1:

Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales,

Clerk of Court, Metropolitan

Trial Court of Manila

A.M. No. P-08-2519

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P)

And

Anonymous Letter-Complaint

against Clerk of Court Atty. Henry P. Favorito of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Clerk of Court Atty.
Miguel Morales of Branch 17, Clerk of Court Amie Grace Arreola of Branch 4, Administrative Officer III
William Calda of the Office of the Clerk of Court and Stenographer Isabel Siwa of Branch 16, all of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila.

A.M. No. P-08-2520

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P)

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

REYES,

DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 19, 2008

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court are two anonymous complaints: docketed as A.M. No. P-08-2519 charging Atty. Miguel
Morales (Atty. Morales), Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 17, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila of
misconduct; and A.M. No. P-08-2520 charging Atty. Morales, together with Isabel Siwa (Siwa), Court
Stenographer, Branch 16; William Calda (Calda), Administrative Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC); Amie Grace Arreola (Arreola), Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 4, and Atty. Henry P. Favorito (Atty.
Favorito), Clerk of Court VI, OCC, all of the MeTC, Manila of misconduct, graft and corruption and
moonlighting.

A.M. No. P-08-2519

In an unsigned and undated letter which the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received on
February 24, 2005, the writers, who claim to be employees of the OCC-MeTC of Manila, allege that Atty.
Morales, then detailed at the OCC, was consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal
cases, such as administrative cases against employees in his old sala, using office supplies, equipment
and utilities. The writers aver that Atty. Moraless conduct has demoralized them and they resorted to
filing an anonymous complaint in fear of retaliation from Atty. Morales.[1]

Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) now Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. dela Cruz,
conducted a discreet investigation on March 8, 2005 to verify the allegations of the complaint. However,
since the office of Atty. Morales was located at the innermost section of the Docket/Appeals Section of
the OCC, DCA Dela Cruz failed to extensively make an observation of the actuations of Atty. Morales. On
March 16, 2005, a spot investigation was conducted by DCA Dela Cruz together with four NBI agents, a
crime photographer and a support staff. The team was able to access the personal computer of Atty.
Morales and print two documents stored in its hard drive, a Petition for Relief from Judgment for the
case entitled, Manolo N. Blanquera, et al. v. Heirs of Lamberto N. Blanquera in the name of Atty. Jose P.
Icaonapo, Jr. (Atty. Icaonapo) filed with the Court of Appeals, and a Pre-trial Brief for the case entitled,
Pentacapital Investment Corp. v. Toyoharu Aoki, et al. also in the name of Atty. Icaonapo, which was filed
before Branch 1, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila. Atty. Morales's computer was seized and taken to the
custody of the OCA.[2] Upon Atty. Morales's motion however, the Court ordered the release of said
computer with an order to the Management Information Systems Office of the Supreme Court to first
retrieve the files stored therein.[3]

Atty. Morales filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. against DCA
Dela Cruz and his companions for alleged conspiracy and culpable violation of Secs. 1,[4] 2[5] & 3[6] of
Art. III of the Constitution relative to the spot investigation. Said letter-complaint was indorsed by the
Chief Justice to the Court Administrator on March 31, 2005 for appropriate action.[7] Atty. Morales's
wife, Francisca Landicho-Morales also filed a letter-complaint dated February 15, 2005 against Judge
Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge of MeTC Branch 16 Manila, Lenin Bravo, former Clerk of the said branch
and Judge Cristina Javalera-Sulit, Presiding Judge of MeTC Branch 18, Manila for violations of the law and
ethical standards which was indorsed by Chief Justice Davide to the Court Administrator for preliminary
inquiry.[8] Although diligent efforts were made to ascertain from the OCA Legal Office the current status
of Atty. Morales's case against DCA Dela Cruz, the same however, could not be determined.

Parenthetically, Atty. Favorito, together with more than a hundred employees of the MeTC Manila, wrote
an undated letter to Chief Justice Davide assailing the spot investigation conducted by DCA Dela Cruz.[9]
Said letter was indorsed by Chief Justice Davide to DCA Dela Cruz on March 28, 2005 for his comment.
[10] No comment can be found in the records of herein administrative cases.
In a 1st Indorsement dated April 14, 2005, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) directed Atty. Morales to comment on the undated anonymous
letter-complaint.[11]

In his Manifestation which the OCA received on April 27, 2005, Atty. Morales alleged that: the
anonymous letter-complaint should not have been given due course as there is no truth to the
allegations therein; the OCA took almost a year to act on the anonymous letter-complaint which did not
have the proper indorsement from the Office of the Chief Justice; even though he brought to the OCC his
personal computer, such act is not prohibited; he did not use his computer to write pleadings during
office hours and neither did he use paper of the OCC; the raid conducted by DCA Dela Cruz without
search and seizure orders violated his right to privacy and the articles seized therewith should be
considered inadmissible.[12]

In a letter dated April 12, 2005, Atty. Morales applied for optional retirement[13] which the Court
approved in its Resolution dated October 12, 2005 subject to the withholding of his benefits pending
resolution of cases against him, the instant case included.[14]

A.M. No. P-08-2520

In another unsigned letter dated April 1, 2004, the writers who claim to be employees of the OCC-MeTC,
Manila, charge Atty. Morales, Arreola, Atty. Favorito, Calda and Siwa of the following offenses: Atty.
Morales and Arreola, who are both detailed in the OCC, leave the office after logging-in only to return in
the afternoon, which acts are allowed by Atty. Favorito; Atty. Morales and Arreola were not given
assignments and whenever they are at the office, they do nothing but play computer games; Siwa is also
allowed by Atty. Favorito to lend money and rediscount checks during office hours using court premises;
many people from different offices go to the OCC because of the business of Siwa; Atty. Favorito also
allows two of Siwa's personal maids to use the OCC as their office in rediscounting checks; and Atty.
Favorito and Calda charge P50.00 to P500.00 from sureties claiming said amounts to be processing fees
without issuing receipts therefor.[15]

In the same spot investigation conducted by DCA De La Cruz on March 16, 2005, a partly hidden plastic
box was discovered containing the amount of P65,390.00 and six commercial checks, which Siwa
voluntarily opened to the team. These were also confiscated and turned over to the custody of the OCA.
[16]
In a letter to then Chief Justice Davide dated April 12, 2005, Siwa requested that said money and
personal belongings that were confiscated be returned to her immediately and that a formal
investigation be conducted regarding DCA Dela Cruz's conduct during the spot investigation.[17] The
seized items were later returned to Siwa[18] while her letter-complaint was indorsed by the Chief Justice
to the Court Administrator on April 18, 2005 for appropriate action.[19] As with the complaint filed by
Atty. Morales, however, the status of Siwa's complaint could not be ascertained despite diligent efforts at
inquiring about the matter from the OCA Legal Office.

In a 1st Indorsement dated April 14, 2005, the OCA directed Atty. Morales, Atty. Favorito, Calda, Arreola
and Siwa to comment on the letter-complaint.[20]

Atty. Morales submitted the same Manifestation he submitted in A.M. P-08-2519.

Siwa in her Comment avers that: the anonymous letter-complaint should not have been given due
course as it contravened Sec. 46(c) of Executive Order No. 292 and the implementing rules; it was not
subscribed and sworn to by the complainant and there is no obvious truth to the allegations therein;
while she admits that she is involved in the business of rediscounting checks, such is a legitimate
endeavor, in fact, there are other employees of the court engaged in the same business; she is also not
aware of any rule prohibiting her from engaging in said endeavor; she does not use the OCC to conduct
her business and she is mindful of her duties as a government employee; thus, she has a staff to do the
encashment of the checks; there were rare occasions when her staff members were stationed at the
corridors to lend cash to employees but while said occasions may have occurred during office hours, her
staff cannot be blamed for the same since the employees go to them; she has never neglected her duty
as a court stenographer -- in fact, her last performance rating was very satisfactory; it is a known fact
that because of the meager pay given to government employees, most augment their income by
engaging in business; she should not be singled out for being enterprising and industrious; and it is
unfair to accuse her of wrongdoing at a time when she has voluntarily retired from government service
due to health reasons.[21]

A month after the incident, Siwa filed for optional retirement[22] which the Court approved in its
Resolution[23] dated October 12, 2005, with the proviso that the amount of P30,000.00 shall be retained
from the money value of her earned leave credits pending resolution of the present case.

Calda explains in his letter dated April 25, 2005 that: the fees of P50.00 and P500.00 were charged in
connection with the filing of surety and cash bonds pursuant to Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court
and that corresponding official receipts were issued; at nighttime, he is the one authorized to approve
the filing of surety bonds since he is the highest ranking officer of a skeletal force detailed for night court
duty; he has been with the MeTC for 16 years, rose in rank, was never involved in any controversy and
would never tarnish his reputation.[24]

Arreola asserts that: her record of arrival and departure was always signed by her superiors without
question because it reflected the correct entries; she is always in the office even when there is typhoon;
and she has proven herself useful in the OCC by answering queries of litigants and verifications from
other offices and attending to complaints.[25]

In compliance, Atty. Favorito adopted the comments of Atty. Morales, Calda and Arreola and denied that
he committed the acts alluded to in the anonymous letter-complaint.[26] Atty. Favorito also incorporated
in his comment a letter of the employees of the OCC-MTC Manila disowning the alleged anonymous
complaint.[27]

In a Resolution dated July 27, 2005, the Court, upon recommendation of the OCA, consolidated the two
complaints and referred the same to the Executive Judge of the MeTC, Manila for investigation, report
and recommendation.[28]

Report of the Investigating Judge

In her Report dated September 1, 2006, MeTC Executive Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta
states that discreet observation of the daily working activities of Atty. Morales and Siwa could no longer
be done as the two had already availed themselves of their optional retirement; thus, random interviews
with employees who had proximate working activities with them were resorted to, as well as perusal of
court records.[29]

The following employees were interviewed: Rueben Duque, Clerk of Court, Branch 16, MeTC; Beneluz
Dumlao, Records Officer I; Marilou Magbag, Clerk III; Estrella Rafael, Records Officer I; Lydia dela Cruz,
Records Officer III; Raymundo Bilbao, Clerk III; Marie Joy Valle, Clerk IV, and Ma. Lizabeth Marcelino,
Administrative Officer II, all of the OCC; Rosie Jose, freelance bondswoman, and Norberto D. Soriano,
authorized representative of the Commonwealth Insurance Company.[30]
After conducting her investigation, Judge Estoesta found:

Insofar as Atty. Morales, Atty. Favorito, Calda and Arreola are concerned, the investigation immediately
stumbled into a dead end. No one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a
categorical and positive statement affirming the charges against the said personnel. While almost all
confirmed that Atty. Morales maintained his own computer and printer at the OCC, nobody could state
for certain that what he worked on were pleadings for private cases. Rafael, who was seated right next to
Atty. Morales at the OCC merely said that what preoccupied Atty. Morales were his own administrative
cases. She did not notice Atty. Morales engage in private work in his computer although she saw Atty.
Icaonapo drop by the office every now and then to personally see Atty. Morales. Rafael explained
however that this could be because Atty. Icaonapo was the counsel of Atty. Morales in his administrative
cases. While documents referring to private cases were found in the hard drive of the computer of Atty.
Morales, and while the writing style is similar to that of the Manifestation he filed in this case, still no
definite conclusion could be drawn that he has composed the said pleadings at the OCC during official
working hours. A close examination of the Pre-Trial Brief signed by Atty. Icaonapo and filed with the RTC
Branch 1, Manila also revealed that the paper and the printer used were not the same as that used in
the office of Atty. Morales.[31]

There was also no evidence to support charges of extortion against Atty. Favorito and Calda. Two
bondsmen who were randomly interviewed denied that Atty. Favorito and Calda exacted illegal sums
from them. The amounts they charged could actually refer to legal fees.[32]

As to Arreola, the charge against her also has no basis. The interviewees were unanimous in saying that
Arreola was always around the office, and that while she fetched her son from a nearby school, she did
so during lunch or after office hours. Random checks on Arreola also revealed that she was always at the
OCC and at Branch 30 where she was reassigned.[33]

As to Siwa, she candidly admitted that she was engaged in lending and discounting activities at her
station, through her own staff which she had maintained for said purpose. Because of her business, a
number of employees, even those from other government agencies, usually huddled at her station to
hold transactions. Branch Clerk of Court Ruben Duque relates that a number of people would often go to
their office looking for Siwa for lending and rediscounting. Assuming that Siwa is not prohibited from
engaging in said business, still it has distracted her from her duties as a stenographer. A random check on
the court records of Branch 16 showed that Siwa had not yet submitted a complete transcription of 7
stenographic notes in 5 cases, 3 of which already had decisions rendered. In one case, the testimonies of
two prosecution witnesses had to be re-taken to fill in the gap which not only wasted precious time of
the court but also distressed the efforts of the prosecution in the presentation of its case.[34]

Judge Estoesta recommended as follows:

1. In OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P [now A.M. No. P-08-2519], with no substantial evidence taken to prove the
charges in the anonymous letter-complaint filed against Atty. Miguel C. Morales, it is RECOMMENDED
that the same be ordered dismissed;

2. In OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P [now A.M. No. P-2520], likewise, with no substantial evidence taken to
prove the charges in the anonymous letter-complaint filed against Atty. Miguel C. Morales, Atty. Henry P.
Favorito, William Calda and Amie Grace Arreola, it is RECOMMENDED that the same be ordered
dismissed insofar as said court employees are concerned; and

3. In OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P [now A.M. No. P-08-2520] insofar as it concerns Ms. Isabel Siwa, it is
RECOMMENDED that she be directed to explain why she still has stenographic notes pending for
transcription despite having already availed of an optional retirement pay.[35]

The report was referred to the OCA for its evaluation, report and recommendation.[36]

OCA Report and Recommendation

The OCA, through ACA Antonio H. Dujua, in its November 7, 2007 Memorandum, states that it does not
entirely concur with the findings and recommendation of Judge Estoesta.

Instead the OCA submits the following findings.

On Atty. Morales: The allegation that Atty. Morales had been using his personal computer to draft
pleadings for private counsels was established in the spot inspection on March 16, 2005. The hard drive
of Atty. Moraless computer yielded a pre-trial brief and a petition for relief from judgment with the
name of Atty. Icaonapo. The said pre-trial brief was the same pleading that was submitted to RTC Branch
1, Manila by Atty. Icaonapo on February 10, 2003. Atty. Morales in his Manifestation dated April 25, 2005
failed to refute the evidence that emanated from his computer and instead chided the OCA for
confiscating the same.

On Siwa: While she insisted that the anonymous letter should not have been given due course, she
admitted in her April 28, 2005 Manifestation to being involved in the business of rediscounting checks,
claiming that she was not the only employee engaged in the same, and that she maintained her own
personnel to do the rediscounting which stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC where Atty.
Favorito is the Clerk of Court.[37]

The OCA concluded that: Atty. Morales and Siwa should be found guilty of gross misconduct. Atty.
Morales, for preparing pleadings for private counsels and litigants; and Siwa, for engaging in the business
of rediscounting checks during office hours; gross misconduct carries the penalty of dismissal from the
service even for the first offense, and while Atty. Morales and Siwa have already left the judiciary, the
Court can still direct the forfeiture of their benefits; Atty. Favorito should also be held liable for neglect of
duty because as Clerk of Court of the MeTC-OCC, he was negligent in allowing the nefarious activities of
Atty. Morales and Siwa to happen right inside the confines of the MeTC-OCC.[38]

On Arreola and Calda: The OCA agrees with Judge Estoesta that the charges against them should be
dismissed for lack of concrete evidence.[39]

The OCA then recommended:

(a) That (resigned) Clerk of Court Miguel C. Morales, Branch 17, and (retired) Court Stenographer Isabel
A. Siwa, Branch 16, both of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila be found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct
with forfeiture of the benefits due them excluding accrued leave credits;

(b) That Clerk of Court Henry P. Favorito of the MeTC-OCC, Manila be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of
Duty and suspended without pay for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely; and

(c) That the charges made in the April 1, 2004 anonymous letter against Clerk of Court Amie Grace A.
Arreola, Branch 4 and Administrative Officer III William Calda, OCC, both of the MeTC, Manila be
DISMISSED for lack of merit.[40]
The Court's Ruling.

The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA with some modifications.

An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown
author. Such a complaint, however does not justify outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded
for the allegations therein may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and
established by other competent evidence. Indeed, complainants identity would hardly be material where
the matter involved is of public interest.[41]

Liability of Atty. Morales.

The two anonymous letters charge Atty. Morales with the following offenses: attending to personal cases
while using official time, office supplies, equipment and utilities, leaving the office after logging-in in the
morning only to return in the afternoon, and playing computer games whenever he was at the office.

