1

MALVAR V. KRAFT FOOD PHILS., INC. After the judgment in her favor became final and executory on March14, 2006, Malvar moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution.5 The Executive Labor Arbiter then referred the case to
G.R. No. 183952 September 9, 2013 the Research and Computation Unit (RCU) of the NLRC for the computation of the monetary
awards under the judgment. The RCU’s computation ultimately arrived at the total sum
CZARINA T. MALVAR, Petitioner, of P41,627,593.75.6
vs.
KRAFT FOOD PHILS., INC. and/or BIENVENIDO BAUTISTA, KRAFT FOODS On November 9, 2006, however, Labor Arbiter Jaime M. Reyno issued an order,7 finding that
INTERNATIONAL, Respondents. the RCU’s computation lacked legal basis for including the salary increases that the decision
promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 69660 did not include. Hence, Labor Arbiter Reyno reduced
DECISION Malvar’s total monetary award to P27,786,378.11, viz:
BERSAMIN, J.: WHEREFORE, premises considered, in so far as the computation of complainant’s other benefits
and allowances are concerned, the same are in order. However, insofar as the computation of
Although the practice of law is not a business, an attorney is entitled to be properly compensated her backwages and other monetary benefits (separation pay, unpaid salary for January 1 to 26,
for the professional services rendered for the client, who is bound by her express agreement to 2005,holiday pay, sick leave pay, vacation leave pay, 13th month pay), the same are hereby
duly compensate the attorney. The client may not deny her attorney such just compensation. recomputed as follows:
The Case
1. Separation Pay
The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in a
labor litigation, but has mutated into a dispute over attorney's fees between the winning
employee and her attorney after she entered into a compromise agreement with her employer 8/1/88-1/26/05 = 16 yrs
under circumstances that the attorney has bewailed as designed to prevent the recovery of just
professional fees. P344,575.83 x 16 = 5,513,213.28

Antecedents 2. Unpaid Salary

On August 1, 1988, Kraft Foods (Phils.), Inc. (KFPI) hired Czarina Malvar (Malvar) as its
Corporate Planning Manager. From then on, she gradually rose from the ranks, becoming in 1/1-26/05 = 87 mos.
1996 the Vice President for Finance in the Southeast Asia Region of Kraft Foods International
(KFI),KFPI’s mother company. On November 29, 1999, respondent Bienvenido S. Bautista, as P344,575.83 x 87 = 299,780.97
Chairman of the Board of KFPI and concurrently the Vice President and Area Director for
Southeast Asia of KFI, sent Malvar a memo directing her to explain why no administrative 3. Holiday Pay
sanctions should be imposed on her for possible breach of trust and confidence and for willful
violation of company rules and regulations. Following the submission of her written explanation,
4/1/00-1/26/05 = 55 holidays
an investigating body was formed. In due time, she was placed under preventive suspension
with pay. Ultimately, on March 16, 2000, she was served a notice of termination.
P4,134,910/12 mos/20.83 days x 55 days 909,825.77
Obviously aggrieved, Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against
KFPI and Bautista in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In a decision dated April 4.
30, 2001,1 the Labor Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal, and Unpaid 13th month pay for Dec 2000 344,575.83
ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of her full backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits, plus attorney’s fees. 5. Sick Leave Pay
On October 22, 2001, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but additionally ruled
that Malvar was entitled to "any and all stock options and bonuses she was entitled to or would Year 1999 to 2004 = 6 yrs
have been entitled to had she not been illegally dismissed from her employment," as well as to
moral and exemplary damages.2 P344,575.88/20.83 x 15 days x 6 = 1,488,805.79

KFPI and Bautista sought the reconsideration of the NLRC’s decision, but the NLRC denied their
Year 2005
motion to that effect.3
Undaunted, KFPI and Bautista assailed the adverse outcome before the CA on certiorari (CA- P344,575.83/20.83 x 15/12 x 1 20,677.86 1,509,483.65
G.R. SP No. 69660), contending that the NLRC thereby committed grave abuse of discretion.
However, the petition for certiorari was dismissed by the CA on December 22, 2004, but with 6. Vacation Leave Pay
the CA reversing the order of reinstatement and instead directing the payment of separation
pay to Malvar, and also reducing the amounts awarded as moral and exemplary damages.4 Year 1999 to 2004 = 6 years
 2

P344,575.88/20.83 x 22 days x 6 = 2,183,581.83
Year 2005
P344,575.83/20.83 x 22/12 x 1 30,327.55
On July 27, 2007, the respondents went to the CA on certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction), assailing the NLRC’s
setting aside of the computation by Labor Arbiter Reyno (CA-G.R. SP No. 99865). The petition
mainly argued that the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion in ruling that: (a) the inclusion
of the salary increases and other monetary benefits in the award to Malvar was final and
2,213,909.36 executory; and (b) the finality of the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 69660 precluded the respondents
from challenging the inclusion of the salary increases and other monetary benefits. The CA
issued a TRO, enjoining the NLRC and Malvar from implementing the NLRC’s decision.11
10,790,788.86
On April 17, 2008, the CA rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 99865,12 disposing thusly:

Backwages (from 3/7/00-4/30/01, award in LA Sytian’s Decision 4,651,773.75 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein Petition is GRANTED and the 19 April 2007
Decision of the NLRC and the 31May 2007 Resolution in NLRC NCR 30-07-02316-00 are hereby
Allowances & Other Benefits: REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The matter of computation of monetary awards for private respondent is hereby REMANDED to
Management Incentive Plan 7,355,166.58 the Labor Arbiter and he is DIRECTED to recompute the monetary award due to private
respondent based on her salary at the time of her termination, without including projected salary
Cash Dividend on Philip Morris Shares 2,711,646.00 increases. In computing the said benefits, the Labor Arbiter is further directed to DISREGARD
monetary awards arising from: (a) the management incentive plan and (b) the share option
Car Maintenance 381,702.92 grant, including cash dividends arising therefrom without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate remedy by the private respondent in the proper forum. Private respondent’s
allowances for car maintenance and gasoline are likewise DELETED unless private respondent
Gas Allowance 198,000.00
proves, by appropriate receipts, her entitlement thereto.
Entitlement to a Company Driver 438,650.00 With respect to the Motion to Exclude the Undisputed Amount of P14,252,192.12 from the
coverage of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to order its immediate release, the same is
Rice Subsidy 58,650.00 hereby GRANTED for reasons stated therefor, which amount shall be deducted from the amount
to be given to private respondent after proper computation.
Moral Damages 500,000.00 As regards the Motions for Reconsideration of the Resolution denying the Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition and the Omnibus Motion dated 30 October 2007, both motions are hereby DENIED
Exemplary Damages 200,000.00 for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.13
Attorney’s Fees 500,000.00
Malvar sought reconsideration, but the CA denied her motion on July30, 2008.14
Entitlement to Philip Sch G Subject to
Aggrieved, Malvar appealed to the Court, assailing the CA’s decision.

"Share Option Grant" Market Price On December 9, 2010, while her appeal was pending in this Court, Malvar and the respondents
entered into a compromise agreement, the pertinent dispositive portion of which is quoted as
follows:
27,786,378.11 NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the covenants and understanding between the
SO ORDERED. parties herein, the parties hereto have entered into this Agreement on the following terms and
conditions:
Both parties appealed the computation to the NLRC, which, on April19, 2007, rendered its
decision setting aside Labor Arbiter Reyno’s November 9, 2006 order, and adopting the 1. Simultaneously upon execution of this Agreement in the presence of Ms. Malvar’s attorney,
computation by the RCU.8 KFPI shall pay Ms. Malvar the amount of Philippine Pesos Forty Million (Php 40,000,000.00),
which is in addition to the Philippine Pesos Fourteen Million Two Hundred Fifty-Two Thousand
In its resolution dated May 31, 2007,9 the NLRC denied the respondents’ motion for One Hundred Ninety-Two and Twelve Centavos (Php14,252,192.12) already paid to and
reconsideration. received by Ms. Malvar from KFPI in August2008 (both amounts constituting the "Compromise
Payment").
Malvar filed a second motion for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision of
the NLRC rendered on April 19, 2007. After the writ of execution was issued, a partial The Compromise Payment includes full and complete payment and settlement of Ms. Malvar’s
enforcement as effected by garnishing the respondents’ funds deposited with Citibank worth salaries and wages up to the last day of her employment, allowances, 13th and 14th month
37,391,696.06.10 pay, cash conversion of her accrued vacation, sick and emergency leaves, separation pay,

retirement pay and such other benefits, entitlements, claims for stock, stock options or other
forms of equity compensation whether vested or otherwise and claims of any and all kinds
against KFPI and KFI and Altria Group, Inc., their predecessors-in-interest, their stockholders,
officers, directors, agents or successors-in-interest, affiliates and subsidiaries, up to the last day
of the aforesaid cessation of her employment.
2. In consideration of the Compromise Payment, Ms. Malvar hereby freely and voluntarily
releases and forever discharges KFPI and KFI and Altria Group, Inc., their predecessors or
successors-in-interest, stockholders, officers, including Mr. Bautista who was impleaded in the
Labor Case as a party respondent, directors, agents or successors-in-interest, affiliates and
subsidiaries from any and all manner of action, cause of action, sum of money, damages, claims
and demands whatsoever in law or in equity which Ms. Malvar or her heirs, successors and
assigns had, or now have against KFPI and/or KFI and/or Altria Group, Inc., including but not
limited to, unpaid wages, salaries, separation pay, retirement pay, holiday pay, allowances, 13th
and 14th month pay, claims for stock, stock options or other forms of equity compensation
whether vested or otherwise whether arising from her employment contract, company grant,
present and future contractual commitments, company policies or practices, or otherwise, in
connection with Ms. Malvar’s employment with KFPI.15
xxxx
Thereafter, Malvar filed an undated Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case,16 praying that the appeal
be immediately dismissed/withdrawn in view of the compromise agreement, and that the case
be considered closed and terminated.
Intervention
Before the Court could act on Malvar’s Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, the Court received on
February 15, 2011 a so-called Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights17 from The
Law Firm of Dasal, Llasos and Associates, through its Of Counsel Retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo18 (Intervenor), whereby the Intervenor sought, among
others, that both Malvar and KFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly and severally the
Intervenor’s contingent fees.
The Motion for Intervention relevantly averred:
xxxx
Lawyers, oftentimes, are caricatured as alligators or some other specie of voracious carnivore;
perceived also as leeches sucking dry the blood of their adversaries, and even their own clients
they are sworn to serve and protect! As we lay down the facts in this case, this popular, rather
unpopular, perception will be shown wrong. This case is a reversal of this perception.
xxxx
Here, it is the lawyer who is eaten up alive by the warring but conspiring litigants who finally
settled their differences without the knowledge, much less, participation, of Petitioner’s counsel
that labored hard and did everything to champion her cause.
xxxx
This Motion for Intervention will illustrate an aberration from the norm where the lawyer ends
up seeking protection from his client’s and Respondents’ indecent and cunning maneuverings.
x x x.
xxxx
On 18 March 2008 Petitioner engaged the professional services of Intervenor x x x on a
contingency basis whereby the former agreed in writing to pay the latter contingency fees
3
amounting to almost P19,600,000.00 (10% of her total claim of almost P196,000,000.00 in
connection with her labor case against Respondents. x x x.
xxxx
According to their agreement (Annex "A"), Petitioner bound herself to pay Intervenor
contingency fees as follows (a) 10% of P14,252, 192.12 upon its collection; (b) 10% of the
remaining balance of P41,627,593.75; and (c)10% of the value of the stock options Petitioner
claims to be entitled to, or roughly P154,000,000.00 as of April 2008.
xxxx
Intervenor’s efforts resulted in the award and partial release of Petitioner’s claim amounting
to P14,252,192.12 out of which Petitioner paid Intervenor 10% or P1,425,219.21 as
contingency fees pursuant to their engagement agreement (Annex "A"). Copy of the check
payment of Petitioner payable to Intervenor’s Of Counsel is attached as Annex "C".
xxxx
On 12 September 2008 Intervenor filed an exhaustive Petition for Review with the Supreme
Court containing 70 pages, including its Annexes "A" to "R", or a total of 419 pages against
Respondents to collect on the balance of Petitioner’s claims amounting to at
least P27,000,000.00 and P154,000,000.00 the latter representing the estimated value of
Petitioner’s stock options as of April 2008.
xxxx
On 15 January 2009 Respondents filed their Comment to the Petition for Review.
xxxx
On 13 April 2009 Intervenor, in behalf of Petitioner, filed its Reply to the Comment.
xxxx
All the pleadings in this Petition have already been submitted on time with nothing more to be
done except to await the Resolution of this Honorable Court which, should the petition be
decided in her favor, Petitioner would stand to gain P182,000,000.00, more or less, which victory
would be largely through the efforts of Intervenor.19 (Bold emphasis supplied).
xxxx
It appears that in July 2009, to the Intervenor’s surprise, Malvar unceremoniously and without
any justifiable reason terminated its legal service and required it to withdraw from the
case.20 Hence, on October 5,2009, the Intervenor reluctantly filed a Manifestation (With Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner),21 in which it spelled out: (a) the terms of and conditions
of the Intervenor’s engagement as counsel; (b) the type of legal services already rendered by
the Intervenor for Malvar; (c) the absence of any legitimate reason for the termination of their
attorney-client relationship; (d) the reluctance of the Intervenor to withdraw as Malvar’s
counsel; and (e) the desire of the Intervenor to assert and claim its contingent fee
notwithstanding its withdrawal as counsel. The Intervenor prayed that the Court furnish it with
copies of resolutions, decisions and other legal papers issued or to be issued after its withdrawal
as counsel of Malvar in the interest of protecting its interest as her attorney.
The Intervenor indicated that Malvar’s precipitate action had baffled, shocked and even
embarrassed the Intervenor, because it had done everything legally possible to serve and
protect her interest. It added that it could not recall any instance of conflict or misunderstanding
with her, for, on the contrary, she had even commended it for its dedication and devotion to
her case through her following letter to Justice Bellosillo, to wit:

July 16, 2008
Justice Josue Belocillo (sic)
Dear Justice,
It is almost morning of July 17 as I write this letter to you. Let me first thank you for your
continued and unrelenting lead, help and support in the case. You have been our "rock" as far
as this case is concerned. Jun and I are forever grateful to you for all your help. I just thought
I’d express to you what is in the innermost of my heart as we proceed in the case. It has been
around four months now since we met mid-March early this year.
The most important and immediate aspect of the case at this time for me is the collection of the
undisputed amount of Pesos 14million which the Court has clearly directed and ordered the
NLRC to execute. The only impending constraint for NLRC to execute and collect this amount
from the already garnished amount of Pesos 41 million at Citibank is the MR of Kraft on the
Order of the Court (CA) to execute collection. We need to get a denial of this motion for NLRC
to execute immediately. We already obtained commitment from NLRC that all it needed to
execute collection is the denial of the MR. Jun and I applaud your initiative and efforts to mediate
with Romulo on potential settlement. However, as I expressed to you in several instances, I
have serious reservations on the willingness of Romulo to settle within reasonable amounts
specifically as it relates to the stock options. Let us continue to pursue this route vigorously
while not setting aside our efforts to influence the CA to DENY their Motion on the Undisputed
amount of Pesos 14million.
At this point, I cannot overemphasize to you our need for funds. We have made financial
commitments that require us to raise some amount. But we can barely meet our day to day
business and personal requirements given our current situation right now.
Thank you po for your understanding and support. 22
According to the Intervenor, it was certain that the compromise agreement was authored by
the respondents to evade a possible loss of P182,000,000.00 or more as a result of the labor
litigation, but considering the Intervenor’s interest in the case as well as its resolve in pursuing
Malvar’s interest, they saw the Intervenor as a major stumbling block to the compromise
agreement that it was then brewing with her. Obviously, the only way to remove the Intervenor
was to have her terminate its services as her legal counsel. This prompted the Intervenor to
bring the matter to the attention of the Court to enable it to recover in full its compensation
based on its written agreement with her, averring thus:
xxxx
28. Upon execution of the Compromise Agreement and pursuant thereto, Petitioner immediately
received (supposedly) from RespondentsP40,000,000.00. But despite the settlement between
the parties, Petitioner did not pay Intervenor its just compensation as set forth in their
engagement agreement; instead, she immediately moved to Dismiss/Withdraw the Present
Petition.
29. To parties’ minds, with the dismissal by Petitioner of Intervenor as her counsel, both
Petitioner and Respondents probably thought they would be able to settle the case without any
cost to them, with Petitioner saving on Intervenor’s contingent fees while Respondents able to
take advantage of the absence of Intervenor in determining the settlement price.
30. The parties cannot be any more mistaken. Pursuant to the Second Paragraph of Section 26,
Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court quoted in paragraph 3 hereof, Intervenor is still entitled
to recover from Petitioner the full compensation it deserves as stipulated in its contract.
4
31. All the elements for the full recovery of Intervenor’s compensation are present. First, the
contract between the Intervenor and Petitioner is reduced into writing. Second, Intervenor is
dismissed without justifiable cause and at the stage of proceedings where there is nothing more
to be done but to await the Decision or Resolution of the Present Petition.23
xxxx
In support of the Motion for Intervention, the Intervenor cites the rulings in Aro v. Nañawa24 and
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of Appeals,25 particularly the following passage:
x x x. While We here reaffirm the rule that "the client has an undoubted right to compromise a
suit without the intervention of his lawyer," We hold that when such compromise is entered into
in fraud of the lawyer, with intent to deprive him of the fees justly due him, the compromise
must be subject to the said fees and that when it is evident that the said fraud is committed in
confabulation with the adverse party who had knowledge of the lawyer’s contingent interest or
such interest appears of record and who would benefit under such compromise, the better
practice is to settle the matter of the attorney’s fees in the same proceeding, after hearing all
the affected parties and without prejudice to the finality of the compromise agreement in so far
as it does not adversely affect the right of the lawyer.26 x x x.
The Intervenor prays for the following reliefs:
a) Granting the Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights in favor of the
Intervenor;
b) Directing both Petitioner and Respondents jointly and severally to pay Intervenor
its contingent fees;
c) Granting a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued
in pursuance of such judgments; and
d) Holding in Abeyance in the meantime the Resolution of the Motion to
Dismiss/Withdraw Case filed by Petitioner and granting the Motion only after
Intervenor has been fully paid its just compensation; and
e) Other reliefs just and equitable.27
Opposing the Motion for Intervention,28 Malvar stresses that there was no truth to the
Intervenor’s claim to defraud it of its professional fees; that the Intervenor lacked the legal
capacity to intervene because it had ceased to exist after Atty. Marwil N. Llasos resigned from
the Intervenor and Atty. Richard B. Dasal became barred from private practice upon his
appointment as head of the Legal Department of the Small Business Guarantee and Finance
Corporation, a government subsidiary; and that Atty. Llasos and Atty. Dasal had personally
handled her case.
Malvar adds that even assuming, arguendo, that the Intervenor still existed as a law firm, it was
still not entitled to intervene for the following reasons, namely: firstly, it failed to attend to her
multiple pleas and inquiries regarding the case, as when communications to the Intervenor
through text messages were left unanswered; secondly, maintaining that this was a justifiable
cause to dismiss its services, the Intervenor only heeded her repeated demands to withdraw
from the case when Atty. Dasal was confronted about his appointment to the government
subsidiary; thirdly, it was misleading and grossly erroneous for the Intervenor to claim that it
had rendered to her full and satisfactory services when the truth was that its participation was
strictly limited to the preparation, finalization and submission of the petition for review with the
Supreme Court; and finally, while the Intervenor withdrew its services on October 5, 2009, the
compromise agreement was executed with the respondents on December 9,2010 and notarized
on December 14, 2010, after more than a year and two months, dispelling any badge of bad
faith on their end.

On June 21, 2011, the respondents filed their comment to the Intervenor’s Motion for
Intervention.
On November 18, 2011, the Intervenor submitted its position on the respondent’s comment
dated June 21, 2011,29and thereafter the respondents sent in their reply.30
Issues
The issues for our consideration and determination are two fold, namely: (a) whether or not
Malvar’s motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of the execution of the compromise
agreement was proper; and (b) whether or not the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s
rights can prosper, and, if so, how much could it recover as attorney’s fees.
Ruling of the Court
We shall decide the issues accordingly.
1. Client’s right to settle litigation by compromise agreement, and to terminate counsel;
limitations
A compromise agreement is a contract, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to
avoid litigation, or put an end to one already commenced.31 The client may enter into a
compromise agreement with the adverse party to terminate the litigation before a judgment is
rendered therein.32 If the compromise agreement is found to be in order and not contrary to
law, morals, good customs and public policy, its judicial approval is in order.33 A compromise
agreement, once approved by final order of the court, has the force of res judicata between the
parties and will not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery.34
A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention of the attorney,
for the former is generally conceded to have exclusive control over the subject matter of the
litigation and may at anytime, if acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out
of court before judgment, even without the attorney’s intervention.35 It is important for the
client to show, however, that the compromise agreement does not adversely affect third persons
who are not parties to the agreement.36
By the same token, a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship
at any time with or without cause.37 But this right of the client is not unlimited because good
faith is required in terminating the relationship. The limitation is based on Article 19 of the Civil
Code, which mandates that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith." The right is also subject to the right of the attorney to be compensated. This is
clear from Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at anytime from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time
from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on
notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to
retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the
docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given
to the adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract
between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was
without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation
stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene
in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a
lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
5
judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
In fine, it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive a just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. The
attorney who has acted in good faith and honesty in representing and serving the interests of
the client should be reasonably compensated for his service.38
2. Compromise agreement is to be approved despite favorable action on the Intervenor’s Motion
for Intervention
On considerations of equity and fairness, the Court disapproves of the tendencies of clients
compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably
reducing or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees.39 Thus, the Court grants
the Intervenor’s Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting
the Intervenor’s right to its stipulated professional fees that would be denied under the
compromise agreement. The Court does so in the interest of protecting the rights of the
practicing Bar rendering professional services on contingent fee basis.
Nonetheless, the claim for attorney’s fees does not void or nullify the compromise agreement
between Malvar and the respondents. There being no obstacles to its approval, the Court
approves the compromise agreement. The Court adds, however, that the Intervenor is not left
without a remedy, for the payment of its adequate and reasonable compensation could not be
annulled by the settlement of the litigation without its participation and conformity. It remains
entitled to the compensation, and its right is safeguarded by the Court because its members are
officers of the Court who are as entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of
fraud committed by the client as much as the client is against their abuses as her counsel. In
other words, the duty of the Court is not only to ensure that the attorney acts in a proper and
lawful manner, but also to see to it that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the
compensation of the attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the subsequent
withdrawal of the case upon the client’s initiative would not deprive the attorney of the legitimate
compensation for professional services rendered.40
The basis of the intervention is the written agreement on contingent fees contained in the
engagement executed on March 19, 2008 between Malvar and the Intervenor,41 the pertinent
portion of which stipulated that the Intervenor would "collect ten percent (10%) of the amount
of PhP14,252,192.12 upon its collection and another ten percent (10%) of the remaining
balance of PhP41,627,593.75 upon collection thereof, and also ten percent (10%) of whatever
is the value of the stock option you are entitled to under the Decision." There is no question
that such arrangement was a contingent fee agreement that was valid in this jurisdiction,
provided the fees therein fixed were reasonable.42
We hold that the contingent fee of 10% of P41,627,593.75 and 10% of the value of the stock
option was reasonable. The P41,627,593.75 was already awarded to Malvar by the NLRC but
the award became the subject of the appeal in this Court because the CA reversed the NLRC.
Be that as it may, her subsequent change of mind on the amount sought from the respondents
as reflected in the compromise agreement should not negate or bar the Intervenor’s recovery
of the agreed attorney’s fees.
Considering that in the event of a dispute between the attorney and the client as to the amount
of fees, and the intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires that there be
evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of the services rendered, taking
into account the facts determinative thereof,43 the history of the Intervenor’s legal
representation of Malvar can provide a helpful predicate for resolving the dispute between her
and the Intervenor.

The records reveal that on March 18, 2008, Malvar engaged the professional services of the
Intervenor to represent her in the case of illegal dismissal. At that time, the case was pending
in the CA at the respondents’ instance after the NLRC had set aside the RCU’s computation of
Malvar’s backwages and monetary benefits, and had upheld the computation arrived at by the
NLRC Computation Unit. On April 17, 2008, the CA set aside the assailed resolution of the NLRC,
and remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of her monetary awards. It
was at this juncture that the Intervenor commenced its legal service, which included the
following incidents, namely:
a) Upon the assumption of its professional duties as Malvar’s counsel, a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 17, 2008 consisting
of thirty-eight pages was filed before the Court of Appeals on May 6, 2008.
b) On June 2, 2009, Intervenors filed a Comment to Respondents’ Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, said Comment consisted 8 pages.
c) In the execution proceedings before Labor Arbiter Jaime Reyno, Intervenor
prepared and filed on Malvar’s behalf an "Ex-Parte Motion to Release to Complainant
the Undisputed amount of P14,252,192.12" in NLRC NCR Case No. 30-07-02716-00.
d) On July 29, 2000, Intervenor prepared and filed before theLabor Arbiter a Comment
to Respondents’ Opposition to the "Ex-Parte Motion to Release" and a "Motion
Reiterating Immediate Implementation of the Writ of Execution"
e) On August 6, 2008, Intervenor prepared and filed before the Labor Arbiter Malvar’s
Motion Reiterating Motion to Release the Amount of P14,252,192.12.44
The decision promulgated on April 17, 200845 and the resolution promulgated on July 30,
200846 by the CA prompted Malvar to appeal on August 15, 2008 to this Court with the
assistance of the Intervenor. All the subsequent pleadings, including the reply of April 13,
2009,47 were prepared and filed in Malvar’s behalf by the Intervenor.
Malvar should accept that the practice of law was not limited to the conduct of cases or litigations
in court but embraced also the preparation of pleadings and other papers incidental to the cases
or litigations as well as the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of the
clients.48 Consequently, fairness and justice demand that the Intervenor be accorded full
recognition as her counsel who discharged its responsibility for Malvar’s cause to its successful
end.
But, as earlier pointed out, although a client may dismiss her lawyer at any time, the dismissal
must be for a justifiable cause if a written contract between the lawyer and the client exists.49
Considering the undisputed existence of the written agreement on contingent fees, the question
begging to be answered is: Was the Intervenor dismissed for a justifiable cause?
We do not think so.
In the absence of the lawyer’s fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer of his
just fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. Here, Malvar not only downplayed
the worth of the Intervenor’s legal service to her but also attempted to camouflage her intent
to defraud her lawyer by offering excuses that were not only inconsistent with her actions but,
most importantly, fell short of being justifiable.
The letter Malvar addressed to Retired Justice Bellosillo, who represented the Intervenor,
debunked her allegations of unsatisfactory legal service because she thereby lavishly lauded the
Intervenor for its dedication and devotion to the prosecution of her case and to the protection
of her interests. Also significant was that the attorney-client relationship between her and the
Intervenor was not severed upon Atty. Dasal’s appointment to public office and Atty. Llasos’
6
resignation from the law firm. In other words, the Intervenor remained as her counsel of record,
for, as we held in Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa v. Eastern Telecommunication
Philippines, Inc.,50 a client who employs a law firm engages the entire law firm; hence, the
resignation, retirement or separation from the law firm of the handling lawyer does not
terminate the relationship, because the law firm is bound to provide a replacement.
The stipulations of the written agreement between Malvar and the Intervenors, not being
contrary to law, morals, public policy, public order or good customs, were valid and binding on
her. They expressly gave rise to the right of the Intervenor to demand compensation. In a word,
she could not simply walk away from her contractual obligations towards the Intervenor, for
Article 1159 of the Civil Code provides that obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith.
To be sure, the Intervenor’s withdrawal from the case neither cancelled nor terminated the
written agreement on the contingent attorney’s fees. Nor did the withdrawal constitute a waiver
of the agreement. On the contrary, the agreement continued between them because the
Intervenor’s Manifestation (with Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner)explicitly called
upon the Court to safeguard its rights under the written agreement, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned counsel respectfully pray that instant Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner be granted and their attorney’s lien pursuant to the written
agreement be reflected in the judgment or decision that may be rendered hereafter conformably
with par. 2, Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Undersigned counsel further requests that they be furnished copy of the decision, resolutions
and other legal processes of this Honorable Court to enable them to protect their interests.51
Were the respondents also liable?
The respondents would be liable if they were shown to have connived with Malvar in the
execution of the compromise agreement, with the intention of depriving the Intervenor of its
attorney’s fees. Thereby, they would be solidarily liable with her for the attorney’s fees as
stipulated in the written agreement under the theory that they unfairly and unjustly interfered
with the Intervenor’s professional relationship with Malvar.
The respondents insist that they were not bound by the written agreement, and should not be
held liable under it.1âwphi1
We disagree with the respondents’ insistence. The respondents were complicit in Malvar’s move
to deprive the Intervenor of its duly earned contingent fees.
First of all, the unusual timing of Malvar’s letter terminating the Intervenor’s legal representation
of her, of her Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, and of the execution of compromise agreement
manifested her desire to evade her legal obligation to pay to the Intervenor its attorney’s fees
for the legal services rendered. The objective of her withdrawal of the case was to release the
respondents from all her claims and causes of action in consideration of the settlement in the
stated amount of P40,000.000.00, a sum that was measly compared to what she was legally
entitled to, which, to begin with, already included the P41,627,593.75 and the value of the stock
option already awarded to her. In other words, she thereby waived more than what she was
lawfully expected to receive from the respondents.
Secondly, the respondents suddenly turned around from their strong stance of berating her
demand as offensive to all precepts of justice and fair play and as a form of unjust enrichment
for her to a surprisingly generous surrender to her demand, allowing to her through their
compromise agreement the additional amount of P40,000,000.00 on top of theP14,252,192.12
already received by her in August 2008. The softening unavoidably gives the impression that
they were now categorically conceding that Malvar deserved much more. Under those
circumstances, it is plausible to conclude that her termination of the Intervenor’s services was
 7

instigated by their prodding in order to remove the Intervenor from the picture for being a solid tort-feasors that individual participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the
obstruction to the settlement for a much lower liability, and thereby save for themselves and other.57 To stress, joint tort-feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned
for her some more amount. among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose
of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount.58 Thus,
Thirdly, the compromise agreement was silent on the Intervenor’s contingent fee, indicating as joint tort-feasors, Malvar and the respondents should be held solidarily liable to the
that the objective of the compromise agreement was to secure a huge discount from its liability Intervenor. There is no way of appreciating these circumstances except in this light.
towards Malvar.
That the value of the stock options that Malvar waived under the compromise agreement has
Finally, contrary to the stipulation in the compromise agreement, only Malvar, minus the not been fixed as yet is no hindrance to the implementation of this decision in favor of the
respondents, filed the Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case. Intervenor. The valuation could be reliably made at a subsequent time from the finality of this
At this juncture, the Court notes that the compromise agreement would have Malvar waive even adjudication. It is enough for the Court to hold the respondents and Malvar solidarily liable for
the substantial stock options already awarded by the NLRC’s decision,52 which ordered the the 10% of that value of the stock options.
respondents to pay to her, among others, the value of the stock options and all other bonuses As a final word, it is necessary to state that no court can shirk from enforcing the contractual
she was entitled to or would have been entitled to had she not been illegally dismissed from her stipulations in the manner they have agreed upon and written. As a rule, the courts, whether
employment. This ruling was affirmed by the CA.53 But the waiver could not negate the trial or appellate, have no power to make or modify contracts between the parties. Nor can the
Intervenor’s right to 10% of the value of the stock options she was legally entitled to under the courts save the parties from disadvantageous provisions.59The same precepts hold sway when
decisions of the NLRC and the CA, for that right was expressly stated in the written agreement it comes to enforcing fee arrangements entered into in writing between clients and attorneys.
between her and the Intervenor. Thus, the Intervenor should be declared entitled to recover In the exercise of their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of the Court, the courts
full compensation in accordance with the written agreement because it did not assent to the are bound to respect and protect the attorney’s lien as a necessary means to preserve the
waiver of the stock options, and did not waive its right to that part of its compensation. decorum and respectability of the Law Profession.60 Hence, the Court must thwart any and every
These circumstances show that Malvar and the respondents needed an escape from greater effort of clients already served by their attorneys’ worthy services to deprive them of their hard-
liability towards the Intervenor, and from the possible obstacle to their plan to settle to pay. It earned compensation. Truly, the duty of the courts is not only to see to it that attorneys act in
cannot be simply assumed that only Malvar would be liable towards the Intervenor at that point, a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that attorneys are paid their just and lawful
considering that the Intervenor, had it joined the negotiations as her lawyer, would have fees.61
tenaciously fought all the way for her to receive literally everything that she was entitled to, WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the compromise agreement; GRANTS the Motion for
especially the benefits from the stock option. Her rush to settle because of her financial concerns Intervention to Protect Attorney's Rights; and ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar and respondents Kraft
could have led her to accept the respondents’ offer, which offer could be further reduced by the Food Philippines Inc. and Kraft Foods International to jointly and severally pay to Intervenor
Intervenor’s expected demand for compensation. Thereby, she and the respondents became Law Firm, represented by Retired Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, its stipulated contingent
joint tort-feasors who acted adversely against the interests of the Intervenor. Joint tort-feasors fees of 10% of P41,627,593.75, and the further sum equivalent to 10% of the value of the stock
are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid option. No pronouncement on costs of suit.
or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.54
SO ORDERED.
They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if
independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury.55 Under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code, joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. As regards the extent of
their respective liabilities, the Court said in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals:56
x x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of
the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although
under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and
that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actor’s negligence ceases
to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other acts. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause
of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions
of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
xxx
Joint tort-feasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if
they had performed the wrongful act themselves. It is likewise not an excuse for any of the joint

SOLATAN V. INOCENTES
A.C. No. 6504 August 9, 2005
GEORGE C. SOLATAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES and JOSE C. CAMANO, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
The present case focuses on a critical aspect of the lawyer-client relationship¾the duty of
loyalty. The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is traditionally characterized as "undivided." This
means that lawyers must represent their clients and serve their needs without interference or
impairment from any conflicting interest.
This administrative case traces its roots from the manner by which Attys. Jose C. Camano and
Oscar A. Inocentes responded to the efforts of complainant, George C. Solatan, to lease a certain
Quezon City apartment belonging to the attorneys’ clients. On the basis of acts branded by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as "bordering on technical extortion," accepting funds
and giving unsolicited advice to an adverse party, and casting doubts as to the procedure of
levy, the IBP resolved1 to recommend the suspension of Atty. Camano from the practice of law
for one (1) year. It likewise recommended the reprimand of Atty. Inocentes, whom it held liable
for the aforementioned acts of his associate, under the principle of command responsibility.
Only Atty. Inocentes has elected to contest the resolution of the IBP, as he questions the
propriety of his being held administratively liable for acts done by Atty. Camano.2 However, the
recommendation to suspend Atty. Camano shall also be passed upon by virtue of Section 12,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.3
Attys. Inocentes and Camano were both engaged in the practice of law under the firm name
of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office. Atty. Inocentes held office in his home located
at No. 19 Marunong St., Central District, Quezon City, while Atty. Camano was stationed at an
"extension office" of the firm located in 3rd/F, 956 Aurora Blvd., Quirino Dist., Quezon City.
The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Andres and Ludivina
Genito (spouses Genito), owners of an apartment complex (the Genito Apartments) located at
259 Tandang Sora cor. Visayas Avenue, Quezon City, when the Genito Apartments were placed
under sequestration by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on 9 July
1986.4 The law office represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan,
and subsequently, with authority from the PCGG.5 in ejectment cases against non-paying
tenants occupying the Genito Apartments.6
Complainant’s sister, Gliceria Solatan, was a tenant in Door 10, Phase B of the Genito
Apartments. It appears from the records that Gliceria Solatan left for the United States in 1986,
and since then, the apartment was either intermittently used by members of her family or placed
under the charge of caretakers.7 In August 1987, a complaint for ejectment for non-payment of
rentals was filed against Gliceria Solatan.8 On 3 March 1988, in a judgment by default,
a Decision9 was rendered ordering Gliceria Solatan to vacate the premises of the apartment,
pay the spouses Genito the amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P30,600.00) as
unpaid rentals from February 1986 to July 1987 with interest at 24% per annum from 20 August
1987 until the premises are vacated, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and
costs of the suit.10
Complainant was occupying the subject apartment when he learned of the judgment rendered
against his sister. On 10 May 1988, prior to the implementation of a writ to execute the
8
judgment, complainant and his mother, Elvira Solatan, approached Atty. Inocentes at his home
office. Complainant informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a lease
contract by virtue of which complainant would be the new lessee of the apartment and thus
make possible his continued stay therein. Atty. Inocentes referred complainant and his mother
to his associate, Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of the ejectment cases against tenants
of the Genito apartments. After the exchange, complainant went to Atty. Camano at the satellite
office of Atty. Inocentes’s firm. From here on out, events quickly turned sour. Different versions
of subsequent events were presented. The facts reproduced hereunder are by and large culled
from the findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Siegfred B. Mison.
During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement was made in which complainant and
his mother agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of Gliceria Solatan, including fifty percent of
the awarded attorney’s fees and One Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P1,600.00) as costs of suit
provided that Atty. Camano would allow complainant’s continued stay at Door 10, Phase B of
the Genito Apartments. As partial compliance with the agreement, complainant issued in the
name Atty. Camano a check for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) representing half of
the P10,000.00 attorney’s fees adjudged against complainant’s sister.
Complainant and his mother failed to make any other payment. Thus, the sheriff in coordination
with Atty. Camano and some policemen, enforced the writ of execution on 22 June 1988 and
levied the properties found in the subject apartment. An attempt at renegotiation took place at
the insistence of complainant, resulting in Atty. Camano’s acquiescence to release the levied
properties and allowing complainant to remain at the apartment, subject to the latter’s payment
of costs incurred in enforcing the writ of execution and issuance of postdated checks
representing installment rental payments. Complainant, thus, issued four (4) checks drawn on
Far East Bank and Trust Company dated the fifteenth (15th) of July, August, September, and
October 1988 each in the amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00).11 Half
of the amount represented complainant’s monthly rental, while the other half, a monthly
installment for the payment of Gliceria Solatan’s judgment debt.
On 28 June 1988, acting on the advice of Atty. Camano, complainant presented an Affidavit of
Ownership to the sheriff who then released the levied items to complainant. However,
a Northern Hill 3-burner gas stove was not retuned to complainant. The stove was in fact kept
by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments wherein he temporarily stayed12 and,
thereafter, turned over the same to a certain Recto Esberto, caretaker of the Genito
Apartments.13
On 1 August 1988, complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty.
Inocentes and Atty. Camano.14 After formal investigation, and despite conflicting testimonies on
the tenor and content of agreements and conversations, several disturbing facts were revealed
to have been uncontroverted—Atty. Camano’s acceptance from complainant of attorney’s fees
and the costs of implementing the writ of execution, possession of complainant’s levied Northern
Hill oven, and advice to complainant on how to recover the latter’s levied items. Thus, IBP
Investigating Commissioner Siegfred B. Mison, made the following recommendations, viz:
Based on the facts revealed in their respective Memoranda, the penalty of six (6) months
suspension is therefore recommended to be imposed on Respondent Camano for committing
the following acts that adversely reflects (sic) on his moral fitness to continue to practice law[:]
1. He received money (P5,000 then P1,000) from the adverse party purportedly for attorneys
fees and for reimbursement of sheriff’s expenses. Such act of accepting funds from the
adverse party in the process of implementing a writ, borders on technical extortion
particularly in light of the factual circumstances as discussed.
2. He gave unsolicited advice to the adverse party in suggesting the filing of an Affidavit of
Ownership over the levied properties, a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the interest
of] his own client, supposedly, the Genitos.

3. He failed to turn over the gas stove to either party thereby casting doubt as to the procedure
of the levy.
Based on the facts revealed, the penalty of Reprimand is therefore recommended to be imposed
on Respondent Inocentes for committing the following acts that adversely reflects (sic) in his
fitness to continue to practice law[:]
1. He allowed Camano to perform all the aforementioned acts, either by negligence
or inadvertence which are inimical to the legal profession. He cannot claim ignorance or feign
innocence in this particular transaction considering that the Complainants themselves went to
his office on different occasions regarding this transaction. Ultimately, he exercised
command responsibility over the case and had supervisory control over Respondent
Camano inasmuch as he received periodic reports either by phone or in person from
the latter.
2. The letter disclaimer executed by Mr. Genito filed by Respondent Inocentes does not mitigate
any liability whatsoever since the wrongdoing done against the profession cannot be undone by
a mere letter from a third party.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
The IBP Board of Governors approved the aforequoted recommendation, with the modification
of an increase in Atty. Camano’s period of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year, in a
resolution stating, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the of the Investigating Commissioner…finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
for accepting funds from adverse party in the process of implementing a writ borders on
technical extortion, for giving unsolicited advice to the adverse party a suggestion evidently in
conflict with [the interest of] his own client and for casting doubts to the procedure of the levy,
Atty. Jose C. Camano is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, likewise,
Atty. Oscar Inocentes is hereby REPRIMANDED for he exercised command responsibility over
the case inasmuch as he received periodic reports either by phone or in person.16
The IBP held that Atty. Camano’s act of giving unsolicited advice to complainant is a culpable
act because the advice conflicted with the interest of his clients, the spouses Genito. The rule
on conflicting interests, established in Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
deals with conflicts in the interests of an attorney’s actual clients among themselves, of existing
and prospective clients, and of the attorney and his clients. It states that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained.17 An attorney
has no power to act as counsel or legal representative for a person without being retained.18 To
establish the professional relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney
are sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession.19 At the time the questioned
statement was made, Atty. Camano had called the police to restrain complainant from
surreptitiously pulling out the levied properties from the apartment complex by virtue of which
the latter was brought to the police station for questioning. The statement was made in response
to complainant’s insistence at the police station that the levied properties were owned by him
and not by the judgment debtor.20 No employment relation was offered or accepted in the
instant case.
More fitting, albeit, to the mind of this Court, inapplicable to the case, is Canon 15 of the same
Code which encompasses the aforementioned rule. In general terms, Canon 15 requires lawyers
to observe loyalty in all dealings and transactions with their clients.21 Unquestionably, an
attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his client resulting
in detriment to the latter may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, far be it that every utterance
9
of an attorney which may have afforded an individual some relief adverse to the former’s client
may be labeled as a culpable act of disloyalty. As in every case, the acts alleged to be culpable
must be assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances.
While the levy was made on chattel found in the apartment of the judgment debtor, Gliceria
Solatan, the complainant was the true owner of the properties. Consequently, the latter had a
right to recover the same. In fact, considering the circumstances, the questioned statement is
in consonance with complainant’s foremost duty to uphold the law as an officer of the court.
The statement of Atty. Camano in such a context should not be construed by this Court as giving
advice in conflict against the interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest
over the incorrectly levied properties.
We, thus, note that the act of informing complainant that the levied properties would be
returned to him upon showing proof of his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the interest
of the spouses Genito, but, in this circumstance, lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal
of the latter’s confidence so as to deserve outright categorization as infidelity or disloyalty to his
clients’ cause. Nonetheless, after having noted the foregoing, we remain convinced with the
propriety of meting the one (1) year suspension from the practice of law on Atty. Camano, as
recommended by the IBP, based on his other culpable acts which tend to degrade the profession
and foment distrust in the integrity of court processes.
On the other hand, Atty. Inocentes seeks to distance himself from the events that transpired
and the reprimand resulting therefrom by asserting that he was incorrectly punished for Atty.
Camano’s acts when his mere participation in the fiasco was to refer complainant and his mother
to Atty. Camano.
However, it is precisely because of such participation, consisting as it did of referring the
complainant to his associate lawyer, that Atty. Inocentes may be held administratively liable by
virtue of his associate’s unethical acts. His failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters
under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. The term "command
responsibility," as Atty. Inocentes suggests, has special meaning within the circle of men in
uniform in the military; however, the principle does not abide solely therein. It controls the very
circumstance in which Atty. Inocentes found himself.
We are not unaware of the custom of practitioners in a law firm of assigning cases and even
entire client accounts to associates or other partners with limited supervision, if at all. This is
especially true in the case of Attys. Inocentes and Camano who, from the records, both appear
to be seasoned enough to be left alone in their work without requiring close supervision over
each other’s conduct and work output. However, let it not be said that law firm practitioners are
given a free hand to assign cases to seasoned attorneys and thereafter conveniently forget
about the case. To do so would be a disservice to the profession, the integrity and advancement
of which this Court must jealously protect.
That the firm name under which the two attorneys labored was that of Oscar Inocentes and
Associates Law Officedoes not automatically make Atty. Inocentes the default lawyer acting in
a supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano. It did, however, behoove Atty. Inocentes to exert
ordinary diligence to find out what was going on in his law firm. It placed in Atty. Inocentes the
active responsibility to inquire further into the circumstances affecting the levy of complainant’s
properties, irrespective of whether the same were in fact events which could possibly lead to
administrative liability. Moreover, as name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked
with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should
act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility.22 It is not without reason or
consequence that Atty. Inocentes’s name is that which was used as the official designation of
their law office.
With regard to the actual existence of Atty. Inocentes’s supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano’s
activities, the IBP Investigating Commissioner based the same on his finding that Atty. Inocentes
 10

received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latter’s dealings with complainant. This
finding is the linchpin of Atty. Inocentes’s supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability
by virtue thereof.
Law practitioners are acutely aware of the responsibilities that are naturally taken on by partners
and supervisory lawyers over the lawyers and non-lawyers of the law office. We have held that
lawyers are administratively liable for the conduct of their employees in failing to timely file
pleadings.23 In Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Zoilo R. Ferrer, et al.,24 partners in a law
office were admonished for the contemptuous language in a pleading submitted to court despite,
and even due to, the fact that the pleading was not passed upon by any of the partners of the
office. We held therein that partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious control of court
pleadings and other court papers that carry their names or the name of the law firm.25
We now hold further that partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally
responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the
cases handled by the persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in
exerting necessary efforts to foreclose the occurrence of violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by persons under their charge. Nonetheless, the liability of the supervising lawyer
in this regard is by no means equivalent to that of the recalcitrant lawyer. The actual degree of
control and supervision exercised by said supervising lawyer varies, inter alia, according to office
practice, or the length of experience and competence of the lawyer supervised. Such factors
can be taken into account in ascertaining the proper penalty. Certainly, a lawyer charged with
the supervision of a fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes should bear greater
responsibility for the culpable acts of the underling than one satisfied enough with the work and
professional ethic of the associate so as to leave the latter mostly to his/her own devises.
While Atty. Camano’s irregular acts perhaps evince a need for greater supervision of his legal
practice, there is no question that it has been Atty. Inocentes’ practice to allow wide discretion
for Atty. Camano to practice on his own. It does constitute indifference and neglect for Atty.
Inocentes to fail to accord even a token attention to Atty. Camano’s conduct which could have
brought the then impending problem to light. But such is not equivalent to the proximate
responsibility for Atty. Camano’s acts. Moreover, it appears from the records that Atty. Inocentes
is a former judge and a lawyer who, as of yet, is in good standing and it is the first time in which
Atty. Inocentes has been made to answer vicariously for the misconduct of a person under his
charge. An admonition is appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated
16 April 2004 is AFFIRMED in respect of the sanction meted out on Atty. Camano. Atty.
Inocentes is hereby ADMONISHED to monitor more closely the activities of his associates to
make sure that the same are in consonance with the Code of Professional Responsibility with
the WARNING that repetition of the same or similar omission will be dealt with more severely.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

TRUST INTERNATIONAL PAPER CORPORATION
V. PELAEZ
G.R. No. 164871 August 22, 2006
TRUST INTERNATIONAL PAPER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
MARILOU R. PELAEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with an Urgent Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks to set
aside the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73356 entitled, "Marilou R.
Pelaez v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al." dated 13 February 20041 and 29 July
2004, respectively. The first Resolution denied petitioner Trust International Paper Corporation’s
(TIPCO) Petition for Relief from Judgment, while the second denied its motion seeking
reconsideration thereof.
Respondent Marilou R. Pelaez started her employment with petitioner as Secretary. She earned
various promotions, the last of which was her appointment as Corporate Cashier in 1993.
After undergoing substantial business losses for the fiscal year 1996-1997, petitioner
implemented cost-cutting and streamlining programs to alleviate its financial predicament. In
the course of carrying out the said programs, several positions were abolished and declared
redundant, one of which was the position of Corporate Cashier. Thus, on 24 December 1997,
respondent received a memorandum from Jose Reyes, petitioner’s Chief Financial Officer,
informing her that her services were terminated. She accepted her severance from the employ
of petitioner and turned over her accountabilities to the different departments which absorbed
her responsibilities. Thereafter, she was no longer required to report for work.
Sometime in January 1998, respondent found out the creation of the position of Treasury Clerk
in petitioner’s plantilla which has the same job description and responsibilities as that of
Corporate Cashier. Feeling deceived, respondent immediately filed on 6 January 1998 a
Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment/underpayment of salaries, separation pay,
retirement benefits, service incentive leave and sick leave benefits, and damages against
petitioner, Elon Ting, the president of TIPCO, Efren TanLapco, the Chief Operating Officer of
TIPCO and Jose E. Reyes, the Chief Financial Officer of TIPCO before the Arbitration Branch of
the DOLE-NCR.
On 12 January 1998, respondent received her separation benefits from petitioner in the amount
of P539,974.20 and correspondingly signed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim.
In a Decision dated 21 September 1999, the Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal
dismissal and awarded to respondent backwages, separation pay and damages. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads:
CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainant to
have been illegally retrenched by respondents. Consequently, they are ordered to pay in solidum
complainant as follows:
a) Backwages as of August 29 August, 1999 – Php 484,000.00
b) Separation Pay – Php 459,800.00
c) Moral Damages – Php 300,000.00
11
d) Exemplary Damages – Php 100,000.00
e) Vacation and sick leaves – Php 55,974.20
f) 5% of the awarded money claims as attorney’s fees.
The sum of Php 539,974.20 should be deducted from the awards granted to complainant.2
On 22 October 1999, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In a Decision dated 31 May 2002, the NLRC reversed the findings and rulings of the Labor
Arbiter. It affirmed the validity of petitioner’s redundancy program, which was the ground for
the termination of respondent’s employment. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.3
On 5 July 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the NLRC denied in a
Resolution dated 31 July 2002.
Unfazed with the setback, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals arguing that grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the NLRC in setting aside the Labor Arbiter’s Decision despite having been duly
supported by the facts and the law.
In due time, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of respondent on the ground
that respondent’s dismissal due to redundancy did not meet the requirements of law; hence,
the same was illegal. The Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of public
respondent NLRC in NLRC NCR CA No. 021691-99, as well as its subsequent resolution denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE and the decision
of the labor arbiter a quo REINSTATED.4
The Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory as no appeal or motion for
reconsideration was filed by either party.
Hence, on 25 July 2003, an Entry of Judgment was issued by the Court of Appeals.
On 29 December 2003, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner anchored its petition on the "excusable negligence" of its counsel Siguion
Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako’s (Siguion Reyna) law firm and the gross negligence of Atty. Elena
C. Cardinez (Atty. Cardinez), a newly hired junior associate of the Siguion Reyna law firm, who
allegedly handled the case for petitioner. Petitioner revealed that the instant case was assigned
to Atty. Cardinez in June 2003 and that all notices, orders and legal processes in connection
with the instant case were immediately forwarded to her for appropriate action.
Petitioner contended that the Siguion Reyna law firm was never remiss in its duty to follow up
the status of the case with Atty. Cardinez. In fact, it was the law firm itself, through Atty.
Cardinez’s supervising lawyers and co-counsels, Attys. Carla E. Santamaria-Seña, Cheryll Ann L.
Peña and Rean Mayo D. Javier, who had to elicit reports from her. When asked about the
developments of the case, Atty. Cardinez supposedly informed the law firm that everything was
in order regarding petitioner’s defense, when in fact, it was not. Eventually, Atty. Cardinez never
reported to work and that she was nowhere to be found despite the law firm’s diligent efforts
to search for her. She did not turn over the case files in her possession, including the Court of
Appeals file folders of the instant case.
Petitioner maintained that the acts of Atty. Cardinez in misrepresenting to the law firm that
everything was in order regarding its defense, when in fact, it was not, and the fact that she
took the files with her constitute gross negligence and should not bind petitioner. Corollarily,

petitioner argues that the Siguion Reyna law firm’s fault can only be categorized as an excusable
neglect for it was not remiss in making follow-ups about the status of the case with Atty.
Cardinez. It acknowledged that the law firm’s mistake was that it put faith in the assurances of
Atty. Cardinez, who repeatedly gave her word that nothing was amiss in the defense of
petitioner’s position in the instant case.
Unconvinced, the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 13 February 2004, denied petitioner’s
Petition for Relief from Judgment, ratiocinating as follows:
There is no use arguing that the instant case was unloaded by Attys. Peña and Javier, to a
certain Atty. Elena C. Cardinez, as it is the responsibility of the law firm of Siguion Reyna
Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office itself, to prepare and submit the appropriate relief or remedy
of its client. The negligence or failure of its partners or associates to perform its duties and tasks
is not excusable negligence that could merit relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of the counsel binds the client because, otherwise,
there would never be an end to a suit so long as counsel could allege its own fault or negligence
to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and relief already lost by the operation of law.5
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 29 July 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition.
In its Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues:
A.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO
RECOGNIZE THE GROSS AND PALPABLE NEGLIGENCE, BORDERING ON FRAUD, COMMITTED
BY PETITIONER’S FORMER HANDLING COUNSEL, ATTY. CARDINEZ, WHOSE NEGLIGENCE AND
ACTIVE MISREPRESENTATION PREVENTED PETITIONER FROM EXHAUSTING ALL THE LEGAL
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT, PARTICULARLY, THE REMEDY OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME
COURT.
B.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT STRICTLY
APPLIED THE TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE TO THE DETRIMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE.
C.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO TAKE
INTO CONSIDERATION PETITIONER’S GOOD AND SUBSTANTIAL DEFENSE, WHICH MUST BE
FULLY VENTILATED, CONSIDERING THAT IT STANDS TO LOSE THE STAGGERING SUM OF
MORE THAN TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00)6
At the onset, it must be pointed out that the present petition seeking the setting aside of the
Court of Appeals’ Resolutions dated 13 February 2004 and 29 July 2004, denying petitioner’s
petition for relief from judgment, is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Section 1(b) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, however, provides:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
12
xxxx
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment.
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Thus, in Azucena v. Foreign Manpower Services,7 it was held:
Neither may petitioner seek to set aside the Court of Appeals’ April 26, 2001 Resolution denying
his petition for relief from judgment through the same mode of review (petition for review on
certiorari), for under Section 1(b) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the denial of a petition for
relief from judgment is subject only to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Based on the foregoing, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment can only be assailed
before this Court via a special civil action under Rule 65 and not through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. In availing of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to
obtain the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions denying its petition for relief from
judgment, petitioner certainly has made use of the wrong remedy.
Even if this Court was to treat the instant petition as a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65, the same would still have to be dismissed.
In Mercury Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court clarified the nature of a petition for
relief from judgment:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional
cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy
available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision
of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. x x x.
This Court likewise ruled:
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the
petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable
negligence.9
In the present case, petitioner posits that the Court of Appeals committed grave error when it
failed to recognize the gross and palpable negligence, bordering on fraud, committed by Atty.
Cardinez, whose negligence prevented petitioner from exhausting all the legal remedies
available to it.
It is undisputed that the counsel of record of petitioner is the Siguion Reyna law firm. The law
firm failed to notify petitioner of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals to enable it to file
a motion for reconsideration or to appeal from the said decision. The law firm’s failure to inform
petitioner of the decision is inexcusable negligence which cannot be a ground for relief from
judgment. This is in line with jurisprudence that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon
the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform his client of an adverse judgment
resulting in the loss of right to appeal will not justify the setting aside of a judgment that is valid
and regular on its face.10
The negligence of Atty. Cardinez, the law firm’s new associate, apparent in her mishandling of
the cause of petitioner likewise constitutes inexcusable negligence. Negligence, to be excusable,
must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could have not guarded against.

