Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
FACTS:
In 1994, Gino Grilli, an Italian national, met Rebecca Fullido in Bohol where
he courted her. In 1995, Grilli decided to build a residential house where he
and Fullido would to stay whenever he would be vacationing in the country.
Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot located in Biking I, Dauis,
Bohol, from her parents which was registered in her name. On the said
property, they constructed a house, which was funded by Grilli. Upon
completion, they maintained a common-law relationship and lived there
whenever Grilli was on vacation in the Philippines twice a year.
ISSUE:
Was the contract void for violating Art. XII of the Constitution?
RULING:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the
judge, motu proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitled to make his own
assessment of the evidence on record to determine whether there is probable
cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with the trial; or in the
absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal case. This is
in line with the fundamental doctrine that "once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the
conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the
court." As such, the determination of probable cause was within the power of
the Ombudsman.
FACTS:
On May 5, 2014, the DILG served the dismissal order of Limbona, which
led to his removal from office and the assumption to the mayoralty of then Vice
Mayor Tago. Displeased by the DILG's actions, Limbona filed with the
COMELEC a petition to cite the petitioners for indirect contempt.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners guilty of indirect contempt?
RULING:
No. The Court finds that the actions of the petitioners do not constitute
indirect contempt. In serving the dismissal order of Limbona and allowing Tago
to assume the vacated mayoralty post, the petitioners could not be said to have
disobeyed the resolutions of the COMELEC in the disqualification case, much
less did so, in a manner that was characterized with contempt against the
COMELEC
.
Contrary to the COMELEC's finding, the DILG did not blatantly disregard
the resolutions of the COMELEC. Records indicate that it did not simply ignore
the COMELEC issuances, notwithstanding the fact that it only obtained notice
thereof through Limbona's counsel and not directly from the COMELEC.
Considering that the implementation of the order to dismiss Limbona was upon
the instance of the Ombudsman, the DILG still took recourse by seeking
clarification from the Ombudsman, which nonetheless later reiterated the
instruction to implement the decision in the administrative case. These
circumstances show good faith on the part of the petitioners, and negate a
supposed intent to plainly disobey the COMELEC.
FACTS:
On the other hand, Respondents provide that the existence of the AC and
the TEC does not limit or prevent the exercise of the COMELEC s constitutional
mandate to enforce election laws. It also argued that the AC and the TEC
merely ensure that the COMELEC will put in place an effective AES that will
clearly and accurately reflect the will of the sovereign people. Lastly, the power
to provide these safeguards is within the authority of the Congress, whose
power includes the power to ensure the faithful execution of its policies. RA
9369 also enjoys the presumption of validity.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. The AC and the TEC's functions are merely advisory and
recommendatory in nature. The functions of the AC are recommendatory, as
can be gleaned from the assailed provision itself in Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436
which provides that the functions of the AC are merely to recommend, to
provide advice and/or assistance, and to participate as nonvoting members
with respect to the COMELEC s fulfillment of its mandate and authority to use
the AES, and which in all instances, is subject to the approval and final
decision of the COMELEC. On the other hand, the TEC's exclusive function is to
certify, through an established international certification entity to be chosen by
the COMELEC from the recommendations of the AC that the AES, including its
hardware and software components, is operating properly, securely, and
accurately, in accordance with the provisions of law.
In this case the Court ruled that RA 9369 is considered valid because
Petitioner Chong failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the assailed provisions are valid and constitutional since they failed to
present substantial evidence to support their claim. Settled is the rule that
every law is presumed valid. Courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor
of the constitutionality of legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a
valid, sensible, and just law. To strike down a law as unconstitutional, the
petitioners have the burden to prove a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing
unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate a
law based on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Political Law: Constitutional Law
ACCREDITED LOCAL PUBLISHERS et. al. v SAMUEL L. DEL ROSARIO, Clerk III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union
A.M No. P-14-3213 July 12, 2016 PER CURIAM
FACTS:
The weekly Ilocandia Publishers and other complainants were Accredited Local
Publishers of judicial or legal notices. As such, they were authorized to participate in
the raffle draws scheduled before RTC Branch 67 of Bauang, La Union. The accused
Del Rosario and other publishers of conspired so that the latter would be the
publishers of judicial and legal notices in cases that had not undergone the process of
raffle, to the prejudice of complainants and in violation of Presidential Decree 1079
(Regulating Publication Of Judicial Notices, Advertisements For Public Biddings,
Notices Of Auction Sales And Other Similar Notices). In his Answer, respondent Del
Rosario admitted referring some cases for publication to certain newspaper publishers
or their representatives without the required raffle. He claimed that he had referred
litigants to those publishers because they charged lower rates, and not because he
was motivated by any monetary gain.