It is undisputed that pleadings for private cases were found in Atty. Morales's personal computer in the
MeTC-OCC and Atty. Morales could not provide any satisfactory explanation therefor. Such fact, by itself,
could already make Atty. Morales liable for simple misconduct for it hints of impropriety on his part. The
Court has always stressed that all members of the judiciary should be free from any whiff of impropriety,
not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as
private individuals, in order that the integrity and good name of the courts of justice shall be preserved.
[42]

Atty. Morales, in defense, argues that since the pleadings were acquired from his personal computer
which DCA Dela Cruz confiscated without any valid search and seizure order, such evidence should be
considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his right to privacy.

Both the Investigating Justice and the OCA failed to discuss this matter. The Court however finds it
proper to squarely address such issue, without prejudice to the outcome of the administrative case filed
by Atty. Morales against DCA Dela Cruz regarding the same incident. The finding of guilt or exoneration
of Atty. Morales hinges on this very crucial question: Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal
computer admissible in the present administrative case against him?

The Court answers in the negative.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is provided for under Section 2, Article III
thereof.[43] The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution also bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.[44] The fact that the present case is
administrative in nature does not render the above principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta v.
Court of Appeals,[45] any violation of the aforestated constitutional right renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

There are exceptions to this rule one of which is consented warrantless search.[46]

DCA Dela Cruz in his report claims that that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the
consent of Atty. Morales.[47] The Court finds however that such allegation on his part, even with a
similar allegation from one of his staff,[48] is not sufficient to make the present case fall under the
category of a valid warrantless search.

Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.[49]
It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.[50] The burden
of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was
freely and voluntarily given lies with the State.[51] Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not
to be presumed and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights.[52] To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right.[53]

In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish his right.
While he may have agreed to the opening of his personal computer and the printing of files therefrom,
in the presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during the March 16, 2005 spot
investigation, it is also of record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case against said
persons questioning the validity of the investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court employee,
unfortunately, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it
violated his constitutional right.

As the Court has staunchly declared:

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights
as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why
the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.

The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of rights, next
only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is protected by the due
process clause. This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom advocates, the right
to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against
unreasonable search and seizure includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while
existing.

xxxx

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford
full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still
it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.[54]

And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated
personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court has no choice but to
dismiss the charges herein against him for insufficiency of evidence.
Liability of Siwa.

The Court agrees with the OCA that Siwa should be administratively disciplined for engaging in the
business of lending and rediscounting checks.

Siwa admits engaging in the business of lending and rediscounting checks, claiming that it was a
legitimate endeavor needed to augment her meager income as a court employee; that she is not aware
of any rule prohibiting her from engaging in the business of rediscounting checks; that there are other
employees engaged in the same business; and that she employs her own staff to do the encashment of
the checks as she always attends to and never neglects her duties as a stenographer.[55]

Siwa is clearly mistaken.

Officials and employees of the judiciary are prohibited from engaging directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession even outside office hours to ensure that full-time officers of the court render full-
time service so that there may be no undue delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition
of cases.[56] The nature of work of court employees requires them to serve with the highest degree of
efficiency and responsibility and the entire time of judiciary officials and employees must be devoted to
government service to ensure efficient and speedy administration of justice.[57] Indeed, the Court has
always stressed that court employees must strictly observe official time and devote every second
moment of such time to public service.[58] And while the compensation may be meager, that is the
sacrifice judicial employees must be willing to take.

As pronounced by the Court in Biyaheros Mart Livelihood Association, Inc. v. Cabusao, Jr.:

Government service demands great sacrifice. One who cannot live with the modest salary of a public
office has no business staying in the service. He is free to seek greener pastures elsewhere. The public
trust character of the office proscribes him from employing the facilities or using official time for private
business or purposes.[59]

Siwa's offense is compounded by the fact that she was previously verbally instructed by her superior,
MeTC Branch 16 Presiding Judge Crispin B. Bravo, to stop using court premises for her business. But she
ignored the same, prompting the latter to issue a written Memorandum dated January 18, 2005 asking
her to explain why she was still using the office in transacting/attending to her lending and rediscounting
business when she was already verbally instructed to desist therefrom in December 2004.[60]

Siwa apologized and promised not to let it happen again, in her letter dated January 21, 2005.[61] Siwa
also admitted that she was using her house-helper in the rediscounting of checks and allowed the latter
to use the court premises in the conduct of the same.[62]

Her allegation that she never neglected her duty as a stenographer is also belied by the findings of the
Investigating Judge, who in her random check of records, discovered that Siwa had not yet submitted a
complete transcription of 7 stenographic notes in 5 cases (3 criminal and 2 civil cases), in three of which
decisions were already rendered.[63] In one case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses had to
be re-taken.[64] Thus, contrary to Siwa's assertion, she was not able to satisfactorily perform her duties
as a court stenographer while engaging in private business.

Her argument that her business is a legal endeavor also cannot excuse her from liability. Many
moonlighting activities pertain to legal acts that otherwise would be countenanced if the actors were not
employed in the public sector. And while moonlighting is not normally considered a serious misconduct,
nonetheless, by the very nature of the position held, it amounts to a malfeasance in office.[65]

Siwa conducted her business within the court's premises, which placed the image of the judiciary, of
which she is part, in a bad light. Time and again, the Court has held that the image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat; thus the conduct of
a person serving the judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum, and be
above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary.[66]

Siwa's infraction constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service which, under Sec. 52 A
(20) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, carries the penalty of
suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
Since this is her first offense and considering the October 12, 2005 Resolution of the Court in A.M. No.
12096-Ret. which approved Siwa's application for optional retirement, retaining only the amount of
P30,000.00 from the money value of her earned leave credits pending resolution of the instant case, the
Court finds she should be imposed the penalty of fine in the amount of P30,000.00.

Liability of Atty. Favorito.

There is no evidence to show that Atty. Favorito knows or should have known that Atty. Morales had
copies of pleadings for private cases in his personal computer for which Atty. Favorito could be held
liable for neglect of duty as supervisor. As to Siwa's lending and rediscounting activities, however, the
Court finds that Atty. Favorito was remiss in addressing said matter which activity took place in the
court's premises which was under his responsibility.

Clarifications, however, should be made.

The OCA in its Memorandum dated November 7, 2007 stated that:

x x x in her April 28, 2005 Manifestation, Siwa admitted to being involved in the business of
rediscounting checks, claiming that 'she is not the only employee engaged in the same business.'
Respondent [Siwa] even had the audacity to admit that she 'maintained my own personnel' to do the
rediscounting which stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC, where respondent Favorito is the Clerk
of Court.[67] (Emphasis supplied)

A review of the records, however, would show that what Siwa submitted is not a Manifestation but a
Comment dated April 28, 2005 and there, instead of stating that her rediscounting activities stretched to
the premises of the MeTC-OCC, she actually denied that she used the OCC to conduct said business.
Pertinent portions of said Comment reads:

4.1. Respondent admits that she is involved in the business of rediscounting checks x x x.

xxxx

4.2. Respondent, however, denies that she uses the Office of the Clerk of Court to conduct this business
x x x.

4.3. There are other occasions when the said staff will be stationed at the corridors to lend emergency
cash to employees in need. The said occasions may have occurred during office hours, for which, the
respondent's staff may not be blamed since it was the employees themselves who go to them. However,
these instances were rare. It should also be emphasized that these transactions occurred outside of the
offices and within the common or public areas.[68] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Siwa never admitted that her business stretched to the premises of the OCC-MeTC but only
claimed that her staff used corridors which were common or public areas for their transactions.

Still, Atty. Favorito failed to address such matter and to prevent such activities from taking place, even if
they were conducted in the corridors, since such areas are still part of the court's premises. As Clerk of
Court of the OCC, it is Atty. Favorito's duty to plan, direct, supervise and coordinate the activities of all
divisions/sections/units in the OCC.[69] He should therefore be reprimanded for his failure to duly
supervise and prevent such activities from happening within his area of responsibility.

Liability of Atty. Favorito and Calda on the extortion charges.

On the claim that Atty. Favorito and Caldo extorted money from sureties without issuing receipts
therefor, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the Investigating Judge and the
OCA.

Investigating Judge Estoesta found that:

x x x the charges of extortion levelled against Atty. Henry P. Favorito and Mr. William Calda x x x suffered
from loose ends.

Random interviews with two (2) bondsmen denied that Atty. Favorito and Mr. Calda exacted such
amounts.

The P50.00 and P500.00 specified to as processing fee could actually refer to the Legal Fees mandated
under Section 8 (o) and Section 21 (c) of Rule 141, as follows x x x

Here, it is obvious that the anonymous letter-complainant has no understanding whatsoever of the legal
fees charged by Office of the Clerk of Court.
This actually hints of the fact that said anonymous letter-complainant may not be a personnel of the
Office of the Clerk of Court after all.

The extortion charge slapped against Atty. Favorito and Mr. Calda, therefore, rings empty.[70]

Such finding was affirmed by the OCA in its Memorandum dated November 7, 2007 which
recommended the dismissal of said charges against Atty. Favorito and Calda for lack of concrete proof.
[71]

Liability of Arreola on absence during office hours.

As with the extortion charges against Atty. Favorito and Calda, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to
hold Arreola administratively liable.

As reported by Judge Estoesta:

x x x the charge against Ms. Amie Grace Arreola regarding her habit of leaving the office after logging-in
found no concrete corroboration.

The interviewees were actually unanimous in saying that Ms. Arreola was not prone to such habit as she
is always around the office. Ms. Arreola may have been known to fetch her son at a nearby school but
she has always done so during lunch hours and after office hours.

As a matter of fact, at a time when the MeTC was stricken by a debilitating brown-out schedule in the
afternoon sometime [in] July 2006, Ms. Arreola was still around, having been one of the skeletal force
who volunteered to stay on. The undersigned has personally seen her around 5:30 p.m. of the same day.

As a matter of fact, several random checks on Ms. Arreola by the undersigned herself revealed that she
has always been around at the OCC and at Branch 30 where she was re-assigned as Branch Clerk of
Court. At times, personal visits were made, interspersed by telephone calls between 8:00 a.m. to 10:30
a.m. where Ms. Arreola proved herself to be always at the office.

Needless to say, therefore, the charge against Ms. Arreola is certainly without basis.[72]

The OCA agreed with the said finding and likewise recommended the dismissal of the charges against
Arreola.[73]

It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt
is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint. That is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, what will prevail is that
respondent has regularly performed his or her duties.[74] Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and
suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on, and charges based on mere
suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.[75]

Since there is no proof, apart from the allegations of the letter-complaint, to hold Atty. Favorito, Calda
and Arreola liable for the afore- stated charges against them, the Court deems it proper to dismiss said
charges for lack of merit.

Other matters.

In view of the initial findings of Investigating Judge Estoesta that Siwa was remiss in her duty of
transcribing stenographic notes assigned to her, the OCA is hereby directed to conduct an audit
investigation on Siwa's transcription of stenographic notes to determine the full extent of the notes she
failed to transcribe on time. If warranted, such matter shall be treated as a separate case to be given a
new docket number and assigned to another ponente for evaluation.

The OCA should also report on the status of the complaint filed by Atty. Morales which the Court
received on March 31, 2005, the complaint of Isabel Siwa dated April 12, 2005, and the letter-complaint
of Atty. Favorito together with other MeTC employees which the Court received on March 28, 2005,
against DCA Dela Cruz, regarding the spot investigation conducted on March 16, 2005 regarding this
case.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Isabel Siwa, Court Stenographer of Branch 16, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Manila, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is FINED in the amount of
P30,000.00 to be deducted from the money value of her leave credits which was set aside per Resolution
dated October 12, 2005 in A.M No. 12096-Ret. entitled Application for Retirement Benefits under
Section 13-A of R.A. No. 8291 of Ms. Isabel A. Siwa, Court Stenographer II, MeTC, Manila, Branch 16.

Atty. Henry P. Favorito, Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court is REPRIMANDED for his failure
to supervise the lending and rediscounting activites of Siwa which took place in the court's premises. The
extortion charges against him are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The charges against Atty. Miguel Morales, former Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 17, are DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence. Deputy Court Administrator Reuben de la Cruz is advised to be more
circumspect in the performance of his duties.

The charges against William Calda, Administrative Officer of the Office of the Clerk of Court, and Amie
Grace Arreola, formerly Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 4 now Clerk of Court of Branch 30, both of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to conduct an audit investigation on Isabel Siwa's
transcription of stenographic notes in view of the finding of Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-
Estoesta in her Investigation Report dated September 1, 2006 in A.M. No. P-08-2519 and A.M. P-08-2520
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P and A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P) that Siwa has not submitted a
complete transcription of stenographic notes in several cases assigned to her. Said matter shall be
treated as a separate case, to be given a new docket number and assigned to a new ponente for final
resolution.

SO ORDERED.

2:

ARTHUR DEL ROSARIO and G.R. No. 180595

ALEXANDER DEL ROSARIO,

Petitioners, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD, and

PEREZ, JJ.

HELLENOR D. DONATO, JR.

and RAFAEL V. GONZAGA, Promulgated:

Respondents.

March 5, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the need for plaintiff to state the facts constituting his cause of action and the correct
forum for actions for damages arising from alleged wrongful procurement and enforcement of a search
warrant issued in connection with an alleged criminal violation of the intellectual property law.

The Facts and the Case

On January 23, 2002 Philip Morris Products, Inc. (Philip Morris) wrote the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), requesting assistance in curtailing the proliferation of fake Marlboro cigarettes in
Angeles City, Pampanga. After doing surveillance work in that city, respondent Hellenor Donato, Jr., the
NBI agent assigned to the case, succeeded in confirming the storage and sale of such fake cigarettes at
the house at 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, that belonged to petitioner Alexander
del Rosario.

On March 5, 2002 respondent Donato applied for a search warrant with Branch 57 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City to search the subject premises. But it took a week later or on March 12, 2002
for the RTC to hear the application and issue the search warrant. Although Donato felt that the delayed
hearing compromised the operation, the NBI agents led by respondent Rafael V. Gonzaga proceeded to
implement the warrant. Their search yielded no fake Marlboro cigarettes.

Subsequently, petitioners Alexander and Arthur del Rosario (the Del Rosarios) filed a complaint for P50
million in damages against respondents NBI agents Donato and Gonzaga and two others before the RTC
of Angeles City, Branch 62, in Civil Case 10584. On August 6, 2003 respondents NBI agents answered the
complaint with a motion to dismiss on the grounds of: a) the failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action; b) forum shopping; and c) the NBI agents immunity from suit, they being sued as such agents.
The RTC denied the motion on March 25, 2003. The NBI agents filed a motion for reconsideration but the
RTC denied the same on June 27, 2003.

Dissatisfied, respondents NBI agents filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP 79496. On June 29, 2007 the latter court granted the petition and annulled the RTCs
orders, first, in alleging merely that the NBI agents unlawfully procured the search warrant without
stating the facts that made the procurement unlawful, the complaint failed to state a cause of action;
and second, the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping in that they should have filed their claim for
damages against the NBI agents through a motion for compensation with the court that issued the
search warrant.

The Del Rosarios sought reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied it on November 19, 2007,
prompting them to file this petition for review.

The Issues Presented

The petition presents two issues:

1. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the complaint of the Del Rosarios did not state a cause of
action; and

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping.

The Courts Rulings

One. The CA held that the Del Rosarios complaint before the RTC failed to state a cause of action against
respondents NBI agents. Such complaint said that the NBI agents unlawfully procured and enforced the
search warrant issued against the Del Rosarios but it failed to state the ultimate facts from which they
drew such conclusion.

The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff
alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks.[1] And
judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three
elements: (1) the plaintiffs legal right in the matter; (2) the defendants corresponding obligation to honor
or respect such right; and (3) the defendants subsequent violation of the right. Absent any of these, the
complaint would have failed to state a cause of action.[2]

According to the Del Rosarios, the following allegations in their complaint state a cause or causes of
action against respondents NBI agents:

2.4 On 12 March 2002, elements of the [NBI] x x x led by Defendant Rafael I. Gonzaga x x x entered by
force the premises belonging to Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario situated at No. 51 New York Street,
Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, pursuant to a Search Warrant unlawfully obtained from the [RTC] of
Angeles City, Branch 57 x x x.

xxxx
2.6 Contrary to the sworn statements given before the court by defendants Hellenor D. Donato Jr. x x x
and contrary to the allegation in Search Warrant No. 02-09A, no fake Marlboro cigarettes and their
packaging were found at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City x x x.

