PANAGUITON VS DOJ - 571 SCRA 549 G.R. NO.

167571, NOVEMBER 25, 2008

FACTS:
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money from Luis Panaguiton. On January 1993, Cawili
and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson jointly issued in favor of petitioner three checks which
bear the signature of both in payment of the said loans. Upon presentment for payment, the checks
were dishonored. Luis Panaguiton made demands but to no avail and so he filed a complaint against
Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. Tongson
alleged that he himself filed some complaints against Cawili and they are not associates. Panaguiton
showed documents proving the signatures of Tongson to strengthen his complaint against Tongson. In a
resolution, City Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson. A case was filed against Cawili before the proper court but the petitioner filed a partial appeal
before the Department of Justice. The Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the
questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation. Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga
dismissed the complaint against Tongson since the offense had already prescribed. An appeal by
Panaguiton to the Department of Justice thru Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee was dismissed. But
on motion for reconsideration, Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez declared that the offense
had not prescribed. On motion for reconsideration, this time by Tongson, DOJ reversed and held that
the offense had already prescribed.

Issue: Whether or not that the offense had already prescribed as Act No. 3326 applies to violation of
special acts and that Act No. 3326 states that prescription shall be interrupted when judicial proceedings
are instituted.

HELD: No, the offense had not prescribed.

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits
the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine,
hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of
the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we
cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive
period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the
law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at
the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation,
the prescription of the offense is halted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which
are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by
the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before
"investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in
character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and
judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. A clear example would be this case, wherein
petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year
prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on
the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the
prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the
Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond
petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early
as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their
rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further
simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay
and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing of his complaint-affidavit
before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to
the filing of the information against petitioner.

Padua vs. People July 28, 2008 R.A. No. 9344, R.A. No. 9165, Probation Law

FACTS: The accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde and Michael Padua, a minor, seventeen (17) years
old, sold, delivered and gave away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1)
folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of marijuana.
Padua’s counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and
enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders
under Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection. Thus,
Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence
of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of P500,000.00.

Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation alleging that he is a minor and a first-time
offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No.
968 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as “The Probation Law of 1976” and Section 70 of Rep.
Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the said laws. However, Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order
denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any
person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion on
its decision denying Padua’s petition for probation. won the petition for probation filed by
Padua, a minor, be granted?

RULING: NO. RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion
because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying
Padua’s petition for probation.

It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking
cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:

SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any
person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty
imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking
or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as
the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech
is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and
harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a
sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of
violation of Sections 11 and 15 of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal
drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug
traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on
probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend
their ways. The CA also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to
exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and
first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.

A person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of 6 months
rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep.
Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 under Section 5,
Rep. Act No. 9165.

Padua’s right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006” was not
violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the
“Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law” has application in this case. Section 68 of Rep. Act
No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not
probation.

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer
be retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that
once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing
the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child
reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution
of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over
and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus,
the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

Note: “Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is
“excess of jurisdiction” when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory
authority. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATIONvs. HON. JUDGE NELSON F.

LIDUA, SR.,Presiding, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, “JOHN DOES” and “PETER
DOES, respondents. G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.
NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court ofBaguio
City
FACTS: Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000, was authorized to render any
motorvehicle immobilized by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally
parked.Balajadia and the other respondents dismantled, took and carried away the
clampsattached to the wheel of the vehicles, which took place on May 7, 2003. Jadewell filed
acomplaint for robbery against the respondents with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May
23,2003. However, the Informations were filed with the MTC on October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed
amotion to quash.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: The MTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case and
Jadewell‟s subsequent motion for reconsideration. Jadewell‟s petition for certiorari with RTC was
likewise denied. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

CONTENTION OF JADEWELL: They argued that the filing of the criminal complaint withthe Office
of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information beforeCourt, is the
reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action had prescribed.

CONTENTION OF BALAJADIA: Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes held that

the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial
proceedings.Thus, the SC, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the
ProvincialProsecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the
allegeddate of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July
7, 2003.

ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,2003
tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense

HELD: No. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of
anInformation tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an
ordinance.The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez,
Rizal alsofeatured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was
committed onMay 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information
was filed withthe Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of
Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information.
They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the
Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private
respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their
prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll
the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling: The Court realizes that
under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably
with the prosecutor‟s office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the
applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the
problem here sought to be corrected.
League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of
the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.
However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed
on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March
to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in
each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of
a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a
fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no
resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the
coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
PCFI v. NTC
G.R. No. L-63318 November 25, 1983

FACTS:
Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the approval of a revised schedule for its
Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP). The NTC issued an ex-parte order provisionally approving the revised
schedule which, however, was set aside by this Court on August 31, 1982. The Court therein ruled that
“there was a necessity of a hearing by the Commission before it should have acted on the application of
the PLDT”. On November 22, 1982, the NTC rendered the questioned decision permanently approving
PLDT’s new and increased SIP rates. It is the submission of the petitioner that the SIP schedule
presented by the PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the NTC has not yet
promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the Revised Subscriber
Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of specific rules and regulations implementing
Presidential Decree No. 217.

HELD:
There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of respondent NTC to promulgate rules and
regulations. In the separate opinion of Justice Abad Santos, it is said that the case involves a simple
problem of statutory construction – that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217. The decision
sustained the petitioner’s contention that it is the duty of NTC to first promulgate rules and regulations.
The resolution does not subscribe to the view that the NTC should or must promulgate rules and
regulations because the decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used is the permissive
“may” and not the mandatory “shall.” The non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the canons index animi
sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of
the statute there should be no departure). Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of
statutory construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the canons above mentioned we have the
following opposite: verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (words ought to be more subservient to
the intent and not the intent to the words). It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the word
“may” in a statute is permissive while the word “shall” is mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute.
The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the
apparent intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction
which will effectuate the legislative intention. In the case at bar compelling reasons dictate that the
provision of the decree should be construed as mandatory rather than merely directory. There is no
justification for the rate increase of the revised schedule of PLDT’s SIP. It is untimely, considering the
present economic condition obtaining in the country. The approved rate defeats the purpose of the decree
which is to spread ownership among the wide base of investors. Accordingly, the decision of NTC is
annulled and set aside.

ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

I vote to deny the second Motion for Reconsideration. I am amazed that the decision which was
promulgated as recently as November 25, 1983, with no dissenting opinion to dilute its acceptability
should now be reconsidered. My amazement is heightened by the fact that when the case was discussed
on July 26, 1984, I had the impression that the motion was doomed so that a request to defer action on it
would have met the same fate had not the request been put on a pag-bigyan basis.
The case involves a simple problem of statutory construction — that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree
No. 217. It reads as follows:

The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Commissions, through its Board of Communications
and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are
immediately implemented and for this purpose, pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated.

The issue is whether or not the National Telecommunications (NTC) must first promulgate the rules and
regulations mentioned in the decree before it can approve the Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of private
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT).

The decision, without any dissenting opinion, sustained the petitioner's contention that it is the duty of
NTC to first Promulgate rules and regulations.

The resolution, which is not unanimous, does not subscribe to the view that the NTC should or must
promulgate rules and regulations because, it is said, the decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the
word used is the permissive "may" and not the mandatory "shall The non-unanimous resolution thus
relies on the canons index animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba legis non est
recedendum (from the words of the statute there should be no departure).

Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of statutory construction march in pairs of
opposite. Thus with the canons above mentioned we have the following opposite: verba intention, non e
contra, debent incservice(words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the
words). Sutherland explains the limits of literalism thus:

The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the
apparent intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction
which will effectuate the legislative intention The intention prevails over the letter, and the letter must if
possible be read so as to conform to the spirit of the act. 'While the intention of the legislature must be
ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law
should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words. Thus words or clauses may be enlarged
or restricted to harmonize with other provisions of an act. The particular inquiry is not what is the abstract
force of the words or what they may comprehend, but in what sense were they intended to be understood
or what understanding do they convey as used in the particular act. (Vol. 2A Statutory Construction, pp.
65-66 [1972].)

It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the word "may" in a statute is permissive while the
word "shall" is mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute. Thus Professor Luis J. Gonzaga states:

According to Black, 'Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or
public duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or officer with power and authority to take some
action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive language win be
construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty. Thus, where the
statute provided that 'the commissioners may take into consideration the enhanced value to the remaining
land of an owner whose land was taken for highway purposes it was held that the word may should be
given a mandatory meaning and is the same as the word 'shall', since it directs the doing of a thing for the
sake of justice or the public good. Similarly, a statute by which municipal corporations are 'authorized and
empowered to provide for the support of indigent persons within their limits or to make public
improvements as to open and repair streets, remove obstructions from highways, construct sewers and
the like, are to be construed as mandatory although they only purport to grant permission or authority
since the public has an interest in such matters and the grant of authority is therefore equivalent to the
imposition of duty." (Statutes and their Construction, pp. 98-99 [1969].)

In the case at bar compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the decree should be construed as
mandatory mother than merely directory. They are stated in the unanimous decision as follows:

1. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien innovative and untested such that existing substantive and
procedural laws would not be applicable. Thus, the Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) was so set up
precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in turn assures
the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone facility.

The SIP has never been contemplated prior to P.D. 217.

The existing law on the other hand, the Public Service Act, diametrically runs counter to the split and
intention, if not the purpose of P.D. 217. It may even be gained that as long as the Optimum number of
individuals may enjoy telephone service, there is no station on the profitability of such companies. Hence,
while P.D. 217 encourages the profitability of public telecommunication companies, the Public Service Act
limits the same.

2. In the absence of such rules and regulations, there is outright confusion among the rights of PLDT, the
consumers and the government itself. As may clearly be after how can the Decision be said to have
assured that most of the population will enjoy telephone facilities? Did the Decision likewise assure the
financial viability of PLDT? Was the government's duty to provide telephone service to its constituents
subserved by the Decision? These questions can never be answered unless such rules and regulations
are set up.

3. Finally, it should be emphasized that NTC is estopped from claiming that there is no need to
promulgate such rules and regulations. In the case of PCFI vs. NTC, G.R. No. 61892, now pending
resolution before this Honorable Tribunal, NTC totally refused to act on a petition filed by PLDT precisely
for the promulgation of such rules and regulations.

Why then did NTC refuse to act on such petition if and when there is no need for the promulgation of such
rules and regulations? After all NTC could have simply ruled that the petition in G.R. No. 618R2 is
unnecessary because such rules and regulations are also unnecessary. (pp. 135-136, Rollo)

The above reasons also rebut the contention in the non-unanimous resolution that the existing
substantive and procedure laws as well as the rules promulgated by the Public Service Commission are
more than adequate to determine the reasonableness of the amounts of investment of telephone
subscribers, etc.

The PLDT's SIP is an unreasonable imposition by a utility company on a captive public. The injury is
compounded by the fact that although the company makes mega profits its service, to use a McEnroe
expression, is the pits.

People vs. Martin Simon G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994 Sale of Prohibited Drugs

FACTS:

Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to laboratory
examination, were found positive for marijuana.

Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was picked up by the
police at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from
the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to sign
some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He
was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the marked money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked
money came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the
blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.

Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she
treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for
this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury,
abrasion or contusion on his body.

Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos
and to pay the costs.

Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Simon correct?

RULING:

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. It must,
therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso
bills.

After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and there were
2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of selling for the 2 tea bags of
marijuana only.

However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of
its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams,
and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same
error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said
Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, the court
hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the
quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and
not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts
should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly
adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical
signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, the court
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and
Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a
special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine
the minimum, the court applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense.”

Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the
range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range have
fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law,
the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day
of prision correccional.

People vs. Puno (Crim1)

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique
Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants

En Banc

Regalado, February 17, 1993

Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent

Facts:

 January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local
election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC

 He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so
Isabelo will temporarily take his place

 When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her
husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving

 After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused
Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver

 Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from
her

 Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused

 But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more

  The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to
issue a check for P100,000

 Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check

 Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned
the car again towards Pampanga

 According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because
according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car

 The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to
Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of
the car

 He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer
had gotten a ride

 He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway

Issue:

1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged

2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Holding:

1. No.

2. No.

Ratio:

1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the
time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money
from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.

 For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty

 In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders

 This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention

2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving
bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was
inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is
the origin of the law on highway robbery)
  PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim

 The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually
operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case

 This is not justified by the accused's intention

Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision

correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual
damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

CASE DIGEST : US vs TURIBIO

G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUIS TORIBIO,
defendant-appellant.

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of
Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a
carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other
draft purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in
the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he
contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in
his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is
an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Facts: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided
for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote
the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to
render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain
by its enactment

The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the purpose of
the law.