In her affidavit, certain Abarra alleged that in exchange for a certain amount of
money intended for the medicines of respondent Del Rosario, the latter submitted a
judicial notice to the Ilocos Herald for publication. Abarra claimed that publisher
Peralta did not know that the notice had not been raffled. When Del Rosario gave her a
second notice for publication, Abarra said that Peralta already knew it had not been
raffled. As a result, Peralta did not publish the second judicial notice.
The Investigating Judge finds respondent Samuel del Rosario, to have violated
the law on raffle of judicial notices, as admitted by him, which is conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, and punishable with dismissal.
ISSUE:
Is the act of Del Rosario considered as grave misconduct that will warrant his
dismissal in the public service?
RULING:
Yes, Del Rosario himself admittedly failed to refer the notices for publication to
the Office of the Clerk of Court for the conduct of raffle. His failure to do so was in
clear violation of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC in relation to P.D. 1079. He claims that he
directly gave notices for publication sans the required raffle, because "other
newspapers charge very high amounts and he [took] pity [on] poor litigants." Yet he
miserably failed to adduce evidence to support his allegation that there were indigent
litigants who had sought his help for referrals to publishers that would charge lower
rates than the others.
The Supreme Court reiterated that it shall not hesitate to impose the ultimate
penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. No less than the
Constitution has enshrined the principle that a public office is a public trust. The
Court will not tolerate or condone any conduct, act, or omission that falls short of the
exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the
image of the judiciary.
As such, since Del Rosario did not abide the provision of P.D 1079 as regards
the said raffle of cases, he is dismissed from the Public Service as Clerk III of the
Regional Trial Court 67 of Bauang La Union.
Political Law: Constitutional Law
FACTS:
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued to DLSU Letter of Authority (LOA)
No. 2794 authorizing its revenue officers to examine the latter's books of accounts and
other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the period Fiscal Year
Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years.
The BIR through a Formal Letter of Demand assessed DLSU the following
deficiency taxes: (1) income tax on rental earnings from restaurants/canteens and
bookstores operating within the campus; (2) value-added tax (VAI) on business income;
and (3) documentary stamp tax (DSI) on loans and lease contracts. The BIR demanded
the payment of ₱17,303,001.12, inclusive of surcharge, interest and penalty
for taxable years 2001, 2002 and 2003. DLSU protested the assessment. The
Commissioner failed to act on the protest; DLSU, a non-stock, non-profit educational
institution, principally anchored its petition on Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the
Constitution, which reads:
ISSUE:
Is DLSU's income and revenues proved to have been used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes exempt from duties and taxes?
RULING:
(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall
be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the
corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the
manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may
likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to
the limitations provided by law including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.
First, the constitutional provision refers to two kinds of educational institutions: (1)
non-stock, non-profit educational institutions and (2) proprietary educational
institutions;
Second, DLSU falls under the first category. Even the Commissioner admits the status
of DLSU as a non-stock, non-profit educational institution;
Third, while DLSU's claim for tax exemption arises from and is based on the
Constitution, the Constitution, in the same provision, also imposes certain conditions
to avail of the exemption;
For all these reasons, the court held that the income and revenues of DLSU proven to
have been used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes are exempt
from duties and taxes.
Law: Constitutional Law
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court
agrees with the interpretation of the administrative tribunals below that the
condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The
underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in Carpio-
Morales, the basic considerations are the following: first, the penalty of removal may
not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term
is separate and distinct; second, an elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have
known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. In this case,
it is a given fact that the body politic, who elected him to another office, was the same.
FACTS:
The subject of the case sprouted from Imbong v. Ochoa and other cases where
the court declared Republic Act No. 10354 (RH Law) and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations as not unconstitutional, save for several provisions which were declared
as violative of the Constitution.
Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines (ALFFI) opposed the unilateral
act of the Food and Drugs Administration on re-certifying the contraceptive drugs
named Implanon and Implanon NXT. The basis of their opposition hinges on the fact
that these drugs are abortifacients. Thus, according to them, they should have been
given notice of the certification proceedings, and a chance to present evidence that
indeed such drugs are abortifacients.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioners are not entitled to
notice and hearing because the said proceedings are done in the exercise of its
regulatory power, not quasi-judicial power; also, they alleged that the Honorable
Supreme Court is incompetent to rule on the instant controversy due to the same
reason.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Thus, on the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the
FDA in the exercise of its “regulatory powers” and, therefore, beyond judicial review,
the Court holds that it has the power to review all acts and decisions where there is a
commission of grave abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution decrees that
the Court must exercise its duty to ensure that no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Such is committed when there is a violation of the
constitutional mandate that “no person is deprived of life, liberty, and property
without due process of law.” The Court’s power cannot be curtailed by the FDA’s
invocation of its regulatory power.”