It must be pointed out that Atty. Cardinez’s name did not appear in any of the pleadings filed
by petitioner before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals. It was only in the
petition for relief filed before the Court of Appeals that the name of Atty. Cardinez appeared for
the first time. In the petition for relief, Atty. Cardinez was blamed by petitioner and its counsel,
the Siguion Reyna law firm, for squandering petitioner’s opportunity to appeal the Court of
Appeals’ decision. What appears on the records is that the Comment and Memorandum of
petitioner before the Court of Appeals were signed by Attys. Carla E. Santamaria-Seña, Cheryll
Ann L. Peña and Rean Mayo D. Javier.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the handling lawyers of the law firm were putting the
blame on Atty. Cardinez when they lost the case and forgot to file the appeal. Besides, if the
case was, indeed, unloaded to Atty. Cardinez, the supervising lawyers would have detected the
omission of the former considering that it is a common practice in a law firm that when it hires
a new associate, his or her work is ordinarily reviewed by the more senior associate of the law
firm. If the supervising lawyers of Atty. Cardinez, namely, Attys. Seña, Peña and Javier, were
not remiss in their duty to follow up the status of the case, they would have known that they
have not received or reviewed any pleadings from Atty. Cardinez pertaining to the case under
consideration. Simply, petitioner’s counsel, the Siguion Reyna law firm itself, was guilty of
inexcusable neglect in handling petitioner’s case before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner insists that its case is an exception to the general rule that the negligence of counsel
binds the client. Petitioner invokes this Court’s ruling in People’s Homesite and Housing
Operation v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,11 Somoso v. Court of Appeals,12 Apex
Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 Salazar v. Court of Appeals,14 Sarraga, Sr. v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank,15 and Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals,16where this Court departed
from the general rule that the client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer considering that, in
said cases, the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their client’s cause and
such amounted to a deprivation of their client’s property without due process of law. In said
cases, the petitions for relief from judgment were given due course. However, we find that the
ruling in said cases do not apply in the instant case.
In People’s Homesite, the counsel failed to apprise the petitioners therein of the hearing and
the case was heard in their absence. The counsel also did not inform the petitioners that he had
received a copy of the decision and neither did he file a motion for reconsideration or a petition
to set aside judgment to protect the interests of his clients. When asked to explain, the counsel
merely said that he did not inform the petitioners because the case escaped his attention. On
account of these attendant facts, this Court found that there was "something fishy and
suspicious" with the actions of counsel. The Court therein, in allowing the petition for relief from
judgment and in remanding the case to the court of origin, had, in mind, the attending
probability that petitioner’s counsel colluded with the adverse party, which is utterly wanting in
the present case.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s counsel was able to actively defend its case before the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. In fact, the Siguion Reyna law firm was able to
obtain a favorable decision for petitioner before the NLRC. The instant case is clearly at variance
with the People’s Homesite case.
In Somoso, the counsel of spouses Somoso informed them that he was withdrawing his
appearance as counsel of the case. A decision dated 8 March 1985 was issued by the trial court
against the spouses. The counsel received the decision on 15 August 1985, but the spouses
came to know of the decision only on 27 September 1985, the day they received the letter from
their counsel informing them of such decision. On 27 September 1985, the counsel belatedly
filed in court his motion to withdraw as counsel which was dated 10 June 1985. This Court
granted spouses’ petition for relief from judgment as they were able to prove that they were
entitled thereto considering that their counsel had earlier informed them of his intention to
withdraw from the case, but belatedly filed the formal withdrawal.
13
In the present case, it has been Attys. Santamaria-Seña, Peña and Javier who participated in
the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. They did not notify the Court of Appeals that they
had withdrawn from the case. There was completely no reason for them not to file an appeal,
being the handling counsel of record during the pendency of the case before the Court of
Appeals.
The case of Apex Mining, Inc. invoked by petitioner is not on all fours with the instant case. In
Apex, petitioners’ counsel did not attend the scheduled hearing for the reception of the evidence.
The law firm did not even bother to inform its client of the scheduled hearing, as a result of
which both counsel and petitioners were unable to attend the same. After the trial court issued
an order declaring petitioners in default for having waived their right to present evidence, their
counsel did not take steps to have the same set aside. In addition, the negligent counsel
deliberately misrepresented in the progress report that the case was still pending with Court of
Appeals when the same was dismissed months earlier. These circumstances are absent in the
case under consideration because at no time was petitioner was deprived of its right to submit
evidence to support its argument.
Neither can the case of Salazar be applied in the case under consideration. In the former,
petitioners were deprived of their right to present evidence at the trial through the gross and
palpable mistake of their counsel who agreed to submit the case for decision without fully
substantiating their defense. In the instant case, petitioner was able to ventilate its defense
though various pleadings and documentary evidence before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and
the Court of Appeals.
In Sarraga, the petition for relief from judgment was granted due to the attending circumstance
where the counsel of record was grossly negligent in defending the cause of the client. On the
other hand, in the present case, petitioner is placing the blame on the alleged gross negligence
of an attorney who was not even been shown to have participated in the proceedings of the
case.
In Heirs of Antonio Pael, this Court found that there was a showing of "badges of fraud"
displayed by the counsel of the unsuccessful party when he resorted to two clearly inconsistent
remedies, namely appeal and motion for new trial. In contrast, the instant case merely illustrates
a scenario where a counsel committed a simple and inexcusable negligence to the prejudice of
the client.
In sum, this is not a case where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable,
pervasive and reckless which deprives the party of his or her day in court. For this reason, the
Court need no longer concern itself with the propriety of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court is bound by the Court of Appeal’s ruling
which had become final and executory due to the simple and inexcusable negligence of
petitioner’s counsel in allowing the reglementary period to lapse without perfecting an appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 13 February
2004 and 29 July 2004 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 73356 denying petitioner’s petition for relief from judgment, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

BACHRACH CORPORATION V. PHILIPPINE
PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 159915 March 12, 2009
BACHRACH CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We have before us the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by the petitioner, Bachrach
Corporation (petitioner), that seeks to reverse the Court of Appeal ( CA) rulings dismissing the
petitioner’s appeal for failure to file an appeal brief.2
ANTECEDENTS
The respondent Philippine Ports Authority (respondent), as lessor, entered into a 99-year
contract of lease with the petitioner over its properties denominated as Blocks 180 and 185.
The lease will expire in the years 2017 and 2018, respectively. Since the rentals for these
properties were based on the rates prevailing in the previous decades, the respondent imposed
rate increases. Separately from these properties, the respondent owned another property – Lot
8, Block 101 – covered by its own lease contract that expired in 1992. This lease has not been
renewed, but the petitioner refused to vacate the premises. The respondent thus filed, and
prevailed in, an ejectment case involving this property against the petitioner.
The parties tried to extrajudicially settle their differences. A Compromise Agreement was drafted
in 1994, but was not fully executed by the parties.3 Only the petitioner, its counsel, and the
respondent’s counsel signed; the respondent’s Board of Directors was not satisfied with the
terms and refused to sign the agreement.
To compel the respondent to implement the terms of the Compromise Agreement, the petitioner
filed a complaint for specific performance with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
42. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73399 and covered only the subjects of the
Compromise Agreement – Blocks 180 and 185.4 Seeking to include Lot 8, Block 101 in the
complaint, the petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File and for Admission of Attached
Supplemental and/or Amended Complaint. In an Order dated June 26, 2000,5 the trial court
denied this motion, stating that:
The amendment/supplement sought in the instant motion seeks the inclusion of Lot 8, Block
101 as one of the real properties subject matter of this case.
Granting for the sake of argument, but not in any way insinuating that plaintiff has a right to
demand performance of the "Compromise Agreement," this Court can only mandate
performance of its provisions. And considering that the "Compromise Agreement" speaks only
of Block Nos. 185 and 180, this Court can only direct actual performance by defendant Philippine
Ports Authority of its terms and conditions, and that is with respect to the lease of these blocks
(185 and 180) and no other. It would therefore be a mistake for this court to grant the motion
and allow inclusion of Lot 8, Block 101, as one of the subject matters of the "compromise
agreement." If ever the plaintiff has any legal right over Lot 8, Block 101 as one of the subject
matters of the "compromise agreement," it has to be a subject matter of another case but
certainly not in this case.6
On December 5, 2000, the petitioner filed a complaint for Specific Performance against the same
respondent, Philippine Ports Authority, this time involving Lot 8, Block 101. This case was
14
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-99431.7The petitioner also sought the consolidation of this case
with the earlier Civil Case No. 95-73399.8
On September 26, 2001, the RTC of Manila, Branch 42 dismissed the Civil Case No. 00-99431
complaint on the grounds of res judicata, forum shopping, and failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action. 9
The petitioner elevated the dismissal to the CA. On February 20, 2002, the petitioner received
the February 13, 2002 notice of the court requiring it to file its Brief within a period of 45 days
from receipt of the Order, which was to expire on April 6, 2002. Two days prior to the expiration
of this period, the petitioner filed a motion for a 45-day extension of time to file the brief. No
brief was filed within the extended period. On November 11, 2002, the CA dismissed the appeal
via a resolution whose pertinent portion reads:
For failure of the plaintiff-appellant, Bachrach Corporation to file the required brief, the appeal
is hereby considered DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
The Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief is NOTED.
SO ORDERED.10
On December 11, 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion to Admit
Attached Brief).11The CA denied the motion in its September 8, 2003 resolution, paving the way
for the filing of the present petition.
THE PETITION
The petition asks the Court to liberally apply the rules of procedure, grant its appeal, and thereby
require the CA to entertain the appeal it dismissed. The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING A LIBERAL APPLICATION
OF SECTION 1(E) RULE 50 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO THE PRESENT CASE CONSISTENT
WITH SECTION 6, RULE 1 OF THE SAME RULES[;]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE RULING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT RES JUDICATA BARS THE FILING OF CIVIL CASE NO. 00-99431[;]
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE RULING OF THE
TRIAL COURT DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 00-99431.
The threshold issue the case presents is whether the CA erred in dismissing the petitioner’s
appeal on the ground that no brief was timely filed.
OUR RULING
The petition is devoid of merit.
Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the dismissal of appeals;
paragraph (e) thereof provides that an appeal shall be dismissed upon –
[f]ailure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or
memorandum within the time provided by these Rules.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the CA’s authority to dismiss an appeal for failure
to file the appellant’s brief is a matter of judicial discretion.12 Thus, a dismissal based on this
 15

ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must be
observed, bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances surrounding the case.13
In the present case, the petitioner blames its former handling lawyer for failing to file the
appellant’s brief on time. This lawyer was allegedly transferring to another law office at the time
the appellant’s brief was due to be filed.14 In his excitement to transfer to his new firm, he forgot
about the appeal and the scheduled deadline; he likewise forgot his responsibility to endorse
the case to another lawyer in the law office.15
Under the circumstances of this case, we find the failure to file the appeal brief inexcusable;
thus, we uphold the CA’s ruling.1avvphi1
The handling lawyer was undoubtedly at fault. The records show that even the filing of a motion
for reconsideration from the Regional Trial Court’s ruling was late. In this case, he even had the
benefit of an extended period for the filing of the brief, but nevertheless failed to comply with
the requirements. If the present counsel were to be believed, the former counsel did not even
make a proper turnover of his cases – a basic matter for a lawyer and his law office to attend
to before a lawyer leaves.
But while fault can be attributed to the handling lawyer, we find that the law firm was no less
at fault. The departure of a lawyer actively handling cases for a law firm is a major concern; the
impact of a departure, in terms of the assignment of cases to new lawyers alone, is obvious.
Incidents of mishandled cases due to failures in the turnover of files are well-known within
professional circles. For some reason, the law firm merely attributes the failure to file the appeal
brief to the handling lawyer. This is not true and is a buck-passing that we cannot accept. The
law firm itself was grossly remiss in its duties to care for the interests of its client.
We note as a last point that the original 45-day period for the appellant to submit its brief
expired on April 6, 2002. Petitioner seasonably filed its motion for extension on April 4, 2002. It
was only on November 11, 2002, about seven (7) months later, that the CA dismissed the
appeal. Absolutely nothing appeared to have been done in the interim, not even in terms of
noting that no appeal brief had been filed. Thus, the petitioner simply took too long to rectify
its mistake; by the time that it acted, it was simply too late.
From these perspectives, the CA cannot in any way be said to have erred in dismissing the
appeal.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review and, consequently, AFFIRM the Court of Appeals’
Resolutions dated November 11, 2002 and September 8, 2003.
SO ORDERED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF FIRM NAME
OZAETA, ROMULO, ETC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO.
ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H.
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and
ALICE V. PESIGAN,petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE
FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J.
ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS
S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio
Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the
names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of
September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly
sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership
name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the
individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such
person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name,
of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in
respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use
a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased
partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of
a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. ... 4
16
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective
deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days;
the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading
national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners'
deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional
firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila
Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members
of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has
been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of
most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953
when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that
of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm
to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been
dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce
Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of
April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being
used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the
law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now
being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce
Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the
Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it
required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from
including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court
believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise
to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the
name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names
of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which
provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm
name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either
be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can
be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from
including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs
of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of
a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of
a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased
lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such
payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly,
neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death
of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding
liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the
names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend
to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer
without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able
lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by
deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code
entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from
liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner
for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the
partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law
contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather
than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on
the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable
goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional
partnership consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding
partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership
is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s
204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill
of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to
be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such
skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership
agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use
of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. 10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose
of carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated
17
that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the
practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal
Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession
as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public
service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment
on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege
or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association" in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice
is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition
or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use
of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names,
under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law
firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country
would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the
composition of the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the
propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of
a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op.
cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
 18

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may
might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title. seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire
as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the member
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products
custom. of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is
petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do
the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of
bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be
statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The
stated therein: têñ.£îhqw⣠other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art
have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no
statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must
of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides bow to legal and ethical impediment.
in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be
imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question as to local included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years
custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval during which they served as such.
of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First
Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such practice SO ORDERED.
should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
xxx xxx xxx
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The
use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the
partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced)
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a
source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence
of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely
because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the
same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated
from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of
such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal
system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions
directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their firm
designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even
if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership
is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or
public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should
not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service.
A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
 19

DACANAY V. BAKER & MCKENZIE

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought
to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker
& McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker
& McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release
of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to
Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie
"and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having
received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker
& McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members
and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates
of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Plana, J., took no part.
Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.

ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC, INC.,
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00
pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
20
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services
and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered
by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved
in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish
the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For
who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like
birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act
of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court
to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the
field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all,
to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name,
it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems,

just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of
the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces
the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading
public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question
are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce
is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man
and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated
in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the
very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain
defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
21
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret
marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract
of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code
describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which
is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged
or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers
do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed
by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal

services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may
be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized
to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means
of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment).
This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial
advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the
fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has
been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as
to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after
their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to
practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services.
It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate
any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation
of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
22
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the
persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of
law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to
another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all
the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic
and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical,
misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages
2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside
of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities
of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should
be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited
by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as

such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the
general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken
to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services
without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give
the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment
of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they
avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely
by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in
the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And
to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use
of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet
to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having
a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice
on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim
23
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful
because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws
cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation
for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective
service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be
careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems
. . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend,
do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the
law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies
that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and
the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage
a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and
the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers,
or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man.
But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and

skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession
for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The
court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have
no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools
cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his
work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind
of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of
law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would
be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew
employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer
in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without
a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent
for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law.
Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But
if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal
role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only
a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or
of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need
not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by
the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The
rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to
appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a
24
licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase
of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows,
even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800,
cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided
that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described
in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez
case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such
as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication
of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal
practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text
may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does
not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two,
that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be
filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public
at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not

purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to
a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes
the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under
the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding
that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems
which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in
connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It
is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation.
The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope
of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice
or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
25
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according
to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while
so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley
and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in

bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that
part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying
the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws
that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other
matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing
computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
26
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do
is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight
of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices
on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter
what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion
domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are
"specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists
in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law.
These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted
what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms
and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized,
then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly.
"If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order,
and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and
only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now,
if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation
to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice
of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules
of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes
or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members
of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court.
Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend
the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not
admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent
and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first
be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public.
One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which
set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation
has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in
the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of
Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
27
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes
in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in
the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.
"The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . .
. . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is
a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned
as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to
which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and,
with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name
listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked
and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the
case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows
a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show
that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision
in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of
lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
28
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times,
to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he
is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It
is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot
be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the
rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant
of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office
of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
 29

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation
of the said calling card.7
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009 The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8
vs. Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent. recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
RESOLUTION complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through
CORONA, J.: paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD
recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & merit a heavier penalty.
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced
his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s
expeditious collection on their claims.4To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
them and sent them text messages. respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of
ethical rules.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
Front and objective information or statement of facts.

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
LAW OFFFICE business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character
Fe Marie L. Labiano of service to which every member of the bar is called.14
Paralegal Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr.
Rm. M-01
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Tel: 362- RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
7820 business.
Fax: (632)
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
362-7821
through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
Cel.: (0926)
disbarment.16
2701719
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business
by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to
protect the community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very
same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during
the mandatory hearing.
 30

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were (c) address;
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result. (d) telephone number and

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule
1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent
never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s
"referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.21Respondent
committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly
used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original
lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This
crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court
is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing
and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
violated Rule 16.04: 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client. Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a SO ORDERED.
matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise
of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to
the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the
lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires
an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23Either of
these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his
client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice
of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the
exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on
lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based
on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
 31

OHRALIK V. OHIO STATE BAR ASSN. (e) Because the State's interest is in averting harm by prohibiting solicitation in circumstances
where it is likely to occur, the absence of explicit proof or findings of harm or injury to the
No. 76-1650 person solicited is immaterial. The application of the Disciplinary Rules to appellant, who solicited
employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in the adverse consequences
Argued January 16, 1978 the State seeks to avert, does not offend the Constitution. Pp. 436 U. S. 462-468.
Decided May 30, 1978 48 Ohio St.2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097, affirmed.
436 U.S. 447 POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE,
BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
Syllabus concurring in the judgment, post, p. 436 U. S. 468. REHNQUIST, J., filed a statement concurring
Appellant, an Ohio lawyer, contacted the parents of one of the drivers injured in an automobile in the judgment, post, p. 436 U. S. 477. BRENNAN, J., took no part in the consideration or
accident after hearing about the accident from another source, and learned that the 18-year- decision of the case.
old daughter was hospitalized. He then approached the daughter at the hospital and offered to
represent her. After another visit with her parents, he again visited the accident victim in her
hospital room, where she signed a contingent fee agreement. In the meantime, appellant
approached the driver's 18-year-old female passenger -- who also had been injured -- at her
home on the day she was released from the hospital; she agreed orally to a contingent fee
arrangement. Eventually, both young women discharged appellant as their lawyer, but he
succeeded in obtaining a share of the driver's insurance recovery in settlement of his lawsuit
against her for breach of contract. As a result of complaints filed against appellant by the two
young women with a bar grievance committee, appellee filed a formal complaint with the
disciplinary Board of the Ohio Supreme Court. The Board found that appellant solicited clients
in violation of certain Disciplinary Rules, and rejected appellant's defense that his conduct was
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the
Board's findings, and increased the Board's recommended sanction of a public reprimand to
indefinite suspension.
Held: The Bar, acting with state authorization, constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for
soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that
the State has a right to prevent, and thus the application of the Disciplinary Rules in question
to appellant does not offend the Constitution. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350,
distinguished. Pp. 436 U. S. 454-468.
(a) A lawyer's solicitation of business through direct, in-person communication with the
prospective clients has long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession's ideal of the
attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant potential for harm to the prospective
client. P. 436 U. S. 454.
(b) The State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the
public simply because speech is a component of that activity. Pp. 436 U. S. 455-456.
(c) A lawyer's procurement of remunerative employment is only marginally affected with First
Amendment concerns. While entitled to
Page 436 U. S. 448
some constitutional protection, appellant's conduct is subject to regulation in furtherance of
important state interests. Pp. 436 U. S. 457-459.
(d) In addition to its general interest in protecting consumers and regulating commercial
transactions, the State bears a special responsibility for maintaining standards among members
of the licensed professions, especially members of the Bar. Protection of the public from those
aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other
forms of "vexatious conduct" is a legitimate and important state interest. Pp. 436 U. S. 460-462.

DE ROY V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September
1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and
directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second
Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been
filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required
by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer
from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny
it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional
Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to
file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in
the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed
entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461,
that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30,
1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court
of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
(at p. 212)
32
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and
clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace
period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30,
1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is
still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669,
October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September
9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it
is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on
August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said
rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply
to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette
as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to
petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications
as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop
and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last
clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack
of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
 33

LACROSSE CASE "He hopes this helps restore some of the confidence in the criminal justice system of North
Carolina," Freedman said, according to The Associated Press.
RALEIGH, North Carolina (CNN) -- The prosecutor in the Duke University lacrosse team rape A tearful Nifong told the court Friday that he would resign as district attorney, regardless of
case was disbarred Saturday for unethical conduct, and the chairman of the disciplinary what the committee decided. He also apologized to the players and their families and to the
committee blamed "political ambition" for his downfall. community.
Earlier Saturday, the panel of the North Carolina State Bar concluded that Durham County, North One of those testifying Saturday was Evans' father, David Charles Evans, who said the ordeal
Carolina, District Attorney Mike Nifong violated more than a dozen ethics rules in prosecuting caused extreme stress to him and his family.
the case against the now-exonerated players.
Evans said his son "believes that when he dies, no matter what he does in his life, he will be
"This matter has been a fiasco," said disciplinary committee chairman F. Lane Williamson. "It [remembered as] one of the three Duke players accused of rape."
seems that at the root of it is self-deception arising out of self-interest.
State Bar prosecutor Douglas Brocker told the committee that "Mr. Nifong did not act as a
"We had a prosecutor who was faced with a very unusual situation in which the confluence of minister of justice, but as a minister of injustice," AP reported.
his self-interest collided with a very volatile mix of race, sex and class."
After the hearing, attorneys for the exonerated lacrosse players said they would push for
The panel determined Nifong withheld key DNA evidence from the players' defense attorneys criminal charges against Nifong.
that might have cleared them earlier, and lied to the presiding judge and state bar investigators.
"I don't think that any of us are done with Mr. Nifong yet," said Jim Cooney, Seligmann's attorney
The three students -- Reade Seligmann, Collin Finnerty and Dave Evans -- were accused of
sexually assaulting an escort-service dancer at a party in March 2006.
Two DNA tests found no match between any of the three men and evidence in the case, but
Nifong -- who was up for re-election at the time -- pursued the prosecution anyway.
North Carolina's attorney general eventually took over the case and in April of this year
determined the charges were unfounded and said Nifong would face a state bar disciplinary
hearing.
"Dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation"
Throughout the proceedings Saturday, Nifong sat quietly with no expression.
As the three former Duke students and their families looked on, Williamson said Nifong practiced
"dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation."
"We are in unanimous agreement there is no discipline short of disbarment that would be
appropriate in this case, given the magnitude of the offenses we have found and the effect upon
the profession and the public," Williamson said. (Read the ethics complaint )
Williamson said that racially inflammatory remarks Nifong made last year "were to further his
political ambition." The three athletes are white, and their accuser is black.
Nifong was re-elected in November.
The bar committee found Nifong lied to the judge in the rape case about whether he knew of
any evidence that would exonerate the defendants. After that lie, "in his mind the facts remained
that way in the face of developing evidence that that was not in fact the case," Williamson said.
After a recess in the hearing, Nifong's attorney surprised the panel by saying his client believed
he deserved to be disbarred.
"I've talked with Mr. Nifong, and he has told me [that] in light of the findings of fact this
commission has made -- and he's told me that he believes this has been a fair and full hearing
of the facts -- that he believes that disbarment is the appropriate punishment in this case,"
defense attorney David Freedman said.
Freedman also said Nifong would waive all right of appeal in the proceedings.

YUMOL, JR. V. FERRER
A.C. No. 6585 April 21, 2005
TOMAS B. YUMOL, JR., FELIX S. VENTIC, ELMER L. MANIEGO and JAKE M.
MAGCALAS, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Tomas B. Yumol, Jr., Felix S. Ventic, Elmer L.
Maniego and Jake Magcalas against Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., for grave misconduct.
At all time material to the controversy, complainants were employees of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), Atty. Yumol as Officer-in-Charge,1 Mr. Ventic, as Supervising Special
Investigator, Mr. Maniego as Special Investigator III and Mr. Magcalas as Special Investigator
I. Respondent Atty. Ferrer, Sr., held the position of Attorney IV, also of the Commission.
On 17 September 2001, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy sought the assistance of the CHR for the
alleged kidnapping of her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy by her husband, John Burt Dy, and the coercive
act of the latter in the transfer of her account with the Porac Rural Bank. Acting on this, Atty.
Ferrer, a Senior Legal Officer of the CHR, issued the two (2) Orders quoted below.
The facts as above stated resulted in the heated altercation that took place on 28 September
2001 between respondent and one Mr. John Burt Dy, whereby the latter accused the CHR of
conniving with his wife, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Dy, and of destroying his reputation and good name at
the Porac Rural Bank. Atty. Yumol, being the OIC Head of the Office, asked Mr. Dy if he could
substantiate his accusations. The latter showed him two (2) alleged Office Orders dated 18 and
19 September 2001, both signed by respondent.
The Order dated 18 September 2001, reads:
2 Office, the undersigned would like to inform your good office that the Commission's
Acting on the Complaint of Ma. CECILIA M. DY, and pursuant to the provision of
the Family Code that children five (5) years and below should remain under the
custody of the mother, in relation to the provisions of the Constitution vesting powers
unto this Commission and in particular, Section 18, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution, the respondent is hereby ordered to give custody of JIANZIL IRISH
M. DY to the maternal custody of the aforementioned mother.
Wherefore, premises considered, pending investigation of the above-entitled case,
the custody of JIANZIL IRISH M. DY is hereby awarded to the mother MA.
CECILIA M. DY.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 18, 2001.
(SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.
Senior Legal Counsel IV
The Order dated 19 September 2001, reads:
3 No. 01-01
Before this Commission is the Complaint filed by complainant wife for alleged
kidnapping of her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy which happened last August 22, 2001
34
and the coercive mean (sic) of respondent JOHN BURT DY in the transfer of the
complainant's cash deposit with the Porac Rural Bank.
Finding the allegations to (sic) sufficiently established, custody of the child was
awarded to the Complainant and properly executed with the aid [of] the Sangguniang
Barangay of Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga and the elements of the Porac PNP.
Likewise, we find that there had been coercion in the transfer of complainant (sic)
deposit in bank, which was already effected by the aforementioned Rural Bank.
NOW, THEREFORE, pending the final determination of this above-entitled case and
by virtue of the powers and authority granted this Commission under Sec. 18, Article
13 of the Constitution, the Rural Bank of Porac is hereby ordered to reinstate the
account of complainant MA. CECILIA M. DY.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 19, 2001.
(SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.
Senior Legal Counsel IV
Complainants Yumol and Magcalas, together with their staff, witnessed the incident and were
surprised to see the two (2) orders allegedly issued by respondent. Mr. Dy also informed Atty.
Yumol that the two (2) orders were already enforced by respondent himself and his co-
employees V. Rigor and E. Enolpe, Police Officer Larucom and the Barangay Captain of their
place.
Concerned by the acts of respondent, Atty. Yumol tried to clarify the matter by writing a letter4 to
the Bank Manager stating, thus:
In reference to the order of Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., Attorney IV of this Regional
participation on the matter is limited only to extend legal guidance/assistance
considering that the disagreement of spouses John Burt Dy and Ma. Cecilia M. Dy is
a family matter. Hence, you are being advised to disregard Atty. Ferrer's order dated
September 19, 2001.
Moreover, the said case is not officially docketed as part of Human Rights cases
handled by the Commission.
I hope this will clarify any misinterpretation of the Commission's mandate.
On 28 September 2001, Yumol required5 respondent to explain within seventy-two (72) hours
the unauthorized issuance of the said Orders.
It turned out later that respondent was engaged in private practice by handling private cases in
courts and other quasi-judicial bodies as shown by the following pleadings:
Pleadings Where Filed
Motion for Reconsideration in Sp. Proc. MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba,
Pampanga.6
Motion for Issuance of Mandatory MTC, San Fernando,
Injunction Pampanga7
 35

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Issuance of RTC-58, Angeles City8 March 6, 2001 2:15 P.M. Crim. Case No. 00- - do -22
Preliminary Injunction 1164

Petition MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba, August 3, 2001 9:00 A.M. Crim. Case No. 01- MTC, Sta. Ana.
Pampanga9 1401 Pampanga23

Sept. 7, 2001 - do - - do -24

Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent RTC-58, Angeles City10
Motion for Postponement
October 15, 2001 8:30 A.M. Civil Case No. RTC 42, San
17360 Frdo., Pamp.25
Motion for Reconsideration - do - 11

Nov. 5, 2001 2:00 P.M. Civil Case No. 8509 MTC Branch 1,
Motion for Reconsideration On Denial of - do -12 San Fernando,
the Release of Vehicle Pampanga.26

Addendum to Motion For Re-Investigation - do -13 Nov. 27, 2001 Civil Case No. 8509 RTC 58, Angeles
City27
Motion to Set Motion For Release of - do -14
Vehicle Dec. 6, 2001 2:00 P.M. Civil Case No. 8509 MTC Br. I, San
Fernando,
Several documents were also notarized by respondent, viz: Pampanga.28
During those times that respondent attended hearings, he declared in his Daily Time Records
Documents Where Used (DTRs) that he was present at the Office as shown by the DTRs attached to the complaint.

Reply of Norberto San Angel dated
October 16, 2001
Sworn Statement dated October 15, 2001
of May Paule, et al.
Criminal Complaint of Myrna Bulaon
MTC, Branch 1, San Fernando,
Pampanga15
Civil Case No. 8509 filed with
the MTC San Fernando,
Pampanga16
Criminal Case No. 01-1401
MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga17
The actuations of the respondent provoked the filing of several criminal cases against him, to
wit:
(1) Falsification of Public Documents,29
(2) Usurpation of Functions,30 and
(3) Violation of Republic Act No. 6713.31
Still, despite the cases filed against him, respondent continued attending hearings in different
courts as demonstrated by the following photostatic copies of the Minutes of the trials of the
cases:32

Reply Affidavit of Myrna Bulaon - do-18

Dates Time Court

Affidavit of Renato P. Canlas Special Proceeding No. 01-01 October 24, 2002 2:00 PM MTC – Arayat,
at MTC, Sta. Ana, Pampanga19 Pampanga33

Respondent also attended court hearings as shown in the following Minutes of Hearings, Orders, November 7, 2002 2:00 PM - do -
and Transcripts of Stenographic Notes:
January 17, 2003 9:00 AM MTC – Sta. Ana,
Date Time Case No. Court Pampanga34

March 2, 2001 9:00 A.M. 01-01 (Ejectment MTC/Sta. Ana, February 10, 2003 9:00 AM MTC – Arayat,
Case) Pampanga20 Pampanga35

April 23, 2001 1:30 P.M. Crim. Case No. 00- RTC-58 Angeles March 10, 2003 9:00 AM - do -36
1164 City21
March 24, 2003 - do -37
 36

After investigative hearings, IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala

March 28, 2003 9:00 AM MTC – Sta. Ana,
submitted her report, the dispositive portion of which reads:50
Pampanga38
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, there is merit in the complaint and it is hereby
May 9, 2003 9:00 AM - do -39 recommended that respondent ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR. be SUSPENDED for
a period of TWO (2) YEARS from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a
May 29, 2003 8:30 AM RTC-54, Macabebe, member of the bar.
Pampanga40
On 30 July 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the recommendation of the
June 12, 2003 2:00 PM MTC – Arayat, Investigating Commissioner but modified the penalty imposed:51
Pampanga41 RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
June 17, 2003 MTC-4, San Frdo., of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
Pampanga42 finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent can be held liable for
July 17, 2003 8:30 AM RTC-54, Macabebe, falsification for making it appear that he was at the CHR office by logging in at the
Pampanga43 DTR when actually he was attending a hearing in some courts, Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer,
Sr., is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
August 26, 2003 9:00 A.M. MTC-4, San Frdo.,
Pampanga44 The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent has committed gross
misconduct arising from the following alleged acts:
Complainants maintained that all these acts constitute grave misconduct.
1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government
We referred the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, employee;
report and investigation.
2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records;
On 04 November 2003, respondent filed a motion45 for extension of twenty (20) days within
which to file his answer, which was granted by the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP, Pasig 3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and
City.46 4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against him
In his answer,47 respondent admitted that Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy dropped by at the CHR to for engaging in private practice.
seek assistance regarding the recovery of her minor son and the restitution of her time Relative to the first ground, respondent contends that CHR lawyers are authorized to engage in
deposit. He also acknowledged having issued the two orders but maintained that the same private practice by invoking CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133.
were in consonance with the powers and functions granted to all CHR lawyers. He argued that
CHR lawyers, pursuant to CHR Resolution No. A-88-056 dated 8 October 1988 and CHR CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in private practice
Resolution No. A89-109-A dated 19 July 1989, can file, appear, prosecute and represent the (adopting the Civil Service Commission Resolution) subject to the following conditions,52 to wit:
Commission for underprivileged victims and persons whose human rights have been violated or
in need of protection in civil, criminal and administrative matters which are properly cognizable NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves
by the Commission. He likewise claimed that he was allowed by the CHR to file a petition for to adopt the following policy:
commission as a notary public and was commissioned on 01 December 2000. He denied having Lawyers employed in the Civil Service Commission, upon written request, may be
falsified his DTRs as the same were certified by complainant Atty. Yumol as Officer-In-Charge authorized to practice their profession subject to the following conditions:
of their office and that his appearances in courts were for legal assistance as allowed in CHR
Resolution No. A-88-056. Lastly, respondent insisted that the instant complaint was an offshoot 1. It shall not entail any conflict of interest insofar as the functions of the
of the administrative case filed by Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy against Atty. Yumol and the other Commission are concerned;
complainants, which prevented the issuance of a certificate of clearance to Atty. Yumol relative
2. It shall not be in representation of a client whose cause of action is against the
to his impending retirement.
government;
In their reply,48 complainants claimed that respondent's commission as notary public was
3. It shall not involve the use of government funds or property;
granted only by the CHR on 29 October 2001, and received by the CHR Region 3 on 07
November 2001, hence, the belated authority granted to him cannot be made to retroact to the 4. It shall not impair the lawyer's efficiency in the discharge of his/her regular
notarized documents which were all done before 07 November 2001. Complainants likewise functions in the office, and absences incurred, if any, shall be covered by duly
argued that respondent's act of appearing in courts as counsel is a form of private practice approved vacation leaves and pass slips;
which is expressly prohibited by Republic Act No. 6713.49 They further explained that the CHR
has no authority to issue the questioned orders as it cannot try and decide cases which courts 5. It shall be subject to the provisions of RA No. 6713 and such other relevant
of justice or quasi-judicial bodies do. Finally, they pointed out that the complaint filed by Mrs. Civil Service Laws and Rules;
Dy against them was already dismissed in an Order dated 15 October 2003.

6. The lawyers can appear only in courts of law, offices of state prosecutors
(Department of Justice), Office of the Ombudsman and quasi-judicial agencies
decisions of which are rendered by presidential appointees;
7. Authority is for one year subject to renewal after review of the lawyer's office
performance;
8. Provided, that, the commission reserves its right to revoke the said authority.
...
Recognizing that the dearth of lawyers committed to the civil service is due to the ".
. . huge disparity in the income of government lawyers as compared to those
employed in the private sector," the Commission on Human Rights is convinced that
CHR lawyers may be authorized to engage in the practice of their profession to
augment their income so as to encourage them in the government service.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Human Rights adopts the above-cited
conditions to authorize, upon written request, to practice their profession. However,
it is the Commission (sic) position that said authority should be strictly construed to
maintain efficient and effective delivery of Commission programs and services.
(Underscoring supplied)
Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR lawyers is not a
matter of right. Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in private
practice, a written request and approval thereof, with a duly approved leave of
absence for that matter are indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any
such written request or duly approved leave of absence. No written authority nor approval of
the practice and approved leave of absence by the CHR was ever presented by
respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private practice.
As to respondent's act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied53 for commission
as notary public on 14 November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01
December 2000.54 However, the CHR authorized55respondent to act as notary public only on 29
October 2001.56 Considering that acts of notarization are within the ambit of the "term practice
of law," for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to engage into it are required,
the crucial period to be considered is the approval of the CHR on 29 October 2001 and not the
approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.
Practice of law has a settled meaning. It refers to any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."57 Thus, as correctly pointed out by
complainants, the belated authority granted to respondent cannot be made to retroact to the
notarized documents dated prior thereto.
As to the alleged falsification of DTRs, records show that respondent has been actually attending
hearings in different courts as shown by the minutes of hearings and/or orders issued by
different courts. Since it has been amply established that he was not properly authorized to do
so as no written request by him and approval thereof of his request and of his leave of absence
was made by the CHR, it is an ineluctable conclusion that he falsified his DTRs when he certified
thereon that he was at the office on the same days and time. Needless to say, he could not be
at two different places at the same time.
We shall now discuss respondent's authority to issue the two (2) Orders. The following are
instructive:
37
. . . The [1987] Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission [on
Human Rights] the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. . .
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice,
or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe
or study closely: inquire into systematically: 'to search or inquire into: . . . to subject
to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry.'" The purpose of investigation,
of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included
or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in
the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "to follow up step by step
by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and
inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination;
the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" to "inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise
of which ordinarily does not require a hearing . . ."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to
settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence
or condemn. x x Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment."58
The Commission on Human Rights having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should
not try and resolve the subject matters involved in the Order dated 18 September 2001, which
awarded the custody of the child to her mother, and Order dated 19 September 2001, which
ordered the Rural Bank of Porac to reinstate the account of the mother of the child. These
matters are undoubtedly and clearly within the judicial and adjudicatory powers of a regular
court.
As to the fourth charge, suffice it to state that despite the cases filed against respondent in
courts, he continued without the proper authority and approved leave of absence, to engage in
the private practice of his profession as shown by certified true copies of the minutes and orders
of the different courts where he attended hearings.
In Spouses Jeneline Donato and Mario Donato v. Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr.,59 we explained
the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on
the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights
of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct is generally motivated
by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily
imply corruption or criminal intent.
 38

To our mind, respondent's acts of issuing the subject orders, engaging in private practice
without prior written request and authority of the CHR and duly approved leave of absence,
notarizing documents even before being so authorized by the CHR and falsifying his DTRs,
constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, per the dictates of Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. . . .
The question now arises as to the penalty to be imposed.
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. On imposing the supreme penalty of
disbarment, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.60 While we
will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where
the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.61 In the case at bar, the IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca
V. Maala recommended the suspension of respondent for two (2) years while the IBP Board of
Governors recommended a lighter penalty of six (6) months suspension. Taking our cue
therefrom, we find one (1) year suspension to be sufficient sanction against respondent -
suspension being primarily intended not as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public
and the legal profession.62
WHEREFORE, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Sr., is hereby found guilty of Gross Misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on
the IBP, as well as to the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

VITRIOLO V. DASIG
A.C. No. 4984 April 1, 2003
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR.
ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA
CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO,complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,1 an official of
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of
respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her public office to secure financial
spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that
respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds
for disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation
as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C.
Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches,
Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending
before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED…
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application
for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In
addition, Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full
knowledge of the existence of a prior registration…
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire
a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for
correction of name.3
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven
(11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.4
39
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 365 of
Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire Supply"
and "Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued,6 the
complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.7
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against
complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and
ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to
draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this
incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.8
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada
a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than
eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment
and with the end view of securing an appointment for herself.9
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the
charges.10 A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12,
Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the
notation "Unclaimed."11
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by
registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed
the Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one
Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.12
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainant’s motion to refer the complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent
to submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and
the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the
Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the
directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment
or Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents
submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in
violation of her oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed
made unlawful demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had
pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act
favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her
public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the Commission on Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further
warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full
text of which reads as follows:
 40

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and, finding the service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
and rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order
to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 20 and
Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of
practice of law for three (3) years.13 dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent
deserves not just the penalty of three years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment.
of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was "Chief Education Program Specialist,
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED." WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and
dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 14 However, if
said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of
then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.15 the respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as the country.
OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre,
Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action SO ORDERED.
on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
given the respondent’s failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondent’s misconduct JJ., concur.
as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the
Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her
to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.
The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation
thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorney’s Oath
imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said
duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 16 Respondent’s
demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests
before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the
Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations.
Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant
to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 617 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive
in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-
constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending
before her office are violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 19 of the Code which bars
lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private
interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s
conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of

COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION V.
DASIG
G.R. No. 172776 December 17, 2008
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. FELINA S. DASIG, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a Rule 45 petition for review1 of the 15 September 20032 Decision and 18 May 2008
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61302.
The factual antecedents of the case follows.
Respondent Felina Dasig (Dasig) was the Chief Education Program Specialist of the Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, of petitioner Commission on Higher
Education (CHED). She had also served as the officer-in-charge of the Legal Affairs Service (LAS)
of the CHED.
In a Memorandum dated 9 October 1998,4 the Director of the LAS brought to the attention of
the CHED several complaints on the alleged anomalous activities of Dasig during her stint as
the officer-in-charge of LAS. Attached to the memorandum were the sworn affidavits of the
complainants.5 The complainants consisted of Rosalie Dela Torre (Dela Torre), Rocella Eje (Eje)
and Jacqueline Ng (Ng), students who applied to have their names corrected in their scholastic
records to conform with their birth certificates; Maximina Sister (Sister), the CHED Human
Resource Management Assistant assigned to the Records Unit; and Don Cesar Mamaril
(Mamaril), Leysamin Tebelin (Tebelin), Joemar Delgado (Delgado), and Ellen Grace Nugpo
(Nugpo), all from the CHED LAS staff. All the students alleged that Dasig tried to exact money
from them under the pretense of attorney's fees in connection with their requests for correction
of names in their academic records. Dasig's former staff at the LAS corroborated the allegations
of the students. They also alleged that Dasig attempted to persuade them to participate in
anomalous activities. Sister, in turn, claimed that Dasig refused to return the Official Record
Book of the CHED which the latter borrowed from her.
Dasig submitted a Memorandum6 and a Counter-Affidavit7 to answer the charges against her.
In her memorandum, she denied all the charges against her. She alleged that it was not within
the CHED's power to entertain the request for change of name so she advised the students to
file petitions in court. Dasig denied that the alleged closed-door meeting on 3 September 1998
with her former staff at the LAS in which she tried to persuade them to accept P20,000.00 from
Ng had ever taken place for she was then allegedly in the Office of the Chairman for the
Investigation and Performance Audit of Dr. Jaime Gellor, then President of the Central Mindanao
University. As to the charge that she improperly took the Official Record Book on 7 September
1998 at around 3:00 p.m. and refused to return the same, Dasig insisted that she was inside
the LAS hearing room during that time conducting the preliminary conference on the
administrative complaint filed by Dr. Aleli Cornista against Dr. Magdalena Jasmin, Dr. Perlita
Cabilangan, Dr. Arsenia Lumba, and Dr. Teresita de Leon, all from CHED Region 3, together
with Special Investigators Buenaventura Macatangay (Macatangay) and Eulando Lontoc
(Lontoc).
In her counter-affidavit,8 Dasig explained that she had not offered her services as a lawyer to
any person and that she had never represented any clients other than the immediate members
of her family ever since she was admitted to the bar. Dasig denied the allegation that she had
41
offered to look for a lawyer for the petitioners since it was inconceivable to have a lawyer who
would accept P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The CHED formed a hearing committee and designated the members to investigate the
complaints against Dasig in Resolution No. 166-98.9 Dela Torre and Eje were not able to
participate in the hearings conducted by the committee for they could not be notified in their
given addresses while Ng and Dasig chose not to participate despite notice. However, Mamaril,
Tebelin, Delgado, and Nugpo all affirmed before the
committee the veracity of Ng's claim that Dasig solicited money from him and attested to the
fact that Dasig even called them together with Macatangay and Lontoc for an emergency closed
door meeting at the LAS conference room at around 4:00 p.m. on 3 September 1998. Dasig
allegedly told them that Ng was willing to pay P20,000.00 for the publication of her request for
correction of name and persuaded them to accept said amount for the purchase of a television
and VHS player for their office and that any excess money would be divided equally among
them. They all objected to Dasig's suggestion.10
The hearing committee concluded that there was substantial evidence on record to hold Dasig
liable for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and recommended that she be dismissed. The CHED found that the complaints against
Dasig were substantiated and affirmed the recommendation of the hearing committee to dismiss
her from the service as her actions constituted gross misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.11 The Civil Service
Commission (CSC) upheld the decision of the CHED12 and denied Dasig's motion for
reconsideration.13
Dasig filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals and raised four issues
before it.14 The first issue was whether Dasig was denied due process of law; the second was
whether the CSC erred in not giving weight to the 1 June 1999 Resolution of CHED Chairman
Angel Alcala (Alcala) absolving her from any administrative liability; the third was whether the
CSC erred in not considering evidence discovered after her dismissal which would have
materially affected the result of the case; and the fourth or last was whether the CSC erred in
not considering that the penalty of dismissal imposed on her was too harsh and oppressive
taking into account her thirty years of government service.
While the case was pending before the appellate court, this Court came out with a Resolution
dated 1 April 200315which ordered the disbarment of Dasig. Several high-ranking officers of the
CHED filed an administrative case for disbarment against Dasig, charging her with gross
misconduct in violation of the Attorney's Oath "for having used her public office to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED" with one of the
grounds for disbarment being Dasig's exaction of money from Dela Torre, Eje and Ng. In the
administrative case, the Court affirmed the following findings of fact:
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions,
during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from
Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N.
Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their
pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains
unrefuted, given the respondent's failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by
this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We
find that respondent's misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as
to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have
known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as
consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her
office.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court denied with finality the motion for reconsideration of Dasig in a resolution dated 17
June 2003.17 Despite the Court's findings in the disbarment proceeding, the Court of Appeals,
however, gave a different assessment of the evidence on record as it found that Dasig was only
"moonlighting" when she offered her legal services to the students who were requesting the
CHED to change their names appearing in their academic records to conform to their birth
certificates. The money which Dasig had asked from the students was, as found by the appellate
court, for "attorney's fees" and other litigation expenses. The appellate court held that the acts
of Dasig had constituted only simple misconduct.
Only the aspect of the Court of Appeals' decision finding Dasig liable only for simple misconduct
is subject to review before this Court. The appellate court decided all the first three issues in
favor of the CHED. It held that administrative due process was complied with since Dasig was
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain her side. It also declared the 1 June 1999
resolution of CHED Chairman Alcala absolving Dasig invalid and without legal effect since it was
he alone who signed it, contrary to the collegial structure of the CHED. And it gave scant
attention to the additional affidavits submitted by Dasig as they were not presented during the
proceedings before the CHED in line with the rule that no question, issue, or evidence shall be
entertained on appeal unless it was raised in the court or agency below.
The Court of Appeals explained its "moonlighting" approach, thus:
After a close perusal of the vital portions of Jacqueline S. Ng's Affidavit, We find that
Petitioner was trying to collect the money from the three students as her attorney's
fees and for the purpose of covering the expenses which shall be incurred in instituting
the appropriate action or proceeding in court- filing fee, publication, etc. for the
correction of the name of said student affiant.18
xxxx
We are of the well-considered view, that [p]etitioner was not trying to use the
influence of her position to cause the correction of the names of the students within
the CHED. It can be safely assumed that as a lawyer, [p]etitioner is fully aware that
an error in a person's name may only be legally corrected upon the filing of the
necessary Special Proceeding under the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 108.
Analy[z]ing [p]etitioner's acts, therefore, [w]e hold that she was merely trying to
engage in the private practice of the legal profession while employed at the CHED.
This is a classic case of "moonlighting", that is, holding an additional job in addition
to a regular one. We are perfectly mindful of [p]etitioner's indiscretion, and so hold
that her acts were improper and unbecoming of a public servant, more particularly of
one with a relatively high and responsible position like her. Simply put, [p]etitioner's
acts must not be condoned, particularly considering that she even attempted to
persuade her former staff at the Legal Affairs Services Office to partake of and
materially benefit from her would-be earnings in the aborted deal with the three
students.19 x x x.
After having been apprised of the Court's factual findings in the disbarment case against Dasig,
the Court of Appeals maintained its decision and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Specifically, it held thus:
The foregoing ruling of the Highest Court of the Land notwithstanding, [w]e still do
not find the propriety of modifying [o]ur conclusion that petitioner should be held
administratively liable only for the less serious infraction of Simple Misconduct. Verily,
the disbarment proceedings against petitioner was predicated in part upon the
provisions of the Attorney's Oath which contained more stringent and rigid standards
by which a lawyer's act must be tested, whereas [w]e examine petitioner's conduct
by using the rules as fixed by the CSC as well as jurisprudence. But more importantly,
aside from the difference in the laws applied, [w]e cannot defer to and take bearing
42
with the ruling of the Supreme Court considering that there is a significant variance
between the undisputed facts as found by the High Court in the disbarment
proceedings against petitioner, on one hand, and the material factual backdrop upon
which [w]e tested petitioner's conduct in public service, on the other. It must be
emphasized that petitioner did not participate in the disbarment proceedings, and as
a necessary consequence of her omission it became automatically undisputed, and
thus glaring in the eyes of the High Court, that she extorted money from the students
by way of consideration for a favorable resolution of the students' applications and
formal requests for the correction of their names, which were purportedly pending
before petitioner's office at the CHED.20 x x x.
The lone issue raised in the present petition is whether the Court of Appeals had correctly held
Dasig liable only for simple misconduct.
The Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The Court of Appeals committed a monumental blunder when it arrived at findings of fact
different from those of the Court in the disbarment case. It is inexplicable why the appellate
court would propound and insist on its "moonlighting" conclusion when even Dasig herself had
denied offering her services to anyone in the first place. It was only after the Court of Appeals
had come up with such finding that Dasig incorporated it into her theory of defense, belatedly
arguing that she should not be held liable for "moonlighting" since the CHED allows limited
practice of law pursuant to an alleged CHED memorandum dated 16 January 1995 entitled,
"Authorizing Lawyers of the Commission to Engage in Limited Practice of Profession."
Despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in the disbarment case which should be a
matter of judicial notice21 in the first place, the Court of Appeals still insisted on its divergent
finding and disregarded the Court's decision ordering the disbarment of Dasig in which one of
the determinative facts in issue was whether Dasig had attempted to extort money from Dela
Torre, Eje and Ng who in turn had wanted to have their academic records corrected to conform
to their birth certificates.
Apart from its mandated duty to take judicial notice of the resolution in the disbarment case,
the Court of Appeals is bound by this Court's findings and conclusions in the said resolution in
accordance with the doctrine of "stare decisis et non quieta movere."22 Although the
administrative case is different from the disbarment case, the parties are different and trials
were conducted separately, there can only be one truth: Dasig had attempted to extort money
from the students. For the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied
to that which follows, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of the
Pyrenees, falsehood on the other!23
Obstinately, the appellate court sought to justify its presumptuously aberrant stance on the
alleged circumstance that Dasig had not participated in the disbarment case. A careful look at
the Court's decision shows that Dasig had been duly informed of the disbarment case when the
Court in a resolution dated 3 February 1999 required her to file a Comment on the charges
against her. The resolution was sent to the same address she had used in filing the petition for
review with the Court of Appeals. She likewise chose not to comply with the order of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline dated 6 February 2001
which had directed her to submit an Answer to the Complaint. The IBP Commission had directed
her anew to file her Answer in an order dated 8 January 2002, but again she failed to comply
with the directive.24 Although Dasig had chosen not to respond to the complaints against her,
she was still able to file a motion for reconsideration, which this Court denied with finality.
Clearly, Dasig was given sufficient opportunity to respond to the charges against her.
 43

The Court of Appeals asserted that "petitioner did not participate in the disbarment proceedings,
and as a necessary consequence of her omission it became automatically undisputed, and thus
glaring in the eyes of the High Court, that she extorted money from the students."25 In more
comprehensible terms, the appellate court declared that petitioner did not participate in the
disbarment proceedings; and because of her non-participation the conclusion on her extortion
activity was unquestioned and appeared ineluctable from the Court's perspective. It is worth
noting that disbarment proceedings are under the administration of the Supreme Court under
the Rules of Court26 pursuant to its constitutional mandate.27 Thus, the statements of the Court
of Appeals constitute a desultory assault on the institutional integrity of this Court, aside from
being incorrect and illogical.
Indeed, the remarks tend to erode and undermine the people's trust and confidence in the
judiciary, ironically coming from one of its subordinate courts. No lower court justice or judge
may deride, chastise or chide the Supreme Court. And the "with due respect" approach that
preceded the remarks as a veneer cannot justify much less obliterate the lack of respect which
the remarks evince. In fact, it is the duty of lower courts to obey the decisions of the Supreme
Court and render obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming
modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation."28 "There is only one
Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings," so declared
Justice J. B. L. Reyes.29
in which the quantum of proof is preponderance of evidence. In evaluating the same evidence
as this Court in the disbarment case, it is truly inconceivable how the Court of Appeals could
have arrived at its "moonlighting" finding.
However, the accrued leave credits of Dasig shall not be forfeited despite the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal from government service. The forfeiture of leave credits is not one of the
accessory penalties of dismissal from service imposed by Section 5833 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals' Decision and
Resolution dated 15 September 2003 and 18 May 2008 respectively are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 001302 affirming the CHED Resolution
dated 29 November 1999 is hereby REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the
accessory penalty of forfeiture of leave credits be deleted. Hence, Felina Dasig is ORDERED to
be DISMISSED from the service with cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service,
including that in government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Presiding Justice, Court of Appeals, Manila, for
dissemination to the Associate Justices, Court of Appeals, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Quite obviously, when this Court dispensed the supreme penalty on Dasig in the disbarment
case based on the factual milieu it had upheld, the Court of Appeals should have done no less
by affirming the most severe penalty imposable under the law which the CHED and the CSC had
inflicted on Dasig in the administrative case that involved the same factual milieu. But, alas, the
appellate court unjustifiably chose to reduce the penalty by downgrading the administrative
offense.
The Court of Appeals erred when it found that Dasig had merely attempted to practice law while
employed at the CHED in offering her services to the three students for the correction of their
names through judicial proceedings under Rule 108. The procedure under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court was not applicable to the students who only wanted to correct entries in their academic
records to conform to their birth certificates. Rule 108 is for the purpose of correcting or
canceling entries in the civil registry involving (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children;
(j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.30 Hence, there is no justification for Dasig to ask for money under the guise of attorney's
fees and litigation expenses when it was her duty as the officer-in-charge of LAS to either
approve or disapprove the students' request to change entries in their academic records to
conform to their birth certificates.
From another perspective, the appellate court erred when it disregarded the factual findings of
the CHED. It ignored the well-settled rule that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise
of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon; hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies are accorded not only great respect but even finality by this Court when they are
supported by substantial evidence.31 The gauge of substantial evidence,32 which is the least
demanding in the hierarchy of evidence, is satisfied since there are reasonable grounds to
believe that Dasig is guilty of the charges against her which led to her dismissal from service.
And neither Dasig nor the Court of Appeals was able to show gross abuse of discretion, fraud,
or error of law on the part of the CHED and the CSC. The findings of the administrative agencies
were further bolstered when the Court arrived at similar findings of fact in the disbarment case,

