PART II – THE RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
A. Bases of right
B. Extent and scope of right
15 REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK v. CIR
FACTS:
1. Bank discharged respondent employees for having written and
published “a patently libelous letter…tending to cause dishonor,
discredit, or contempt…”
a. The respondents had written to the bank president,
demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality,
nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees
2. At the instance of the employees, prosecutor Tirona filed a
complaint in the CIR for ULP - to dismiss, discharge or otherwise
prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having filed
charges or for having given or being about to give testimony
3. The Bank moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending
that respondents were discharged not for union activities but for
having written and published a libelous letter against the bank
president
4. In 1960, SC overruled the decision of the CIR in the Royal
Interocean case and held that "the charge, the filing of which is the
cause of the dismissal of the employee, must be related to his right
to self-organization in order to give rise to unfair labor practice on
the part of the employer.”
5. CIR- guilty of ULP
6. Bank argues that the court should have dismissed the complaint
because the discharge of the respondents had nothing to do with
their union activities as the latter in fact admitted at the hearing
that the writing of the letter-charge was not a "union action" but
merely their "individual" act
ISSUE: Whether or not there was ULP since the letter-charge was not
a union act. There’s ULP.
 Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when
they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for
they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their
right of self-organization that includes concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection, interference with which constitutes
ULP
 When the respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism
and other management practices, they were acting within an area
marked out by the Act as a proper sphere of collective bargaining
 In National Labor Relations Board v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
Co.
o Employees shall have the right to engage in concerted
activities for their mutual aid or protection even though no
union activity be involved, for collective bargaining be
contemplated. Here Davis and Johnson and other salesmen
were properly concerned with the identity and capability
of the new cashier. Conceding they had no authority to
appoint a new cashier or even recommend anyone for the
appointment, they had a legitimate interest in acting
concertedly in making known their views to management
without being discharged for that interest
 What the Bank should have done was to refer the letter-charge to
the grievance committee. This was its duty, failing which it
committed ULP
 The grievance committee, created in the CBA, would have been an
appropriate forum for such negotiation. Indeed, the grievance
procedure is a part of the continuous process of collective
bargaining. It is intended to promote, as it were, a friendly
dialogue between labor and management as a means of
maintaining industrial peace
 Right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited, as the
right of an employer to discharge for cause is not denied. The
Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the
right of an employer to select his employees or to discharge them.
It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering
with the countervailing right of self-organization
 Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the employees'
right of self-organization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a
refusal to bargain collectively, constituted ULP
16 VICTORIANO v. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION
1. Victoriano was an employee of Elizalde Rope Factory and an
Iglesia ni Cristo.
a. Before, the law allows the employer to require the employee to
join a labor organization as a condition for employment
b. However, such law was amended to provide that it will not
cover members of religious sects which prohibit labor
organization affiliation (RA 3350)
2. Iglesia prohibits labor organization affiliations, thus, Victoriano
presented his resignation with the Union
a. The Union wrote to the Company asking it to dismiss
Victoriano from employment
b. The company told Victoriano to arrange with the Union,
otherwise he shall be terminated.
3. Victoriano filed an action for injunction
a. RTC enjoined the company from dismissing victoriano
b. The company argues that RA 3350 is unconstitutional because
it infringes on the right to form associations in violation of the
Constitution; and for impairing obligations of contracts; and
for discriminating religious sects and violation of the equal
protection clause; that in the exercise of persons to join
associations, which is a civil right, a religious test has been
used.
WON the law is constitutional YES
1. There was no prohibition to join labor organizations
a. The law merely provides that employees of religious sects that
prohibit labor organization affiliation cannot be compelled to
join one as a condition for employment
2. The right to organize has two notions: first, liberty or freedom, i.e.,
the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for
himself without being prevented by law; and second, power,
whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from
Joining an association
a. The right not to join is limited – because when the company
and the union agreed on a “closed shop”, the employer may
only employ those members of the said union;
b. RA 3350 made an exception as to those religious sects
prohibiting labor organization affiliation
c. RA 3350 reinforces the right to self organization – gives the
employees more freedom to choose whether to affiliate or not
3. As to the impairment of obligations of contracts
a. Such right is no absolute; it only prohibits unreasonable
impairment
b. The state has the duty to safeguard the interests of the people;
involves public welfare
c. The purpose of the law is to insure freedom of belief and
religion and to avoid discrimination against members of
religious sects which prohibit labor organization affiliation; to
enable them to work and earn
4. There is no violation of the non-establishment of religion clause of
the Constitution – the law merely advances the free exercise of
religion and so that in the exercise of their religion, they be not
prevented from working by reason of the closed shop agreements
5. No violation of the equal protection clause because it allows
classification
a. There is a valid basis for classification between those who by
reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up
with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit
membership in labor unions
17 REYES v. TRAJANO (1992)
Topic: Extent and Scope of Right to Self-Organization
1. The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the
Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of TriUnion
Industries Corporation.
2. The competing unions were the Tri-Union Employees Union-
Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture
(TUEUOLALIA) and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS).
a. Of the 348 workers deemed as qualified voters, only 240
took part in the election. Among the 240, 141 of which
were members of the “Iglesia ni Kristo” (INK).
3. There were 3 choices: the two contending labor organizations and
the third choice was “NO UNION.”
a. TUEA-OLALIA got 95 votes; TUPAS got 1; No Union 1;
Challenged Votes: 141.
4. The challenged votes of the INK members were segregated and
excluded from the final count because INK members should not
be allowed to vote since they are not members of any union and
refused to participate in the previous certification elections.