The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private
property by police regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction
placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be
authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.

The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of
the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with public
interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the requesites of
a valid exercise of police power

The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent
domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a
mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and
public interest.

Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Facts:

Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company ate Manay,
Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in Davao City. Although quarters were provided
by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill many of them preferred to commute and the deceased
went home about thrice a week, to which the respondent furnished the transportation. On the day
following the accident, Conrado and Leonora were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized
at San Pedro Hospital, Davao City, where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. Leonora gave
birth to the posthumous daughter at the deceased named Raquel.

Issue:

Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as
the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

Held:

Yes, they are dependents whiting that of expressed in the Workmen's Compensation Act.

From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or
actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or
incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the
deceased are considered dependents.

It is also supported in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been
ascertained, effect should be given to it by judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained,
therefore, as to the meaning of statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a
rejection of the plea of DSTC.
Assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of
the statute and its purpose should prevail. In US v. Toribio, SC held that no construction is to be adopted
that would tend "to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator."

Therefore, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission of awarding the claimant widow for
herself and in behalf of her minor child the compensation and attorney's fees is affirmed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SALUSTIANO CALLOS, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Respect for a womans life includes giving due regard to her innocence, honor, and purity. When these
virtues are violated, the offender reveals his utter disregard for womanhood and the more it becomes
appalling when the violator is a girls own father.

Before us on automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of the 5 th Judicial Region
(Branch 15, Tabaco, Albay) imposing upon appellant Salustiano Callos the supreme penalty of death for
two counts of rape.

Two informations were filed upon complaint of Lorilyn Callos, appellants own 12-year old daughter,
on January 22, 1996. The Information in Criminal Case No. T-2708 charged:

That on or about November 17, 1994, at more or less 8:00 oclock in the evening, at Purok 4, Barangay
Bantayan, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with her 12-year-old daughter,
LORILYN CALLOS, against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

(p. 13, Records, T-2708.)

The Information in the second case, Criminal Case No. T-2709, charged a rape committed on November
29, 1994 in the same Purok 4 in Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and joint trial on the merits accordingly ensued. The
evidence presented by both the prosecution and defense is summarized in the Peoples Brief thusly:

On November 17, 1994, at about 8:00 in the evening, Lorilyn Callos, together with her brothers, Arjay
(nine [9] years old), Gerald (seven [7] years old) Jason (five [5] years old), Mark John (three [3] years old),
and Jessa May (two [2] years old), was sleeping in their house at Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay (p. 4-11, TSN,
May 21, 1996). While they were thus sleeping, Lorilyn was suddenly awakened when appellant (her
father) went on top of her. After that, appellant pulled down her panties. Lorilyn pulled it back but
appellant prevailed (p. 18, TSN, September 2, 1996). Thereafter, appellant held her breasts and
succeeded in inserting her penis into her private part. Lorilyn wanted to free herself from appellant but
could not do so because appellant pinned her down. Lorilyn felt pain when appellant inserted his penis
into her private part. Feeling helpless, Lorilyn cried. Appellant told her not to cry (pp. 7-8, ibid.).
Lorilyn testified that appellant was on top of her only for a while because one of her brothers woke up.
After appellant consummated his beastly desire, Lorilyn noticed there was blood on her private part (pp.
4-20, TSN September 2, 1996).

Lorilyn further testified that appellant was always doing it (sexual intercourse) to her but could not recall
the dates. Appellant would always threaten her every time she would not follow his evil wishes. Lorilyns
mother knew about the incident but did nothing. She told Lorilyn not to tell her uncles about the incident
as they might hurt appellant (p. 15, ibid.).

Lorilyn was able to finally reveal her harrowing experience to Rosemarie and her Ate Chu when the latter
found her in their house crying. When asked why she was crying she told her (Ate Chu) about the
incident. Ate Chu got mad at appellant and told Lorilyn that they should tell her uncle (Ate Chus father)
the incident. Lorilyn instead pleaded to Ate Chu not to tell her uncle because appellant would her her
again (p. 16, ibid.).

Despite her mothers threats, Lorilyn continued to narrate her experience in the hands of appellant. She
testified that on November 29, 1994, at about 2:00 p.m., she, together with her brothers, was in their
house when appellant told Lorilyns brothers to leave the house for them to take a bath in the river.
Appellant prevented Lorilyn from leaving the house. He told her that if she disobeyed his wish, he would
punish her. After Lorilyns brothers left, appellant told Lorilyn to get inside their house. Lorilyn refused but
appellant got a whip and commanded her to do as told. Inside the house, appellant ordered Lorilyn to
undress. Lorilyn initially refused but when appellant threatened to whip her with a piece of wood, Lorilyn
obligingly followed out of fear. Then, appellant inserted his penis into her private part. Lorilyn tried to free
herself from appellant but failed because appellant was on top of her. While appellant was on top of her,
he was sucking and mashing her breast. Lorilyn kept on crying while appellant was doing his demonic
acts (pp. 22-24, ibid.).

Thereafter, Lorilyn said to appellant that she would tell her mother what he did to her. Appellant
threatened Lorilyn not to tell her mother otherwise he would punish her. Appellant also told Lorilyn not to
tell her brothers about the incident. After their brief exchange of words, appellant ordered Lorilyn to
change her clothes and leave the house (pp. 24-25, ibid.).

Dr. Amalia Guiruba, the rural health physician of Tabaco, Albay testified that she physically examined
Lorilyn on December 1, 1995. She found out that Lorilyns labia majora and minora are coaptated. She
also found deep lacerations at 6:00 oclock, 9:00 oclock and 3:00 oclock positions which could have been
caused by an insertion of an erect penis. She further testified that it is possible that the lacerations could
have been inflicted on the date of the rape incidents as appearing in the medico-legal report (Exhibit E)
(pp. 15-21, TSN, December 16, 1996).

Resurreccion Barasona, a policeman stationed at Tabaco, Albay testified that on November 30, 1995,
Lorilyn and Lourdes Callos went to their police station and lodged a complaint for rape against appellant.
Consequently, policeman Barasona entered said complaint in their police blotter identified as Blotter Entry
No. 27541 (Exhibit F) (pp. TSN, Jan. 20, 1997).

(pp. 89-94, Rollo.)