RAMOS V. IMBANG
A.C. No. 6788 August 23, 2007
(Formerly, CBD 382)
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Complaint
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R.
Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.2 She
gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.3
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside.
He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled
and rescheduled.4 This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent
charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally
inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She
was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he
was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).5
Respondent's Defense
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from
the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as
counsel for the complainant's daughter.6
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses.7 Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an
indigent, he declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson,
a relative who was a private practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the
complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed
upon.10Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant.
She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the
complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's
acceptance fee.11
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one
of her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent
for safekeeping.12 Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated
July 15, 1992.13
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few months later or in September
1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch
44
as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However,
he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.15
Recommendation of the IBP
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On
November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of
Governors.16
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with
the PAO.18 It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman
and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not
have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected
respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request.19 It found
respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private
cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent
violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a
client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that
he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and
ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was
substantiated by the receipt.21
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent
violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however,
modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the
total amount, an additional suspension of six months.22
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.23 More specifically,
lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they
are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants
who owe utmost fidelity to public service.24
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For
this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
 45

xxx xxx xxx complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the
complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, in favor of the client)33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given
provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.25 for filing fees and bail bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.35
devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices. WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1,
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken from the
establishes an attorney-client relationship.26Respondent's admission that he accepted money Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest
from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of
complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
prohibition on private practice of profession. on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created SO ORDERED.
for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter
5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance
to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.28
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as
this was inconsistent with the office's mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against
accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This undertaking includes the observance of the
above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the
complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services.
Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession
disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's
fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a
complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done),
respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the
Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant
to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted
dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.31
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of
all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public
faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in
private practice.321avvphi1
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the

LAHM III V. MAYOR
A.C. No. 7430 February 15, 2012
MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, Complainants,
vs.
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint1 filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion
(complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. (respondent)
for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath.
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment2 to the complaint.
In a Resolution3 dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation4 dated September 19,
2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as
follows:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission against the members
of the Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-
NCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the
party-respondents are the complainants in the instant case.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The said
Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning. A day after, on
September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants herein entered its appearance and asked
for additional time to oppose and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David
Edward Toze.
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs the parties
in the said case to maintain the status quo ante. The complainants herein sought the
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x.
xxxx
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was immediately
reinstated and assumed his former position as superintendent of the International School
Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not resolved,
however, the scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 20,
2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal
case filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but the
respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007 requiring the parties to appear in
his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David Edward
Toze’ claim of moral and exemplary damages.
46
xxxx
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was issued
by him on account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was filed by David Edward Toze,
and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Additional Time to File Comment that was
thereafter filed by the counsel for the herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending
before the respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person of David
Edward Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David
Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for
a relatively long period of fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing
the Order dated September 14, 2006 that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
xxx
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being premature since
the aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending before the Labor Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant case is a subterfuge in order to compel
the respondent to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal dismissal case because the
complainants did not assail the Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.5
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the grounds cited
by the respondent to justify his issuance of the status quo ante order lacks factual basis and is
speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the authority to issue a temporary restraining
order and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion
for reconsideration directed against the September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated
effort to keep the status quo ante until the expiration of David Edward Toze’s employment
contract.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED for a period
of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident will be dealt
with more severe penalty.6
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
6447 which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The
said resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors had previously recommended
the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for three years in Administrative Case
(A.C.) No. 7314 entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.".
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition,8 but it was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.
The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the
respondent should be sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended
from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath. Thus:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath

which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (emphasis
supplied)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.9 Gross misconduct is any inexcusable,
shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration
of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of
the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.10
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the
respondent as a member of the bar. However, the grounds asserted by the complainants in
support of the administrative charges against the respondent are intrinsically connected with
the discharge of the respondent’s quasi-judicial functions.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a public officer
entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well settled that the Court may suspend or disbar
a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which
characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or
showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy
of public confidence.11
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts committed in the
discharge of his functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing
disciplinary sanctions against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he
has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the
rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is
of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he
may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.12
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,13 we stressed that:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if
said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer,
then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as
OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre,
Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action
on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted,
given the respondent’s failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondent’s misconduct
as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the
Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her
to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.
xxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations.
Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant
47
to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive
in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-
constant scrutiny of the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might
tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.14 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,15 we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts
committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform –
Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases against judges considering
that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan16 where the respondent-lawyer
was suspended from the practice of law for acts he committed in his capacity as an accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs
official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be
approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of
rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may
be erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such
error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.17
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous order
that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic,
lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge
may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he
renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in
performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.18
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it.
Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.19
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, the respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to
maintain the status quo ante until the said motion had been resolved. It should be stressed,
however, that at the time the said motion was filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is already in effect.
Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in proper
cases, the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section 1,
Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. – A preliminary injunction or restraining order
may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
(e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the

sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor
dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order shall become effective only upon the approval of the bond which
shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by the party enjoined, if it is finally
determined that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the
cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency
of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has
the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. Under
Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, only the NLRC, through its
Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders. Thus:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or restraining order
may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
(e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the
sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor
dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party. (emphasis supplied)
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of evidence as may be
delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides that:
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the application of
a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall
conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and
their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Commission
within fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the respondent, in
violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this point, the Investigating Commissioner
aptly ruled that:
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Toze’s Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005
Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.
xxxx
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission, should have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of
procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The first, states that it is the Commission
of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction or restraining order. While the second,
states [that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings on the application of preliminary injunction
or restraining order only in a delegated capacity.20
48
What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in resolving
the motion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The unfounded insistence of
the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion
for reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause
prejudice to the complainants.
On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:
The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September 14, 2006
and the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the illegal dismissal case before the
respondent.
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between David Edward
Toze and International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze will render work as a
superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006 and August 2006-July 2007.
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as superintendent
of International School of Manila until the resolution of the former’s Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila is
about to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the respondent expediently
resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Toze’s Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents because any delay in
the resolution thereof would result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and
unwarranted prejudice to International School Manila.
xxxx
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case before him,
there are barely four (4) months left with the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze
and International School Manila.
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the reconsideration of the
Order dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape the attention of this Commission. There
appears an orchestrated effort to delay the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated
September 14, 2006 and keep status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Toze’s
Employment Contract with International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering
the illegal dismissal case moot and academic.
xxxx
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of [the] assailed
Order x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under the circumstance that is attendant
with the term of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School
Manila. The respondent’s lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending incident before him
for more than five (5) months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the
respondent’s disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence.1âwphi1 Failure to decide a case or
resolve a motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being
a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no
matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the people’s faith and confidence in the
judiciary x x x. 21
 49

Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the
strictures of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning law in violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
sanction from this Court. resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a
WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or imposition of a more severe penalty.
temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and
mandates lawyers to "obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and
processes". likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as attorney.
All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his acts as a SO ORDERED.
labor arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into prejudice
to the rights of the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate penalty to be
imposed.
Under Rule 14022 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance
of the law is a serious charge,23 punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not
exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service.24
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Additionally,
in parallel cases,25 a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was meted the penalty of
suspension for six months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident
would be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing recommendation.
This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law for three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled "Mary Ann T.
Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This case, however, is still pending.
It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded
upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private
practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms
of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private
interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the
discharge of their official functions.26
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the Philippines
v. Judge Caguioa,27 thus:
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the palm
of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws and rules will render them
administratively liable.1âwphi1 Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. "Verily, for transgressing the
elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent should be administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law."
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or
a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving
of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority."28 (citations omitted)

ENRIQUEZ, SR. V. GIMENEZ
G.R. No. L-12817 April 29, 1960
JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and
ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June
1957.
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and
control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served
by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the
boundaries of cities, municipalities, and municipal districts in the Philippines, and those served
by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On
19 September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 127
providing, among others, for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
of all the records, properties, machinery, equipment, appropriations, assets, choses in actions,
liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks
and sewerage systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities and municipal districts (51 Off.
Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and
passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality in this present
administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No.
1383." (Annex A.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No.
152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on
the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle and
prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality
of Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from
exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality, (Annex B). On 2 May
1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and
constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought
against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality
of the Act creating it (Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed
Resolution No. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or
proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage
the services of a special counsel, and appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the expenses
of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter
to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated action
against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On 27 June 1956 the
Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829 approving Resolution No.
201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the
municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and
conditions: that his professional services shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to
and including the appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that his professional fee shall be P1,500
and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint, P500 upon the termination of the
50
hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have become
final or, should the judgment be appealed, after the appeal shall have been submitted for
judgment to the appellate court; and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and
necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courts including
court and sheriff fees, transportation and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of
transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28 June
1956, the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
(civil No. 542, Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing
to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H).
On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On 24 July 1956 the
petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of P40
paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee.
Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer
forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels
for pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for
initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500, based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by
the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and
prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had no
authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to the
refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M).
On 15 August 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on
11 September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under
section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court Annex N). On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed
this petition for review in this Court.
The Revised Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. — When the council is
desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or
the constitution or attributes of the municipal government, it shall frame such
question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for decision.
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. —
The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its
officers, including district health officers, and of the mayor and council of the various
municipalities and municipal districts of the province. As such he shall, when so
requested, submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by
any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof.
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in
litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or
municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is
vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district
in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other
municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a
provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial
fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and
counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality
in any court except when he is disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the
municipality, the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. The Provincial
Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the
 51

case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province;1 and
when in the case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of
the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and, therefore, would not
be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not
justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or
prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions
enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for
inhibition or disqualification.3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline
employment,4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided
for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others, "that he will well
and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which
he is about to enter. . . ."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal
council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in
place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant
to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the municipal
council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive supervision over
the Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and
direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and
absurd position of having control of both sides of the controversy. The petitioner's contention is
untenable. Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No.
94, series of 1947 and further amended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off.
Gaz., 5913, 5917, provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over
the Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In
Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2888, this Court distinguished
supervision from control as follows:
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter. . . .
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity and
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from
requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without
authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for
payment of attorney's fees. The decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as
to costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

GONZALES V. CHAVEZ
G.R. No. 97351 February 4, 1992
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, petitioner submits for the Court's adjudication the twin issues of whether or
not the Solicitor General neglected his public duty by withdrawing as counsel for the Republic
of the Philippines and the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in cases he
had filed in court and whether or not the PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring
private lawyers as a result of such withdrawal of appearance.
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen taxpayer, filed the petition as a class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the subject matters involved are of
common and general interest to all Filipino citizens and taxpayers as they pertain to the
enforcement of a public duty and the prevention of unlawful expenditure of public funds.
According to the petitioner, the Solicitor General is the counsel for the Republic and the PCGG
in thirty-three (33) cases before this Court, one hundred nine (109) cases in the Sandiganbayan,
one (1) case in the National Labor Relations Commission and another case in the Municipal Trial
Court or a total of one hundred forty-four (144) cases. 1 In December 1990, the Solicitor General
withdrew as counsel in said cases through a pleading entitled "Withdrawal of Appearance with
Reservation." 2 The pleading states:
The SOLICITOR GENERAL, to this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully withdraws as
counsel for plaintiff Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in the
above-captioned case, with the reservation, however, conformably with Presidential
Decree No. 478, the provisions of Executive Order No. 292 as well as the decisional
law of "Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.," (G.R. No. 92561, September 12,
1990), to submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this
Honorable Court, if called for by circumstances in the interest of the government or if
he is so required by the court.
The Solicitor General filed a substantially similar pleading in the cases where the Republic is a
party.
As a result of such withdrawal of appearance, the PCGG hired forty (40) private lawyers,
nineteen (19) of whom are trial lawyers. They would receive a monthly compensation of at least
P10,000.00 plus appearance fee of P1,700.00 in actual trial and/or P500.00 if trial is
postponed. 3
Petitioner contends that since the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance was made
without any reason, it implied that it was "within the absolute discretion" of said public official.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 and Section 35 of the Administrative Code of 1987,
however, mandatorily require the Solicitor General to stand in the place of, and act for the
Republic and the PCGG in court. Therefore, the Solicitor General has "no discretion to reject by
withdrawing" as counsel for said entities.
Applying the ruling of this Court with respect to a fiscal in Sta. Rosa Mining Co. v. Zabala, 4 the
petitioner further states that: "Similarly, it is the duty of the Solicitor General to appear for the
52
Republic and the PCGG, hence regardless of his personal convictions or opinions, he must
proceed to discharge his duty (not withdraw, which is equivalent to refusal to prosecute), and
let the court decide the merits of the case." 5
Moreover, petitioner avers that the Solicitor General cannot withdraw his appearance "with
reservation" nor can he file his "comment/observation on the incident/matters" after such
withdrawal because by ceasing to appear as counsel, he loses his standing in court. Unless a
case involves the constitutionality of a treaty, law, ordinance or executive order for which Rule
3 Section 23 of the Rules of Court 6 mandates his appearance, the Solicitor General is not
authorized to appear therein after his withdrawal as counsel inasmuch as he himself is not a
party-litigant.
Furthermore, under Section 26, of Rule 138, 7 the Solicitor General may not unilaterally withdraw
his appearance without the consent of the Republic or the PCGG unless the court authorizes his
withdrawal. Since there was no such court authority, the Solicitor General's withdrawal of
appearance in said several cases is null and void, as it constitutes an act against a mandatory
law and hence, it may be attacked collaterally. Neither may the Solicitor General withdraw on
the authority of Orbos v. Civil Service Commission 8 wherein this Court held:
In the discharge of this task the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest
of the government is upheld within the limits set by law. . .
xxx xxx xxx
There are cases where a government agency declines the services of the Solicitor
General or otherwise fails or refuses to forward the papers of the case to him for
appropriate action. . .
The Court finds and so holds that this practice should be stopped. To repeat, the
Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, any of its agents and officials in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.
The exception is when such officials or agents are being charged criminally or are
being civilly sued for damages arising from a felony. His services cannot be lightly
rejected, much less ignored by the officer or officials concerned.
Indeed, the assistance of the Solicitor General should be welcomed by the parties. He
should be given full support and cooperation by any agency or official involved in
litigation. He should be enabled to faithfully discharge his duties and responsibilities
as the government advocate. And he should do no less for his clients. His burden of
assisting in the fair and just administration of justice is clear.
This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the performance of his
duty. As a matter of fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor
General in many proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned task. He should
not therefore desist from appearing before this Court even in those cases he finds his
opinion inconsistent with the government or any of its agents he is expected to
represent. The Court must be advised of his position just as well. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner adds the following observations: 9
Therefore, this case militates more against the Solicitor General than in his favor. For
if the government and its officials cannot reject the services of the Solicitor General,
neither may the latter select the case he would represent by withdrawing in some and
retaining others. For unlike private lawyers who are bound to their clients by contract
and, therefore, can reject cases offered to them, the Solicitor General and PCGG are
wedded to each other by statute for better and for worse. And only a divorce, through
the abolition of PCGG or resignation of the Solicitor General, can untie the marital
knot. Otherwise, the relationship should continue sans PCGG demurring, and the

Solicitor General withdrawing. Absent such resignation or abolition, the Solicitor
General has to prosecute or defend the said cases to the best of his ability.
Hence, petitioner contends, the PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private
lawyers as substitutes for the Solicitor General. Nowhere in Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14
does it appear that the PCGG is authorized to hire said lawyers. Since the Solicitor General is
named by law as the lawyer for all government agencies, the hiring of private lawyers by such
agencies is impliedly excluded. Thus, by employing private lawyers, the PCGG is creating a public
office and naming a public officer. However, in the absence of a law providing for the creation
of the office of PCGG counsel, said hired lawyers are usurpers or intruders whose acts may be
challenged in a collateral proceeding such as an action for prohibition.
Similarly, petitioner asserts, prohibition will lie against the Commission on Audit considering that
any payment for the services of the PCGG-hired lawyers would result in an unlawful expenditure
of public funds. Stressing the need to preserve the status quo until the determination of his
rights as a citizen and taxpayer, petitioner prays for the issuance of temporary restraining order.
Acting on the petition, however, the Court required the respondent to file their respective
comments on the petition without granting the prayer for a temporary restraining order. 10
In its comment, the Commission on Audit (COA) alleges that it has not allowed the disbursement
of funds to pay for the services of PCGG-hired private lawyers. It points out the fact that under
COA Circular No. 89-299 dated March 21, 1989, the COA has withdrawn the pre-audit of
transactions entered into by national government agencies pursuant to the constitutional
provision that the COA has the exclusive authority to "define the scope of its audit and
examination, to establish the techniques and methods required therefor." 11 Neither has the
COA allowed in post-audit the disbursements of funds in payment of the services of the hired
private lawyers. Moreover, under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986, the hiring of
private lawyers by government agencies and instrumentalities is prohibited unless there is prior
written conformity of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case
may be, as well as the written concurrence of COA.
For its part, the PCGG, through Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren and lawyer Eliseo B. Alampay,
asserts in its comment that the scope of its authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14
is broad enough to include the authority to engage the services of private lawyers, if necessary,
for the fulfillment of its mandate. While such authority is not expressly stated in said executive
orders, "it must be deemed necessarily implied in and subsumed under the expressly
enumerated powers of the Commission." 12
The PCGG contends that its power under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 14 to "file and
prosecute all cases investigated by it" includes "the grant of discretion to the Commission in
determining the manner of filing and prosecuting its cases including the matter of who, in
particular, will control and supervise the prosecution of said cases." The phrase "with the
assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies" simply means
that the Solicitor General is called upon to render assistance to the PCGG and whether or not
such discretion is required by the Commission is a matter of discretion on its part. Such provision
does not preclude the PCGG from engaging the services of private lawyers in the same way that
it is "clearly authorized to hire accountants, appraisers, researchers and other professionals as
it performs its functions." Since, upon the dictates of legal and practical necessity, it has hired
lawyers in the United States and in Switzerland, "it may similarly hire Filipino lawyers in
prosecuting its Philippine cases." 13
The PCGG further asserts that the hiring of private lawyers is "not an ultra vires" act but a
"means by which (it) can effectively exercise its powers." It emphasizes the fact that it hired
private lawyers "only after the Officer of the Solicitor General had unilaterally withdrawn its
appearance" for the PCGG in the various pending PCGG-instituted cases. Its own Litigation
Division, which was constituted after the Solicitor General's withdrawal, is "sorely undermanned"
53
but it has to contend with "affluent and influential individuals and entities" who can "afford to
hire skilled lawyers and organize vast litigation networks." The PCGG tried to seek the assistance
of the Department of Justice and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel but only the
former sent two additional prosecutors to handle its cases. 14
The PCGG clarifies that its powers are circumscribed not only by the executive orders
aforementioned but also by the inherent police power of the State. By hiring private lawyers, it
was merely trying to assist the President of the Philippines in protecting the interest of the State.
As such, it was acting as an alter ego of the President and therefore, it was the Executive which
determined the necessity of engaging the services of private prosecutors. Contending that
"overwhelming necessity" impelled it to hire private lawyers, the PCGG avers that inasmuch as
the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Philippine National Bank may engage the services of
private lawyers, with more reason may it be allowed to hire private prosecutors after it was
abandoned by the Solicitor General in the prosecution of the ill-gotten wealth cases.
Consequently, "the Solicitor General's withdrawal of assistance is tantamount to his tacit
approval of the PCGG's hiring of private prosecutors in replacement of the solicitors handling
the said civil cases." 15
The PCGG concludes that the reasonableness of the compensation for its hired lawyers can
hardly be questioned considering the expertise of said lawyers and the complexity of the cases
they would be handling for the PCGG. Thus, the prayer for a preliminary injunction must be
denied otherwise "the harm that would be done would be far greater than the perceived mischief
petitioner seeks to prevent." 16
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez inhibits himself from appearing in this case "considering
that as far as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity) is concerned, the subject is a
closed matter among the OSG, the PCGG and the Courts." 17 In the comment filed by Assistant
Solicitor General Edgardo L. Kilayko and Solicitor Iderlina P. Pagunuran, the OSG sets out at
length the history of the PCGG from its creation until the filing in the Sandiganbayan of thirty-
nine (39) " prima facie cases" for ill-gotten wealth against former President Marcos and his
cronies. As suits and countersuits stemmed from the original thirty-nine (39) civil cases, "the
OSG had been put to a tremendous task and thus invariably in urgent need of being consulted
or informed by the PCGG of the facts and circumstances material to the prosecution and
progress not only of the original 39 civil cases, but also of all kinds of "incidents."
Nonetheless, the OSG lawyers faced the challenge and the odds if only to live up to their task
as "the best lawyers there are in the country." The OSG further explains: 18
On many a time, however a time, however, the lack of the above-mentioned
consultation or information resulted in situations that rendered the OSG unavoidably
incapable of performing its functions and duties as Lawyer of the Government, not
only as mandated upon it by law and as spelled out in Orbos v. CSC, G.R. No. 92561,
September 12, 1990, but also in consonance with its office motto: "Integrity In
Advocacy."
Once the OSG argued before the Sandiganbayan that an asset was under
sequestration, only to be informed by the adverse party waving a document before
the Sandiganbayan Justices that the sequestration had earlier been lifted, with a
PCGG resolution, the document, to boot (Razon case). Then, again, OSG argued, even
before this Honorable Court, that an ill-gotten asset had "mysteriously" disappeared,
only to be informed by the Honorable Court, that a PCGG Commissioner had earlier
by resolution authorized the disposition of the asset (COCOFED case). All the
instances need not be enumerated here, as they are not meat and substance, even
as OSG is rendered thereby a laughing stock in its professionalism.
As to matters that are of great pith and moment, suffice it to say that the recent
Benedicto "compromise" agreement, not to mention the SMC-UCPB Compromise

settlement, is sub judice or under advisement not only of the Sandiganbayan but also
of this Honorable Court in separate "incidents," and suffice it to state that the
relationship, obtaining between the Government offices/agencies and the Office of
the Solicitor General as counsel, is not at all like one that simply would obtain between
private client and private lawyer in private practice, although constant consultation
and advice are sine qua non in both types of relationship. The relationship is rather
one, created as it is by law, where imposed upon OSG is the responsibility to present
to the courts the position that will uphold the best interests of the People, the
Government and the State, albeit the same may run counter to its client's position or
route of action. At any rate, the PCGG through nationwide TV broadcast and print
media, publicly announced that PCGG had disposed with or otherwise did not need
the legal services of the Lawyer of the Government, and thus OSG descended, not
the unmerited remark of having "abandoned" the ill-gotten wealth cases, but the
time-honored principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio est, i.e., there is no obligation
to do impossible things (Lim Co Chui v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 463), without in any way
casting any aspersion on the moral integrity of any Commissioner or PCGG official, as
made clear by the Solicitor General to the President in a meeting with PCGG.
Hence, in the light of all the foregoing circumstances, at rock-bottom precisely so as
not to prejudice "the interest of the Government" (Orbos), the Solicitor General
withdrew as counsel for PCGG in all said cases by filing a notice of "Withdrawal of
Appearance with Reservation."
In arguing that the instant petition should be dismissed, the OSG contends that this case has
become moot and academic as this very Court had resolved to allow the withdrawal of
appearance of the Solicitor General in all the cases pending before it "with reservation,
conformably with PD No. 478, Executive Order No. 292, as well as the doctrine laid down in
'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,' G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, . . ." 19 For its
part, the Sandiganbayan had also resolved that "the appearance of the Solicitor General is
deemed withdrawn to be substituted by the PCGG's legal panel." 20
The OSG maintains further that the instant petition does not present a case and controversy as
the petitioner himself does not even have a "court standing" and a "litigable interest." All the
petitioner seeks is an "advisory opinion." The OSG asserts that the "incident" (referring to the
Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance) should be distinguished from that in JPC
Enterprise, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 21 wherein the Assets Privatization Trust (APT)
decided to appear for itself because the law names the Minister of Justice only as its ex
oficio legal adviser while by itself it can file suits and institute proceedings and engage external
expertise in the fulfillment of its tasks. However, since the APT has no personality of its own, it
should have appeared through the Solicitor General. The OSG argues that said "adversarial
incident" is not present in this case.
In his reply to the comments of the PCGG and the OSG, the petitioner insists that although as
between the Solicitor General and the PCGG, this case may have been rendered moot and
academic, as between him on the one hand and the Solicitor General and the PCGG on the other
hand, a "real controversy" still exists and the issues raised herein have not ceased to exist either.
Moreover, a judgment of prohibition and mandamus would have a "practical legal effect and
can be enforced." 22
Citing Miguel v. Zulueta, 23 and Tañada v. Tuvera, 24 petitioner asserts that he has a standing
in court because where a question of public right is involved and the object of the mandamus is
the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show any legal or special interest in the
result of the proceeding. It is sufficient that, as a citizen, he is interested in having the laws
executed and the duty in question enforced.
54
The petitioner rebuts the PCGG's contention that its power to hire private lawyers may be implied
from its expressly enumerated powers. He asserts that since P.D. No. 478 mandates that "the
Solicitor General as law office of the government with the duty to appear for the PCGG," no
implication from the express powers of (the) PCGG can stand against the language of P.D. No.
478. On the other hand, the law regarding the PCGG and that regarding the Solicitor General
should be harmonized. 25
The Court considers these pleadings sufficient bases for resolving this petition and, on account
of the importance and imperativeness of the issues raised herein, the filing of memoranda by
the parties is dispensed with.
We shall, first of all, confront a preliminary issue interposed by the OSG — whether or not this
case has been rendered moot and academic by this Court's resolution granting the Solicitor
General's motion to withdraw appearance as counsel in the several cases pending herein. It
should be clarified that the resolution had to be issued with the national interest in mind. Time
was of the essence and any hedging on the part of the PCGG and/or its counsel could, not
merely set back but prejudice, the government's all-out efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth.
Notwithstanding the ostensible mootness of the issues raised in a case, this Court has never
shirked from its symbolic function of educating bench and bar by formulating guiding and
controlling principles, precepts, doctrines and rules. 26 More so, if the case is of such magnitude
that certain legal ambiguities must be unravelled for the protection of the national interest. 27
To allow the transcendental issue of whether the OSG may withdraw its appearance in a cluster
of cases of national import to pass into legal limbo simply because it has been "mooted" would
be a clear case of misguided judicial self-restraint. This Court has assiduously taken every
opportunity to lay down brick by brick the doctrinal infrastructure of our legal system. Certainly,
this is no time for a display of judicial timorousness of the kind which the Solicitor General is
untimely exhibiting now.
Accordingly, we confront the issue conscious of their far-reaching implications, not alone on the
instant case but on future ones as well, which the OSG will surely be called upon to handle again
and again.
The resolution of the first issue laid down at the beginning of this ponencia hinges on whether
or not the Solicitor General may be compelled by mandamus to appear for the Republic and the
PCGG. This issue is best resolved by a close scrutiny of the nature and extent of the power and
authority lodged by law on the Solicitor General.
At this juncture, a flashback on the statutory origins of the Office of the Solicitor General is in
order. Incorporated in Act No. 136 dated June 11,
1901 28 providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine Islands was Chapter III entitled
"The Attorney General." Section 40 states:
There shall be an Attorney-General for the Philippine Islands, to be appointed by the
Philippine Commission . . .
The catalog of his duties includes the following:
He shall prosecute or defend therein all causes, civil and criminal, to which the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity, is
a party . . . 29
Section 41 further provides:
There shall be an officer learned in the law to assist the Attorney-General in the
performance of all his duties, called the Solicitor-General who shall be appointed by
the Commission . . . In case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney-General, or of his

absence or disability, the Solicitor-General shall have power to exercise the duties of
that office. Under the supervision of the Attorney-General, it shall be the especial duty
of the Solicitor-General to conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court,
in which the Philippine Government is interested, and the Attorney-General may,
whenever he deems it for the interest of the Philippine Government, either in person
conduct and argue any case in any court of the Philippine Islands in which the
Philippine Government is interested or may direct the Solicitor General to do so.
(Emphasis supplied)
Six months later, a law was passed reorganizing the Office of the Attorney-General and providing
for the appointment of the said official and the Solicitor General by the Civil Governor and for
an increase in their salaries. Their duties remained basically the same. 30
In the meantime, Act No. 222 was passed on September 5, 1901 providing for the organization
of, among others, the Department of Finance and Justice which embraced within its executive
control the Bureau of Justice. 31
Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1917, the Bureau of Justice
is specifically constituted "the law office of the Government of the Philippine Islands and by it
shall be performed duties requiring the services of a law officer." 32 Its chief officials are the
Attorney-General and his assistant, the Solicitor General. 33
As principal law officer of the Government, the Attorney-General shall have authority
to act for and represent the Government of the Philippine Islands, its officers, and
agents in any official investigation, proceeding, or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer. 34
In 1932, the office of the Attorney-General was phased out and his functions were assumed by
the Secretary of Justice. 35 Subsequently, the Bureau of Justice came to be known as the Office
of the Solicitor General, 36 headed by the Solicitor General. 37
Parenthetically, these institutions were patterned after the Office of Attorney-General, created
by the First U.S. Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which called for a "meet person, learned
in the law, to act as Attorney-General for the U.S." 38 When the Department of Justice was
established in 1870, the position of Solicitor-General was created as an assistant to the Attorney-
General. 39 Over a century later, their respective positions and functions remain the same. The
Attorney-General of the United States, appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate, is now the head of the Department of Justice. 40 In the same manner, a Solicitor
General, learned in the law, is appointed to assist the Attorney-General in the performance of
his duties. 41
In contrast, the Solicitor-General of the Philippines, emerging from the shadow of the Attorney-
General and later, of the Secretary of Justice, has come to his own. On July 20, 1948, Republic
Act. No. 335, amending Section 1659 of the Administrative Code, bestowed on him the rank of
Undersecretary of a Department. Subsequently, a series of amendatory laws designed to enlarge
the complement of the Office of the Solicitor General was enacted 42 until on June 4, 1974, by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 478, its pivotal role in the government became clearly defined
and delineated.
During the martial law years, President Ferdinand E. Marcos leaned heavily on his Solicitor
General to provide legal underpinnings of his official acts. Reflective of the tremendously
enhanced power of the official and the position was Executive Order No. 454 enacted on
September 23, 1975, conferring upon the Solicitor General the rank of a member of the
Cabinet "with all the rights, honors and privileges pertaining to the position." Said executive
order was superseded by Executive Order No. 473 dated August 12, 1976 "making the Solicitor
General a member of the Cabinet." These executive orders were capped by Executive Order No.
55
552 dated August 14, 1979 elevating the OSG into a Ministry with the same powers and functions
defined in P.D. Nos. 478 and 1347.
P.D. 478 became, as it were, the Magna Carta of the Office of the Solicitor General. After the
change of administration, or on July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 292 instituting the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Book IV, Title III,
Chapter 12 thereof, the Office of the Solicitor General is described as an "independent and
autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice." Headed by the Solicitor General,
"who is the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government," the Office shall have a
Legal Staff composed of fifteen (15) Assistant Solicitors General and such number of Solicitors
and Trial Attorneys "as may be necessary to operate the Office which shall divided into fifteen
(15) divisions. 43 Among its powers and functions are the following which are relevant to the
issues:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. — The office of the Solicitor General shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services
of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall
also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. (Emphasis supplied.) It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(2) Investigate, initiate court action, or in any manner proceed against any
person, corporation or firm for the enforcement of any contract, bond,
guarantee, mortgage, pledge or other collateral executed in favor of the
Government. Where proceedings are to be conducted outside of the
Philippines, the Solicitor General may employ counsel to assist in the
discharge of the aforementioned responsibilities.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies
and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the
Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the
courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal Officers with
respect to such cases.
(9) Call on any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the
Government for such service, assistance and cooperation as may be
necessary in fulfilling its function and responsibilities and for this purpose
enlist the services of any government official or employees in the pursuit of
his tasks.
Departments, bureaus, agencies, offices, instrumentalities and corporations
to whom the Office of the Solicitor General renders legal services are
authorized to disburse funds from their sundry operating and other funds
for the latter Office. For this purpose, the Solicitor General and his staff are
specifically authorized to receive allowances as may be provided by the
Government offices, instrumentalities and corporations concerned, in
addition to their regular compensation.

(10) Represent, upon the instructions of the President of the Republic of
the Philippines in international litigations, negotiations or conferences
where the legal position of the Republic must be defended or presented.
(11) Act for the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body
or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion ,
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require; and
(12) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 44
In thus tracing the origins of the Office of the Solicitor General to gain a clear understanding of
the nature of the functions and extent of the powers of the Solicitor General himself, it is evident
that a policy decision was made in the early beginnings to consolidate in one official the
discharge of legal functions and services in the government. These took the form mostly of
representing the Government in various legal proceedings.
The rationale behind this step is not difficult to comprehend. Sound government operations
require consistency in legal policies and practices among the instrumentalities of the State.
Moreover, an official learned in the law and skilled in advocacy could best plan and coordinate
the strategies and moves of the legal battles of the different arms of the government. Surely,
the economy factor, too, must have weighed heavily in arriving at such a decision.
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor
General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal
proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is the discernible intent which may be
gathered from the term "shall," which is invariably employed, from Act No. 136 (1901) to the
more recent Executive Order No. 292 (1987).
Under the principles of statutory construction, so familiar even to law students, the term "shall"
is nothing if not mandatory.
In common or ordinary parlance and in its ordinary significance, the term "shall" is a
word of command, and one which has always and which must be given a compulsory
meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. It has the invariable significance
of operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is
in favor of this meaning or when public interest is involved, or where the public or
persons have rights which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a contrary intent
appears. 45
The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used in an imperative, and not
in a directory, sense. If a different interpretations if sought, it must rest upon
something in the character of the legislation or in the context which will justify a
different meaning. 46
Exactly what is the signification of the mandate for the OSG "to represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigations or matter requiring the services of the lawyer?"
To "represent" is standing in place, supplying the place, or performing the duties or
exercising the rights, of the party represented; to speak or act with authority on behalf
of another; to conduct and control proceedings in court on behalf of another. 47
The decision of this Court as early as 1910 with respect to the duties of Attorney-General well
applies to the Solicitor General under the facts of the present case. The Court then declared:
In this jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Attorney General "to perform the duties
imposed upon him by law" and "he shall prosecute all causes, civil and criminal, to
56
which the Government of the Philippines Islands, or any officer thereof, in his official
capacity, is a party . . ." 48
Being a public officer, the Solicitor General is "invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public." 49 Another
role of the Solicitor General is an officer of the Court, in which case he is called upon "to share
in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes;" therefore, he may
be enjoined in the same manner that a special prosecutor was sought enjoined by this Court
from committing any act which may tend to "obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the
administration of justice." 50
In one case where a fiscal manifested before the trial court that he would not prosecute the
case in court for insufficiency of evidence after his motion to dismiss had been denied, this Court
granted a petition for mandamus to compel him to prosecute the case. We declared:
Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his
duty of presenting evidence to the Court to enable the court to arrive at its own
independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk
from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a
private prosecutor . . . In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public
prosecutor to appear for the government since an offense is an outrage to the
sovereignty of the State . . . This is so because "the prosecuting officer is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty where
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligations to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. 51
Undoubtedly, the above arguments apply equally well to the Solicitor General who is sought to
be compelled to appear before the different courts to ensure that the case of the Republic of
the Philippines against those who illegally amassed wealth at the expense the people maybe
made to account for their misdeeds and return said wealth.
Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether
to prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, 52 our own
Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suit either with or
without stipulations with other party. 53 Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that
the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reason for the discretion given
him is not unlimited. 54 Its exercise must be, not only within the parameters set by law but with
the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal. Such are reflected in its policies, thus:
The discretionary power of the attorney for the United States in determining whether
a prosecution shall be commenced or maintained may well depend upon matters of
policy wholly apart from any question of probable cause. Although as member of the
bar, the Attorney for the United States is an officer of the court, he is nevertheless an
executive official of the Government, and it is as an officer of the executive
department that he exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be a
prosecution in a particular case. . . . 55
The first executive order ever issued by President Aquino on February 28, 1986, created the
PCGG. It announced the government's policy of recovering all ill-gotten wealth amassed by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates. It charged the
PCGG with the "task of assisting the President" in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth,
investigation of "such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign" to it, and the
adoption of safeguards to ensure that corruption may not be again committed with impunity.

This issuance was followed by Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986 freezing all assets
and properties of Marcos, his family and cronies; prohibiting their transfer, conveyance,
encumbrance or concealment, and requiring all persons in and outside of the Philippines who
are in possession of said properties to make full disclosure of the same to the PCGG.
On April 11, 1986, the PCGG promulgated its Rules and Regulations. A pertinent provision states:
Sec. 10. Findings of the Commission. — Based on the evidence adduced, the
Commission shall determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the
asset, property or business enterprise in question constitute ill-gotten wealth as
described in Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2. In the event of an affirmative finding, the
Commission shall certify the case to the Solicitor General for appropriate action in
accordance with law. Business, properties, funds, and other assets found to be
lawfully acquired shall be immediately released and the writ of sequestration, hold or
freeze orders lifted accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, or on May 7, 1986, Executive Order No. 14 defining the jurisdiction over cases
involving such ill-gotten wealth was issued, it contains the following provisions:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, with the assistance of the Solicitor General and
other government agencies, is hereby empowered to file and prosecute all cases
investigated by it under Executive Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986, and
Executive Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be warranted by its finding.
Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases,
whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction thereof.
Sec. 3. Civil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for
consequential damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No.
1379, or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in
connection with Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986, may be filed separately
from and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by
a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied).
All these legal provisions ineluctably lead to no other conclusion but that under the law of its
creation and the complementary Rules, the law office of the PCGG, as it is for the rest of the
Government, is the Office of the Solicitor General. Although the PCGG is "empowered to file and
prosecute all cases investigated by it" under Executive Orders No. 1 and 2, it does not thereby
oust the Office of the Solicitor General from its lawful mandate to represent the Government
and its agencies in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer. Moreover, such express grant of power to PCGG does not imply that it may abdicate
such power and turn over the prosecution of the cases to private lawyers whom it may decide
to employ. In those instances where proceedings are to be conducted outside of the Philippines,
the Solicitor General, continuing to discharge his duties, may employ counsel to assist
him, 56 particularly because he may not be licensed to appear before the courts in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Under its own Rules and Regulations, specifically the provision aforequoted, the PCGG certifies
to the Solicitor General the cases for which it had found reasonable ground to believe that
certain assets and properties are ill-gotten under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2. The Solicitor
General shall then proceed "in accordance with law."
Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the
management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate
action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal
57
authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government
on the matter at hand.
After filing a case, he may even move for its dismissal in the event that, along the way, he
realizes that prosecuting the case would not serve the government's purposes. In other words,
because he was appointed to the position on account of his qualification as a man "learned in
the law," the Solicitor General is obligated to perform his functions and to perform them well.
He may not, however, abdicate his function through an arbitrary exercise of his discretion. We
find that a withdrawal of appearance on flimsy or petty grounds is tantamount to withdrawing
on no grounds at all and to a dereliction of duty.
The Office of the Solicitor General repeatedly invoked the ruling in Orbos v. Civil Service
Commission, 57 which hardly constitutes authority to uphold its position with respect to the
withdrawal of the Solicitor General in the instant case. On the contrary, in said case, this Court
struck down private respondent's motion to disqualify the OSG from appearing for petitioner
Department of Transportation and Communications Secretary Orbos. At the risk of being
repetitious, the parties were reminded that under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 —
The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines,
its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. (Emphasis
supplied)
This Court clarified that even when "confronted with a situation where one government office
takes an adverse position against another government agency, as in this case, the Solicitor
General should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is
incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best
interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position. In such an instance,
the government office adversely affected by the position taken by the Solicitor General, if it still
believes in the merit of its case may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or
representative."
The Court further pointed out that it is not entirely impossible that the Office of the Solicitor
General may take a position adverse to his clients like the Civil Service Commission and the
National Labor Relations Commission, among others, and even the People of the Philippines. In
such instances, however, it is not proper for the Solicitor General to simply decline to handle
the case or arbitrarily withdraw therefrom. The Court enjoins him to "nevertheless manifest his
opinion and recommendations to the Court which is an invaluable aid in the disposition of the
case." 58
However, in those cases where a government agency declines the services of the Solicitor
General or otherwise fails or refuses to forward the papers of the case to him for appropriate
action, the Court categorically held that ". . . this practice should be estopped." 59 By the same
token, the Solicitor General should not decline to appear in court to represent a government
agency without just and valid reason, especially the PCGG which is under the Office of the
President, he being a part of the Executive Department.
In the case at bar, the reason advanced by the Solicitor General for his motion to withdraw his
appearance as lawyer for the PCGG is that he has been, more than once embarrassed in court
and thereby made "a laughing stock in its (his) professionalism." Examples are when the OSG
lawyers betrayed ignorance in open court of certain moves taken by the PCGG, such as the
lifting of a sequestration of an asset or when it was under the impression that an asset had
mysteriously disappeared only to be informed that "a PCGG Commissioner had earlier by
resolution authorized the disposition of said asset."
The last straw, as it were, was the public announcement through media made by the PCGG that
it had "dispensed with or otherwise did not need the legal services of the lawyer of the

government." 60 It is evident that the withdrawal of the Solicitor General was precipitated by
institutional pique, the lawyers concerned having allowed their collective pride to prevail over
their sense of duty in protecting and upholding the public interest.
One wistfully wishes that the OSG could have been as zealous in representing the PCGG as it
was in appearing for the head of their office, the Solicitor General, in a civil suit for damages
filed against him in a Regional Trial Court arising from allegedly defamatory remarks uttered by
him.
Such enthusiasm, according to this Court, was misplaced. For Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 478 which authorizes the OSG to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, admits of an exception, and
that it is, it stops short of representing "a public official at any stage of a criminal case or in a
civil suit for damages arising from a felony." 61
In instances such as the above, the OSG can, with reason, withdraw its representation even if
it has already entered its appearance. But the Solicitor General, as the officially-mandated lawyer
of the government, is not empowered to take a similar step on the basis of a petty reason like
embarrassment, as that to which the individual lawyers assigned to appear for their office were
subjected. Had they not been too preoccupied with their personal feelings, they could have
checked themselves in time. For a sense of professional responsibility and proper decorum
would dictate that they distinguish between the institution which, from the very beginning, had
been constituted as the law office of the Government and the individuals through whom its
powers and duties are exercised. No emotions, of whatever kind and degree, should be allowed
to becloud their high sense of duty and commitment to country and people.
The OSG itself admitted refraining from citing other incidents as additional bases for the Solicitor
General's withdrawal "as they are not of meat and substance" but apparently, their
overwhelming sense of shame overcame them as the OSG was "rendered thereby a laughing
stock in its professionalism." 62
Now a word on the incidents that allegedly caused humiliation to the OSG lawyers, thus
provoking the Solicitor General into withdrawing his appearance as counsel for the PCGG. No
litigation can be assured of success if counsel does not enjoy the confidence of his client. This
is manifested by, among other things, holding regular, constant and untrammeled consultation
with each other. Who can say but that if the communication lines had been kept open between
the OSG and PCGG, no surprises would have been sprung on the former by the latter in open
court?
Petitioner's claim that the Solicitor General could not withdraw his appearance as lawyer of
PCGG inasmuch as he had neither the consent of his client nor the authority from the court,
applying the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, is not well-taken. Here is no ordinary
lawyer-client relationship. Let it be remembered that the client is no less than the Republic of
the Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides. Whether regarded as an abstract
entity or an ideal person, it is to state the obvious that it can only act through the instrumentality
of the government which, according to the Administrative Code of 1987, refers to the "corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippines . . ." 63 And the OSG is, by law, constituted the law office of the Government whose
specific powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the people before
any court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require.
Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a collectivity that constitutes the Republic
of the Philippines. Thus, the distinguished client of the OSG is the people themselves of which
the individual lawyers in said office are a part.
58
In order to cushion the impact of his untimely withdrawal of appearance which might adversely
affect the case, the Solicitor General has offered "to submit his comment/observation on
incidents/matters pending with this Honorable Court, if called for by circumstances in the
interest of the government or if he is so required by the court." However, as correctly pointed
out by the petitioner, while the Solicitor General may be free to express his views and comments
before the Court in connection with a case he is handling, he may not do so anymore after he
has formally expressed his refusal to appear therein. For by then, he has lost his standing in
court. Unless his views are sought by the court, the Solicitor General may not voluntarily appear
in behalf of his client after his withdrawal from the case; otherwise, such reappearance would
constitute a blatant disregard for court rules and procedure, and that, on the part of one who
is presumed to be "learned in the law."
In the face of such express refusal on the part of the Solicitor General to continue his appearance
as counsel of the PCGG in the cases to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Filipino people from
the Marcoses and their cronies, the PCGG has had to employ the service of a group of private
attorneys lest the national interest be prejudiced. Were this Court to allow such action to remain
unchallenged, this could well signal the laying down of the novel and unprecedented doctrine
that the representation by the Solicitor General of the Government enunciated by law is, after
all, not mandatory but merely directory. Worse, that this option may be exercised on less than
meritorious grounds; not on substance but on whimsy, depending on the all too human frailties
of the lawyers in the OSG assigned to a particular case. Under such circumstances, it were
better to repeal the law than leave the various government agencies, all dependent on the OSG
for legal representation, in a condition of suspenseful uncertainty. With every looming legal
battle, they will be speculating whether they can rely on the Solicitor General to defend the
Government's interest or whether they shall have to depend on their own "in-house" resources
for legal assistance.
The Court is firmly convinced that, considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be
no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed,
mandatory upon the OSG to "represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer."
Sound management policies require that the government's approach to legal problems and
policies formulated on legal issues be harmonized and coordinated by a specific agency. The
government owes it to its officials and their respective offices, the political units at different
levels, the public and the various sectors, local and international, that have dealings with it, to
assure them of a degree of certitude and predictability in matters of legal import.
From the historical and statutory perspectives detailed earlier in this ponencia, it is beyond cavil
that it is the Solicitor General who has been conferred the singular honor and privilege of being
the "principal law officer and legal defender of the Government." One would be hard put to
name a single legal group or law firm that can match the expertise, experience, resources, staff
and prestige of the OSG which were painstakingly built up for almost a century.
Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of virtually the entire
government officialdom, the OSG may be expected to transcend the parochial concerns of a
particular client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal. Given such objectivity,
it can discern, metaphorically speaking, the panoply that is the forest and not just the individual
trees. Not merely will it strive for a legal victory circumscribed by the narrow interests of the
client office or official, but as well, the vast concerns of the sovereign which it is committed to
serve.
In light of the foregoing, the Solicitor General's withdrawal of his appearance on behalf of the
PCGG was beyond the scope of his authority in the management of a case. As a public official,
it is his sworn duty to provide legal services to the Government, particularly to represent it in
 59

litigations. And such duty may be enjoined upon him by the writ of mandamus. And such duty
may be enjoined upon him by the writ of mandamus. Such order, however, should not be
construed to mean that his discretion in the handling of his cases may be interfered with. The
Court is not compelling him to act in a particular way. 64 Rather, the Court is directing him to
prevent a failure of justice 65 resulting from his abandonment in midstream of the cause of the
PCGG and the Republic and ultimately, of the Filipino people.
In view of the foregoing, there need be no proof adduced that the petitioner has a personal
interest in the case, as his petition is anchored on the right of the people, through the PCGG
and the Republic, to be represented in court by the public officer duly authorized by law. The
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and
hence, part of the public which possesses the right. 66
The writ of prohibition, however, may not be similarly treated and granted in this petition. The
said writ, being intended to prevent the doing of some act that is about to be done, it may not
provide a remedy for acts which are already fait accompli. 67 Having been placed in a situation
where it was constrained to hire private lawyers if the Republic's campaign to legally recover
the wealth amassed by the Marcoses, their friends and relatives was to prosper, the PCGG's
action is justified. However, it was not entirely blameless. Its failure to coordinate closely with
the Solicitor General has spawned the incidents which culminated in the withdrawal of the latter
from appearing as counsel in its cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The Solicitor General is
DIRECTED to immediately re-enter his appearance in the cases wherein he had filed a motion
to withdraw appearance and the PCGG shall terminate the services of the lawyers it had
employed but not before paying them the reasonable fees due them in accordance with rules
and regulations of the Commission on Audit.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., concurs in the result.

GUMARU V. QUIRINO STATE COLLEGE
G.R. No. 164196 June 22, 2007
CONSTANTINO T. GUMARU, petitioner,
vs.
QUIRINO STATE COLLEGE, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the Decision1 dated November 25, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72603, which reversed and set aside the Order dated June 26, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 88, denying the motion to quash the
writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-97-32470, as well as its Resolution dated June 17,
2004, which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 25, 1985, C.T. Gumaru Construction and Quirino State College, an educational
institution organized and existing under Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 440,2 through its president, Julian A. Alvarez, entered into an
Agreement3 for the construction of the state college’s building in Diffun, Quirino Province.
Construction was done in stages and was covered by supplemental agreements, because
funding depended on the state college’s annual budget allocation and fund releases from the
government.
On October 17, 1997, Constantino T. Gumaru, owner and proprietor of C.T. Gumaru
Construction, filed a complaint for damages4 before the RTC of Quezon City against the state
college and Julian A. Alvarez, asking for (1) P368,493.35, the expected profits which he would
have realized from the construction of an unfinished portion of the project which was allegedly
awarded by the defendants to another contractor in violation of his preferential right to finish
the project; (2) P592,136.51, the escalation costs of construction materials and supplies;
(3) P50,000.00, the value of plaintiff’s bodega allegedly demolished by the defendants; and
(4), P200,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.5
On May 8, 1998, Atty. Carlos T. Aggabao, purportedly acting as counsel for the defendants,
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. The motion was denied.
Defendants were directed to file an answer. When they failed to answer within the prescribed
period, they were declared in default and plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
On February 22, 2001, the trial court decided the case in favor of the plaintiff, viz:
WHEREFORE, x x x judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff Gumaru and against the
defendants College and Alvarez directing the latter to JOINTLY and SEVERALLY pay the former
as follows:
1. The sum P368,493.35 for the First Cause of action;
2. The amount of P592,136.51 for the Second Cause of action;
3. The amount of P50,000.00 for the Third Cause of action;
4. P100,000.00 for moral damages and P100,000 for attorney’s fees, plus costs.
5. The first three awards are with legal interests reckoned from the filing of this case until the
amounts are paid in full.6
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Defendants failed to appeal from the decision, a copy of which was duly served on Atty. Aggabao
on March 6, 2001.7 The decision became final and executory, and plaintiff moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution. On December 5, 2001, a Writ of Execution8 was issued, directing
the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Quirino Province to seize the personal properties or, if
insufficient, the real properties of the defendants to satisfy the judgment awards. The awards
amounted to P1,739,725.30, inclusive of interests and sheriff’s fees.
On January 11, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the
first time as counsel for the defendants. At the same time, it filed a "Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution" on the following grounds: (a) defendants were not duly represented in court, since
the OSG was not notified of the proceedings; and (b) writs of execution may not be issued
against government funds and properties to satisfy court judgments.
Meanwhile, a Sheriff’s Notice of Levy and Auction Sale9 was issued against two (2) parcels of
land in the name of Quirino State College,10 viz:
WHEREAS, by virtue of a Writ of Execution issued by the Hon. Abednego O. Adre, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, x x x Branch 38, Quezon City x x x the undersigned provincial
Sheriff of Quirino in order to satisfy the amount of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY
NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE AND 30/100 PESOS (P1,739,725.30) with
interest thereon from the date of execution until fully paid aside from other incidental expenses
incurred in connection with enforcement of this Writ of Execution is HEREBY LEVIED upon all
rights, interest and participation of the defendant over the property described below, to wit:
LAND
A parcel of land under ARP. No. 00411-15003 in the name of Quirino State College, Diffun,
Quirino of which land is situated at Bonifacio, Diffun, Quirino, Philippines, containing an area of
THIRTY THOUSAND (30,000) SQM. more or less.
LAND
A portion of land under ARP. No. 00415-16002 in the name of Quirino State College, Diffun,
Quirino of which land situated at Bonifacio, Diffun, Quirino, Philippines, containing an area of
11.13110161 HA. more or less.
In an "Urgent Motion" dated March 13, 2002,11 the OSG reiterated its plea for the quashal of
the writ of execution and asked the court to take judicial notice of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 10-2000,12 as well as Commission on Audit (COA) Resolution No. 2000-36613 dated
December 19, 2000, which finally adjudged plaintiff liable to the state college for P4,681,670.00
in overpayments, and liquidated damages for delay in the construction of the college building.
The trial court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution.14 Without ruling on the issue
of the defendants’ alleged lack of legal representation, the court ruled that the properties of the
state college may be seized under the writ of execution, since it is an incorporated agency of
the government given specific powers to sue and be sued. A separate appropriation to satisfy
the judgment awards was not considered necessary, because the state college’s charter provides
that funds for the construction and repair of its buildings, machinery, equipment, and facilities
shall be taken from its annual appropriation.
The OSG filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On November 25, 2003, the
Court of Appeals granted the petition.15 In quashing the writ of execution, the Court of Appeals
ruled that although the funds and properties of government agencies with personalities separate
and distinct from the government are not exempt from execution or garnishment, the rule does
not apply where the incorporated government agency concerned is performing a vital
governmental function, like herein state college. In such cases, the money claim should be filed
first with the COA as provided in Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.