2.7 The inclusion of Plaintiff Arthur del Rosario in Search Warrant No. 02-09 had no factual basis
considering that the premises searched is the property solely of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario.

2.8 Worse the enforcement of Searched [sic] Warrant No. 02-09 was just part of the series of raids and
searches that was conducted in Angeles City and Pampanga, which was done with much publicity in the
community and had tended to include the Plaintiffs in the same category as other persons and entities
who were in fact found to be dealing with fake Marlboro cigarettes.

xxxx

3.2 The baseless sworn allegations that Plaintiffs had under their control and possession counterfeit
Marlboro cigarettes and packaging to obtain a search warrant, and the malicious service of the such
warrant at the residential premises of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario in full and plain view of members of
the community, as part of the series of raids and operations conducted within Angeles City and
Pampanga during that period, has tainted irreversibly the good names which Plaintiffs have painstakingly
built and maintained over the years.

xxxx

3.4 Plaintiffs were subjected to so much humiliation and embarrassment by the raid conducted on the
subject residential premises, and subjected them to much unwarranted speculation of engaging in the
sale of fake merchandise.

Essentially, however, all that the Del Rosarios allege is that respondents NBI agents used an unlawfully
obtained search warrant against them, evidenced by the fact that, contrary to the sworn statements
used to get such warrant, the NBI agents found no fake Marlboro cigarettes in petitioner Alexander del
Rosarios premises.
But a judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described illicit article does not of itself render the
courts order unlawful. The Del Rosarios did not allege that respondents NBI agents violated their right by
fabricating testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. Their allegation
that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While a
motion to dismiss assumes as true the facts alleged in the complaint, such admission does not extend to
conclusions of law.[3] Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to
dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action.[4]

Further, the allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a malicious manner is also not
sufficient. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other related words without ultimate facts to support the
same are mere conclusions of law.[5]

The Del Rosarios broad assertion in their complaint that the search was conducted in full and plain view
of members of the community does not likewise support their claim that such search was maliciously
enforced. There is nothing inherently wrong with search warrants being enforced in full view of
neighbors. In fact, when the respondent or his representative is not present during the search, the rules
require that it be done in the presence of two residents of the same locality. These safeguards exist to
protect persons from possible abuses that may occur if searches were done surreptitiously or
clandestinely.

Two. Invoking Section 21 of this Courts Administrative Matter (A.M.) 02-1-06-SC (not A.O. 01-1-06-SC as
cited), the CA held that, rather than file a separate action for damages, the Del Rosarios should have filed
their claim for compensation in the same proceeding and with the same court that issued the writ of
search and seizure. The Del Rosarios were thus guilty of forum shopping.

A.M. 02-1-06-SC, the Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property
Rights, provides:

SEC. 21. Claim for damages. Where the writ [of search and seizure] is discharged on any of the grounds
provided in this Rule, or where it is found after trial that there has been no infringement or threat of
infringement of an intellectual property right, the court, upon motion of the alleged infringing defendant
or expected adverse party and after due hearing, shall order the applicant to compensate the defendant
or expected adverse party upon the cash bond, surety bond or other equivalent security for any injury or
damage the latter suffered by the issuance and enforcement of the writ. Should the damages exceed the
amount of the bond, the applicant shall be liable for the payment of the excess.
When a complaint is already filed in court, the motion shall be filed with the same court during the trial
or before appeal is perfected or before judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the applicant,
setting forth the facts showing the defendants right to damages and the amount thereof. The award of
damages shall be included in the judgment in the main case.

Where no complaint is filed against the expected adverse party, the motion shall be filed with the court
which issued the writ. In such a case, the court shall set the motion for summary hearing and
immediately determine the expected adverse partys right to damages.

A judgment in favor of the applicant in its principal claim should not necessarily bar the alleged infringing
defendant from recovering damages where he suffered losses by reason of the wrongful issuance or
enforcement of the writ.

The damages provided for in this section shall be independent from the damages claimed by the
defendant in his counterclaim.

But the subject search warrant was not issued under A.M. 02-1-06-SC, which governed the issuance of a
writ of search and seizure in a civil action for infringement filed by an intellectual property right owner
against the supposed infringer of his trademark or name. Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro
cigarettes, did not go by this route. Philip Morris did not file a civil action for infringement of its
trademark against the Del Rosarios before the RTC of Angeles City.

Instead, Philip Morris sought assistance from the NBI for the apprehension and criminal prosecution of
those reportedly appropriating its trademark and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes. In turn, the NBI
instituted a police action that included applying for a search and seizure warrant under Sections 3, 4, 5
and 6 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (not under the provisions of A.M. 02-1-06-SC)
against the Del Rosarios upon the belief that they were storing and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes in
violation of the penal provisions of the intellectual property law.

The proceeding under Rule 126, a limited criminal one, does not provide for the filing of counterclaims
for damages against those who may have improperly sought the issuance of the search warrant.
Consequently, the Del Rosarios had the right to seek damages, if the circumstances warranted, by
separate civil action for the wrong inflicted on them by an improperly obtained or enforced search
warrant. Unfortunately, their complaint, as worded, failed to state a proper cause of action.

Petitioner Arthur del Rosario claims that respondents NBI agents wrongfully included him as respondent
in their application for a search warrant since he neither owned the house at 51 New York Street nor
resided in it. But the rules do not require respondents in search warrant proceedings to be residents of
the premises to be searched. If this were the case, criminals in possession of illegal articles could simply
use other peoples residence for storing such articles to avoid being raided and searched.

The Del Rosarios raise a number of procedural issues: a) the supposed failure of respondents NBI agents
to file their motion for reconsideration of the RTC order denying their motion to dismiss within 15 days
of receipt of the order; b) their resort to a special civil action of certiorari to challenge the RTCs denial of
their motion to dismiss; c) the propriety of their inclusion of a motion to dismiss in their answer; d) the
CAs grant to them in 2003 of a 15-day extension to file a petition for certiorari after the lapse of 60 days
when the Court did not yet come out with a ruling that barred such extension; and e) their being
represented by private counsel rather than by the Office of the Solicitor General.

With the Courts rulings in the principal issues raised in this case, it finds no sufficient reason to further
dwell on the lesser issues that the Del Rosarios raise above. Besides, the Court finds no error in the CAs
disposition of the same.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP 79496 dated June 29, 2007 and its Resolution dated November 19, 2007 for the reasons stated in this
Decision, with the MODIFICATION that Civil Case 10584 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

3:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus

ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA,

Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 176066

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,*

DEL CASTILLO, and

PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
August 11, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review is the Decision[1] dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00381, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] dated April 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda guilty in Criminal Case No.
17619-R, of illegal possession of marijuana under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; and in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, of violating
Presidential Decree No. 1866, otherwise known as the Illegal Possession of Firearms, as amended.

On April 5, 2000, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC against accused-appellant for
illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of firearm. The Informations read:

Criminal Case No. 17619-R

The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC.
8, ART. II OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Marijuana), committed as follows:

That on or about 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay Gabriela Silang, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully and unlawfully have in her possession, custody, and control the following, to wit:
a) Nine (9) bricks of dried Marijuana leaves with an approximate total weight of 18.750 kgs.,
and

b) One (1) plastic bag containing dried Marijuana leaves weighing approximately .3 kg.

without any authority of law to do so in violation of the above-cited provision of law.[3]

Criminal Case No. 17620-R

The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1866, AS AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Firearm), committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay Gabriela Silang, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there willfully and unlawfully have in her possession, custody, and control one (1) Cal. .357 S & W
revolver, a high-powered firearm, without any license, permit or authority duly issued by the
government to possess or keep the same in violation of the above-cited law.[4]

Upon her arraignment on April 18, 2000, accused-appellant, assisted by her counsel de parte, pleaded
NOT GUILTY to both charges.[5] Pre-trial and trial proper then ensued.

During trial, the prosecution presented four witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Modesto F. Carrera
(Carrera), Police Officer (PO) 2 Jaime Chavez (Chavez), SPO2 Fernando Fernandez (Fernandez), and
Forensic Chemist II Marina Carina Madrigal (Madrigal).

The events, as recounted by the prosecution, are as follows:

At around nine oclock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong
(Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group) at DPS Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2
Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain Estela Tuan had been
selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. Present at that time were Police
Superintendent Isagani Neres, Regional Officer of the 14th Regional CIDG; Chief Inspector Reynaldo Piay,
Deputy Regional Officer; and other police officers.[6]

SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. At around one oclock in the
afternoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then
accompanied the two informants to the accused-appellants house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered
accused-appellants house, while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes,
Tudlong and Lad-ing came out of accused-appellants house and showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana
leaves they bought. After returning to the CIDG regional office, SPO2 Fernandez requested the
laboratory examination of the leaves bought from accused-appellant. When said laboratory examination
yielded positive results for marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for Search Warrant for
accused-appellants house.

SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a Search Warrant before
Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City,
Branch IV, at about one oclock in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three
oclock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued
a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable cause. The Search Warrant read:

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned of the existence of facts upon which the application
for Search Warrant is based, after personally examining by searching questions under oath SPO2
Fernando V. Fernandez of the CAR Criminal Investigation and Detection Group with office address at DPS
Compound, Utility Road, Baguio City and his witnesses namely: Frank Lad-ing of Happy Hallow, Baguio
City and Jerry Tudlong, of Barangay Kitma, Baguio City, after having been duly sworn to, who executed
sworn statements and deposition as witneses, that there is a probable cause to believe that a Violation
of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 has been committed and that there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that Estela Tuan, has in her possession and control at her resident at Brgy. Gabriela
Silang, Baguio City, the following:
- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish

xxxx

which are subject of the offense which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime in the day the house of the
accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, and forthwith seize and take possession of the
following:

- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish

x x x nothing follows x x x

and bring said items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue, thereafter, it shall be void.

The officers must conduct the search and seize the above-mentioned personal items in the presence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of her family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence
of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

The officers seizing the items must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the
house in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must,
in the presence of the 2 witnesses mentioned, leave a receipt in the place in which the seized items were
found; thereafter, deliver the items seized to the undersigned judge together with a true inventory
thereof duly verified under oath.

Baguio City, Philippines, this 25th day of January, 2000.

(SGD)ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES

Executive Judge

MTCC, Branch IV[7]

Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police Senior Inspector
Rodolfo Castel, SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez and PO2 Chavez implemented the
warrant. Before going to the accused-appellants house, SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be
present when the Search Warrant was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested one
Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-appellants neighbor, to come along.

The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellants house. Even though accused-appellant was
not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by Magno Baludda (Magno), accused-
appellants father, after he was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez and Police Senior
Inspector Ricarte Marquez guarded the surroundings of the house,[8] while SPO1 Carrera and PO2
Chavez searched inside.

SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began searching the rooms on the first floor in the presence of Magno and
Pascual. They continued their search on the second floor. They saw a movable cabinet in accused-
appellants room, below which they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six oclock that
evening, accused-appellant arrived with her son. The police officers asked accused-appellant to open a
built-in cabinet, in which they saw eight more bricks of marijuana.[9] PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the
items confiscated from accused-appellant[10] and a certification stating that the items were confiscated
and recovered from the house and in accused-appellants presence.

The nine bricks of marijuana were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination.

The defense, on the other hand, had an entirely different version of what transpired that day. It
presented four witnesses, namely, accused-appellant herself; Beniasan Tuan (Beniasan), accused-
appellants husband; Magno, accused-appellants father; and Mabini Maskay (Maskay), the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Gabriela Silang.
In her testimony, accused-appellant declared that she worked as a vendor at Hangar Market. Sometime
in January 2000, while she was selling vegetables at Hangar Market, her son arrived with two police
officers who asked her to go home because of a letter from the court.[11] At about six oclock in the
afternoon, she and her husband Beniasan reached their residence and found a green paper bag with
marijuana in their sala. According to the police officers, they got the bag from a room on the first floor of
accused-appellants house. Accused-appellant explained that the room where the bag of marijuana was
found was previously rented by boarders. The boarders padlocked the room because they still had things
inside and they had paid their rent up to the end of January 2000.[12] The police officers also informed
accused-appellant that they got a gun from under a cabinet in the latters room, which accused-appellant
disputed since her room was always left open and it was where her children play.[13] Accused-appellant
alleged that a Search Warrant was issued for her house because of a quarrel with her neighbor named
Lourdes Estillore (Estillore). Accused-appellant filed a complaint for the demolition of Estillores house
which was constructed on the road.[14]

Beniasan supported the testimony of his wife, accused-appellant. He narrated that he and accused-
appellant were at their Hangar Market stall when two police officers came and asked them to go home.
Beniasan and accused-appellant arrived at their residence at around six oclock in the evening and were
shown the marijuana the police officers supposedly got from the first floor of the house. The police
officers then made Beniasan sign a certification of the list of items purportedly confiscated from the
house.[15]

Magno testified that he resided at the first floor of accused-appellants residence. He was present when
the search was conducted but denied that the Search Warrant was shown to him.[16] He attested that
the confiscated items were found from the vacant room at the first floor of accused-appellants house
which was previously occupied by boarders. Said room was padlocked but was forced open by the police
officers. In the course of the police officers search, they pulled something from under the bed that was
wrapped in green cellophane, but Magno did not know the contents thereof.[17] The police officers also
searched the rooms of accused-appellant and her children at the second floor of the house, during
which they allegedly found a gun under the cabinet in accused-appellants room. Magno claimed that he
did not personally witness the finding of the gun and was merely informed about it by the police officers.
[18]

Maskay, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, was the last to testify for the
defense. He corroborated accused-appellants allegation that the latter had a quarrel with Estillore, and
this could be the reason behind the filing of the present criminal cases. He further remembered that the
members of the CIDG went to his office on January 24, 2000 to ask about the location of accused-
appellants house.[19]
The RTC, in its Decision dated April 9, 2002, found accused-appellant guilty as charged and adjudged
thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 17619-R, the Court finds the accused Estela Tuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of illegal possession of marijuana (nine [9] bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an
approximate weight of 18.750 kilograms and the one [1] plastic bag containing the dried marijuana
weighing about .3 kilograms) in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by
Section 13 of Republic Act 7659 as charged in the information and sentences her to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

The nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of 18.750 kilograms and one
(1) plastic bag containing dried marijuana leaves weighing approximately .3 kilograms (Exhibit F, F-1, F-1-
A to F-1-J) are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in
accordance with law.

The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of her preventive
imprisonment in the service of her sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code;
and

2. In Criminal Case No. 17620-R, the Court finds the accused Estela Tuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of illegal possession of firearms (one [1] caliber .357 S & W revolver), a high powered
firearm, without any license, permit or authority issued by the Government to keep the same in violation
of Section 1, Republic Act No. 8294 which amended Section 1 of PD 1866 as charged in the information
and hereby sentences her, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to imprisonment ranging from 4
years 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional in its maximum period as Minimum to 6 years and 8
months of prision mayor in its minimum period as Maximum and a fine of P30,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The firearm caliber .357 S & W revolver without serial number is ordered forfeited in favor of the State to
be disposed of immediately in accordance with law.

The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of her preventive
imprisonment in the service of her sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.[20]
The records of the two criminal cases were forwarded to this Court by the RTC, but the Court issued a
Resolution[21] dated October 13, 2004 transferring said records to the Court of Appeals pursuant to
People v. Mateo.[22]

On September 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision.

The Court of Appeals held that the contested search and consequent seizure of the marijuana bricks
were done pursuant to the Search Warrant validly issued by the MTCC. There was no showing of
procedural defects or lapses in the issuance of said Search Warrant as the records support that the
issuing judge determined probable cause only after conducting the searching inquiry and personal
examination of the applicant and the latters witnesses, in compliance with the requirements of the
Constitution. Hence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal
possession of marijuana.

The Court of Appeals, however, modified the appealed RTC judgment by acquitting accused-appellant of
the charge for illegal possession of firearm. According to the appellate court, the records were bereft of
evidence that the gun supposedly confiscated from accused-appellant was unlicensed. The absence of a
firearm license was simply presumed by the police officers because the gun was a defective paltik with
no serial number. That the said condition of the gun did not dispense with the need for the prosecution
to establish that it was unlicensed through the testimony or certification of the appropriate officer from
the Board of the Firearms and Explosives Bureau of the Philippine National Police.

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
RTC of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated April 9, 2002, is hereby MODIFIED such that the conviction of
accused-appellant for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, RA 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED while her
conviction for Violation of PD 1866, as amended, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is
accordingly ACQUITTED of the latter offense.[23]
In its Resolution dated October 20, 2006, the Court of Appeals gave due course to accused-appellants
Partial Notice of Appeal and accordingly forwarded the records of the case to this Court.