5. The INK employees protested. Filed a petition to cancel the
election alleging that it was not fair and the results did not reflect
the true sentiments of the majority of the employees.
6. TUEU opposed saying that the INK members do not have legal
personality to protest because they are not members of either unit.
a. INK prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from
joining or forming any labor organization.
7. Med-Arbiter found no merit in the INK employee’s petition.
Certified TUEU as the bargaining unit.
a. Religious belief was being utilized to render meaningless
the rights of the non-members of the INK to exercise the
right to be represented.
b. INK members had no legal personality since they were not
parties to the petition for certification election.
8. INK employees appealed saying that they were disenfranchised
even if they had an overwhelming majority.
9. Bureau of Labor Relations: Denied the appeal. Lack of legal
capacity; did not participate previously because of religious
beliefs.
10. SolGen: Concurred with the INK Employees.
11. NLRC: If the workers who are members of the INK in the exercise
of their religious belief opted not to join any labor organization as
a consequence of which they themselves cannot have a bargaining
representative, then the right to be represented by a bargaining
agent should not be denied to other members of the bargaining
unit.
ISSUE: Whether INK employees had the right to vote in the
certification election. YES.
 Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
 Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an
employer, among others, to "interfere with restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their right to self- organization."
 Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to "restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
of their rights to self-organization.
 The INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit, do
have the right of self-organization. As well as the fact that when
they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be
represented by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that
right of self- organization, albeit in its negative aspect.
 Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that
only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take
part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly
 discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all
bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are
FACTS:
members of a labor organization or not.
ISSUE: Whether the employees have the right NOT to vote for any of
the unions. YES.
 The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or
affiliate with a labor union or determine which of two or more
unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in concerted
activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual
aid and protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement
of their rights and interests.
 labor union.
 Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union,
and to disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is
subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union,
and to maintain membership therein.
o The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily
includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said
right.
o It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the
exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should
be compelled to exercise such a conferred right.
o The fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in
a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to
renounce such membership.
18 KAPATIRAN V CALLEJA (1988)
1. From 1984 to 1987, Tupas was the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the workers in the Meat and
Canning Division of the Universal Robina Corporation, with a
3-year CBA which was to expire on November 15, 1987.
2. Within the freedom period of 60 days prior to the expiration of
its CBA, Tupas filed an amended notice of strike as a means of
pressuring the company to extend, renew, or negotiate a new
CBA with it.
3. On October 8, 1987, the New Ulo, composed mostly of
workers belonging to the Iglesia ni Kristo sect, registered as a
4. On October 12, 1987, the Tupas staged a strike. URC obtained
an injunction against the strike, resulting in an agreement to
return to work and for the parties to negotiate a new CBA.
5. The next day, New Ulo, claiming that it has the majority of the
daily wage rank and file employees numbering 191, filed a
petition for a certification election at the Bureau of Labor
Relations.
6. Tupas moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in
form and that the members of the New Ulo were mostly
members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect which 3 years previous
thereto refused to affiliate with any labor union. It also
accused the company of using the New Ulo to defeat Tupas'
bargaining rights.
7. Med-Arbiter: ordered the holding of a certification election
within 20 days.
8. Tupas appealed with the BLR. While on appeal, Tupas was
able to negotiate a new 3-year CBA with URC.
9. BLR Director: dismissed appeal.

ISSUE: WON the BLR Director acted with GADLEJ in affirming the
Med-Arbiter’s order for certification election.- NO.
RULING:
1. The Court decision upholding the right of members of the
Iglesia ni Kristo sect not to join a labor union, for being
contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of
that sect from forming their own union. The recognition of the
tenets of the sect should not infringe on the basic right of
self-organization granted by the constitution to workers,
regardless of religious affiliation.
2. The fact that Tupas was able to negotiate a new CBA with
URC within the 60-day freedom period of the existing CBA,
does not foreclose the right of the rival union, New Ulo, to
challenge Tupas' claim to majority status, by filing a timely
petition for certification election before Tupas' old CBA
expired and before it signed a new CBA with the company.
3. A certification election is the best forum in ascertaining the
majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers
themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative
thru secret ballot.
4. Since it has not been shown that the Med-Arbiter’s order is
tainted with unfairness, the Court will not thwart the holding
of a certification election
19 PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS INC v. PAN AMERICAN
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and CIR
FACTS:
1. Respondent union, Pan-Am EEs Association, filed a notice of
strike w/ the Department of Labor and declared and maintained a
strike against herein petitioner Pan-Am World Airways.
2. The President of the PH certified the strike to the CIR as being an
industrial dispute affecting the national interest.
3. Several conferences were held. It was the position of the Union
that its members would not resume the performance of their
duties unless the officers (of the Union) were likewise included in
the return-to-work order. Pan-Am was agreeable to having the
workers return to work but NOT the 5 officials of the Union.
4. Pan-Am alleged that the strike was illegal, being offensive to a no-
strike clause of an existing CBA. Hence, the 5 officials, as the
responsible parties, could be dismissed. Consequently, it was not
agreeable to their being allowed to return to the positions held by
them prior to the strike as they would not be only lacking in
incentive and motivation for doing their work properly but would
also have the opportunity to cause grave and irreparable injury to
Pan-Am.
 The 5 officers of the union consist of 3 Passenger Traffic
Representatives and a reservation clerk who in the course of
their duties could cause mix-ups in the reservation and
accommodation of passengers which could result in very
many suits for damages against Pan-Am. The other union
officer who, is in the cargo department could underweight or
overweigh cargo to the great detriment of the service or even,
of the safety of Pan-Am’s aircraft.