Gumaru’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition raising the following
issues:
I. Whether or not, upon the facts and circumstances obtaining herein, the consent given by the
State to respondent to sue and be sued is plenary and not limited only to proceedings anterior
to the stage of execution;
II. Whether or not the money claim subject of the case below is required to be filed first with
the Commission on Audit (COA);
III. Whether or not the enforcement of the money judgment here involved is subject to rules
and procedures under Sections 49-50 of Presidential Decree No. 1445;
IV. Whether or not, being an incorporated agency of the Government, respondent’s liability is
controlled by the rulings on incorporated or chartered government agencies;
V. Whether or not further appropriation is required for the enforcement of the money judgment
against respondent herein; and
VI. Whether or not respondent’s representation below by counsel of its own choice instead of
by the OSG was proper.
Stated differently, the proper issues to be resolved are: (a) whether respondent state college
was properly represented before the trial court; (b) if in the negative, whether the lack of proper
legal representation was enough to nullify the proceedings; and (c) whether the properties of
respondent state college may be seized under the writ of execution issued by the trial court.
On the issue of legal representation, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides:
The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office
concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of
the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. x x x x
Under the foregoing, the OSG is mandated to act as the law office of the government, its
agencies, instrumentalities, officials and agents in any litigation or proceeding requiring the
services of a lawyer.16 With respect to government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs),
the OSG shall act as counsel only when authorized by the President or by the head of the office
concerned. The principal law office of GOCCs, as provided in Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III,
Book IV, of the Administrative Code of 1987,17 is the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC).
In the case at bar, respondent state college is classified under the Code as a chartered
institution,18 viz:
(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter,
and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This
term includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State.
(emphasis ours)
as opposed to a GOCC defined in the following segment,19 viz:
(13) A government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental
or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
61
fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled
corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service
Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.
Therefore, the proper statutory counsel of respondent state college is the OSG. Legal
representation by Atty. Carlos T. Aggabao, a private lawyer, was clearly improper. In Gonzales
v. Chavez,20 we traced the statutory origins of the OSG and ruled that its mandate to act as the
principal law office of the government is compulsory, viz:
In x x x tracing the origins of the Office of the Solicitor General to gain a clear understanding of
the nature of the functions and extent of [its] powers x x x, it is evident that a policy decision
was made in the early beginnings to consolidate in one official the discharge of legal functions
and services of the government. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [T]he intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, x x
x the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in
the laws creating the office is the discernible intent which may be gathered from the term
"shall," which is invariably employed, from Act No. 136 (1901) to the more recent Executive
Order No. 292 (1987).
Under the principles of statutory construction, so familiar even to law students, the term "shall"
is nothing if not mandatory.21 (emphases ours)
Thus, the Solicitor General cannot refuse to represent the government, its agencies,
instrumentalities, officials and agents without a just and valid reason. He should not desist from
appearing before the Court even in those cases where his opinions may be inconsistent with the
government or any of its agents he is expected to represent.22 As in the case of fiscals or
prosecutors, bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility do not constitute legal and valid excuses
for inhibition.23 Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal or
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General in the case at bar, cannot refuse to perform his functions
without violating his oath of office.24 Refusal to perform the duty is compellable by a writ of
mandamus.25 On the other hand, government agencies were admonished not to reject the
services of the Solicitor General, or otherwise fail or refuse to forward the papers of a case to
the OSG for appropriate action.26 Actions filed in the name of the Republic that are not initiated
by the OSG will be summarily dismissed.27 Moreover, the fee of the lawyer who rendered legal
service to the government in lieu of the OSG or the OGCC is the personal liability of the
government official who hired his services without the prior written conformity of the OSG or
the OGCC, as the case may be.28 We explained the rationale for the compulsory nature of the
OSG’s mandate, in this wise:
The rationale x x x is not difficult to comprehend. Sound government operations require
consistency in legal policies and practices among the instrumentalities of the State. x x x [A]n
official learned in the law and skilled in advocacy could best plan and coordinate the strategies
and moves of the legal battles of the different arms of the government. Surely, the economy
factor, too, must have weighed heavily in arriving at such a decision.
xxx xxx xxx
Sound management policies require that the government’s approach to legal problems and
policies formulated on legal issues be harmonized and coordinated by a specific agency. The
government owes it to its officials and their respective offices, the political units at different
levels, the public and the various sectors, local and international, that have dealings with it, to
assure them of a degree of certitude and predictability in matters of legal import.
 62

From the historical and statutory perspectives x x x it is beyond cavil that it is the Solicitor SO ORDERED.
General who has been conferred the singular honor and privilege of being the "principal law
officer and legal defender of the Government." One would be hard put to name a single legal
group or law firm that can match the expertise, experience, resources, staff and prestige of the
OSG which were painstakingly built up for almost a century.
x x x [E]ndowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of virtually the entire
government officialdom, the OSG may be expected to transcend the parochial concerns of a
particular client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal. Given such objectivity,
it can discern, metaphorically speaking, the panoply that is the forest and not just the individual
trees. Not merely will it strive for a legal victory circumscribed by the narrow interests of the
client office or official, but as well, the vast concerns of the sovereign which it is committed to
serve.29
The Solicitor General is thus expected to be the official who would best uphold and protect the
legal interests of the government.30 His non-representation of the government is dangerous and
should not be allowed.
The magnitude of the non-representation by the OSG is nowhere more apparent than in the
case at bar. Instead of having been represented by an "official learned in the law" who will
"promote and protect the public weal" taking into consideration the "vast concerns of the
sovereign which it is committed to serve," respondent state college was instead represented by
a private lawyer who made no move to protect its interests except to file a motion to dismiss
the complaint filed against the state college, which was eventually denied by the trial court. No
answer to the complaint was filed notwithstanding due receipt of the order directing its filing,
as a consequence of which the state college was declared in default. The order of default itself
was not reconsidered, no move whatsoever having been made in that direction. The plaintiff
was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. When the decision was rendered adjudging the
state college and its co-defendant, Julian A. Alvarez, liable to the plaintiff, no effort was made
to appeal the decision notwithstanding due receipt of a copy thereof by Atty. Aggabao on March
6, 2001. Thus, a writ of execution was issued against the properties of the state college, which
by this time remained as the sole defendant, Julian A. Alvarez having died during the pendency
of the case and no proper substitution of parties having been made at the instance of Atty.
Aggabao. Clear, therefore, was the utter failure of justice insofar as respondent state college is
concerned. It was as if it was not represented by counsel at all. While it may be argued that the
officials of respondent state college should have informed the OSG of the suit filed against the
state college, and that it was their fault or negligence that the OSG was not informed in the first
place, it is settled, however, that the principle of estoppel does not operate against the
government for the act of its agents or their inaction.31 The State has to protect its interests
and cannot be bound by, or estopped by the mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents,
much more, non-suited as a result thereof.32 The legality of legal representation can be raised
and questioned at any stage of the proceedings.33
The circumstances of this case, therefore, justify the nullification of the proceedings before the
trial court, and the writ of execution issued as a consequence thereof. The state college should
be given the opportunity to present its defenses with the benefit of its statutory counsel, the
OSG. A new trial would best serve the interests of justice. With this disquisition, discussion of
the other issues is not necessary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for trial
anew, with the Office of the Solicitor General appearing as counsel for respondent Quirino State
College. The Decision dated February 22, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 88, in Civil Case No. Q-97-32470, and the assailed Decision dated November 25, 2003
and Resolution dated June 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72603 are, for
this reason, VACATED and SET ASIDE.

REPUBLIC V. MARCOS-MANOTOC
G. R. No. 171701 February 8, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R.
MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG
CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of the Philippines assailing the
Resolutions1 issued by the Sandiganbayan in connection with an alleged portion of the Marcoses’
supposed ill-gotten wealth.
This case involves P200 billion of the Marcoses’ alleged accumulated ill-gotten wealth. It also
includes the alleged use of the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9 for the Marcos family’s
personal benefit; the alleged use of De Soleil Apparel for dollar salting; and the alleged illegal
acquisition and operation of the bus company Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco).
The Facts
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of then President
Corazon C. Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG was given the following mandate:
Sec. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to
the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign
to the Commission from time to time.
(c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices shall not be
repeated in any manner under the new government, and the institution of adequate
measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.
Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry
out the purposes of this order.
(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any
building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any
records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or
disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent
the Commission from accomplishing its task.
63
(c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or
dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the
Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until
the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the
appropriate authorities.
(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of facts by any person
or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise make
ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its tasks under this order.
(e) To administer oaths, and issue subpoena requiring the attendance and testimony
of witnesses and/or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records,
statement of accounts and other documents as may be material to the investigation
conducted by the Commission.
(f) To hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate
penalties, following the same procedures and penalties provided in the Rules of Court.
(g) To seek and secure the assistance of any office, agency or instrumentality of the
government.
(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this order.
Thus, numerous civil and criminal cases were subsequently filed. One of the civil cases filed
before the Sandiganbayan to recover the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth was Civil Case No.
0002, now subject of this Petition.
On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting
and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his
death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta,
Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.
On 1 October 1987, the PCGG filed an amended Complaint to add Constante Rubio as defendant.
Again on 9 February 1988, it amended the Complaint, this time to include as defendants
Nemesio G. Co and herein respondents Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho, and Yeung Chun
Fan.
For the third time, on 23 April 1990, the PCGG amended its Complaint, adding to its growing list
of defendants Imelda Cojuangco, the estate of Ramon Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc.2
The PCGG filed a fourth amended Complaint, which was later denied by the Sandiganbayan in
its Resolution dated 2 September 1998.
The allegations contained in the Complaint specific to herein respondents are the following:3
29. Defendants Imelda (IMEE) R. Marcos-Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc, Irene R. Manotoc (sic)
Araneta, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., actively collaborated, with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos among others, in confiscating and/or
unlawfully appropriating funds and other property, and in concealing the same as described
above. In addition, each of the said Defendants, either by taking undue advantage of their
relationship with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, or by reason of the
above-described active collaboration, unlawfully acquired or received property, shares of stocks
in corporations, illegal payments such as commissions, bribes or kickbacks, and other forms of
improper privileges, income, revenues and benefits. Defendant Araneta in particular made use
of Asialand Development Corporation which is included in Annex "A" hereof as corporate vehicle
to benefit in the manner stated above.

31. Defendants Nemesio G. Co, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan are the
controlling stockholders of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Corporation (Phils.). Through
Glorious Sun (Phils.), they acted as fronts or dummies, cronies or otherwise willing tools of
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and/or the family, particularly of Defendant Imelda
(Imee) Marcos-Manotoc, in the illegal salting of foreign exchange4 by importing denim fabrics
from only one supplier – a Hong Kong based corporation which was also owned and controlled
by defendant Hong Kong investors, at prices much higher than those being paid by other users
of similar materials to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff.
Thus, petitioner set forth the following causes of action in its Complaint:5
32. First Cause of Action: BREACH OF PUBLIC TRUST – A public office is a public
trust.1avvphi1 By committing all the acts described above, Defendants repeatedly breached
public trust and the law, making them liable solidarily to Plaintiff. The funds and other property
acquired by Defendants following, or as a result of, their breach of public trust, some of which
are mentioned or described above, estimated to amount to P 200 billion are deemed to have
been acquired for the benefit of Plaintiff and are, therefore, impressed with constructive trust
in favor of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. Consequently, Defendants are solidarily liable to
restore or reconvey to Plaintiff all such funds and property thus impressed with constructive
trust for the benefit of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
33. Second Cause of Action: ABUSE OF RIGHT AND POWER –
(a) Defendants, in perpetrating the unlawful acts described above, committed abuse of right
and power which caused untold misery, sufferings and damages to Plaintiff. Defendants
violated, among others Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
(b) As a result of the foregoing acts, Defendants acquired the title to the beneficial interest in
funds and other property and concealed such title, funds and interest through the use of
relatives, business associates, nominees, agents, or dummies. Defendants are, therefore,
solidarily liable to Plaintiff to return and reconvey all such funds and other property unlawfully
acquired by them estimated at TWO HUNDRED BILLION PESOS, or alternatively, to pay Plaintiff,
solidarily, by way of indemnity, the damage caused to Plaintiff equivalent to the amount of such
funds or the value of other property not returned or restored to Plaintiff, plus interest thereon
from the date of unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.
34. Third Cause of Action: UNJUST ENRICHMENT –
Defendants illegally accumulated funds and other property whose estimated value is P 200
billion in violation of the laws of the Philippines and in breach of their official functions and
fiduciary obligations. Defendants, therefore, have unjustly enriched themselves to the grave and
irreparable damage and prejudice of Plaintiff. Defendants have an obligation at law,
independently of breach of trust and abuse of right and power, and as an alternative, to solidarily
return to Plaintiff such funds and other property with which Defendants, in gross evident bad
faith, have unjustly enriched themselves or, in default thereof, restore to Plaintiff the amount
of such funds and the value of the other property including those which may have been wasted,
and/or lost estimated at P 200 billion with interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition
until full payment thereof.
35. Fourth Cause of Action: ACCOUNTING –
The Commission, acting pursuant to the provisions of the applicable law, believe that
Defendants, acting singly or collectively, in unlawful concert with one another, and with the
active collaboration of third persons, subject of separate suits, acquired funds, assets and
property during the incumbency of Defendant public officers, manifestly out of proportion to
their salaries, to their other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.
Consequently, they are required to show to the satisfaction of this Honorable Court that they
64
have lawfully acquired all such funds, assets and property which are in excess of their legal net
income, and for this Honorable Court to decree that the Defendants are under obligation to
account to Plaintiff with respect to all legal or beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets
of whatever kind and wherever located in excess of the lawful earnings or lawful income from
legitimately acquired property.
36. Fifth Cause of Action – LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES –
(a) By reason of the unlawful acts set forth above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people have suffered
actual damages in an amount representing the pecuniary loss sustained by the latter as a result
of the Defendants’ unlawful acts, the approximate value and interest of which, from the time of
their wrongful acquisition, are estimated at P 200 billion plus expenses which Plaintiff has been
compelled to incur and shall continue to incur in its effort to recover Defendants’ ill-gotten
wealth all over the world, which expenses are reasonably estimated at P 250 million. Defendants
are, therefore, jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for actual damages in an amount reasonably
estimated at P 200 Billion Pesos and to reimburse expenses for recovery of Defendants’ ill-
gotten wealth estimated to cost P 250 million or in such amount as are proven during the trial.
(b) As a result of Defendants’ acts described above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people had painfully
endured and suffered moral damages for more than twenty long years, anguish, fright, sleepless
nights, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock as well as besmirched reputation and
social humiliation before the international community.
(c) In addition, Plaintiff and the Filipino people are entitled to temperate damages for their
sufferings which, by their very nature are incapable of pecuniary estimation, but which this
Honorable Court may determine in the exercise of its sound discretion.
(d) Defendants, by reason of the above described unlawful acts, have violated and invaded the
inalienable right of Plaintiff and the Filipino people to a fair and decent way of life befitting a
Nation with rich natural and human resources. This basic and fundamental right of Plaintiff and
the Filipino people should be recognized and vindicated by awarding nominal damages in an
amount to be determined by the Honorable Court in the exercise of its sound discretion.
(e) By way of example and correction for the public good and in order to ensure that Defendants’
unlawful, malicious, immoral and wanton acts are not repeated, said Defendants are solidarily
liable to Plaintiff for exemplary damages.
In the meantime, the Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO (PEA-PTGWO), a union of
Pantranco employees, moved to intervene before the Sandiganbayan. The former alleged that
the trust funds in the account of Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco) amounting to P 55
million rightfully belonged to the Pantranco employees, pursuant to the money judgment the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) awarded in favor of the employees and against
Pantranco. Thus, PEA-PTGWO contested the allegation of petitioner that the assets of Pantranco
were ill-gotten because, otherwise, these assets would be returned to the government and not
to the employees.
Thereafter, petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents.
However, the latter objected to the offer primarily on the ground that the documents violated
the best evidence rule of the Rules of Court, as these documents were unauthenticated;
moreover, petitioner had not provided any reason for its failure to present the originals.
On 11 March 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution6 admitting the pieces of evidence
while expressing some reservation, to wit:
WHEREFORE, taking note of the objections of accused Marcoses and the reply thereto by the
plaintiff, all the documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution are hereby admitted
in evidence; however, their evidentiary value shall be left to the determination of the Court. SO
ORDERED.

Imelda R. Marcos; Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and
Gregorio Ma. Araneta III; Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-
PTGWO subsequently filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.
On 6 December 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution,7 which granted all the
Demurrers to Evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Demurrer to Evidence filed by defendant Imelda R.
Marcos is hereby DENIED. The Demurrer to Evidence filed by defendants Maria Imelda Marcos
Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos Araneta, Gregorio Maria Araneta III, Yeung Chun
Kam, Yeung Chun Fan, Yeung Chun Ho, and intervenor PEA-PTGWO, are hereby GRANTED.
The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of defendant Gregorio Maria Araneta
III, are accordingly ordered lifted. SO ORDERED.
The Sandiganbayan denied Imelda R. Marcos’ Demurrer primarily because she had categorically
admitted that she and her husband owned properties enumerated in the Complaint, while
stating that these properties had been lawfully acquired. The court held that the evidence
presented by petitioner constituted a prima facie case against her, considering that the value of
the properties involved was grossly disproportionate to the Marcos spouses’ lawful income.
Thus, this admission and the fact that Imelda R. Marcos was the compulsory heir and
administratrix of the Marcos estate were the primary reasons why the court held that she was
responsible for accounting for the funds and properties alleged to be ill-gotten.
Secondly, the court pointed out that Rolando Gapud, whose deposition was taken in Hong Kong,
referred to her as one directly involved in amassing ill-gotten wealth. The court also considered
the compromise agreement between petitioner and Antonio O. Floirendo, who disclosed that he
had performed several business transactions upon the instructions of the Marcos spouses.
With regard to the siblings Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., the court noted
that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never established. In fact, they were
never mentioned by any of the witnesses presented. Neither did the documentary evidence
pinpoint any specific involvement of the Marcos children.
Moreover, the court held that the evidence, in particular, exhibits "P,"8 "Q,"9 "R,"10 "S,"11 and
"T,"12 were considered hearsay, because their originals were not presented in court, nor were
they authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that
petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These
exhibits were supposed to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotok in the media networks
IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally. These exhibits
also sought to prove her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel.
Finally, the court held that the relationship of respondents to the Marcos spouses was not
enough reason to hold the former liable.
In the matter of the spouses Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III, the court similarly held
that there was no testimonial or documentary evidence that supported petitioner’s allegations
against the couple. Again, petitioner failed to present the original documents that supposedly
supported the allegations against them. Instead, it merely presented photocopies of documents
that sought to prove how the Marcoses used the Potencianos13 as dummies in acquiring and
operating the bus company Pantranco.
Meanwhile, as far as the Yeungs were concerned, the court found the allegations against them
baseless. Petitioner failed to demonstrate how their business, Glorious Sun Fashion Garments
Manufacturing, Co. Phils. (Glorious Sun), was used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show
that they themselves were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the
documentary evidence relevant to this allegation was inadmissible for being mere photocopies,
and that the affiants had not been presented as witnesses.
65
Finally, the court also granted the Demurrer filed by PEA-PTGWO. While the court held that
there was no evidence to show that Pantranco was illegally acquired, the former nevertheless
held that there was a need to first determine the ownership of the disputed funds before they
could be ordered released to the rightful owner.
On 20 December 2005, petitioner filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that there
was a preponderance of evidence to show that respondents Marcos siblings and Gregorio
Araneta III had connived with their parents in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. It pointed out that
respondents were compulsory heirs to the deposed President and were thus obliged to render
an accounting and to return the ill-gotten wealth.
Moreover, petitioner asserted that the evidence established that the Yeungs were dummies of
the Marcoses, and that the Pantranco assets were part of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Finally, petitioner questioned the court’s ruling that the evidence previously admitted was later
held to be inadmissible in evidence against respondents, thus, depriving the former of due
process.
Inadvertently, petitioner was not able to serve a copy of the motion on respondents Imee
Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr. But upon realizing the oversight, it immediately did
so and filed the corresponding Manifestation and Motion before the court. Nonetheless, this
inadvertence prompted Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr. to file their Motion for
Entry of Judgment.
On 2 March 2006, the court issued the second assailed Resolution,14 denying petitioner’s Motion.
The court pointed out its reservation in its Resolution dated 12 March 2002, wherein it said that
it would still assess and weigh the evidentiary value of the admitted evidence. Furthermore, it
said that even if it included the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses, these were not substantial
to hold respondents liable. Thus, the court said:
WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient reason to set aside the resolution dated December 6,
2005, the plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The plaintiff’s Motion
and Manifestation dated January 18, 2006 is GRANTED in the interest of justice. The Motion
for Entry of Judgment filed by defendants Imee Marcos and Bongbong Marcos is DENIED. SO
ORDERED.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner raises the same issues it raised in its Motion for Reconsideration filed before the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:15
I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY
RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG) R. MARCOS,
JR., CONSIDERING THAT MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATES THEIR CONNIVANCE WITH FORMER PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS
AND OTHER MARCOS DUMMIES AND ABUSED THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE IN UNLAWFULLY
AMASSING FUNDS FROM THE NATIONAL TREASURY.
II. PETITION PROVED, BY MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENT-
SPOUSES GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA CONNIVED WITH FORMER
PRESIDENT MARCOS IN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRING BUSINESS INTERESTS WHICH ARE
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND IN A MANNER PROHIBITED UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION AND ANTI-GRAFT STATUTES.
III. RESPONDENTS IMEE, BONGBONG, AND IRENE MARCOS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF
FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS AND ARE EQUALLY OBLIGED TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING AND
RETURN THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF THE MARCOSES.

IV. THERE EXISTS CONCRETE EVIDENCE PROVING THAT RESPONDENTS YEUNG CHUN KAM,
YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND YEUNG CHUN HO ACTED AS DUMMIES FOR THE MARCOSES, AND
USED THE CORPORATION, GLORIOUS SUN, AS A CONDUIT IN AMASSING THE ILL-GOTTEN
WEALTH. ACCORDINGLY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THEIR DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.
V. THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY INTERVENOR PEA-PTGWO WITH RESPECT TO THE
PANTRANCO ASSETS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED SINCE AMPLE EVIDENCE PROVES
THAT THE SAID ASSETS INDUBITABLY FORM PART OF THE MARCOS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH,
AS BUTTRESSED BY THE FACT THAT NO JUDICIAL DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE AS TO
WHOM THESE ASSETS RIGHTFULLY BELONG.
VI. THE SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING WHICH REJECTED PEITITONER’S DOCUMENTARY
EXHIBITS ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING "INADMISSIBLE" DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS ITS EARLIER
RULING ADMITTING ALL SAID DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND WAS RENDERED IN A MANNER
THAT DEPRIVED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
There is some merit in petitioner’s contention.
The Marcos Siblings and Gregorio Araneta III
Closely analyzing petitioner’s Complaint and the present Petition for Review, it is clear that the
Marcos siblings are being sued in two capacities: first, as co-conspirators in the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth; and second, as the compulsory heirs of their father, Ferdinand
E. Marcos.16
With regard to the first allegation, as contained in paragraph 29 of its Third Amended Complaint
quoted above, petitioner accused the Marcos siblings of having collaborated with, participated
in, and/or benefitted from their parents’ alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. In particular,
as far as Imee Marcos-Manotoc was concerned, she was accused of dollar salting by using
Glorious Sun to import denim fabrics from one supplier at prices much higher than those paid
by other users of similar materials. It was also alleged that the Marcoses personally benefitted
from the sequestered media networks IBC-13, BBC-2, and RPN-9, in which Imee Marcos had a
substantial interest.
Irene Marcos-Araneta, on the other hand, was accused of having conspired with her husband,
respondent Gregorio Araneta III, in his being President Marcos’ conduit to Pantranco, thereby
paving the way for the President’s ownership of the company in violation of Article VII, Section
4, paragraph 2 of the 1973 Constitution.17
To prove the general allegations against the Marcos siblings, petitioner primarily relied on the
Sworn Statement18and the Deposition19 of one of the financial advisors of President Marcos,
Rolando C. Gapud, taken in Hong Kong on various dates.
Meanwhile, to prove the participation and interests of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in De Soleil Apparel
and the media networks, petitioner relied on the Affidavits of Ramon S. Monzon,20 Yeung Kwok
Ying,21 and Rodolfo V. Puno;22and the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) taken during the
PCGG hearing held on 8 June 1987.23
As to spouses Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Araneta III, petitioner submitted the Articles
of Incorporation of Northern Express Transport, Inc.;24 the Memorandum of Agreement25 and
the Purchase Agreement26 between Pantranco and Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company,
Inc. (BLTBCo.); the Confidential Memorandum regarding the sale of the Pantranco assets;27 the
Affidavit28 and the letter to the PCGG29 of Dolores A. Potenciano, owner of BLTBCo.; the
Affidavit30 and the Memorandum31 of Eduardo Fajardo, who was then the Senior Vice-President
of the Account Management Group of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which was in turn the
creditor for the Pantranco sale; and the Affidavit of Florencio P. Lucio, who was the Senior
Account Specialist of the National Investment and Development Corporation.32
66
Petitioner contends that these documents fall under the Rule’s third exception, that is, these
documents are public records in the custody of a public officer or are recorded in a public office.
It is its theory that since these documents were collected by the PCGG, then, necessarily, the
conditions for the exception to apply had been met. Alternatively, it asserts that the "documents
were offered to prove not only the truth of the recitals of the documents, but also of other
external or collateral facts."33
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner failed to observe the best evidence rule.
It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief to be granted, the
operative act on how and in what manner the Marcos siblings participated in and/or benefitted
from the acts of the Marcos couple must be clearly shown through a preponderance of evidence.
Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is constrained and is left with no choice
but to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents.
First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents
themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove
petitioner’s allegations.
Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the
original document itself. The origin of the best evidence rule can be found and traced to as early
as the 18th century in Omychund v. Barker,34 wherein the Court of Chancery said:
The judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one general rule of
evidence, the best that the nature of the case will admit.
The rule is, that if the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be
proved by those witnesses.
The first ground judges have gone upon in departing from strict rules, is an absolute strict
necessity. Secondly, a presumed necessity. In the case of writings, subscribed by witnesses, if
all are dead, the proof of one of their hands is sufficient to establish the deed: where an original
is lost, a copy may be admitted; if no copy, then a proof by witnesses who have heard the deed,
and yet it is a thing the law abhors to admit the memory of man for evidence.
Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not
presented, or any compelling ground why the court should admit these documents as secondary
evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who had executed them.
In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the documents fall under Sec. 7 of Rule
130, which states:
Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. ─ When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved be a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Secs. 19 and 20 of Rule 132 provide:
SECTION 19. Classes of documents. ─ For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
All other writings are private.
SECTION 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations
does not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.
Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these
public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in
the course of the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a
credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have
subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify
only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own
perception.35 Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these
documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda
submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified
as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the
affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant's statements,
parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover,
the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon.36
As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it may be considered as a
public document since it was taken in the course of the PCGG’s exercise of its mandate, it was
not attested to by the legal custodian to be a correct copy of the original. This omission falls
short of the requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.37
In summary, we adopt the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Further, again contrary to the theory of the plaintiff, the presentation of the originals of the
aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130, Section 3 (a), (b), and (d) of the Rules
of Court. Under paragraph (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public office,’ presentation of the original thereof is excepted.
However, as earlier observed, all except one of the exhibits introduced by the plaintiff were not
necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings
purportedly before the PCGG, the plaintiff’s exhibit "Q", may be a public document, but what
was presented by the plaintiff was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN. The Rules provide
that when the original document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
67
thereof. Exhibit "Q" was not a certified copy and it was not even signed by the stenographer
who supposedly took down the proceedings.
The rest of the above-mentioned exhibits cannot likewise be excepted under paragraphs (a)
and (b) of Section 3. Section 5 of the same Rule provides that ‘when the original documents
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may
prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.’ Thus, in order that secondary evidence may be
admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original;
(2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good
faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of these requirements were
complied with by the plaintiff. Similar to exhibit ‘Q’, exhibits ‘P’, ‘R’, ‘S’, and ‘T’ were all
photocopies. ‘P’, ‘R’, and ‘T’ were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court.
Exhibit ‘S’ is a letter which is clearly a private document. Not only does it not fall within the
exceptions of Section 3, it is also a mere photocopy. As We previously emphasized, even if
originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still be considered hearsay evidence if
the affiants do not testify and identify them.38
Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that petitioner failed to prove
that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III collaborated with former President Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos and participated in the first couple’s alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth
insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.
The Marcos siblings are compulsory heirs.
To reiterate, in its third Amended Complaint, petitioner prays that the Marcos respondents be
made to (1) pay for the value of the alleged ill-gotten wealth with interest from the date of
acquisition; (2) render a complete accounting and inventory of all funds and other pieces of
property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and
beneficial interest therein; (3) pay actual damages estimated at P200 billion and additional
actual damages to reimburse expenses for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth
estimated at P250 million or in such amount as may be proven during trial; (4) pay moral
damages amounting to P50 billion; (5) pay temperate and nominal damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in an amount to be proven during the trial; (6) pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P1 billion; and (7) pay treble judicial costs.39
It must be stressed that we are faced with exceptional circumstances, given the nature and the
extent of the properties involved in the case pending with the Sandiganbayan. It bears emphasis
that the Complaint is one for the reversion, the reconveyance, the restitution and the accounting
of alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of damages. Based on the allegations of the
Complaint, the court is charged with the task of (1) determining the properties in the Marcos
estate that constitute the alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) tracing where these properties are; (3)
issuing the appropriate orders for the accounting, the recovery, and the payment of these
properties; and, finally, (4) determining if the award of damages is proper.
Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it
is imperative therefore that the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this rule is the
protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the
intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.40 On that
note, we take judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E.
Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II,41 we upheld the grant by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of the state
their right to defend or protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their
possession, control or ownership, then they may not be dropped as defendants in the civil case
pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those parties-in-interest
without whom there can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties who
possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are indispensable if
their interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined
with that of the other parties.42
In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos – that is, the accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth – the present case must
be maintained against Imelda Marcos and herein respondent Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos,
Jr., as executors of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
According to this provision, actions may be commenced to recover from the estate, real or
personal property, or an interest therein, or to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the
executors.
We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained against Imee Marcos-Manotoc and
Irene Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex "A" to the Third
Amended Complaint, which states that the listed properties therein were owned by Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos and their immediate family.43 It is only during the trial of Civil Case No. 0002
before the Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these properties are
indeed ill-gotten or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their predecessors. Thus,
while it was not proven that respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may
be in possession, ownership or control of such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as
heirs of the Marcos couple. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does not remove
the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.
Secondly, under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the
Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the
decedent’s death.44 In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to
transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration
or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols,45 we said:
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is
deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the
death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa with reason
states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided
owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the
coowners of the estate while it remains undivided." (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala,
35 Phil. 679.) And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign
or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or
mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the
dissolution of the community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528,
where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left
by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano
Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the
share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.
(Emphasis supplied)
68
Lastly, petitioner’s prayer in its Third Amended Complaint directly refers to herein respondents,
to wit:
1. AS TO THE FIRST SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION – To return and
reconvey to Plaintiff all funds and other property acquired by Defendants
during their incumbency as public officers, which funds and other property are
manifestly out of proportion to their salaries, other lawful income and income from
legitimately acquired property which Defendants have failed to establish as having
been, in fact, lawfully acquired by them, alternatively, to solidarily pay Plaintiff the
value thereof with interest thereon from the date of acquisition until full payment.
2. AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION – to individually render to this
Honorable Court a complete accounting and inventory, subject to evaluation
of Court-appointed assessors, of all funds and other property legally or beneficially
held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and beneficial interest in such
funds and other property. (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, because (1) the action pending
before the Sandiganbayan is one that survives death, and, therefore, the rights to the estate
must be duly protected; (2) they allegedly control, possess or own ill-gotten wealth, though
their direct involvement in accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have been proven.
Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho And Yeung Chun Fan
It is worthy to note that respondents draw our attention to American Inter-Fashion Corporation
v. Office of the President46 in which they contend that this Court considered the allegation of
dollar salting as baseless. The cited case, however, finds no application herein as the former
merely ruled that Glorious Sun was denied due process when it was not furnished by the
Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) any basis for the cancellation of the export quota
because of allegations of dollar salting. That Decision did not prevent petitioner from adducing
evidence to support its allegation in Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan under a
different cause of action.
Nevertheless, the allegations against Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan in
the case at bar were also proved to be baseless. Again, petitioner failed to illustrate how
respondents herein acted as dummies of the Marcoses in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. This Court
notes that the Complaint against the Yeungs alleges that the Marcoses used Glorious Sun – the
garment company in which the Yeungs are controlling stockholders – for illegal dollar salting
through the company’s importation of denim fabrics from only one supplier at prices much
higher than those being paid by other users of similar materials. Notably, no mention of De
Soleil Apparel was made.
To prove its allegations, petitioner submitted the controverted Exhibits "P," "Q," "R," "S," and
"T." As earlier discussed in detail, these pieces of evidence were mere photocopies of the
originals and were unauthenticated by the persons who executed them; thus, they have no
probative value. Even the allegations of petitioner itself in its Petition for Review are bereft of
any factual basis for holding that these documents undoubtedly show respondents’ participation
in the alleged dollar salting. The pertinent portion of the Petition reads:
To illustrate, the Affidavit dated May 29, 1987 executed by Mr. Ramon Monzon which was
submitted as Exhibit P, showed that respondent Imee Marcos-Manotoc owns and controls IBC-
13, BBC-2 and (R)PN-9, and has interest in the De Soleil Apparel. The testimony of Mr. Ramon
Monzon during the hearing on June 8, 1987 before the Presidential Commission on Good
Government as shown in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes also affirmed his declarations in
the Affidavit dated May 29, 1987. The Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated June 8, 1987 was
presented as Exhibit Q. Moreover, the Affidavit dated March 21, 1986 of Yeung Kwok Ying
which was presented as Exhibit R disclosed that Imee Marcos-Manotoc is the owner of 67%

equity of De Soleil Apparel. The letter dated July 17, 1984 signed by seven (7) incorporators of
De Soleil Apparel, addressed to Hongkong investors which was presented as Exhibit
S confirmed that the signatories hold or own 67% equity of the corporation in behalf of the
beneficial owners previously disclosed to the addressees. In addition to the foregoing
documents, petitioner presented the Affidavit of Rodolfo V. Puno, Chairman of the Garments
and Textile Export Group (GTEB) as Exhibit T wherein he categorically declared that the
majority of De Soleil Apparel was actually owned by respondent Imee Marcos-Manotoc.47
The foregoing quotation from the Petition is bereft of any factual matter that warrants a
consideration by the Court. Straight from the horse’s mouth, these documents are only meant
to show the ownership and interest of Imee Marcos Manotoc in De Soleil – and not how
respondent supposedly participated in dollar salting or in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.
PEA-PTGWO
The PEA-PTGWO Demurrer to Evidence was granted primarily as a consequence of the
prosecution’s failure to establish that the assets of Pantranco were ill-gotten, as discussed
earlier. Thus, we find no error in the assailed Order of the Sandiganbayan.
A Final Note
As earlier adverted to, the best evidence rule has been recognized as an evidentiary standard
since the 18th century. For three centuries, it has been practiced as one of the most basic rules
in law. It is difficult to conceive that one could have finished law school and passed the bar
examinations without knowing such elementary rule. Thus, it is deeply disturbing that the PCGG
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) – the very agencies sworn to protect the interest
of the state and its people – could conduct their prosecution in the manner that they did. To
emphasize, the PCGG is a highly specialized office focused on the recovery of ill-gotten wealth,
while the OSG is the principal legal defender of the government. The lawyers of these
government agencies are expected to be the best in the legal profession.
However, despite having the expansive resources of government, the members of the
prosecution did not even bother to provide any reason whatsoever for their failure to present
the original documents or the witnesses to support the government’s claims. Even worse was
presenting in evidence a photocopy of the TSN of the PCGG proceedings instead of the original,
or a certified true copy of the original, which the prosecutors themselves should have had in
their custody. Such manner of legal practice deserves the reproof of this Court. We are
constrained to call attention to this apparently serious failure to follow a most basic rule in law,
given the special circumstances surrounding this case.
The public prosecutors should employ and use all government resources and powers efficiently,
effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage of public funds and
revenues. They should perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill.48
The basic ideal of the legal profession is to render service and secure justice for those seeking
its aid.49 In order to do this, lawyers are required to observe and adhere to the highest ethical
and professional standards. The legal profession is so imbued with public interest that its
practitioners are accountable not only to their clients, but to the public as well.
The public prosecutors, aside from being representatives of the government and the state, are,
first and foremost, officers of the court. They took the oath to exert every effort and to consider
it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.50 Lawyers owe fidelity
to the cause of the client and should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them.51 Hence, should serve with competence and diligence.52
We note that there are instances when this Court may overturn the dismissal of the lower courts
in instances when it is shown that the prosecution has deprived the parties their due process of
69
law. In Merciales v. Court of Appeals,53we reversed the Decision of the RTC in dismissing the
criminal case for rape with homicide. In that case, it was very apparent that the public
prosecutor violated the due process rights of the private complainant owing to its blatant
disregard of procedural rules and the failure to present available crucial evidence, which would
tend to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused therein. Moreover, we likewise found that
the trial court was gravely remiss in its duty to ferret out the truth and, instead, just "passively
watched as the public prosecutor bungled the case."
However, it must be emphasized that Merciales was filed exactly to determine whether the
prosecution and the trial court gravely abused their discretion in the proceedings of the case,
thus resulting in the denial of the offended party’s due process. Meanwhile, the present case
merely alleges that there was an error in the Sandiganbayan’s consideration of the probative
value of evidence. We also note that in Merciales, both the prosecution and the trial court were
found to be equally guilty of serious nonfeasance, which prompted us to remand the case to
the trial court for further proceedings and reception of evidence. Merciales is thus inapplicable
to the case at bar.
Nevertheless, given the particular context of this case, the failure of the prosecution to adhere
to something as basic as the best evidence rule raises serious doubts on the level and quality
of effort given to the government’s cause. Thus, we highly encourage the Office of the President,
the OSG, and the PCGG to conduct the appropriate investigation and consequent action on this
matter.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 6 December 2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For the
reasons stated herein, respondents Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, and
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. shall be maintained as defendants in Civil Case No. 0002 pending
before the Sandiganbayan.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the President so that it may look into
the circumstances of this case and determine the liability, if any, of the lawyers of the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Presidential Commission on Good Government in the manner by
which this case was handled in the Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE V. CASTAÑEDA, JR
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch III, and BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, respondents.
Fiscal Regidor Y Aglipay and Special Counsel Vicente Macalino for petitioner.
Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.
Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.
SANTOS, J.:
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent
Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by
respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public
Document committed, according to the Information, as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named a BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, with deliberate intent to commit
falsification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate
and forge the signature of his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed
by said accused wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership
of said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72,
Book No. LVII, Series of 1975, notarized by Notary Public Abraham Pa. Gorospe,
thereby making it appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave her marital
consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did not. 2
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense
moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court
which provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons
cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein
enumerated.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a wife
for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against
the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.
The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under the
exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, in an order dated
March 31, 1977. A motion for reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by respondent
Judge in an order dated May 19, 1977.
Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People
of the Philippines, seeking set aside the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and praying
that a preliminary injunction or a ternporary restraining order be issued by this Court enjoining
said judge from further proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal Case No. 1011.
70
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to issue a temporary restraining order, and (b) to
require the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Notice of Appearance on June 27, 1977, 4 and its Memorandum in support of
the Petition on August 30, 1977. 5 The respondents filed their Memorandum on September 5,
1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was considered submitted for decision. 7
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the sole issues determinative
of the instant petition, to wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public
Document filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto — who allegedly forged
the signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that
the latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal
partnership when in fact and in truth she did not — may be considered as a criminal case for a
crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on
marital disqualification.
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule,
as a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the
forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein
that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership
when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and
lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the
consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband Clearly, therefore,
it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And
it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a
crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely
disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a
crime committed by one spouse against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus,
in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, 8this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up
the criterion to be followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down
in Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and
the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception
is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR
DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN
THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other
except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoño v. Daquigan this Court held that the rape
committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed
by the husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime committed by the accused in
that can was not his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the exception for
the reason that said criminal act "Positively undermine(d) the connubial relationship. 9
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime
and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but
the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the wife in personally
lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in
 71

connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from
testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underacore
the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous decisions,
"identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that Identity is
nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the
law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home. 11 Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial disqualification rule.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be
disqualified from testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by
the Solicitor General," (t)o espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of
a husband committing as many falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter
in the anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret — all with
unabashed and complete impunity.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31, 1977,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto,
in Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for
reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is
hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the case,
allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify against her husband.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

MADDELA V. DALLONG-GALICINAO
A.C. No. 6491 January 31, 2005
BENILDA M. MADDELA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Complainant Benilda Madella is a Clerk in the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, while respondent Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the RTC, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. Their offices are
both housed at the Dumlao Hall of Justice within the Capital Compound in Bayombong.
In an affidavit-complaint dated 7 February 2003, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) and docketed as CBD No. 03-1060, the complainant prays for the disbarment of the
respondent for "acts unbecoming … a public servant and a lawyer, grave misconduct and
slander."
On the basis of the same affidavit-complaint, the complainant filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) an administrative complaint, which was docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1554-
P. The complaint was referred to Executive Judge Jose Godofredo M. Naui of the RTC of
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In her affidavit-complaint, the complainant alleged that sometime in July 1999, she received the
amount of P40,000 from the respondent by way of a loan at an interest of 5% per month. In
November 2001, since part of the loan remained unpaid, the respondent went to complainant’s
office and took complainant’s "cash gift check" amounting to P5,000 in her absence and without
her knowledge. There, the respondent "uttered unsavory and humiliating words" against her
(the complainant). The respondent was able to encash the check even without her endorsement
and applied the proceeds thereof to the interest of complainant’s loan. From January to
November 2002, the respondent, based on complainant’s promissory note, had been collecting
from the complainant an amount equivalent to one-half of the face value of the checks she
received as benefit from the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 10 December 2002, the
respondent went again to the office of the complainant and demanded one-half of the value of
the check representing a cash gift of P5,000. The complainant refused, reasoning that it was a
cash gift, not a JDF check and, therefore, not covered by their agreement. Complainant’s refusal
to part with the amount angered the respondent, prompting the latter to raise her voice, utter
"unsavory remarks" against the complainant, and bang her fist on top of the complainant’s table,
causing the glass top of the table to break. Several people witnessed this incident and heard
the accusations hurled by the respondent against the complainant with regard to her failure to
pay her debt.
To support her bid to have the respondent stripped of the privilege to practice the noble
profession of law, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint a copy of a confidential
letter-complaint of one Benjamin Rilloraza dated 3 May 2001 addressed to Atty. Ma. Cristina
Layusa of the Office of the Bar Confidant, opposing the respondent’s admission to the Bar in
view of her acts of notarizing documents outside the area of her commission. Mr. Rilloraza
claimed that the respondent, although not yet a lawyer, was issued a notarial commission for
"Kayapa or (Kasibu)," Nueva Vizcaya. However, the respondent notarized documents in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, outside the area of her commission. To prove his allegation, he
attached to the said letter-complaint photocopies of a Deed of Sale of Motor Vehicle dated 31
January 2001 and an Affidavit dated 3 May 2001, both indicating that they were notarized by
the respondent in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and that the respondent’s commission as a
72
Notary Public was for Bayombong. Mr. Rilloraza likewise alleged that despite her husband’s
death, the respondent continued to receive and encash for at least three months checks
corresponding to her husband’s salaries as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Office of the Clerk of Court
of Nueva Vizcaya. He also pointed out that the respondent even continued to claim the higher
allowable deductions as a married individual despite the death of her husband.
The complainant also presented a Certification issued on 6 May 2003 by Judge Jose B. Rosales
of Branch 27, RTC, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in his capacity as Executive Judge, stating that
the respondent was never appointed as a notary public for Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, during
the period from 1 January 1997 to December 2003.
For her part, the respondent denied that she is engaged in the business of lending money, the
truth of the matter being that the complainant approached her sometime in November 1998
begging that she lend her some money. She then informed the complainant that she knew of
somebody who had money. Out of pity and compassion, she agreed to be the guarantor to
facilitate her loan. To prove her claim, she presented an affidavit of Mr. Josue B. Liclican dated
10 March 2003 stating that he is the creditor of the complainant and that the respondent merely
brokered the loan agreement and acted as a guarantor in favor of the complainant. Mr. Liclican
also claimed that by reason of complainant’s failure to pay her obligation after the lapse of more
than four years, he tried to collect the loan from the respondent, who acted as a guarantor.
As regards complainant’s allegation that she did not authorize the respondent to obtain the cash
gift in November 2001, the respondent averred that she had a verbal agreement with the
complainant authorizing her to obtain the check. She also presented an authorization signed by
the complainant on 8 January 2002 authorizing the respondent to receive the former’s JDF
checks and to apply half of the amount as installment payment of her loan, with the obligation
to return the other half to the complainant. To refute the allegation that she continued to obtain
the checks of her deceased husband, the respondent presented a letter dated 2 May 1998
informing the OCA of the death of her husband on 3 April 1998 with a request to stop sending
checks issued in his name. She likewise presented her Income Tax Return (ITR) for 1998 filed
on 11 January 1999, which showed that she declared herself as "head of the family" and not as
a married individual. She forwarded the said ITR to the OCA on 10 March 1999, and informed
the latter of her change of status for purposes of taxation.
Anent the allegation that she notarized documents in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, outside of
the area of her commission, the respondent explained that she did it to accommodate the parties
thereto, who were her relatives, and that she did not derive profit from such act.
Respondent’s motion to suspend the proceedings in CAD No. 03-1060 in view of the pendency
of OCA IPI No. 03-1554 was denied.
On 20 February 2004, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and
recommendation. She found that the respondent has proved that she is not the creditor of the
complainant and that she had promptly informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
Supreme Court of the death of her husband, precluding any occasion where she could unlawfully
claim her husband’s salary and avail herself of the higher allowable tax deductions even after
his death. However, Commissioner Maala recommended that for the acts of notarizing outside
the area of her notarial commission and obtaining the JDF checks of the complainant from the
cash clerk in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 27-2001, the respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six months.
On 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-227 in CBD
No. 03-1060, annulling and setting aside Commissioner Maala’s recommendation; dismissing
the administrative complaint against Atty. Galicinao with respect to the charge of violating a
Supreme Court Circular for collecting a loan for which she acted as a guarantor; and imposing
upon the respondent the penalty of reprimand for her act of notarizing documents outside the
area where she was commissioned as a notary public.
 73

We affirm the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the IBP dismissing the administrative
complaint against the respondent to the extent covered by the complaint in A.M. No. P-04-1890,
formerly OCA IPI No. 03-1554-P. It must be pointed out that as an employee of the Judiciary
and a member of the Bar, the respondent is subject to our disciplinary authority. Under our
Resolution in A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on 1 October 2002, an administrative case
against a court official who is a lawyer, based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against
such official both as a court official and as a member of the Bar. Thus, in our Resolution of 20
September 2004 in A.M. No. P-04-1890, we severely reprimanded the respondent for simple
misconduct, with a warning that a repetition of the same act in the future shall be dealt with
more severely, and we ordered her to replace the broken glass top with a new one.
Hence, the only remaining issue is respondent’s liability for her act of notarizing documents
outside the area of her commission as a notary public. Although such act was not one of the
grounds relied upon in complainant’s affidavit-complaint, we cannot turn a blind eye thereto
considering respondent’s admission that she did such act. For that, as correctly held by the IBP,
the respondent must be disciplined. The penalty of reprimand recommended by the IBP is,
however, too light.
We have declared on several occasions, that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon
the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof ( Nunga v.
Viray, A.C. No. 4758, 366 Phil. 155, 160 [1999]).
Thus, we are not satisfied with respondent’s explanation that she notarized documents outside
of the area of her notarial commission as a favor to her relatives and for free. Whether the
respondent derived profit from her act of notarizing outside the area of her authority is of no
moment. The fact remains that she notarized outside the area of her commission. Considering,
however, that her misconduct as a notary public was committed while she was not yet a lawyer,
she could not be disciplinarily dealt with as a lawyer. The penalty that should be meted to her
should, therefore, be as a notary public before she was admitted to the Bar. The penalty of fine
would be a sufficient sanction.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby MODIFIES the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors and
hereby imposes on respondent ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO a fine of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000) for misconduct as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, all the courts of the
Philippines, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Ynarez-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V.
MORANTE
A.M. No. P-02-1555 April 15, 2004
(Formerly A.M. No. 02-1-68-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR ALLAN C. MORANTE, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas
City, Branch 275,respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case stemmed from an anonymous letter dated September 10, 2001 addressed to the Chief
Justice from "CONCERNED LAW PRACTITIONERS."1 The letter brought to his attention the
alleged corrupt acts/practices of respondent Edgar Allan Morante, Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 275. Attached to the letter was a news clipping that
appeared in the September 10, 2001 issue of The Metro Daily Tribune, entitled "NBI Agents Nab
Las Piñas Clerk of Court for Extort."2 The news item reported that the respondent "was caught
by government agents in the act of receiving some P.2 million to fix a court decision."3
In a First Indorsement dated September 24, 2001, the matter was referred to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.4
The OCA requested National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo G. Wycoco,
through Special Action Unit Head Atty. Vicente de Guzman, for a copy of its investigation report
and its annexes on the Morante extortion case, and to inform the said office whether the filing
of administrative/criminal cases against the subject was recommended.5 On January 28, 2002,
Deputy Court Administrator Christopher Lock submitted his memorandum on the matter to the
Court.
The Court thereafter issued a Resolution dated February 19, 2002, re-docketing the instant case
as A.M. No. P-02-1555,6 suspending the respondent effective immediately pending the
investigation of the case, and referring the administrative matter to Justice Narciso Atienza,
Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator, for investigation, report and recommendation.7
Pursuant to the Court’s resolution, Justice Atienza conducted a formal investigation of the
case.8 In due course, the Investigating Justice submitted his report to the Court on January 15,
2003, finding the respondent guilty of grave and serious misconduct and recommending that
the respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, with prejudice to
his appointment in any branch of the government or its agencies or instrumentalities.
The Case for the Complainant9
Tetsuo Momma, a Japanese citizen, was the president of the Montec International Corporation
with principal offices at Lot 2, Block 21, Phase III, Cavite Export Processing Zone Authority,
Rosario, Cavite. He employed Jose "Joey" Olavere as his executive secretary, who also acted as
his personal interpreter.
Luz Amper filed a criminal complaint against Momma, her former employer, for libel with the
Las Piñas City Prosecutor. After the requisite preliminary investigation, an information for libel
was filed against Momma on January 28, 2000 with the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 00-0117. The case was raffled to Branch 255 of the court,
presided by Judge Ambrosio Alumbres whose pairing judge was Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda,
74
the Presiding Judge of Branch 275 of the court. Momma posted a cash bail bond of P80,000.
On March 29, 2000, the court issued a hold departure order against him.
In the meantime, Momma filed a petition for review of the resolution of the Las Piñas City
Prosecutor finding probable cause for libel against him. On November 7, 2000, the Secretary of
Justice issued a resolution granting Momma’s petition for review, reversing the resolution of the
City Prosecutor, and directed the latter to file a motion to withdraw the information, and to
inform the Secretary of Justice of his action thereon within ten days from notice. Private
complainant Luz Amper, through counsel, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution
of the Secretary of Justice, but the latter issued a Resolution on January 12, 2001 denying the
said motion. She forthwith filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA),
entitled Luz Amper v. Secretary of Justice10 for the nullification of the said resolution. However,
the CA did not issue any temporary restraining order against the respondents and thereafter
dismissed the petition.
On December 1, 2000, Momma filed a letter-complaint with the Court against Judge Ambrosio
Alumbres, alleging, inter alia, that the Judge pressured him into settling the libel case
for P7,000,000. According to Momma, the Judge would even call his representative to his
chambers in an effort to convince him to settle the case. When he refused, the Judge agreed
to reduce the offer to P3,000,000.00. He also complained that the Judge was eager to issue
warrants for his arrest although there were no valid reasons therefor. He asked the Court to
help him have an impartial judge to decide the libel case.11
On December 2, 2000, Olavere, in behalf of Momma, filed a motion with the RTC Branch 255,
for the inhibition of the presiding judge.12 Acting on the complaint of Momma, the OCA wrote
him on February 5, 2001, requesting that his complaint be executed under oath within ten days.
Momma complied with the request.
On March 12, 2001, the State Prosecutor filed a motion with the trial court in Criminal Case No.
00-0117 for the withdrawal of the information, conformably with the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice, and the lifting of the hold departure order. Momma, through his counsel Atty. Roberto
Garay, filed a motion on April 17, 2001 for the release of his cash bail bond in the amount
of P80,000. Because the private complainant was not notified of the hearing of the public
prosecutor’s motion on May 2, 2001, the court reset the hearing to May 16, 2001, and then
reset it anew to June 25, 2001.
On June 3, 2001, Judge Ambrosio Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255, retired from office.
Executive Judge Manuel Fernandez designated Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, the pairing Judge
of Branch 255, as Acting Presiding Judge thereof.
Judge Maceda at times required Ms. Joselita P. Macaldo, Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the Office
of the Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch 255, to make a case summary or a preliminary statement
of pending incidents thereon before resolving the same. She also prepared drafts of orders for
Judge Maceda’s approval and signature, and the latter would either approve the draft and sign
the same, or revise it, in which case, the order would be typewritten in Branch 255. Macaldo
would then affix her initials below the typewritten name of Judge Maceda before the latter
signed the Order.
On June 25, 2001, Momma filed a motion for the lifting of the hold departure order. The said
motion was set for hearing on July 2, 2001. Conchita Blanza, Stenographer, Branch 255, RTC,
Las Pinas, recorded the proceedings of the hearing. Judge Maceda issued an Order stating that
the pending incidents had been submitted for the resolution of the court. On July 3, 2001 OIC
Macaldo transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 00-0117 to respondent Atty. Edgar Allan
C. Morante, who was the Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch 255, for the resolution by Judge
Maceda of the pending incidents.

