Rogelio C. Lascoña Jr.

Wills and Succession – Midterms

1. TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS: The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is
an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His
will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was
appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided
into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion"
shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with
the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of
Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with
respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the
provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or
substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real
property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the
widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower
court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to
this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not an impairment of legitime occurred in the instant case.

HELD: Yes. The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They admit
that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is
the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the
deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or
substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)

It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It appears that the court a
quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the
estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which
is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any

additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated
above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

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One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda
de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUE 2:

ISSUE:
Whether or not fideicommissary substitution is valid.
HELD:
The fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes are not related to Wanda. The second heir mustbe related to and be
one generation from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child ora parent of the first heir.
Therefore, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:1/2 thereof to his widow as her legitime
and 1/2 of the estate which is the free portion goes to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to
Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez, the substitutes.

2. CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-13876 February 28, 1962

DIZON, J.:

FACTS: The spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo commenced an action for partition against Manuel
Singson in connection with a residential lot located at Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square
meters, and the improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that Singson owned one-
half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly
probated last will of Dnñ a. Leona Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said
property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action. It is admitted that Dnñ a. Leona Singson,
who died single on January 13, 1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time of her death. On July 31, 1951 she
executed her last will which was admitted to probate in Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G.R. No. 3605-R. At the time of the execution of the will, her nearest living relatives were
her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation,
all surnamed Florentino. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.Defendant appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testamentary disposition provided for what is called substitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion
fideicomisaria.

RULING: The last will of the deceased Dnñ a. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion
Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens
before or after that of the testatrix.The substitution of heirs provided for in the will is not expressly made of the
fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy
usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix.
As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death — whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix —
her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.The appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.

3. CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

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MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Manila,defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

FACTS: P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name, with the La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated
credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased,
represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.The la atter held a judgement for P7,872.23 for due execution
against the husband of Ana Maria, Joaquin Perez Alcantara hence the deposited amount in La Urbana was attached. The
plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a
preliminary injunction restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that the
plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction.The court held that said La Urbana
deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of
injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, or a fideicommissary substitution.

RULING: There is a fideicommissary substitution.All the elements of this kind of substitution are present:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the
enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such
an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving
children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in
case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the
disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in
clause XI.
As a consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute
property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.
Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which is on deposit with the association known
as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of the judgment
against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Mariano Garchitorena.

4. Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

FACTS: The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. Joseph G. Brimo is a Turkish
citizen who was domiciled in the country.The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one
of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it. The partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they
are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code. A perusal of Brimo’s will provided that he desired to apply the laws
of the Philippines to his will and not the laws of Turkey. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition
is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the condition to apply the laws of the Philippines to the probate of the deceased’s will is valid.

RULING: NO. The said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice
the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

The condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the
civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.Said condition
then, in the light of the legal provisions is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the oppositor. All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a
manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the
judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

5. TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS. ROSALINA SANTOS (Executrix), petitioner and appellee, vs.
FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant.
G.R. No. L-22797 September 22, 1966

FACTS: On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the last
will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. 1The nearest of kin of the
deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said
nieces. Among the legatees — or more accurately, devisees — mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not
related by blood to the deceased. Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia opposed to the probate of said will on grounds
that the will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix
Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the
execution of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.The will likewise contained a "no contest and forfeiture"
clause .

ISSUE:
(1) Did Flora's actuations, under the facts and circumstances herein, amount to a violation of the "no-contest and forfeiture"
clause of the will; and
(2) Is the "no-contest and forfeiture" provision of the will valid?

RULING:
(1)NO. after realizing her mistake in contesting the will — a mistake committed in good faith because grounded on strong
doubts — she withdrew her opposition and joined the appellee in the latter's petition for the probate of the will. She must not
be penalized for rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the testatrix had been fulfilled, her will had been admitted and
allowed probate within a reasonably short period, and the disposition of her property can now be effected.
(2) Fourteenth.—I request all my heirs, devisees and legatees to look after each other, love and help one another and accept
with thanks what I have bequeathed to them, and treasure, love and cherish the same. Any one of them who contests or
opposes the probate of my will or the carrying out of its provisions shall lose any right to receive any inheritance or benefit
under my will, and their inheritance or share shall pertain to the other heirs who have not opposed. This is the "no-contest and
forfeiture" clause of the will. However due to the non-violation of this clause,th court did not bother to discuss the same.

6. LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

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DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-
appellee.

G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal
properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor. Clause 6th , contained the institution of heirs. The 12th
clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any
child with Donñ a Fausta Nepomuceno. Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife
Donñ a Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial
administratrix. On May 1, 1956, Donñ a Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and without
having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563
in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor
in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno,
on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and
personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause.
Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the
widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.

ISSUE: How should the will of the Testator be interpreted.

RULING: The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation,
and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following
the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. ART. 790. The
words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense
can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or
unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical
sense. In this case the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow should have the
possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the
8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if
the widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid
properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due to
fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is
declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of
the death of Donñ a Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting
and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.

7. SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, vs.MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO
G.R. No. L-13386 . October 27, 1920

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JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS: Juliana Nieva, married to Francisco Deocampo, is the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff. Alfeo Deocampo is the son
of Juliana. Juliana died on April 19, 1889 and her son inherited parcels of land from her. Alfeo later died on July 7, 1890,
therefore the parcels of land was inherited by his father Francisco. Francisco later married defendant Manuela Alcala, of which
Jose Deocampo was born. Francisco died on April 15, 1914. Defendants took possession of the parcels of land under the claim
that Jose inherited the same ab intestate.
On September 30, 1915, plaintiff instituted an action for recovery of the parcels of land pursuant to Art. 811 of the Civil Code.
The trial court held that she was not entitled to the property as she was an illegitimate relative of the decedent therefore
reserve troncal would not apply.

ISSUE: Whether or not reserva troncal is applicable to an illegitimate relative within the third degree?

RULING:
No, reserva troncal is not applicable in this case because plaintiff is not a legitimate child of Juliana and is thus barred pursuant
to Article 943 of the Civil Code which reads:“A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the
natural or legitimated child.”
The Supreme Court held that the appellant is not entitled to the property left behind by her natural brother, who
inherited the property by operation of law, as she is expressly prohibited to inherit pursuant to Article 943 of the Civil Code or
the Iron Barrier Rule.

8. CELEDONIA SOLIVIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

FACTS: Esteban Javellana, Sr., married Salustia Solivio on December 1916 or barely ten months before his death. Salustia
Solivio brought paraphernal properties to the marriage. Salustia died on October 11, 1959, leaving all her properties to her
only child, Esteban Jr., including a house and lot where she, her son, and her sister had lived. The titles of all the properties
were transferred in the name of Esteban Jr. During the lifetime of Esteban, he expressed his plan to place his estate in a
foundation to help the poor and deserving students obtain a college degree to honour his mother. However, he died on
February 26, 1977, single and without issue. Petitioner and Private Respondent entered into an agreement to put all the
properties of the decedent to a foundation, just as planned by the decedent. Petitioner later filed a petition to declare herself
as the sole heir of the deceased on the ground that the properties of the estate of the decedent came from her sister, mother of
the decedent, and that she was the decedent’s nearest relative by degree on his mother’s side. After being declared as such, she
proceeded to put up the foundation. However on August 7, 1978, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
declaration of petitioner as the sole heir claiming that she too, respondent, was a heir of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property may be subject of reserva troncal?

RULING: No, the property of the decedent is not a reservable property. In order for a property to be reservable, the
property must be inherited by an ascendant from his descendant which the descendant has acquired such property by
gratuitous title from another ascendant or a brother or sister, pursuant to Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
“ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came”

The decedent in this case is not an ascendant but a descendant of the origin of the property, mother of the descedent, therefore
the principle of reserva troncal does not find applicability in this case.

