REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.

HEIRS OF IGNACIO DAQUER AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, PROVINCE OF

PALAWAN, RESPONDENTS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 193657, September 04, 2018 JUSTICE LEONEN

FACTS

On October 22, 1933, Ignacio Daquer (Daquer), applied for a homestead patent grant over Lot No. H-19731, situated at Brgy. Corong-
Corong, Centro, Bacuit, Palawan. THE APPLICATION WAS LODGED BEFORE Bureau of Lands (now Land Management Bureau)
seeking 9 hectares of land for his "exclusive personal use and benefit." On September 3, 1936 such application was approved by the
Director of Bureau of Lands and issued him Homestead Patent No. V- 67820, covering an area of 65,273 square meters. Thereafter,
Homestead Patent No. V-67820 was transmitted to the Registrar of Deeds of Palawan for registration.15 After registration, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. G-3287 was issued in Daquer's name.

On April 3, 1969, Daquer passed away. He was survived by his children, who were his legal heirs.

Department Secretary and the Undersecretary for Legal Affairs of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources instructed the
Community Environment and Natural Resource Office (CENRO) "to submit an inventory of suspected spurious titles cases which may
fall within timberland and classified public forest."

Upon investigation, Lilang discovered that the land covered by Homestead Application No. 197317 and OCT No. G-3287 (Ignacio
Daquer’s Lot) fell within the zone of unclassified public forest. Relative to this, Lilang and Senior Forest Management Specialist Chief
Leonardo Publico issued a Certification dated July 10, 2000, confirming that Lot No. H-19731 was "still within the Unclassified Zone".

Consequently, the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Free Patent, Original Certificate of
Title and Reversion of land to public domain on April 1, 2003. It argued that Lot No. H-19731 could not have been validly registered
because it fell within the forest or timberland zone. It claimed that until and unless these lands were reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable, occupying them in the concept of an owner, no matter how long, could not ripen into ownership.

Republic presented Land Management Officer Lilang as witness and testified that Lot No. H-19731 fell within the unclassified public
forest, all lands not within the tract of areas classified as alienable and disposable, as shown in the classification map, were regarded
as unclassified public forest. Thus, since Lot No. H-19731 fell outside the alienable and disposable area, it should be considered as part
of the unclassified public forest.

Heirs of Daquer, on the other hand, presented Porcepina as witness. Porcepina testified that she was residing at Lot No. H-19731 and
that she had custody of OCT No. G-3287. She paid the taxes over the land after the death of her brother, Francisco Daquer.

RTC denied the Republic's petition for cancellation and reversion for lack of merit.

RTC relied heavily on the presumption of regularity of official functions when the Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources granted the homestead patent. It ruled that it would not award a homestead patent over forest land but only over
public agricultural land.

RTC likewise noted that under the land classification map, areas falling outside the alienable and disposable area were not considered
as unclassified public forest, but only unclassified land, it ruled that unclassified lands, such as Lot No. H-19731, are presumed to be
agricultural lands.

Finally, RTC held that even assuming that subject lot was previously considered as unclassified land, the issuance of Homestead
Patent could only mean that the land at that point in time had already been expressly classified as alienable or disposable land of public
domain.

Republic appealed before the CA.

According to the Republic, public lands may only be classified by the Executive Department through the Office of the President. The
Director of the Lands Management Bureau (then Bureau of Lands] is devoid of jurisdiction over public forests or any land not capable of
registration. When he (or she] is misled into issuing patents over such lands, the patents and the corresponding certificates of title are
immediately infected with jurisdictional flaw which warrants the institution of suit to revert land to the State

CA affirmed the Decision of RTC.

ISSUE whether the mere issuance of a homestead patent could classify an otherwise unclassified public land into an alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain.

SC A homestead patent is a gratuitous grant from the government "designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to
land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation."

Only lands of the public domain which have been classified as public agricultural lands may be disposed of through
homestead settlement.

The Public Land Act vested the exclusive prerogative to classify lands of the public domain to the Executive Department, specifically
with the Governor-General, now the President. Thus, until and unless lands of the public domain have been classified as public
agricultural lands, they are inalienable and not capable of private appropriation.

it must be emphasized that in classifying lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable, there must be a positive act from the
government declaring them as open for alienation and disposition.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the
Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. . . .

A positive act is an act which clearly and positively manifests the intention to declassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable.56

"Any person seeking relief under ... the Public Land Act admits that the property being applied for is public land."57 "The burden of proof
in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable."58

As aptly argued by petitioner, an act of the government may only be considered as "express or positive if [it] is exercised directly for the
very purpose of lifting land from public ownership." 59

In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable.
Respondents presented no proof to show that a law or official proclamation had been issued declaring the land covered by Homestead
Patent No. V-67820 to be alienable and disposable.

Having failed to overcome the burden of proving that the land covered by Homestead Patent No. V-67820 is alienable and disposable,
the presumption that it is an inalienable land of the public domain remains.

Even if the property falls within the unclassified zone, this Court, in Heirs of the late Spouses Palanca v. Republic,79 ruled that
unclassified lands, until released and rendered open to disposition, shall be considered as inalienable lands of the public domain, thus:

In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition. When the property is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot ripen
into private ownership. This is because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in such lands and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Thus, the
Court has emphasized the need to show in registration proceedings that the government, through a positive act, has declassified
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

As a rule, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes the nature of a certificate of title issued through a judicial
proceeding and becomes incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1) year. Thus, in Wee v. Mardo:

[O]nce a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of public domain and
becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent, when registered in
the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and becomes as indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from
the date of issuance thereof. Said title, like one issued pursuant to a judicial decree, is subject to review within one (1) year from the
date of the issuance of the patent.

However, In Republic v. Ramos, this Court held that despite the registration of the land and the issuance of a Torrens title, the State
may still file an action for reversion of a homestead land that was granted in violation of the law. The action is not barred by the statute
of limitations, especially against the State.
Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register
the title which one may already have on the land. Where the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he
cannot acquire one under the Torrens system of registration . . .

Lot No. H-19731, the land covered by Homestead Patent No. V-67820, is still part of the inalienable lands of the public domain there
being no positive act declassifying it. Consequently, OCT No. G-3287, issued pursuant to Homestead Patent No. V-67820, is null and
void. Thus, the State is not estopped from instituting an action for the reversion of Lot No. H-19731 into the lands of the public domain.

Lands of the public domain can only be classified as alienable and disposable through a positive act of the government. The
State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake, or error of its officials or agents. It may revert the land at any time, where
the concession or disposition is void ab initio.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 14, 2010 Decision and September 7, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90488 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The ownership and possession of the tract of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. G-3287 in the name of Ignacio Daquer falling within the unclassified zone is hereby REVERTED to
and REACQUIREDby the Republic of the Philippines.

The Register of Deeds of Palawan is directed to CANCEL Original Certificate of Title No. G-3287 for being null and void.

SO ORDERED.