Olavere and Momma’s counsel, Atty. Garay, followed up the case with the respondent several
times for the early resolution of the pending incidents therein. According to Olavere and Momma,
the ninety-day period for the resolution thereof had long since elapsed.
On August 20, 2001, Atty. Garay arrived in the house of Olavere, and informed the latter that
the respondent had a message: if Olavere wanted a favorable decision in the libel case against
Momma, he, Olavere, would have to talk with the respondent to make "arrangements" with the
Judge. Olavere forthwith saw the respondent in the latter’s office at the Justice Hall in Las Piñas
City. The respondent told Olavere that he, the respondent, could have the case against Momma
dismissed by Judge Maceda if Momma was willing to come across with P250,000.
When Olavere relayed the respondent’s message to Momma, the latter replied that he would
have to see the order of dismissal first. Olavere, in turn, relayed Momma’s message to the
respondent, and the latter told Olavere that Momma would have to pay P50,000 in exchange
for an unsigned copy of the order of dismissal of the court. The balance of P200,000 would then
be paid to the respondent upon delivery to Olavere of the order of dismissal bearing the
signature of Judge Maceda. Olavere informed Momma of the respondent’s message. The two
agreed to report the matter to the NBI, so that the respondent could be apprehended in
flagrante delicto.
On August 27, 2001, Momma arrived at the NBI where he executed a complaint-affidavit against
the respondent for robbery/extortion. The said affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before
Atty. Timoteo Pineda, Jr., the Executive Officer of the Special Action Unit of the NBI. In the said
complaint-affidavit, Momma alleged, inter alia, that the respondent had requested him to
produce P250,000 in exchange for the court’s favorable decision in the libel case.13 It was also
alleged that Momma and Olavere agreed to give P50,000 in consideration for the unsigned order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 00-0117.
At about 11:00 a.m. on August 28, 2001, Olavere saw the respondent in his office at the second
floor of the Justice Hall in Las Piñas City. The other court personnel were then having lunch.
Olavere gave the P50,000 to the respondent who then gave Olavere an unsigned copy14 of the
Order dated July 19, 2001 granting the motion to withdraw information filed by the State
Prosecutor, Momma’s motion for the release of his cash bond, as well as the lifting of the hold
departure order. The respondent told Olavere that he would call him as soon as the order had
already been signed by Judge Maceda. In the afternoon of the same day, Olavere proceeded to
the Special Action Unit of the NBI and gave a sworn statement to Senior Agent Nelson Pacada,
alleging, inter alia, that the respondent had demanded P250,000 in exchange for the order of
dismissal of the libel case against Momma, and that he, Olavere, had already given P50,000 to
the respondent earlier that morning in exchange for an unsigned order of the dismissal of the
libel case, the balance payable to the respondent upon delivery by him of the order of dismissal
duly signed by Judge Maceda.15 Olavere gave the NBI the unsigned Order he earlier received
from the respondent.16
Momma and NBI Agent Pineda decided to conduct an entrapment operation against the
respondent at his office. Momma gave four P500 bills to Pineda bearing Serial Numbers
RU582077, RU582078, SW730103 and TX016250 for the operation.17 Pineda requested NBI
Forensic Chemist, Felicisima Francisco, to subject the four bills contained in the white envelope
to fluorescent powder markings.18 Francisco also dusted the white envelope with fluorescent
powder. She then returned the bills and the white envelope to Pineda. The latter, in turn, placed
the four P500 bills on top of other peso bills amounting to P198,000. Since the bills were so
bulky, Pineda placed the P200,000 in a brown envelope and sealed the same. The forensic
chemist, however, did not dust the envelope with fluorescent powder.
In the meantime, Olavere was able to talk with the respondent over the telephone a couple of
times. They agreed that Olavere would deliver the balance of P200,000 to the respondent at his
75
office in the morning of August 31, 2001. In exchange, the respondent would give Olavere the
order dismissing the case bearing the signature of Judge Maceda.
On August 29, 2001, Judge Maceda signed an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw
Information, the State Prosecutor’s Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order, as well as Momma’s
motion for the release of his cash bond of P80,000. The respondent affixed his initials on the
order below the typewritten name of Judge Maceda.19 Instead of returning the records of
Criminal Case No. 00-0117 to Branch 255 of the RTC for the release of the said order, the
respondent kept the said records, including the order of Judge Maceda, and waited Olavere to
return with the P200,000.
When Olavere informed Pineda that the respondent had agreed to a meeting in the morning on
August 31, 2001 for the payoff, Pineda called the other NBI agents to a pre-entrapment
conference and agreed on the mechanics of the operation. Olavere and Pineda agreed that they
would proceed to the office of the respondent; Olavere would carry the brown envelope
containing the P200,000, while the NBI agents would position themselves strategically nearby.
Immediately after delivering the envelope with the money to the respondent, Olavere will give
the pre-arranged signal. The NBI agents would then enter the office of the respondent, take
him into custody and confiscate from him the P200,000.
Shortly before noon of August 31, 2001, Olavere and NBI Agents Timoteo Pineda, Jr. Marlon
Toleda, Joel Toresa, and Dante Sonbar arrived at the second floor of the Justice Hall in La Piñas
City. Judge Maceda was absent because he was ill. The agents strategically positioned
themselves outside the office of the respondent, while Olavere, with the brown envelope
containing P200,000, proceeded to the latter’s office. The respondent met Olavere outside the
office and brought him inside. The respondent then gave Olavere a copy of the Order in the
libel case signed by Judge Maceda, dated August 29, 2001.20 Olavere handed over to the
respondent the brown envelope containing the P200,000 and gave the pre-arranged signal to
the NBI agents who were waiting outside. Instead of opening the envelope and counting the
money contained therein, the respondent placed the envelope on top of his table.
When the NBI agents heard Olavere’s pre-arranged signal, they entered the office of the
respondent. They saw the brown envelope containing the P200,000 on the respondent’s table.
They took custody of the respondent and the brown envelope, including the money inside. The
NBI agents informed the respondent of his constitutional rights and brought him to the NBI
headquarters in Taft Avenue, Manila, where he was placed under arrest.21 The chemist was
unable to examine the brown envelope which contained the bribe money because the NBI
agents failed to deliver the same to her.
Olavere gave a sworn statement to NBI Agent Toledo.22 The NBI agents executed their joint
affidavit of the respondent’s arrest.23 On the same date, the NBI Director transmitted to Inquest
Prosecutor Roberto D. Lao of the Department of Justice the complaint of Momma and Olavere
charging the respondent of violating Section 3(b) in relation to paragraph (c) of Republic Act
No. 3019.24 The respondent submitted his counter-affidavit25 and rejoinder26 during the
preliminary investigation. The respondent was later charged of violating Rep. Act No. 3019 in
an Information filed with the RTC of Las Piñas City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-0317.
The Case for the Respondent27
The respondent vehemently denied the charges hurled against him. He adopted the counter-
affidavit he submitted to the Inquest Prosecutor as his testimony on direct examination before
the Investigating Justice. His version of the incident is as follows:
When Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of RTC, Branch 275 took over the numerous
cases pending before the sala of Judge Alumbres after the latter retired as Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 255, an inventory of cases revealed that there were 143 cases
with pending incidents; 91 cases submitted for decision which were already beyond

the reglementary period for issuing an order, resolution or decision, and 891 other
pending cases. The office was deluged by calls from party litigants, their
representatives, as well as their respective counsels, who were eager to follow up the
status of their respective cases and seek the speedy resolution thereof. One case
being followed up with unusual persistence was the criminal case for libel against
Momma. The respondent met Atty. Roberto Garay during the third or fourth week of
June 2001 when the latter followed up the resolution of the pending incidents. He
met Jose "Joey" Olavere, who introduced himself asan employee of Momma and
followed-up the resolution of the motion to lift hold departure order, the motion to
withdraw information filed by the State Prosecutor and Momma’s motion for the
refund of the cash bond then pending before Branch 255 of the RTC.
Olavere began telling "stories" that his employer had already spent almost P1,000,000
to settle or dispose of the said libel case, particularly the hold departure order issued
by the court. Olavere showed to him a list containing the names of the "recipients"
and the amounts received by each: Judge, P300,000; Clerk of Court, P100,000;
sheriff, P20,000; fiscal, P50,000. Olavere even admitted that he was being paid a
bonus for the "arrangements" that he had facilitated with the said officials. He also
revealed that Momma wanted to go back to Japan to visit his father who was seriously
ill.28
Because of his employer’s apparently precarious situation, Olavere requested the respondent to
intercede for his employer so that the criminal case against the latter could be resolved in the
soonest possible time. The respondent replied that Judge Maceda was a very strict presiding
judge, and that it was impossible to influence him in the resolution of cases. He also told Olavere
that he was going to do his best to help, but emphasized that he was not promising anything.
After this first visit, Olavere came to his office several more times. Olavere and Atty. Garay also
started calling the said office frequently. It got to a point where the respondent evaded their
calls.29
The respondent denied that he received the sum of P50,000 from Olavere in exchange for an
unsigned Order dated July 19, 2001. He denied ever preparing and giving the said unsigned
order to Olavere. He alleged that although Judge Maceda often asked him to prepare a
preliminary study of the facts and legal issues in pending cases, the Judge did not ask him to
prepare any order in Criminal Case No. 00-0117. He claimed that the records of Criminal Case
No. 00-0117 were inside the chambers of Judge Maceda from July to August 2001.
At around 9:00 a.m. of August 28, 2001, Olavere arrived in his office and asked the respondent
if there was already an order lifting the hold departure order issued against his employer duly
signed by Judge Maceda. He replied in the negative. He was in a hurry at the time because he
had an appointment with the City Legal Officer, Atty. Zardi Melito Abellera. Before he left the
office, he advised Olavere to check the matter out with Branch Sheriff Josefino Ortiz.30Sheriff
Ortiz heard him say, "There’s no resolution yet. Better follow up with Branch 255." 31 Olavere
then told him that he would be back on Friday to find out if an order had already been issued.
There was no talk about money.32The respondent was accompanied by Branch Sheriff Josefino
Ortiz, and they arrived in Atty. Abellera’s office at about 9:15 a.m. Ortiz stood by the door to
the office of Atty. Abellera during the meeting. The meeting, where they talked about the budget
for the offices and the newly appointed judges, lasted until about 11:30 a.m.33 Thereafter, the
respondent and Ortiz had lunch together.34
In the morning of August 29, 2001, the respondent arrived in his office and saw a draft of an
order for Judge Maceda’s review bearing his corrections. The said order was appended to the
records. The respondent corrected the draft and gave the records to the stenographic reporter
for the typing of the final draft. The next day, August 30, 2001, he saw the Order dated August
76
29, 2001, already signed by Judge Maceda. However, the respondent did not transmit the
records to the Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 255 for the release of the Order.
On or about 11:20 a.m. on August 31, 2001, Olavere again came to his office to follow up the
libel case. He stood up and went inside Judge Maceda’s chambers to get a copy of the order,
which he knew had already been signed the day before.35 At around 11:30,36 he summoned
RTC Sheriff Roberto Galing of Branch 255 to have the order certified by OIC Joselita R. Macaldo
of Branch 255. Sheriff Galing had the copy of the order certified by Macaldo, and handed the
same to him. The respondent, in turn, gave a
copy of the Order to Olavere. The respondent also made the latter acknowledge the receipt of
the said copy in the original copy of the order retained for the court file.37 Olavere read the
order, then placed it inside his bag as he stood in front of the respondent’s desk. The respondent
noticed that Olavere was pulling out a bulky brown envelope, about 8x11 inches in size. Olavere
placed the envelope on top of the respondent’s desk. The latter immediately said, "Ano ‘yan?"38
Court Process Server Leon Matienzo of RTC, Branch 255, had entered the office to inform the
respondent that he was able to get a schedule for the civil service examination and stood in
front of the copy machine located beside the respondent’s table. Matienzo heard the respondent
say, "Ano ‘yan?" as the latter pointed to a thick brown envelope on his table.39 Matienzo told
him, "Boss, excuse me po, ipapa-alam ko lang na nakapag pa-schedule na kami para sa civil
service exam," to which the latter replied, "Okay." Matienzo then left the room to have his
lunch.40
The respondent turned his attention back to Olavere and repeated his query about the envelope,
"Ano ‘yan? Bakit may letterhead pa yan ng Garay Law Office?" Olavere replied, "Eh galing kay
Garay ‘yan, e!"41 Suddenly, a group of about eight persons barged into the office, approached
his desk and introduced themselves as agents of the NBI. They surrounded the desk and one
of them took hold of the brown envelope. The seal was removed and the envelope was opened
in front of the respondent. The latter saw that the envelope contained bundles of
money.42Realizing that the respondent had not picked up the envelope, much less touched the
money contained therein, one of the NBI agents positioned to grab his right hand and tried to
place it inside the envelope, in an apparent attempt to mark it with the fluorescent powder with
which the money was previously dusted.43 The apparent attempt to mark the respondent’s right
hand was foiled by the timely entry of Leticia B. Agbayani, the Branch Stenographer, who
immediately shouted, "What’s happening here? Anong nangyayari dito?" to which the
respondent replied, "Entrapment daw!"44 Agbayani asked, "Anong inilagay? Hinawakan mo ba?"
to which the respondent replied, "Hindi, hindi ko hinawakan." She then told the NBI agents,
"You mean to say that you can entrap anybody when somebody (sic) put an envelope on top
of your table?" When she inquired where the envelope was, a certain Atty. Pineda replied, "It
was already secured."45
People began to gather in the office. One of them, Branch Sheriff Josefino Ortiz, pointed to the
NBI agents for setting him up, and asked to accompany the latter to the NBI Headquarters in
Manila. At this point, Olavere informed the respondent that he was also a confidential agent of
the NBI and showed his identification card.46 The group left the office at around 12:00 noon.
They boarded a pick-up truck together with Atty. Pineda and a certain Atty. Bonoan. They
arrived at around 1:30 in the afternoon. The respondent underwent interrogation and testing
for fluorescent powder marks.47 While he was being questioned at the NBI office, he noticed a
foreign-looking individual who was freely going in and out of the office of NBI Division Chief
Atty. De Guzman. He later came to know that the man was in fact Tetsuo Momma.48 Momma
was apparently a very influential individual at the NBI as he was also seen conversing and
laughing with Olavere and Atty. De Guzman.49
According to the respondent, the case against him was weakened by Olavere’s execution of an
affidavit retracting his sworn statement and supplemental statement to the NBI, the latter’s
testimony, and by the affidavit of desistance executed by Momma dated March 5, 2001.

The Issues
The issues for resolution in this case are the following: (a) whether or not the complainant
adduced substantial evidence to prove that the respondent gave the unsigned Order dated July
19, 2001 to Olavere on August 28, 2001 after receiving P50,000 from the latter; (b) whether or
not the respondent promised and agreed to give to Olavere on August 31, 2001 a certified copy
of the August 28, 2001 Order signed by Judge Bonifacio Maceda and in consideration
of P200,000; (c) whether or not the respondent
received the brown envelope containing P200,000 from Olavere on August 31, 2001 after giving
to Olavere the certified copy of the August 28, 2001 Order signed by Judge Maceda; and, (d)
whether the respondent is guilty of grave and serious misconduct in office.
The Ruling of the Court
On the first issue, the respondent asserts that in administrative cases, where the acts subject
of the complaint are criminal in nature such as bribery or violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent asserts that the
complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he
demanded P50,000 in consideration for the delivery of an unsigned order granting the motion
of the State Prosecutor for the withdrawal of the Information and for the granting of the motion
for the lifting of the hold departure order, and that he actually gave to Olavere on August 28,
2001 an unsigned order after receiving P50,000 from him. The respondent contends that the
affidavit-complaint of Momma was hearsay because the latter failed to testify. He also asserts
that Olavere’s claim, as contained in his affidavit, that he had an agreement with the respondent
to give P50,000 in consideration of an unsigned order, is belied by Olavere’s testimony during
the investigation, that the agreement was for the delivery of a signed copy of the Order to
Olavere. Furthermore, Toledo’s allegation that Olavere arrived in the NBI on August 27, 2001 is
belied by the latter’s testimony that it was only on August 28, 2001 when he made a report to
the NBI. The respondent concludes that Olavere could not have given him P50,000 on August
28, 2001 because Olavere admitted that it was entirely possible that he did not give the P50,000
to the respondent but pocketed the money himself.
The contention of the respondent does not persuade.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Bautista,50 this Court, citing its ruling in Mamba v.
Garcia,51 held that in administrative proceedings only substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction,
is required. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, as the standard
of integrity demanded of members of the Bench is not satisfied which merely allows one to
escape the penalties of criminal law. The dismissal of any criminal case against the respondent
in an administrative case, for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. The affidavit-complaint52 of
Momma was admitted by the Investigating Justice as part of the testimony of Toledo and
Olavere and, more specifically, Momma submitted the said affidavit-complaint against the
respondent to the NBI and subscribed and swore to the truth of its contents before Toledo.53
The complainant adduced substantial evidence that the respondent himself gave to Olavere the
unsigned order54after receiving P50,000 from the latter. As gleaned from Olavere’s affidavit, the
respondent gave the unsigned order to him in the morning of August 28, 2001 after he had
given P50,000 to the respondent.
T: Papaano naman aayusin ni ATTY. MORANTE ang kaso?
S: Sinabi niya sa akin na mapapadismiss niya ang kaso ng boss ko bastat magproduce
lang ako ng P250,000. Sinabi ko ito sa boss ko pero ang sabi niya, gusto niyang
makita ang papeles.
77
T: Ano ang nangyari pagkatapos?
S: Ang sabi ni ATTY. MORANTE magbigay ako ng P50,000 kapalit ang walang pirmang
papeles at pagkatapos yong balanseng P200,000 ay itatawag niya sa akin.
T: Pumayag ba naman ang boss mo?
S: Opo, sa katunayan ay binigay ko na kaninang umaga ang P50,000 at itatawag ni
ATTY. MORANTE sa akin kapag pirmado na ang desisyon para maibigay ko ang
balanseng P200,000.
T: Mayroon ibinigay bang papeles si ATTY. MORANTE?
S: Opo, ito pong walang pirmang Order ni Judge MACEDA. (Affiant submits an
unsigned six-page Order dated July 19, 2001 under Judge BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA,
RTC, Branch 255, Las Pinas City marked as Annexes "A" to "A-5").55
We reject respondent’s contention that Olavere was impeached as a witness, and that the
entirety of his sworn statement and supplemental statement to the NBI and his testimony during
the investigation was weakened, merely because in answer to one of the questions of
respondent’s counsel on cross examination, Olavere stated that he went to the office of the
respondent on August 28, 2001 with the intention of getting a signed copy of the Order of Judge
Maceda,56 contrary to his earlier declaration in his sworn statement that he was at the office of
the respondent on the said date, with the intention of getting an unsigned order. We find no
basis for the respondent’s assertion that since the case against him is based principally on
Olavere’s testimony and sworn statement, the complaint against him must be dismissed.
It is true that in response to one of the questions of the respondent’s counsel on cross
examination on whether Olavere had intended to secure an unsigned order from the respondent
on August 28, 2001, Olavere declared that he was expecting a signed order from the
respondent. Indeed, the answer of Olavere contradicts his sworn statement to the NBI in which
he stated that he went to the office of the respondent on August 28, 2001 to get an unsigned
order. It bears stressing, however, that in answer to the subsequent questions on cross
examination, Olavere testified that he intended to secure an "unsigned decision" from the
respondent on August 28, 2001, thereby corroborating his sworn statement.57
To determine the credibility and probative weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony
must be considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. To determine which contradicting
statements of a witness is to prevail as the truth, the other evidence received must be
considered. In People v. Ubiña,58 the Court held that contradicting testimony given subsequently
does not necessarily discredit the previous testimony if the contradiction is satisfactorily
explained. There is no rule which states that a previous testimony is presumed to be false merely
because a witness now says that the same is not true. A testimony solemnly given in court
should not be lightly set aside. Before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the
subsequent one should be carefully scrutinized – in other words, all the expedients devised by
man to determine the credibility of witnesses should be utilized to determine which of the two
contradicting testimonies represents the truth.
Also, under Rule 132, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by
showing that such two contradicting statements are under oath. However, in order to impeach
Olavere’s testimony to be inconsistent with the sworn statement, the sworn statement alleged
to be inconsistent with the subsequent one should have been shown and read to him and,
thereafter, he should have been asked to explain the apparent inconsistency. This was not done
in this case, and the respondent cannot derive any benefit from the supposed contradiction in
Olavere’s testimony.59 We reiterate our own ruling in People v. De Guzman:60
In People vs. Resabal, this Court explicitly ruled that the mere presentation of the
prior declarations of a witness without the same having been read to the witness

while he was testifying in court is insufficient for the desired impeachment of his
testimony. As explained therein, the apparent contradiction between the declarations
of the witness before the former justice of the peace court and those before the then
court of first instance was insufficient to discredit him since he was not given ample
opportunity, by reading to him his declarations before the lower court, to explain the
supposed discrepancy.
The rule which requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing
evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon common sense and
is essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the
necessary inquiries, which enables him to explain the statements referred to, and to
show that they were made under a mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between
them and his testimony.
It would be unjust to complainant at this stage to be declared an incredible witness
as a result of the unauthorized procedure adopted by appellant. It is evidentiarily
proscribed to discredit a witness on the bases of purportedly prior inconsistent
statements which were not called to the attention of that witness during the trial,
although the same are supposedly contained in a document which was merely offered
and admitted in its entirety without the requisite specifications.
Through such a somewhat underhanded recourse, a party can expediently offer in
evidence at the trial the whole document containing allegedly variant statements and
then point out much later on appeal the supposed contradictory statements which
were not specified, intentionally or otherwise, in the same trial. That sub silentio
gambit would necessarily deprive a witness of the chance to explain the seeming
divergencies, which is the paramount consideration of the rule mandating the laying
of the proper predicate.
Complainant is undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by the rule to
explain the supposed differences in her statements. Without such explanation before
us, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis to evaluate and assess her
credibility on the rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by
a witness in reconciling his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed
impeached. As things stand before us and the court a quo, therefore, complainant’s
credibility remains unimpeached.
On the foregoing considerations, we confirm the validity of the doctrine articulated by
the Court of Appeals in Villaruel vs. Bascon that, unless the proper predicate is laid
during the trial by calling the attention of a witness to his alleged inconsistent
statements given outside of his testimony in court and asking him to explain the
contradiction, the supposed inconsistencies cannot be pointed out on appeal for the
purpose of destroying the credibility of the witness. This pronouncement was actually
based upon and in line with the holdings of this Court in Escosura and People vs. Lim
Quingsy.
We have calibrated, in light of the other evidence on record, the entirety of Olavere’s testimony
on cross-examination and have arrived at the conclusion that, indeed, Olavere intended to
receive an unsigned Order of Judge Maceda from the respondent on August 28, 2001. The
evidence on record shows that when Olavere arrived at the respondent’s office on August 28,
2001, he received the unsigned order from the respondent after the latter had received
the P50,000. We, therefore, rule that Olavere was not impeached as a witness and his sworn
statement rendered of no probative weight merely because of his erroneous answer to one of
the questions of respondent’s counsel on cross-examination. We also note that the Investigating
Justice gave credence and full probative weight to the sworn statement of Olavere, that he
received the unsigned order61 from the respondent on August 28, 2001.
78
The probative weight of the sworn statement of Olavere that the respondent gave him the
unsigned Order on August 28, 2001 cannot be overcome by the latter’s bare denials.
This Court is convinced, as the Investigating Justice was, that the respondent himself prepared
the unsigned order. The evidence on record shows that the respondent, as the Deputy Clerk of
Court of Branch 275, received from Macaldo, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 255, the
records of Crim. Case No. 00-0117 on July 3, 2001, as Judge Maceda was to resolve the pending
incidents, including the Motion to Resolve Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion to Quash, Lift Hold
Departure Order and to Recall Warrant of Arrest and Release Bond filed by the State Prosecutor.
After receiving the records of the case from Macaldo, the respondent kept the same in his
custody. The respondent failed to adduce credible evidence that he parted with the records
from July 3, 2001 to August 28, 2001 and turned over the same to Judge Maceda.
Even a cursory reading of the unsigned Order will show that it contained facts culled from the
records of Criminal Case No. 00-0117. As the records were in the custody of the respondent,
only he could have prepared the said order. Moreover, on the last page, on the left bottom side
of the order, contain the initials of the stenographic reporter who typed the said order, followed
by the initials of the respondent himself: "EACM" corresponding to his full name, Edgar Allan C.
Morante. We agree with the perceptive disquisitions of the Investigating Justice in his Report to
this Court on the utter untenability of the respondent’s bare denial, thus:
The denial of the respondent, and even a thousand more, cannot alter the fact that
his initial eacm which stands for Edgar Allan Ching Morante and the initial of one of
the stenographers of Branch 275 which reads, cgl appeared at the left bottom portion
of the last page of the unsigned order (Exhibit "B-5," p. 131, Rollo). The stenographer
with cgl initial appeared to be the favorite stenographer of Judge Maceda as shown
by the fact that all the orders that the judge issued which were marked as Exhibits
"H" to "H-23," only Exhibit "H-22" did not bear said initial. The initial of the
respondent eacm that appeared in the unsigned order is a mute but a very persuasive
and convincing witness that, indeed, the unsigned order was prepared by him
(respondent) and, he was the one who gave it to Olavere in exchange of the Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos. Moreover, the signed order except for two or three
significant paragraphs was bodily lifted from the unsigned order. The signed order
also bore the initial (cgl) of the same stenographer at the bottom of the last page and
of the respondent below the typewritten name, BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA (TSN, p.
6, Nov. 8, 2002)….62
The respondent foisted on the Court a tattle-tale when he claimed that the records of Criminal
Case No. 00-0117 had been in the chambers of Judge Maceda from July to August 2001 and,
as such, it was physically impossible for him to have prepared the unsigned order and later gave
it to Olavere. The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove that Judge
Maceda received the records of said case from Macaldo or from the respondent before August
28, 2001. The respondent should have adduced in evidence the record book of Branch 275
showing when the records were transmitted to Judge Maceda. It behooved the respondent to
have presented Judge Maceda as a witness to corroborate his claim that the records were in
the chambers of the Judge from July 3, 2001 up to August 28, 2001. The respondent could have
elicited from Judge Maceda that he kept the records of said criminal case in his chambers during
the said period. Judge Maceda could have identified the person who prepared the draft of the
signed order which he corrected before he signed the same on August 28, 2001. The respondent
failed to do so. The respondent’s culpability became more evident when he was confronted by
the Investigating Justice with the unsigned order. The Investigating Justice noticed that the
respondent blushed and started to stammer when the latter answered clarificatory questions.63
A reading of both the unsigned order64 and the signed order65 reveals that there can be no other
conclusion than that the two orders were prepared by one and the same person using the same
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typewriter, and the records of Criminal Case No. 00-0117. As gleaned from the encompassing Q: The P50,000.00?
Report of the Investigating Justice:
A: I am coordinating my every move with the Chief of SAU. That includes
… When respondent was confronted with the two (2) orders – unsigned and signed the P50,000.00 we were supposed to give in exchange for the unsigned decision.
– with his initials in both and, asked whether he noticed that the 2nd par. of page 2
of the signed order was verbatimly copied from the 3rd par., p. 1 of the unsigned COURT:
order, respondent blushed and started to stammer in answering further questions. When you say SAU. What do you mean by that?
A careful examination of the two (2) orders would show that par. 2, p. 1 of the unsigned order WITNESS:
is the same as par. 1, p. 3 of the signed order; par. 1, p. 3 of the unsigned order is the same
as par. 2, p. 3 of the signed order except that the cited authority in the unsigned order reads Special Action Unit.
Luspo vs. Mogue, while in the signed order the authority cited reads, Crespo vs. Mogul, 151
COURT:
SCRA 462. The cited authority which reads Luspo vs. Mogue can be concocted only by a devious
mind. Par. 2, p. 3 to p. 4, of the unsigned order is similar to par. 1, p. 2 of the signed order; Of what?
and, the last paragraphs of both the unsigned and signed orders are the same.
WITNESS:
The respondent resorted to twisting the testimony of Olavere to prove his claim that the latter
pocketed the P50,000 intended for the respondent. Of the NBI.

When asked by counsel for the respondent if it was possible that he, Olavere, did not give Q: So before you allegedly gave the P50,000.00 to Atty. Morante, you informed the
the P50,000, Olavere testified it was possible, but insisted that he gave the same to the NBI?
respondent: A: Yes, they knew of my every move.66
ATTY. MORALES-PADUA: When Olavere saw the NBI agents on August 27, 2001 as claimed by Toledo about the denial
Q: And then you reported to Mr. Momma that the amount of P50,000.00 was received of the respondent for P250,000 in consideration of an unsigned order is not of such importance.
by Mr. Morante? Olavere went to the NBI on said date and executed an affidavit-complaint against the
respondent and filed the same to the NBI. Olavere closely coordinated all their moves with the
A: Of course. NBI, including the giving of P50,000 for the unsigned order:
Q: He takes (sic) your word for it? Q When you alleged you gave the money to Atty. Morante, you did notify the NBI?
A: Yes. A After I gave the money, I went directly to the NBI and reported what happened
during the exchange of unsigned decision.
Q: It is possible that you did not give it to Mr. Morante? You just told Mr. Momma
that you gave it to Mr. Morante. Is that not possible? Q We are talking about the P50,000.00?
A: It is possible, but I gave it to Mr. Morante. A Yes.
Q: And it is also possible that you pocketed the money? Q You did not go to the NBI before you gave the money to entrap Atty. Morante?
A: That is impossible, I will not do that. COURT:
Q: It is possible. Before you gave the money, you did not go to the NBI?
A: I will not do that to my boss. That is the question.
Q: When you alleged you gave the money to Atty. Morante, you did notify the NBI? Q The P50,000.00?
A: After I gave the money, I went directly to the NBI and reported what happened A I am coordinating my every move with the Chief of SAU. That includes
during the exchange of unsigned decision. the P50,000.00 we were supposed to give in exchange for the unsigned decision.
Q: We are talking about the P50,000.00? Q When you say SAU, what do you mean by that?
A: Yes. A Special Action Unit.
Q: You did not go to the NBI before you gave the money to entrap Atty. Morante? Q Of what?
COURT: A Of the NBI.
Before you gave the money, you did not go to the NBI? Q So before you allegedly gave the P50,000.00 to Atty. Morante, you informed the
NBI?
That is the question.

A Yes, they knew of my every move.67
Indeed, immediately after receiving the unsigned order from the respondent on August 28,
2001, Olavere gave the unsigned order to the NBI as evidence against the respondent. The
culpability of the respondent is, likewise, evidenced by his failure to follow procedure when he
made arrangements with Olavere to release the order signed by Judge Maceda himself. As ruled
by the Investigating Justice:
Respondent violated procedure when he personally released the signed order to
Olavere. According to Ms. Macaldo, the release of the order should have been made
by the court where it was filed. Since the Momma case was filed with Branch 255 and
the pending incidents were resolved by Judge Maceda only as a pair judge, the order
should be released by the staff of Branch 255. This procedure was followed in all
cases with pending incidents from Branch 255 that were resolved by Judge Maceda,
except the Momma case.68
Anent the second and third issues, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice in his
Report that the complainant was able to adduce substantial evidence to prove that the
respondent promised to Olavere and agreed to give and did give and actually gave to the latter
on August 31, 2001 a certified copy of the August 28, 2001 Order already signed by Judge
Maceda after receiving the brown envelope containing the P200,000 from Olavere. In his
affidavit-sworn statement on August 31, 2001 Olavere declared, thus:
T Pagkatapos na maibigay mo ang P50,000 noong August 28, 2001 kapalit ang
walang pirmang desisyon, anong nangyari?
S Nakipagset ng schedule si ATTY. MORANTE na ibibigay niya ang pirmadong
desisyon kapalit ng P200,000 sa biyernes, August 31, 2001.
T Ano ang sumunod na pangyayari?
S Ngayon araw na ito, August 31, 2001, bandang alas-onse y medya ng umaga (11:30
AM) ay nagpunta ako sa opisina ni ATTY. MORANTE.
T Ano naman ang ginawa mo sa opisina ni ATTY. MORANTE?
S Ayon sa usapan ay kinuha ko ang pirmadong desisyon ni Judge BONIFACIO SANZ
MACEDA kapalit ng P200,000. Tinanggap niya ang pera na nasa loob ng envelop at
ipinatong sa ibabaw ng kanyang mesa. (Affiant submits Order of Judge BONIFACIO
SANZ MACEDA dated August 29, 2001 marked as Annexes "A" to "A-3")
T Ano ang sumunod dito?
S Dumating na ang mga taga-NBI at hinuli si ATTY. MORANTE.
T May ipapakita ako sa iyong tao, kilala mo ba siya?
S Opo, siya po si ATTY. ALLAN MORANTE ang Branch Clerk of Court ng Branch 275,
RTC, Las Piñas City, na tumanggap ng P200,000 nasa loob ng envelope.
T Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong nais na itanong pa sa inyo, mayroon ba
kayong nais na idagdag o ibawas dito sa inyong salaysay?
S Wala po. 69
To the clarificatory questions of the Investigating Justice, Olavere replied, viz:
Q When you went inside the room, there is (sic) a door?
COURT
80
Door to the office?
Q Door to the office of Atty. Morante from the outside?
There must be a door.
A Yes, of course.
Q The door was not locked.
A Presumably it was not locked.
Q You did not lock it when you enter (sic)?
A No.
Q Then you went to the office of Mr. Morante?
A Yes, he led me inside.
Q Then according to you, you got the signed copy of the decision given to you
allegedly by Atty. Morante?
A After the exchange of the money.
Q Then you got the money from your back contained in an envelope, and you gave
it to Atty. Morante?
A I handed it to him.
Q He got it and then placed it in (sic) the table. That is the statement that you swore
and I quote: "Tinanggap niya ang pera na nasa loob ng envelope at ipinatong sa
ibabaw ng kanyang mesa." He did not hide it in his drawer. He did not pocket it. And
after receiving the money, he placed it there on top of the table. And you swore to
that statement?
A Yes.
Q When was the money given to you by the NBI? We are referring to the P200,000.00.
Who gave to (sic) you the money?
A Mr. Momma gave the money.
Q Did you give it to the NBI?
A I showed it to them and then they had it dusted for ( sic) fluorescent powder. All
the proceedings were done with proper paper works. And I had the money with me
and I went to Las Pinas.
Q When you handed the money contained in an envelope, you know that it was
already dusted for (sic) fluorescent powder and everything in order to show…?
A Yes.70
Respondent belabored on the evidence on record that after the entrapment operation in the
office of the respondent, the dorsal and palmar aspects of his left and right hand were subjected
to ultraviolet light test and were found negative for fluorescent powder. However, the result of
the test does not enfeeble the case for the complainant. In the first place, the absence of
fluorescent powder on the dorsal and palmar aspects of the respondent’s hands is not conclusive
evidence that he did not hold the brown envelope at all before the NBI agents arrived in his
office. The evidence on record shows that the NBI agents referred the white mailing envelope
with the P1,000 bills to the NBI Forensic Chemist Section for the application of fluorescent

powder.71 The said bills and the white mailing envelope were dusted with fluorescent powder.
However, the NBI agents discovered that the white mailing envelope was too small to contain
bundles of bills amounting to P200,000, and placed the bundles of bills in a 6x8-inch size brown
envelope, which, however, was no longer dusted with fluorescent powder. After receiving the
envelope from Olavere, the respondent placed it on top of his table. Had the respondent opened
the envelope containing the four P1,000 bills dusted with fluorescent powder, for sure, the
palmar aspects of his hand would have tested positive for fluorescent powder.
The respondent claimed that one of the NBI agents who barged into his room took hold of the
brown envelope, removed the seal and opened it in front of him, and that the said agent grabbed
his right hand and attempted to place it inside the envelope, but was foiled when stenographer
Leticia B. Agbayani entered the room and shouted, "What’s happening here?" (Anong
nangyayari dito?) to which the respondent replied, "Entrapment daw."72 The claim of the
respondent is belied by his testimony that before Agbayani’s arrival, an NBI agent had already
taken the money from the brown envelope and placed the bundles of money on top of his table.
Thus, when Agbayani barged into the respondent’s room, Agbayani must have seen the bundles
of money on his table. In her affidavit,73 she stated that when she barged into the respondent’s
room after the NBI had gained entry, she asked the respondent, "Alam mo ba kung anong
laman niyan?" to which the respondent replied, "Hindi," does not bolster the respondent’s
defense, but on the contrary, weakens the same. It is incredible that the respondent would
respond that "he did not know what was contained in the envelope," when, according to his
testimony, Agbayani barged into the room and the bundles of P200,000 had already been taken
out of the envelope and were placed on his table. The respondent even failed to identify the
NBI agent who filed an administrative or criminal charge against him for attempting to falsely
implicate the respondent.
Apart from the presumption that the NBI agents performed their duties in accordance with law,
the bare statement of the respondent cannot prevail, especially since Leon Matienzo, the
principal witness, whose testimony the respondent principally relied on to corroborate his, was
found by the Investigating Justice incredible. We agree with the following disquisition of the
Investigating Justice in his Report to the Court:
To corroborate respondent’s defense that he did not received (sic) the money inside the bulky
brown envelope, another tutored and perjured witness in the person of Leon Matienzo was
presented.
Leon Matienzo admitted that his affidavit was prepared by Atty. Cayton, counsel for the
respondent. Witness was not sure whether his affidavit was prepared in August or September
2001. When the witness finally decided that his affidavit was prepared September 2001, on a
Monday after talking to Atty. Morante, yet he cannot remember the date. The witness was
warned not to talk to anybody while still testifying (TSN, pp. 22-23, July 22, 2001). The witness
was even ambivalent when asked as to the time his affidavit was prepared (TSN, p. 24, Ibid.)
which is a proof that he was tutored and was just asked to sign it.
Witness Matienzo is the Process Server of Branch 254. He claimed that at about 11:30 o’clock
in the morning on August 31, 2001, he went inside the office of the respondent to inform him
that they were able to get a schedule for their civil service examinations. Almost simultaneous
with his arrival in said office, he heard Atty. Morante asked (sic) the person he was talking to,
"ano yan?" He asked to be excused and told the respondent, "boss ipapaalam ko lang na
nakapagpa-schedule na kami para sa civil service examination" and, he (Morante) answered,
"Okay." And he asked permission to leave.
The role assigned to Matienzo in the defense of respondent was just to say/testify that he heard
Atty. Morante asked (sic), "ano yan?" and, nothing more. The witness is the Process Server of
Branch 254 presided by Judge Fernandez, the Executive Judge. According to him, he was
already permitted by the Executive Judge and the Branch Clerk of Court to take the civil service
81
examination. Why then would he still go to the office of Atty. Morante, who was not his superior,
on the fateful day of August 31, 2001 just to inform him that he had a scheduled civil service
examination?
Hereunder are portions of the testimony of the witness that would show the limited role assigned
to the witness in respondent’s defense:
Q What was the reaction of the person who was inside (the office) when Atty. Morante
say (sic), "ano yan?"
A Nakatingin po sa kanya, sir.
Q He did not react?
A Hindi ho kasi mabilis lang po ako doon, eh. Nang sabihin po nag-excuse na po ako.
Q Why were you in a hurry to leave the place when at that point, Atty. Morante was
already asking, what was that?
A Dahil sa nag-excuse po ako, sir. Excuse me, sir, sabi ko sa kanya at sa kanyang
kausap, me sasabihin lang po ako (TSN, p. 32, July 22, 2002).
Q Now, are you sure that what you heard was, ano yan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Nothing else?
A Nothing else, sir. (TSN, p. 35, Ibid.)
The witness cannot even remember the date when the affidavit was prepared, the
day he signed it and, the date when it was subscribed before a person authorized to
administer oath. These only show that all the facts stated therein were supplied by
counsel to corroborate the testimony of the respondent.74
The case for the complainant is not enfeebled by the affidavit of Olavere dated December 5,
2002 where he retracted his sworn statement, the supplemental sworn statement to the NBI
and his testimony before the Investigating Justice; and desisted from being a witness against
the respondent on his claim that "the statements therein are not only hearsay but were brought
about by grave mistake and misapprehension of fact and any lack of knowledge of court
procedures;"75 nor by the affidavit of desistance executed by Momma on his claim that:
3. However, the said statement was merely provided by my interpreter, which is turned out and
was later on discovered, was a result or was brought about by mistake and grave
misapprehension of facts and his lack of knowledge of court procedure, Atty. Morante did not
request nor received money directly from me to have the said case dismissed and I have never
met him in my life; …76
First. In People v. Ballabare,77 we held that a retraction of a witness does not necessarily negate
an original testimony. For this reason, the Court looks with disfavor upon such retractions
because testimonies can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. Moreover, any reconsideration must be tested in a public trial, with sufficient
opportunity given to the adverse party affected by it to cross-examine the recanting witness.
Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants his testimony, courts must
not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of recantation. They should
determine which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original
testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence.78 We have also held
that it is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the Court and
the parties simply because an affiant withdraws his testimony. Olavere and Momma executed
 82

their affidavits only after the formal investigation had been concluded and the case submitted govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers, including those in
for report and recommendation by the Investigating Justice. government service.86 Lawyers in government are public servants who owe utmost fidelity to
the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional
Second. The respondent failed to file a motion for the reopening of the investigation to enable obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.87
him to present Olavere and Momma to testify on their affidavits to prevent the Investigating
Justice and the Court Administrator, which were not even furnished with copies of said affidavits, Under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC88 Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against
from conducting examination of Olavere and Momma on their affidavits. Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts;
and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such
Third. Olavere had personal knowledge of the facts contained in his sworn statement, Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar,89which took effect on October 1, 2002, the
supplemental sworn statement and his testimony and, hence, the said statement and testimony respondent would have been required to "comment on the complaint and to show cause why
are not hearsay. Olavere dealt personally with the respondent, gave him the total amount he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member
of P250,000 after receiving the unsigned and signed orders from the respondent. of the bar." However, the complaint was filed before this Court on September 21, 2001, long
Fourth. Olavere and Momma did not explain their affidavits why it took them until December before the said resolution took effect. Thus, it cannot be applied in the instant case.90
11, 2002 or after the lapse of more than a year from the entrapment of the respondent on WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Edgar Allan C. Morante, Clerk of
August 31, 2001 to execute the same. It is incredible that it took Olavere more than one year Court, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 275, having been found GUILTY of grave and
to realize that the facts contained in his sworn statement and as testified to by him were hearsay serious misconduct, is DISMISSEDfrom the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all
and of his lack of knowledge of procedure. Being a mere secretary and a functionary of Momma, retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to his re-employment in any
Olavere has not explained how he came to the conclusion that his sworn statement and branch or instrumentality in the government, including government-owned and controlled
testimony are "hearsay." corporations.
Fifth. The desistance of witnesses does not automatically result in the dismissal of an SO ORDERED.
administrative case. This Court, in fact, looks with disfavor at affidavits of desistance filed by
complainants, especially if done as an afterthought. Contrary to the submission of the Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
respondent, the withdrawal of the complaint on the recantation of Olavere does not have the Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
legal effect of exonerating him from any administrative disciplinary actions for acts/omissions
meriting disciplinary sanctions by the respondent. It does not operate to divest this Court of
jurisdiction to determine the truth behind the matter stated in the complaint. The Court’s
disciplinary authority cannot be dependent on or frustrated by private arrangements between
parties. An administrative complaint against an official or employee of the judiciary cannot
simply be withdrawn by a complainant who suddenly claims a change of mind.79
On the last issue, we agree with the Investigating Justice that the respondent, based on the
substantial evidence on record, is guilty of grave and serious misconduct: for extorting P50,000
from Momma through Olavere for the unsigned order, and another P200,000 for the order duly
signed by Judge Maceda. Such abominable acts of the respondent warrant his dismissal from
the service and the imposition of accessory penalties therefor.80
The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of
all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.81
Time and again this Court has stressed that those involved in the administration of justice must
conduct themselves in a manner that is beyond reproach since their office is circumscribed with
a heavy burden of responsibility.82Public office is a public trust. No position demands greater
moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office. Clerks of
court, in particular, being the chief administrative officers of their respective courts, must be
individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the
integrity of the court and its proceedings.83 As essential and ranking officers of our judicial
system, they perform delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice.84 Clerks of court serve as an exemplar for other court employees,
whose duties and responsibilities must be strictly performed. They play a key role in the
complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on the job under one pretext or
another.85
Furthermore, it must be stressed that a member of the Bar who assumes public office does not
shed his professional obligations. The Code of Professional Responsibility was not meant to

DE LA CRUZ V. CARRETAS
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043 September 5, 2007
JUAN DE LA CRUZ (CONCERNED CITIZEN OF LEGAZPI CITY), complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RUBEN B. CARRETAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 9, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This administrative case stems from an anonymous complaint by "Juan de la Cruz," a concerned
citizen of Legazpi City, against respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas, presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 9. The letter-complaint1 read:
The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court
and The Honorable Court Administrator Supreme Court, Manila
Sir and Madam,
Kami po ay sumulat sa inyo dahil po sa reklamo sa masamang ugali at asal ni Judge
Ruben Car[r]etas ng RTC, Branch 9, Legazpi City.
Siya po ay isang mayabang na Judge at mahilig mang insulto sa pamamagitan ng side
comments sa mga testigo, abogado at fiscal, parang siya na lang ang may alam sa
batas. Bilang Judge siya na po ang nagdirect, at cross-examine sa mga testigo.
Dahil sa kanyang ginagawa napapahiya ang mga testigo, abogado at fiscal sa harap
ng publiko. Nawawala din po ang respeto ng publiko sa justice system.
Kami po ay umaasa at nanalangin sa madaliang aksyon ng inyong opisina para
malutas ang problemang ito.
Salamat at mabuhay po kayong lahat.
Ang gumagalang,
(Sgd. Juan de la Cruz)
Concern[ed] citizen of Legazpi [City]
In his comment,2 respondent judge surmised that the complaint was initiated by a lawyer whose
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was not granted. He denied the accusation and
claimed that he had not insulted anyone. He then narrated that, in his first few months in office,
he experienced the following exasperating and somewhat amusing incidents: a lawyer insisting
on further examining a witness he had already subjected to re-cross examination; a prosecutor
proceeding with the presentation of evidence when the accused had not yet been arraigned; a
lawyer appearing for an absent counsel de parte and manifesting that he was appearing "in
corroboration" with the latter; lawyers appearing without observing the proper dress code; a
lawyer offering the testimony of his witness "to collaborate" the testimony of another witness;
a lawyer manifesting that he was ready for trial but turning out to be unprepared with his
documentary evidence, prompting the court to call a recess; a case for unjust vexation
committed against a minor being raffled to his sala when the records showed that the victim
was waylaid, boxed and dragged to a forested area where the accused touched her private part
and mashed her breasts; a case being filed for kidnapping and serious illegal detention only
despite the fact that the girl was raped while in captivity. Respondent judge stated that he never
83
encountered these mistakes "in all his years of law practice in Manila." Thus, he was shocked
because he thought that these things "happened only in anecdotes."
Respondent judge observed that due to their familiarity with each other, lawyers appearing in
his sala hardly objected even to obviously objectionable questions. In such instances, he called
the attention of counsels because, to his mind, they were making a "moro-moro"3 out of the
proceedings.
Respondent judge also stated that, while he may have used harsh word sometimes, they were
made out of exasperation and with the intention merely to right the wrong committed in his
presence, not to insult anyone. Nonetheless, he apologized to those who may have been
offended by his remarks.
In connection with the complaint, Judge Romeo S. Dañas, executive judge of the RTC of Legazpi
City, conducted a discreet investigation.4 He interviewed lawyers who appeared in the sala of
respondent judge. He requested them to submit their respective written comments on the
decorum of respondent judge when holding trial. Among these comments were the following:
1. Atty. Mariano B. Baranda, Jr.
i. Respondent judge should avoid making embarrassing, insulting and
abrasive remarks. He should also limit himself to asking clarificatory
questions.5
2. Atty. Expedito P. Nebres
i. If not in open court respondent judge is kind, courteous and respectful.
However, in open court he is arrogant and boastful. He has a bad habit in
making embarrassing or insulting remarks when presiding over cases. Most
of the time, he was the one conducting direct and cross-examination of
witnesses. He used to scold, harass and embarrass witnesses, litigants,
lawyers, prosecutors and PAO6 lawyers for just a slight mistake in
procedure.7
3. Atty. Alexis C. Albao
i. In the course of presentation of evidence for his client, he was insulted and
subjected to sarcastic remarks by respondent judge, not once but for
several occasions. This traumatized him and made him avoid reading the
transcript of stenographic notes of the said hearing until now. In one
occasion, respondent judge proceeded to cut short the proceedings. When
he manifested that he would cross-examine the defendant, respondent
judge stood from his seat and in a sarcastic manner looked backward
manifesting that he was not interested or not listening to the cross-
examination. Thus, he was discouraged from proceeding with his cross-
examination. Most of the time, respondent judge would unduly intervene
in the presentation of evidence and asked more questions than counsel.
Respondent judge showed apathy to those who were subjected to his
insults. He insisted that others submit to his way of doing things. He showed
inflexibility to minor mistakes.8
4. Atty. Ricardo V. de Jesus
i. While he was in the process of conducting direct examination, respondent
judge instructed him to ask questions which respondent judge thought to
be material. When he was through with his direct examination, respondent
judge asked him in open court how long he had been in private practice.
He replied that he had been practicing for only a period of one and a half
(1½) years. Respondent judge then told him to prepare supposed direct
questions and expected answers. He felt embarrassed.9
On October 6, 2005, the members of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Albay held a meeting
to discuss the matter of assigning a public prosecutor to the sala of respondent judge. During

the meeting, the prosecutors raised their concern about the behavior of respondent judge.
Provincial prosecutor Benigno L. Tolosa furnished Judge Dañas with a copy of the minutes of
the meeting.10 The relevant portions of the minutes11 were:
II. DISCUSSION
 The Provincial Prosecutor informed the group about the purpose of the
meeting. He said that the prosecutor assigned in RTC Branch 9, Prosecutor
Maria Miranda-Gojar will soon be transferring to the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor. He asked suggestions from the group on how to go about
the matter of assigning a prosecutor in Branch 9 considering that all
prosecutors have their own court assignment and considering further that
the Presiding Judge of said Branch has a behavioral and attitudinal problem.
 Considering that the matter to be discussed involves the problem with the
Presiding Judge, the Provincial Prosecutor requested those prosecutors
[present] to share their experiences in the court with the Presiding Judge.
 Prosecutor [Eduardo B.] Quinzon remarked that the judge has a sudden
burst of temper and wild moods, insulting and humiliating lawyers in front
of their clients even in the presence of other people.
 Prosecutor Gojar added that the Presiding Judge has a volatile temper and
is fond of insulting and humiliating witnesses and also lawyers. She also
said that during arraignment or trial of cases, he would even call her
attention and would insult the prosecutor who made the Information and
Resolution of the case and even the Chief who approved the same.
 Prosecutor [Maria Teresa A.] Mahiwo added that she observed one hearing
[where] the Presiding Judge [scolded] the two private lawyers who [were]
much older than him. She said that being assigned in Branch 9 will not be
good for the health of any prosecutor.
III. RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT
 Prosecutor [Elmer M.] Lanuzo opined that because the judge is
temperamental, he should be given a fiscal who is not temperamental.
 It was resolved by the group that no prosecutor will be assigned at RTC
Branch 9 considering that all prosecutors have their own court assignment.
 It was also agreed that the Presiding Judge can request from the
Department of Justice a prosecutor who would attend to the cases in his
sala.12
Judge Dañas also received a letter13 from city prosecutor Palmarin E. Rubio of Legazpi City. City
prosecutor Rubio stated that the prosecutor assigned to the sala of respondent judge did not
want to comment on the conduct of respondent judge. He suggested that members of an audit
team from this Court be made to observe the proceedings in Branch 9 to "see and feel the
tension[-]charged atmosphere in the sala once the trial started."14
To his report, Judge Dañas attached copies of the comments of the lawyers he interviewed, the
letter of provincial prosecutor Tolosa enclosing the minutes of the meeting of the public
prosecutors in Albay and the letter of city prosecutor Rubio.15 He concluded that the charges
against respondent judge were true. However, he refrained from recommending any definite
action against him and left the matter to the sound discretion of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).16
84
In its report,17 the OCA adopted the findings of Judge Dañas and made the following
recommendation:
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable
Court is our recommendation that respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City be ADVISED to observe proper judicial
decorum and to conscientiously abide by the mandates of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics in the exercise of his official functions.18
We disagree. Respondent judge deserves more than mere "advice."
Respondent judge should be reminded of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 and Section 1, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:19
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to
the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to
be done.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be learned in the law, dignified in
demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character. Besides having the requisite learning in
the law, he must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint.20 In this connection, he should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who
come to his court.21 A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or
witnesses who appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the
people’s faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court
and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges
shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.22 (emphasis supplied)
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer,23 litigant or witness. The act betrays lack
of patience, prudence and restraint.24 Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his
language.25 He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient
control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness.26

Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice.27 A judge
should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his
reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters
harsh words, snide remarks or sarcastic comments. As a result, he degrades the judicial office
and erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
Against this backdrop, respondent judge indeed appears arrogant and boastful not only in the
eyes of the anonymous complainant but also to the lawyers who practice in his sala. He revealed
a hint of arrogance in his comment when he professed exasperation over minor procedural
mistakes28 or even negligible lapses (such as the confusion in the use of "collaborate" and
"corroborate"). He also displayed a condescending attitude toward lawyers in the provinces
when he implied that they were "inferior" to lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he should ensure
that his conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. He
must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety.
The dispensation of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer.29 A sense of
shared responsibility which is a crucial factor in the administration of justice is expected of
them.30 They should co-exist in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, not animosity and
derision. Respondent judge antagonized the lawyers (private practitioners, public attorneys and
public prosecutors alike) appearing in his sala by his perceived arrogance and insulting remarks.
Consequently, he impaired the administration of justice.
Respondent judge unduly intervened in the presentation of evidence. He asked more questions
than counsel and conducted direct and cross-examination of witnesses. In so doing, he
contravened Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics:31
RULE 3.06 – While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear
up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial,
it should be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
—∞——∞——∞—
14. Interference in conduct of trial
While a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition and
prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, nevertheless, he
should bear in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the
examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially
those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of trial, may tend to
prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in
respect thereto.
Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but the
judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits
of the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing
counsel, litigants or witnesses, he should avoid a controversial tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind
as to their positions, and he should not be tempted to an unnecessary display of
learning or a premature judgment.
A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent
unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details in the course of the
testimony of the witness or thereafter.32 Questions designed to clarify points and to elicit
additional relevant evidence are not improper.33 But the judge should limit himself to asking
clarificatory questions and the power should be sparingly and judiciously used. The rule is that
85
the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the
conduct of the trial.34 A judge must always maintain cold neutrality and impartiality for he is a
magistrate, not an advocate.35
In fine, the over-all conduct of respondent judge has been unbecoming of a magistrate. It is
classified as a light charge36 for which a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000
may be imposed.37
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,38 this administrative case against respondent judge shall also
be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar.
Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial
Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 139 and 1140 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the people’s
respect for the law and legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due
to the courts and to judicial officers.
Respondent judge also transgressed Canon 841 and Rule 8.0142 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he humiliated, insulted or embarrassed lawyers appearing in his sala.
Instead of establishing a cordial and collaborative atmosphere with lawyers, respondent judge
alienated them and effectively disregarded their significant role in the administration of justice.
Accordingly, respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is hereby found GUILTY of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2, Section 1, Canon
4 and Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Rule
3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He
is FINED in the amount of P7,500.
Respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is also hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 8 and
11 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED in the amount
of P7,500.
Judge Carretas is further STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

TAN V. PACURIBOT
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 December 14, 2007
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
SHERLITA O. TAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog
City, respondent.
x---------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1983 December 14, 2007
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog
City, respondent.
x---------------------x
ANONYMOUS LETTER-WRITERS, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog
City, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM, J.:
These consolidated-complaints filed against Executive Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot (Judge
Pacuribot) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, Branch 27, consist of the following:
1. Affidavit-Complaint1 dated 4 December 2005 filed by Sherlita O. Tan (Ms. Tan), Court
Stenographer of RTC, Branch 27, Gingoog City, and affidavit-complaint2 dated 20 December
2005 filed by Johanna M. Villafranca (Ms. Villafranca), Clerk II, Gingoog City Parole and
Probation Office, charging Judge Pacuribot with sexual harassment;
2. Letter3 dated 4 April 2005 from "concerned citizens," asking for the relief of Judge Pacuribot
on the grounds that he has been terrorizing and harassing most of the employees, both casual
and contractual, of the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City; and
3. An undated letter4 from "concerned citizens" also asking the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) to investigate the illicit relationship of Judge Pacuribot and a certain Sheryl Gamulo. They
informed the OCA that Sheryl Gamulo bore two acknowledged children of Judge Pacuribot, the
eldest of whom named Rexell Pacuribot was born on 15 October 2004, and the second child
was born on 2 September 2005, both at Maternity Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City.
On 14 December 2005, OCA issued a Memorandum5 recommending that:
1. The complaint of Ms. Sherlita Tan be referred to the Committee on Decorum and
Investigation of the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City for investigation;
2. the complaint of Ms. Johanna M. Villafrancia be docketed as a regular administrative
matter
3. Judge Pacuribot be required to comment on the complaint of Ms. Villafranca; and
4. Judge Pacurribot be suspended immediately until further orders from this Court.6
86
On 7 March 2006, we issued a resolution amending Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC,
approving all the other recommendations of OCA and suspending Judge Pacuribot, thus:
With respect to all the other recommendations of the OCA, finding them to be in
accord with existing laws, the same are hereby APPROVED. In particular, Judge Rexel
Pacuribot is immediately SUSPENDED until further notice from this Court. He is
likewise DIRECTED to comment on the complaints of Mesdames Tan and Villafranca
within ten days. The complaint, however, of Ms. Sherlita Tan should be docketed as
a regular administrative matter to be consolidated with that of Ms. Johanna M.
Villafranca’s for proper disposition in line with the foregoing discussions.7
On 25 October 2006, the court referred the case to Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores of the
Court of Appeals, Cagayan De Oro City Station, for investigation, report and recommendation
within 90 days from notice thereof.
On 8 October 2007, Investigating Justice Dy Liacco Flores submitted her Report8 with the
following findings:
Tan’s story
Ms. Tan’s nightmare as an underling of respondent judge started on 20 October 2004 – a
Wednesday. Having officially filed a half-day leave, she went to Cagayan de Oro City to attend
a wedding ceremony at six o’clock in the evening at Pryce Plaza Hotel. She stood as one of the
principal sponsors to a couple named Kimberly Castillon and Thomas Elliot. At around 8:00
o’clock in the evening, while relishing the "gala" portion during the wedding reception (when
the newly weds dance and guests pin peso bills on their attire), she received from [Judge
Pacuribot] a call through her mobile phone, asking when is she going back to Gingoog City. She
said she intends to go back right after the wedding reception. [Judge Pacuribot] offered to bring
her to Agora Bus Terminal but she politely refused the offer saying that she will just take a taxi
in going there. Taking her answer as declining his offer, he ordered her to come out, displaying
short temper, saying he was already waiting outside the hotel. To hint at urgency, he told her
that he just slipped out from the Masonic Meeting he was attending and will immediately return
to it right after he will have shuttled her there. Aware that he has the tendency to humiliate
anyone in public when he is angry, she decided to abruptly leave the wedding reception and
comply.
xxxx
Coming out into the lobby of the hotel, Ms. Tan saw respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] inside
his car, alone. When she came near, he opened the car door for her and she took her seat.
Then, angrily he asked: "What took you so long?" She kept mum. She saw in between their
seats his clutch bag with his short firearm. That sight frightened her although she was consoled
by the thought that she would soon get rid of him at the bus terminal. Pryce Plaza Hotel to the
bus terminal would be about twenty (20) minutes ride, traffic considered.
Unfortunately, [Judge Pacuribot] had other ideas. Along the way to the bus terminal, he drove
in to what looked like a compound. She unexpectedly saw that his car entered a small garage,
and when it stopped, the roll down shutter quickly locked up from behind. She was brought not
to the bus terminal but to a motel whose name she came to recognize only after the incident
as the City Lodge Motel in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City. She felt deceived. Knowing the
implications, she protested: "Why did you bring me here, sir? Didn’t I tell you that I will just
take a taxicab to the Agora Terminal?" He rudely told her: "Shut up! As if you are still a virgin!"
Respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] then directed her to get down the car. Timorously, she
obeyed. As soon as she went down his car, she looked for a possible exit and found none. All
she saw was a door which opened. He ushered her into the room, walking closely from behind
her. He locked the door.
 87

Ms. Tan, scared and confused, walked to the comfort room, where she pretended to relieve A: I refused.
herself. There, she again looked for a possible exit. Again, she found none. After a short while,
she heard [Judge Pacuribot] asking: "What are you doing there? What’s taking you so long?" Q: What was his reaction, if any?
Remembering, that he has a gun, she came out of the comfort room. To her dismay, she found A: He angrily shouted at me: "My goodness! Why are you so slow? As if you are a virgin!"
him nude in bed and fear overcame her more.
Q: What did you feel, if any?
[Judge Pacuribot] ordered Ms. Tan to undress. Her reluctance made her move slowly. He let
out more impatience asking: "What’s taking you so long to undress? Excite me!" She refused at A: I was terrified of him.
first, but he became furious. At that moment too, she saw his gun on what seemed to her was
Q: What did you do, if any?
headboard of the bed. Frightened, she undressed, retaining her bra and panty. He asked her to
kiss him and she obeyed half-heartedly. While she was kissing his neck, he expressed A: I was forced to go near him, kissed his neck, but [I] stopped.
dissatisfaction by asking: "You don’t know how to kiss! How do you do it with Ramon? Get into
sex right away without any preliminaries?" Ramon is her husband. She was quiet. Q: Why did you stop?

