PLANT SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT
What you should know about
liquid thermal expansion
Decision flowchart aids in correct thermal relief valve requirements
S. NOROUZI, Sazeh Consultants, Engineering and Construction, Tehran, Iran;
and S. RAHIMI MOFRAD, Petrofac Engineering and Construction, Sharjah, UAE
ipe rupcure due to the rma l expansio n of blocked liquid
berwcen process valves may cause Ii miring effects, bur ir
coul d produce unacceptable consequences, especially wi t h
dangero us liq uids. Most references provide p ro per guidel ines
regarding t herm al expansion rel ief valve requ irements; howeve r,
there is no stra ight forward method to specify when a t he rmal
relief valve CJ 'R.V) is requi red . Furthe rmo re, in the absence of a
step-wise approach, so metimes t he T RY is provided based on the
Auid's volume or narure (hua rdous o r Aam mability) while check-
ing thermal expansion's iniri:il requirements has been mistakenly
neglected.
TRV requ irement. Fig. I i~ a s im ple flowcha rt represenr-
ing queMions rega rding decisions for a TRY requirem e nt for
a specific pipe o r equipmenr. Eq uipme nt refe rs to any process
volume incl ud ing diffe rent ty pes of heat excha ngers, air cool-
e rs, vessels a nd pumps chat sa tisfy t he liquid rhe rmal expansio n
inicial requiremencs. The decis io n flowchart consists of th ree
boxes. Box I c hecks the inicial req ui remenrs needed fo r iniciar-
ing cherma l ex pansio n , while Box 2 investigates existing safety
meas ures, desig n provisions and o che r alterna rives cha t may be
urilized insteaJ of'J'RVs. T he co nseque nces of equipme nt/pipe
rupcure o n human health . safcry and e nviro nme n tal ai.pec ts,
cquipmenc inrcgriry, and e<.:onomical and operatio nal cost fol -
lowed by ru ptures, a re reviewed in Box 3. If a ny of t hese con-
sequences arc nor ro le ra ced, the n a T RY sho uld be provided to
di rect the excess blocked liquid ro rhe confined volume such as
another vessel o r Aa re ne two rk.
Each q uestion in the decision flowchart is described below in
greater detail.
I. T he syste m is considered completely liquid- fi lled at 95% o r
greate r volume. For a f\vo-phase system with lower liquid frac tio n
and gas system, a TRY is not usually required because existing gas
ca n absorb the increase in liq uid volume due ro thermal expa n-
sion. Small vapo r o r gas pockets can d isappear upon heating due
ro compre~ ion a nd/or solu bili1..ario n. In contrast, multi-compo-
nent mixtures with a wide boiling rangt: can have sufficicm va po r
present ro preclude becoming completely liquid- LJlled. T he liquid
volume change due co heating sho uld be estimated co determ inc if
the vapor pocket volume is sufficient for liq uid expansion . 1
2. P ro <.:ess pla n r pip ing (o n- plot piping) is nor normally
blocked in, but sto rage or t ranspo rt piping sections are regularly
shut in during no rmal opera ri o n. T his is why few process lines
haveTRVs.
SPECIALREPORT
Any 1. Is the system completely full of liquid?
no1 2. Is the line or equipment normally blocked in for
operational/emergency purposes?
3. Is the heating system temperature higher than
operating liquid temperature?
All yes
4. Is the estimated final pressure lower than the system
design limits?
5. Is there any other form of pressure safety device on
Any protected system?
yes2 6. Is there any administrative operating procedure, reliable
system or skillful operator for draining the liquid before
the system is blocked in?
7. Is there any provision preventing the tight blockage
Of liquid?
8. Is there any weak point in the system where expansion
could be relieved without any major consequence?
All no
9. Is the liquid lethal, toxic or corrosive?
10. Is the liquid combustible or explosive?
All 11. Is the liquid environmentally harmful?
3
no 12. Is the liquid highly volatile?
13. Is the pipe/equipment in critical need of service from a
plant operation viewpoint?
14. Is the pipe/equipment size so large that the rupture cost
is not tolerable?
1TRV Is not required because thennaJexpansion will not occur.
2TRV Is not required since existing safeguard will remove rupture risk but thermal
expansion will occur.
3TRV IS not required sinee l1le rupture risk is acceptable bUI some provisions
should be considered for handling rupture consequences.
Decision flowchart for TRV requirements.
Exception. Process lines o r e q ui pmcnc that handle fluid s
lo we r t ha n a mbient tem perature arc exce ptions. l n t his case,
the a nswe r to q uestio n two is y es, whcchcr liquid h lockagc is
normally do ne or not.
HYDROCARBON PROCESSING N OVEMBER 2008 I 67
I
I
SPECIALREPORT PLANT SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT
(\4-in. hole)
-l>l<l-----'*1- ~ -
r.1.a -in. hole)
~
~ 5. The required relief rate due to liquid thermal expansion
~ ~Closed valve JMil 3-way valve
1>4 Check valve t><J Open valve
~Gatevalve
Design provisions for releasing the pressure due to
thermal expansion.