5. Pan-Am did offer, however, to deposit their salaries even if they
would not be working, promising that they would not even be
required to refund any amount should the right to remain in their
positions be considered as legally terminated due to calling the
alleged illegal strike.
6. CIR: Required Pan-Am to accept the 5 union officers pending
resolution on the merits of the dispute involved in the strike. MR
denied.
7. Hence, this petition, alleging a grave abuse of discretion,
consisting in the failure to grant Pan-Am’s demand to exclude
from a return-to-work order the 5 union officials.
ISSUE:
1. W/N CIR could be said to have acted in grave abuse of discretion.
NO
2. W/N the return to work order, insofar as 5 union officers are
affected, is valid. YES
RULING:
1. NO. CIR did not act in GAD.
Considering that this is a case certified by the President, with the CIR,
its broad authority of compulsory arbitration, the discretion it
possesses cannot be so restricted that the mere failure to grant a plea
to exclude from the return-to-work order the union officials could be
considered as tantamount to a grave abuse thereof.
CA 103 empowers the CIR to act with broad powers and jurisdiction.
If the CIR is granted authority to find a solution in an industrial
dispute and such solution consists in ordering of employees to return
back to work, it cannot be contended that the CIR does not have the
power or jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. Of what use is
its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does not have the power
and jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it has adopted.
Further, if the said court has the power to fix the terms and conditions
of employment, it certainly can order the return of the workers w/ or
w/o backpay as a term or condition of the employment. Section 10 of
RA 875 implies is that CIR is granted great breadth of discretion in its
quest for a solution to a labor problem so certified. Hence, the
allegation as to the grave abuse of discretion is clearly devoid of
merit.
2. YES. The return to work order is valid. The union wins!
a. No danger is expected from the union officers’ return to
work.
Pan-Am betrayed an inexcusable lack of confidence in the
responsibility of union officials and ultimately in the validity of the
collective bargaining process itself. Implicit in a regime of collective
bargaining is the confidence that must be displayed by management
in the sense of responsibility of union officials to assure that the 2
indispensable elements in industry and production could-work side
by side, attending to the problems of each w/o neglecting the
common welfare that binds them together.
The moment management displays distrust in the union officials
discharging their functions just because a strike was resorted to, then
the integrity of the collective bargaining process itself is called into
question. It would have been different if there were a rational basis
for such fears, purely speculative in character.
The record is bereft of slightest indication that any danger, much
less one clear and present, is to be expected from their return to
work. Necessarily, the union officials have the right to feel offended
by the fact that, while they will be paid their salaries in the meanwhile
they would not be considered as fit persons to perform the duties
pertaining to the positions held by them. Far from being generous
such an offer could rightfully, be considered insulting.
b. To allow Pan-Am’s plea would result in the impairment of
the rank and file EEs’ right to freedom of association/
right to self-organization.
The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more
specifically to the right of self-organization. There is both a
constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to
form unions to take care of their interests vis-a-vis their employers.
Their freedom organizations would be rendered nugatory if they
could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to
bargain for them.
If Pan-Am’s demand would be granted, the laborers in the union
would thus have the leaders of their choice condemned as
irresponsible, possibly even constituting a danger to the operations of
the enterprise.
The effect of would be to deprive effectively the rank and file of
their freedom of choice as to who should represent them. For what
use are leaders so undeserving of the minimum confidence. To that
extent then, their constitutional and statutory right to freedom of
association suffers an impairment hardly to be characterized as
inconsequential.
C. Workers with right of self-organization
1. All employees
20 CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION v. CA (2006)
Topic: Supervisors
Facts:
 The parties are Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation (CAPASCO),
a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing steel products; and private respondents
Enrique Tamondong III, the Personnel Superintendent of
CAPASCO, and CAPASCO Union of Supervisory Employees
(CUSE), a duly registered union of CAPASCO. Four former
employees of CAPASCO originally filed this labor case before
the NLRC. However, in the course of the proceedings, 3 of
them executed a Release and Quitclaim.
 Petitioner CAPASCO, hired private respondent Tamondong
as Assistant to the Personnel Manager for its Cainta Plant.
Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of
Personnel/Administrative Officer, and later to that of
Personnel Superintendent. Later on, the supervisory personnel
of CAPASCO organized a union, herein respondent CUSE.
Tamondong was elected as one of its officers. Consequently,
CAPASCO sent a memo to Tamondong requiring him to
explain and to discontinue from his union activities, with a
warning that a continuance thereof shall adversely affect his
employment. Tamondong ignored the warning, invoking his
right as a supervisory employee to join and organize a labor
union. In view of that, CAPASCO terminated his employment
on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, citing his union
activities as acts constituting serious disloyalty to the
company.
 Tamondong challenged his dismissal for being illegal and as
an act involving unfair labor practice by filing a Complaint for
Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice before the NLRC.
 In contrast, petitioner CAPASCO contended that by virtue of
private respondent Tamondong’s position as Personnel
Superintendent, he was considered as a managerial employee,
thus, under the law he was prohibited from joining a union as
well as from being elected as one of its officers.
 LA: finding petitioner CAPASCO guilty of unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal and ordered Tamondong’s
reinstatement.
 NLRC: reversed the decision, dismissing the Complaint for
unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal.
 CA: reversed the decision, finding petitioner CAPASCO guilty
of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal.
