City of Davao vs.

Intestate Estate of Dalisay

Facts: The properties of the Estate of Amado S. Dalisay were forfeited for nonpayment of estate taxes. 5 properties
were acquired by the City Government of Davao pursuant to Sec. 263 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) on
July 19 2004.On Sept. 11 2006 Respondent inquired for the balance needed to pay for the redemption and tendered
such paymenton Sept. 13 2006 in the RTC after refusal of the City to accept stating the 1 year period had already
expired. The City Treasurer issued the subject five Declarations of Forfeiture only on September 13, 2006.

Issue: WON the redemption period starts upon the date of the sale or upon the date of the issuance of the declarati
on of forfeiture?

Held: The phrases “…date of such forfeiture…” is construed to mean upon the date of the sale. The term “such” was
phrased to avoid repetition and to mean the entire legal process of auction. The redemption period was deemed ex
pired and Respondent’s claim is dismissed.
Although these laws are to be construed liberally in favor of the redeemer there is also a statutory prescription of
rights. The evidence that respondents only pursued to ask of the balance only almost a year after the annotation or
a year after the auction sale proves they were negligent and sleeping on their rights.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS:

The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups
and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under
the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections

December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng
Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB
was denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.

13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013
issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to
determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections
have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).

39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to include the
names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court
issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.
ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:

No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the
qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who
are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms
of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties
for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral
party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties
representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the
end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any
class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral
parties.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their
only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
 Pelaez vs Auditor General

undue delegation of legislative power

Caption: PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23825 15 SCRA 569 December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Facts:

The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the
margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present
special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him,
as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.”

Issues:

Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Discussions:

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the
same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.

Rulings:

Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which
he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less power
over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the
process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that
which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

— CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, POLITICAL LAW —

 Vigilar vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, Jan. 18, 2011 Immunity from Suit
DECEMBER 4, 2017

FACTS:

Aquino was invited by DPWH to a bidding for the construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the Porac River at

Barangay Ascomo-Pulungmasle, Guagua, Pampanga. Aquino was subsequently awarded the “Contract of

Agreement” by the said government agency.

By 9 July 1992, the project was duly completed by respondent, who was then issued a Certificate of Project

Completion dated 16 July 1992. However, claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but petitioners refused to

pay the amount. He thus filed a Complaint for the collection of sum of money with damages before the Regional

Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. Petitioners, for their part, set up the defense that the Complaint was a suit against

the state; that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and that the “Contract of Agreement”

covering the project was void for violating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the proper appropriation and the

Certificate of Availability of Funds.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioners (DPWH) then appealed the case before the CA which

ruled in their favor, declaring the contract null and void ab initio but ordered compensation to Aquino for worked

delivered, subject to Commission on Audit rules. Unsatisfied with the CA’s decision, Petitioners then raised the issue

before the Supreme Court seeking complete dismissal of the case without paying Aquino any money.

ISSUE:

Was the doctrine of sovereign immunity properly invoked?

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court said that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument

for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. Citing their decision in EPG Construction (G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001,

354 SCRA 566), the court said that it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable if the respondent is not
 duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public

have received benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor. The Court

further said that the no government agency or agent can conveniently hide under the State’s cloak of invincibility

against suit, because this principle has limitations especially when that the ends of justice would be subverted if we

were to uphold, in this particular instance, the State’s immunity from suit. The Court finally said that in this case, it

can’t be an instrument of injustice by upholding the immunity from suit principle and affirmed the decision of the

Court of Appeals.

CASE DIGEST: Leonardo Paat vs CA G.R. no. 111107 (266 SCRA 167)
Concept: Doctrine of Prior Resort

Facts:
· May19, 1989. The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR because the driver of the truck was not able
to produce the required documents for the forest products.
· Jovitio Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), issued an order of confiscation
of the truck and gave the owner 15 days to submit an explanation. Owner was not able to sumbit an explanation
and the order of the CENRO was enforced.
· The issue was brought to the secretary of the DENR. While pending, the owner filed a suit for replevin against the
Layugan. Layugan filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the owner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Trial court ruled in favor of the owner. CA sustained Trial Court’s decision

Issue: W/ON the trial court has jurisdiction?

Held. No. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.

YNOT v. IAC

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an
absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose)
and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall
be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six
(6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above
order. He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the
merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced, directed
theconfiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of
want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar
as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following mustbe present: (a) that the interests of the public,
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626
complies with the above requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a directrelevance
to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary
for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those
seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those
still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same
lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not
clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if
assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts to
outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed
and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the
government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as
summaryabatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and
urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition
of the confiscated property also presents a case of invaliddelegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned
(Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and
reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead,
they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even
corruption.

People vs Vera

undue delagation of power; equal protection of the law

Caption: PEOPLE VS VERA

G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.

Facts:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for new
trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to
the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent
of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office.
The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation
because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards
the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if
Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection
of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of
power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon
because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:

1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated
to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards
any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice
Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to
exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority
extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal protection,
to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class.

Rulings:

1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The
provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section
of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those
now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall
apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the
hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it
has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial
to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one
province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province
may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but
not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to
enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province
would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all
the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their
respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be
in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BIENVENIDO ARCAYOS
G.R. NO. 130866
SEPTEMBER 16, 1998

Facts: Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for misappropriating funds worth
Php 38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal
was illegal, respondent filed a case against St. Martin Funeral Homes in the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).

Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an employee due to the lack of an
employer-employee contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on St. Martin’s monthly payroll.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no employer-employee relationship
between the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal in such a situation.

The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and remanded the case to the labor
arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the
Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme Court.

Held: No.
Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the Secretary of Labor, whose decisions are then appealable
to the Office of the President. However, the new rules do not anymore provide provisions regarding appellate review
for decisions rendered by the NLRC.

However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to review such decisions from the NLRC by virtue
of their role under the check and balance system and the perceived intention of the legislative body who enacted the
new rules.

“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the
administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of
the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”

The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should have been filed initially
to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the Court of Appeals.