This Court then issued a Resolution[24] dated February 28, 2007 directing the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. Accused-appellant[25]
opted not to file a supplemental brief and manifested that she was adopting her arguments in the
Appellants Brief since the same had already assiduously discussed her innocence of the crime charged.
The People[26] likewise manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief as the issues have
all been addressed in its Appellees Brief.

Accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors in her Brief: [27]

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING AS VOID THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED AGAINST THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Given that accused-appellant was already acquitted of the charge of violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 on the ground of reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, her instant appeal relates only to
her conviction for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The
Court can no longer pass upon the propriety of accused-appellants acquittal in Criminal Case No. 17620-
R because of the rule that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its
promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in
double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it
happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of Appeals.[28]
In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, such as Criminal Case No. 17619-R, a case
becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. In such a situation, this Court
generally relies upon the assessment by the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing
the conduct or demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. Hence, its factual findings are
accorded respect even finality absent any showing that certain facts of weight and substance bearing on
the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.[29]

The Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule in the case at bar.

Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements concur: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.
[30]

All the foregoing elements were duly proven to exist in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The search conducted
by SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez in accused-appellants house yielded nine bricks of marijuana.
Marijuana is a prohibited drug, thus, accused-appellants possession thereof could not have been
authorized by law in any way. Accused-appellant evidently possessed the marijuana freely and
consciously, even offering the same for sale. The bricks of marijuana were found in accused-appellants
residence over which she had complete control. In fact, some of the marijuana were found in accused-
appellants own room.

Accused-appellant challenges the judgment of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, finding her
guilty of illegal possession of marijuana, by pointing out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses that supposedly manifested their lack of credibility, i.e., the date of the test buy
and the manner by which the doors of the rooms of the house were opened.

These alleged inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are so inconsequential that
they do not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact of
illegal possession of marijuana by accused-appellant at her house. The Court has previously held that
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in
actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of
witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal
occurrence.[31]
Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses
nor the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen
their credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed.[32]

Accused-appellant further questions the non-presentation as witnesses of Lad-ing and Tudlong, the
informants, and Pascual, the neighbor who supposedly witnessed the implementation of the Search
Warrant, during the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. 17619-R and 17620-R before the RTC. This Court
though is unconvinced that such non-presentation of witnesses is fatal to Criminal Case No. 17619-R.

The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. The
prosecution need not present each and every witness but only such as may be needed to meet the
quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in
nature. The Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute
suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecutions case.[33]

Although Criminal Case No. 17619-R involves illegal possession of marijuana, the following
pronouncement of this Court in People v. Salazar,[34] relating to the illegal sale of the same drug, still
rings true:

Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her affected by the prosecution's failure to present the
informer who pointed to her as a drug pusher. The presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is
not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony
would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should
be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the
marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-presentation of the informer on the witness
stand would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecutions' evidence. (Emphasis ours.)

Lastly, accused-appellant insists that the items allegedly seized from her house are inadmissible as
evidence because the Search Warrant issued for her house was invalid for failing to comply with the
constitutional and statutory requirements. Accused-appellant specifically pointed out the following
defects which made said Search Warrant void: (1) the informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, made
misrepresentation of facts in the Application for Search Warrant filed with the MTCC; (2) Judge Cortes of
the MTCC failed to consider the informants admission that they themselves were selling marijuana; and
(3) the Search Warrant failed to particularly describe the place to be searched because the house was a
two-storey building composed of several rooms.

The right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizure is recognized and protected by no less
than the Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III which provide:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

SEC. 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases ours.)

Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure laid down the
following requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by
the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
[35]

There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued search warrant were
complied with, i.e., personal determination of probable cause by Judge Cortes; and examination, under
oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, by Judge Cortes.
What is left for the Court to determine is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of
probable cause; and particular description of the place to be searched and things to be seized.

In People v. Aruta,[36] the Court defined probable cause as follows:

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search.
Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought
are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in
the place to be searched.
A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
[37] Such substantial basis exists in this case.

Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-appellants
residence after said judges personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and
Tudlong, the informants.

SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by
Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of accused-appellant.
He testified before Judge Cortes:

COURT:

Q. You are applying for a Search Warrant and you alleged in your application that Estela Tuan of Brgy.
Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, is in possession of dried marijuana leaves and marijuana hashish, how did
you come to know about this matter?

A. Through the two male persons by the name of Frank Lad-ing and Jerry Tudlong, Your Honor.

Q. When did these two male persons report to your office?

A. January 22, Your Honor.

Q. This year?

A. Yes, your honor.

Q. To whom did they report?

A. To me personally, Your Honor.

Q. How did they report the matter?

A. They reported that a certain Estela Tuan is selling dried Marijuana leaves and marijuana hashish, Your
Honor.

Q. What else?

A. She is not only selling marijuana but also selling vegetables at the Trading Post in La Trinidad, Your
Honor.

Q. They just told you, she is selling marijuana and selling vegetables, that is already sufficient proof or
sufficient probable cause she is in possession of marijuana, what else did they report?

A. That they are also selling marijuana in large volume at their house.

Q. What did you do when you asked them regarding that matter?

A. They had a test buy and they were able to buy some commodities yesterday, Your honor.

Q. Who bought?

A. Tudlong and Lad-ing, Your Honor.

Q. How did you go about it?

A. I accompanied the said persons and kept watch over them and gave them money after which, they
were able to purchase and when they purchased the said items or drugs, they were even informed that
if you wanted to sell then you could come and get. Your Honor.

COURT:
Q. Where is that P300.00?

A. It is with them, Your Honor.

Q. You did not entrap her?

A. No, Your Honor, because it is only a test buy.

Q: And that was January 22. Why did you not apply immediately for search warrant?

A: Because we still have to look at the area and see to it that there are really some buyers or people who
would go and leave the place, Your Honor.

Q: What did you observe?

A: Well, there are persons who would go inside and after going inside, they would come out bringing
along with them something else.

Q: Did you not interview these people?

A: No, Your Honor. We did not bother.[38]

Lad-ing and Tudlong affirmed before Judge Cortes that they were the ones who informed SPO2
Fernandez that accused-appellant was keeping and selling marijuana at her house, and that they took
part in the test buy.

Lad-ing narrated:

COURT:
Q: Mr. Lad-ing, you said that you are working at the Trading Post. What kind of work do you have there?

A: I am a middleman of the vegetable dealers, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q: Did you come to know of this person Estela Tuan?

A: Yes, Your Honor, because there was an incident wherein we were conducting our line of business
when they came and joined us and we became partners, Your Honor.

Q: You said, they, how many of you?

A: A certain Jerry Tudlong, Estela Tuan and myself, Your Honor.

Q: In other words, Estela Tuan went with you and later on she became your partner in that business?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: And so what happened when she became a partner of your business?

A: When we were about to divide our profit, we then went at their residence at Gabriela Silang, Baguio
City, Your Honor.

Q: What happened?

A: While we then sitted ourselves at the sala, she told us that if we wanted to earn some more, she told
us that she has in her possession marijuana which could be sold, Your Honor.

Q: And so, what happened?

A: After which, she showed the marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: Where was the marijuana?

A: It was placed in a cellophane, in a newspaper, Your Honor.

Q: How big?

A: A dimension of 10 x 4 inches, Your Honor.

Q: With that size, where did she show you the box of this cellophane?

A: At the place where we were sitted at the receiving room, Your Honor.

Q: In other words, she went to get it and then presented or showed it to you?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Where did she go, if you know?

A: Because at the sala, there is a certain room located at the side that is the place where she got the
same, Your Honor.

Q: Where is this house of Estela Tuan located, is it along the road or inside the road or what?

A: It is near the road but you have to walk in a little distance, Your Honor.

Q: Will you describe the place where Estela Tuan is residing?

A: Well, it is a two storey house, the walls are made of galvanized iron Sheets, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q: Do you know who are staying there?

A: I do not know who is living with her, however, that is her residence, Your Honor.
Q: How many times did you go there?

A: It was my second time to go at that time we were sent by PO Fernandez to purchase marijuana, Your
Honor.

Q: Where is the marijuana now?

A: It is in the possession of PO Fernandez, Your Honor.

Q: Where is the marijuana placed?

A: In a newspaper, Your Honor.

Q: What happened next?

A: We handed to her the amount of P300.00, your Honor.

Q: And she gave you that marijuana?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: How many rooms are there in the first floor of the house of Estela Tuan?

A: Three rooms, Your Honor, it has a dining room and beside the place is the receiving room where we
sitted ourselves, Your Honor.

Q: When you already bought marijuana from her, what did she tell you, if any?

A; Well, if we would be interested to buy more, I still have stocks here, Your Honor.[39]
Tudlong recounted in more detail what happened during the test buy:

COURT:

Q: My question is, when she told you that she has some substance for sale for profit and you mentioned
marijuana, did you talk immediately with Frank or what did you do?

A: We reported the matter to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, your Honor.

xxxx

Q: What time?

A: We went to the office at 9:00 9:30 oclock in the morning, Your Honor.

Q: When you went there, what did you do?

A: The amount of P300.00 was given to Frank and we were instructed to purchase, Your Honor.

Q: Did you go?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: Will you tell what happened when you went to the house of the woman?

A: Well, we were allowed to go inside the house after which, we were made to sit down at the receiving
area or sala, Your Honor.
Q: When you went there, you were allowed to enter immediately?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Who allowed you to enter?

A: The female person, Your Honor.

Q: What happened when you were asked to be sitted?

A: During that time, Frank and the female person were the ones conferring, Your Honor.

Q: Did you hear what they were talking about?

A: That Frank was purchasing marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: What did the woman tell you?

A: After we handed the money, a plastic which was transparent, was then handed to Frank, it was a
plastic and there was a newspaper inside, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: So, you did not actually see what is in the newspaper?

A: No, Your Honor, however, I know that that is marijuana.

Q: Why?

A: Because that was our purpose, to buy marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: And you have not gotten marijuana without Estela Tuan informing you?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Will you tell us what kind of materials were used in the house of Estela Tuan?

A: Two storey, the walls are made of GI sheets, Your Honor.\

Q: Is the house beside the road or do you have to walk?

A: It is near the road. Upon reaching the road, you still have to walk a short distance, Your Honor.

Q: Where did Estela Tuan get the newspaper placed in a transparent plastic?

A: She got it from a room because were then made to wait at the sala, Your Honor.

Q: Did she tell you how much she can sell marijuana?

A: She told us, Your Honor.

Q: What?

A: Well, the marijuana that we purchased was worth P300.00[.] However, we could divide it into two
small packs and we could sell it at P20.00 per piece so that you can also have some gain.

COURT:

Q: After that, to whom did you sell?

A: We did not sell the marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: I thought you are going to sell marijuana and so you went there?

A: We were just instructed by PO Fernandez to verify what we are telling him was true, Your Honor.[40]
Accused-appellants contention that MTCC Judge Cortes failed to consider the informants admission that
they themselves were selling marijuana is utterly without merit. First, even after carefully reviewing the
testimonies of Lad-ing and Tudlong before Judge Cortes, this Court did not find a categorical admission
by either of the two informants that they themselves were selling marijuana. In fact, Tudlong expressly
denied that he and Lad-ing sold the marijuana, having only bought the same from the accused-appellant
for the test buy. Moreover, even if the informants were also selling marijuana, it would not have affected
the validity of the Search Warrant for accused-appellants house. The criminal liabilities of accused-
appellant and the informants would be separate and distinct. The investigation and prosecution of one
could proceed independently of the other.

Equally without merit is accused-appellants assertion that the Search Warrant did not describe with
particularity the place to be searched.

A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness.[41] In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search
Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was
accused-appellants residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant for accused-appellants
house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized as a result of the search conducted by virtue
thereof, may be presented as evidence against the accused-appellant.

Since it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the accused-appellant is, indeed, guilty of violation of Article II,
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court shall now consider the appropriate penalty to
be imposed upon her.

Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 20(3), of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, provides:
SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20
hereof. (As amended by R.A. 7659)

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the
Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements,
as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, illegal possession of 750 grams or
more of the prohibited drug marijuana is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Accused-appellant
had in her possession a total of 19,050 grams of marijuana, for which she was properly sentenced to
reclusion perpetua by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In the same vein, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon accused-appellant by the RTC, affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, is also correct, as the same is still within the range of fines imposable on any person
who possessed prohibited drugs without any authority, under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, finding appellant Benhur Mamaril guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8[1] of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended by RA No. 7659.

The Information filed against appellant reads:

That on or about the 1st day of February, 1999 and sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of
Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, willfully, unlawfully and criminally [did] keep and possess crushed marijuana
leaves contained in seventy eight (78) sachets with a total weight of two hundred thirty six and eighty
three hundredth (236.83) grams and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops weighing one thousand six
hundred grams, each brick weighing eight hundred (800) grams, with a total weight of one thousand
eight hundred thirty six and eighty three hundredth (1,836.83) grams, a prohibited drug, without
authority to possess the same.

CONTRARY to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.[2]

When arraigned on October 8, 1999, appellant pleaded not guilty.[3] At the pre-trial conference held on
October 18, 1999, the parties admitted the following facts:

1. That the search was made in the house and premises of the parents of the accused where he
(accused) also lives, at Ramos St., Lingayen, Pangasinan, on February 1, 1999 at about 2:30 o clock in the
afternoon;

2. That the search was conducted by the elements of the PNP particularly SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, SPO1
Alfredo Rico and others;

3. That the policemen brought along with them a camera;

4. That the accused was in the balcony of the house when it was searched;

5. The existence of the report of physical science report No. (DT-077-99) issued by the PNP Crime
Laboratory through Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid;

6. That accused was subjected to urine sample laboratory on February 2, 1999.[4]

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Prosecutions Evidence

On January 25, 1999, the Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police Station, represented by SPO2
Chito S. Esmenda, applied[5] before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, for a
search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana, a prohibited drug, at the family residence of
appellant Benhur Mamaril, situated at Ramos Street, Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan. On said date, then
presiding Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos (now retired) issued Search Warrant No. 99-51.[6]

On February 1, 1999, at about 2:30 p.m., the Chief of Police of the Lingayen Police Station, SPO3 Alfredo
Rico, SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police officers went to the residence of appellant and
implemented Search Warrant No. 99-51. When they arrived at appellants house, they saw appellants
mother under the house. They asked her where appellant was, and she told them that appellant was in
the house, upstairs. When they went upstairs, they saw appellant coming out of the room. Upon seeing
the policemen, appellant turned back and tried to run towards the back door. SPO3 Rico told appellant
to stop, which appellant did. SPO3 Rico informed appellant that they had a search warrant to search the
house premises. They showed appellant and his mother the search warrant. Appellant looked at the
search warrant and did not say anything. Thereafter, the policemen searched the house. The search was
witnessed by two members of the barangay council in said area, namely, Barangay Kagawad Leonardo
Ramos and Barangay Tanod Valentino Quintos, whom the police brought with them.[7]

The searching team confiscated the following: (1) fifty-five (55) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
suspected marijuana leaves, which were found in a buri bag (bayong) under appellants house; (2) three
heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds contained in an eye-glass
case; (3) twenty-two (22) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds
taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc chair; and (4) two (2) bricks of suspected marijuana
contained inside a white and gray bag found inside the closet of appellants room. SPO3 Alfredo Rico took
pictures[8] of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt[9] of the property seized. SPO4 Faustino
Ferrer, Jr. prepared a certification[10] that the house was properly searched, which was signed by
appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police officers
brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the Lingayen Police Station and turned them over to
the desk officer.[11]

The next day, on February 2, 1999, police officers Alfredo Rico, Alberto Santiago and Rodolfo Madrid
brought the confiscated articles to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Florendo, San Fernando, La Union for
examination. Appellant was also brought there for a drug test.[12]
Police Superintendent Ma. Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, forensic chemist and head of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Regional Office I, Camp Florendo, Parian, San Fernando City, La Union, testified that on
February 2, 1999, she received from the Chief of Police of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a request[13] for a drug
test on the person of appellant Benhur Mamaril and a laboratory examination of the confiscated
specimens.[14] After weighing the specimens and testing the same, Police Superintendent Cid issued a
report[15] finding the specimens[16] to be POSITIVE to the test for the presence of marijuana x x x.[17]

Moreover, Police Superintendent Cid affirmed the findings in her report[18] that the examination
conducted on the urine sample of appellant was positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride known as shabu.[19]