[Judge Pacuribot] ordered her to lie down on the bed. She yielded out of fear. He pulled her A: I was disgusted with what I was doing and with him.
bra and panty, kissed her neck and lips, and sucked her tongue and breasts. Minutes after, he Q: What was his reaction, if any?
inserted his penis to her vagina. While he did a push and pull motion, she was complaining:
"You are so rude, Sir! We work in the same office yet you disgrace me!" He told her angrily: A: He angrily told me: "You don’t know how to make love! How do you do it with Ramon? You
"Shut up! Concentrate! See! It’s softening...." She recalled that he tried several times to stiffen simply have sex without foreplay? Kayati ba sab?"
his penis but he seemingly has some erection problem. At his attempt for coitus, she felt the
penetration was just slight. Later, he was getting exhausted and was breathing hard. He would Q: What was your reaction, if any?
rest each time he failed to have full enjoyment. While he rested, she would ask him to let her A: I felt helpless and kept quiet.
go, but angrily he refused. Instead, he would forcibly ride on top of her again and make more
attempts at coitus until he finally gave up. He said to her: "It won’t stiffen because I have been Q: What happened next, if any?
forbidden to eat many kinds of food such as meat which gives energy."
A: He ordered me saying: "Suck it!"
After a while, Ms. Tan saw [Judge Pacuribot] got up from bed, took his gun, and peeped through
Q: What did he want you to suck on him?
the window of the motel. This time, she once again implored him, "Sir, I’ll just take a taxi to
Agora." He answered: "I’ll bring you there." At the time, she was so confused that she cannot A: His penis.
recall whether he made payment in the motel. She could not concentrate anymore.
Q: What did you do, if any?
The two left the motel in his car. However, instead of conducting her to the bus terminal, again
[Judge Pacuribot] brought Ms. Tan to another place . . . this time to Discovery Hotel adjacent A: I refused.
to Limketkai Center, Cagayan de Oro City. When she protested, he told her that it would be Q: What was his reaction, if any?
safer for her to sleep there instead of traveling alone. It was around 10 o’clock in the evening.
Still unrelieved of her fright which Ms. Tan calls "shock," or "rattled," she failed to ask for help, A: He got angry, pulled my hair and pushed my face to his penis saying: "suck it! Let it in till
nor did she think of escaping. She was not even able to call her husband. She was even deep your throat! Let my penis reach your throat!"
wondering whether anyone will help her if the judge will do anything to her. After he partially
Q: What did you do, if any?
settled the room’s bill, he warned her not to leave until his return the following morning saying
he was returning to the Masonic Conference. After he left, she asked a bellboy if she could A: I gasped for breath so that when I opened my mouth, his penis entered my mouth.
leave, but the bellboy told her that she should first settle the hotel bill before she can check out.
Unfortunately, she had no money enough to pay the balance of the hotel bill. Meantime, through Q: What happened next, if any?
his cell phone, he kept calling her that night and threatening her to watch out in the office if
A: He tightened his hold on me so I was forced to suck his penis afraid that he might break my
she would disobey. She was crying in the hotel. She was terrified of what he will do to her and
neck.
her family, and what reaction her husband would make once he learns of what happened to
her. She was scared that her husband might kill [Judge Pacuribot] and her husband would be Q: What happened next, if any?
harmed in turn.
A: His penis reached my throat and I felt nauseated so I ran to the bathroom and vomited.
At around 7 a.m. of the following morning, [Judge Pacuribot] arrived. He came panting and
rested in bed while Ms. Tan just stood by. She saw him put his gun near the bed. She recounted Q: What happened next, if any?
the events that happened after, as follows: A: I stayed in the bathroom for a while because I was not feeling well.
Q: What did he do, if any? Q: What was his reaction, if any?
A: He ordered me again saying: "Make Love to me!" A: He angrily ordered me to go to him and lie beside him and I obeyed.
Q: What was your reaction, if any? Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He rode on top of me again and tried to insert his penis into my vagina.
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: His penis could hardly stiffen.
Q: What was his reaction, if any?
A: He got angry saying: "It can’t enter! Your vagina’s too small.
Q: What did he do next, if any?
A: He spread my two (2) legs wide apart and tried to insert his penis but it did not stiffen.
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: He pulled my head towards him by pulling my hair.
Q: What was your reaction, if any?
A: I told him: "Don’t pull my hair, sir! It’s very painful! What a sadist you are!"
Q: What was his reaction, if any?
A: He just kissed my lips, neck, sucked my nipple and mashed my breast by saying: "This is the
breast of a lustful woman" while continuing to suck my neck and breast.
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: He said: "I’m going to plant lots of kiss marks here to let the people know that you passed
through my hands."
Q: What was he referring to as "here"?
A: My neck.
Q: What was your reaction, if any?
A: I cried.
Q: What happened after that, if any?
A: He rested while I went crying to the bathroom, washed my body then dressed up.
Ms. Tan again pleaded for [Judge Pacuribot] to let her go. This time, [Judge Pacuribot] assented,
but he offered to bring her to the bus terminal. Traumatized, she refused the offer. She told
him that she will just take a taxi and will have breakfast at the Ororama. Still he insisted to
shuttle her there. Thus, at about past 8:00 o’clock in the morning, he left her at Ororama Cogon,
Cagayan de Oro City.
Ms. Tan did not report to the office the next working day, that was 22 October 2004 – a Friday.
She absented herself from her work because she still had noticeable number of kiss marks on
her neck. She only reported on Monday and covered her kiss marks with her hair. At the office,
[Judge Pacuribot] told her not to file anymore her leave for October 20 and 21, 2004 while
bragging, "Ako na gud ni, kinsay magbuot nako?" (It is me, who will prevail against me?)
Ms. Tan told no one of her traumatic experience and carried on as if nothing happened. But
from then on, [Judge Pacuribot’s] advances on her went on unabated even in the office.
Whenever she would go inside his chamber, at times, he would grab her blouse, mash her
breast, and kiss her neck saying that she smells so sweet. At times, he would touch the crotch
of her pants or pull the string of her panty. On 13 October 2005, he did the same indignities to
her in the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the latter just pretended to see
nothing by turning his back. Every time she would resist and/or evade his sexual advances, he
88
would shame her before her officemates at a later time. He also told her to send him text
messages of endearment. She was warned that her failure to comply, or to receive his call, or
reply to his text messages will have an adverse effect on her performance rating.
The situation got worse for Ms. Tan when respondent judge [ Judge Pacuribot] indicated his
interest in renting a room in her house which she used as her home office. Ms. Tan’s house is
near the Police Station and the courthouse. Initially, she candidly told him that the said room is
not for rent. She even refused him in the presence of her officemates who cannot comprehend
why she should not allow him to rent the room considering that it would be an additional income
for her. At that time, they were unaware what she was going through.
Ms. Tan brought her commercial calendar to their office. It has her picture. Having seen it,
[Judge Pacuribot], in the presence of Ms. Tan, instructed Placido Abellana, the court aide, to
mount her calendar at the door of his chamber, saying: "Whoever removes the calendar would
take a scolding from me. Don’t remove Shirley’s calendar. I like that hot babes." Then, pointing
to her picture, he added: "That’s my idol, the hot babes Kikay!" As he was still trying to persuade
her then to let him rent a room in her house, he said in jest to Placido Abellana: "If I rent the
room, I will call Shirly… she will massage me and step on my back and I will feel good because
Shirley is sexy."
With the pressure on her to rent him a room being kept, Ms. Tan eventually yielded, but she
erected a wall between his rented room and her house, and provided for him a separate ingress
and egress. Nonetheless, when her husband is not around, she would find him knocking on her
window and ordering her to go to his room.
Ms. Tan claims that if [Judge Pacuribot] could not have his way with her because she resists,
he would scold her in his chamber and would also humiliate her in the presence of her
officemates. She would also receive threats from him as regards her performance rating. In
fact, her "Very Satisfactory" rating in the previous years of her service went down to
"Satisfactory" for the period of January to June 2005, the first and only time that she was given
such a rating.
Because of the very oppressive ways of [Judge Pacuribot], Ms. Tan eventually suffered from
what doctors call "chronic fatigue syndrome" and was hospitalized in December 2005. Dr. Virgilio
Lim of Lipunan Hospital of Gingoog City treated her. Dr. Lim testified that emotional stresses of
a patient could lead to chronic fatigue syndrome.
Ms. Tan’s helplessness against the sexual abuses and advances of her judge was gnawing on
her. She found it revolting. She finally mustered enough courage to come out in the open to
free herself. She executed an Affidavit Complaint sworn before a woman Clerk of Court of
Cagayan de Oro City on 06 December 2005. She flew to Manila and went to the Supreme Court
on 08 December 2005 to file her administrative case against her superior. In February 2006,
she filed criminal charges of rape, acts of lasciviousness and sexual harassments against [Judge
Pacuribot] before the City Prosecutor of Gingoog City. At the onset, no lawyer in Gingoog City
would even want to accept her case. The criminal cases were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
She re-filed the case with the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro City. They were also
dismissed.
Villafranca’s Story
Ms. Villafranca first met respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] sometime in November 2004 at the
lobby near the Probation Office at the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City where she holds office.
When [Judge Pacuribot] passed by, she was then talking to a certain Dondi Palugna, her
childhood friend who at that time was [Judge Pacuribot’s] driver. Short introductions followed.
On 18 December 2004, Ms. Villafranca received a call through her cell phone from [Judge
Pacuribot]. To Ms. Villafranca, the call was unexpected. After their talk, he asked her if he could

call again for chitchat. She answered "Ok lang." She asked him how he got her mobile number.
He said he got it from Dondi Palugna. Later, she began to receive text messages from him,
telling her how beautiful and sexy she is, how the mini skirt suited her, etc. She courteously
acknowledged his praises and said "thank you" to him. Then, he started inviting her for dinner.
Knowing him to be married and the fact that she is married, she declined these invitations citing
an inoffensive excuse which is her evening teaching sessions at Bukidnon State College, Gingoog
City. But she found him persistent. One time, he took offense at her refusal, saying "Why don’t
you come with me? I AM A JUDGE! Why should you refuse me? Why do you go with Dondi and
not with me when I AM A JUDGE?" At another instance, he even asked her why she goes with
Dondi Pallugna, a drug addict, and not him a judge. Although scared of his outbursts, which by
reputation he was known, she politely explained to him that his driver Dondi Pallugna was her
childhood friend. Still, she had to dodge his persistence.
In avoidance, Ms. Villafranca requested for a transfer to Probation Office, Cagayan de Oro City.
This was in February 2005. She was asked to make a written request which she failed to file
due to heavy work load. At that time, the Regional Office of the Probation Office for Region X
was about to hold a Timestral Conference. Venue of the Conference was Gingoog City and so
the host office for that conference was the Gingoog City Parole Office where Ms. Villafranca
works. She was assigned to take charge of the hotel accommodations of participants in the
conference. For that reason, she was too busy attending to her assigned task that she failed to
prepare the written request. Accordingly, nothing materialized out of her intended transfer.
Although calls of [Judge Pacuribot’s] were unwanted, but Ms. Villafranca wanted to be polite to
him for two (2) reasons: his status as a judge and his reputation, in the Hall of Justice, as
"terror" which caused most people to fear him. So, she took his calls politely, gave him respect,
and when she had to turn down his call, she had to do it courteously like: "Ok, sir, I still have
work to do, I cannot talk long."
In the last week of February 2005, Ms. Villafranca got a call from [Judge Pacuribot] who was
fuming mad because she refused his dinner invitations. Scared, she finally relented. It was
scheduled on 22 February 2005 which turned out to be her worst nightmare.
February 22, 2005 came. [Judge Pacuribot] asked Ms. Villafranca to choose a restaurant. She
singled out The Mansion in Gingoog City for good reasons. The Mansion is owned by her relative.
On that account, she thought that in the place she will be safe. She planned to invite one of her
relatives in that restaurant during the dinner. By arrangement, she was to be picked up at 7
p.m. at the school gate.
A few minutes past 7 p.m., on the appointed date, [Judge Pacuribot], driving his car, fetched
Ms. Villafranca. He opened the car door to her and she took her seat. While she was talking to
him, she saw him brought out his clutch bag, took out his gun, cocked it and put it in between
them. Frightened that it may blow off anytime, she voiced out her fears of guns. He quickly
replied that guns are for the safety of judges who are prone to ambushes.
Noticing that [Judge Pacuribot] was driving towards the opposite direction of The Mansion, she
told him they are driving the wrong way. But she was told that they are going to Butuan City as
he knew a great dining place there. While driving with his left hand, [Judge Pacuribot] would
hold his gun with his right hand and put it down every now and then when he had to change
gear. This scared her even more and she started shaking in fear. She observed that he was over
speeding and would honk his horn furiously so the other drivers would allow him to overtake.
She started having frightening thoughts like imagining being killed if she resists and be left along
the road. She feared for her life, and of her children.
After about an hour, Ms. Villafranca noticed that [Judge Pacuribot] turned right from the national
highway, and a little farther, he honked his horn, entered a garage which then immediately
closed as soon as his car entered. It was late for her to realize that he brought her to a motel
in Butuan City. She became numbed with fear. He alighted from the car carrying his gun, and
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opened the door on her side. She asked him: "Why are you taking me here? You told me we
were going to a restaurant." He ignored her. He told her to get out of the car. Sensing she was
uncooperative because she would not get down, he grabbed her from the car. She tried to resist
but she was numbed with fear. She wanted to get away but she could not seem to move. He
pushed her in the room. She attempted to go out of the room but he locked the door and
blocked it with his body. She pleaded to him to let her go because her children and family are
looking for her. Then, [Judge Pacuribot] grabbed Ms. Villafranca by her shoulders and tried to
kiss her. She evaded by backing out from him and turning her face away. As she continued to
back away from him, she fell on the bed while he immediately laid on top of her. She felt his
hands groping all over her body, as he tried to kiss her. She kept on pleading to him to let her
go; that she wants to go home because her kids are looking for her. He lifted her blouse,
unbuttoned and unzipped her pants while she was pushing him away. But he was too strong
and big for her. She tried to get up when he took off his pants and brief, but he was fast and
was soon on top of her. As he pinned her down on the bed, she could hardly move and found
him too heavy. All along she was trembling in fear and was crying while pleading to him for
mercy. But he could not be dissuaded. On cross examination, [Judge Pacuribot’s] counsel asked
her some details on this incident, as follows:
Atty. Kho:
Q: You said you were brought to Butuan City in a motel. Do you remember the name of the
motel?
A: No, I don’t.
Q: Could you remember the size of the room that you were in on that day which you claim on
February 22, 2004?
A: I’m sorry, Attorney, everything seems to be so blurred during that time. All I could really
remember was asking him to take me home because it was not agreed that I go with him in a
motel but in a restaurant at Mansion by the sea at Gingoog City.
Q: So you don’t remember really anything else?
A: I remember what happened to me.
Q: Why, what happened to you?
A: When he forced himself to me.
Q: When you say he forced himself to you, what do you mean?
A: When he was on top of me and he was kissing me. God, I can feel and I can remember how
heavily he was breathing in my face and he was kissing me all over and he was trying to position
himself inside of me. Those are what I can remember and I kept on telling him: "No! I want to
go home to my children." I wanted to go home because my family will be looking for me. What?
Did he listen to me? No, he kept on telling me I am emancipated. Nobody will look for me.
Q: What were you wearing at that time on February 22?
A: I was wearing pants and a blouse.
Q: Were you undressed at that time?
A: I am sorry?
Q: Were you undressed?
A: Undressed? He undressed me.
Q: He undressed you?

A: Yes.
Q: Nothing left?
(No reply).
Ms. Villafranca felt that her legs were being parted as [Judge Pacuribot] tried to insert his penis
into her vagina, but she could sense he had difficulty with erection. She felt penetration was
slight. She recalled that he tried penetration more than three times, but was unsuccessful. She
felt his heavy breathing while he planted vile kisses on her neck and chest. Her repeated pleas
for mercy had not done her any good. Not long after, he rolled over with her and she found
herself on top of him. He grabbed her hair and pushed down her face to his penis, and forced
her to do oral sex on him instead. She resisted, but he insisted saying that it was what he
wanted, otherwise she would be put to harm. She took it to mean that he will kill her if she
refuses him. Scared, she relented and had oral sex on him. She felt shamed as she sucked his
limp penis. She was disgusted with him, with herself and the very act itself. Still not having an
erection, he released his grip on her. While she was physically and emotionally exhausted, she
continued crying for mercy, but [Judge Pacuribot] was boasting that nobody in his right mind
would refuse his demands as he could easily cause damage to anybody’s honor if he wanted to.
Ms. Villafranca then got up, and put on her underwear and pants. [Judge Pacuribot] also got up
and took his cell phone. She pulled the sheets to cover herself because her blouse was on the
opposite side of the bed. However, he pulled the sheets from her and pushed her to the bed
half naked. She braced herself with her arms so that the she would not be pinned down on the
bed again. But to her surprise, he took a picture of her, using his cell phone. She was petrified.
He then looked at the picture commenting that it was no good because she was not smiling, so
he ordered her to smile as he will take another picture of her. Although she defied him, yet he
did take another picture of her. She the hurriedly put on her blouse while he dressed up, fixed
himself and tucked his shirt and his gun.
After [Judge Pacuribot] settled the bill, he led her out of the room. Ms. Villafranca shrugged him
off. At the garage, she was ushered to the front seat of the car. She was dying to go home. He
drove back to Gingoog City. On their way back, she turned her back on him, closed her eyes,
covered her face with hand, and pretended to be asleep. Later, he informed her of their
approach to Gingoog City. She asked him to drop her off at the old Caltex gasoline station along
the national highway. From there, she hailed a motorela, went home, took a long bath to wash
his marks of her. At about 11 p.m., she fetched her children from her father’s house. When
asked where she had been, she gave her father a lame excuse that she went out with her
friends.
Ms. Villafranca reported to work the next day. There had been some phone calls in their office.
Like any other office, whoever has the convenience to answer at the time would pick up the
phone. [Judge Pacuribot] had called twice their office already and when her officemates answer
the phone, he would just hang the line. When the phone rung again, she picked it up. It was
[Judge Pacuribot] on the other end. After recognizing her voice, he belittled her yelling:
"Prostitute! Devil! Animal! Why don’t you pick up the phone?" She was consumed with fear, and
meekly told him that she was just busy. Days passed as he continued to threaten her with the
publication of her half naked picture. She tried to pacify him sensing that he could make real
his threats. Being married to an overseas worker with two kids, she was so scared of figuring in
a scandal. Her fright of him was burdensome. He would send her text messages telling her of
sweet nothings, but every time she would ignore them, he would burst in anger and would
renew his threats. At times, she made excuses, like having no cell phone load, but he would
insist that she should secure a load, otherwise he would shame her. He was far too wise to
accept excuses. Her constant fear made her succumb to his blackmails.
[Judge Pacuribot] was always demanding that Ms. Villafranca send him text messages and
letters expressing nonsense, a matter she could not understand then. She thought it was only
90
to feed his ego. On cross examination, [Judge Pacuribot’s] counsel asked why she complied
with these orders. She answered:
Atty. Kho:
Q: In your affidavit, do you remember having said that the respondent is forcing you to send to
him text messages?
A: Yes.
Q: And you complied with the sending of these text messages?
A: Yes, because one day when I was not able to text he called me and he screamed at me over
the phone and then he said: "Burikat, animal ka, yawa ka, imo gibuhat… dili ko nimo i-ignore.
This will be the last time na imo ko i-ignore sa text or sa tawag nako. Otherwise, you will pay
for it."
Atty. Ignes translating: "You whore, you devil, you animal, don’t you dare! This will be the last
time you will ignore me in my call, otherwise you will pay for it."
Atty. Kho:
Q: Why did you allow him to do that to you?
A: Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that picture, he will show that to my
mother-in-law and then he will destroy me and he will create scandal in Gingoog City.
Q: Is it not that you are well-connected? Your grandmother is the mayor. Did you not report it
to her?
A: My husband is not around, Attorney.
Q: And?
A: And what? How would I explain to them that I was there? How he took my picture? How am
I going to? I don’t know. I just wanted to protect my family from any shame, from any scandal.
And he knew that it would be his hold to me. And he knew that I would be very careful with the
name that my family had, that is why he is constantly threatening me with such same
arguments, you know. "Ikaw and madaot ani. Imo ning kuan tana."
Atty. Ignes: "You will be destroyed because of this."
Atty. Kho:
Q: So, you admit that you sent him a lot of text messages?
A: I did not deny it in my affidavit. I had it in my affidavit, that there were text messages and
forced notes written for him.
[Judge Pacuribot] also asked her to send him cards with amorous messages. On these, she was
also grilled on cross – examination. It went as follows:
Atty. Kho:
Q: You mean you often wrote some notes?
A: Yes. I may even have some drafts there wherein he even edited it.
Q: What kind of notes were they?
A: Love notes and there was a time he made me write a letter to my mother-in-law which the
very next day I was posting myself at the Post Office awaiting for that letter to come so that I
could intercept it.
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xxxx Q: I am going to show you one last card. Tell me, is this one of the cards that you said you
signed? I’m going to give this to you. For submission.
Q: Also attached to the Comment of respondent are some notes already marked as Annex 9.
Could you go over some of these notes and tell us if this is your handwriting? Annexes 9 and A: Yes.
9B.
Q: This is one of the cards that you signed?
A: I will not deny that I wrote these letters but they were under his supervision just like the
ones he made to my mother-in-law and to my husband. A: One of those cards that I signed.

Q: You mean to say you were writing the letters? xxxx

A: Yes. He will dictate to me what to do, what to say. Q: Miss Witness, the handwriting on this card now marked as Exhibit 6, on the second line of
the handwriting are the words "Love you, Bi." Could you tell us what is the meaning of the word
xxxx "Bi", if you know?
Q: So you were acting like a stenographer who writes down his dictation? A: It has no significance with me because your client dictated it to me.
A: I did not act like a stenographer who wrote down his dictation. But I acted like a victim who Q: So, it was dictated only.
is under threat by some…
A: As I said, he dictated words to me.
Q: The words here in Annexes 9-A and 9-B, you mean to say all of these are his words, the
respondent? Ms. Villafranca’s resistance would always be met with a threat to divulge the incident in the
motel. Although she yielded to these promptings of sending him text messages or cards or
A: As I said Attorney, yes, under his dictation, under his supervision. Do you know what is this? notes, she never understood why [Judge Pacuribot] behaved so. It was late in the day when
enlightenment came to her that all his orders to her to send him amorous text messages, letters
Atty. Kho: No. Do not ask me a question. You are not allowed to do that. and cards were not to feed his ego but to prepare for his defense even while she was as
Witness (continuing) While I was doing those writing, I felt that all my limbs were so tired. I felt submissive as a lamb. In his Comment to the administrative charge against him, he cited the
so heavy writing those letters. text messages, letters and cards he induced her to send to him to deflect her charges of rape
and unprofessional conduct and prove them untrue. He cited them in his Comment as her
Atty. Kho: manifestation of "fatal attraction" to him.
Q: So you admit sending the respondent a lot more letters that the ones I’ve presented you? xxxx
A: I admit that I wrote those letters under his supervision, yes. There had been occasions when [Judge Pacuribot] summoned Ms. Villfranca to his chambers
on the pretext of discussing probation matters, but once inside his chamber, he would lock the
Q: All of the letters that you sent were all under his supervision?
door, grab her, kiss her, put kiss marks on her neck and chest. He would pull her hair and push
A: As I said, yes, under his supervision. There were times that he would even call me to his her down to his crotch and demand that she performs oral sex on him. Her overpowering fear
chamber to have some cards signed. of him and the scandal he can inflict on her family made her yield to him. When she would
disobey him he would call her cell phone with lots of insults like calling her "burikat" or with his
Q: So, aside from notes, you also sent him cards? threats.
A: Yes, I recall signing them because he would ask me to do so. Also, [Judge Pacuribot] demanded food from Ms. Villafranca which the latter had to bring to his
xxxx room in Ms. Tan’s house. Her fear of dire consequences of her resistance absorbed her. When
demanded to bring food, she would comply out of fear. In her words, "Yes, I went because he
Justice Flores: would put me under pressure and under fire." She went not only because of his constant threat
of making public his cell phone picture of her, half naked, but also because of "his added threat
Q: When you said that the judge would even call you to his chamber to sign cards, what kinds that he is going to tell my mother-in-law; that he is going to destroy me; that I am nobody; that
of cards? my family is no good and he would call me ‘burikat, burikat (whore)’. He would call me that
A: Greeting cards, Your Honor. name ‘yawa ka, animal ka. Sumunod ka nako." She was angst-ridden with the set – up. She
was fearful that somebody might see her in his rented room or on her way to it or back. She
Atty. Kho: was made to go there about eight (8) times. All these instances, she saw him display his gun.
She found him too selfish and an ingrate. Once, on his demand to bring food, she brought him
Q: Hallmark?
only pansit and lumpia which was no longer crisp. Unappreciative, he furiously stabbed his plate
A: I don’t recall. I would just easily sign them, do whatever he wanted and then after he is done with fork, breaking it and carped that she served him food which is not fit for a judge, and
touching me I would ask myself to leave. suited only to her seaman husband. He also made her eat with him on occasions which she
abhorred so much because according to her "he ate like a pig – eating fast with shoulders
Q: So, you also sent him lots of greeting cards? hunched, elbows on the table, mouth noisily chewing the food."
A: I did not send your client. He gave it to himself.

When grilled on those eight (8) times, the following exchanges between [Judge Pacuribot’s]
counsel and Ms. Villafranca took place:
Atty. Kho:
Q: In all of these times, 8 times which you said, you did not care to offer any resistance?
A: I had offered a lot of resistance, Attorney, but your client would make it a point that I should
not refuse him.
Q: You tried to resist?
A: I had evaded him many times, many times but he would always point out that I should not
refuse him, otherwise he will destroy me and he did eventually when I finally had the courage
to put up with him, you know.
(The witness is crying at the witness stand)
Q: During those 8 times which you said you went to the room of respondent at Sherlita Tan’s
place which is near the police station and the LTO, was there a time that you shouted?
A: I could not shout, I’m scared.
Q: You were scared of what?
A: Scared of your client.
Q: Of the person?
A: Yes and how intimidating he could be and how evil he could be.
After eating, Ms. Villafranca would be ordered to take off her clothes; then, [Judge Pacuribot]
would lay on top of her for his sexual pleasures. But penetration would be slight because, as
usual, he had difficulty with erection. As a consequence, he would push her down to his organ
and order her to do oral sex on him. She detested his routine of putting kiss marks on her neck
and chest which he intentionally used so that, as he told her, people would know that he owned
her. At times, she left his rented room wearing a hooded jacket in order o hide her face fearful
that certain people might recognize her along the way. There were times she also left his room
without underwear because he would not give it to her. She hated his sexual abuses, but she
was more afraid of causing scandal to her family.
In April 2005, after having dinner with [Judge Pacuribot] in his rented room, Ms. Villafranca was
pulled by her hair and was asked, "[w]ho owns you now?" She answered in fear – "you." He
looked very pleased. Then, he told her to leave her husband and promised to help her file a
marriage annulment complaint in Gingoog City. She did not say a word. He went on top of her
and pulled her hair demanding for an answer. Terrified, she said "opo". Then, she was forced
to have sex with him.
[Judge Pacuribot] wanted to destroy the relationship Ms. Villafranca has with her husband and
his family. He forced her to write a letter, asking for a break up of marriage from her husband
which [Judge Pacuribot] edited. He also ordered her to write to her mother-in-law with whom
she had some difficulty in their in-law relationship, to say she wanted a marriage break-up. She
told him she does "not need to write letters to her mother-in-law. What for?" But he insisted.
Her hands felt heavy writing them, in fact it took her three drafts to write as shown in Exhibits
"B", "C" and "D" of Ms. Villafranca. Discontented with her drafts, he took away the last from
her, edited it, and told her he will mail it to her mother-in-law. Thinking he will make good of
his threat, the following day she posted herself outside the Gingoog City Post Office for a long
time and waited for the mailing of said letter so that she can intercept it. No one came. She
instructed the postal clerk that if there is a letter intended for her mother-in-law, she should not
give it to her mother-in-law but to her instead.
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Meantime, Ms. Villafranca’s morbid fear of [Judge Pacuribot], his threat to mire her and her
family in scandal and her guilt toward her family had been sucking her into a vortex of emotional
and physical collapse. She bore the immense pain of yielding to him. She seemingly could not
withstand the humiliation for being involved in forced sordid incidents with [Judge Pacuribot]
whom she detested.
On 9 May 2005, seemingly depressed for her accumulated frustrations for not being able to see
her way out of her predicament, Ms. Villafranca, sent a text message to her husband who was
then working aboard a foreign vessel. Her text message went this way: "Whatever will happen
to me, you take care of the kids." He asked: "What’s wrong?" She answered: "I cannot fully
disclose to you everything but in due time I will. Whatever happens to me, just take care of the
kids and that I love them." Her disturbing message constrained her husband to pre-terminate
his employment contract and rushed home to Gingoog City on 15 May 2005. She then personally
told [Judge Pacuribot] to stop calling her or asking for food, but he grabbed her hair, twisted
her head and planted a kiss mark on her neck, telling her that it would send a message to her
husband that he, not her husband, owned her. Still, she was not prepared to make her
revelations to her husband.
In the third week of May 2005, Ms. Villafranca was persistently instigated by [Judge Pacuribot]
to file an annulment case against her husband. Later, he asked her to sign what Ms. Villafranca
calls a "ridiculous document" he drafted wherein it purported to show that she and her husband
agreed that each of them may freely cohabit with a third person. She signed it in the face of his
threats. Worse, he asked her to ask her husband to sign the same document.
On 25 May 2005, at the Hall of Justice in Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca was summoned to [Judge
Pacuribot’s] chamber. Once inside, he slapped her for not filing her petition for annulment of
marriage and hit her head with clenched fist. Then, he planted on her neck kiss marks which he
said he wanted her husband to see. Indeed, when her husband found her with kiss marks, she
suffered from her husband’s beating.
Citing her husband’s beating her, Ms. Villafranca pleaded to [Judge Pacuribot] to stop molesting
her. He countered with an unusual suggestion – File a rape case against him. When she refused,
the threat of the dire consequences of her refusal came again. She still kept from her husband
what she was going through.
But [JudgePacuribot] seized another incident to destroy her more. On 15 June 2005, he reported
in writing to the superiors of Ms. Villafranca – superiors in local office and superiors in Manila –
alleging her negligence allegedly committed on 6 June 2005 in forgetting to shut off the air-con
unit in their Probation Office. Her local superior in the Probation Office referred to her the letter
of [Judge Pacuribot]. She prepared an explanation which her local superior used as letter to the
judge. Thinking that because she authored that letter, the explanation there covered already
her side, she did not write nor see the judge anymore. This further infuriated him.
xxxx
In July 2006, Ms. Villafranca’s request for transfer was granted and she started working in
Cagayan de Oro City on 17 July 2006. The transfer of assignment resulted in her constant
separation from her nine (9) year old son and four (4) year old daughter, plus the great
inconvenience of a 2½ hours bus ride from Gingoog City one way, and transportation expenses.
She would usually go home to Gingoog City to be with her family and children on weekends, or
every now and then, and sometimes late at night.
After her transfer to the Probation Office in Cagayan de Oro City on 17 July 2006, Ms. Villafranca
was able to tell her husband what she went through. Before that, she just could not find the
courage to tell him because she was scared. When she was twitted on cross examination on
how so long that she was scared, she said:

Atty. Kho:
Q: So, what you told him at that time was that you were scared?
A: Attorney, I was walking in fear most of those times and even up to now when I came home
I am walking in fear. I don’t know if I’m safe. I don’t know if the next day I will be dead. I don’t
know. Those were the times when I asked my husband to accompany me because I’m always
scared all the time. Even if I just go out of the gate ask my husband to accompany me.
(At this juncture, witness is sobbing)
Ms. Villafranca decided to fight back with this administrative charge. She subscribed her
Affidavit-Complaint before State Prosecutor Roberto A. Escaro on 13 December 2005. In Ms.
Villafranca’s Complaint she prayed that [Judge Pacuribot] be found guilty of gross violation of
the Judicial Code Of Professional Responsibility (Code of Judicial Conduct) for being totally unfit
to stay in the Judiciary and she prayed that he be ordered immediately dismissed from service.
She also prayed that [Judge Pacuribot] be immediately ordered to cease and desist from causing
any further assault on her person, in her personal and professional capacity.
On the same day, Ms. Villafranca submitted her Affidavit-Complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator. [Judge Pacuribot] filed his Comment. Among others, he cited that Ms. Villafranca
was "fatally attracted to him" and that he refused to reciprocate because "he is a judge and
happily married," and for the reason that Ms. Villafranca’s "misdirected adoration is atrociously
immoral." Ms. Villafranca filed a Rejoinder refuting point by point the defenses of [Judge
Pacuribot] and calling them lies. Ms. Villafranca said his defenses are presumptuous and
revolting because in the Hall of Justice, female personnel "invariably veer away from his path in
trepidation." She asserts that [Judge Pacuribot’s] extramarital indiscretions are well known, if
not well documented, in Gingoog City, that it is common knowledge that his mistress Sheryl
Gamulo, whom [Judge Pacuribot] housed in Motomull St., Gingoog City, gave birth to two (2)
children by [Judge Pacuribot] on 16 October 2004 and 02 September 2005 at the Maternity
Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City; that the eldest child was baptized in Opol, Misamis Oriental with
Atty. Wilfredo Bibera, his clerk of Court, and Dondi Pallugna, his driver, as baptismal sponsors.
Ms. Villafranca claims therein that respondent judge is also known to have sired a daughter in
Ozamiz City now about ten (10) years old whose picture has been circulated in the Hall of Justice
and that [Judge Pacuribot’s] immorality most probably inflicted on victimized women is a sick
source of scandal and gossip in the city.
To be able to put behind her harrowing experience, Ms. Villafranca applied for leave of absence
with their office to work abroad knowing that [Judge Pacuribot’s] order in People v. Anude and
his letter to her superiors have effectively made her lose that desired promotion. Eventually she
left the country on 2 October 2006 for Dubai, UAE to work and forget her past even if her leave
of absence in their office was not yet approved. On 18 March 2007, she returned to testify in
this case after struggling against employment restrictions and financial constraints, she not
having been half a year yet abroad. On 22 March 2007, when asked on the witness stand when
she will leave again for Dubai, she said: "I want to leave the country as much as possible and
stay out of here. I don’t want to be reminded of what happened to me." At the time she testified
in March 2007 in this case, her leave of absence in the Probation Office was not yet granted.
In his Comment, Judge Pacuribot denied the charges of Ms. Tan and Villafranca for "lack of
9
factual and legal bases"; and opposed the allegations on the ground that the same were
motivated by revenge and were part of a comprehensive and sinister plan to drive him out of
service.
Judge Pacuribot made total denial of Ms. Tan’s charges against him and claimed that the alleged
incidents on 20 and 21 October 2004 were "big lie[s], a fraud, a hoax and deception." He insisted
that he could not have committed the acts complained of by Ms. Tan because in his first five
93
months in office, he was busy planning what to do and how to quickly dispose of the almost
500 cases he inherited, including the new ones raffled to him.
In particular, Judge Pacuribot denied the alleged rape incidents on 20-21 October 2004 in
Cagayan de Oro City, and interposed the defense of alibi. He contended that he was in faraway
Gingoog City, which is 120 kilometers away from Cagayan de Oro City. He stated that on
Mondays, he reports for his duties in Gingoog City, and goes home to Cagayan de Oro City only
on Fridays. He maintained that on 20 October 2004, a Wednesday, at 7:00 p.m., he went out
of his chambers with his court aide Placido Abellana, Jr., and his security officer SPO1 Ronald
Espejon. They proceeded to Garahe Sugbahan Grill for dinner. After dinner, Espejon and
Abellana escorted him back to his boarding house. Abellana left him at 9:00 p.m. while Espejon
went home at about 11:00 p.m.
Judge Pacuribot admitted that he did not hold trial on 21 October 2004, a Thursday, because
the scheduled settings were all cancelled that day which cancellation was made a week before.
He averred that on the same day, he was writing decisions in his chambers. In the evening, he
asked Abellana to buy food and they ate supper with Espejon. Abellana left him about 8:00 p.m.
while Espejon left at about 10:00 p.m.
He, thus, concluded that it was impossible for him to be with Ms. Tan on 20 and 21 October
2004, a Wednesday and a Thursday, respectively. He argued that no proof existed to show his
physical presence in Cagayan de Oro City on those dates; hence, the presumption of his
continuing physical presence in his station during the inclusive period alluded to ran in his favor.
Judge Pacuribot also cited several factors which made Ms. Tan’s allegations unbelievable:
1. Ms. Tan’s behavior was not reflective of a rape victim. Ms. Tan did not immediately report
the incident to the authorities. As a 43-year-old lady who is no longer naïve and having assisted
as stenographer in countless rape cases, she should know how important it is to immediately
report the incident.
2. Judge Pacuribot pointed to Ms. Tan’s admission that she did not put up a struggle when he
allegedly brought her to City Lodge Motel and Discovery Hotel. Had she wanted to catch the
attention of employees, she could have done so. He also stressed that what Ms. Tan called a
headboard where he allegedly put his gun in the motel room was merely less than one inch in
width, too narrow for a .45 cal. gun to rest.
3. On 25 November 2004, a month and three days after the alleged rape, Ms. Tan invited all
her officemates, including him, to her birthday party held at her home, where she sang and
danced. She displayed her dancing skills then. She even taught him how to dance the swing.
Again, during the Court’s Christmas Party in December 2004, she socialized with her fellow
workers, including him, and even performed the "kikay dance" during the program.
4. On 1 Septemeber 2005, all the staff of Judge Pacuribot, including Ms. Tan, attended his
birthday party at his house in Cagayan de Oro City, where she merrily danced with dance
instructors and posed with Judge Pacuribot’s wife.
5. On May 2006, five months after she filed the administrative charge against Judge Pacuribot,
Ms. Tan joined the Search for Mrs. Gingoog City Contest as one of the candidates and she
paraded in the gymnasium, all smiles, while attired in an elegant gown.
6. Judge Pacuribot alleged that Ms. Tan and her husband were publicly known to be putting up
a façade that all was well with them, although they constantly quarreled and had been sleeping
in separate rooms already.
Judge Pacuribot disputed Ms. Tan’s version of how he became the lessee of a room at Ms. Tan’s
house. He claimed that in January 2005, she came to know that he was looking for a new
boarding house and she offered two small rooms at her house available for rent. He chose the

one facing the Police Station of Gingoog City, which he claimed to be only about five meters
more or less from the room he rented. He paid an advance rental of P5,000.00.
Judge Pacuribot denied sexually harassing Ms. Tan. In refuting her claim that he sexually
harassed her in his chambers, he countered that this could not have happened as his court aide,
Placido Abellana, was always in his chamber with him. If Abellana was out on an errand, his
security officer, SPO1 Ronald Espejon, temporarily took over. There had never been any moment
in his chambers that he was without companion. There was always either his court aide or his
security officer with him. Even when he had visitors, his court aide was still in his chambers to
maintain transparency and avoid unwarranted talk. Once in a while, his branch clerk of court,
Atty. Willfredo Bibera, Jr., would go to his chambers to confer with him regarding cases.
Sometimes, too, his security officer Espejon would take his blood pressure in his chambers.
Under these circumstances, Judge Pacuribot argued that no sexual harassment could have
occurred. He also called attention to the fact that Ms. Tan’s affidavit and testimony presented
the dates of the alleged sexual harassments as follows:
27 October 2004 06 January 2005
03 November 2004 08 August 2005
25 November 2004 03 October 2005
08 December 2004 04 October 2005
09 December 2004 11 October 2005
05 January 2005 13 October 200510
The 6 January 2005 alleged incidents were followed only on 8 August 2005, thus, belying Ms.
Tan’s claim that the sexual harassments were done regularly. Also, Ms. Tan’s allegation that he
sexually harassed her on 25 November 2005 was incredible, because on that date she was on
her birthday leave, and was busy preparing the dishes she was going to serve them during her
party. He emphasized that the criminal complaints for rape, acts of lasciviousness and sexual
harassments filed by Ms. Tan against him with the City Prosecutors Office in Gingoog City and
Cagayan de Oro City were all dismissed.
Judge Pacuribot explained that these administrative and criminal charges filed against him by
Tan and Villafranca were part and parcel of a grand plot hatched by Ronnie Waniwan, a radio
commentator, to oust him from office. He claimed that Waniwan was then facing four counts of
libel in his sala. The City Prosecutor recommended P50,000.00 bail for each. When Waniwan
filed a motion to reduce bail bond, respondent denied it for several reasons, i.e., (1) there was
a previous conviction, (2) he was not from Gingoog City, and (3) when a warrant for his arrest
was issued, he went into hiding instead of surrendering. Waniwan filed a motion for respondent
to inhibit himself, which the latter denied. As a consequence, Waniwan spent 13 days in jail for
failure to put up a bail bond. Judge Pacuribot learned that Waniwan had contacted the NPA for
Judge Pacuribot’s "liquidation" as revealed in the affidavits of two captured NPA sparrow unit
members. He discovered that Waniwan with Mesdames Tan and Villafranca plotted and
conspired to destroy him after his personal talk with other media men including Jonas
Bustamante, Jerry Orcullo and Jessie Mongcal.
Judge Pacuribot believed that Ms. Tan succumbed to the egging of Waniwan to jump the gun
on him. Ms. Tan knew that her job was in danger because of her growing inefficiency, a subject
of his several warnings, since her inefficiency would essentially affect the performance of his
court, a scenario which he abhorred, having been a consistent performer in the disposal of cases
during his days as labor arbiter. In fact, he considered Ms. Tan the most inefficient among the
four stenographers he had. She was allegedly lazy, inarticulate in the English language, and
flawed in spelling, which hampered her effectiveness in preparing transcriptions. Worse, due to
her moonlighting as manager of the Tan-Hoegee Internet Café, she would usually go home
during office hours to catch some sleep. He believed that his good relationship with her soured
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when he asked Ms. Tan to be more focused on the job; that he was going to move to a new
house; and when he did not let her borrow P200,000.00, or at least be a guarantor of her loan.
Anent the written charges of Ms. Villafranca, Judge Pacuribot specifically denied all material
allegations therein for being untrue. In particular, he denied the alleged rape incident on 22
February 2005 in Butuan City. He asserted that he never went out alone at night in Gingoog
City, knowing the place to be dangerous, and the fact that PNP confirmed to him that he was
in the list of those slated for "liquidation" by the NPA. Hence, he insisted that he neither invited
Ms. Villafranca for dinner, nor did he travel from Gingoog City to Butuan City during night time.
Judge Pacuribot claimed that on 22 February 2005, at 5:00 o’clock more or less in the afternoon,
he asked a certain Fil Sumaylo to buy and cook a big fish and ten pieces of small octopus
because they would have dinner at the latter’s house. At about 6:30 p.m., respondent went with
his security officer Espejon and court aide Abellana to Sumaylo’s house. His branch clerk of
court, Atty. Bibera, was also there. After dinner, Espejon and Abellana escorted him back to his
boarding house at about 11:00 p.m. Abellana left ahead, while Espejon left at about 11:30 p.m.
Also, Judge Pacuribot gave several reasons why he would not venture at all to go to Butuan City
alone. He said he was security conscious, considering that he handled drug cases and other
high-profile cases. He had also received NPA threats on his life. He claimed that Butuan City
was about 80 kilometers from Gingoog City and he would not go there and risk his life for a
woman he barely knew.
In denying Ms. Villafranca’s allegations of sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness, Judge
Pacuribot pointed out that the acts of grabbing, kissing and performing oral sex in his chambers
could not have happened as his court aide, Abellana, who is the uncle of Ms. Villafranca, was
always present in his chambers, aside from the fact that his chamber was just beside the room
of the staff.
Judge Pacuribot contended that Ms. Villafranca’s charges were improbable. He assessed her to
be a very intelligent woman with a strong personality. Ms. Villafranca is well connected, because
she is a recognized illegitimate daughter of a certain Polkem Motomull, a one-time member of
the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental and nephew of Mrs. Ruthie Guingona, incumbent City
Mayor of Gingoog City. A sister of her father is the Assistant City Auditor of Gingoog City, while
Judge Pacuribot’s predecessor, Judge Potenciano de los Reyes, is her father’s first cousin-in-
law. RTC Judge Downey Valdevilla of Cagayan de Oro City is also her uncle; and even Judge
Pacuribot’s court aide, Abellana, is her father’s first cousin. Considering the big family of Ms.
Villafranca, anyone will think, not just twice, but several times, before doing anything against
her. Ms. Villafranca will not just allow herself to be raped and beaten by a stranger like him in
Gingoog City. He found out that, as indicated in the police blotter of Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca
reported that she was raped and mauled by Mr. Ricky Lee Villfranca, her husband, who carted
away important belongings at about 2:00 a.m. of 26 May 2005. He claimed that if Ms. Villafranca
could report her husband to the police for said offense, then she should have reported him also
to the police if her allegations were true.
Judge Pacuribot denied calling Ms. Villafranca through her cellphone. On the contrary, it was
she who was calling him. She also sent him adoring or alluring text messages including seductive
notes and poems. He claimed that being a happily married man, he ignored the flirtatious and
seductive advances of Ms. Villafranca, to her consternation and bewilderment. He claimed that
her adulation of him came to an abrupt end and metamorphosed into an intense hatred and
dislike after he issued the 6 June 2005 Order in Criminal Case No. 2004-2879 entitled, "People
v. Anunde" pointing out her incompetence, inexperience and unprofessional attitude toward her
work. He opined that the charges of Ms. Villafranca are typical under the adage, "Hell hath no
fury than a woman scorned."
Judge Pacuribot further complained that Ms. Villafranca would follow up cases of her relatives
in his sala.

After weighing the evidences and arguments of all the parties, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco
Flores found:
FATHERHOOD UNPROVEN
On the Anonymous Letters about [Judge Pacuribot’s] illegitimate fatherhood, the Investigator
finds the claim unsupported by any documentary evidence. Although the certification of the
hospital’s administrative officer proves correct the claim in the anonymous letter as to (1) the
hospital; (2) the identity of the mother; (3) the number of children delivered; and (4) the date
of birth of the two children, but it did not shed light on the identity of the children’s father. In
this case, the certificates of birth of the two (2) children mentioned in the anonymous letter
showing [Judge Pacuribot’s] fatherhood would be the best evidence adequate to prove the
claim. With no-record-of-birth-certifications issued by the local civil city registrar and the office
of the Civil Registrar General, no finding of guilt can be made.
RAPE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENTS PROVEN BEYOND REASONBLE DOUBT
Ms. Villafranca’s story of rape and repeated sexual harassments is credible. [Judge Pacuribot’s]
defense of denial and alibi failed to overcome complainants’ evidence.
On the rape in Butuan City motel, [Judge Pacuribot] insists on the improbability of his presence
at the scene of the crime because he alleges that he does not go out at night in Gingoog City
without company for two (2) reasons – that he is security conscious and that there is an NPA
threat on his person.
Firstly, [Judge Pacuribot’s] being security conscious is no proof of improbability in going to
Butuan City. So many criminals are security conscious yet they go out alone at night to commit
a crime. Hence, his being security conscious could not have deterred him to go out.
Secondly, his claim of an NPA threat on his person is suspect. He claims that he learned he was
marked for NPA liquidation when he was given a copy of the affidavits of two (2) captured NPAs
named Marvin Lumod and Rico Roselem marked as Exhibits "22" and "23" respectively.
Unfortunately, these two (2) affidavits will not help [Judge Pacuribot]. Marvin E. Lumod’s
Affidavit is dated 20 June 2006 while Rico A. Roselem’s Affidavit is dated 19 June 2006. The
incident in Butuan City occurred on 22 February 2005. The reason, therefore, in not wanting to
go out at night without company on 22 February 2005 was still absent. [Judge Pacuribot’s] alibi
that he was in Gingoog City on 22 February 2005 is backed up by the testimonies of SPO1
Ronald Espejon and Placido Abellana. But these two are his loyals aside from the fact that
Abellana, as his court aide, is also one whose employment is under control and supervision of
[Judge Pacuribot]. Thus, on that account, their testimony must be taken with grain of salt. Their
testimony cannot discredit the straightforward testimony of Ms. Villafranca on how [Judge
Pacuribot] deceived her twice – on the purpose and on the place. He invited her for dinner but
ravished her instead. They agreed on The Mansion in Gingoog City for the dinner, yet drove her
to a Butuan City motel.
[Judge Pacuribot] asks: Why did Ms. Villafranca not report to the authorities that he sexually
assaulted her, if true, when she even reported to the police that her husband raped her on 26
May 2005? [Judge Pacuribot], to prove that Ms. Villafranca reported to the Police, presented
Annex "3", a certified copy of an entry in the Police Blotter of Gingoog City. [Judge Pacuribot]
should have noted that in that certified copy, it is shown that it was his security officer, SPO1
Ronald Espejon, not Ms. Villafranca, who had the report entered in the police blotter. The
certification did not say that Ms. Villafranca appeared at all in the Police Station and had the
incident blottered. All that Ms. Villafranca did was to ask Espejon for assistance because he was
beaten by her husband.
[Judge Pacuribot] claims that the administrative charge is Ms. Villafranca’s reprisal against him.
He claims that Ms. Villafranca appears to be "fatally attracted to him" and that he "remains
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steadfast in his refusal to reciprocate he atrociously immoral and misdirected adoration to him."
He claims the administrative charge is proof of the fury of a woman scorned. On the "fatal
attraction" [Judge Pacuribot] cited the text messages, notes and cards he claims Ms. Villfranca
sent him. Ms. Villaffranca explained how he has always demanded of her to send him those, the
reason for which she could not fathom then. He would even have cards in his chamber and then
summon her to sign them. When she resists, he would let out a barge of insults and threats.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] possession of those letters, cards, and text messages was adequately
explained by Ms. Villafranca.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] theory of Ms. Villafranca’s "fatal attraction" and "misdirected adoration" of
him is funny. He never disputed the testimony of the two (2) complainants that [Judge
Pacuribot] is reputed in the Hall of Justice as "terror", that he is fond of humiliating people in
public, using excoriating language on his victim, that female employees avoid him and veer
away from him when they meet in the Hall of Justice. He also failed to specifically deny the
claim of Ms. Villafranca that he housed his mistress, Sheryl Gamulo, in Motomul St., Gingoog
City. He also failed to specifically deny her claim that he sired a ten (10) year old daughter in
Ozamis City. Will all the dark side of his character publicly known, hardly would a twenty-nine
(29) year-old, very pretty married woman who [Judge Pacuribot] claims is very intelligent fall
for such character. Thus, [Judge Pacuribot’s] claim of Ms. Villafranca’s "fatal attraction" and
"misdirected adoration" of him becomes incredible.
[Judge Pacuribot] asks why did Ms. Villafranca allow herself to be raped and victimized over a
prolonged period of time when there were people capable of helping or protecting her
considering her illustrious, although illegitimate, lineage? Further, if he committed sexual abuses
on Ms. Villafranca at his rented room which was very near the police station, why did she not
shout or report to the police?
The fact that Ms. Villafranca is well connected in Gingoog City was actually not a boon but a
bane. It was on that account that she wanted to protect at all costs their family from any
scandal. [Judge Pacuribot] capitalized on it with his constant threat that he will bring scandal to
them by making public her half naked picture taken in the motel. Her wanting to protect her
family from shame cowed her into silence and submission. Her testimony demonstrates that. It
reads:
Atty. Kho:
Q: A cellphone picture that is what you are afraid of?
A: No, also his added threats that he is going to tell my mother-in-law, that he is going to
destroy me, that I am nobody, that my family is no good, and that he would call me "burikat,
burikat." He would call me that name. "Yawa ka. Animal ka. Sumunod ka nako."
(Atty. Ignes – Div. Clerk of Court interpreting:)
"Burikat" means a whore. "You lewd devil, and you have to follow me."
xxxx
Q: Why did you allow him to do that to you?
A: Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that picture, he will show that to my
mother-in-law and then he will destroy me and he will create a scandal in Gingoog City.
Q: Is it not that you are well-connected?
A: My husband is not around, Attorney.
Q: And?