In both cases, the trial court, in its decision dated October 24, 1997, found appellant guilty as charged.
Consequently, the death penalty was imposed in each case and appellant was ordered to indemnify
Lorilyn in the amount of P50,000.00 in each case (p. 29, Rollo).
Appellant in the present automatic review advances the lone, shot-gun argument that the real age of the
victim was not duly established. He does not question the propriety of his conviction on the two counts of
the crime of rape, limiting himself to merely arguing that the death penalty imposed by the trial court is not
in accord with the recent pronouncements of this Court in People vs. Perez (G.R. No. 122764, September
28, 1998) and People vs. Javier (G.R. No. 126096, July 26, 1999), where we held that the special
qualifying circumstances required in Republic Act No. 7659 must be duly alleged and proved before the
death penalty may be properly imposed. This notwithstanding, in carrying out our bounden duty to review
all cases where the death penalty has been imposed, we perused and examined the record of the case to
determine if appellant is at all liable. The record, however, indubitably supports the finding of the trial
court relative to its conviction of the appellant for the crime of rape.

As to the incident on November 17, 1994, appellant claimed that he attended a birthday party of his uncle
and came home in so drunken a state that he passed out right outside his house. He frankly admitted he
did something wrong, that is, he almost molested his daughter had it not been for the timely intervention
of his wife. He further testified that he whipped his daughter because she broke the radio.

However, on cross-examination, the following declarations were elicited from appellant:

Q: You said that you had already asked for forgiveness, am I correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you also said that you had asked for forgiveness because you had done something wrong?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that something which is wrong was the sexual intercourse you had with your daughter Lorelyn
Corral (sic) on November 17, 1994?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q: And in the early morning of the following day, you had learned that you did something wrong to your
daughter?

A: I was informed about it by my wife, sir.

Q: Knowing that you had sexual intercourse with your daughter, what did you do?

A: I cried a lot when I learned about it, sir. I realized that I had done something wrong.

(pp. 9, 15, tsn, Feb. 18, 1997.)

This admission of appellant in open court shows that he indeed raped his daughter on the night
of November 17, 1994.

Regarding the rape alleged to have been committed on November 29, 1994, appellant was, however,
absolutely silent, which muteness becomess an eloquent admission of the crime charged (People vs.
Calayca, 301 SCRA 192 [1999]). More importantly, Lorilyn categorically testified that she was raped by
appellant on November 29, 1994, aside from the other numerous occasions when she was similarly
abused. Such testimony, which oftentimes is the only evidence that can be offered to prove the guilt of
the perpetrator, is sufficient to sustain a conviction (People vs. Villaluna, 303 SCRA 518 [1999]; People
vs. Banela, 301 SCRA 84 [1999]). No woman, especially one who is of the tender age, would concoct a
horrendous tale, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to
public trial and forced to relive such horrifying experience, if she is not motivated solely by the desire to
have the culprit apprehended and punished (People vs. Almaden, 305 SCRA 157 [1999]; People vs.
Ayo, 305 SCRA 543 [1999]; People vs. Monfero, 308 SCRA 396 [1999]), even if the familys honor is at
stake, and even if it is her own father that she would be sending to prison (People vs. Bation, 305 SCRA
253 [1999]. The long standing rule is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her, and so long as her testimony
meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof (People vs. Ambray, 303
SCRA 697 [1999]; People vs. De La Cuesta, 304 SCRA 83 [1999]; People vs. Maglantay, 304 SCRA 272
[1999]; People vs. Vaynoco, 305 SCRA 93 [1999]). The findings of the trial court on this score should,
therefore, be upheld.

Now to the issue of whether there is independent evidence of Lorilyns age to qualify the rape and to
justify the penalty of death. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the crime of rape, increasing
the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. In order to impose the higher penalty, the duality and
concurrence of both circumstances must be alleged and proved (People vs. Perez, 296 SCRA 17
[1998]). The People, in its brief, claims that there is sufficient evidence to establish the age of the victim at
the time of rape. Lorilyn Callos testified that she was 13 at the time she was put on the stand. She also
testified that she was born on August 6, 1982; hence, was 12 years old at the time of commission of the
crime. She also disclosed to the examining physician that she was 13 years old at the time of her
examination. She informed Policeman Barasona that she was 13 years old when she lodged a complaint
against appellant on November 30, 1995. Even appellant declared that his daughter was 14 years old at
the time of his testimony (p. 6, tsn, February 18, 1997), making her 12 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime.

Although not stated in the Peoples brief, in our review of the record, we noted that the minutes of the
hearing indicate that Lorilyn Callos birth certificate was presented and marked during trial. Although said
document was never formally offered in evidence and, therefore, strictly speaking, does not form part of
the record of exhibits of the case, it is to be significantly considered that the defense counsel admitted the
authenticity of the birth certificate (Order of Judge Mamerto M. Buban, Jr., October 2, 1996).

In the determination of each element of the case, only moral certainty is required. In People vs. De la
Cruz (G.R. Nos. 131167-68, August 23, 2000), the Court held that the prosecution proved the minority of
the victim beyond reasonable doubt through the testimony of the victims mother. In the present case,
appellant himself, Lorilyns own father, testified that his daughter was a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense. Adding to that the various documents presented in court as well as pertinent
testimony, one can hardly doubt that indeed, Lorilyn was a minor at the time she was raped.

It must be stressed that in criminal cases, the determination of the guilt of the accused, and along with it
the proper penalty to be imposed, is coupled with the grave responsibility of safeguarding the accuseds
life and liberty, bearing in mind that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Imposing the
death penalty should be exercised with extreme caution, and only in instances where the guilt of the
accused is proven beyond reasonable doubt, wherein both substantive and procedural due process are
observed, can it be upheld. In this case, there exists no doubt that Lorilyns age was sufficiently proved.
The Court, therefore, must sustain the conviction of the accused.

The lower courts award of civil indemnity should, however, be modified. Civil indemnity, which is actually
in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
rape (People vs. Banago, 309 SCRA 417 [1999]). If the crime of rape is effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the penalty of death is authorized, the civil indemnity for the victim shall not
be less than P75,000 (People vs. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 [1999], People vs. Ambray, 303 SCRA 697
[1999]; People vs. Bolatete, 303 SCRA 709 [1999]). In addition, moral damages, fixed in the amount of
P50,000.00, per count, should also be awarded to the rape victim without need for pleading or proof of
the basis thereof (People vs. Banela, 301 SCRA 84 [1999]; People vs. Alba, 305 SCRA 811 [1999]).