3. The heat source can be internal or external. J\n imernal
hear source is usually a chemical reacrion. A heating coil, heat-
ing jacket, heat tracing, solar radiation, radiation from fla res and
ambient temperature are external heating sources. Unlike steam
and hot fluid tracing, electrical Lracing is nor considered a hearing
source since rhe remperarure is maintained by a control system.
The maximum temperature expected from solar hearing is usu-
ally about 60°C-70°C. A TR.Vis not req uired iffluid temperature
is greater than heat source temperature. This is because blocked
liquid with relatively high operating temperature tends to cool or
keep its temperature instead of hearing. Flar.e heat rad iation can
increase rhe metal surface temperature to a much higher tempera-
ture depending on flare gas flowrate, distance from the flare and
burning duration.
External foe is not considered a heat source if thermal expan-
sion is studied for a system consisting of only pipes. The fire case
is a hear source if rhe system includes liquid-full equipment. In
this case, if rhe liquid's initial boiling point at relieving pressure
is lower than the fire temperature, an external fire leads to three
stages: lic1uid thermal expansion, two-phase relieving and vapor
relieving (fire case- liquid vaporization). From a pressure safety
valve (PSV) sizing viewpoint, a PSY sized for rhe vapor relieving
stage is adequate because the first two stages are short transient
periods. If the fluid's boiling point is very high, rhe relief device
should be sized only for thermal expansion.
4. Jn estimating pressure rise due to thermal expansion, equa-
rions recommended in APT-521 section 5. I 4.4. l 1 are used. The
APT relation needs many design parameters. If parameters are
unknown, the following simplified equation may be utilized:
Pf.= p + av (rf - T;) (l)
, x
where:
(2)
When ca lculating final pressure, the final temperature needs ro
be known. The hearing source temperarure can he considered the
final temperature. Generally, a TRY will pop up long before liquid
temperature reaches the source temperature. In other words, a
5°C-l 0°C increase in liyuid temperature is sufficient to increase
the pressure from operating to design pressure. For example, the
68 j NOVEMBER 2008 HYDROCARBON PROCESSING
pressure will raise abou r 4 bars for each l °C increase in water
blocked in temperature a L20°C as per Eq. 3 calculation:
l1P a 2.1 x I0
4
(foe) ( )
(3)
11T = ; = 4.56 xio-s(X )=4.6 bafoc
bar
is very small , so if another pressure safery device is provided to
prQ(ecr the system from a ny other e me rgency case, it will relieve
the pressure hy pop-up action.
6. Draining the liquid trapped benveen block valves is a nor-
mal practice done by the operaror within the process plant; hence,
a TRY is not normally provided for on-plot piping. If there is
any specific req uirement for liquid draining, ir should be clearly
mentioned .i n shutdown o r mai ntenance procedures. Draining
l 0% liquid volume is enough ro prevent thermal expansion .
Conversely, storage area piping or liquid transport lines (off-plot
piping) due to the operation type and accessibility limitation are
regularly blocked in without liyuid draining. Utilizing lock-open
(LO) valves can be considered a reliable preventive device si nce
t his valve type is locked in the open position during operation and
closed only under permic.
7. T he process designer can consider some provisions such as
drilling a small hole in the check or block valve (if it is gate) or
addi ng an open bypass aro und the check valve or block valve if
leakage through additional faci lities is acceptable. Placing a check
valve around one block valve is another alternative. The check
valve is closed during normal operation and it will be opened
when thermal expansion takes place. A three-way valve can also
be installed instead of a block valve 2 (w here applicable) to ensure
that the piping system never becomes completely blocked in. Fig.
2 illustrates these alternatives.
8. One of rhe piping items that is considered as a weak point,
is a c heck valve. Af>l-521 section 5. 14.4.2 takes no credit for
reverse A.ow-back (leakage) through a check valve; however, other
references consider the check valve's leakage sufficienr to relieve
excess liquid.
9. If the blocked liquid is dangerous ro personnel health or
is highly corrosive, rupture is nor tolerable and a TRV should be
provided.
l 0. If the blocked liquid is combustible or explosive, rupture
is not tolerable from a plant safety vicwpoinr, then a TRY should
be provided.
11 . If releasing liquid through a rupture has a major envi-
ronmenral impact, rupture is not tolerated and a TRV should be
provided to direct the liquid to a closed system.
12. lf highly volatile ma rerials continue ro release through a
rupture until liyuid is totally vaporized, maimenance performance
may not be possible for a long time depending on the system's
total liyuid inventory. Aside from downtime due to maintenance,
valuable material loss a nd volatile organic compound emissions
are other concerns.
13. If the line or equipment is not critical, it can be hypassed
in a rupture case without any major interruption in a process
operation; then, a TRV is not reyuired.