A: And what? How could I explain to them that I was there? How he took my picture? How am
I going to? I don’t know. I just wanted to protect my family from my shame, from any scandal.
And he knew that it would be his hold to me. And he knew that I would be very careful with the
name that my family had, that is why he is constantly threatening me with such same argument,
you know: "Ikaw and madaot ani. Ino ning huan tanan."
(Atty. Ignes:)
"You will be destroyed because of this."
Ms. Villafranca said she was scared of [Judge Pacuribot’s] person and "how intimidating he could
be and how evil he could be." She feared him because when she resists him he would tell her
"madaot ka ani." (You will be destroyed because of this.) So she had to yield to him because
she knew he could do what he threatens to do – to destroy her. She points to the Order dated
6 June 2005 in People v. Anude of how indeed he had destroyed her.
[Judge Pacuribot] claims in his Comment and Consolidated Memorandum that Ms. Villafranca is
a very intelligent girl and with strong personality, reasons why it is improbable to make her a
victim of rape and sexual harassments. And yet, when he issued the Anude Order, he made her
look like she is an irredeemable incompetent who "cannot spell", who "uses high falutin words
in her Post Sentence Investigation Report which she herself may not have understood," whose
sentence construction is horrendous," "her proper noun is written with small letter" and that
"her adjectives or adverbs do not fit the things or persons described." [Judge Pacuribot] engages
in double – talk.
In the three – paged Anude Order, [Judge Pacuribot] tried to show that Ms. Villafranca’s
incompetence is toxically mixed with acute haughtiness because Ms. Villafranca refuses to
consult the judge or see him or refused to come to him even when summoned repeatedly.
[Judge Pacuribot] should not gripe. He summoned Ms. Villafranca to his chamber on 25 May
2005. Once inside, [Judge Pacuribot] slapped her for not filing her petition for annulment of
marriage and her head with his clenched fist. He planted on her neck kiss marks which he said
he wanted her husband to see. When Ms. Villafranca’s husband saw them later, he beat her. At
2:00 am of 26 May 2005, SPO1 Ronald Espejon claims that Ms. Villafranca called him for
assistance. It was the start of Ms. Villafranca’s growing defiance to [Judge Pacuribot], a fact
that roiled him to point of issuing the Anude Order eleven (11) days later.
[Judge Pacuribot] also belittled Ms. Villafranca repeatedly in said Order by referring to here as
"MERE Clerk II/understudy Johanna M. Villafranca of Gingoog City Parole and Probation Office,"
calling her "visibly inexperienced mere clerk," "very raw," and that her report was atrocious. He
ordered her Post Sentence Investigation Report returned "OFFICIALLY" to the superior of Ms.
Villafranca for proper corrections. [Judge Pacuribot] stated therein that Ms. Villafranca cannot
be located in her office as she is always absent per information in her office. He stated that she
should not be allowed to practice making post sentence investigation in preparation for a desired
promotion.
The Anude Order is the classic proof of how Ms. Villafranca’s disobedience to [Judge Pacuribot]
ended up in her destruction – "Madaut ka ani." The Order destroyed her person and her career.
Therein, he has beaten Ms. Villafranca’s career to a pulp. Any superior of Ms. Villafranca who
will read the Anude Order will block any desire of Ms. Villafranca for promotion which the latter
was aiming for at the time. She rued with tears how the Anude Order displaced her from her
job.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] repeated harping in said Order about Ms. Villafranca’s failure to consult him
and to come to him even when summoned, rendered more believable Ms. Villafranca’s claim
that [Judge Pacuribot] would summon her to his chamber on the pretext of official matters and
thereafter subject her to his lasciviousness conduct.
96
[Judge Pacuribot’s] claim that Ms. Villafranca was part of Ms. Waniwan’s conspiracy was
unproven. All the Sun Star pictures of Ms. Tan’s filing of the criminal complaint before the City
Prosecutor’s Office did not show at any instance the face of Ms. Villafranca. Also, she made it
clear in her testimony that sometime in February 2006, when Ms. Tan filed her criminal
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor, two other media men called her up to see if
they can get a copy of her Affidavit-Complaint. But she refused to prevent the public from
knowing what she went through.
Indubitably, Ms. Villafranca’s testimony and the anguish that came with it can only come from
a very sad experience. Even on the very delicate matters where [Judge Pacuribot] had stripped
her mercilessly of her dignity and womanhood, Ms. Villafranca was frank and straightforward,
proof of how outraged she was when [Judge Pacuribot] had raped her and had sexually
harassed her repeatedly.
Her spontaneity in answering the cross examination questions, the anguish she revealed in
court, her very natural and coherent way of telling how she was ravished and abused repeatedly
as an underling leaves no room to doubt her testimony and the things she said under oath in
her Affidavit – Complaint, her Rejoinder, and her Sworn Statement. Her tears could only be the
clues to her righteous indignation against the indignities she suffered from [Judge Pacuribot].
Indeed, the conviction to reveal the truth must have been so strong that she had to come back
to the country hurdling employment restrictions and the difficulty of not having saved enough
yet for her trip back just to testify in this case.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] claim that her administrative charge is a fabrication is unacceptable against
the avalanche of Ms. Villafranca’s evidence. The Investigator cannot find any valid reason to
sustain [Judge Pacuribot’s] denial and alibi as a defense.
[Judge Pacuribot] is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of rape in Butuan City and
guilty of multiple sexual harassment committed inside respondent judge’s chamber and in his
rented room in Gingoog City. His claim that Ms. Villafranca’s charge is a fabrication is
unacceptable considering the avalanche of evidence against him.
While [Judge Pacuribot] committed physical assault on Ms. Villafranca on 25 May 2005 when
after summoning her to his chamber, he slapped her for not filing the petition to annul her
marriage and hit her head with his clenched fist, the same is deemed absorbed by the offense
of sexual harassment considering that brute force and intimidation had always been used by
[Judge Pacuribot] to commit said offenses.
On the eight (8) occasions that [Judge Pacuribot] had carnal knowledge of Ms. Villafranca in his
rented room while [Judge Pacuribot’s] gun was always displayed on the table, implying the
commission of rape, the same are treated as sexual harassments only for Ms. Villafranca’s failure
to state when they were committed and to provide details on those occasions.
Ms. Tan’s agony started with [Judge Pacuribot’s] deception. He made her believe he will bring
her in his car to the bus terminal from Pryce Plaza Hotel, only to surprise her after riding with
him by bringing her to the City Lodge Motel to ravish her. Again, while about to leave City Lodge
Motel, he deceived her again by telling her that he will bring her now to the bus terminal, only
to bring her to the Discovery Hotel, so that he can ravish her some more later. Aside from
deception, [Judge Pacuribot] uses extravagantly another tool – intimidation. Immediately after
Ms. Tan settled herself on the front seat on that infelicitous night of 20 October 2004, he
immediately had his bag between them, the bag Ms. Tan knows contains [Judge Pacuribot’s]
gun. Also, he used on her an uncouth language in a loud voice, an irrational temper, a fake
message of urgency to rattle Ms. Tan and make her jump to obedience without thinking. By the
time Ms. Tan realized [Judge Pacuribot’s] repulsive intentions, it was too late to fight back
because she had been trapped in the motel.

His repeated intimidating warnings on Ms. Tan that she could harm her if she disobeys were
indeed proven true. On 24 November 2004, Ms. Tan was severely and publicly scolded before
her office mates, a fact that was affirmed by Atty. Wilfredo Bibera. Her performance rating from
"Very Satisfactory" slipped down to "Satisfactory" in 2005.
[Judge Pacuribot] uses force and cruelty on his hapless victims. When he ordered her to do oral
sex on him and she refused, he pulled her hair and pushed her face to his penis with an order:
"Suck it. Let it in till deep your throat. Let my penis reach your throat." He tightened his hold
on her that she was frightened he might break her neck. In pain, she had to plead: "Don’t pull
my hair, sir. It’s very painful. What a sadist you are." While he was sucking her nipple and
mashing her breasts, he was telling her: "This is the breast of a lustful woman." While he was
planting vile kisses on her neck to produce "chiquinini" on her, he told her: "I am going to plant
lots of kiss marks here to let the people know that you passed through my hands." Upon hearing
it, Ms. Tan cried. Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot] is a sadist beyond description capable of declaring
his unconcealed intention to parade her to the public as his victim.
At the trial, when issues would touch on her tender feelings towards her family or when it would
recall [Judge Pacuribot’s] cruelty that crushed her respectability or the delicateness of her
womanhood, she would invariably sob on the witness stand. The way he ravished her and
sexually harassed her showed how irrationally lewd or unbearably cruel he was.
Even when Ms. Tan was already abused, still the thought that he is her superior had never been
lost to her. Ms. Tan has always addressed him – "Sir."
"Why did you bring me here, Sir? Didn’t I tell you I will just take a taxi to Agora
Terminal?
"Don’t pull my hair, Sir. It is very painful. What a sadist you are."
"You are so rude, Sir, we work in the same office yet you disgrace me."
"Sir, I just take a taxi to Agora."
[Judge Pacuribot’s] moral ascendancy over Ms. Tan was an undeniable factor to her blind
submission to his depravity.
[Judge Pacuribot] pointed to Ms. Tan’s inefficiency, her not being a happily married woman,
that her husband is a wife beater and a violent man, that she is in financial straits who even run
to him for help. It is precisely these weaknesses, personal problems, and economic difficulties
which added to Ms. Tan’s inability to fight back and made her so submissive. She was the ideal
prey. As she was made to admit during her cross examination, she is the lone breadwinner in
the family with two (2) children to support.
[Judge Pacuribot] challenges Ms. Tan’s claim of rape and repeated sexual harassments by
arguing, to wit:
"Why did she not refuse to go with respondent when he allegedly fetch her at Pryce
Plaza Hotel on 20 October 2004 and instead go voluntarily with him?"
"At the Discovery Hotel, if indeed she stayed and slept there all by herself, why did
she not escape or call for help and instead wait for respondent to arrive the next
morning? So that he can sexually assault her again? Or why did she fail to ask for
help from any of the hotel staff or from anybody while in the Discovery Hotel?"
"If she immediately reported to the police authorities the maltreatment of her son by
her husband, why did she not complain of the alleged incidents of sexual harassments
and acts of lasciviousness she experienced from the respondent?"
97
Despite her claims of having been subjected to rape, sexual harassment and acts of
lasciviousness, why did she gleefully socialize with respondent during their Christmas party and
respondent’s birthday celebration?"
Ms. Tan had only two (2) options –
"Lose her job by promptly fighting back at [Judge Pacuribot]; or
"Keep her job tolerating him with muffled defiance.
Ms. Tan had correctly assessed the far reaches of his influence. When she was looking for a
lawyer to help her file the administrative charge, no lawyer in Gingoog City would like to accept
her case. She had to look for one in Cagayan de Oro City. She was thus correct to wonder while
she was in Discovery Hotel whether anyone there would come her aid if [Judge Pacuribot] will
start harming her.
Ms. Tan as a victim cannot be put in the same footing as other rape victims where the offender
holds no control on the victim’s survival and has no moral ascendancy over her. Fighting back
immediately against the offender is a rational move. In the case at bench, [Judge Pacuribot’s]
moral ascendancy and influence over her was a given. It was that together with his flair to
humiliate people and his blackmails which made her succumb to his sexual abuses. Ms. Tan
values her job; in fact, she consciously keeps track of her performance ratings. An underling
who believes that her immediate superior wields control over her continued employment or
sudden separation from service will cower in fear to the point of tolerating the indignities
committed on her. As [Judge Pacuribot] impressed on her, looking for a new job at her age is
not easy.
At the time that [Judge Pacuribot] was taking advantage of Ms. Tan, [Judge Pacuribot’s]
proverbial explosives temper and short fuse were being put to good use to terrorize her with
remarkable frequency. That dark spot in his character which has been brought up front in other
people’s consciousness in the months following his arrival in the Hall of Justice as a "terror" is
enough intimidation. To Ms. Tan, to "submit now and complain later" is a good, albeit temporary,
shelter against immediate public humiliation or job separation. Thus, Ms. Tan’s failure to report
to the police is understandable.
Also, [Judge Pacuribot] seems to have a masterful skill on how to exploit his victim’s
weaknesses. Ms. Tan is a stenographer, a position she has difficulty coping with because as
[Judge Pacuribot] noted, her spelling, her grammar and her knowledge of the English language
are not at par with the demands of her job. He has warned her of her "inefficiency" and of
staying late in the evening as manager of the internet café. He pointed to her joining without
prior SC permission a trip to Hongkong on a weekend in a packaged tour for stenographers in
Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, with such faults and difficulties, she is the ideal prey. Her fear of
losing a source of livelihood has made her behave submissive to him.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] alibi that on October 20 and 21, 2004, he was in Gingoog City and it was
impossible for him to be in Cagayan de Oro City on those days does not impress. It fails to
establish the impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. With the convenience of
his car, [Judge Pacuribot] could travel and be in different places, one after another in a short
time. After all, the incidents on October 20 and 21, 2004 were all beyond office hours.
To support [Judge Pacuribot’s] claim that he was present on those days in Gingoog City, he
presented his Certificate of Service for the month which shows that he was only on leave on
October 4 to 7, 2004.
Noteworthy is the testimony of Ms. Tan stating that when she met [Judge Pacuribot] on Monday
in their office after the rape incident, the latter told her not to file anymore her leave for October
20 and 21, 2004 and bragging, "Ako na gud ni, kinsay magbuot nako?" (It is me, who will prevail
against me). If he can forego the filing of application for leave for his subordinates, much more

is there reason for him not to submit an application for leave for his own absence reason why
his Certificate of Service for the month of October is not reliable.
On 21 October 2004 – a Thursday, all schedule of hearing were cancelled and [Judge Pacuribot]
said that they were cancelled the week before. Was the cancellation the week before due to the
fact that [Judge Pacuribot] received the notice of their Masonic Conference scheduled on
October 20 in Cagayan de Oro City? It was [Judge Pacuribot] who informed Ms. Tan of that
Masonic Conference that evening of October 20. Ms. Tan could not just have invented that idea
of a Masonic Conference. That is the reason why the cancellation of hearing on October 21 casts
doubt on [Judge Pacuribot’s] alibi.
Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, like alibi, is
a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical
testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally
held to prevail.
[Judge Pacuribot] cites Ms. Tan’s merry behavior during the Christmas Party and his Birthday
Party in Cagayan de Oro City as hardly the behavior of a rape victim or a victim or repeated
sexual harassments. Normally, such a victim is expected to behave with animosity and grievance
toward the offender. Unfortunately for her, she cannot afford to display such animosity and
grievance unless it is at the cost of her job. If she cannot defy his demands when he victimizes
her, shouldn’t her economic realities prompt her to win her war with friendship? [Judge
Pacuribot] should be reminded that in sexual harassments under Section 3 of RA No. 7877, an
offense is committed regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission
is accepted by the subject of said act.
Ms. Tan’s testimony was clear, frank and consistent. Her candid and clear-cut account of how
respondent judge had been deceitful and intimidating in his dealings with her that evening has
inspired belief. And throughout her testimony, she succeeded in revealing how [Judge Pacuribot]
took full advantage of his moral ascendancy over her as his underling, destroying whatever
resistance she could put up by belittling her, outwitting her and insulting her to reduce her to
submission.
There is no standard reaction of a victim in a rape incident. In fact, not every victim of rape can
be expected to act in conformity with the expectations of anyone who has not been subjected
to the same danger at any time. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress
are unpredictable; people react differently.
Investigator, thus, finds [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of
rape committed on October 20 and 21, 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and guilty of sexual
harassments committed in respondent judge’s chamber in RTC, Branch 27, Hall of Justice,
Gingoog City against Ms. Sherlita O. Tan.
One can see in these two cases a common strategy used by [Judge Pacuribot] in achieving his
vile purposes. He used deceit on Ms. Tan. He used deceit on Ms. Villafranca. He used intimidation
on Ms. Tan and he used it on Ms. Villafranca. He makes use of a substantial blackmail against
both.
In the case of People v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court had occasion to instruct us on the effects
of intimidation, thus:
Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed,
and the victim submits herself to her attackers because of fear. Besides, physical resistance is
not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an
accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others
may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is strongly
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suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a gun is sufficient
to bring her into submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the
burden of proving resistance.
[Judge Pacuribot] computed nine (9) months, twenty-one (21) days as interval from the time
Ms. Villafranca claimed she was raped on 22 February 2005 to 13 December 2005 when she
filed the complaint. Ms. Tan also filed her administratively charge only thirteen (13) months of
being his superior’s prey. Did delay cast doubt on the truthfulness of their claim?
In the case of People v. Aguero, Jr., where there was a two (2) years delay in the filing of the
complaint for rape, the Supreme Court said:
As to the alleged two-year delay in the filing of the complaint, suffice it to say, that complainant’s
failure to promptly report the incident does not sufficiently detract from her credibility and
cannot be taken against her. It has been held that a rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting
the crime does not destroy the truth of the complaint and is not an indication of deceit as it is
common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear for her aggressor and lack of courage to face
the public stigma of having been sexually abused.
In the case of People v. Espinosa, where the criminal complaint was filed about one and a half
years from commission of the offense, the Supreme Court said:
x x x Delay in reavealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge.
Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they prefer
to silently bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the
offender’s making good on his threats. This is understandable, considering the inbred modesty
of Filipinas and their aversion to the public disclosure of matters affecting their honor.
Delay in the filing of the charges does not necessarily undermine the credibility of witnesses.
The Supreme Court has deemed delay as justified when there is fear of reprisal, social
humiliation, familial considerations and economic reasons. In the case of Ms. Tan, her tormentor
is her superior who constantly dangles his influence and power over her and her job. As regards
Ms. Villafranca, the threat to destroy her, her family and her family’s good name was ever
present; thus, haunting her emotionally and psychologically. The delay in reporting the rape
cases committed by [Judge Pacuribot] has been justified.
On the repeated sexual harassments and violence committed separately on the persons of Ms.
Tan and Ms. Villafranca within the chamber of [Judge Pacuribot], the latter deems them
improbable because of the situation in his chamber. He points out that outside his chamber is
the staff room and there is a glassed window that divides them. Ms. Villafranca cited the incident
on 13 October 2005 where [Judge Pacuribot] did lascivious acts on her inside the chamber in
the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the latter’s just turned his back and
pretended to see nothing.
In the case of People v. Lavador, the rapist-appellant argued that rape was impossible due to
the presence of the victim’s son on her side. The Supreme Court said:
Nor can we accept the argument that the rape was improbable due to the presence of Noniluna’s
sons by her side. This Court has repeatedly declared that lust is no respecter of time and place
and rape can be committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the
roadside, within the school premises, inside the house where there are several occupants and
even in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping. x x x.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] defense of "improbability" cannot, therefore, be accepted.
[Judge Pacuribot] declares that the charges against him are complainants’ tools of revenge
against him. He cites his Order in People v. Anude and his letter reporting Ms. Villafranca’s

negligence as reasons from Ms. Villafranca’s anger and resentment. Against Ms. Tan, he cites
his warning against her inefficiency as stenographer, her moonlighting in her internet caféhis
refusal to grant her a loan of P200,000.00 or being her guarantor.
In the case of Simbajon v. Esteban, the Supreme Court in believing the testimony of the
complainant saying:
"The investigating judge correctly disregarded the respondent’s imputation of ill motive on the
part of complainant. No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and
her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to
perpetuate a falsehood.
Indeed, it is against human nature for a married woman to fabricate a story that would not only
expose herself to a lifetime of dishonor, but destry her family as well. Besides, there is no
sufficient evidence of any ill-motive imputable to Mesdames Tan and Villafranca to narrate
anything other than their respective desire to tell the truth and seek redress for the wrong
inflicted on each of them. For the kind of reputation [Judge Pacuribot] has in the Hall of Justice
and by his behavior where he projects himself as full of influence and power, these two women
will be the last to even cross the path of respondent judge without just cause. Thus, the
presumption applies that, one will not act and prevaricate "and cause damnation to one who
brought him no harm or injury.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] theory that all these charges are part of the sinister plan to oust [Judge
Pacuribot] from office at the instigation of Ms. Waniwan is far fetched.
On 8 December 205, or earlier, when Ms. Tan filed her complaint, there was no Mr. Waniwan
to speak of. Mr. Waniwan only materialized in February 2006 when she filed the same charges
against [Judge Pacuribot] before the City Prosecutor of Gingoog City. Media men at the slightest
clue of a "scoop" hound without let up those who could be sources of information. When the
media men became nosey, it was already in February 2006 when Ms. Tan filed the case in the
Prosecutor’s Office. By then, the filing of the administrative charge of Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca
was fait accompli. In the case of Ms. Villafranca, the Waniwan theory is patently absurd. Two
media men were eager in February 2006 to take hold of Ms. Villafranca’s affidavit but she
refused them staunchly. It is incredible that two (2) married women would prevaricate against
a person who has power and control over their jobs at the mere urging of Mr. Waniwan is
irrelevant. In People v. Mortales, the Supreme Court, speaking through now Chief Justice Renato
Puno, appositely said:
No married woman would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation to foist a false charge
of rape. Neither would she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and her family.
The fact that the victim resolved to face the ordeal and relate in public what many similarly
situated would have kept secret evinces that she did so to obtain justice. Her willingness and
courage to face the authorities as well as to submit to medical examination are mute but
eloquent confirmation of her sincere resolve.
Finally, it may be true there are minor and trivial discrepancies in Ms. Tan’s testimony, but they
neither impair the integrity of the victim’s evidence as a whole nor reflect negatively on the
witness’ honesty. Such inconsistencies, which might have been caused by the natural fickleness
of memory, even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken the credibility of the witness, for they
shake off the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
In sum, [Judge Pacuribot] should be made administratively liable for the charges against him in
A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-1982 and RTJ-06-1983.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines integrity to mean "soundness or moral principle and character."
It is said to be synonymous with "probity," "honesty," and "uprightness." The evidence adduced
indubitably show that [Judge Pacuribot] lacks the honesty in dealing with his two subordinates
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herein. Not only did he fail to live up to the high moral standard expected of a member of the
Judiciary but he has transgressed the norms of morality expected of every person.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] offenses in raping his victims and sexually harassing them were committed
with aggravation. He knew they were married but instead of helping strengthen or protect their
marriage, he tried his best to destroy their marital bonds.
Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot’s] reprehensible acts amount to gross misconduct, and immorality the
depravity of which is quite rare. They undoubtedly violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. They
are classified as severe charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 22 of the same Rules, any of the following sanctions may be imposed if the
respondent is guilty of a serious charge:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more that three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In Simbajon v. Esteban, the respondent Judge Esteban, for his sexual advances on one of his
female subordinates which consisted of "grabbing her, kissing her all over her face, embracing
her and touching her right breast" was preventively suspended for the duration of the
investigation until further notice AND was subsequently dismissed from service with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits except leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government – owned or controlled corporations.
Herein [Judge Pacuribot’s] conduct is far worse that those of Judge Esteban. [Judge Pacuribot’s]
acts indubitably went far beyond the bounds of decency and morality. He raped and repeatedly
sexually assaulted, not only one, but two female, married subordinates. He did not only violate
his victims’ womanhood and their dignities as persons but he aimed to weaken, then eventually
destroy two families. By such act, [Judge Pacuribot] disgraced his noble office, as well as the
judiciary, in the eyes of the public. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe.
When the fading sobs of two tearful women finally died down and their copious tears dried in
the numerous hankies that absorbed them what emerges is a figure that unmistakably exudes
the abominable torpedo of marital bonds, a practicing deceiver and a merciless pervert whose
face is unrecognizable as he is hooded with a judicial robe that helps conceal his dark side. His
family, wife and children may have all been innocently kept away from knowing this dark side
and to spare them from the afflictive and crushing humiliation of having a husband and father
of such a character, may the foregoing description be a "for your eyes only" to the members of
the highest court and the court administrator.
Thus, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommended:
This finding is made with full awareness of the recent Supreme Court ruling on quantum of
evidence required in the cases at bench. In the 7 August 2007 case of Alquizar v. Carpio, et al.,
the Supreme Court pronounced that:
x x x. In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the
allegations in the complaint rests on the complainant. While substantial evidence
would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where
the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative
proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to be

governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to
support the administrative charges or to establish the ground/s for the removal of a
judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino:
Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a
misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench,
the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not
mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind. The evidence adduced here overwhelmingly established moral certainty
that respondent judge raped and sexually harassed complainant Mesdames Tan and Villafranca
on separate and repeated occasions.
xxxx
Having found [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses of rape and
repeated sexual harassments, the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits is hereby recommended.11
We agree in the recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
We have reviewed the record of this case and are thereby satisfied that the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Justice are in truth adequately supported by the evidence
and are in accord with applicable legal principles. We therefore resolve to adopt such findings
and recommendations relative to the administrative liability of the respondent judge for grave
misconduct and immorality.
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice,
but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the
system have administered justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may,
in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice,
indeed, has been served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the
judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive
and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest
integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and in their private
lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with
fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.
With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct
has the following provisions:
Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be
beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their
100
personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday
lives. For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of
an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character
and are at all times expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public
decency. We have adhered to and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency,
which every member of the judiciary must observe.12 A magistrate is judged not only by his
official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are
externalized.13 He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral
integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
We explained the rationale for requiring judges to possess impeccable moral integrity, thus:
The personal and official actuations of every member of the Bench must be beyond
reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the public in the
administration of justice cannot be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not
equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity, and if he obtusely
continues to commit an affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than
a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary.14
We also stressed in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.15 that:
The code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of
[even] a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is
no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The
Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very
recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from
his personal experience. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and
in private life should be above suspicion."
Judge Pacuribot miserably failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He behaved in a
manner unbecoming a judge and model of moral uprightness. He betrayed the people's high
expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the Judiciary in general.
It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving
by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.16 In
the cases at bar, the complainants Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca were able to adequately
substantiate their allegations.
We find totally unacceptable the temerity of Judge Pacuribot in subjecting the complainants,
both his subordinates, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Over long
periods of time, he persistently solicited sexual favors from Ms.Tan and Ms. Villafranca. When
they refused, he made their working conditions so unbearable that Ms. Tan was eventually
forced to transfer to another office and Ms. Villafranca to seek employment abroad. Certainly,
no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from any court employee, even from a woman of
loose morals.17 Judge Pacuribot’s conduct indubitably bears the marks of impropriety and
immorality. Not only do his actions fall short of the exacting standards for members of the
judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large.
 101

His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably Pacuribot on the grounds that he has been terrorizing and harassing most of the employees has
constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily "x x x result in an intimidating, hostile, been rendered moot by the disposition of these cases.
or offensive environment for the employee[s]."18
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that "[T]he
We need not detail again all the lewd and lustful acts committed by Judge Pacuribot in order to administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems
conclude that he is indeed unworthy to remain in office. The narration of the Investigating in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all that
Justice was sufficiently thorough and complete. The audacity under which the sexual violation is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary
of the complainants were committed and the seeming impunity with which they were hemorrhages every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and
perpetrated by Judge Pacuribot shock our sense of morality. All roads lead us to the conclusion defend at all costs. This should not come to pass."23
that Judge Pacuribot has failed to behave in a manner that will promote confidence in the
Judiciary. His actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrity of the Judiciary, fomenting WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross
distrust in the system. Hence, his acts deserve no less than the severest form of disciplinary misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the service, with forfeiture of all
sanction -- dismissal from the service. retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued
On his part, Judge Pacuribot put up the defense of denial, attributing ill feelings and bad motives earned leave credits. Respondent judge is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately
to Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca. from rendering any order or decision; or from continuing any proceedings, in any case
whatsoever, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision. Lastly, respondent judge
Already beyond cavil is the evidentiary rule that mere denial does not overturn the relative is REQUIRED to SHOWCAUSE why he should not be disbarred as a member of the Philippine
weight and probative value of an affirmative assertion. Denial is inherently a weak defense. To Bar. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial This Decision is immediately executory. The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that
is purely self-serving and is with no evidentiary value. Like the defense of alibi, denial crumbles a copy of this resolution be immediately served on respondent. SO ORDERED.
in the light of positive declarations.19 Denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the witnesses who had no ill motive to testify falsely. Moreover, in the case at bar,
there is utter lack of basis to sustain the purported ill motives attributed by Judge Pacuribot to
the complainants. The Investigating Justice correctly disregarded Judge Pacuribot’s imputation.
No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny
and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetrate a falsehood.20 The only plausible
and satisfactory explanation for us is that the charges against respondent are true.
Judge Pacuribot and his witnesses failed to overcome the evidence presented by the
complainants.
Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants,
who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer. His actuations are aggravated
by the fact that complainants are his subordinates over whom he exercises control and
supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order
to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of acting in loco parentis over his
subordinate employees, he was even the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his
superior position.21
In sum, we concur with the Investigating Justice in holding that complainants were able to
muster the requisite quantum of evidence to prove their charges against Judge Pacuribot. By
having sexual intercourse with Ms Tan and Ms. Villafranca, his subordinates, respondent violated
the trust reposed on his high office and completely failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict
standards of morality required of members of the Judiciary.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, we hold, without any hesitation, that Judge
Pacuribot be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanction - dismissal from the service
for the charges of sexual harassment against him.
We, however, find the complaints of the Anonymous Letter Writers without merit. Beyond the
bare allegations that Judge Pacuribot maintained an illicit relationship with a certain Sheryl
Gamulo and fathered two children with her, there is nothing in the records that would indicate
that he, indeed, committed the crime charged. We have stressed time and again that allegations
must be proven by sufficient evidence. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof.22 The letter dated 4 April 2005 from "concerned citizens" asking for the relief of Judge

IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C.
BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V.
NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG
A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC February 24, 2009
IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V.
NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG, G.R. No. 179120.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is the Report of the Investigating Committee created under the Resolution
dated December 10, 2008, to investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated
ponencia of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC,
Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, respectively, to determine who are
responsible for the leakage of a confidential internal document of the En Banc.
The investigating committee, composed of Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing as Chairperson
and Mme. Justice Conchita Carpio Morales and Mr. Justice Renato C. Corona as Members,
submitted the following report:
INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE CREATED UNDER THE EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER
10, 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HON. REYNATO S. PUNO, Chief Justice
HON. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, Associate Justice
HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Associate Justice
HON. MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Associate Justice
HON. DANTE O. TINGA, Associate Justice
HON. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, Associate Justice
HON. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., Associate Justice
HON. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, Associate Justice
HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Associate Justice
HON. ARTURO D. BRION, Associate Justice
HON. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA, Associate Justice
RE: Report on the Investigation of the Unauthorized Release of the Unpromulgated
Ponencia of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the Consolidated Cases of Limkaichong v.
COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v.
Nograles, Docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33,
Respectively, to Determine Who are Responsible for the Leakage of a Confidential Internal
Document of the En Banc
102
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court the following report on the results of the investigation of the
committee created under the En Banc Resolution dated December 10, 2008.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
During its session on July 15, 2008, the Court En Banc continued its deliberations on the draft
of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. Comelec, Villando v.
Comelec, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as G.R. Nos.
178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, respectively, (Limkaichong case) which was
used by this Court as a working basis for its deliberations. Since no one raised any further
objections to the draft, the En Banc approved it. It having been already printed on Gilbert paper,
albeit a number of Justices manifested that they were concurring "in the result," Justice Reyes
immediately circulated the ponencia during the same session.
After the session and during lunch, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno noted that seven of the 13
Justices (excluding Justice Reyes) concurred "in the result" with the ponencia of Justice
Reyes (hereafter Gilbert copy or Justice Reyes’s ponencia or ponencia or
unpromulgated ponencia). Justices Minita Chico-Nazario and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro then
informed the Chief Justice that they too wanted to concur only "in the result." Since nine
Justices, not counting the Chief Justice, would concur only "in the result," the Justices
unanimously decided to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy. It was noted that if a
majority concurred only "in the result," the ponencia would have no doctrinal value. More
importantly, any decision ousting a sitting member of the House of Representatives should spell
out clearly the legal basis relied upon by the majority for such extreme measure. Justice Antonio
T. Carpio then volunteered to write his Reflections on Justice Reyes’s ponencia for discussion in
the following week’s En Banc session.
During its session on July 22, 2008, the En Banc deliberated on Justice
Carpio’s Reflections which had in the meantime been circulated to the members of the Court. As
a result, the En Banc unanimously decided to push through and set the date for holding oral
arguments on the Limkaichong case on August 26, 2008.
On the request of Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong case was included in the agenda of
July 29, 2008 where it was listed as Item No. 66. The decision to hold oral arguments remained,
however.
On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R.
No. 179120, held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in Maria Orosa Street,
Ermita, Manila, and circulated to the media an undated letter signed by him, together with what
appeared to be a xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. In his letter, Biraogo insinuated
that the Court, at the instance of the Chief Justice and with the implied consent of the other
Justices, unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia.
Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the
confidential internal deliberations of the Court and constituted contempt of court, the Court, in
a Resolution dated December 10, 2008, directed
1. The creation of an Investigating Committee, chaired by Senior Associate Justice
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, with Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
Chairperson, Third Division and Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Working
Chairperson, First Division, as Members to investigate the unauthorized release of the
unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes to determine who are responsible for this
leakage of a confidential internal document of the En Banc, and to recommend to the
En Banc the appropriate actions thereon;

2. Mr. Louis C. Biraogo to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution, why he should not be punished for contempt for writing the undated letter
and circulating the same together with the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes.
As directed, the committee, composed of the aforementioned three senior Justices, conducted
initial hearings on December 15 and 16, 2008.
In the meantime, in compliance with the Court’s above-quoted Resolution dated December 10,
2008, Biraogo submitted to the Court his Compliance dated December 22, 2008 to which he
attached the following annexes: (1) an undated photocopy of a 3-page printed letter addressed
to "Dear Mr. Biraogo" which purportedly was sent by a "Concerned Employee" as Annex "A";
(2) a June 12, 2008 note handwritten on a memo pad of Justice Reyes reading:
Re: G.R. Nos. 178831-32, etc. [the comma and "etc." are
handwritten]
Dear Colleagues,
I am circulating a revised draft of the ponencia.
(Sgd.)
RUBEN T. REYES,
together with a copy of Justice Reyes’s Revised Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008 agenda
as Annex "B"; (3) a photocopy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14
Justices as Annex "C"; and (4) a photocopy of Justice Carpio’s Reflections as Annex "D".
Justice Ynares-Santiago later inhibited herself upon motion of Justice Ruben T. Reyes while
Justice Carpio voluntarily inhibited himself. They were respectively replaced by Justice Renato
C. Corona and Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, by authority of the Chief Justice based on
seniority. Additional hearings were then held by the reconstituted committee on January 14, 16,
19, 20, 21 and 22, 2009.
The following witnesses/resource persons were heard:
1. Armando A. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben
T. Reyes
2. Rodrigo E. Manabat, Jr., PET Judicial Staff Officer II, Office of Associate Justice
Ruben T. Reyes
3. Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben
T. Reyes
4. Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
5. Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
6. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
7. ACA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief, Public Information Office
8. Ramon B. Gatdula, Executive Assistant II, Office of the Chief Justice
9. Atty. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, Clerk of Court En Banc
10. Major Eduardo V. Escala, Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office
of Administrative Services
11. Atty. Felipa B. Anama, Assistant Clerk of Court
12. Willie Desamero, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court
103
13. Glorivy Nysa Tolentino, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
14. Onofre C. Cuento, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court
15. Chester George P. Del Castillo, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice
Ruben T. Reyes
16. Conrado B. Bayanin, Jr., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
17. Fermin L. Segotier, Judicial Staff Assistant II, Office of Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura
18. Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes
SUMMARIES OF TESTIMONIES
Below are the summaries of their testimonies:
1. ARMANDO A. DEL ROSARIO, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T.
Reyes, testified as follows:
He was in charge of circulating ponencias for the signatures of the Justices and of forwarding
signed (by all the Associate Justices who are not on leave) ponencias to the Office of the Chief
Justice (OCJ).
On July 15, 2008, after the En Banc session, he received from Justice Reyes the original of the
unpromulgated ponencia (Gilbert copy). Because he was busy at that time, he instructed his co-
employee Rodrigo Manabat, Jr. to bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for
signature and to wait for it. He instructed Manabat to rush to Justice Nachura’s office because
the latter was going out for lunch. After more than 30 minutes, Manabat returned with the
Gilbert copy already signed by Justice Nachura, who was the last to sign.1 Del Rosario then
transmitted the Gilbert copy together with the rollo, temporary rollos, and diskettes to the OCJ
pursuant to standard operating procedures for the promulgation of decisions. The documents
were received by Ramon Gatdula on the same day at around 3:00 p.m.
The following day, on July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes instructed him to
retrieve the Gilbert copy and the accompanying documents and diskettes as he was told that
the promulgation of the ponencia had been placed on hold. He brought the Gilbert copy to
Justice Reyes who told him to keep it. He then placed the Gilbert copy in a sealed envelope and
placed it inside his unlocked drawer and wrote a note in his logbook when he retrieved the
Gilbert copy that its promulgation was on hold and would be called again on July 29, 2008.2
The Gilbert copy was in his sole custody from July 16, 2008 until December 15, 2008 (when the
investigating committee held its first hearing).3 He never opened the envelope from the day he
sealed it on July 16, 2008 until December 10, 2008, when Justice Reyes told everybody in their
office that the Gilbert copy had been photocopied and leaked. He did not have any news of any
leakage before then. And he also did not photocopy the Gilbert copy. The seal placed on the
envelope was still intact when he opened it on December 10, 2008.4 Although the lawyers in
their office knew that he kept original copies of drafts in his unlocked drawer, he believed that
nobody in his office was interested in photocopying the Gilbert copy. He was solely responsible
for keeping the Gilbert copy. He did not know any of the parties to the case and none of them
ever called him. And he did not know what Gatdula did after receiving the Gilbert copy.5
The Limkaichong case was called again on July 29, 2008 as Item No. 66. The Office of Justice
Reyes received the En Banc agenda for the said date on July 25, 2008. Upon receipt of the said
En Banc agenda and the new item number, their office prepared a new cover page and attached
it to the Gilbert copy. The original cover page of the Gilbert copy for the agenda of July 15, 2008
showing the case as item number 52 was thrown away.6

On being recalled on January 20, 2009, Del Rosario further testified as follows:
On July 15, 2008 when the Justices were about to leave the En Banc session room after the
adjournment of the session, he entered the room just like the rest of the aides.7 He carried the
folders of Justice Reyes, returned them to the office, and went back to, and waited for Justice
Reyes until Justice Reyes finished lunch at the En Banc dining room.8 The Gilbert copy was left
with Justice Reyes.9 Before 1:00 p.m., after the Justices had taken lunch,10 Justice Reyes, who
was then carrying an orange envelope, handed to him the Gilbert copy and instructed him to
speed up the ponencia’s signing by Justice Nachura (who was not taking part in the oral
arguments of a case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day) since the latter might be leaving.11 He
heard Justice Reyes say "Ihabol mo ito… Ihabol na ipapirma kay Justice Nachura" in the
presence of Judicial Staff Head, Atty. Rosendo Evangelista, as the three of them were going
down the stairs to their office from the session room.12
He was not the one who brought the ponencia to the Office of Justice Nachura because he gave
the task to Manabat to whom he relayed the instruction.13 There were already signatures on
page 36 of the ponencia when he gave it to Manabat and only the signature of Justice Nachura
was missing.14 He pointed this to Manabat saying, "ito na lang ang walang pirma, dalhin mo
doon." Manabat obliged him.15
After a few minutes, Manabat returned to their office bearing the Gilbert copy. He went to Atty.
Evangelista, showing him that the ponencia had already been signed by Justice Nachura. Atty.
Evangelista then instructed him to have the ponencia promulgated by delivering the same to
the OCJ. He (Del Rosario) complied, personally handing the Gilbert copy with the rollo, records
and diskettes to Ramon Gatdula of the OCJ at 3:30 p.m., also of July 15, 2008. 16The ponencia
stayed at the OCJ until the afternoon of the following day, July 16, 2008.17
He was not told that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold until the afternoon of July
16, 2008, when Justice Reyes called him to his chambers and instructed him to retrieve the
ponencia. He also stated that someone from the OCJ called their office and requested them to
retrieve the ponencia because its promulgation was on hold.18 At 4:00 p.m. that day, he
retrieved the ponencia etc. from the OCJ19 and gave the ponencia to Justice Reyes.20
He merely showed the ponencia to Justice Reyes who ordered him to keep it ("tabi mo muna
yan").21 He then placed a note "Hold, reset July 29" in his logbook after being informed by Atty.
Evangelista of such date of resetting.22 He reiterated that he placed the Gilbert copy in a brown
envelope, sealed it with the officially issued blue and white seal provided by the Printing Office,
and placed the envelope inside his unlocked drawer. The envelope was still sealed when he
checked it on December 10, 2008.23 He admitted that from the time he kept the Gilbert copy in
his drawer until the Special En Banc meeting on December 10, 2008, he and no one else was
in possession of the Gilbert copy. But he denied that he ever opened the envelope or photocopy
the Gilbert copy. In fact, he did not mind it.24 And nobody inquired about it since July 16, 2008
until December 10, 2008.25 He likewise denied that he knew Congressman Paras or Biraogo or
that the two ever called his office.26
When asked if he could produce the envelope into which he placed the Gilbert copy, he replied
that Justice Reyes had taken it.27 He also informed that what was placed on the face of the
brown envelope was a computer print-out containing the title of the case, the names of the
ponente and the other Justices, and the manner they voted.28
When he was asked by Justice Carpio Morales whether it was possible for him to recognize any
tampering if, for instance, the envelope and the seal were replaced with a similar envelope and
blue and white seal with a similar print-out information on the face of the envelope, he answered
in the negative.29 (At that point, Justice Carpio Morales remarked that Del Rosario, therefore,
could not have been certain when he said that the envelope remained sealed from July 16, 2008
to December 10, 2008.)30
104
Nobody else knew where he put the Gilbert copy—in the same place as the other drafts. It was
possible for someone to take the Gilbert copy from his drawer and photocopy it on a weekend
or after office hours.31 Nobody told him to guard the Gilbert copy.32
Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox machine.33 He drew a sketch of the
layout of the desks inside the office of Justice Reyes, illustrating that his location was two desks
away from the table of April Candelaria, a secretary in the office, and that the xerox machine
was situated at the back of the long table of the receiving clerks.34
He stayed in the office as long as Justice Reyes was still there but he could not say for sure that
nobody photocopied the Gilbert copy after office hours as he also went out of the office to
smoke in the nearby garden area or repair to the toilet.35
He never reported to office on Saturdays and there was one time Justice Reyes went to office
on a Saturday as he was also asked to report but he refused.36 Justice Reyes sometimes dropped
by the office on Sundays after attending services at the United Methodist Church along Kalaw
Street, as told to him by the driver.37
He also circulated copies of the Revised Draft of the decision to the other Justices but he never
received a copy of Justice Carpio’s Reflections.38 He did not offer an explanation why the Gilbert
copy, which was in his possession, and the Revised Draft, were leaked.39 No information was
supplied by his officemates, friends or relatives to help explain the leakage.40 Among his relatives
working in the Court are his mother-in-law, Jasmin P. Mateo of the OCJ, sister of former Court
Administrator Ernani Pano, and Mrs. Mateo’s sibling, who works at the Hall of Justice
Committee.41
He and the driver of Justice Reyes were given keys to the main door of the Office of Justice
Reyes but he could not say that only the two of them held keys to the main door.42 April
Candelaria and Atty. Ferdinand Juan asked for and got duplicates of the key, but could not
remember exactly when. Atty. Juan got a duplicate of the key because the lawyers sometimes
went out for dinner and needed to go back to the office to retrieve their personal belongings.43
April Candelaria’s secretarial functions included recording of the social activities of Justice Reyes
and delivering door-to-door papers to his chambers.44 Candelaria and the driver were in the
staff of Justice Reyes since the latter’s stint at the Court of Appeals, while Atty. Juan was
employed ahead of him.45
Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox machine because all of them photocopied
personal documents and were too ashamed to ask other officemates to do it for them.46
When news of the leakage came out, Justice Reyes called all his legal staff and him to a meeting.
In a tone that was both angry and sad, Justice Reyes asked them if they knew anything about
the leakage.47 A meeting among Justice Reyes, Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and him took place
on December 15, 2008, before the initial hearing by the investigating committee.48 Justice Reyes
also talked to him one-on-one and asked him if a copy of Justice Carpio’s Reflections was
attached to the Gilbert copy and other documents when they were sent to the OCJ. He replied
that there was none and that he just kept the Gilbert copy in his drawer and had in fact forgotten
all about it until Justice Reyes inquired about it in December.49 He was not able to read Jarius
Bondoc’s column about the leakage of the Gilbert copy (which came out in the Inquirer in
October 2008 about the Gilbert copy) nor had Justice Reyes confronted him about said column
before December 2008.50
During the initial hearing in December 15, 2008, nobody talked to him or knew that he was
testifying as he was even surprised that he was called to testify.51 When confronted with the
testimony of his officemate, Chester Del Castillo, who testified that Justice Reyes called only
one meeting, he opined that Del Castillo might not have known about the meeting with the
lawyers since Del Castillo was frequently absent.52

2. RODRIGO E. MANABAT, JR., PET Judicial Staff Employee II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben
T. Reyes, testified as follows:
He was the personal aide of Justice Reyes. On July 15, 2008, he brought the Gilbert copy to the
Office of Justice Nachura for signature upon the instruction of Del Rosario and Atty.
Evangelista.53 He gave the Gilbert copy to the receptionist and waited outside the said office.
After ten minutes, the document was returned to him.54 He then immediately gave it to Del
Rosario. It took him not more than 15 minutes to return the document to Del Rosario.55He
averred that he did not photocopy the Gilbert copy nor did he notice if anybody from the Office
of Justice Nachura photocopied it.56 He also did not know if Del Rosario placed the document in
a sealed envelope or photocopied it.57 After returning the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario, he went
back to Justice Reyes who asked him if Justice Nachura had already signed the ponencia. He
answered yes and told Justice Reyes that the ponencia was already with Del Rosario.58
3. ATTY. ROSENDO B. EVANGELISTA, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T.
Reyes, testified that as follows:
Around 1:00 p.m. on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes instructed him to have signature page 36 of
the ponencia reprinted and circulated for signing allegedly because Justice Minita Chico-Nazario
wanted to change her qualified concurrence thereon—"in the result"—to an unqualified
concurrence. He thus instructed Jean Yabut, the stenographer in charge of finalizing drafts, to
reprint page 36 of the Gilbert copy. Then he ordered the reprinted page circulated for signatures
together with the other pages of the ponencia. He assumed that the original page 36 was
discarded as it was no longer in their files. He likewise assumed that the signatures were
completed on the reprinted page 36 as the Gilbert copy was forwarded around 3:00 p.m. to the
OCJ per standard operating procedure.59 He was not informed then by Justice Reyes or anybody
that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy had been put on hold per agreement of the
Justices.60 He came to know that it was on hold only on July 17, 2008, when Del Rosario
informed him upon his arrival at the office. Because the information was unusual and because
it was his duty to make sure that signed decisions were promulgated, he asked Justice Reyes.
Justice Reyes then confirmed that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold.61 After that, he
just assumed that the Gilbert copy was in their office with Del Rosario who was assigned to
keep such documents. However, he did not know exactly where in his work area Del Rosario
kept it.62 He did not make a photocopy of the Gilbert copy nor did he order Del Rosario and
Manabat to make photocopies. Neither did he know how the Gilbert copy was photocopied. He
only came to know about the leakage last December 10, 2008.63
When, on January 22, 2009, he was recalled by the committee, he further testified as follows:
He occupied the last cubicle in the lawyers’ room and the xerox machine was located outside
the lawyers’ room.64 It was upon the instruction of Justice Reyes that their office reprint page
36 of the Gilbert copy and circulate it for signature. The instruction to circulate the reprinted
page, which was circulated together with the other pages of the Gilbert copy, was given by him
to either Manabat or Del Rosario.65 He saw the original page 36 where Justice Chico-Nazario
(supposedly) wrote the phrase "in the result" on top of her signature.66 Aside from him, Court
Attorney VI Czar Calabazaron, who principally researched on the case, also saw the qualification
in Justice Chico-Nazario’s signature while the Gilbert copy lay on top of Justice Reyes’s coffee
table inside his chambers. He recalled that at about 12:30 p.m. or before 1:00 p.m. right after
the En Banc session on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes called the him and Atty. Calabazaron to his
chambers.67 In that meeting, Justice Reyes phoned Justice Chico-Nazario after noticing that
Justice Chico-Nazario’s signature bore the notation "in the result."68 He, however, did not hear
what they talked about since the less-than-five-minute phone conversation was inaudible, even
though he was just approximately one meter away.69 Justice Reyes thereafter instructed him to
reprint the second signature page (page 36). He assumed from the context of the instruction
that it was due to the change in Justice Chico-Nazario’s concurrence, without asking Justice
105
Reyes the reason therefor.70 He then directed the stenographer to, as she did, reprint the second
signature page, page 36, which was brought in to Justice Reyes in his chambers.71
He attended the oral arguments on a case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. on that day (July 15, 2008)
and arrived at the session hall before that time.72 As far as he could recall, he went down to the
Office of Justice Reyes about 3:00 p.m. to retrieve a material needed for the oral arguments.
He denied having testified that he went down purposely to check if the ponencia had been
circulated and the second signature page signed anew and to make sure that the ponencia had
already been transmitted to the OCJ.73 When confronted with the transcript of stenographic
notes, he maintained that it was part of his duties to see to it that every ponencia of Justice
Reyes was promulgated.74 He was sure that he went down to their office at around 3:30 p.m.,
although he could not recall his purpose for doing so. It was probably to get some materials
related to the oral arguments, and that it just so happened that Del Rosario saw him and
informed him that the Gilbert copy had already been transmitted to the OCJ.75
When asked as to the whereabouts of the original signature page 36, he surmised that it must
have been shredded since it was not made part of the official documents submitted to the
OCJ.76 While he searched for it in his cubicle, it could no longer be located.77 He did not inquire
from Justice Reyes or from Del Rosario who also had access to that page, because
he assumed that it could not be located since what was submitted to the OCJ was the one where
Justice Chico-Nazario’s concurrence was no longer qualified by the phrase "in the result."78 As
he was attending the oral arguments, he had no opportunity to see the reprinted signature page
36 with the affixed signatures prior to the transmittal to the OCJ.79
He came to know that the Gilbert copy was retrieved on July 16, 2008.80 It was Del Rosario who
informed him on July 17, 2008 that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold and was
returned to their office.81 Justice Reyes did not advise them earlier that the promulgation was
on hold.82 After learning about it, he inquired from Justice Reyes who confirmed that the
promulgation was indeed on hold. He never asked for the reason even though that was their
first "on hold" incident because he thought that the case would be called again at another
session.83 He read the newspaper reports about the unpromulgated ponencia but did not
validate them with Justice Reyes.84
He assumed that Del Rosario, being the custodian, kept the Gilbert copy in their office.85 Their
office reprinted the second signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy.86 When shown page 36 of the
Gilbert copy by the committee, he assumed that it was the reprinted page since Justice Chico-
Nazario’s signature no longer contained any qualification.87 He stated that it was the practice of
their office to photocopy drafts signed by Justice Reyes and to furnish the other Justices with
advance copies for their review before the session. Only such drafts were photocopied.
Ponencias, which had already been signed by the other Justices and printed on Gilbert paper,
were never photocopied. Del Rosario only logged them in his logbook and prepared soft copies
for submission to the Division Chair or the Chief Justice.88 He assured the committee that this
practice was 100% complied with despite the fact that he was not one of those assigned to
photocopy, but later yielded to given situations by Justice Carpio Morales.89
When directed to compare the front page of the photocopy Biraogo submitted as Annex "C" to
his Compliance to the Show Cause Order with the original Gilbert copy submitted to the
committee by Justice Reyes, Atty. Evangelista noticed the difference in the dates of the agenda.
He noted that Biraogo’s copy, which was the copy allegedly leaked to him, bore the agenda date
"July 15, 2008," while the Gilbert copy submitted by Justice Reyes to the committee bore the
agenda date "July 29, 2008." He also noted that the item numbers were also different because
the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 52 in the photocopy submitted by Biraogo, whereas
in the Gilbert copy, the case was listed as Item No. 66.90 To him, it was probable that Biraogo
got his copy from another source but it was not probable that Biraogo photocopied a copy in
the office.