The saddest part of this story is the remorse of appellant, which came a little too late. After the
prosecution had presented its evidence, defense counsel moved to set aside appellants plea of not guilty
and requested that appellant be re-arraigned so that he may voluntarily change his plea to guilty (p. 2,
tsn, Feb. 13, 1997), turning such plea into a mitigating circumstance. Under Section 7, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code, a plea of guilty can be considered a mitigating circumstance if done before the
prosecution presents it evidence. In the event, the prosecution did not consent to this desperate attempt
of appellant to qualify for a lower penalty. The trial court argued and did not re-arraign appellant. Dura lex
sed lex. Ultimately, we have to follow the law.

Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote,
that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED with modification. Accused-appellant
SALUSTIANO CALLOS is convicted of 2 counts of qualified rape and sentenced to DEATH on each
count. Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000 for each
count or a total of P250,000 is also awarded. No pronouncement as to costs.

In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act
7659, upon finality of this decision, let the certified true copy of the record of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.

People v. Suriaga, 381 SCRA 159 (2002)

FACTS: Edwin Ramos was cleaning the car of hisolder brother, Johnny who was taking care of his 2-year old daughter, Nicole,
playing inside the car. Suriaga, a cousin of the Ramos brothers, arrived. He was accompanied by hislive-in-partner Rosita.
Suriaga requested Edwin if he could drive the car, but the latter declined, saying he did nothave the keys. Meanwhile, Johnny
returned to his house because a visitor arrived. At this instance, Rosita held Nicole and cajoled her. Rosita asked Edwin if she
could take Nicole with her to buy barbeque. Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long time and because he trusted her,
Edwin acceded. When Rosita and the childleft, Suriaga joined them. More than an one hour has passed but the two failed to
return with Nicole. Edwin,Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, then began searching but they
could not find their daughter and Rosita. Nicole’s grandfather then receive a call from Suriaga asking for ransom in the amount
of P100,000.00. Johnny immediately reported the call to the PACC Task Force. The next day,Suriaga called Mercedita,
introduced himself and asked herif she and her husband would give the amount to which the latter responded in
the positive. Suriaga instructed Mercidita as to the how the money should be delivered to him with a warning that if she will
not deliver the money,her daughter would be placed in a plastic bag or thrown ina garbage can. Thereafter, with the cash
money, and while being tailed by PACC agents, Mercida proceeded to deliver the money to Suriaga. The PACC agents arrested
Suriaga and his companion Isidera after Mercida gave the money to them. Prior thereto, Nicole was rescued in a shanty where
Rosita’s sister lived.

HELD: The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled within
dubitable proof of the accused’s intent to effect the same. And if the person detained is a child, the question that needs to be
addressed is whether there is evidence to show that in taking the child, there was deprivation of the child’s liberty and that it
was the intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the child’s custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for
ransomhave been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the following circumstances:

1) appellant, aprivate individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission from her father;

2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rosita’s sister lived, without informing her parents of their
whereabouts;

3) He detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight and the following day;
and

4) he demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through telephone calls and gave instructions where and how it should be delivered

Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008]

16AUG

Ponente: CORONA, J.

FACTS:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in Manila.
His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of
the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint
was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay,
summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.

RATIO:

[R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1
and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal
of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head
of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules.

Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES VS QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 [Constitutional Law - Article VI: Legislative Department; Taxation ]

FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from
real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital building.
Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was denied, and a petition
hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of
the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from
real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the
decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and
1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.

2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the
provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health
and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was to render medical
services to the public in general including those who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of
charity. Under PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in the
form of subsidies granted by the government.

2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its
real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes only. This
provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties
are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by
the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities
are not exempt from such taxes.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MODESTO MAMAC y CAMINERO, accused-
appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

In two informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, [1] Modesto C. Mamac was
accused of raping Bernadette U. Enguito on two separate occasions. The informations were respectively
docketed as Criminal Case No. 35,662-95 and Criminal Case No. 35,663-95.

After a joint trial, the trial court found Mamac guilty beyond reasonable doubt on both
indictments.[2] Accordingly, it sentenced him as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
Modesto Mamac y Caminero is hereby sentenced as follows:

Crim. Case No. 35,662: To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua as the crime was committed in 1991
and the applicable law is the Penal Code, not RA 7659 which became a law only in December 1993 and
to indemnify Bernadette (Enguito) into (sic) Forty thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.

Crim. Case No. 35,663: To be put to death as the crime of rape was committed on August 14, 1995 when
RA 7659 was already a law and indemnify Bernadette Enguito Forty thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Davao City, Philippines, April 28, 1997."

Appellant did not contest his conviction in Criminal Case No. 35,662-95. Only Criminal Case No. 35,663-
95 is before this Court on automatic review.

The information in Criminal Case No. 35,663-95 dated August 21, 1995 reads:[3]

"That on or about August 16, 1995, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-mentioned accused did then and there wilfully unlawfully and feloniously, by
means of intimidation, that is by then and there threatening and intimidating Bernadette Enguito by killing
her should she not agree to submit herself to his criminal design and by his moral ascendancy over said
Bernadette Enguito, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have carnal knowledge
of said Bernadette Enguito against her will and consent.

Contrary to law."

The records reveal that Bernadette[4] was sleeping inside their house located at Toril, Davao City at 9
o'clock in the evening of August 14, 1995 when appellant came and woke her up. To rouse Bernadette
from her sleep, appellant poked her with a long stick while she was lying alongside her brother and sister.
When she opened the window to check, Bernadette saw appellant outside brandishing a bolo. Appellant
then menacingly ordered Bernadette to go out of the house and brought her towards the Lipada River.
Upon reaching the bank of the river, appellant commanded Bernadette to take off her clothes while
pointing the bolo at her. Bernadette complied in fear. Then with appellant sticking the bolo at Bernadette's
neck, appellant forced himself upon Bernadette despite the latter's resistance and plea. Bernadette was
only sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the sexual attack.
Bernadette's mother, Segunda U. Enguito,[5] noticed Bernadette coming back into the house. When
Segunda asked Bernadette where she had been, Bernadette answered that she just went out to urinate.