 CAPASCO avers that Tamondong as Personnel
Superintendent, was performing functions of a managerial
employee because he was the one laying down major
management policies on personnel relations such as: issuing
memos on company rules and regulations, imposing
disciplinary sanctions, and executing the same with full power
and discretion. Additionally, private respondent Tamondong
was not only a managerial employee but also a confidential
employee having knowledge of confidential information
involving company policies on personnel relations.
Issue: Whether or not CAPASCO was guilty of unfair labor practice
and illegal dismissal. NO.
Held:
 The Court of Appeals cannot be said to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion in annulling the Decision of the NLRC
because the findings that Tamondong was indeed a
supervisory employee and not a managerial employee, thus,
eligible to join or participate in the union activities of CUSE,
were supported by evidence on record. A Memorandum was
issued, which required Tamondong to observe fixed daily
 working hours from 8:00 am to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 pm
to 5:00 pm. This imposition upon Tamondong, according to
the Court of Appeals, is very uncharacteristic of a managerial
employee. To support such a conclusion, the Court of Appeals
cited the case of Engineering Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC where
this Court held that one of the essential characteristics of an
employee holding a managerial rank is that he is not subjected
to the rigid observance of regular office hours or maximum
hours of work.
 Tamondong may have possessed enormous powers and was
performing important functions that goes with the position of
Personnel Superintendent, nevertheless, there was no clear
showing that he is at liberty, by using his own discretion and
disposition, to lay down and execute major business and
operational policies for and in behalf of CAPASCO. At the
most, the record merely showed that Tamondong informed
and warned rank-and-file employees with respect to their
violations of CAPASCO’s rules and regulations.
 Accordingly, Article 212(m) of the Labor Code, as amended,
differentiates supervisory employees from managerial
employees, to wit: supervisory employees are those who, in
the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such
managerial actions, if the exercise of such authority is not
merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment; whereas, managerial employees are
those who are vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Thus, from the foregoing provision of the Labor
Code, it can be clearly inferred that Tamondong was just a
supervisory employee. Hence, the Labor Code provisions
regarding disqualification of a managerial employee from
joining, assisting or forming any labor organization does not
apply to Tamondong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DISMISSED.
21 FILOIL REFINERY CORPORATION v. FILOIL SUPERVISORY
AND CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
1. Respondent is a labor organization, composed exclusively of the
supervisory and confidential employees of petitioner corporation
2. There exists another entirely distinct labor association composed
of the corporation's rank-and-file employees, with which
petitioner executed a CBA. This expressly excluded from its
coverage petitioner's supervisory and confidential employees,
who in turn organized their own labor association
3. Respondent filed with court certification as sole and exclusive
collective bargaining agent
4. Corporation filed MtoD – supervisors are not employees within
the Industrial Peace Act, they are part of management, they do not
have the right to bargain collectively although they may organize
an organization of their own
5. Court denied MtoD - under the Industrial Peace Act, "Individuals
employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of employees under their supervision but may
form separate organizations their own."
6. Since respondent "clearly represents the majority of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit," respondent court therefore
certified it as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the
employees in the unit
7. Petitioner pursues anew its contention that supervisors form part
of management and are not considered as employees entitled to
bargain collectively, arguing that "as supervisors form part and
parcel of management, it is absurd for management to bargain
collectively with itself."
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Supervisors (and confidential
employees) may form a labor organization and enjoy right to
collective bargaining. YES.
RATIO:
 In AG & P Co. of Manila, Inc. vs. C.I.R., section 3 of the Industrial
Peace Act “explicitly provides that “employees” — and this term
includes supervisors — “shall have the right to self-organization,
and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representations of their own choosing and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other
mutual aid or protection” and that “individuals employed as
supervisors … may form separate organizations of their own”
 For this reason, supervisors are entitled to engage in union
activities and any discrimination against them by reason thereof
constitutes an unfair labor practice
 Supervisors (and confidential employees), even though they may
exercise the prerogatives of management as regards the rank and
file employees are indeed employees in relation to their employer,
the company which is owned by the stockholders and
bondholders (capital) and should therefore be entitled under the
law to bargain collectively with the top management with respect
to their terms and conditions of employment
 Supervisors as a general rule should form an association of their
own and should exclude all other types of personnel unless a
special consideration exists, like example, that they are so few in
number and that there are other technical men or confidential men
equally few in number. In the latter case, the supervisors,
technical men and confidential employees may be constituted into
one unit
4. Aliens
D. Excluded Employees/Workers
1. Managerial Employees
22 PAPER INDUSTRIES VS LAGUESMA
1. PICOP manufactures paper and timber products
a. PICOP Supervisory Union instituted a petition to be the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of supervisory and technical
staff of PICOP
b. Med-Arbiter ordered for the certification election among the
union members
2. PICOP appealed and questioned the inclusion of section heads
and supervisors in the list of voters whose positions were
considered as managerial employees
a. Art. 245 LC prohibits managerial employees from joining labor
unions
b. That upon decentralization, and reorganization they are now
considered as managerial
c. The reorganization was a valid exercise of management
prerogative
WON the employees are prohibited from joining said labor union.