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9. MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
-versus-
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913

ARELLANO, C.J.:

FACTS: Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a
son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two parcels. Pedro also died on
July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his
mother, Marcelina Edroso. She then filed for the registration and issuance of the titles of the lot under her name.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things:
Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the
registration of each parcel."
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property
required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother
and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is reservable.

HELD: Yes. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable
consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by
operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil
Code, art. 811).
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired without a
valuable consideration — that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by
operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application are required
by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free
disposal of her son.
The ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by
virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively
— use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in
the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the
ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree
who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature
and scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property,
first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no
title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who
must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their
place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent
place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor
the right is reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the
fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and void.

10. CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

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-versus-
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961

DIZON, J.:

FACTS: The subject lot was originally owned by the deceased Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named
Francisco. Upon the death of Saturnino properties were left to all of his children, among which, Lot 3368 to Francisco.
Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the
public instrument entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of
the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina
Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 — which was in their possession
— the latter refused.
Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, declared the property in their name executed a
deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is reservable.

HELD: Yes. It is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso
inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants; it
was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses
in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who
died only on January 13, 1952.
This court has held in connection with this matter that reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property
but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the
same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists,
the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the
reservista.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as above modified — is affirmed, with costs, and without prejudice to whatever action
in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.

11. FRANCISCA MAGHIRANG and SERGIA GUTIERREZ, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

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ATILANO BALCITA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-22066 December 2, 1924

GREGORIO EMPALMADO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
SERGIA GUTIERREZ, opponent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-22067 December 2, 1924

Francisco & Lualhati for appellants.

Ramon Diokno for appellees.

By the appeal in civil cause No. 2643 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sergia Gutierrez seeks to reverse a decision of
said court, whereby two parcels of land were declared to be the exclusive property of Gregorio Empalmado and of Esteban
Reyes, respectively, free from the claim of Sergia Gutierrez that said lots are held by said defendants subject to a contingent
reservable interest in her favor. Connected with the action above mentioned is the proceeding in the second appeal, wherein
the trial court declared that the first of the two lots in controversy should be registered in the name of Gregorio Empalmado,
free from the same claim. Because of the intimate relation between the action instituted in behalf of the appellant, Sergia
Gutierrez, as reservee, and the registration proceeding in which she is opponent, the two causes were heard together in the
trial court and will be here disposed of in a single opinion.

The basis of the claim put forth by the plaintiff Gutierrez is the same as to both parcels, but the facts constituting the respective
defenses of the two defendants are different. It will therefore be convenient to state first the points pertaining to the two
parcels in common and then such as pertain especially to the controversy over each.

It appears that the original owner of both parcels was one Bonifacio Gutierrez, who died about the year 1902, after having
been thrice married. The first wife left no children, but the second wife left a daughter, Zoila Gutierrez, who intermarried with
Atilano Balcita, one of the defendants herein. To this pair was born a daughter, Gertrudis Balcita. Zoila Gutierrez predeceased
her father; and upon the death of the latter, the two parcels of land with which we are concerned passed by inheritance directly
from Bonifacio to his granddaughter Gertrudis, then a mere child. Gertrudis Balcita herself died on December 9, 1912, at the
age of 16, leaving no heir except her father, Atilano Balcita. The plaintiff, Sergia Gutierrez, is a daughter of Bonifacio Gutierrez
by his third wife, one Francisca Maghirang. Sergia was therefore the aunt of Gertrudis Balcita, on her mother's side, and as
reservee under article 811 of the Civil Code she should succeed to the title of the two parcels which Atilano Balcita inherited, or
should have inherited, from Gertrudis, provided all the conditions necessary to the assertion of the reservation right are
fulfilled.