The following day, Bernadette revealed her harrowing experience to her boyfriend. To avoid the perverse
advances of appellant, Bernadette and her boyfriend ran away to Butuan City. Segunda followed them
and Bernadette disclosed to her mother the depraved acts of appellant. Segunda brought Bernadette
back to Toril and accompanied her to the police to file a complaint. In her affidavit [6] filed before the police,
Bernadette referred to appellant as her grandfather.

On August 19, 1995, Dr. Uldarico C. Casquejo[7] examined Bernadette and found a healed wound at her
vaginal opening. Dr. Casquejo also noted that a vaginal speculum easily penetrated her vagina without
any effort. Vaginal smear examination showed the presence of spermatozoa and pus cells.

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the accusation lodged against him. [8] Already 64 years of age at the time of
his examination in court, appellant[9] denied having raped Bernadette on August 14, 1995. He stated that
at his age, he could no longer have sex with his 48-year old common law wife, more so with a younger
woman. During his cross examination, appellant failed to give any reason why Bernadette would file a
rape charge against him.

Appellant himself provided the circumstances of his relationship to Bernadette. He said that Segunda is
the daughter of his common-law wife with another man. Although Bernadette calls him lolo, appellant
declared that he never treated Bernadette as his granddaughter.

In his Brief,[10] appellant asserts that:

"I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF COMPLAINANT, BERNADETTE ENGUITO; and

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME

CHARGED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

In support of the above contentions, appellant maintains that there is no reason for Bernadette to be
cowed into going out of their house by his mere act of stabbing her with a stick as she was very much
secure inside the house.

We clarify first that Bernadette categorically stated in open court that she went out of the house because
appellant threatened to kill her family.[11] With the display of the bolo and the utterance of foreboding
Words by appellant, it is easy to understand why Bernadette left the safety of their house. Fear simply
overwhelmed Bernadette. She twice stressed that she was afraid when appellant ordered her to go out of
the house.[12]

There is nothing incomprehensible about Bernadette's reaction. We have long recognized that different
people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response
when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One person's spontaneous
response may be aggression, while another person's reaction may be cold indifference. [13]
Appellant also attempts to discredit Bernadette by pointing to an inconsistency in her testimony as
compared to her mother's narration in court. It is emphasized that Bernadette declared that it was to her
boyfriend that she first reported the incident while Segunda stated on the witness stand that it was to her
that Bernadette first reported the crime. It is settled that conflict in testimonies of witnesses in describing
details of an event may be due to differences in observations and memory which does not necessarily
imply falsehood on their part.[14] Such seeming inconsistency does not detract from the main thrust of
Bernadette's testimony that she was raped by appellant. An inconsistency which pertains only to minor
and trivial details not touching on the why's and wherefore's of the crime strengthens rather than
diminishes a witness's credibility as it erases suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. [15]

Be that as it may, we do not agree with the trial court's imposition of the penalty of death upon appellant.
It appears that the trial court considered appellant as Bernadette's step-grandfather. On the other hand,
the Solicitor General[16] justifies the imposition of the death penalty because of appellant's employment of
a deadly weapon to consummate the rape.

The different modes of committing rape and the special circumstances qualifying the offense are laid
down in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, viz:

"ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxx

The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. The victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.

x x x."

Rape with the use of a deadly weapon was introduced in Article 335 by Republic Act No. 4111 [17] on June
20, 1964 and the rape of a minor by a relative was introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 [18] on December
31, 1993. Both types of rape were recognized as qualified rape in People vs. Tabugoca.[19]

A reading of the information will reveal that appellant was only charged with simple rape under the first
circumstance provided in Article 335. Unadorned of its auxiliary words, the information accuses appellant
of employing threat and intimidation and of abusing his moral ascendancy over Bernadette to carry out
the rape. The information does not contain any allegation of relationship and minority nor the use of a
deadly weapon. The information therefore does not charge appellant with qualified rape and he cannot be
sentenced to death.

We have held that the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender is a
special qualifying circumstance which should be alleged in the information to warrant imposition of the
death penalty.[20] Minority and relationship are treated as special qualifying circumstances and not merely
as aggravating circumstances because they increase the imposable penalties by degrees. [21]

Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if not alleged, a qualifying
aggravating cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information.[22] It must be properly pleaded in
order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him.[23] Needless to state, appellant will be denied due process if after being
charged with simple rape, he is convicted of its qualified form punishable with death.[24]

We hasten to add that appellant is not a step-grandfather of Bernadette. Appellant himself admitted that
he co-habited and lived with the maternal grandmother of Bernadette without the benefit of
marriage.[25] The word "step", when used as prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, is repugnant to
blood relationship and is indicative of a relationship by affinity. [26] Since no relationship by affinity can be
established between Bernadette and appellant, appellant cannot be considered as. the step-grandfather
of Bernadette.

At the most, appellant can be described as the common law husband of Bernadette's grandmother. As
such, appellant is not a "parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent" of Bernadette. [27] In a similar case,
we ruled that courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not embraced by it to the
end that no person who, is clearly not within the terms of statute can be brought within them.[28] Expressio
unius est exclusio alteruis.

On the other hand, while the employment of a bolo was sufficiently established by the prosecution, such
clear showing cannot justify the imposition of the death penalty in the absence of an aggravating
circumstance.[29] Appellant's crime is only punishable by reclusion perpetua.

Since appellant should only be punished with reclusion perpetua, we decline to raise the indemnity
awarded to Bernadette by the trial court to P75,000.00 as prayed for by the Solicitor General. Such award
is only warranted where the crime of rape is qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is imposed by law.[30] The offended party is entitled to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[31] She may also be given moral damages without need of proof.[32]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 35,663-95 is AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant Modesto Mamac y Caminero is sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim, Bernadette Enguito, the additional amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages. The amount of P40,000.00 awarded to the victim as indemnity is increased to P50,000.00.
Costs against accused-appellant.
Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010.

17MAY

Third Division

[CORONA, J.]

FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he
filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending
appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of
his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an
appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty
of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal
mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean automatic
grant of bail in case of appeal.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk
of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the
history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It
is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison.
Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our
criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate
sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused
faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other
release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-
wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.
PARAS, J.:

The basic issue in this original action for certiorari and mandamus filed by the National Power Corporation
is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated
lands, the law applicable is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or
Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum. Pending
consideration of this case on the merits, petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order to restrain or enjoin the respondent judge of the lower court from enforcing the
herein assailed orders and from further acting or proceeding with Civil Case Nos. 2248 and 2277.