After the prosecution formally offered its testimonial and documentary exhibits on March 5, 2000,
appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion with memorandum[20] contending that: (1) the exhibits of
the prosecution are inadmissible in evidence under Section 2 and Section 3 (2) of Article III (Bill of Rights)
of the 1987 Constitution as the search warrant, by virtue of which said exhibits were seized, was illegally
issued, considering that the judges examination of the complainant and his two witnesses was not in
writing; and (2) said search warrant was illegally or improperly implemented. Appellant prayed that all
the exhibits of the prosecution be excluded as evidence or in the alternative, that the resolution of the
admissibility of the same be deferred until such time that he has completed the presentation of his
evidence in chief. On August 25, 2000, the prosecution opposed the motion, and the trial court denied
appellants motion.[21]

The Defenses Evidence

Appellant Benhur Mamaril, 31, single, laborer, denied that he was residing at his parents house at Ramos
Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan since he has been residing at a rented house at Barangay Matic-matic, Sta.
Barabara, Pangasinan since December 18, 1998. Appellant declared that on February 1, 1999, it was his
brother and the latters family who were residing with his mother at Ramos Street, but on said day, his
brother and family were not in the house since they were at the fishpond.[22]

Appellant testified that on February 1, 1999, he was at his parents house at Ramos Street, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, because he and his live-in partner visited his mother on said day and arrived there at 10:00
a.m. At about 2:00 p.m. of February 1, 1999, while appellant was at the back of his parents house, about
seven to nine policemen, in civilian clothes, arrived. The policemen asked appellant to go upstairs and
they immediately handcuffed him and brought him to the balcony of the house. He stayed at the balcony
until the search was finished after more than 30 minutes. Thereafter, he was brought to the clinic of one
Dr. Felix and a medical examination was conducted on him. Then he was brought to the municipal hall.
[23]

Appellant testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye-glass case, and the gray and white bag containing
suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of the search when he was at the balcony of their
house. He also testified that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time while he was
testifying in court. He admitted that the signature on the certification that the house was properly
searched was his.[24]

Moreover, appellant testified that in the early morning of February 2, 1999, he was brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, La Union where he gave his urine sample. Appellant insinuated that
the confiscated items were only planted because he had a misunderstanding with some policemen in
Lingayen. However, he admitted that the policemen who searched his parents house did not threaten or
harm him in any way and he had no misunderstanding with SPO3 Alfredo Rico.[25]

Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39, Lingayen, Pangasinan, was requested to
testify on the available records regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51 on file in the trial court and to
identify said documents. Atty. Castillo testified that he only had with him the application for search
warrant, the supporting affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez and the return of the
search warrant.[26]

Atty. Enrico declared that before he assumed office as Branch Clerk of Court, the person supposed to be
in custody of any transcript of the searching questions and answers made by Executive Judge Eugenio G.
Ramos in connection with the application for Search Warrant No. 99-51 was Mrs. Liberata Ariston, who
was then a legal researcher and at the same time OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. However, during the trial of
this case, Mrs. Liberata Ariston was in the United States of America. Atty. Enrico averred that he asked
Mrs. Liberata Aristons daughter, Catherine Ramirez, who is a court stenographer, about said transcript,
but it has not been found. Atty. Enrico testified that based on the records, there is no stenographic notes.
He added that they tried their best to locate the subject transcript, but they could not find it.[27]

The Trial Courts Decision

On January 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused of
the crime of possession of marijuana defined and penalized under Section 8 of RA 6425, as amended,
this Court in the absence of any modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000), plus
costs of this suit.

The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in full in service of his
sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[28]

The Appeal

Appellant contends that the trial court made the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ARTICLES ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED FROM ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-51 WAS ILLEGALLY
ISSUED.

II

THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS TOTALLY INADMISSIBLE THE INVENTORIED
ARTICLES IN THE RECEIPT OF SEIZED PROPERTY AND THE CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATION ISSUED
THERETO (EXHS. J AND I) SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT ASSISTED BY COUNSEL WHEN HE
SIGNED THE SAME.
III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[29]

Appellant prays for his acquittal on the ground that Search Warrant No. 99-51 was illegally issued
considering that there was no evidence showing that the required searching questions and answers were
made anent the application for said search warrant. Appellant pointed out that Branch Clerk of Court
Enrico O. Castillo testified that based on the records, there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings in connection with the application for said search warrant. Appellant thus asserts that it
cannot be said that the judge made searching questions upon the alleged applicant and his witnesses,
which is in violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court.

Our Ruling

Appellants contention is meritorious.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution, thus:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, thus:

Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable
cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[30] In determining
the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and his
witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced
in writing in the form of searching questions and answers.[31]

Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, who was
requested to testify on the available records kept in their office regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51,
presented before the court only the application for search warrant[32] and the supporting affidavits[33]
of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez. Atty. Castillo could not produce the sworn statements
of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching
questions and answers in writing as required by law. Atty. Castillo testified, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of the proceedings of a
searching questions and answers made by the Executive Judge upon the complainant as well as the two
(2) witnesses not only in connection with application for Search Warrant 99-51 but in all of those
application covered by that record namely, 99-49, 99-50, 99-51, 99-52, 99-53 and 99-54?

A Sir, based on the records there is no transcript of [s]tenographic notes.

Q Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs. Liberata Ariston about said
transcript?

A I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday and she told me that she will
try to find on (sic) the said transcript.

Q But until now there is no transcript yet?

A Yes, sir.

Q Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the records of this case together
with the application for search warrant as well as the supporting affidavit of the said application, but
there is no records available to have it with you and there is no proof with you?

A Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store room which they placed is
topsy turvy and all the records are scattered. So, we are having a hard time in scanning the records, sir.

Q But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate said transcript, Mr.
Witness?

A Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the said transcript.

Q You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic notes?

A No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir.

Q That is by a machine steno?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who are using the machine steno
to identify what cases does that stenographic notes (sic)?

A Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find the transcript of stenographic notes
concerning Search Warrant No. 99-49 to 99-54.[34] (Underscoring ours)

Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove that
Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. The records only
show the existence of an application[35] for a search warrant and the affidavits[36] of the complainants
witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona,[37] we held:

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the issuing judge examined under
oath, in the form of searching questions and answers, the applicant SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda and his
witnesses on January 25, 1999 as it is so stated in Search Warrant No. 99-51. Although it is possible that
Judge Ramos examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put into writing as required
by law. Otherwise, the depositions in writing of the complainant and his witnesses would have been
attached to the record, together with the affidavits that the witnesses submitted, as required by Section
5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor General
that the subject stenographic notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of Court Enrico Castillo
testified before the trial court because of the confused state of the records in the latters branch when he
assumed office.

The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to question the
legality of the search because he did not protest against it, and even admitted during his testimony that
he was neither threatened nor maltreated by the policemen who searched their residence.

We disagree. The cases[38] cited by the Solicitor General involved a warrantless search. In this case, the
police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant before his residence was searched. At that
time, appellant could not determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance with the law. It was
only during the trial of this case that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the
search warrant was illegally issued causing appellant to file a motion with memorandum objecting to the
admissibility of the evidence formally offered by the prosecution. In People v. Burgos,[39] we ruled:

Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia
v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not
amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by
Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):

xxxxxxxxx

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent, or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(56 C.J., pp.1180, 1181).

We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.
(Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458).
In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen showed him the search
warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Moreover, appellant seasonably
objected[40] on constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said
warrant during the trial of the case,[41] after the prosecution formally offered its evidence.[42] Under
the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or
during the trial.

No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate
an invalid warrant.[43] In Mata v. Bayona,[44] we ruled:

.[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It
might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:

It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his
peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private
affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual
to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the
Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer
undertakes to justify it.

We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the complainant
and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and
answers was not complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized
pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in accordance with
Section 3 (2),[45] Article III of the Constitution.
It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to exclude the evidence seized
pursuant to said illegal search warrant.

Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to sustain the conviction of
appellant.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal
Case No. L-5963, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring Search Warrant No.
99-51 NULL and VOID and the search and seizure made at appellants residence illegal. For lack of
evidence to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant BENHUR MAMARIL is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal
grounds.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to IMPLEMENT without delay this Decision and to
INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released
from confinement.

The confiscated marijuana is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is hereby
directed to deliver or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

6. ROMER SY TAN,

Petitioner,

-versus-
SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, and
BRYAN SY LIM,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 174570

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

PERALTA, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:

On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision[1] in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy Tan v. Sy
Tiong Gue, et al., the decretal portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28, 2003 are
REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.

On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[2] wherein respondents informed
this Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted their motion for the withdrawal of
the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375. As such, respondents prayed that the decision be
reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot and
academic on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case.

In his Comment[3] dated July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere reiteration of what
respondents have previously alleged in their Comment and which have been passed upon by this Court
in the subject decision. Petitioner alleges that he also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila a Complaint for Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the same incidents and that
should the Information for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the items seized by virtue of
the subject search warrants will be used as evidence therein.

On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their Reply.

On September 8, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution[4] wherein respondents were required to submit a
certified true copy of the Order of the RTC dated November 14, 2008, which granted their motion to
withdraw the information.

On October 22, 2010, respondents complied with the Courts directive and submitted a certified true
copy of the Order.[5]
In granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into consideration the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated August 29, 2006, which affirmed the
findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice that the elements of Robbery, i.e.,
unlawful taking with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, were absent. Thus, there was lack of
probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of the Information.[6] The RTC also considered that the said
pronouncements of the CA were affirmed by no less than this Court in G.R. No. 177829 in the
Resolution[7] dated November 12, 2007.

Accordingly, the RTC granted respondents motion to withdraw the information without prejudice, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw information is hereby GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED
without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject
search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there was probable cause
warranting the issuance by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents alleged acts of robbery
has been rendered moot and academic. Verily, there is no more reason to further delve into the
propriety of the quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.[8]

Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same incident
subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of the
evidence therein. Contrary to petitioners contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in any
other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued. Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicants personal knowledge and his or her
witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants
issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases
emanated from the same incident.

Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information was based on the findings of the CA, as
affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery
absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an essential element for the crime of
Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be
filed, much more, prosper.

Based on the foregoing, the Court resolves to Grant the motion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents is
GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated February 17, 2010 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The
petition filed by Romer Sy Tan is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.

7.

ARNEL U. TY, MARIE ANTONETTE TY, JASON ONG, WILLY DY, and ALVIN TY,

Petitioners,

- versus -

NBI SUPERVISING AGENT MARVIN E. DE JEMIL, PETRON GASUL DEALERS ASSOCIATION, and TOTALGAZ
DEALERS ASSOCIATION,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 182147

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DEL CASTILLO, and

PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners seek the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated September 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98054, which reversed and set
aside the Resolutions dated October 9, 2006[2] and December 14, 2006[3] of the Secretary of Justice,
and reinstated the November 7, 2005 Joint Resolution[4] of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor.
Petitioners assail also the CA Resolution[5] dated March 14, 2008, denying their motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts

Petitioners are stockholders of Omni Gas Corporation (Omni) as per Omnis General Information Sheet[6]
(GIS) dated March 6, 2004 submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Omni is in the
business of trading and refilling of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders and holds Pasig City Mayors
Permit No. RET-04-001256 dated February 3, 2004.

The case all started when Joaquin Guevara Adarlo & Caoile Law Offices (JGAC Law Offices) sent a letter
dated March 22, 2004[7] to the NBI requesting, on behalf of their clients Shellane Dealers Association,
Inc., Petron Gasul Dealers Association, Inc., and Totalgaz Dealers Association, Inc., for the surveillance,
investigation, and apprehension of persons or establishments in Pasig City that are engaged in alleged
illegal trading of petroleum products and underfilling of branded LPG cylinders in violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 33,[8] as amended by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1865.[9]

Earlier, the JGAC Law Offices was furnished by several petroleum producers/brand owners their
respective certifications on the dealers/plants authorized to refill their respective branded LPG cylinders,
to wit: (1) On October 3, 2003, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) issued a
certification[10] of the list of entities duly authorized to refill Shellane LPG cylinders; (2) on December 4,
2003, Petron Corporation (Petron) issued a certification[11] of their dealers in Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao authorized to refill Petron Gasul LPG cylinders; and (3) on January 5, 2004, Total (Philippines)
Corporation (Total) issued two certifications[12] of the refilling stations and plants authorized to refill
their Totalgaz and Superkalan Gaz LPG cylinders.

Agents De Jemil and Kawada attested to conducting surveillance of Omni in the months of March and
April 2004 and doing a test-buy on April 15, 2004. They brought eight branded LPG cylinders of Shellane,
Petron Gasul, Totalgaz, and Superkalan Gaz to Omni for refilling. The branded LPG cylinders were refilled,
for which the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents paid PhP 1,582 as evidenced by Sales Invoice
No. 90040[13] issued by Omni on April 15, 2004. The refilled LPG cylinders were without LPG valve seals
and one of the cylinders was actually underfilled, as found by LPG Inspector Noel N. Navio of the
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Association (LPGIA) who inspected the eight branded LPG cylinders on
April 23, 2004 which were properly marked by the NBI after the test-buy.

The NBIs test-buy yielded positive results for violations of BP 33, Section 2(a) in relation to Secs. 3(c) and
4, i.e., refilling branded LPG cylinders without authority; and Sec. 2(c) in relation to Sec. 4, i.e.,
underdelivery or underfilling of LPG cylinders. Thus, on April 28, 2004, Agent De Jemil filed an
Application for Search Warrant (With Request for Temporary Custody of the Seized Items)[14] before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City, attaching, among others, his affidavit[15] and the affidavit of
Edgardo C. Kawada,[16] an NBI confidential agent.

On the same day of the filing of the application for search warrants on April 28, 2004, the RTC, Branch
167 in Pasig City issued Search Warrants No. 2624[17] and 2625.[18] The NBI served the warrants the
next day or on April 29, 2004 resulting in the seizure of several items from Omnis premises duly itemized
in the NBIs Receipt/Inventory of Property/Item Seized.[19] On May 25, 2004, Agent De Jemil filed his
Consolidated Return of Search Warrants with Ex-Parte Motion to Retain Custody of the Seized Items[20]
before the RTC Pasig City.

Subsequently, Agent De Jemil filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) his Complaint-Affidavits
against petitioners for: (1) Violation of Section 2(a), in relation to Sections 3(c) and 4, of B.P. Blg. 33, as
amended by P.D. 1865;[21] and (2) Violation of Section 2(c), in relation to Section 4, of B.P. Blg. 33, as
amended by P.D. 1865,[22] docketed as I.S. Nos. 2004-616 and 2004-618, respectively.

During the preliminary investigation, petitioners submitted their Joint Counter-Affidavit,[23] which was
replied[24] to by Agent De Jemil with a corresponding rejoinder[25] from petitioners.

The Ruling of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor

in I.S. No. 2004-616 and I.S. No. 2004-618

On November 7, 2005, the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor Leandro C. Catalo of Manila issued a Joint
Resolution,[26] later approved by the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo upon the recommendation
of the Head of the Task Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TFAIPP), Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Leah C. Tanodra-Armamento, finding probable cause to charge petitioners with violations of
pertinent sections of BP 33, as amended, resolving as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that two (2) Informations for violations of
Section 2 [a] (illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products) and Section 2 [c] (underfilling of
LPG cylinders), both of Batas Pambansa Bilang 33, as amended, be filed against respondents [herein
petitioners] ARNEL TY, MARIE ANTONETTE TY, JASON ONG, WILLY DY and ALVIN TY.[27]

Assistant City Prosecutor Catalo found the existence of probable cause based on the evidence submitted
by Agent De Jemil establishing the fact that Omni is not an authorized refiller of Shellane, Petron Gasul,
Totalgaz and Superkalan Gaz LPG cylinders. Debunking petitioners contention that the branded LPG
cylinders are already owned by consumers who are free to do with them as they please, the law is clear
that the stamped markings on the LPG cylinders show who are the real owners thereof and they cannot
be refilled sans authority from Pilipinas Shell, Petron or Total, as the case may be. On the underfilling of
one LPG cylinder, the findings of LPG Inspector Navio of the LPGIA were uncontroverted by petitioners.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration,[28] was denied through a Resolution[29] by the Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor issued on May 3, 2006.