GUTIERREZ VS. EMPALMADO

Parcel A. — In the year 1905 Atilano Balcita sold the parcel A to one Vicente Almario. As the land belonged to Gertrudis, a
lawsuit was instituted in her behalf in 1912 with a view to recovering it. The litigation was compromised by the reconveyance
of the land by Almario to Gertrudis and the payment to him of P1,200, which was the amount that he had paid for the property.
The money necessary to effect this compromise had to be borrowed by Gertrudis, or those representing her; and although the
point is subject to discussion, the preponderance of the testimony is to the effect that the money was obtained from Gregorio
Empalmado under an agreement by which Gertrudis Balcita undertook to convey the land to him for the sum of P2,100. The
document, Exhibit B, constituting the evidence of this agreement is dated November 28, 1912. In addition to the signature of
Gertrudis Balcita, which is questioned, it bears the signature of Atilano Balcita and two subscribing witnesses. Gertrudis
Balcita died of dysentery on December 9, 1912, and on December 12 thereafter her father, Atilano Balcita, executed the
document Exhibit C, whereby he conveyed, or purported to convey, the same parcel to Gregorio Empalmado, it being recited
that he had inherited the land from his daughter Gertrudis. Gregorio Empalmado immediately entered into possession, and he
has subsequently maintained possession under claim of ownership.

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For the plaintiff, Gutierrez, it is insisted that the document, Exhibit b, is not authentic and that the name of Gertrudis Balcita
subscribed thereto is a forgery. The trial judge was of the opinion that the due execution of this instrument had been proved by
a preponderance of the evidence; and although the question is debatable, and the point not altogether free from doubt, we are
of the opinion that the trial court's conclusion on this point should be affirmed. The two subscribing witnesses both say that
they saw the girl sign the document upon the date stated therein, and this is corroborated not only by the testimony of
Gregorio Empalmado, who was present at the execution of the instrument, but also by Atilano Balcita himself. The only
testimony to the contrary is that of Sergia Gutierrez, who says that the girl was too sick for some time prior to her death to
admit the possibility of her having signed the instrument. It is true that the questioned signature appears somewhat
suspicious, but we have not sufficient data upon which to pronounce it a forgery, considered as a mere question of
penmanship. Certainly, the instrument expresses the agreement that would naturally have been drawn upon under the proven
circumstances which gave rise to the transaction.

Upon the foregoing state of facts the trial judge found as a matter of law that the title to parcel A passed out of Gertrudis Balcita
and became vested in Gregorio Empalmado before her death; and although Gertrudis was then a minor, the conveyance was
only voidable and not void. Moreover, as his Honor pointed out, the contract was evidently advantageous to the minor because
she thereby obtained the money necessary to get the property back from Vicente Almario, with the consequent saving of P900.

These conclusions of the trial court seem to us well founded, and the result is that, as to this parcel, the inchoate reservable
right asserted by Sergia Gutierrez never came into existence. In this view the conveyance executed by Atilano Balcita a few days
after the death of his daughter Gertrudis operated as a mere quit-claim from him, as title had already vested in Empalmado
under the prior agreement with her.

No error was therefore committed by the trial judge in dismissing the complaint in case No. 2643 in so far as it affects parcel A
and the right of the defendant Empalmado thereto; nor did his Honor err in ordering the registration of the same parcel in the
name of Empalmado and his wife Felipa Brion, regardless of the opposition of the plaintiff Gutierrez.

GUTIERREZ VS. REYES

Parcel B. — As already stated, this parcel comes from the same source as the parcel A, that is, from the estate of Bonifacio
Gutierrez. With respect to this parcel it appears that on May 28, 1906, Atilano Balcita, being then in possession and asserting a
claim of ownership, sold the same by a contract of sale with pacto de retro for the sum of P200 to the defendant Esteban Reyes.
In the document constituting the evidence of this sale Atilano Balcita falsely declared that he was owner by virtud of having
inherited the property from his parents and that he had been in quiet and pacific possession for fifteen years. Esteban Reyes
was a purchaser for value and bought in belief that the land really belonged to his vendor. The period for repurchase under this
contract was ten years, which passed in 1916 without redemption having been effected. It is not clear whether the purchaser
under this contract entered into possession during the time stipulated for redemption or not; but it is agreed that, with this
exception, the defendant Reyes had, until the institution of this action on May 10, 1918, exercised actual and adverse
possession, to the exclusion of all other persons.lawphi1.net

Upon the facts above stated the trial judge gave Reyes the benefit of prescription under the ten years statute (sec. 41, Code of
Civ. Proc.) and held that the right of Sergia Gutierrez, as reservee, had been thereby destroyed.