The following are the antecedents of the case:

On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned
and controlled corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going
infrastructure and development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain
against private respondents with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Sur,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2248 and Civil Case No. 2277, respectively. The complaint which sought to
expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of
the development of hydro-electric power and production of electricity as well as the erection of such
subsidiary works and constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith.

Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. After responsive pleadings were filed and
issues joined, a series of hearings before court-designated commissioners were held.

On June 15, 1979, a consolidated decision in Civil Cases Nos. 2248 and 2277 was rendered by the lower
court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely
been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private
respondents certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest
thereon xxx until fully paid."

Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the said consolidated decision were filed by the petitioner.
The same were denied by the respondent court. Petitioner did not appeal the aforesaid consolidated
decision, which became final and executory.

Thus, on May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed an ex-parte motion for
the execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid
balance of P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at
6% per annum. The said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the
petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision dated
June 15, 1979. Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest
computed at 6% per annum.

On February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol), through counsel, filed
with the trial court an ex-partemotion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying, for the first time, that the legal
interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as
allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the
judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum." (Brief
for Respondents, p. 3)
On February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum. (Annex
L, Petition). Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions also praying that the legal interest
on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the
lower court issued on March 10, 1981 and August 28, 1981 orders bearing similar import.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated August 28, 1981, alleging that
the main decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of
money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said
main decision can no longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that Presidential Decree No.
116 is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.

On January 25, 1982, the lower court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, stating that the rate
of interest at the time of the promulgation of the June 15, 1981 decision is that prescribed by Central
Bank Circular No. 416 issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116, which is 12% per annum, and that
it did not modify or change but merely amplified its order of August 28, 1981 in the determination of the
legal interest.

Petitioner brings the case to Us for a determination of which legal interest is applicable to the transaction
in question.

Central Bank Circular No. 416 reads:

"By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as
the 'Usury Law,' the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that
the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent (12%)
per annum."

It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits. This has already been settled in several cases decided by this Court. Private
respondents, however, take exception to the inclusion of the term "judgments" in the said circular,
claiming that such term refers to any judgment directing the payment of legal interest, which term includes
the questioned judgment of the lower court in the case at bar.

Private respondents' contention is bereft of merit. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury
Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should be interpreted to mean only judgments involving
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the principle of ejusdem generis. Under this
doctrine, where general terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects,
the general term will be construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the
same nature as those specifically enumerated (Crawford, Statutory Construction, p. 191; Go Tiaco vs.
Union Ins. Society of Camilan, 40 Phil. 40; Mutuc vs. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228)

The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by
treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is
emmbraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the
ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it
would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms (2
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., pp. 395-400).
Applying the said rule on statutory construction to Central Bank Circular No. 416, the general term
"judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits. As significantly laid down by this Court in the case of Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260:

"The judgments spoken of and referred to are judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearance of
any money, goods or credits. Any other kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with, nor
involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said
law for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. The Monetary Board may not
tread on forbidden grounds. It cannot rewrite other laws. That function is vested solely with the legislative
authority. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that statutes should be construed as a whole and not as a
series of disconnected articles and phrases. In the absence of a clear contrary intention, words and
phrases in statutes should not be interpreted in isolation from one another. A word or phrase in a statute
is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may thus be modified or
restricted by the latter."

Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law
applicable to the case at bar. Said law reads:

"Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the
indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest
agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum."

The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to
judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is evident not only from
said circular but also from Presidential Decree No. 116, which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise known
as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the
payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation
arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.

In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits
but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without
stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for
damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties
expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof.
Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced
in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the
Civil Code shall apply.

As for private respondents' argument that Central Bank Circular No. 416 impliedly repealed or modified
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, suffice it to state that repeals or even amendments by implication are not
favored if two laws can be fairly reconciled. The Courts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed
another by implication, and they will not make such an adjudication if they can refrain from doing so, or if
they can arrive at another result by any construction which is just and reasonable. Besides, the courts will
not enlarge the meaning of one act in order to decide that it repeals another by implication, nor will they
adopt an interpretation leading to an adjudication of repeal by implication unless it is inevitable and a
clear and explicit reason therefor can be adduced. (82 C.J.S. 479-486). In this case, Central Bank
Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil Code contemplate different situations and apply to different
transactions. In transactions involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, as well as
judgments relating to such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, the Central Bank circular
applies. It is only in such transactions or judgments where the Presidential Decree allowed the Monetary
Board to dip its fingers into. On the other hand, in cases requiring the payment of indemnities as
damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of an obligation other than those involving loan
or forbearance of money, goods or credits, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies. For the Court, this is the
most fair, reasonable, and logical interpretation of the two laws. We do not see any conflict between
Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil Code or any reason to hold that the former has
repealed the latter by implication.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders promulgated on February 11, 1981, March 10,
1981, August 28, 1981 and January 25, 1982 (as to the recomputation of interest at 12% per annum) are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. It is hereby declared that the computation of legal interest at 6% per annum
is the correct and valid legal interest allowed in payments of just compensation for lands expropriated for
public use to herein private respondents by the Government through the National Power Corporation. The
injunction heretofore granted is hereby made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962]

15AUG

Ponente: REGALA, J.

FACTS:

[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground
that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. The lower court denied the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel
who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule
of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the information against the
accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code.

HELD:

YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded
for trial on the merits.

RATIO:

The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal
in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted
from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been
no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms. On law reason and public policy,
defendant-appellee’s contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54
must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the
legislature.

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of “expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by
Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace
from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for
the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius
est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.

Republic vs. Cojuangco Jr.

G.R. No. 139930 June 26, 2012

Facts: In 1977, Regala, Lazatin, et al incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM).
On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the UCPB, composed of respondents Cojuangco et
al, authorized UCPB to invest not more than P500 million from the fund in the equity of UNICOM
for the benefit of the coconut farmers. On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized
capital stock to 10 million shares without par value. On September 18, 1979, a new set of
UNICOM directors, composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al approved another
amendment to UNICOM’s capitalization by increasing its authorized capital stock to one billion
shares. The paid-up subscriptions of 5 million shares without par value were then converted to
500 million Class A voting common shares without par value per share.

Respondents amended again UNICOM’s capitalization on September 18, 1979, giving the
incorporators unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1 million shares to 100 million shares
without cost to them. And UNICOM filed its Certificate of Filing of Amended AOI with the SEC on
February 8, 1980, making public respondents acts as board of directors.