In time, petitioners appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.[30]

The Ruling of the DOJ Secretary

in I.S. No. 2004-616 and I.S. No. 2004-618

On October 9, 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution[31] reversing and setting
aside the November 7, 2005 Joint Resolution of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Chief State Prosecutor is
directed to cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations of Sections 2(a) and 2(c) of B.P. Blg.
33, as amended by P.D. 1865, against respondents Arnel Ty, Mari Antonette Ty, Jason Ong, Willy Dy and
Alvin Ty and report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[32]
The Office of the Secretary of Justice viewed, first, that the underfilling of one of the eight LPG cylinders
was an isolated incident and cannot give rise to a conclusion of underfilling, as the phenomenon may
have been caused by human error, oversight or technical error. Being an isolated case, it ruled that there
was no showing of a clear pattern of deliberate underfilling. Second, on the alleged violation of refilling
branded LPG cylinders sans written authority, it found no sufficient basis to hold petitioners responsible
for violation of Sec. 2 (c) of BP 33, as amended, since there was no proof that the branded LPG cylinders
seized from Omni belong to another company or firm, holding that the simple fact that the LPG cylinders
with markings or stamps of other petroleum producers cannot by itself prove ownership by said firms or
companies as the consumers who take them to Omni fully owned them having purchased or acquired
them beforehand.

Agent De Jemil moved but was denied reconsideration[33] through another Resolution[34] dated
December 14, 2006 prompting him to repair to the CA via a petition for certiorari[35] under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98054.

The Ruling of the CA

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment[36] on Agent De Jemils appeal, sought the
dismissal of the latters petition viewing that the determination by the Office of the Secretary of Justice of
probable cause is entitled to respect owing to the exercise of his prerogative to prosecute or not.

On August 31, 2007, Petron filed a Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention[37] and Petition-in-Intervention[38] before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 98054. And much
earlier, the Nationwide Association of Consumers, Inc. (NACI) also filed a similar motion.

On September 28, 2007, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision[39] revoking the resolutions
of the Office of the Secretary of Justice and reinstated the November 7, 2005 Joint Resolution of the
Office of the Chief State Prosecutor. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolutions dated October 9, 2006 and
December 14, 2006 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Joint Resolution dated November 7, 2005
of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor finding probable cause against private respondents Arnel Ty,
Marie Antonette Ty, Jason Ong, Willy Dy, and Alvin Ty is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.[40]

Citing Sec. 1 (1) and (3) of BP 33, as amended, which provide for the presumption of underfilling, the CA
held that the actual underfilling of an LPG cylinder falls under the prohibition of the law which does not
require for the underfilling to be substantial and deliberate.

Moreover, the CA found strong probable violation of refilling of another companys or firms cylinders
without such companys or firms written authorization under Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended. The CA
relied on the affidavits of Agents De Jemil and Kawada, the certifications from various LPG producers
that Omni is not authorized to refill their branded LPG cylinders, the results of the test-buy operation as
attested to by the NBI agents and confirmed by the examination of LPG Inspector Navio of the LPGIA, the
letter-opinion[41] of the Department of Energy (DOE) to Pilipinas Shell confirming that branded LPG
cylinders are properties of the companies whose stamp markings appear thereon, and Department
Circular No. 2000-05-007[42] of the DOE on the required stamps or markings by the manufacturers of
LPG cylinders.

After granting the appeal of Agent De Jemil, however, the motions to intervene filed by Petron and NACI
were simply noted by the appellate court.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was rebuffed by the CA through the equally assailed March 14,
2008 Resolution.[43]

Thus, the instant petition.

The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS.

II. WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT
PETITIONERS VIOLATED SECTION 2(A) OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 33, AS AMENDED.

III. WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT
PETITIONERS VIOLATED SECTION 2(C) OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 33, AS AMENDED.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS CAN BE HELD LIABLE UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 33, AS
AMENDED, FOR BEING MERE DIRECTORS, NOT ACTUALLY IN CHARGE OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
BUSINESS AFFAIRS OF THE CORPORATION.[44]

The foregoing issues can be summarized into two core issues: first, whether probable cause exists
against petitioners for violations of Sec. 2 (a) and (c) of BP 33, as amended; and second, whether
petitioners can be held liable therefor. We, however, will tackle at the outset the sole procedural issue
raised: the propriety of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 availed of by public respondent Agent De
Jemil to assail the resolutions of the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

Petrons Comment-in-Intervention

On April 14, 2009, Petron entered its appearance by filing a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Comment-in-Intervention[45] and its Comment-in-Intervention [To petition for Review on Certiorari
dated 13 May 2008].[46] It asserted vested interest in the seizure of several Gasul LPG cylinders and the
right to prosecute petitioners for unauthorized refilling of its branded LPG cylinders by Omni. Petitioners
duly filed their Comment/Opposition[47] to Petrons motion to intervene. It is clear, however, that Petron
has substantial interest to protect in so far as its business relative to the sale and refilling of Petron Gasul
LPG cylinders is concerned, and therefore its intervention in the instant case is proper.
The Courts Ruling

We partially grant the petition.

Procedural Issue: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 Proper

Petitioners raise the sole procedural issue of the propriety of the legal remedy availed of by public
respondent Agent De Jemil. They strongly maintain that the Office of the Secretary of Justice properly
assumed jurisdiction and did not gravely abuse its discretion in its determination of lack of probable
causethe exercise thereof being its sole prerogativewhich, they lament, the appellate court did not
accord proper latitude. Besides, they assail the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies when Agent
De Jemil immediately resorted to court action through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
before the CA without first appealing the resolutions of the Office of the Secretary of Justice to the Office
of the President (OP).

We cannot agree with petitioners.

For one, while it is the consistent principle in this jurisdiction that the determination of probable cause is
a function that belongs to the public prosecutor[48] and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may
direct the filing of the corresponding information or move for the dismissal of the case;[49] such
determination is subject to judicial review where it is established that grave abuse of discretion tainted
the determination.

For another, there is no question that the Secretary of Justice is an alter ego of the President who may
opt to exercise or not to exercise his or her power of review over the formers determination in criminal
investigation cases. As aptly noted by Agent De Jemil, the determination of probable cause by the
Secretary of Justice is, under the doctrine of qualified political agency, presumably that of the Chief
Executive unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter.

Chan v. Secretary of Justice[50] delineated the proper remedy from the determination of the Secretary
of Justice. Therein, the Court, after expounding on the policy of non-interference in the determination of
the existence of probable cause absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the public prosecutor
and the Secretary of Justice, however, concluded, citing Alcaraz v. Gonzalez[51] and Preferred Home
Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[52] that an aggrieved party from the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice may directly resort to judicial review on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, thus:

x x x [T]he findings of the Justice Secretary may be reviewed through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 based on the allegation that he acted with grave abuse of discretion. This remedy is available to the
aggrieved party.[53] (Emphasis supplied.)

It is thus clear that Agent De Jemil, the aggrieved party in the assailed resolutions of the Office of the
Secretary of Justice, availed of and pursued the proper legal remedy of a judicial review through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in assailing the latters finding of lack of probable cause on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.

First Core Issue: Existence of Probable Cause

Petitioners contend that there is no probable cause that Omni violated Sec. 2 (a), in relation to Secs. 3 (c)
and 4 of BP 33, as amended, prohibiting the refilling of another companys or firms LPG cylinders without
its written authorization. First, the branded LPG cylinders seized were not traded by Omni as its
representative annotated in the NBI receipt of seized items that the filled LPG cylinders came from
customers trucks and the empty ones were taken from the warehouse or swapping section of the
refilling plant and not from the refilling section. Second, the branded LPG cylinders are owned by end-
user customers and not by the major petroleum companies, i.e., Petron, Pilipinas Shell and Total. And
even granting arguendo that Omni is selling these LPG cylinders, still there cannot be a prima facie case
of violation since there is no proof that the refilled branded LPG cylinders are owned by another
company or firm.

Third, granting that Petron, Total and Pilipinas Shell still own their respective branded LPG cylinders
already sold to consumers, still such fact will not bind third persons, like Omni, who is not privy to the
agreement between the buying consumers and said major petroleum companies. Thus, a subsequent
transfer by the customers of Petron, Total and Pilipinas Shell of the duly marked or stamped LPG
cylinders through swapping, for example, will effectively transfer ownership of the LPG cylinders to the
transferee, like Omni.

Fourth, LPG cylinder exchange or swapping is a common industry practice that the DOE recognizes. They
point to a series of meetings conducted by the DOE for institutionalizing the validity of swapping of all
and any kind of LPG cylinders among the industry players. The meetings resulted in a draft Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) which unfortunately was not signed due to the withdrawal of petroleum major
players Petron, Total and Pilipinas Shell. Nonetheless, the non-signing of the MOA does not diminish the
fact of the recognized industry practice of cylinder exchange or swapping. Relying on Republic Act No.
(RA) 8479,[54] petitioners maintain that said law promotes and encourages the entry of new participants
in the petroleum industry such as Omni. And in furtherance of this mandate is the valid practice of
cylinder exchange or swapping in the LPG industry.

We are not persuaded by petitioners strained rationalizations.

Probable violation of Sec. 2 (a) of BP 33, amended

First. The test-buy conducted on April 15, 2004 by the NBI agents, as attested to by their respective
affidavits, tends to show that Omni illegally refilled the eight branded LPG cylinders for PhP 1,582. This is
a clear violation of Sec. 2 (a), in relation to Secs. 3 (c) and 4 of BP 33, as amended. It must be noted that
the criminal complaints, as clearly shown in the complaint-affidavits of Agent De Jemil, are not based
solely on the seized items pursuant to the search warrants but also on the test-buy earlier conducted by
the NBI agents.

Second. The written certifications from Pilipinas Shell, Petron and Total show that Omni has no written
authority to refill LPG cylinders, embossed, marked or stamped Shellane, Petron Gasul, Totalgaz and
Superkalan Gaz. In fact, petitioners neither dispute this nor claim that Omni has authority to refill these
branded LPG cylinders.
Third. Belying petitioners contention, the seized items during the service of the search warrants tend to
show that Omni illegally refilled branded LPG cylinders without authority.

On April 29, 2004, the NBI agents who served the search warrants on Omni seized the following:

Quantity/Unit Description

7 LPG cylinders Totalgaz, 11.0 kg [filled]

1 LPG cylinder Petron Gasul, 11.0 kg [filled]

1 LPG cylinder Shellane, 11.0 kg [filled]

29 LPG cylinders Superkalan Gaz, 2.7 kg [empty]

17 LPG cylinders Petron Gasul, 11.0 kg [emptly]

8 LPG cylinders Marked as Omnigas with Shell emboss,

11.0 kg [empty]

5 LPG cylinders Marked as Omnigas with Totalgaz emboss,

11.0 kg [empty]

23 LPG cylinders Shellane, 11.0 kg [empty]

3 LPG cylinders Marked as Omnigas with Gasul emboss,

11.0 kg [empty]

21 LPG cylinders Totalgaz, 11.0 kg [empty]

The foregoing list is embodied in the NBIs Receipt/Inventory of Property/Item Seized[55] signed by NBI
Agent Edwin J. Roble who served and implemented the search warrants. And a copy thereof was duly
received by Atty. Allan U. Ty, representative of Omni, who signed the same under protest and made the
annotation at the bottom part thereon: The above items/cylinders were taken at customers trucks and
the empty cylinders taken at the warehouse (swapping section) of the company.[56]

Even considering that the filled LPG cylinders were indeed already loaded on customers trucks when
confiscated, yet the fact that these refilled LPG cylinders consisting of nine branded LPG cylinders,
specifically Totalgaz, Petron Gasul and Shellane, tends to show that Omni indeed refilled these branded
LPG cylinders without authorization from Total, Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Such a fact is bolstered by the
test-buy conducted by Agent De Jemil and NBI confidential agent Kawada: Omnis unauthorized refilling
of branded LPG cylinders, contrary to Sec. 2 (a) in relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended. Said
provisos provide:

Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts.The following acts are prohibited and penalized:

(a) Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products;

xxxx

Sec. 3. Definition of terms.For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be construed to mean:

Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products

xxxx

(c) Refilling of liquefied petroleum gas cylinders without authority from said Bureau, or refilling of
another companys or firms cylinders without such companys or firms written authorization; (Emphasis
supplied.)

As petitioners strongly argue, even if the branded LPG cylinders were indeed owned by customers, such
fact does not authorize Omni to refill these branded LPG cylinders without written authorization from
the brand owners Pilipinas Shell, Petron and Total. In Yao, Sr. v. People,[57] a case involving criminal
infringement of property rights under Sec. 155 of RA 8293,[58] in affirming the courts a quos
determination of the presence of probable cause, this Court held that from Sec. 155.1[59] of RA 8293
can be gleaned that mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in connection
with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake
or deception among the buyers/consumers can be considered as trademark infringement.[60] The Court
affirmed the presence of infringement involving the unauthorized sale of Gasul and Shellane LPG
cylinders and the unauthorized refilling of the same by Masagana Gas Corporation as duly attested to
and witnessed by NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and test-buys.

Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that Omni refilled various branded LPG cylinders even if owned by
its customers but without authority from brand owners Petron, Pilipinas Shell and Total shows palpable
violation of BP 33, as amended. As aptly noted by the Court in Yao, Sr. v. People, only the duly authorized
dealers and refillers of Shellane, Petron Gasul and, by extension, Total may refill these branded LPG
cylinders. Our laws sought to deter the pernicious practices of unscrupulous businessmen.

Fourth. The issue of ownership of the seized branded LPG cylinders is irrelevant and hence need no
belaboring. BP 33, as amended, does not require ownership of the branded LPG cylinders as a condition
sine qua non for the commission of offenses involving petroleum and petroleum products. Verily, the
offense of refilling a branded LPG cylinder without the written consent of the brand owner constitutes
the offense regardless of the buyer or possessor of the branded LPG cylinder.

After all, once a consumer buys a branded LPG cylinder from the brand owner or its authorized dealer,
said consumer is practically free to do what he pleases with the branded LPG cylinder. He can simply
store the cylinder once it is empty or he can even destroy it since he has paid a deposit for it which
answers for the loss or cost of the empty branded LPG cylinder. Given such fact, what the law manifestly
prohibits is the refilling of a branded LPG cylinder by a refiller who has no written authority from the
brand owner. Apropos, a refiller cannot and ought not to refill branded LPG cylinders if it has no written
authority from the brand owner.

Besides, persuasive are the opinions and pronouncements by the DOE: brand owners are deemed
owners of their duly embossed, stamped and marked LPG cylinders even if these are possessed by
customers or consumers. The Court recognizes this right pursuant to our laws, i.e., Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines. Thus the issuance by the DOE Circular No. 2000-05-007,[61] the letter-
opinion[62] dated December 9, 2004 of then DOE Secretary Vincent S. Perez addressed to Pilipinas Shell,
the June 6, 2007 letter[63] of then DOE Secretary Raphael P.M. Lotilla to the LPGIA, and DOE Department
Circular No. 2007-10-0007[64] on LPG Cylinder Ownership and Obligations Related Thereto issued on
October 13, 2007 by DOE Secretary Angelo T. Reyes.

Fifth. The ownership of the seized branded LPG cylinders, allegedly owned by Omni customers as
petitioners adamantly profess, is of no consequence.
The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom
the search warrants is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be
seized.[65] Petitioners cannot deny that the seized LPG cylinders were in the possession of Omni, found
as they were inside the Omni compound.

In fine, we also note that among those seized by the NBI are 16 LPG cylinders bearing the embossed
brand names of Shellane, Gasul and Totalgaz but were marked as Omnigas. Evidently, this pernicious
practice of tampering or changing the appearance of a branded LPG cylinder to look like another brand
violates the brand owners property rights as infringement under Sec. 155.1 of RA 8293. Moreover,
tampering of LPG cylinders is a mode of perpetrating the criminal offenses under BP 33, as amended,
and clearly enunciated under DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 which provided penalties on a per cylinder
basis for each violation.

Foregoing considered, in the backdrop of the quantum of evidence required to support a finding of
probable cause, we agree with the appellate court and the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, which
conducted the preliminary investigation, that there exists probable cause for the violation of Sec. 2 (a) in
relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.[66] After all, probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as
the investigating officer acts upon reasonable beliefprobable cause implies probability of guilt and
requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction.[67]

Probable violation of Sec. 2 (c) of BP 33, as amended

Anent the alleged violation of Sec. 2 (c) in relation to Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended, petitioners strongly
argue that there is no probable cause for said violation based upon an underfilling of a lone cylinder of
the eight branded LPG cylinders refilled during the test-buy. Besides, they point out that there was no
finding of underfilling in any of the filled LPG cylinders seized during the service of the search warrants.
Citing DOEs Bureau of Energy Utilization Circular No. 85-3-348, they maintain that some deviation is
allowed from the exact filled weight. Considering the fact that an isolated underfilling happened in so
many LPG cylinders filled, petitioners are of the view that such is due to human or equipment error and
does not in any way constitute deliberate underfilling within the contemplation of the law.
Moreover, petitioners cast aspersion on the report and findings of LPG Inspector Navio of the LPGIA by
assailing his independence for being a representative of the major petroleum companies and that the
inspection he conducted was made without the presence of any DOE representative or any independent
body having technical expertise in determining LPG cylinder underfilling beyond the authorized quantity.