We are of the opinion that the conclusion thus reached is erroneous. We may accept the legal proposition that occupancy by
Esteban Reyes, pursuant to the contract of sale with pacto de retro by which he acquired the property, and prior to the
expiration of the period for redemption, may be considered an adverse possession as against everybody having a prescriptible
interest, notwithstanding the existence of the stipulation for repurchase. As was said by this court in Santos vs. Heirs of
Crisostomo and Tiongson (41 Phil., 342, 352), the insertion of a stipulation for repurchase by the vendor in a contract of sale
does not necessarily create a right inconsistent with the right of ownership in the purchaser. Such a stipulation is in the nature
of an option, and the possible exercise of its rests upon contingency. It creates no subsisting right whatever in the property, and

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so far from being inconsistent with the idea of full ownership in the purchaser, it really rests upon the assumption of
ownership in him.

But it must be borne in mind that the true owner of this property was Gertrudis Balcita, a minor, and the period of limitation
did not begin to run against her or any person claiming in her right until the date of her death, which was December 9, 1912. It
must furthermore be remembered that the plaintiff does not claim in the character of an ordinary successor to the rights of
Gertrudis Balcita; her claim is based upon a positive provision of law, which could no operate in any wise until the death of
Gertrudis Balcita, when the reservable character first attached to the property in question. From this it is obvious that the right
of the plaintiff — which even yet is of a purely contingent nature — could not be affected by anything that had occurred prior
to the death of Gertrudis Balcita; and as this action was begun in May, 1918, the ten-year period necessary to confer a complete
prescriptive title had not then elapsed.

What has been said makes it unnecessary to express any opinion upon he more recondite question whether Sergia Gutierrez
really has a prescriptive interest in the parcel B, but we may observe that the position of the reservee under the Spanish law is
very much like that of the ordinary remainderman at common law, who is entitled to take after the termination of a particular
life estate; and it is generally accepted doctrine in common law jurisdictions that if the life tenant loses his life estate by
adverse possession the interest of the remainderman is not thereby destroyed. (17 R. C. L., 982; 21 C. J., 972, 975, 1013.) The
reason for the rule is said to be that, during the existence of the life estate, the remainderman has no right to possession and
consequently cannot bring an action to recover it. (21 C. J., 974.) As was said by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Webster vs.
Pittsburg, etc., Railroad Co. (15 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1154), "No possession can be deemed adverse to a party who has not at the time
the right of entry and possession."

From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment must be affirmed in so far as concerns the registration of parcel A in
expediente No. 409, G. L. R. O., record No. 14769, and in so far as relates to the dismissal of the complaint against Gregorio
Empalmado in case No. 2643; but the judgment in the same case must be reversed in so far as relates to parcel B, now in the
possession of Esteban Reyes, and it is hereby declared that said parcel is reservable property and upon the death of Atilano
Balcita will pass to Sergia Gutierrez, if she be then living. Let a certified copy of this pronouncement be filed with the register of
deeds of the Province of Laguna for record pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 2837 of the Philippine Legislature. So ordered,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

12. PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP vs. FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and
ERNESTO BAUTISTA
BENGZON, J.P., J.: G.R. No. L-22601 October 28, 1966

1) Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221.
2) Petra Garcia died. Severino Salak sold to Honoria Salak for P812.00 his½ portion of said lot. Severino Salak died. While,
Honoria Salak and other members of her family died — massacred by the Japanese.
3) Two settlement proceedings were instituted in the Court:a. Special Proceeding No. 3, to settle the estates of Severino Salak
and Petra Garcia and
b. Special Proceeding No. 23, to settle the estates of the Salak family (parents Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo; and children
Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya).
4) Special Proceeding No. 3 (year 1946) Project of Partition which the court approved: Lot No. 221, which was given
thereunder to Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4 of it in her capacity as heir, and the other 3/4 by purchase and/or exchange with her
co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun and Ernesto Bautista). From 1946 up to the present Francisca Salak has possessed all of
Lot No. 221.
5) February 26, 1948 - Special Proceeding No. 23 the court a quo held that the heirs entitled to the estates of the Salak
family were Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carillo (3/4 share) and Ernesto Bautista (1/4 share), applying the survivorship
presumption, thus:
a) Simeon Salak died first — his properties went to the children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya (1/4 each);

