-28] can be applied during this verification step so that the system
discrimination capability can be adjusted and noise resistance improved, among other
properties. The primary and input images are appropriately introduced into different planes of
the optical processor according to the description of Ref. [18]. When the signatures to
compare coincide with the information included in the ID tag, that is, the multiple AND
condition s ( x ) = q ( x ) AND r ( x ) = p ( x ) AND b ( x ) = d ( x ) AND n ( x ) = m ( x ) is
fulfilled, a positive validation occurs. The term of interest for the multifactor application in
the output plane of the optical processor corresponds to the cross-correlation of
autocorrelation ( AC ) signals given by
* * 2
ACPOF ts ( x )
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
AC PPC tr +2 b ( x )
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
ACCMF Tn ( x ) ,
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
(2)

provided that the phase extraction technique [25] is applied as a nonlinearity. In Eq. (2) the
symbol denotes cross-correlation, subindices CMF (classical matched filter), POF (phase-
only filter), PPC (pure phase correlation) indicate the sort of filter involved in the
autocorrelation signal. A capital T f stands for the Fourier transform of the function in small
t f . A sharp and intense multifactor autocorrelation peak is obtained in the output plane

#86607 - $15.00 USD Received 17 Aug 2007; revised 11 Oct 2007; accepted 15 Oct 2007; published 9 Nov 2007
(C) 2007 OSA 12 November 2007 / Vol. 15, No. 23 / OPTICS EXPRESS 15623
provided the system is free of noise and distortions. Consequently, the information contained
in Eq. (2) allows reinforced security verification by simultaneous multifactor authentication.
If any of the authenticator signals do not coincide with the corresponding reference
primary image, that is s ( x ) ≠ q ( x ) or r ( x ) ≠ p ( x ) or b ( x ) ≠ d ( x ) or n ( x ) ≠ m ( x ) , the
output contains a cross correlation signal that is, in general, broader and less intense than the
multifactor autocorrelation peak of Eq. (2). Furthermore, the key code known by the
processor, b ( x ) , plays an important role in optical security as an additional authenticator with
the properties described in Refs. [1, 3, 29-30].
3. Experimental multifactor validation
3.1 Experimental capturing conditions
To show the feasibility of the proposed compact encryption-verification system, some
experimental results were obtained and analyzed. For practical reasons, we have computed the
encrypted distribution ψ ( x ) using techniques for computer generated holograms (CGH) and
then, also by computer, we have rearranged the information to redistribute it into the two discs
of amplitude and phase that compose the ID tag. A distortion-invariant ID tag containing the
multifactor encrypted information was produced by printing the ID tag using a common
Hewlett Packard laser printer on a black cardboard. The printed ID tag was uniformly
illuminated by ordinary incandescent light bulbs and grabbed lately by a NIR InGaAs camera
[Fig. 4(a)], with sensitivity in the NIR region (900-1700nm). This result shows a feasible way
to obtain NIR ID tags using common materials. Just for comparison the ID tag was also
registered using a monochrome camera sensitive in the visible region of the spectrum [Fig.
4(b)] to show that its content cannot be perceived at naked eye.
3.2 Identification results
The ID tag was experimentally captured, and read out to obtain the encrypted distribution in
matrix notation. The registered ID tag was rotated 7 degrees from horizontal position [Fig.
4(a)]. The scrambled four factors (primary images s ( x ) , r ( x ) , b ( x ) , n ( x ) ) were decrypted
and introduced as a reference for the validation of the set of input images q ( x ) , p ( x ) , d ( x ) ,
m ( x ) . Figure 5 shows the output planes of the processor for different situations that
correspond to the most relevant identification results obtained in the experiment. The
maximum intensity value of the output planes, normalized to the case where a satisfactory
verification is achieved, are summarized in Table 1. In both, Fig. 5 and Table 1, the predicted
ideal results are shown along with the experimental ones for comparison. A high and sharp
multifactor autocorrelation peak is essential for the method to be reliable. This situation
occurs when the system is free of noise and distortions. In practice, image noise particularly
arises when using coherent illumination. It is well known that varieties of non-linear
techniques, useful to adjust the discrimination capabilities of a system and to improve its noise
robustness, do exist. In the present proposal, we have used phase extraction [25-26] as it has
been mentioned in Section 2.4.
The first analyzed case [Fig. 5(a)] corresponds to a positive validation, for which the four
input images coincide with the primary images included in the ID tag. As a result, an intense
and sharp intensity peak projects over a low background on the output plane of the optical
processor. This peak stands for the correct identification of an authorized person and parcel.
The maximum intensity value of this output plane is normalized to one for the sake of
comparison with the following verification results. Also for comparison, the output correlation
signal of the processor is depicted for an ideally captured ID tag and on its side for the
experimentally captured ID tag [Fig. 4(a)].