NO
1. Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle
Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers
have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and
operational policies while the task of First-Line Managers is
simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-
and- file employees of an organization. Under this distinction,
"managerial employees" therefore fall in two (2) categories,
namely, the "managers" per se composed of Top and Middle
Managers, and the "supervisors" composed of First-Line Managers
a. Mere designation of manager is not sufficient to make him a
manager
 b. In this case, the employees in question are not really
managerial employees but only supervisory employees
because they do not lay down company policies
c. They do not have the right to hire/ fire – they can only make
recommendations subject to review
2. Confidential Employees
23 METROLAB INDUSTRIES, INC. VS. ROLDAN-CONFESOR
G.R. No. 108855. February 28, 1996
FACTS:
1. Metro Drug Corp Employees Association-Federation of Free
Workers is a labor organization representing rank and file
employees of Metrolab and Metro Drug
2. The CBA between Metrolab and the Union expired. The
negotiations for a new CBA ended in a deadlock
3. The Union filed a notice to strike. After the parties failed to settle
their dispute despite conciliation, the the Labor Secretary issued
an order resolving all the disputed items in the CBA and ordered
the parties involved to execute a new CBA
4. The Union filed an MR and pending said MR, Metrolab laid off 94
workers of its rank and file employees
a. Metrolab claim that it was a valid exercise of management
prerogative since the mass lay off was a result of yearly
gross revenue loss and the workers needed to produce
their product, Eskinol, was reduced
5. Labor Secretary declared the lay off illegal and ordered
reinstatement with full backwages
6. Metrolab filed an MR alleging that the lay-off did not aggravate
the dispute. Pending resolution of the MR, Metrolab, again, laid
off 73 workers.
7. Labor Secretary ordered the following
a. Cease and desist order against the lay-off of workers
b. Lay-off was illegal
c. also ruled that executive secretaries are excluded from the
closed-shop provision of the CBA, not from the
bargaining unit
CONTENTS OF THE CBA:
 In the assailed resolution, the Labor Secretary clarified the CBA
provision on the closed-shop and the scope of the bargaining unit.
a. The Close-Shop provision provided that all qualified
employees must join the Association immediately upon
regularization as a condition for continued employment
b. The exclusion provision included the executive secretaries
and other managerial employees
METROLAB: Labor Secretary erred in ruling that the executive
secretaries are included as part of the bargaining unit of rank and file
employees
 Metrolab read the exclusion of managerial employees and
executive secretaries as exclusion from the bargaining unit and
not from the closed-shop provision
 They point out that managerial employees are lumped under one
classification with executive secretaries, so that since the former
are excluded from the bargaining unit, so must the latter be
likewise excluded.
ISSUE: Whether the Labor Sec erred in including the executive
secretaries in the bargaining unit
HELD: YES
1. Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to
join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial
 employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions
or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary
manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to
sensitive and highly confidential records.
2. Several Jurisprudence provided for the rationale behind the
exclusion of confidential employees from the bargaining unit of
the rank and file employees
a. To allow the confidential employees to join the existing
Union of the rank-and-file would be in violation of the
terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement wherein this
kind of employees by the nature of their
functions/positions are expressly excluded.
b. If confidential employees could unionize in order to
bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be
governed by their own motive rather than the interest of
the employers.
c. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the
purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension
of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to
act “in the interest of the employers.
d. It is not farfetched that in the course of collective
bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they
are duty-bound to protect.
3. Forming part of the bargaining unit, the executive secretaries
stand to benefit from any agreement executed between the Union
and Metrolab. Such a scenario, thus, gives rise to a potential
conflict between personal interests and their duty as confidential
employees to act for and in behalf of Metrolab. They do not have
to be union members to affect or influence either side.
4. Finally, confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and
file. As previously discussed, the nature of employment of
confidential employees is quite distinct from the rank and file,
thus, warranting a separate category. Excluding confidential
employees from the rank and file bargaining unit, therefore, is not
tantamount to discrimination.
24 Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery (TPMA)
v. Asia Brewery, Inc. (ABI). G.R. No. 162025. Aug. 3, 2010
FACTS:
1. ABI entered into a CBA with BLMA, the exclusive and
independent representative of ABI’s rank-and-file employees.
2. Art. 1 of the CBA defined the scope of the bargaining unit. The
bargaining unit is comprised of all regular rank-and-file daily-
paid employees of the company.
3. Sec. 2 of Art. 1 of the CBA, among others, specifically excludes
“Confidential and Executive Secretaries” and “Purchasing and
Quality Control Staff” from the bargaining unit.
4. Subsequently, a dispute arose when ABI stopped deducting
union dues from 81 employees (18- QA Sampling inspector,
20-checkers and the rest are secretaries/clerks), believing that
their membership in BLMA violated the CBA.
5. BLMA claimed that the ABI’s action restrained the employees
right to self-organization.
6. The Voluntary Arbitrator sustained BLMA’s contention. The
81 employees qualify under the rank-and-file category because
their functions are merely routinary and clerical.
7. The CA reversed the VA and ruled that the 81 employees are
not eligible for the inclusion in the bargaining unit as defined
in Art.1 of the CBA.
8. In the meantime, TPMA won as the new bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees. TPMA filed
with the CA a Motion for Reconsideration and intervention.
Both motions were denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the 81 employees are disqualified to be a member of
the Union of rank-and-file employees. – NO. There is no showing in
this case that the secretaries/clerks and checkers assisted or acted in
a confidential capacity to managerial employees and obtained
confidential information relating to labor relations policies.
HELD:
Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join,
form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees,
jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees
or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are
required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial
employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly
confidential records. Confidential employees are thus excluded from
the rank-and-file bargaining unit.
The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join
any labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial
employees because if allowed to be affiliated with a Union, the latter
might not be assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of
interests and the Union can also become company-denominated with
the presence of managerial employees in the Union
membership. Having access to confidential information, confidential
employees may also become the source of undue advantage. Said
employees may act as a spy or spies of either party to a collective
bargaining agreement.
Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a
confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and
effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.
The two (2) criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an
employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his
supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed
responsibilities relating to labor relations.