On March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of
directors, before the PCGG. Nine years later, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a
memorandum that the action has already prescribed.

Issue: Whether or not respondents alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already
prescribed.

Ruling: R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be computed in
accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326 which states that “prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof xxx”
That investment does not, however, appear to have been withheld from the public. The
transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board rooms when UNICOM applied with
the SEC to accommodate UCPB’s investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected in the
General Information Sheets that corporations have been mandated to submit annually to the
SEC.

Reckoning the 10-year prescriptive period from the commission of the violation of law, the last
day for filing the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990. Hence, the action has already
prescribed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA

G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010

FACTS:

AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old. BBB is married to appellant, who was
working abroad for six years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a
restaurant supervisor from 4pm to 2am for six days a week.

In February 1999 at around 9:30 pm, AAA then 11 yrs old, was sleeping inside the house when she felt and saw
appellant touch her thighs. The following day, at around the same time and while BBB was at work, appellant again
touched AAA from her legs up to her breast.

Two weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife,
then appellant was able to penetrate her. Two days after, appellant again raped her. AAA recounted that appellant
raped her at least 3 times a week at the same time until October 15, 2002, when she was 14 yrs. old.

RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape.CA affirmed the finding
that AAA was raped by appellant, but did so only on 2 counts and consider the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the victim even without court authority

Whether that the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of relationship is applicable.

HELD:

To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender.

Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with his ward. The theory that
a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People vs. Dela Cruz which held that the
guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on Civil Procedure.

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial
appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating
its objectives. The appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision
introduced by RA 7659.Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a
mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot
impose death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under RA 7659, since he does not fit into that category.
Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in the Information. What
was clearly stated was that appellant was the “adopting father” of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to
establish.

For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only be convicted for
two counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.

G.R. No. L-18792 February 28, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GUILLERMO BELLO, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts:

Guillermo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Guillermo was a
54 year old widower, and Alicia’s senior by 30 years. Prior to Alicia’s employment at Maring’s Place, the
couple led a ‘blissful’ life. Due to poverty, Alicia became an entertainer/public hostess at the said bar, and
Guillermo used to watch her there everyday; very much smitten by her beauty[1].

However, on May 16, Guillermo saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater with a man, and surprised the
man caressing her inside the movie house. Guillermo dragged her outside.

Two weeks later, Guillermo visited Maring’s Place to ask Alicia for money, but the owner, Maring (who
was fantastically creative enough to name the bar after him), told him to go home and to leave Alicia
alone because he was an old invalid. He proceeded to walk home empty handed, but upon
passing Bonifacio Street, he came across the Marasigan brothers who mocked him with the above stated
remark. The self-loathing Guillermo proceeded to Paty’s place and downed give glasses of Tuba.

By nighttime of the same day, Guillermo returned to Maring’s Place and did then and there stab Alicia
several times. Realizing what he had done, he ran to Gumarca and surrendered to the police there. He
was found guilty by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City of murder attended by the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, alevosia, and abuse of confidence and ungratefulness; The penalty for which
is death; thus the automatic review of the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the victim should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation, albeit his relationship with the victim being merely a common-law marriage?

HELD:

Yes. By stare decisis, passion or obfuscation on the part of the offender must arise from legitimate
and moral sentiments. Since common-law marriages are considered unlawful in the Philippines,
Obfuscation, when relationship is illegitimate, cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

To answer this question, we must first differentiate the circumstances of this case with that of U.S. v
Hicks. In the said case, the common-law wife of Mr. Hicks terminated her relations with the American, and
contracted new relations with a certain corporal. Mr. Hicks shot his ex-common-law-wife when she
refused to go home with him and resume their relationship. Since they were not married, she was entitled
to do so. What she did – cruel as it may be – was legal in the eyes of law. Passion and obfuscation were
not appreciated in such a case, since:
 1. The common-law wife had a right to leave her common-law husband, as they were not united in
holy matrimony. He had no right to compel her to go with him. Remember that the first
requirement of passion or obfuscation is that there be an unlawful act, sufficient to produce
diminution of self-control or the exercise of will power.

Returning now to the case at hand, what Guillermo was asking from Alicia was that she (1) quit her job as
a hostess; an ill-reputed profession corroborated by her promiscuous relations with other men, and (2)
resume her job as a hostess.

The Supreme Court held that Alicia’s flat out refusal was an exhibition of immorality itself. A monogamous
illegitimate relationship is definitely of higher standing than illicit relationship for the sake of gain – or
gainful promiscuity as the court put it.

This, coupled with the cruel words against him were enough to constitute passion and obfuscation in the
old soul. Thus, he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance.

Judith Yu vs Samson-Tatad

GR No. 170979 February 9, 2011

Facts:

An information for estafa against the petitioner (Judith Yu) was filed with the RTC which convicted the
petitioner as charged. Fourteen days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging
that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was
convicted. The respondent judge denied the petitioner's motion for new trial for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging she had a fresh period of 15 days from the
receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, within which to file a notice of appeal. The prosecution
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal fore being belatedly filed and a Motion for execution of the decision.

Issue:

Does the fresh period rule apply to appeals in criminal cases?

Ruling:

Yes, to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when
the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted
by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, litigants today need not concern
themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now
counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any
final order or resolution.

Consti II case digest: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(FOURTH DIVISION) and ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, Respondents.

Double Jeopardy

Requisites

G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008

FACTS:

During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando
M. Tiape, a relative of Villapando’s wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte.
Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal
Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.

On February 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the two were charged for violation of
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Sandiganbayan.

Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the case against
Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000. Villapando
filed his Demurrer to Evidence the Sandiganbayan found with merit and acquitted him of the crime
charged.

The Ombudsman filed a petition through the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Villapando can be prosecuted despite of his acquittal before the Sandiganbayan.

RULING:

Yes, because the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Although this Court held that once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts
to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter
shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.

The Office of the Ombudsman argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
which states no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of
their subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991, for its part, states that except for
losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall, within one year after
such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it ruled that
temporary prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of lack of legal qualification.

The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a position are provided by law and
that it may well be that one who possesses the required legal qualification for a position may be
temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one-year prohibition imposed
on losing candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should a
person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the appointee possesses all the
qualifications stated in the law.

In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction,
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding
temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991.

Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.