Again, we are not persuaded.

Contrary to petitioners arguments, a single underfilling constitutes an offense under BP 33, as amended
by PD 1865, which clearly criminalizes these offenses. In Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the
Philippines, Inc.,[68] the Court affirmed the validity of DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 which provided
penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, thus:

B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing
of petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving
petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be
perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight
markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no
distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering
LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are
obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some
petroleum merchants.[69] (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, in denying the motion for reconsideration of the LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines,
Inc., the Court upheld the basis of said DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 on the imposition of penalties on a
per cylinder basis, thus:

Respondents position is untenable. The Circular is not confiscatory in providing penalties on a per
cylinder basis. Those penalties do not exceed the ceiling prescribed in Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 33, as
amended, which penalizes any person who commits any act [t]herein prohibited. Thus, violation on a per
cylinder basis falls within the phrase any act as mandated in Section 4. To provide the same penalty for
one who violates a prohibited act in B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, regardless of the number of cylinders
involved would result in an indiscriminate, oppressive and impractical operation of B.P. Blg. 33, as
amended. The equal protection clause demands that all persons subject to such legislation shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the
liabilities imposed.[70]

The Court made it clear that a violation, like underfilling, on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase of
any act as mandated under Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended. Ineluctably, the underfilling of one LPG cylinder
constitutes a clear violation of BP 33, as amended. The finding of underfilling by LPG Inspector Navio of
the LPGIA, as aptly noted by Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Catalo who conducted the preliminary
investigation, was indeed not controverted by petitioners.

On the issue of manifest bias and partiality, suffice it to say that aside from the allegation by petitioners,
they have not shown that LPG Inspector Navio is neither an expert nor qualified to determine
underfilling. Besides, it must be noted that the inspection by LPG Inspector Navio was conducted in the
presence of NBI agents on April 23, 2004 who attested to that fact through their affidavits. Moreover, no
rules require and petitioners have not cited any that the inspection be conducted in the presence of DOE
representatives.

Second Core Issue: Petitioners Liability for Violations

Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended, provides for the penalties and persons who are criminally liable, thus:

Sec. 4. Penalties. Any person who commits any act herein prohibited shall, upon conviction, be
punished with a fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) but not more than fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000), or imprisonment of at least two (2) years but not more than five (5) years, or both, in
the discretion of the court. In cases of second and subsequent conviction under this Act, the penalty
shall be both fine and imprisonment as provided herein. Furthermore, the petroleum and/or petroleum
products, subject matter of the illegal trading, adulteration, shortselling, hoarding, overpricing or misuse,
shall be forfeited in favor of the Government: Provided, That if the petroleum and/or petroleum
products have already been delivered and paid for, the offended party shall be indemnified twice the
amount paid, and if the seller who has not yet delivered has been fully paid, the price received shall be
returned to the buyer with an additional amount equivalent to such price; and in addition, if the
offender is an oil company, marketer, distributor, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer and other retail outlets, or
hauler, the cancellation of his license.
Trials of cases arising from this Act shall be terminated within thirty (30) days after arraignment.

When the offender is a corporation, partnership, or other juridical person, the president, the general
manager, managing partner, or such other officer charged with the management of the business affairs
thereof, or employee responsible for the violation shall be criminally liable; in case the offender is an
alien, he shall be subject to deportation after serving the sentence.

If the offender is a government official or employee, he shall be perpetually disqualified from office.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Relying on the third paragraph of the above statutory proviso, petitioners argue that they cannot be held
liable for any perceived violations of BP 33, as amended, since they are mere directors of Omni who are
not in charge of the management of its business affairs. Reasoning that criminal liability is personal,
liability attaches to a person from his personal act or omission but not from the criminal act or
negligence of another. Since Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended, clearly provides and enumerates who are
criminally liable, which do not include members of the board of directors of a corporation, petitioners, as
mere members of the board of directors who are not in charge of Omnis business affairs, maintain that
they cannot be held liable for any perceived violations of BP 33, as amended. To bolster their position,
they attest to being full-time employees of various firms as shown by the Certificates of Employment[71]
they submitted tending to show that they are neither involved in the day-to-day business of Omni nor
managing it. Consequently, they posit that even if BP 33, as amended, had been violated by Omni they
cannot be held criminally liable thereof not being in any way connected with the commission of the
alleged violations, and, consequently, the criminal complaints filed against them based solely on their
being members of the board of directors as per the GIS submitted by Omni to SEC are grossly
discriminatory.

On this point, we agree with petitioners except as to petitioner Arnel U. Ty who is indisputably the
President of Omni.

It may be noted that Sec. 4 above enumerates the persons who may be held liable for violations of the
law, viz: (1) the president, (2) general manager, (3) managing partner, (4) such other officer charged with
the management of the business affairs of the corporation or juridical entity, or (5) the employee
responsible for such violation. A common thread of the first four enumerated officers is the fact that
they manage the business affairs of the corporation or juridical entity. In short, they are operating
officers of a business concern, while the last in the list is self-explanatory.

It is undisputed that petitioners are members of the board of directors of Omni at the time pertinent.
There can be no quibble that the enumeration of persons who may be held liable for corporate violators
of BP 33, as amended, excludes the members of the board of directors. This stands to reason for the
board of directors of a corporation is generally a policy making body. Even if the corporate powers of a
corporation are reposed in the board of directors under the first paragraph of Sec. 23[72] of the
Corporation Code, it is of common knowledge and practice that the board of directors is not directly
engaged or charged with the running of the recurring business affairs of the corporation. Depending on
the powers granted to them by the Articles of Incorporation, the members of the board generally do not
concern themselves with the day-to-day affairs of the corporation, except those corporate officers who
are charged with running the business of the corporation and are concomitantly members of the board,
like the President. Section 25[73] of the Corporation Code requires the president of a corporation to be
also a member of the board of directors.

Thus, the application of the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means the mention
of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the thing
upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its
operation and effect.[74] The fourth officer in the enumerated list is the catch-all such other officer
charged with the management of the business affairs of the corporation or juridical entity which is a
factual issue which must be alleged and supported by evidence.

A scrutiny of the GIS reveals that among the petitioners who are members of the board of directors are
the following who are likewise elected as corporate officers of Omni: (1) Petitioner Arnel U. Ty (Arnel) as
President; (2) petitioner Mari Antonette Ty as Treasurer; and (3) petitioner Jason Ong as Corporate
Secretary. Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended, clearly indicated firstly the president of a corporation or juridical
entity to be criminally liable for violations of BP 33, as amended.

Evidently, petitioner Arnel, as President, who manages the business affairs of Omni, can be held liable for
probable violations by Omni of BP 33, as amended. The fact that petitioner Arnel is ostensibly the
operations manager of Multi-Gas Corporation, a family owned business, does not deter him from
managing Omni as well. It is well-settled that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, it
must be taken to mean exactly what it says.[75] As to the other petitioners, unless otherwise shown that
they are situated under the catch-all such other officer charged with the management of the business
affairs, they may not be held liable under BP 33, as amended, for probable violations. Consequently, with
the exception of petitioner Arnel, the charges against other petitioners must perforce be dismissed or
dropped.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. Accordingly, the assailed
September 28, 2007 Decision and March 14, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
98054 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioners Mari Antonette Ty, Jason Ong, Willy Dy and
Alvin Ty are excluded from the two Informations charging probable violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang
33, as amended. The Joint Resolution dated November 7, 2005 of the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor is modified accordingly.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

8.

G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents.

Ronolfo S. Pasamba for petitioner.

BELLOSILLO, JR., J.:

PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition) the following
resolutions of the Commission on Elections: Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for being
unconstitutional, and Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and Resolution No. 92-0999 dated 23
April 1992, for want of legal and factual bases.

The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11
May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No. 2323
otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms
by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction
forces during the election period.1 Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution No.
2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and
transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.2

On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting
the return of the two (2) firearms3 issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised
of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto
Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress.

Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some
twenty (20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the
outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car
and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car.
Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the
firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives.

Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The
referral did not include petitioner as among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992,
the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation
meritorious.4

On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances mentioned
in Arellano's sworn explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm
Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained
that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by
returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a
bodyguard.5

On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters,
recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against
petitioner be also dismissed.6

Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of
Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32
of R.A. No. 7166;7 and petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an
elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of R.A.
7166, and

Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881.8

On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative
proceedings as well as the filing of the information in court.9 On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.10 Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that the rules and
regulations of an administrative body must respect the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus Election
Code provides for the disqualification of any person/candidate from running for or holding a public
office, i.e., any person who has either been declared by competent authority as insane or incompetent
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude; that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned
in the resolution are not within the letter or spirit of the provisions of the Code; that the resolution did
away with the requirement of final conviction before the commission of certain offenses; that instead, it
created a presumption of guilt as a candidate may be disqualified from office in situations (a) where the
criminal charge is still pending, (b) where there is no pending criminal case, and (c) where the accused
has already been acquitted, all contrary to the requisite quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from
running or holding public office under the Omnibus Election Code, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt.
As a result, petitioner concludes, Resolution No. 2327 violates the fundamental law thus rendering it
fatally defective.
But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the

11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in
the elections that ensued. Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the implications of the charge against
him on his qualification to run for public office.

However, there still remains an important question to be resolved, i.e., whether he can be validly
prosecuted for instructing his driver to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives
the two firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless search of his
car.

Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP conducted the search. According to
him, without a warrant and without informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen
searched his car. The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of Arellano
but were neatly packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car. Thus, the
search of his car that yielded the evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par.
(2), Art. III, of the Constitution. 11

Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary
investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet. Consequently,
making him a respondent in the criminal information would violate his constitutional right to due
process.

Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any candidate for
public office during the election period from employing or availing himself or engaging the services of
security personnel or bodyguards since, admittedly, Arellano was not a security officer or bodyguard but
a civilian employee assigned to him as driver by the House of Representatives. Specifically, petitioner
further argues, Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he did, the firearms in compliance with
the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus, no law was in fact violated. 12

On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its own comment on the

petition13 upon manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could not take the position of COMELEC
and prayed instead to be excused from filing the required comment. 14
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), in relation to Sec. 263, of
B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that "the principals, accomplices and accessories, as defined in the Revised
Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses." It points out that it was upon petitioner's
instruction that Arellano brought the firearms in question outside petitioner's residence, submitting that
his right to be heard was not violated as he was invited by the City Prosecutor to explain the
circumstances regarding Arellano's possession of the firearms. Petitioner also filed a sworn written
explanation about the incident. Finally, COMELEC claims that violation of

the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the offender is immaterial. 15

Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into the alleged constitutional infirmity of Resolution No.
2327 since this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue. 16

As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority.
However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had
been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view,17 as well as the
search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed
that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search. 18

Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and
that they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly,
COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The records do not show that the manner by which the package was
bundled led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention either of any report
regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was stopped and
searched. Given these circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly
search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.

An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or
that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the
vehicle to be searched.19 The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is
determined by the facts of each case.20 Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in
situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where
the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 21

We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior
confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters, e.g., where a
confidential report that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the
search was conducted and appellants were caught in flagrante delicto transporting drugs at the time of
their arrest; 22 where apart from the intelligence information, there were reports by an undercover
"deep penetration" agent that appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 23 where the
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing prohibited drugs was strengthened by the
conspicuous bulge in accused's waistline, and his suspicious failure to produce his passport and other
identification papers;24 where the physical appearance of the accused fitted the description given in the
confidential information about a woman transporting marijuana;25 where the accused carrying a bulging
black leather bag were suspiciously quiet and nervous when queried about its contents;26 or where the
identity of the drug courier was already established by police authorities who received confidential
information about the probable arrival of accused on board one of the vessels arriving in Dumaguete
City. 27

In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the
Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution

No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description
furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special
strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of
Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The
action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security of his
property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in
violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any
proceeding.

It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied waiver
of petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the
firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that "guidelines
shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the implementation
of this authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in
consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under Sec. 5,
Resolution No. 2323."28 The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five o'clock in the
afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was not
shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations, and the reason for
the same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint
that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists
passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant exercise.
With the authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice
but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would raise
suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist and to conduct an extensive
search of his vehicle.

In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As
conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of
fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation,29 driver Arellano being alone and a mere
employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the
extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was any,
could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty.

Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary
investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process which requires that the procedure
established by law should be obeyed. 30

COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he was invited to enlighten
the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in
fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the incident. This does not satisfy the requirement
of due process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of his defense.31 Due process guarantees the observance of both
substantive and procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only
a statute or a rule of court. 32 In Go v. Court of Appeals,33 we held
that —

While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since
it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The
right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or
technical right; it is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to
anyone save, perhaps, to hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.

Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate
the latter's explanation. Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the
case, so that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not
petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised that he was himself a
respondent when he appeared before the City Prosecutor.

Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC
cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary investigation for himself. The
motion itself expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right. Petitioner's protestation started as
soon as he learned of his inclusion in the charge, and did not ease up even after COMELEC's denial of his
motion for reconsideration. This is understandably so since the prohibition against carrying firearms
bears the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more than six (6) years without
probation and with disqualification from holding public office, and deprivation of the right to suffrage.
Against such strong stance, petitioner clearly did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantless search conducted by the Philippine
National Police on 13 January 1992 is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless
search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against petitioner. Consequently, COMELEC
Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 being violative of the Constitution is SET ASIDE.

The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May 1992 is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.

Today is Wednesday, December 12, 2018 home

Custom Search

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 148117 March 22, 2007

MABINI EPIE, JR. and RODRIGO PALASI, Petitioners,

vs.

THE HON. NELSONIDA T. ULAT-MARREDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad,
Benguet and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684.

The facts of the case as gleaned from the records are:

In an Information dated September 22, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet Province
charged Mabini Epie, Jr. and Rodrigo Palasi, petitioners, with violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705,2 as amended. The Informtion reads:

That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, along the Halsema National Highway at Acop,
Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding each other and without
any authority of law or without any license or permit granted by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), and with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and transport 870 bd. ft. of
Benguet Pine lumber having a total market value of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
PESOS (₱24,360.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, to the damage
and prejudice of the GOVERNMENT in the actual sum aforesaid.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet (presided by respondent
Judge Nelsonida T. Ulat-Marredo), docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3138.

When arraigned, both petitioners, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial then ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, SPO2 Alberto
Ngina of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tublay Station received an information from a confidential
agent that a jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine
lumber.

SPO2 Ngina immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano and SPO1 Domingo Pulig.
They then swiftly established a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet.

At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives spotted the jeepney heading toward La
Trinidad. They flagged it down but it did not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan, La
Trinidad where it finally halted.

The police saw five persons inside the jeepney then loaded with assorted vegetables, like womboc3 and
chili.

When SPO4 Quitoriano lifted a womboc, he found some pieces of lumber under it. The driver and his
companions admitted they have no permit to transport the lumber. The police immediately arrested and
investigated petitioners, Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were
charged with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.

After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Suppress
Evidence of the Prosecution" on the ground that the pieces of Benguet pine lumber were illegally seized.

In a Resolution4 dated July 26, 1999, respondent judge denied the motion.

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, it was denied in a Resolution dated
September 27, 1999.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55684 assailing the said Resolutions of the trial court.
On September 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that
respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
that the search conducted without warrant by the police officers is valid; and that the confiscated pieces
of lumber are admissible in evidence against the accused.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was denied in a Resolution5
dated April 11, 2001.

Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether the police officers have a probable cause to
believe that the subject vehicle was loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped and
searched without a warrant.

In this jurisdiction, the fundamental law of the land recognizes and protects the right of a person to
privacy against unreasonable intrusions by the agents of the State. This right to undisturbed privacy is
guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the above provision
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise,
such search and seizure constitutes derogation of a constitutional right.6

The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap,7 we listed the exceptions where
search and seizure may be conducted without warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in
plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. The only requirement in these
exceptions is the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be
searched.8 In People v. Aruta,9 we ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause must only be
based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in determining probable cause for its
determination varies according to the facts of each case.

Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may be
conducted by peace officers. The only issue we should determine is whether there was probable cause
to justify such warrantless search and seizure.