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b) Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya died next — Honoria's and Consuelo's properties went to their mother, Isabel; those of Ligaya
went to her son, Ernesto Bautista;
c) Isabel died next — her properties went to her son Adolfo; and
d) Adolfo died last — his properties went to his maternal grandmother, Agustina.
a. Agustina thereby succeeded to the properties that came by intes-state succession from Honoria Salak and Isabel
Carrillo, including ½ of Lot No. 221.
6) November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed an action in the CFI (Case No. 351) against the heirs in Special
Proceeding No. 3 to recover ½ of Lot No. 221 which as aforementioned has been possessed by Francisca Salak de Paz.
7) On June 8, 1950 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in Special Proceeding No.
23, and further decreed that the properties inherited by Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo were subject to reserva troncal.
8) Agustina died. On November 6, 1950, Ernesto Bautista filed a petition in Special Proceeding No. 23 for the execution of the
judgment (June8, 1950).
9) Lower court issued its order declares all the interest of the said reservista Donñ a Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo as
well as that of her heirs in the three-fourths share adjudged to the reservista, definitely terminated, and that the reservee, the
minor Ernesto Bautista, is entitled to the immediate delivery to him of the said threefourths share declared reserved to him.
10) On December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No. 351
By virtue of the existence of third-degree relatives of Adolfo Salak, the portion of Lot No. 221, inherited by Agustina de
Guzman was never released from the reserva, so as to convert the ownership of Agustina de Guzman into an absolute one.
a. Upon her death on April 24, 1950, therefore, the property did not pass by inheritance to her legal heirs, but rather reverted
to the family trunk of the Isabel-Adolfo line.
11) On April 22, 1963, Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup filed the present suit for recovery of 2/3 of 1/2 of No. 221 against
Francisca Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautista.
12) On June 20, 1963, defendants Francisco Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautita filed a motion to dismiss upon the grounds that
the cause of action is barred by prior judgement and by the statute of limitations.
13) The court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata, finding the suit barred by the order of delivery
dated November 14, 1950 in Special Proceeding No. 23.
14) Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed to Us upon questions of law.
Defendants support the motion to dismiss: that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of
limitations. Although the action was dismissed by the lower court expressly upon the ground of res judicata, it did not totally
disregard the defense of prescription.
- Prima Carrillo being then the administratrix of the estate of her mother, she allowed about thirteen (13) years before
she commenced the present action.
RULING:
1) When the trial judge decides a case in favor of a party on a certain ground, the appellate court may uphold the decision
below upon some other point which was ignored or erroneously decided in favor
of the appellant by the trial court.
 The reserva troncal arose — as had been finally decided by the Court of Appeals in Special Proceeding No. 23 — when
Agustina acquired by operation of law all the properties of her descendant Adolfo (grandson), who acquired them by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, Isabel (Adolfo's mother).
o According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, as it then becomes a
right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor.
Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised within the time for recovering real properties, can be lost by
prescription.
PRESENT CASE:
- Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the property 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 — from Francisca
Salak de Paz, who has been possessing it in the concept of an owner, from April 24, 1950 when Agustina died.
- And the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the existence of reserve troncal, promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the
more doubtless that such right had accrued in their favor from the time Agustina died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or
cause of action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.
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  Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the period of prescription for actions to recover real
property, counted from the time the cause of action accrued. This is the applicable law because Article 1116 of the
New Civil Code provides that "Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code [August 30, 1950] shall
be governed by laws previously in force."
o Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein, having been filed only on April 22, 1963, or more than ten (10) years from April 24, 1950,
has prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed on theground of prescription, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.

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