14. Generally, pipes with a diameter more than l V2 in. or
longer than :30 mare considered large pipes. 3 If pipe diameter or
length is less than l l/2 in. and shorter rban 30 m, the pipe rup-
ture cost is expected to be lower than the TRV cost, so no TRY is
required in this case. This advice should be considered carefully
 PLANT SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT
and approved by the project owner. Equipmenr operating full of
liquid should be provided with a TRV if the quancicy of blocked-
in liquid is higher rhan 0.5 m3. ' v
TRV relief rate. for a liquid-full system, Eq. 4 (in SI), can be
used co calculace the approximate relief race value:
av<P (4)
q = l,000 dC
Reference 3 prescnrs differenr correlations for calculating rhe
cubical expansion coefficienc.
for calcularing thermal relief race, some assumptions shall be
applied:
• ror heat exchangers, the maximum exchanger duty during
operation is taken as Lhe heat transfer race. The trapped liquid heat
transfer coefficienr is substantially lower than rhe flowing liquid
hear transfer coeffkien r, and the heat transfer rate is generally
controlled by free convection of rrapped liquid inside the pipe.
Therefore, using maximum exchanger dury is the mosr conserva-
tive assumption.
• lf the fluid properties vary significantly with temperature,
rhe most severe operating conditions should be used.
• Fuel co fired hearers or healing medium lO ocher equipment
is continuously flowing at maximum conditions. Concrol valves
on heater fuel or heating fluids will be assumed to be fully open.
• Eliminating TRYs due to die presence of remperatun.: con-
trol system chat will dose the heat source in case ofliquid block-
age, is nor allowed.
TRV sizing. Since it is not easy to determine the rdicf rate
through a TRV, in mosr systems N PS -M x NPS l (DN20 x DN25)
relief valve can be used, even rhough it is commonly oversiL.ed.
Two general applications where TRYs are larger rhan DN20 x
DN25 valves arc long pipelines o f large diameter in uninsulated,
aboveground inscallarions and large vessels or exchanger~ opcrar-
ing liquid-full. for Lhese cases, relief rate calculation and TRY size
checking arc recommended.
TRV location. Usually, any location on a pipe or equipmenr is
suitable for installing a TRV The availabiliry of a suitable discharge
rome and maintenance requiremcnrs may limir rhc opt ions. A
relief valve may be located on a pipe rather than on the equipment
if both belong to the same blocked -in sysrem. for ease ofservice, a
TRY should be located at the lowest elevation and at platforms.
TRV discharge location. If the liquid temperature i~ above its
flash point, greater than 300°C or if any answer to quescion~ 9 12
in the flowchart is yes, the liquid muse be discharged into a dosed
system, such as a flare header, proccs:; or drain v~I. A relief v.Jvc can
be connected co a v~scl where the particular liquid is stored. If chc
vessel is far away, the TRY discharge line can be connected co t11c pipe
secrion that is our of the blocked-in system so rhar chc TRY acrs like a
bypas~ around the block valve. if relief is to the process, the TRV shall
discharge to a location that is always capable ofabsorbing the relieved
material. Other valve'~ location an<l possible po~itions ar rhe time of
discharge shall be taken imo accounr. If a liquid is not dangerous, rhe
TRY discharge line can be routed to grade (atmosphere). HP
NOMENCLATURE
d Liquid rdJtivc dcn~i1y rcfrrrcd ro warer •I 15.6 C, dimen;ionlcss
c Specific l1c.1l <::1p~city of tr••ppcd liquid, )/kg K
SPECIALREPORT
p Pressure, kPa (psia)
Volumetric rdief rate, m 3/sec
fJ
r Tcmperaru re, •c ( H
Spe<.illc volume of li4uid, m3/kg (ft 1/ lb)
<I> Heat t r.msfor rare, \\/all
av CubiCJI expansion co~fficicnr of the liquid. ll°C ( 1rr)
x lsothernul compressibility coefficient of 1hc liquid. l/kPa (!/psi)
SU BSCRI PTS
I First condirion
2 Second condition
Initial rnndition
f Hnal rnndition
LIT ERATURE CITED
1
American Petroleum Institute, API RP 52 1, "Pressure relieving and tkpressur-
0
ing sy11nns' 5th Ed., January 2007.
2 Wong, W. Y., "Safer relief valve si1ing", Chcmical Engineering, May 1989.
pp. 137-140.
1 Bravo, F. and B. 0. Beatty, "Decide whethe1 10 use thermal relief valves,..
CE!', December I993. pp. 35-J8.
Sanaz No rouzi is a process engineer with Sazeh Consultants,
Engineering & Co11struction. Tet11a11. Iran . She has a BS degree 1n
chemical engineering from Iran University of Science and Technol -
09y, Iran.
Saeid Rahimi M o frad 1~ a process engineer with Petrofac
Eng u1eering and Conwuction, Shaq.ih, UAE He hcl~ published
many articles on pressure relief system design. Mr Rah1m1 h<is an
MS d1!9ree 1n chemical eng1neenng from Shani Un1vers1ty of Tech-
nol09y and a BS degree from Sh1ra1 University, Iran
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