Political Law: Constitutional Law
DOCTRINE: Local Government Code; Scope of the Taxing Power of LGU’s: Local
Government Units shall have the authority to adjust the tax rates as prescribed by the
Local Government Code; it does not cover local taxes which were not enacted in
accordance with its provisions.
FACTS:
In 2005, Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao City, after due notice and hearing,
enacted the assailed Davao City Ordinance No. 158-05, Series of 2005, otherwise
known as "An Ordinance Approving the 2005 Revenue Code of the City of Davao”. In
this ordinance, it will require the businesses to pay a tax rate of 1.5% or an increase of
200% from the previous rate. Mindanao Shopping Destination Corporation et.al,
corporations engaged in the business of retailing, claimed that they used to pay only
50% of 1 % of the business tax rate under the old Davao City Ordinance No. 230,
Series of 1990. They believed that the increase is not allowed under Republic
Act (RA) No. 7160, The Local Government Code. Consequently, invoking the LGC,
petitioners appealed to the DOJ, docketed as MTO-DOJ Case No. 02-2006, asserting
the unconstitutionality and illegality of Section 69 (d), for being unjust, excessive,
oppressive, confiscatory and contrary to the 1987 Constitution and the provisions of
the LGC.
Meanwhile, on September 26, 2006, Davao City Ordinance No. 0253, Series of
2006 (Amended Ordinance), amended Section 69 (d) of the questioned ordinance. In it,
tax rate on retailers with gross receipts in excess of ₱400,000.00 was reduced from
one and one-half percent (1 1/2%) to one and one-fourth percent (1 1/4%). With the
development, Mindanao Shopping maintained that the adjustment in the tax base no
longer exceeds the limitation as set forth in Section 191 of the LGC considering that
the current Davao City tax rate of 1.25% on retailers with gross receipts/sales of over
₱400,000.00 under the assailed ordinance is way below or 0.25% short of the
maximum tax rates of 1.5% for cities sanctioned by the LGC. Respondents insist that
there is thus no increase or adjustment to speak of under the premises which is
violative of Section 191 of the LGC.
ISSUE:
Did the assailed ordinance violate the limitations imposed by the Local
Government Code?
RULING:
No. It can be shown that the assailed ordinance does not violate the limitation
imposed by Section 191 of the LGC on the adjustment of tax rate for Section 191 of
the LGC presupposes that the following requirements are present for it to apply, to wit:
(i) there is a tax ordinance that already imposes a tax in accordance with the
provisions of the LGC; and (ii) there is a second tax ordinance that made adjustment
on the tax rate fixed by the first tax ordinance. In the instant case, both elements are
not present.
As to the first requirement, it cannot be said that the old tax ordinance (first
ordinance) was imposed in accordance with the provisions of the LGC. To reiterate, the
old tax ordinance of Davao City was enacted before the LGC came into law. Thus, the
assailed new ordinance, Davao City Ordinance No. 158-05, Series of 2005 was actually
the first to impose the tax on retailers in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.
Thus, given the absence of the above two requirements for the application of
Section 191 of the LGC, there is no reason for the latter to cover a situation where the
ordinance, as in this case, was an initial implementation of R.A. 7160.
Political Law: Constitutional Law
FACTS:
Aggrieved by the Ombudsman's reversal, the petitioners filed the present special
civil action for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 174777 seeking to nullify the
Ombudsman's Supplemental Resolution and to cite the Ombudsman in contempt.
ISSUE:
Does the Ombudsman have the power to determine whether the criminal case
will be filed or not?
RULING:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution clothed the Ombudsman with authority to
investigate offenses committed by public officers and employees. In Casing v.
Ombudsman, the Court stated that:
The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and
prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public
officials and employees. Specifically, the determination of whether
probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call.
Therefore, the determination of probable cause-that is, one made for the
purpose of filing an information in court-is essentially an executive function and not a
judicial one. The State's self-preserving power to prosecute violators of its penal laws
is a necessary component of the Executive's power and responsibility to faithfully
execute the laws of the land.