25 SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. v. SMC SUPERVISORS and
EXEMPT UNION (2011)
1. In SMCSEU v. Laguesma, SC held that even if the supervisory
employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of SMFI handle
confidential data regarding internal business operations, they are
not to be considered confidential employees because the same do
not pertain to LabRel (negotiation and settlement of grievances)
a. They were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit
for CB.
b. Employees belonging the 3 plants (Cabuyao, San
Fernando, Ortis) of SMC-Magnolia constitute a single
bargaining unit.
2. Pursuant to this decision, DOLE conducted pre-election
conferences.
a. However, there was a discrepancy in the list of eligible
voters.
3. SMFI questioned the eligibility of some of its employees to vote
because some do not belong to the bargaining unit which the
Union seeks to represent or no employment relationship exists.
a. Some of the employees should not be allowed to vote
because they are confidential employees; not covered by
the bargaining unit; job grade level 4 but performing
managerial work; belong to Ugong plant; non-SMFI
employees; members of other unions.
4. Union:
a. The bargaining unit contemplated in the original petition
is the Poultry Division of SMC known as SMFI
b. It covered operations in Calamba, Laguna, Cavite, and
Batangas
c. It submitted individual and separate declarations of the
employees whose votes were challenged.
5. Based on the results of the votes, the Med-Arbiter issued the
Order stating that since the "Yes" vote received 97% of the valid
votes cast, SMCSEU is certified to be the exclusive bargaining
agent of the supervisors and exempt employees of SMFI's
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and
Otis.
6. On appeal, DOLE affirmed the Order with the modification of
excluding 4 employees from the bargaining unit which the Union
seeks to represent saying that 2 of which are members of another
union and the other 2 are employees of SMC, which is separate
from SMFI.
7. CA: Affirmed. Stated that those holding positions of HR Assistant
and Personnel Assistant are excluded from the bargaining unit.
ISSUE: Whether the confidential employees are excluded from the
bargaining unit. YES.
1. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the
normal course of their duties, become aware of management
policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to
be accomplished by the “confidential employee rule.”
2. Confidential employees, such as accounting personnel, should be
excluded from the bargaining unit, as their access to confidential
information may become the source of undue advantage
3. Corollarily, although Article 24530 of the Labor Code limits the
ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to
managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this
prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of
their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a
fiduciary manner to managerial employees and, hence, are
likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
4. The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to
join any labor organization is similar to the inhibition for
managerial employees, because if allowed to be affiliated with a
union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty in view of
evident conflict of interests and the union can also become
company- denominated with the presence of managerial
employees in the union membership.
5. Having access to confidential information, confidential employees
may also become the source of undue advantage. Said employees
may act as a spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining
agreement.
NOTE:
 Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act
in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of
labor relations.
 The confidential relationship must exist between the employee
and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed
responsibilities relating to labor relations.
3. Workers-Members of a Cooperative
26 BATANGAS I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v YOUNG (1988)
FACTS:
G.R. No. 62386
1. Batangas-I Electric Cooperative Union (union) filed with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment a petition for certification
election. The union alleged that it is a legitimate labor
organization; that BATELEC has 150 employees, more or less;
that the union desires to represent the regular rank and file
employees for purposes of collective bargaining; that there is
no other existing union; that there is no certified collective
bargaining agreement in the said cooperative; and that there
has been no certification election conducted in BATELEC
during the last 12 months preceding the filing of the petition.
2. Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification election.
3. BATELEC appealed, contending that there was a legal
impediment to the holding of a certification election
considering that the formation of a union in a cooperative is
illegal and invalid, the officers and members of the union
being the owners thereof.
4. Director of the Bureau of Legal Relations revoked the Med-
Arbiter’s resolution.
G.R. No. 70880
1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) filed with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment a petition for certification election.
The petition alleged that it is a legitimate labor organization;
that the Bulacan II Electric Cooperative Inc. (BECO II) is
engaged in the service and supply of electric current and
therefore, an employer under the provisions of the LC; that the
FFW seeks to be certified as the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the regular rank and file
employees and workers; that there is no other existing union;
that there is no certified collective bargaining agreement in the
said establishment; and that there has been no certification
election conducted in BECO II during the last 12 months
preceding the filing of the petition.
2. BECO II contended that the petition does not comply with the
30% jurisdictional requirement considering that it has a total of
143 employees, 24 of whom are members of the cooperative,
28 are managerial, 3 are confidential, 23 are contractual, and 28
casual, thereby leaving only 37 belonging to the rank and file;
and that to grant the petition would be violative of Art. 243 of
the LC and Sec. 35 of PD 269.
3. FFW contended that it has substantially complied with the
30% jurisdictional requirement with the 73 signatures it
submitted, and that there is nothing in the law that prohibits
or restricts cooperative members from joining labor
organizations.
4. Med-arbiter directed the holding of a certification election.
5. Director of the Bureau of Legal Relations affirmed.
G.R. No. 74560
1. FFW ALECO I Chapter filed a petition for certification
election, alleging that it is a legitimate labor organization; that
the Albay Electric Cooperative I (ALECO I) is an electric
cooperative servicing electricity in the Province of Albay; that
 ALECO I has 160 employees, more or less, majority of whom
are FFW members; that there is no other union existing nor a
CBA existing in the cooperative; and that no certification
election has been held for the past 12 months prior to the filing
of the petition.
2. FFW contended that the ALECO I is covered by the LC; that it
has a right to organize and be represented by a union; that
there is no legal impediment to the holding of a certification
election considering that out of the 141 rank and file
employees, 63 supported the petition.