We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential informer disclosed to SPO2
Ngina that a passenger jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96,
Atok, Benguet. The lumber was covered with assorted vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in
Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept the jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day, the police spotted
the vehicle. They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan,
La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not
produce the required DENR permit to cut and transport the same.

In People v. Vinecarao,10 we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even
after having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from
proceeding with their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of
the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle
contained objects which were instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present
case. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless
search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 55684. Costs against petitioners.

EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

BERNARDO TUAZON Y NICOLAS,

Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 175783

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO, and

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

September 3, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For Review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01799 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas, affirming the Decision[2] dated 14
October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114,
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425,[3] as amended.

The Information filed against appellant alleged:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses BERNARDO TUAZON y NICOLAS of the crime of Violation of
Section 16, Article III, R.A. 6425, as amended, committed as follows:

That, on or about the 7th day of March, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess
any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control seven (7) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags each containing 97.92 grams, 95.46
grams, 40.47 grams, 5.36 grams, 5.41 grams, 2.95 grams and 3.17 grams for a total weight of 250.74
grams of white crystalline substance, which after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted
gave positive result to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride also known as shabu a regulated
drug, in violation of the above-cited law.[4]
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.[5]

The prosecutions version of the case relied heavily on the testimony of PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno)
who testified that in the morning of 7 March 1999, the Antipolo City Police Station received through
telephone, a confidential information that a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411[6] would deliver
an unspecified amount of shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip, Antipolo City
Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct a
surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car and
immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to a stop and opened a window of said vehicle
giving the policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City Police
Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellants waist. PO1
Padlan inquired about the gun and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he
produce any pertinent document relating to said firearm. This prompted PO3 Bueno to order appellant
to get down from the car. As soon as appellant stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five
plastic sachets on the drivers seat, the contents of which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu.
Appellant was thereafter immediately brought to the police station.

In the Joint Affidavit executed by PO3 Bueno and PO1 Padlan, it was stated that when they frisked
appellant, they discovered 2 big plastic bag (sic) and 5 medium size plastic (sic) and a 9 mm. pistol
marked Parabellum bearing serial number C-9890 with one loaded magazine with eleven ammunition.[7]

The white crystalline substance confiscated from appellant was then forwarded to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for examination. The test conducted on
the specimen turned over to the crime laboratory yielded the following:

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.

CONCLUSION:
Specimens A-1 through A-7 contains Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.[8]

Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that led to his indictment.
According to him, he used to work as a caretaker of Curacha, a beer house/videoke bar located along
Circumferential Road, Marville II Subdivision and owned by a certain Bong Reyes. On 6 March 1999, he
reported for work at six oclock in the evening. Later that night, unidentified men walked up to him. One
of these men asked him regarding the ownership of the car parked outside the bar. He allegedly
accompanied the men outside so he could confirm the identity of the owner of the car that the men
were inquiring about. Thereupon, the men pointed to him a green colored Isuzu Gemini car which
according to him was driven by his employer, Reyes. After revealing this information to the unidentified
men, the latter purportedly pointed guns at him and ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The
men allegedly asked him regarding the whereabouts of Reyes and threatened to include him in whatever
trouble Reyes was in. A few hours passed and he was then brought to the police headquarters where he
was asked regarding his address and the name of his employer. After two days, he was allegedly forced
to admit that he was in fact the owner of the Gemini car as well as of the shabu and the gun recovered
from said vehicle. He learned later on that he was charged with violations of Republic Act No. 6425 for
illegal possession of shabu and Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearm. The latter
case was eventually dismissed. At the end of his direct examination, appellant reiterated that he should
not have been the one charged with illegal possession of shabu, but Reyes who was driving the Gemini
car.

The trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to support a guilty verdict and
imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.[9]

On 17 September 2003, we resolved to accept the appeal interposed by appellant, the records of the
case having been forwarded to this Court by the RTC, Antipolo City, Branch 71. We also required the
parties to file their respective briefs.[10]

In addition to the required brief, appellant filed a supplementary pleading in which he questioned the
validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence presented against him. He contends that at the
time of his warrantless arrest, he was merely driving within Marville Subdivision. He had not committed,
was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime which could have justified his
apprehension. He goes on to argue that even if he had waived the issue regarding the validity of his
arrest by his failure to raise the matter before entering his plea, such waiver did not affect the
unlawfulness of the search and seizure conducted by the police. Appellant claims that as the confidential
informant had been cooperating with the police for three weeks prior to his arrest, the authorities were
already informed of his identity and his alleged illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior
surveillance and then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said warrant, the shabu seized
from him should be excluded from evidence. [11]

On 23 February 2005, we ordered the transfer of this case to the Court of Appeals conformably with our
decision in People v. Mateo, which modified the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court with respect
to direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.[12]

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the court a quo. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the October 14, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Antipolo City, in
Criminal Case No. 99-16114, is hereby AFFIRMED.[13]

In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found PO3 Buenos testimony to be clear and
unequivocal[14] and should therefore prevail over appellants defense of denial.[15] The Court of
Appeals likewise brushed aside appellants contention that he was a victim of frame-up as this defense
has been viewed with disfavor and has become a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising
from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[16] It also took note of appellants failure to give any
credible reason why the police singled him out considering that they were strangers to one another prior
to the date of the incident.[17]

Appellant is again before this Court pleading his innocence by making a lone assignment of error

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 16, ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED.[18]

Appellant contends that the trial courts reliance on the prosecutions evidence was erroneous
considering that he, as a mere grade school graduate, could not have concocted his narration of the
events that led to his arrest.[19] He also maintains that he was an easy target of police operatives, since
he was a new employee in the videoke bar and was therefore unfamiliar with the people who
frequented said establishment. In addition, he insists that the prosecution failed to meet the exacting
test of moral certainty required for conviction and that the trial court should not have applied the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties on the part of the police officers. [20]

Appellant likewise points out the trial courts supposed failure to substantiate the factual and legal bases
for his conviction. He notes that the court a quos evaluation of the facts and evidence was contained in
only two paragraphs and was utterly lacking in substantial discussion, in contravention of this Courts
edict that the decisions must distinctly and clearly express their factual and legal bases.[21]

On 19 February 2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
desired. On 17 April 2007, appellant filed a Manifestation stating that he would no longer file a
supplemental brief as all relevant matters for his defense were already discussed in his previous
pleadings.[22] The Office of the Solicitor General likewise manifested that it would no longer file a
supplemental brief.[23]

The appeal must fail.

In insisting that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of PO3 Bueno, appellant
is basically making an issue about a witnesss credibility. In this regard, we reiterate the rule that
appellate courts will generally not disturb factual findings of the trial court since the latter has the
unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying.[24] Thus, unless attended with arbitrariness or
plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the highest degree
of respect on appeal.[25] Our careful review of the records of this case reveals that the trial court did not
err in relying on the testimony of PO3 Bueno. In open court, PO3 Bueno recounted their encounter with
appellant as follows:

PROS. LUNA:

Thank you, your honor.

Q: Mr. Witness, where were you assigned as police officer sometime in the month of March 1999?

WITNESS:

A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.

Q: Mr. Witness, do you know accused Bernardo Tuazon?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How did you come to know him?

A: Because we arrested Bernardo Tuazon.

Q: If the accused in this case is present before this Court, will you please point him out?

A: He is that person wearing yellow T-shirt.

LEGAL RESEARCHER ACTING AS INTERPRETER:

The witness is pointing to a male person inside the courtroom when confronted give his name as
Bernardo Tuazon.

PROS. LUNA:

Q: Do you recall where were you at about 12:10 in the morning of March 7, 1999?
WITNESS:

A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.

Q: What were you doing then at that time?

A: We were doing our duty as police investigator, sir.

Q: Who were your companions at that time?

A: PO1 Manuel Padlan, and CA Ronald Naval, sir.

Q: While performing your functions, do you remember any unusual incident at that time?

A: One of our confidential agents gave an information thru telephone, sir.

Q: About what?

A: About delivery of shabu of undetermined amount in the area of Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City, sir.

Q: Do you know that person involved or who is the person supposed to deliver an undetermined amount
of shabu?

A: The asset did not say who will deliver the shabu but he only said on the telephone that the car is a
Gemini bearing plate number PFC 411 who will deliver at said place.
Q: Upon receipt of said information what did you do next?

A: We informed our Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana, sir.

Q: What was the reaction of Major Quintana?

A: Our Chief of Police told us to do surveillance in the area.

Q: What did you do next?

A: We immediately recorded the dispatch and we boarded a marked vehicle and proceeded to the area
in Marville Subdivision, sir.

Q: Where is this located?

A: In Barangay San Roque fronting along the highway in Antipolo City.

Q: Upon reaching that place what happened?

A: When we arrived in the subdivision we saw a Gemini car with plate number PFC 411, sir.

Q: If a picture of that car would be shown to you would you be able to identify it?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you a picture already marked as Exhibit B,. B-1 and B-2. What relation has this to the
one you mentioned?

A: This is the car where the accused was then on board, sir.

Q: Upon seeing the car what did you do?

A: We immediately conduct a check point, sir.

Q: Specifically, what did you do?

A: We flagged down the vehicle, sir.

Q: What happened after flagging down the car?

A: When we flagged down the vehicle, we identified ourselves as police officers, sir.

Q: What was the reaction of the driver of the vehicle?

A: The driver opened the window and we identified ourselves as members of the Antipolo City Police
Station, sir.

Q: What was the reaction of the driver?

A: When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on his waist.
Q: What did you do next? In your case what did you do?

A: We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.

COURT:

Q: Did you know what Padlan did?

WITNESS:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did he do?

A: He questioned his gun and it turned out that there is no pertinent document for his gun.

Q: What do you mean he was asked? Who was asked?

A: The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.

PROS. LUNA:

Q: What was the reaction of Bernardo Tuazon?

WITNESS:

A: He said that the gun is not his.

Q: Upon hearing that the gun was not owned by Bernardo Tuazon what did you do as police officer?

A: I ordered him to get down from the car.

COURT:

Q: After he got down from the car, what happened?

WITNESS:

A: I saw five (5) plastic bags on the drivers seat.

Q: Upon seeing that plastic bag what did you do?

A: I asked him the contents of that plastic and he replied that it contained shabu, sir.

Q: What did you do upon hearing the answer of the accused?

A: We immediately brought him to the headquarters together with the evidence, sir.

Q: What did you do with the shabu?

A: We brought it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, sir.

Q: What was the result of the examination, if you know?

A: It gave positive result to the tests for methylamphetamine hydrochloride sir.[26]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing testimony of PO3 Bueno establishes beyond
reasonable doubt appellants culpability. His testimony regarding the circumstances that occurred in the
early hours of 7 March 1999 from the moment their office received a confidential tip from their informer
up to the time they accosted appellant deserved to be given significance as it came from the mouth of a
law enforcement officer who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty. Police
officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions in the
absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary or that they were moved by ill-will.[27]

Appellants bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the positive and affirmative testimony offered
by the prosecution. It is well-settled that positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the
bare denials of an accused.[28] A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative
matters.[29] Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility.[30]

We shall now resolve the issue raised by appellant regarding the admissibility of the physical evidence
presented against him. No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is
encapsulated in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which states:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same
article

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures
admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[31]

In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing,[32] this Court had the occasion to elucidate on the rationale for the
exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the requirement of search warrant, thus:

[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not
give the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do
so would render the aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to
indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy
consideration behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness
on the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at
all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.
[33]

In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,[34] the term probable cause was explained to mean

[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to

warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged;
or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a
fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of the case.

When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe prior to the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in
the vehicle to be searched.[35]

In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini
car driven by appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu
at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to
monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the
Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car,
they saw a gun tucked in appellants waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his
possession of said firearm which all the more strengthened the polices suspicion. After he was told to
step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic sachets containing white powdery substance.
These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless search
of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.

In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the evidence against him on the
ground that the same was obtained through a warrantless search. His failure amounts to a waiver of the
objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police. It
was only proper for the trial court to admit said evidence. [36]
Appellant also faults the trial court for its failure to abide by the Constitutional requirement that (n)o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based.[37] Again, we disagree.

Faithful adherence to the aforementioned constitutional provision is a vital component of due process
and fair play.[38] The rule takes an even more important significance for the losing party who is entitled
to know why he lost so that he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision needs to be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law
on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to
the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.[39]

In this case, we find that the assailed decision of the trial court substantially complied with the
requirements of the Constitution. The decision contained a summary of the facts of the case as
presented by the prosecution and by the defense. It likewise contained an explanation as to why it found
appellant guilty as charged. Admittedly, the decision is brief but to our mind, it sufficiently informed
appellant as regards the bases for his conviction. It readily informs appellant that the trial court
disregarded his defense of bare denial in favor of the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties enjoyed by police officers.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799
dated 31 July 2006, finding appellant Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,
- versus -

BELEN MARIACOS,

Appellant.

G.R. No. 188611

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

PEREZ,* JJ.

Promulgated:

June 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
02718, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La
Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana
fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency or office.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the
following were stipulated upon:

1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen Mariacos;

2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;

3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from a passenger jeepney;

4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in two (2) bags were
submitted for examination to the Crime Lab;

5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination gave positive
result for the presence of marijuana;

6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and submitted for examination
weighed 7,030.3 grams;

7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and

8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen,
Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino.

During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a
checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana
from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2
Lunes B. Pallayoc (PO2 Pallayoc), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not
yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay
Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).

At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the
Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a
passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and
one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc
then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion,
he found the black backpack with an O.K. marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney
about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a
few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already
being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a
policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.

PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos,
and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San
Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the
bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of
marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.

Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime
laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all
tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.

When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that:

On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani Herbacio,
was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal
waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang (Lao-ang), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags
which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded
later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion,
Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang
suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without
explanation, they were brought to the police station. When they were at the police station, Lani
Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true
contents of the bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the
bags and that she did not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed
a Counter-Affidavit.[3]
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and sentences here (sic) to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court personnel and media.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering the
evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.[5] She claimed that her right against an
unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the
bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that
PO2 Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one
he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable cause for
her arrest.[6]

Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.[7] She
alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of
1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the
custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said
regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or
paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be required to sign copies of
the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the
identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to
prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of
custody over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the
warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal,[8] justified
as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from
their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of
marijuana.[9] The OSG also argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of
her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and participated in the trial
and presented her evidence.[10] The OSG brushed aside appellants argument that the bricks of
marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately
after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was practicable.[11]

In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the RTC decision
in toto.[12] It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away from the
jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA
ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and conveying the bag that contained the
illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:

It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags when he was
aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on
board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed
only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying the
bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.

xxxx

Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At
the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified
owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus,
there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.

Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been trying to
intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was
tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse
than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle
has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2
Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags
which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no
use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.[13]

Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.

Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States agents to conduct searches
and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on searches and seizures, providing,
more or less, clear parameters in determining which are proper and which are not.

Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used against
her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the
apprehending officer.

Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable cause
for the warrantless arrest of appellant.

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14]

Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.

Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause.[15]

In People v. Bagista,[16] the Court said:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a
moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a
judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to
do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.[17] Without probable cause, the articles
seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.[18]

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently

strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.[19]

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.[20]

Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant
could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of
the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is
used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.[21]

This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made
in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when
the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly
be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.[22]

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that
carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick
decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting
the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no
time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for
its destination.

It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants arrest, the police received
information that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a
checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met
the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana
was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable
cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus,
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.[23]

For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is
necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.[24]
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede
the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.[25]

Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also valid.

Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:

SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a
neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence.

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership
thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.
[26]

Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and
good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this
case.[27] Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable
under the Dangerous Drugs Act.[28]

Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to
crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against
particular individuals, but against public order.[29]

Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to another.[30] There is no
definitive moment when an accused transports a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the
purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as
to the perpetration of the criminal act.[31] The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a
finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of
destination is reached.[32]

Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable
presumption[33] that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.[34] Appellant failed to rebut
this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her
possession is insufficient.

Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her
and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the packages contained and
where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked
from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him the bags he had
left with them, and not to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the bags.

Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular,
she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the custody of seized
prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine
qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of that crime.[35]
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs, to wit:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.

PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the police
station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized from
appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other police
officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag
yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops.[36] PO2 Pallayoc identified
the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not
accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present.
However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will
not render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.[37]

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was immediately brought to the
police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages,
revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the
following day. Contrary to appellants claim, the prosecutions evidence establishes the chain of custody
from the time of

appellants arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-
compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellants arrest was illegal or that the
items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not
question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.[38] Even assuming that
the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial
court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not.
Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.
Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody,
enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence
and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties
regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.[39]

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.