#86607 - $15.00 USD Received 17 Aug 2007; revised 11 Oct 2007; accepted 15 Oct 2007; published 9 Nov 2007
(C) 2007 OSA 12 November 2007 / Vol. 15, No. 23 / OPTICS EXPRESS 15624
 DISTORTED ID TAG

INPUT IMAGES VERIFICATION OUTPUT

Simulated results Experimental results
q=s p=r d =b m=n

authorized
(set of primary images)
(a)
q=s p=r d =b m≠n

authorized unauthorized

(b)
q≠s p≠r d ≠b m≠n

unauthorized

(c)
SCRATCHED AND DISTORTED ID TAG

INPUT IMAGES VERIFICATION OUTPUT

Simulated results Experimental results
q=s p=r d =b m=n

authorized

(d)

Fig. 5. Experimental and simulated results for the verification system by using distorted NIR
multifactor ID tags: (a) Positive validation when the four identifying factors coincide with the
information included in the ID tag; Negative results obtained when one (b) or more factors (c)
do not coincide with the set of primary images; (d) Positive validation with a partially
scratched ID tag. In all cases, verification outputs are normalized to the positive validation (a).

#86607 - $15.00 USD Received 17 Aug 2007; revised 11 Oct 2007; accepted 15 Oct 2007; published 9 Nov 2007
(C) 2007 OSA 12 November 2007 / Vol. 15, No. 23 / OPTICS EXPRESS 15625
 When the parcel origin does not match the one included in the ID tag [Fig. 5(b)], the
obtained output plane shows an insignificant intensity peak that hardly projects over the
background. An appropriate threshold value will indicate that the verification process is not
satisfied due to the fact that one factor corresponds to an unauthorized signal.
If another signal among the four factors (biometric, parcel content or key code) or even the
whole set of input images does not correspond to the set introduced into the ID tag, the
resulting output planes are very similar to the one plotted in Fig. 5(c). As an example, we
show the result obtained for four unauthorized signals. A low energy background is produced
at the system output.
Finally, if the ID tag is slightly scratched due to friction [Fig. 5(d)], a positive verification
result is still obtained when the whole set of input images coincides with the authorized
factors included in the ID tag as it is proved by the sharp and intense peak that projects on the
output plane.
Table 1 summarizes the numerical results obtained for the analyzed authentication tasks. A
positive validation is only obtained when the four input images match the primary images
contained in the ID tag. If one or more input images do not coincide with the set of primary
images, a negative result is obtained in the verification process.
In all the analyzed examples, there is a satisfactory agreement between the experimental
and the predicted verification results.

Table 1. Experimental and simulated results for the multifactor verification system. The maximum intensity peak
value of the output plane of the verification system is given for different situations. Values are normalized to the
positive validation which is when the four factors coincide with the authorized factors included in the captured ID tag.

All input images Just one input image fails None

coincide q≠s p≠r d ≠b m≠n coincides

Simulated 1.0 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.18 0.01

Experimental 1.0 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.30 0.07
Result Validation Rejection

4. Conclusions
This paper suggests a new scenario in securing techniques involving remote identification. A
compact encryption-verification technique has been proposed for highly-secure identification
systems. It relies on the combination of a multifactor encryption method, NIR ID tags and a
joint pattern recognition-based optical processor. The distortion-invariant NIR ID tag, which
has a non visible signal, can be built by using commonly available materials so that it is only
captured in the NIR spectral region. ID tag designing is smart: distortion-invariant, NIR ID
tag printing on a black cardboard just using a laser printer, and increased robustness are the
remarkable characteristics this kind of tag exhibits. Experimental verification results have
been shown to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposal and their agreement with the ideally
predicted results obtained by numerical simulation. We have shown that our system is robust
against scratches produced by common friction or handling, though it can be sensitive to cuts
of the ID tag caused by non-authorized manipulation.
The proposed system is an attractive tool for highly secure authentication tasks. The
surveillance and tracking of classified parcels along with the identification of the person
responsible for transferring the parcel has been shown as an example of a high-demanding
security task. But this is not the only case. Other situations can also benefit from this
encryption-verification system. For instance, this proposal can be also applied to the control of
vehicle access to restricted areas. If there is a strict need of security, it would be necessary to
identify both the vehicle as well as its driver for a given day and place. Several pieces of
information such as a biometric of the driver along with the plate number and/or the tire

#86607 - $15.00 USD Received 17 Aug 2007; revised 11 Oct 2007; accepted 15 Oct 2007; published 9 Nov 2007
(C) 2007 OSA 12 November 2007 / Vol. 15, No. 23 / OPTICS EXPRESS 15626
pattern could be verified to increase security. The encrypted multifactor information would be
placed in an ID tag. Distortions could appear if the ID tag readout is made at a distance. Thus,
ID tags used to identify vehicles should also be read even though they were captured under
some type of scale variation or rotation.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to Dr. E. Valencia for preparing the multimedia file and to an
anonymous reviewer for some insightful comments.
This work has been funded by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER
(project DPI2006-05479).

#86607 - $15.00 USD Received 17 Aug 2007; revised 11 Oct 2007; accepted 15 Oct 2007; published 9 Nov 2007
(C) 2007 OSA 12 November 2007 / Vol. 15, No. 23 / OPTICS EXPRESS 15627