3. ALECO I sought the dismissal of the petition on the allegation
that FFW failed to comply with 30% requirement, considering
that 112 rank and file employees have manifested in a
"declaration" that they do not desire to be represented by any
union.
4. Intervenors ALECO I employees for a "no-union stand"
alleged that of the 63 signatories to the petition, 51 are not
qualified to join the union as they are members-consumers of
the ALECO I and are considered joint owners of the
cooperative.
5. Med-arbiter directed the holding of a certification election.
6. Director of the Bureau of Legal Relations affirmed.
ISSUE: WON employees of electric cooperatives are qualified to form
or join labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining.-YES
but only if such employees are neither members nor co-owners of the
cooperative.
RULING:
1. A cooperative is by its nature different from an ordinary
business concern being run either by persons, partnerships, or
corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who
run and operate the business while the others are its
employees.
2. An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member
and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective
bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself
or his co-owners. However, in so far as it involves
cooperatives with employees who are not members or
co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to
exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective
bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the
Constitution and existing laws of the country.
3. BATELEC: The union admitted in its petition that its officers
and members are also members-consumers of the cooperative.
Such being the case, the employees belonging to the union are
not qualified to form a labor organization and bargain
collectively.
4. BECO II: 24 employees are members of the cooperative. Thus,
even if the 24 cooperative members, assuming that all of them
supported the petition, are to be deducted from the said 73
employees, there still remain 49, a sufficient compliance with
the 30% jurisdictional requirement.
5. ALECO I: There are 141 rank and file employees, of which 90
are rank and file employees, nonmembers of the cooperative,
who may validly form, join or assist labor organizations for
purposes of collective bargaining. 63 rank and file employees
supported the petition for certification election but 51 of them
are members of the petitioner cooperative. Hence, only 12 rank
and file employees who were qualified to form, join or assist
labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining,
signed the petition, which definitely is a number short of the
30% jurisdictional requirement.
6. In the present Article 257 of the LC, it is now provided that in
any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent,
the petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor
organization shall be supported by the written consent of at
least 20% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
4. Employees of international organizations
27 International Catholic Migration Commission v. Pura Calleja
FACTS:
This case is a consolidated case involving the validity of the claim of
immunity by the International Catholic Migration Commission
(ICMC) and the International Rice Research Institute, Inc. (IRRI) from
the application of Philippine Labor Law.
ICMC Case:
1. An agreement was forged between the Philippine and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Vietnamese refugees. An
operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual
resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan.
2. ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine
Government. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic
and Social Council.
3. Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
filed for Certification Election among the rank and file members of the
ICMC. ICMC opposed the petition on the ground that it is an
international organization registered with the United Nations and,
hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.
IRRI Case:
1. The Philippine Government and the Ford and Rockefeller
Foundations signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing
IRRI.
2. Initially IRRI was organized and registered with the SEC.
However, by virtue of PD No. 1620, IRRI was granted the status,
prerogatives and immunities of an international organization.
3. Kapisanan filed a Petition for Direct Certification Election with
DOLE’s regional office (Region 4).
4. IRRI opposed the petition, invoking PD 1620 conferring upon
it the status of an international organization and granting it immunity
from all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings under
Philippine Laws.
ISSUE: Whether the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities
extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor Laws.
YES.
RATIO:
 There can be no question that diplomatic immunity has, in fact,
been granted ICMC and IRRI.
 Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the
Philippine Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have
a status "similar to that of a specialized agency."
 IRRI is similarly situated, Pres. Decree No. 1620, Article 3, is
explicit in its grant of immunity.
 Department of Foreign Affairs, through its Legal Adviser,
sustained IMCM’s invocation of immunity. Similarly, in respect of
IRRI, DFA maintained that IRRI enjoys immunity from the
jurisdiction of DOLE.
 The foregoing opinions constitute a categorical recognition by the
Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC and IRRI enjoy
immunities accorded to international organizations, which
determination has been held to be a political question conclusive
upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department
of the Government.
 The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and
IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and
respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of
partiality and interference by the host country in their internal
workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of
Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of
immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from
political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice
of member States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions.
 ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means
deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article
II, Section 18, Article III, Section 8, and Article XIII, Section 3, of
 the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of
the Labor Code, relied on by the BLR Director and by Kapisanan.
 For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there
are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations provides that "each specialized agency shall make
provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes
arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to
which the specialized agency is a party."
5. Effect of Including Employees Outside the Bargaining Unit
28 SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL v.
CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORPORATION (2011)
TAKE-AWAY: The right to file a petition for certification election is
accorded to a labor organization provided that it complies with the
requirements of law for proper registration. The inclusion of
supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent
the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its
status as a legitimate labor organization.
FACTS:
1. Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of
Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms filed
a petition for certification election among the regular rank-
and-file EEs of the company w/ the Mediation Arbitration
Unit of DOLE.
2. The company filed an Answer with MTD on the ground that
the union is not a legitimate labor organization because of (1)
failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by
law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within
petitioner union.
3. Med-Arbiter: DISMISSED the petition and ruled that the union
registration was fatally defective.
a. The union is NOT a legitimate labor org because the
Charter Certificate and other docs were NOT executed
under oath and certified by the union secretary and
attested to by the union president as required by
Section 235 of the LC in relation to DO No. 9.
b. The list of membership of the union consisted of
employees who performed supervisory functions and
under Article 245 of the Labor Code, said supervisory
employees are prohibited from joining the union w/c
seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees of the
company.
