91. WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB v. LEE E.

WON
G.R. No. L-23851 MARCH 26, 1976
FACTS:
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc alleged that Lee E. Won claims ownership of its
membership fee certificate 201-1478 by virtue of a decision rendered in a civil case. Bienvenido
A. Tan claims to be lawful owner pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by the original
owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201-1199. It alleged that the membership fee
certificate 201-1478 issued in behalf of the Corporation is null and void because issued in violation
of its by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding membership fee
certificate 201 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by
its president and secretary and from the fact that the decision from the previous civil case is binding
upon Tan; that Tan is made a party because of his refusal to join it in this action or bring a separate
action to protect his rights despite the fact that he has a legal and beneficial interest in the subject
matter of this litigation; and that he is made a part so that complete relief may be accorded. The
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether the findings in the decision of the previous civil case constitutes res judicata and
bars its present action.
HELD:
Although res judicata or bar by a prior judgment was the principal ground availed of by
the appellees in moving for the dismissal of the complaint and upon which the trial court actually
dismissed the complaint, the determinative issue, as can be gleaned from the pleadings of the
parties, relates to the propriety and timeliness of the remedy of interpleader.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after
judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially
where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected
the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This
must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to
the latter.
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successful
establishment of his rights to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to
diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the
possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done
because having elected to take its chances of success, with full knowledge of all the fact, the
Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat.
DOCTRINE:
The Action of Interpleader - remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his
possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either,
comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing.
 92. ARTURO SARTE FLORES v. SPOUSES ENRICO and EDNA LINDO
G.R. No. 183984 APRIL 13, 2011
FACTS:
Edna obtained a loan from Arturo and to secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage covering a property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico. Edna also signed
a Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact. Edna issued
three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of
funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against
respondents. The RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Furthermore, the RTC ruled that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna
as he could file a personal action against her. However, the RTC ruled that it had no jurisdiction
over the personal action which should be filed in the place where the plaintiff or the defendant
resides in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against respondents.
Respondents alleged that Enrico was not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna
without Enrico’s signature. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of
improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping, invoking the previous decision. The motion
were dismissed by the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general rule is that a
motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, the rule admits of exceptions. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents’ motion
to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint
for collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits.
HELD:
Yes, the rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-
debtor, that is, to recover the debt. The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal
action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security. An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be multiplicity
of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location
of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties. The two remedies are alternative and
each remedy is complete by itself. If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he
waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice versa.
The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however subsists
notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage. Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the principal
obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null and void. That obligation matures and
becomes demandable in accordance with the stipulation pertaining to it. Under the foregoing
circumstances, what is lost is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special remedy for
satisfying or settling the indebtedness which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity, the
mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount
due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
DOCTRINE:
Principle of Unjust Enrichment - every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
 93. CAPITOL HILLS GOLD & COUNTRY CLUB v. MANUEL SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 182738 FEBRUARY 24, 2014
FACTS:
Respondent, a stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. filed a
petition for the nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special
meeting of stockholders of April 23, 2002. On August 12, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents, which the court granted in an Order dated September
10, 2002.
On December 9, 2002, then Presiding Judge Bruselas issued an Order for the immediate
implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order. On several occasions, petitioners failed to
comply with the directive to produce documents for inspection. On September 3, 2007, the trial
court issued an order directing the defendants to strictly comply with this September 10, 2002
order. Failure of the defendants to comply with all the requirements of the order dated September
10, 2002 will result in this court citing all the defendants in contempt of court. This Court shall
order defendants solidarily to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay to comply with the
order of September 10, 2002 until the defendants shall have fully and completely complied with
the said order.
Further sanctions shall be meted upon defendants should the Court find that defendants
have been in bad faith in complying with the order of September 10, 2002 despite the order of this
Court. Petitioners questioned the aforesaid Resolution via Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners claim
that the threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy that there should be
willfulness or that the contumacious act be done deliberately in disregard of the authority of the
court. CA ruled that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order of the court stating that failure to strictly comply with it will result
to the persons being directed thereby to be cited for contempt constitutes a final order in an indirect
contempt proceeding. Hence it violates due process
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere
reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a
case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only
serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the
long-overdue order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the
requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the
court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the
mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
DOCTRINE:
Charges for Indirect Contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending
in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed,
heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the
contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
 97. ELSA DEGAYO v. CECILIA MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN, et al
G.R. No. 173148 APRIL 6, 2015
FACTS:
Degayo and the tenants claims ownership on the belief that the area was an accretion to
Lot No. 861. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the disputed property was an
abandoned riverbed, which should rightfully belong to them to compensate for the erstwhile
portion of Lot No. 7328, over which the Jalaud River presently runs.
Magbanua-Dinglasan filed a complaint for ownership and damages against the tenants
with the RTC (Civil Case 16047). Degayo sought to intervene but her motion was denies.
Notably, Degayo never bothered to question the interlocutory order denying her motion for
intervention by filing a petition for certiorari. Instead, Degayo initiated the present suit against
the respondents for declaration of ownership with damages involving the disputed parcel of land.
The RTC rendered in favor of the respondents which became final and executory. In another
civil case (Civil Case 18328), the court, found in favor of Degayo and declared the property in
question as an accretion to Lot No. 861.
The CA granted the respondents’ appeal and reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC (Civil Case 18328). The CA likewise noted that the previous decision (Civil Case 16047) is
conclusive to the title of the thing, being an aspect of the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
Degayo sought for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision in Civil Case No. 16047 constitute res judicata.
HELD:
Yes, Res judicataliterally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It also refers to the "rule that a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. It rests on the
principle that parties should not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that,
when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
It is beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case No. 16047 has attained finality in view
of the tenant’s abandonment of their appeal to the CA. Moreover, records show that that decision
was adjudicated on the merits, i.e., it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case by a court which had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties.
DOCTRINE:
Doctrine of Res Judicata - rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits
on points and matters determined in the former suit.
 98. LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION v. DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 155849 AUGUST 31, 2011
FACTS:
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution, advising respondent
Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the
required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially
considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153
(MC 153). For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO 213)
entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November 24, 1994. DMAP challenged the constitutionality of EO 213 and commenced in CA a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
or temporary restraining order; these actions were subsequently dismissed and such decision was
upheld by the Court on appeal. DMAP then held a general membership meeting where it
reproduced the Sea Transport update wherein it was averred among others that The Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities and not on the
legal issue DMAP presented and Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time
is at least 3 to 6 months. Lorenzo Shipping Corp, et al, alleges that such publication constitutes
indirect contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether the publication of the Sea Transport Update constitutes indirect contempt.
HELD:
No, the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts
and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels
have long recognized and respected. The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore,
whether or not the criticism is bona fide or dine in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was not
disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we
need to remind that the power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on preservative and not
on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order
to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.
DOCTRINE:
Contempt of Court - a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its
broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in
its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a
body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of a court.