4. DOLE: DISMISSED the union’s appeal bec the petition for
certification election was filed out of time. Although the
charter certificate need not be verified and that there was no
independent evidence presented to establish that some
members were supervisory EEs, dismissal is sustained because
another union, Pinag-isang Lakas Manggagawa sa Charter
Chemical and Coating Corporation, earlier filed a petition for
certification election. The decision granting said petition
became final and executory 5 months prior to the petitioner-
union’s filing. Under DO No. 9, a motion for intervention
involving a certification election in an unorganized
establishment should be filed prior to the finality of the
decision calling for a certification election. The union filed an
MR.
5. DOLE: REVERSED itself and found that no certification
election was previously conducted in the company. The prior
certification election filed by Pinag-isang Lakas was likewise
denied by the Med-Arbiter and, on appeal, was dismissed by
the DOLE for being filed out of time. Hence, the certification
election is allowed. The company appealed from this decision.
6. CA: REVERSED the DOLE because: (1) The union failed to
comply w/ the documentation requirements under the Labor
Code. (2) The union consisted of both rank-and-file and
supervisory EEs. (3) The issues as to the legitimacy of the
union can be attacked collaterally in a petition for certification
election and the infirmity in the membership of petitioner
 union cannot be remedied through the exclusion-inclusion
proceedings in a pre-election conference. Thus, considering
that the union is not a legitimate labor organization, it has no
legal right to file a petition for certification election.
7. Hence, the instant petition, where the union argues:
a. That the litigation of the issue as to its legal personality
to file the subject petition for certification election is
barred by the DOLE *stated in fact no. 4*
b. That the lack of verification of its charter certificate and
the alleged illegal composition of its membership are
not grounds for the dismissal of a petition for
certification election under Section 11, Rule XI of D.O.
No. 9, nor are they grounds for the cancellation of a
unions registration under Section 3, Rule VIII of said
issuance.
c. That what is required to be certified under oath by the
local union’s secretary or treasurer and attested to by
the local union’s president are limited to the union’s
constitution and by-laws, statement of the set of
officers, and the books of accounts.
d. That the legal personality of the union cannot be
collaterally attacked but may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation.
8. The company argues:
a. That it cannot be precluded from challenging the
DOLE decision bec it did not attain finality after
having been subsequently reversed, and it having
timely filed its MR.
b. That the law expressly requires that the charter
certificate be certified under oath.
c. That the union is not a legitimate labor organization
because its composition is a mixture of supervisory
and rank-and-file employees in violation of Article 245
of the Labor Code. Thus, the illegal composition of the
union nullifies its legal personality to file the petition
for certification election and its legal personality may
be collaterally attacked.
ISSUES & RULING:
1. W/N the question as to the legal personality of the union is barred
by the DOLE decision (fact no. 4).
 NO, it is not barred. The issue as to the union’s legal personality
has been timely and consistently raised by the company before the
Med-Arbiter, DOLE, CA and now the SC.
2. W/N the charter certificate needs to be certified under oath by the
local union’s secretary or treasurer and attested to by its president.
NOTE: The SC stated that RA 9481, which took effect in 2007,
introduced substantial amendments to the LC. However, since the
operative facts in this case occurred in 1999, it shall decide the issues
under in accordance w/ RA 6715, amending the LC.
 NO, the union’s charter certificate need NOT be executed under
oath.
Although Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules requires that a
charter certificate be certified under oath by the Secretary/Treasurer
of the local/chapter and attested to by its President, the Court in SMC
v. Mandaue Packing, ruled that it is not necessary for the charter
certificate to be certified and attested by the local/chapter officers.
Considering that the charter certificate is prepared and issued by the
NATIONAL union and not the local/chapter, it does not make sense
to have the local/chapters officers certify or attest to a document
which they had no hand in the preparation of.
Hence, the union validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor
organization upon submission of (1) its charter certificate, (2) the
names of its officers, their addresses, and its principal office, and (3)
its constitution and by-laws, the last two requirements having been
executed under oath by the proper union officials as borne out by the
records.
3. W/N the mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory EEs in the
union nullifies its legal personality as a legitimate labor
organization.
 NO, the inclusion of the supervisory EEs in the union does NOT by filing a MTD or an appeal from it, not even a mere allegation that
divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. some employees participating in a petition for certification election
are actually managerial EEs will lend an ER legal personality to block
In Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., the Court found that RA 6715
the certification election. The ER’s only right in the proceeding is to
omitted specifying the exact effect that any violation of the
be notified or informed thereof.
prohibition on the co-mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file
EEs would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization.
The Court, in that case, cited the ruling in the Tagaytay Highlands case,
wherein the Court stated that while there is a prohibition against the
mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file EEs in one labor
organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects
thereof. Thus, after a labor organization has been registered, it may
exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor
organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is
not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless
such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under Article 239 of the LC.
In Kawashima, the Court further noted that in the SMC v. Mandaue
Packing case, the Court explained that since the 1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to provide a list of
its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny recognition
to said local or chapter on account of any question pertaining to its
individual members.
Therefore, in the instant case, the union was not divested of its status
as a legitimate labor organization even if some of its members were
supervisory EEs. It had the right to file the subject petition for
certification election.
4. W/N the legal personality of the union may be collaterally
attacked by the company in the certification election proceedings.
NO.
Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a
mere bystander to any petition for certification election. Such
proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, bec the
purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the
EEs in their collective bargaining w/ the ER. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of the EEs. The ER cannot have
any partisan interest therein. It cannot interfere/oppose the process