Only a few persons were authorized to operate the xerox machine in their office, namely,
Conrado Bayanin, Jr., Armando Del Rosario, Chester Del Castillo, a certain Leonard and a certain
Ramon.91 He could not recall who among the five had been directed to photocopy the July 15,
2008 draft.92 He ventured a guess that the top page of the Gilbert copy might have been
reprinted but could not impute any motive to any person.93 Even if he was the staff head, he
was not privy to the preparation of the first page nor of the top cover bearing the date "July 29,
2008" copy.94
Finally, he manifested that from the time the Gilbert copy was signed by 14 Justices until
December 15, 2008, he did not acquire exclusive control or possession of the Gilbert copy
because Del Rosario was the custodian thereof.95He reiterated that he did not know where,
exactly, Del Rosario kept the documents. He admitted that he was remiss in his duties as staff
head for not knowing.96 It was their practice not to lock drawers.97 He was aware that Justice
Reyes eventually prepared another draft of a ponencia changing his position in the Limkaichong
case because he helped in the research in November 2008.98 He never consulted the Gilbert
copy because he had a softcopy thereof in his computer.99 He did not ask why Justice Reyes
was departing from his original position.100 He denied that he knew Biraogo, Limkaichong,
Jerome Paras, Olive Paras or any party to the case.101
He winded up his testimony by manifesting that the investigation was an experience that he
hoped would not happen again and that he would not have to undergo again.102
4. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO testified as follows:
She signed the Gilbert copy only once, in the En Banc conference room before going to the En
Banc dining hall.103Justice Reyes was beside her, looking on, when she affixed her signature.
Immediately after signing, she returned the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who circulated it for
the signatures of the other Justices. She remembered that Justice Reyes was holding the
document even when the Justices were already at the dining hall. She did not photocopy the
ponencia nor was there any opportunity for her to do so as there was only one Gilbert copy and
the only time she held it was when she affixed her signature. She added that her concurrence
to the ponencia was without qualification but when it was noted during lunch that most of the
Justices had simply concurred "in the result," she and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
signified their intention to qualify their concurrence and concur likewise only "in the
result."104 However, she was no longer able to indicate the change on the document as she and
the other Justices had decided to put on hold the promulgation of the decision until after holding
oral arguments on the Limkaichong case. No reprinted signature page was ever sent to her
office for her signature and she did not affix her signature on any other copy of the ponencia.
She was not the last to sign the ponencia.105
5. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO testified as follows:
She signed the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session and Justice Reyes was right beside
her when she signed the ponencia.106 No reprinted signature page 36 was ever sent to her office
for signature and she did not affix her signature on any other copy of the ponencia. She did not
photocopy the ponencia and there could have been no opportunity to do so right after she
signed it.107
6. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA testified as follows:
He believed that he signed the ponencia in the En Banc conference room just before he went
to the En Banc dining hall for lunch. He believed he was never sent a reprinted signature page.
He either returned the ponencia to Justice Reyes right after signing it or passed it on to the
other Justices for them to sign. He could not recall if he was the last to sign the ponencia. Asked
whether he leaked the decision, Justice Nachura replied that he did not. Nor did he order any
of his staff to photocopy it. In fact, there was no opportunity to photocopy the ponencia as he
106
was not in custody thereof.108 Although he knew the husband of one of the petitioners, Olivia
Paras, neither she nor her husband ever asked for a copy of the ponencia.109
7. ASSISTANT COURT ADMINISTRATOR JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ, Chief, Public
Information Office (PIO), testified as follows:
The copy of Biraogo’s undated letter with the attached copy of the unpromulgated ponencia of
Justice Reyes, which he furnished the En Banc, came from a member of the media. Around 3:00
p.m. on December 9, 2008, a reporter called him on the phone, asking if he would like to give
a statement because Biraogo was going to hold a press conference about the Limkaichong case
later that day at Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, in front of the Court of Appeals. He requested the
reporter to inform him of what was going to be taken up during the press conference. The
reporter went to his office around 5:00 p.m. the same day, and furnished him a copy of Biraogo’s
undated letter. Attached to the letter was a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. The reporter
informed him that Biraogo distributed to the media during the press conference copies of the
letter and the attachment.110
Sometime in October 2008, months before Biraogo held the press conference, Jarius Bondoc
had published a blind item column on the Limkaichong case. On November 8, 2008, another
column, this time by columnist Fel Maragay, came out in the Manila Standard. The words used
in both columns were the same so he thought that there was really an effort to report the story
in the media. Knowing Jarius Bondoc to be a respectable journalist, he met with him to clarify
matters as many of the statements in the news item were false or inaccurate. He provided
Bondoc with the surrounding circumstances on the matter so that Bondoc would have the proper
context in case he was again requested to publish the story. Bondoc offered to write about what
he had said, but he told Bondoc that there was no need because there was no truth to the story
given to the media anyway. He left it to Bondoc whether he would use the new information if
he was again asked to publish the story.111
The leak could not have come from the PIO as they were never given a copy of the
unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices. He also did not bring drafts from
the OCJ to the PIO. It is only after a case has been promulgated that the Clerk of Court gives
the PIO copies. But in this case, the Clerk of Court did not even have a copy as the decision had
not been signed by the Chief Justice.112
8. RAMON B. GATDULA, Executive Assistant III, Office of the Chief Justice, testified as follows:
On July 15, 2008, at 3:30 p.m., he received from Armando Del Rosario the Gilbert copy of the
ponencia together with the rollos and two diskettes. He kept the Gilbert copy in his locked
cabinet overnight and gave it to the Chief Justice’s secretary the following day. In the afternoon
of July 16, 2008, an employee from the Office of Justice Reyes retrieved the Gilbert copy. He
did not inquire anymore about the reason why they were retrieving it as it was common practice
for the offices of the ponentes to retrieve drafts whenever there were corrections. When asked
whether he photocopied the ponencia, Gatdula said that he does not photocopy the decisions
he receives. Their office also never photocopies decisions. They forward such decisions straight
to the Clerk of Court for promulgation and they receive copies thereof only after the Clerk of
Court has affixed her signature thereon and indicated the date of promulgation.113
9. ATTY. MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA, the En Banc Clerk of Court, testified on the procedure
for promulgation of ponencias.
After the Chief Justice affixes his signature on a decision, the decision is brought together with
the rollo to the En Banc Clerk of Court to be logged, recorded and checked. If the necessary
requirements for promulgation are present, she signs the decision. It is at this time that the
decision is considered as promulgated. The Office of the Clerk of Court distributes copies to the
parties to the case. The date of promulgation is then encoded in the case monitoring system

and a copy of the decision is given to the PIO.114 Decisions reaching their office usually come
with the rollos except where a particular decision is considered rush.115
She denied having seen the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes and stated that the same
never reached their office during the period from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008.116 She
and her staff only learned of the draft decision after it was circulated by the media.117 In her
office, decisions for promulgation are always brought to Verna Albano for recording, then to her
for signature.118 If Verna is absent, it is Atty. Felipa Anama, the assistant clerk of court, who
receives the ponencias and rollos.119 She further stated that in her more than 10 years of work
in the Court, she never heard any incident of a draft ponencia being leaked except this one.120
10. MAJOR EDUARDO V. ESCALA, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Security Division, Office
of Administrative Services, testified as follows:
Security personnel inspect all offices everyday at 5:00 p.m.121 Security personnel used to inspect
even the offices of the Justices, but they stopped doing so since last year.122 As far as
photocopiers are concerned, security personnel only make sure that these are unplugged after
office hours.123 His office has nothing to do with the operation of the machines.124 They always
check if employees bring out papers from the Court. But they encounter problems especially
from the offices of Justices because employees from these offices always claim that they have
been allowed or instructed by their Justice to bring papers home with them, and there is no way
to check the veracity of those claims.125 Since he assumed office on July 14, 2008, he is not
aware of any record of a leak.126 He suggested that the memory cards of the machines be
checked.127
11. ATTY. FELIPA B. ANAMA, Assistant Clerk of Court, testified as follows:
She acts as Clerk of Court in the absence of Atty. Villarama.128 Their office never releases
unpromulgated ponencias129 and they ascertain that every decision or resolution to be
promulgated is complete.130 She remembered that their office released the Show Cause
Resolution dated December 10, 2008 and had it delivered personally to Biraogo as it was an
urgent resolution.131 Willie Desamero was the employee who personally served the resolution
on Biraogo.132
She indicated that it was very difficult to serve something at Biraogo’s residence for by the
account of Desamero, he was stopped at the guard house and was made to wait in the
clubhouse until Biraogo was notified of his presence; and that it took Desamero two hours to
serve the December 10, 2008 resolution on Biraogo.133
She has been with the Supreme Court for 29 years and she never encountered a leak nor did
she ever issue a resolution or decision without the signature of the Chief Justice.134
12. WILLIE DESAMERO, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc, testified as
follows:
He served the December 10, 2008 Resolution on Biraogo on December 12, 2008.135 It was
difficult to serve the Resolution. It took him six rides to get to Biraogo’s subdivision in Laguna
and when he got there, he was stopped by the security guards at the entrance of the subdivision.
They asked him to wait at the clubhouse and it took Biraogo two hours to arrive.136 When
Biraogo saw him, Biraogo commented, "Ang bilis naman"137 and "bakit ka lang naka-tricycle?
Meron naman kayong sasakyan"?138 Birago read the Resolution before he signed to receive the
document.139 Biraogo arrived in a car and had a back-up car.140 Biraogo was in his early 50s,
was wearing short pants, and had a sarcastic smile at that time.141
An officemate of his had also been to Biraogo’s house to serve some Resolutions.142 While it was
not his usual duty to serve court processes, Atty. Anama and Atty. Villarama requested him to
serve the resolution on Biraogo since the regular process servers in their office were not then
107
available and he is the only one in their office who resides in Laguna.143 In his years of service
with the Court, he knew of no case which involved leakage of court documents.144
13. GLORIVY NYSA TOLENTINO, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura, testified as follows:
She is responsible for communications, drafts and door-to-door papers that come in at the Office
of Justice Nachura.145 She presented page 267 of her logbook, to which Justice Reyes had earlier
invited the committee’s attention. According to the logbook entry, the Gilbert copy was brought
to their office on July 15, 2008 and that Justice Nachura signed the copy. However, since it is
not office practice to record the time of receipt or release, she could not remember what time
the Gilbert copy was brought to their office for signature.146 Nonetheless, the Gilbert copy did
not stay long in their office because it was a door-to-door paper and was accordingly given
preferential treatment. Justice Nachura immediately signed the ponencia when she gave it to
him.147 However, she could not recall if Justice Nachura was the last to sign the Gilbert
copy.148 She added that their office did not have a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing
the signatures of 14 Justices. They only had the advance copies circulated for concurrence.149
14. ONOFRE C. CUENTO, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc, testified as
follows:
He personally served two resolutions on Biraogo at his residence last August 6, 2008, together
with driver Mateo Bihag.150 On the day he served the resolutions, they were stopped at the
guardhouse and were escorted by a barong-clad security officer to Biraogo’s house.151 They had
a hard time getting to the residence of Biraogo whom he does not personally know.152 Biraogo
did not mention or send his regards to any member of the Court.153
15. CHESTER GEORGE P. DEL CASTILLO, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice Ruben
T. Reyes, testified as follows:
He joined the staff of Justice Reyes in September 2007 upon the recommendation of Court of
Appeals Justice Mariano Del Castillo and Retired Justice Cancio Garcia.154
He was the most proficient in the use of the photocopiers in the office of Justice Reyes so it was
to him that the task of photocopying documents was usually given by Del Rosario and the
lawyers.155 He, however, never photocopied any paper bearing the signatures of the
Justices.156 He did not handle ponencias in Gilbert paper nor ever photocopy any ponencia in
Gilbert paper.157
He usually left the office at 4:30 p.m. He sometimes saw members of the staff photocopying
papers even beyond 4:30 p.m. It was Del Rosario who often gave orders to photocopy drafts
and who was the most trusted member of the staff as demonstrated by the fact that he could
go in and out of Justice Reyes’s chambers.158 Del Rosario never left the office before Justice
Reyes and he (Del Rosario) often left late.159
He had never been to Barangay Malamig although he had been to Biñan, Laguna.160 He does
not know Biraogo or his wife.161 Neither does he know Paras.162 He did not know where Gilbert
copies were kept.163 When he was asked who would leave the office first, Justice Reyes or Del
Rosario, he said he did not know. Del Rosario was tasked to lock the main door of the office.164
The office staff knew of the leaked decision on the Limkaichong case, but the staff remained
apathetic and did not talk about it.165 The apathy was probably because the staff thought that
the matter had already been settled since Del Rosario and Atty. Evangelista had already been
interviewed.166 He was not sure if anyone from their office was involved in the leakage.167 He
was not part of the meeting called by Justice Reyes before the start of the investigation.168 Only
Atty. Evangelista, Del Rosario, and Manabat were called to the meeting.169 He surmised that the
meeting was about the leakage.170

16. CONRADO B. BAYANIN, JR., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, who
was called by the committee upon Justice Reyes’s suggestion, testified as follows:
Part of his duties in the Office of Justice Reyes was to receive and release papers and rollos as
he was seated near the door.171 It was not his duty to handle or receive ponencias in Gilbert
form.172 He could not remember if he had ever received any paper in connection with the
Limkaichong case.173 While he knew how to operate the xerox machine, just like all the other
utility workers in the office,174 he had never photocopied anything signed by the Justices,
especially those on Gilbert paper.175
When asked who handled photocopies ordered by Justice Reyes, he replied that he did not
know.176 He did not know and had no opinion on how the ponencia was leaked.177 He only knew
that his officemates talked about the leak,178 but he did not know specifically what his
officemates talked about.179 Before Justice Reyes’s retirement ceremony, Justice Reyes called
him to his chambers and very calmly asked him if he knew if anybody had photocopied the
unpromulgated ponencia.180
17. FERMIN L. SEGOTIER, Judicial Staff Assistant II and receptionist at the Office of Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, testified as follows:
His duty is to receive communications, but only Glorivy Nysa Tolentino keeps a logbook for the
door-to-door papers that come to their office.181 He does not remember any details pertaining
to the July 15, 2008 signing of the Limkaichong Ponencia, aside from the fact that it was to
Justice Reyes’s staff to whom he gave it back.182 He assumed that it was to Del Rosario to whom
he returned the Gilbert copy because in the Office of Justice Reyes, Del Rosario was the one in
charge of circulating ponencias in Gilbert form for signature.183 He could not recall handing a
Gilbert paper to Manabat.184 The ponencia stayed only for a short time (about 5 minutes) in
their office because it was a door-to-door paper. After it was signed by Justice Nachura, it was
handed back to the staff of Justice Reyes, so there was no chance for them to photocopy the
ponencia.185 It was not their standard operating procedure to leave any Gilbert paper in their
office if it could not be signed right away.186
18. RETIRED JUSTICE RUBEN T. REYES, for his part, submitted during the hearing on
January 22, 2009, a written statement entitled "Notes/Observations" (Notes) consisting of 12
paragraphs. In his Notes, Justice Reyes stressed the following:
Biraogo did not point to him as the source of the leak of the unpromulgated ponencia; 187 in
Biraogo’s December 22, 2008 Compliance with the Court’s Show Cause Order, Biraogo stated
that his informant was allegedly a "SC concerned employee" who left a brown envelope with a
letter and some documents in his Biñan, Laguna home; it could be seen from the attachments
to Biraogo’s Compliance that it was not only the unpromulgated ponencia or Gilbert copy that
was leaked but also two other confidential documents: his Revised Draft ponencia for the June
17, 2008 agenda (attached as Annex "B" to the Compliance) and Justice
Carpio’s Reflections (attached as Annex "D"); and since these other documents were circulated
to all Justices, the investigation should not only focus on the leak of the unpromulgated ponencia
but also on the leak of the two other confidential and internal documents of the Court.188
Justice Reyes also pointed out in his Notes as follows: the committee should not only look into
his office but also the offices of Justice Carpio and the other Justices. He, however, reiterated
that he had said in his media interviews that he believed that none of the Justices themselves,
much less the Chief Justice, leaked the ponencia or authorized its leakage.
Justice Reyes pointed out that Biraogo’s informant mentioned a certain Atty. Rosel, who was
allegedly a close friend and former partner of Justice Carpio. Justice Reyes said that Atty. Rosel
allegedly asked a favor from Justice Carpio before the latter wrote his Reflections.189 Thus, he
said, the committee should also question Atty. Rosel and even Justice Carpio himself.
108
On why he did not lift a finger when Biraogo got hold of the decision, despite reports regarding
the leak, Justice Reyes stated that he was on a sabbatical leave with the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education research in four States in the United States from October 10, 2008 to November
1, 2008.
He had nothing to do with the leak and he even prepared a second draft decision (deviating
from his prior disposition) after oral arguments were held on the case.
Thus, in his Notes, he posed: "If he leaked it, why would he prepare a second different
decision?" He willingly obliged to the holding of oral arguments. He had no commitment to
anybody and had no reason to leak the unpromulgated ponencia.190 He added, "[I]f he had a
hand in the leak, why would it include Justice Carpio’s Reflections which was contrary to the
unpromulgated decision?"
Justice Reyes, still in his Notes, stated that no Justice in his right mind would leak the
unpromulgated ponencia or other confidential documents, such as the Revised Draft and Justice
Carpio’s Reflections.
He went on to refer to Biraogo’s Compliance that the informant was purportedly "an old hand
in the Supreme Court who was accustomed to the practices of the Justices" and had a "circle"
or group in the Supreme Court. Since all his office staff, except two stenographers, one utility
worker and one messenger, were all new in the Court, then the "old hand" referred to could not
have come from his office. But if it could be proven by evidence that one of his staff was the
source of the leak, Justice Reyes argued that only that staff should be made liable, for he had
publicly declared that he did not and would never allow nor tolerate such leakage.191
More on Justice Reyes’s Notes: He suggested that Newsbreak writers Marites Vitug and Aries
Rufo be cited for contempt of court, for obtaining, without lawful authority, confidential
information and documents from the Court, officials or employees, and for writing false,
malicious articles which tended to influence the investigation of the committee and to degrade,
impede and obstruct the administration of justice. 192
Aside from submitting his Notes, Justice Reyes also testified as follows:
While he was first heard on January 16, 2009, after he presented a 9-paragraph written
statement, he noticed that it needed refinement and revision so he requested for time to edit
it. Hence, he submitted his above-mentioned Notes on January 22, 2009.
Justice Reyes identified the Gilbert copy, which he submitted earlier to the committee for
safekeeping, and his Notes."193 He clarified that the Compliance he was referring to in his Notes
was Biraogo’s December 22, 2008 Compliance with the Court’s Show Cause Order.194
His desire to include Justice Carpio in the investigation, per number 4 of his Notes, came about
because it appeared from Biraogo’s Compliance and from the alleged informant’s letter that it
was not only the unpromulgated ponencia signed by 14 Justices that was leaked but also the
Revised Draft ponencia and Justice Carpio’s Reflections.195 He suggested that what should be
investigated was the source of the three documents.196 Justice Quisumbing replied that the
matter seemed settled because Justice Reyes also mentioned in Paragraph No. 6 of his Notes
that he believed that none of the Justices, much less the Chief Justice, caused or authorized the
leak.197 Justice Reyes stressed that he thought it was only fair that the Committee also call
Justice Carpio to shed light on the matter in the same way that he was asked to shed light
thereon.198
Justice Carpio Morales pointed out that Justice Reyes’s ponencia as signed by 14 Justices did
not come into the possession of the other Justices but only of Justice Reyes.199 She added that
if logic were followed, then all of the Justices should be investigated because copies of Justice
Carpio’s Reflections were circulated to all. She declared that she was willing to be investigated
and that she was volunteering to be investigated.200 However, she pointed out that the logic of

Justice Reyes was misplaced, considering that the documents attached to Biraogo’s Compliance
were allegedly received at the same time. If Biraogo received the documents at the same time
and one Justice never took hold of the ponencia as signed, said Justice could not have made
the leak to Biraogo.201
Justice Reyes went on to testify as follows: The Gilbert copy which he submitted to the
committee was given to him by Del Rosario.202 He did not photocopy the Gilbert copy nor provide
Biraogo a copy thereof or instruct any of his staff to photocopy the same.203
The xerox copy of the Gilbert copy attached to the Compliance of Biraogo appeared to be the
same as the committee’s copy because he (Justice Reyes) looked at the initials on each page
and found them to be similar.204Justice Quisumbing thereupon invited Justice Reyes’s attention
to the cover page of the Gilbert copy which had been submitted to and in custody of the
committee (committee’s copy).205 Upon perusal thereof, Justice Reyes stated that the cover
page of the committee’s copy did not appear to be the same as the cover page of Biraogo’s
copy. He observed that the cover page of the committee’s copy showed the agenda date "July
29, 2008," and that the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 66, whereas the cover page
of Biraogo’s copy showed the agenda date "July 15, 2008," and that the same case was listed
as Item No. 52.206 Justice Reyes then qualified his earlier statement and said that he was only
referring to those pages of the decision itself which bore his initials, when he spoke of similarity,
and said that the cover page did not bear his initials.207
Justice Corona pointed out, and Justice Reyes confirmed, that page 1 of the committee’s copy
also differed from page 1 of Biraogo’s copy. Justice Corona pointed that in the committee’s copy,
there were asterisks after the names of Justice Azcuna and Justice Tinga and footnotes that the
two were on official leave, whereas no such asterisks and footnotes appeared on page 1 of
Biraogo’s copy.208 Justice Corona also pointed out and Justice Reyes once again confirmed that
there was a slight variance between the initials on page 34 of the committee’s copy and the
initials on page 34 of Biraogo’s copy.209
Justice Quisumbing then posed the question whether Justice Reyes would admit that there were
at least two sources.210 At this juncture, Justice Reyes brought out another photocopy (new
copy or Justice Reyes’s new copy) of the Gilbert copy to which new copy the left top corner of
the top cover was stapled a 1"x1" piece of thick paper bearing the initials "RTR" and on the
right top corner of the same cover appeared a handwritten notation reading "Gilbert
copy." Justice Reyes repeatedly stated that his new copy was a facsimile of the committee’s
copy. He pointed out that the initials on page 34 of the new copy and that of the committee’s
copy matched. He concluded, however, that page 34 of Biraogo’s copy was not a faithful
reproduction of the committee’s copy.211 Justice Reyes avoided the question of whether he or
his staff kept more than one xerox copy of the Gilbert copy that had been signed by majority or
14 members of the Court, saying that he could not say so because he did not personally attend
to photocopying of decisions.212 He stressed that his initials on page 34 of the new copy differed
from the initials appearing on page 34 of Biraogo’s copy.213 He also pointed out that in Biraogo’s
copy, particularly on page 3, there was a handwritten correction superimposed over the
misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such handwritten correction appeared on page 3 of
both the committee’s copy and the new copy.214 He added that he did not know who made the
handwritten correction in Biraogo’s copy and that the new copy he was presenting to the
committee was furnished to him by the committee. Said copy was allegedly the xerox copy of
the Gilbert copy.215
Justice Reyes professed that he had nothing to do with the leak as he would not leak, authorize,
allow, or tolerate any leak of his decision or revised draft. He dispelled any pecuniary profit from
such leakage, especially since he was about to retire when the leak happened. He could not,
however, say the same of his office staff since he did not want to speculate, so he was giving
the committee the broadest latitude in calling any of his staff.216
109
Upon Justice Carpio Morales’s interrogation, Justice Reyes stated that he found the new copy in
his files just the week before the January 22, 2009 hearing.217 Justice Carpio Morales then invited
his attention to the fact that page 1 of the new copy, like page 1 of Biraogo’s copy, did not
contain the footnotes and asterisks appearing in the committee’s copy. She also noted that the
copy of Biraogo and the new copy presented by Justice Reyes matched to a T.218 Justice Reyes
only replied that he did not pay particular attention nor personally attend to the photocopying.219
Justice Reyes stated that there should only be one copy of the Gilbert copy,220 but it appeared
that he supplied the committee with two apparently different copies (the Gilbert copy and the
new copy).221 Justice Reyes noted that the new copy and Biraogo’s copy did not match exactly
as regards pages 3 and 34. He stressed that there appeared on page 3 of Biraogo’s copy a
handwritten correction over the misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such correction was
made on the new copy. Additionally, on page 34 of Biraogo’s copy, his initial appeared to have
a smudge while on page 34 of the new copy, there was no smudge.222
When asked to explain why the new copy, which he claimed to have been photocopied from
the committee’s copy, did not match the committee’s copy on page 1 but matched page 1 of
Biraogo’s copy, Justice Reyes offered no explanation.223 Justice Reyes also refused to submit
the new copy to the committee ("Why should I?") and questioned the committee’s request that
he initial the controversial pages of the new copy.224 Thus, the committee members decided to
affix their signatures on the first five pages of the new copy and then drew a rectangle around
their signatures and the date—January 22, 2009. 225 The committee then had the new copy
photocopied. 226Justice Corona soon noticed that Justice Reyes was trying to hide the new copy
between his files. At that point, Justice Corona pulled out the new copy from Justice Reyes’s
files. Justice Reyes then repeatedly said that he was not submitting it to the committee.227 The
committee proceeded to discuss the other matters contained in Justice Reyes’s Notes.
Justice Reyes at that point then stated that he had not withdrawn his standing motion for
inhibition against Justice Carpio Morales, to which Justice Carpio Morales replied that she would
remain impartial. Justice Carpio Morales likewise stressed that the committee would decide
according to the evidence.228
Upon being asked by the committee, Justice Reyes said that he could not recall if he was holding
the Gilbert copy after the En Banc session and while having lunch.229 He stated that per standard
arrangement, his staff would usually get his folders and bring them to his office.230 As far as he
could recall, before the Court adjourned, the members already knew that many concurred only
in the result.231 He could not recall, however, if the Chief Justice learned about it only at the
dining room.232
Justice Reyes denied having given Atty. Evangelista the instruction to reprint signature page 36
of the Gilbert copyand stated that it must have been Atty. Evangelista’s sole decision.
What Justice Reyes remembered telling Atty. Evangelista after the En Banc session was that
many concurred only "in the result" and that Justice Chico-Nazario wanted to change her
concurrence.233 Justice Carpio Morales confronted him with certain portions of the December
15, 2008 TSN where he clearly volunteered the information that he was the one who instructed
Atty. Evangelista to reprint page 36 which is the second signature page.234 Justice Reyes replied
that maybe Atty. Evangelista was under the mistaken impression that the change of the said
page pushed through because, as it turned out, there was no qualification in the concurrence
of Justice Chico-Nazario. He also insisted that he did not volunteer the information that he was
the one who ordered the reprinting of page 36. He contended that he was in fact questioning
Atty. Evangelista when the latter said that the instruction came from him.235
With regard to the "re-signing" by Justice Nachura,236 Justice Reyes declared that it was difficult
to speculate and rely on inaccurate recollection, especially since several months had passed.
Justice Corona replied that the testimonies could not be inaccurate since there were entries in
the logbook, showing that Justice Nachura indeed signed in his chambers.237 Justice Reyes

stated that the changing of the original signature page 36 was not carried out238 and that Atty.
Evangelista’s recollection of the event was inaccurate. Justice Reyes also stated he could not
recall calling Justice Chico-Nazario on the phone after the En Banc session on July 15, 2008.239
Justice Reyes stated that Del Rosario was assigned to keep and take care of the circulated drafts
and ponencias printed on Gilbert paper, and from time to time Atty. Evangelista would have
access to them since the latter was the judicial staff head.240 Justice Reyes’s staff members in
October were the same until he retired on December 18, 2008.241 Justice Reyes’s impression of
Biraogo’s letter was that somebody who had an axe to grind against the Chief Justice or who
wanted to discredit him could have done it.242
Justice Reyes said that he never had any personal interest in the case and argued that the best
proof of this was that he did not stick to his original decision after the case was heard on oral
arguments on August 26, 2008, just to prove that he was not beholden to any party.243
Justice Reyes could not offer a straight answer to the question of what his undue interest was
in still trying to have the signature of all the Justices after he had taken his lunch and to forward
the Gilbert copy and the rollo etc. to the OCJ even after the decision to put the promulgation of
the ponencia on hold was arrived at, at lunchtime of July 15, 2008. He simply dismissed the
recollections of his staff and preferred to believe Del Rosario’s over those of Evangelista’s or
Manabat’s. He insisted that he never had the chance to talk to Del Rosario or to Atty. Evangelista
right after the En Banc session, and claimed that he never gave the instruction to bring the
Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura. He likewise insisted that the testimony of Atty.
Evangelista was incorrect and that he would rather believe Del Rosario’s testimony.244
THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE’S FINDINGS OF FACT
From the testimonies of the witnesses, the committee finds the following facts established.
On July 15, 2008, even after the Justices had agreed at lunchtime to withhold the promulgation
of the Gilbert copy in the Limkaichong case, Justice Reyes, under his misimpression that
Justice Nazario had "concurred in the result" and that she would finally remove such
qualification, instructed his Judicial Staff Head, Atty. Evangelista, and Del Rosario to have the
signature page 36 (where the names of Justices Nazario, Nachura and three others appeared)
reprinted and to bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature as Justice
Nachura, who was not participating in the oral arguments on the case scheduled at 1:30 that
afternoon, might be going out. Jean Yabut was tasked by Atty. Evangelista to reprint the second
signature page (page 36) on Gilbert paper.
The reprinted signature page 36, together with the rest of the pages of the Gilbert copy, was
then given by Atty. Evangelista to Del Rosario. Del Rosario, in turn, gave the Gilbert copy,
together with the reprinted signature page 36, to Manabat whom he instructed to go to the
Office of Justice Nachura for him to affix his signature thereon.
Manabat immediately went to the Office of Justice Nachura and handed the Gilbert copy to
Fermin Segotier, the receptionist at Justice Nachura’s office. As the Gilbert copy was a door-to-
door document, Segotier immediately gave it to Glorivy Nysa Tolentino who recorded it in her
logbook. She then brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Nachura. When the reprinted page 36 of
the Gilbert copy was brought out from Justice Nachura’s chambers and returned to Tolentino,
she recorded it in her logbook that it was already signed. The whole process took not more than
five minutes. The Gilbert copy was returned to Manabat, who had waited outside the office of
Justice Nachura.
Manabat then repaired to the chambers of Justice Reyes who inquired from him if Justice
Nachura had signed the reprinted page 36 to which he answered in the affirmative. Manabat
thereafter handed the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario.
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When Atty. Evangelista, who was attending the oral arguments on a case scheduled that
afternoon, went down the Office of Justice Reyes at about 3:30 p.m., he and/or Del Rosario
must have eventually noticed that Justice Nazario did not, after all, qualify her concurrence on
the original signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy with the words "in the result."
Since neither Atty. Evangelista nor Del Rosario was advised by Justice Reyes that the
promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold, Del Rosario brought the Gilbert copy, together
with the rollo, records and diskettes to the OCJ to be promulgated and gave it at 3:30 p.m. to
Ramon Gatdula of the OCJ. Gatdula later transmitted the Gilbert copy to the secretary of the
Chief Justice.
The following day, July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes called Del Rosario to his
chambers and instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert copy, etc. from the OCJ, informing him for
the first time that the promulgation of the ponencia had been put on hold. Around that same
time, the OCJ phoned the Office of Justice Reyes and told them to retrieve the ponencia for the
same reason.
Thus, Del Rosario went to the OCJ and asked for the return of the Gilbert copy. As Gatdula had
already forwarded the same to the Chief Justice’s secretary for the Chief Justice’s signature,
Gatdula retrieved it from the secretary. Del Rosario retrieved all that he submitted the previous
day, except the rollo which had, in the meantime, been borrowed by Justice Carpio.
Del Rosario then brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who told him to keep it. Del Rosario
informed Atty. Evangelista the following day, July 17, 2008, that the promulgation of the Gilbert
copy was on hold. After Atty. Evangelista verified the matter from Justice Reyes, he (Atty.
Evangelista) told Del Rosario that the case would be called again on July 29, 2008. Del Rosario
made a note in his logbook to that effect.
On July 25, 2008, the Office of Justice Reyes received the En Banc agenda for July 29, 2008
where the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 66. A new cover page reflecting the case as
Item No. 66 was thus prepared and attached to the Gilbert copy bearing only 14 signatures.
After the Gilbert copy was retrieved from the OCJ on July 16, 2008, it remained in the sole
custody of Del Rosario until December 15, 2008, the initial hearing conducted by the
investigating committee. The Gilbert copy remained inside his unlocked drawer, in a brown
envelope, which he had sealed with the blue and white seal used by all Justices. He opened it
only on December 10, 2008, after Justice Reyes informed his staff that there was a leak of the
ponencia.
When news of Biraogo’s conduct of a press conference on December 9, 2008 bearing on the
leakage came out, Justice Reyes immediately called his legal staff and Del Rosario to a meeting
and asked them if they knew anything about the leakage. He called for a second meeting among
Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and Del Rosario on December 15, 2008, before the hearing by the
investigating committee took place in the afternoon of that day. Justice Reyes likewise had a
one-on-one talk with Del Rosario and asked him if a copy of Justice Carpio’s Reflections was
attached to the Gilbert copy and related documents when they were sent to the OCJ, to which
he (Del Rosario) answered in the negative.
EVALUATION
The committee finds that the photocopying of the Gilbert copy occurred between July 15,
2008, before it was brought to the OCJ or after it was retrieved on July 16, 2008 from the OCJ,
and July 25, 2008, when the Office of Justice Reyes caused the preparation of the new cover
page of the Gilbert copy to reflect that it was agendaed as Item No. 66 in the July 29, 2008 En
Banc session, because the cover page of the photocopy in the possession of Biraogo, as well as
the cover page of Justice Reyes’s new copy, still bore the agenda date "July 15, 2008" and Item
No. 52.

The committee likewise finds that the leakage was intentionally done. It was not the result of a
copy being misplaced and inadvertently picked up by Biraogo or someone in his behalf. The
committee notes that none of the offices to which the Gilbert copy was brought (OCJ and the
Office of Justice Nachura) and which acquired control over it photocopied ponencias in Gilbert
form and released photocopies thereof to party litigants. In any event, as earlier reflected, page
1 of the Gilbert copy that was sent to the OCJ and Justice Nachura’s Office and page 1 of
Biraogo’s photocopy differ.
To reiterate, the Gilbert copy bearing the signatures of 14 Justices was photocopied and that a
copy thereof was intentionally leaked directly or indirectly to Biraogo. As will be discussed
below, the committee FINDS that the leak came from the Office of Justice Reyes.
It bears reiterating that the leak did not come from the OCJ even if the Gilbert copy stayed
therein from 3:30 p.m. on July 15, 2008 up to 4:00 p.m. on July 16, 2008. This is clear from
the fact that page 1 of the copy in Biraogo’s possession differs from page 1 of the Gilbert copy
which was forwarded to the OCJ. Thus, on page 1 of the Gilbert copy which contains the names
of the Justices of the Court, there appear asterisks after the names of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna
and Justice Dante O. Tinga. These asterisks have corresponding footnotes stating that Justice
Azcuna was on official leave per Special Order No. 510 dated July 15, 2008 and Justice Tinga
was likewise on official leave per Special Order No. 512 dated July 16, 2008. In contrast, page
1 of Biraogo’s copy and Justice Reyes’s new copy, glaringly contain no such asterisks and
footnotes, which indicates that page 1 of Biraogo’s copy was photocopied from page 1 of the
draft prepared by Justice Reyes before it was finalized on Gilbert paper.
The leak also could not have come from the offices of the other associate justices, contrary to
Justice Reyes’s insinuation. Justice Reyes insinuated that because all the Justices were furnished
with advance copies of the draftponencia before the session of July 15, 2008, anyone from those
offices could have leaked the decision. An examination of the copy in Biraogo’s possession
readily shows that every page thereof – pages 1 to 36 – contained Justice Reyes’s authenticating
initials while none of the advance copies furnished to the Justices was similarly authenticated.
Advance copies of a draft given to the justices as a working basis for deliberations are not
initialed by the justice who prepares it. And they do not contain the signature of any of the
Justices, except the one who prepared the draft, precisely because the Justices have yet to go
over it and deliberate on it. As standard procedure, it is only after a draft decision has been
adopted by the Court that it is finalized-printed on Gilbert paper and every page thereof is
authenticated by the ponente, and circulated for signature by the other Justices.
It need not be underlined that there was no opportunity for anyone from the offices of the
Associate Justices to photocopy the ponencia as none of said offices acquired possession of the
document, except the Office of Justice Reyes and the Office of Justice Nachura. But based on
testimony, the unpromulgated ponencia stayed in the Office of Justice Nachura only for less
than five minutes, which did not suffice for it to be signed by Justice Nachura and to be
photocopied. Again, and in any event, page 1 of the photocopy in Biraogo’s possession does not
match the same page of the Gilbert copy.
Furthermore, except for Justice Reyes, the Associate Justices took hold of the Gilbert copy only
briefly when they signed it at the En Banc conference room. At no other time did any of them
hold the document long enough to photocopy it. Pursuant to standard procedure, only
the ponente, Justice Reyes in this case, and his staff, took custody of the ponencia bearing the
signatures of 14 Justices before it was sent to the OCJ.
But who from the Office of Justice Reyes leaked the unpromulgated ponencia? While the
evidence shows that the chain of custody could not rule out the possibility that the Gilbert copy
was photocopied by Del Rosario who had control and possession of it, and while there is no
direct evidence as to the identity of the perpetrator of the leakage, the committee FINDS that
based on the circumstantial evidence reflected above, particularly the evident undue interest of
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Justice Reyes to circulate a draft ponencia of the case soonest even before the memoranda of
all the parties fell due, and to withhold the information to Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that
the promulgation of the ponencia was put on hold and, instead, allow the immediate
promulgation after lunch despite his admission that the decision to hold the promulgation was
arrived at at lunchtime, it was Justice Reyes himself who leaked a photocopy thereof.
Recall that the Court gave due course to the petition on April 8, 2008 and the first memorandum
was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General only on June 16, 2008. The other parties, namely,
Olivia Paras, Speaker Nograles, et al., and Biraogo subsequently filed their respective
memoranda only on July 1, 2, and 24, 2008. Even before the En Banc session of June 10,
2008, however, Justice Reyes had already circulated a draft decision.
Further, still later or on June 12, 2008, Justice Reyes circulated, via transmittal letter of even
date printed on his memo pad and signed by him, a Revised Draft, copy of which transmittal
letter, as well as the Revised Draft, also came into the possession of Biraogo (Annex "B" to
Biraogo’s Compliance).
Furthermore, even after the Justices had, at lunchtime of July 15, 2008, unanimously decided
that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy would be put on hold--and this was, it bears repeating,
admitted by Justice Reyes--, Justice Reyes, after partaking lunch at the dining room and before
1:00 p.m., instead of advising his Chief of Staff Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that the
promulgation was put on hold, still instructed them to reprint the second signature page (page
36) and to have the reprinted page immediately brought to the Office of Justice Nachura for
signature; and before Justice Reyes left for the session hall for the oral arguments of that case
scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day, Justice Reyes still followed up the case by asking Manabat if
Justice Nachura had already signed the Gilbert copy.245
When confronted with the incontrovertible evidence of his undue interest in the case and haste
in having the Gilbert copy promulgated, Justice Reyes was notably evasive. On January 16,
2009, Justice Carpio Morales asked Justice Reyes if he would admit that he prepared a draft of
the decision even before the first memorandum was submitted on June 16, 2008. Justice Reyes
stated that he could not admit that fact.246 Such fact is documented, however, and it would not
have escaped him as the records of the Limkaichong case were with him and yet he already
prepared and caused the circulation of a draft of the decision on June 12, 2008.
Justice Reyes also gave conflicting accounts on when he gave the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario
after the En Banc session of July 15, 2008 was adjourned. During the proceedings of the
committee on December 15, 2008, Justice Reyes categorically stated that pursuant to standard
operating procedures, he gave the signed Gilbert copy to Del Rosario after the Chief Justice
noted that seven Justices had concurred "in the result."247 It bears recalling that the Chief Justice
confirmed noting such fact during lunchtime. However, the following day, during the December
16, 2008 proceedings, Justice Reyes implied that pursuant to standard operating procedures,
his staff got his folders including the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session. Hence, so he
reasoned, as the agreement to put on hold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy and to hold
oral arguments on the case was arrived at only after lunch which followed the adjournment of
the En Banc session, his staff did not know about such agreement.248 But even Del Rosario,
whose testimony he credits more than any of the other members of his staff, categorically stated
that Justice Reyes gave him the Gilbert copy after he (Justice Reyes) had taken his lunch and
while he (Del Rosario), Justice Reyes and Atty. Evangelista were, before 1:00 p.m., on their way
to Justice Reyes’s office, and that, at that instant, Justice Reyes instructed Atty. Evangelista to
have the signature page 36 reprinted and have Justice Nachura (who was not participating in
the oral arguments scheduled that afternoon) sign.
During the January 22, 2009 hearing, when asked to explain why the top cover of the new copy
which he brought with him and which he claimed to have been photocopied from the
committee’s copy, did not match the top cover of the committee’s copy (or the original Gilbert

copy) but matched the top cover of Biraogo’s copy, Justice Reyes offered no
explanation. Neither did he account for the other dissimilarities between page 1 of his new copy
and the same page 1 of Biraogo on one hand, and page 1 of the Gilbert copy , viz: page 1 of
the new copy, like page 1 of Biraogo’s copy, does not have asterisks after the names of
Justices Tinga and Azcuna and the corresponding footnotes, which the Gilbert copy
has.
Justice Reyes, despite his professed desire to bring out the truth, refused to submit his new
copy to the committeeand questioned the committee’s request that he place his initials on the
questioned pages of his new copy. Later, while the committee was discussing other points in
his Notes, Justice Reyes tried to hide his new copy. Justice Corona had to pry it out of Justice
Reyes’s files.1avvphi1 As Justice Reyes repeatedly said that he was not submitting his new copy
to the committee ("Why should I"), the committee members were prompted to photocopy his
new copy, but only after they affixed their signatures and date (January 22, 2009) on the first
5 pages thereof.
To the members of the committee, the foregoing proven facts and circumstances constitute
more than substantial evidence which reasonably points to Justice Reyes, despite his
protestations of innocence,249 as THE source of the leak. He must, therefore, be held liable for
GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
Effect of Justice Reyes’s Retirement
The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude
the finding of any administrative liability to which he is answerable.250
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between
the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The
instant case is not moot and academic, despite Justice Reyes’s retirement.
Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions may no longer be imposed, there are other
penalties which may be imposed if one is later found guilty of the administrative offenses
charged, including the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture
of benefits.251
The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce a respondent official innocent of the charges
or declare him/her guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant
with dreadful and dangerous implications. For, what remedy would the people have against a
civil servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his/her last days in office? What
would prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and
other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he/she would soon be beyond the pale of the
law and immune from all administrative penalties?
If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over
members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for
acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of
litigants and the general public. If innocent, a respondent official merits vindication of his/her
name and integrity as he leaves the government which he/she served well and faithfully; if
guilty, he/she deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and
imposable under the situation.252
The Court cannot over-emphasize the importance of the task of preserving the confidentiality
and integrity of court records. A number of rules and internal procedures are in place to ensure
the observance of this task by court personnel.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct253 provides that confidential information acquired by justices
and judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose not
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related to their judicial duties.254 The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel likewise devotes one
whole canon on confidentiality, to wit:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential
information acquired by them while employed in the judiciary, whether such information came
from authorized or unauthorized sources.
Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record
relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the
work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases, including notes, drafts,
research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations and similar papers.
The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,
records of internal deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in
preparing a decision, resolution or order shall remain confidential even after the
decision, resolution or order is made public.
SEC. 2. Confidential information available to specific individuals by reason of statute, court rule
or administrative policy shall be disclosed only by persons authorized to do so.
SEC. 3. Unless expressly authorized by the designated authority, court personnel shall not
disclose confidential information given by litigants, witnesses or attorneys to justices, judges or
any other person.
SEC. 4. Former court personnel shall not disclose confidential information acquired by them
during their employment in the Judiciary when disclosed by current court personnel of the same
information would constitute a breach of confidentiality. Any disclosure in violation of this
provisions shall constitute indirect contempt of court.255(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Ineluctably, any release of a copy to the public, or to the parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia
infringes on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court. It is settled that the internal
deliberations of the Court are confidential.256 A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise judicial power.257
In Mirasol v. De La Torre, Jr.,258 the Court stated that "[c]ourt documents are confidential
documents. They must not be taken out of the court without proper authority and without the
necessary safeguards to ensure their confidentiality and integrity." Thus, the Court found the
clerk of court guilty of gross misconduct. Moreover, the case enunciates that acts of gross
misconduct destroy the good image of the judiciary so the Court cannot countenance them nor
allow the perpetrators to remain in office. This same pronouncement was reiterated in Betguen
v. Masangcay.259 Though both cases involve indiscretions of clerks of court, it is but logical that
a higher standard of care be imposed upon magistrates of the Court.
PAGCOR v. Rilloza,260 in fact, commands persons who routinely handle confidential matters to
be confidential employees. They are thus expected to be more careful than an ordinary
employee in their day to day business. They are reposed such trust and confidence that a breach
of their duty would mean breach of trust. As applied to the case of Justice Reyes, the
breach of duty amounts to breach of public trust as the committee believes that the
leak was motivated by self-interest.
The fact that Justice Reyes was not formally charged is of no moment. It is settled that under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring
judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance
of the law or misconduct.261

In People v. Valenzuela,262 which deals with the administrative aspect of a case brought on
certiorari, the Court dispensed with the conduct of further hearings under the principle of res
ipsa loquitur and proceeded to consider critical factors in deducing malice and bad faith on the
part of the judge, after it did not accept at face value the judge’s mere denial. In that case, the
judge ordered the return of the peso equivalent of the foreign currency to the accused despite
its forfeiture as dutiable goods and even after the finding that the accused had nothing to do
with the mailing thereof.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr.,263 where the Court took into account glaring
circumstances in the proceedings of the case in concluding that the judge acted with bad faith,
the judge was similarly found guilty of grave and serious misconduct when he unjustly declared
the defendant in default and awarded outrageously exorbitant damages. l
Prudential Bank v. Castro264 was an administrative case spawned by a party’s complaint, wherein
the Court, in light of the surrounding circumstances, found that the judge committed serious
and grave misfeasance because the issuance of the orders and ill-conceived summary judgment
showed the judge’s partiality to, or confabulation with the plaintiff and its lawyers.
In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano,265 the Court proceeded in adjudging
the attendant circumstances as tainted with bad faith and questionable integrity to call for the
exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers over members of the judiciary. In that case, the Court
found the submissions of the judge unacceptable and clearly inadequate to overcome the
cumulative effect of the highly questionable actuations– taking cognizance of a claim for
damages arising from an attachment, instead of having it litigated in the same action where the
writ was issued – as evincing gross ignorance of the law and active bias or partiality.
The Court, in Cruz v. Yaneza,266 perceived the judge’s persistent pattern of approving bail bonds
and issuing release orders beyond its territorial jurisdiction as evincing a modus operandi that
flagrantly flaunts fundamental rules.
In De Los Santos v. Magsino,267 the Court again applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when
a judge irregularly approved a bail bond and issued a release order of an accused whose case
was pending in another province, in palpable disregard and gross ignorance of the procedural
law on bail.
The principle was also applied to discipline court personnel and suspend members of the Bar
from the practice of law.
The Court, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Pardo,268 found the clerk of court guilty of
gross discourtesy in the course of official duties when he failed to accord respect for the person
and rights of a judge as can be gleaned from a mere reading of his letter to the Executive Judge.
In Sy v. Moncupa,269 the Court found the evidence against the clerk for malversation of public
funds eloquently speaks of her criminal misdeed to justify the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. The clerk admitted the shortage in the court funds in her custody and pleaded for
time to pay the amount she had failed to account for.
In maintaining an earlier Resolution,270 the Court, in In re Wenceslao Laureta,271 also declared
that nothing more was needed to be said or proven and the necessity to conduct any further
evidentiary hearing was obviated. In that case, the Court found that the letters and charges
leveled against the Justices were, of themselves and by themselves, malicious and
contemptuous, and undermined the independence of the judiciary.
Meanwhile, in Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda, it was held
272
that it was reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the respondent
committed an infringement of ethical standards by his act of receiving money as acceptance fee
for legal services in a case and subsequently failing to render such service. The Court found the
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respondent liable for disloyalty to his client and inexcusable negligence in legal matters
entrusted to him.
The Court, in Dizon, clarified the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, viz:
In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of the assailed decisions, an
inexplicable grave error bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring
about an unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak an injustice against a hapless
party. The facts themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of such a character as to give
rise to a strong inference that evil intent was present. Such intent, in short, was clearly
deducible from what was already of record. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not except or
dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of evil intent is based.
It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are
admitted or are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative
the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support
a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary.273 (Underscoring and emphasis
supplied.)
The apparent toning down of the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule was further amplified
in at least two cases. In Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Villanueva,274 the Court ruled that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to cases of knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment,
and even if the doctrine is appreciable, complainant still has to present proof of malice or bad
faith.
Then came Fernandez v. Verzola,275 where it was held that failure to substantiate a claim of
corruption and bribery and mere reliance on conjectures and suppositions cannot sustain an
administrative complaint. In dismissing the complaint, the Court rejected as untenable the
reasoning that the decision itself is evidence of corruption per doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It
upheld the rule that rendering an erroneous or baseless judgment, in itself, is not sufficient to
justify the judge’s dismissal from the service.
The supposed tempering of the principle of res ipsa loquitur in Dizon only bolstered and
solidified the application of the doctrine in cases not only of gross negligence but of serious
misconduct as well, since it speaks of "inference of evil intent."
As explained in Louis Vuitton, the familiar rule in administrative cases is that the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, and that he
cannot be subjected to civil, criminal or administrative liability for any of his official
acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.The rule adds that the
proper remedy is via judicial recourse and not through an administrative action.1avvphi1
It must be pointed out that Louis Vuitton involves gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment. In cases of leakage or breach of confidentiality, however, the
familiar rule obviously does not apply. While the injured party is the Court itself, there is no
judicial remedy available to undo the disclosure. Moreover, the premature disclosure does not
spring from the four corners of the assailed decision or resolution nor can it gleaned on the face
of the issuance itself. Indeed, one need not dwell on the substance of the decision since that in
itself is inherently insufficient. In unearthing the misdeed, it becomes not only desirable but also
necessary to trace the attendant circumstances, apparent pattern and critical factors
surrounding the entire scenario.
In Macalintal v. Teh,276 the Court pronounced:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or
a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of
the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal

is in order.1avvphi1 After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-
litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their
grasp of legal principles.277 (Underscoring supplied.)
The same norm equally applies in the breach of the basic and essential rule of confidentiality
that, as described in one case, "[a]ll conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or
by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation [and c]ourt personnel are not in a position to
know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any
one of them being present.278
As Dizon declared, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not dispense with the necessity of
proving the facts on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses that absent
a credible explanation, it is clearly sound and reasonable to conclude a strong inference of evil
intent on the basis of facts duly admitted or shown by the record. In fine, jurisprudence allows
the reception of circumstantial evidence to prove not only gross negligence but also serious
misconduct.
Justice Reyes is Likewise Liable for Violating his Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility
For leaking a confidential internal document of the En Banc, the committee likewise finds Justice
Reyes administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his lawyer’s oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he may be disbarred or suspended per Section
27,279 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes. It is likewise provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and that a lawyer shall
not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system. Here, the act of Justice Reyes not only violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, it also
infringed on the internal deliberations of the Court and impeded and degraded the
administration of justice. The act is rendered all the more pernicious considering that it was
committed by no less than a justice of the Supreme Court who was supposed to serve as
example to the bench and bar.
That Justice Reyes was an impeachable officer when the investigation started is of no moment.
The rule prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings against an impeachable officer
who is required by the Constitution to be a member of the bar as a qualification in office applies
only during his or her tenure and does not create immunity from liability for possibly criminal
acts or for alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other supposed
violations.280 Once the said impeachable officer is no longer in office because of his removal,
resignation, retirement or permanent disability, the Court may proceed against him or her and
impose the corresponding sanctions for misconduct committed during his tenure, pursuant to
the Court’s power of administrative supervision over members of the bar. Provided that the
requirements of due process are met, the Court may penalize retired members of the Judiciary
for misconduct committed during their incumbency. Thus, in Cañada v. Suerte,281 this Court
ordered the disbarment of a retired judge for misconduct committed during his incumbency as
a judge.
However, pernicious as Justice Reyes’s infractions may have been, the committee finds the
imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment unwarranted. In the determination of the
imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, the Court takes into account the
primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and
reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While the assessment of what
sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to the Court’s sound discretion, the sanction
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should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice.
Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar. Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and member of the bar. Under the circumstances of this case, the committee finds
the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law sufficient and proper.
Liability of Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista
The Committee finds that Atty. Evangelista, Justice Reyes’ Judicial Staff Head, was remiss in his
duties, which includes the supervision of the operations of the office, particularly with respect
to the promulgation of decisions. While it is incumbent upon him to devise ways and means to
secure the integrity of confidential documents, his actuations reflected above evinced "a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."282
Atty. Evangelista was admittedly unmindful of the responsible safekeeping of draft ponencias in
an unlocked drawer of a member of the staff. He failed to make sure that the unused portion
of confidential documents like the second signatory page of the ponencia in Gilbert form had
been properly disposed of or shredded. He was not on top of things that concerned the
promulgation of ponencias, for he failed to ascertain the status and procedural implication of an
"on hold" order after having been apprised thereof by his subordinate, Del Rosario, on July 17,
2008. Despite his awareness that the Limkaichong case would eventually be called again, he
admitted that he was not privy to the preparation of the copy of the ponencia for the subsequent
session on July 29, 2008.
With these findings, the Court finds him liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY.
Liability of Armando Del Rosario
The committee likewise finds Del Rosario administratively liable for failing to exercise the
required degree of care in the custody of the Gilbert copy. Del Rosario admittedly kept the
Gilbert copy in an unlocked drawer from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008 when he should
have known that, by the nature of the document in his custody, he should have kept it more
securely. His carelessness renders him administratively liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF
DUTY, defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee
resulting from either carelessness or indifference.283
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court
officials and employees are mandated to carry. They are constantly reminded that any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must
be avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all
those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish the people’s faith in the judiciary.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, (simple) neglect
of duty is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense.
Under Sec. 19, Rule XIV of the same Rules, the penalty of fine (instead of suspension) may also
be imposed in the alternative.284 Following the Court's ruling in several cases involving (simple)
neglect of duty,285 we find the penalty of fine on Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario in the amount
of P10,000 and P5,000, respectively, just and reasonable.
RECOMMENDATIONS
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Investigating Committee respectfully recommends that
(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) be found liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for
violating his oath as a member of the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility
and be meted the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar;
 115

(2) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) also be found liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for
leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and be FINED in the amount
of P500,000, to be charged against his retirement benefits; and
(3) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario be held liable for SIMPLE
NEGLECT OF DUTY and be FINED in the amount of P10,000 and P5,000,
respectively.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
(Sgd.)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Chairman

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Member Member

The Court finds the above-quoted report well taken. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, this per curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court En Banc by a
unanimous decision of all the members of the Court except for two (2) Justices who are on
official leave.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the findings and APPROVES
WITH MODIFICATIONthe Recommendations of the Investigating Committee as follows:
(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking
a confidential internal document of the Court and he is FINED P500,000.00, to be
charged against his retirement benefits, and disqualified to hold any office or
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporations; furthermore, Justice Ruben T. Reyes
is directed to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision
why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar in light of the
aforementioned findings.
(2) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario are held liable for SIMPLE
NEGLECT OF DUTYand are ordered to pay the FINE in the amount
of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES JOSE AND CONCEPCION
OLORGA V. BELDIA
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2137 February 10, 2009
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 06-2530-RTJ)
HEIRS OF SPOUSES JOSE and CONCEPCION OLORGA, represented by ILDA
OLORGA-CAÑAL,Complainants,
vs.
Judge ROLINDO D. BELDIA, JR., and Branch Clerk of Court MARY EMILIE T.
VILLANUEVA, Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch
57, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint dated April 5, 2006, complainant Ilda Olorga-Cañal, by herself and as
representative of the other heirs of spouses Jose and Concepcion Olorga, charged respondents
Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. and Atty. Mary Emilie T. Villanueva, former presiding judge and
branch clerk of court, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, Branch 57, with infidelity in the custody of records in connection with Civil Case No.
X-82 entitled "Concepcion Olorga, et al. v. Cesar Lopez" for specific performance and damages.
The complainants made the following allegations:
(1) The records of Civil Case No. X-82, which was filed way back in 1982 by their
mother, Concepcion Olorga, were lost while in the custody of respondents and could
not be found. They found out that the only entry was the name of [Atty. Rudy B.
Cañal]1 who filed the case, the date of the filing, the title of the complaint and nothing
else, up to the present year 2006 or precisely a span of 24 years.
(2) As a result of said complete loss of the records, they found it extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to prove that the property or lot, subject matter of the civil case,
had been fully and completely paid for by the spouses. All the documentary evidence
had already been submitted to the RTC, Branch 57 in 1993 as supported by the xerox
copy of the order of respondent judge. Unfortunately, complainants could not secure
a certified true copy of this order but would be able to present the original carbon
copy duly signed by the Clerk of Court at that time.2
(3) Their late father, notwithstanding the distance of their home from the court, the
two-hour bus ride and the long hours of waiting in the court, followed up the case
after the death of their mother, for almost 10 years, i.e.from 1982 to 1991. On April
19, 1993, they had already rested their case and the lawyer for the defendant had
manifested in open court that if the last defense witness could not be presented on
the next scheduled hearing, he, too, would be resting his case. Despite this,
respondent judge failed to resolve the case within the mandated time of 90 days,
from 1994 to 2006.3
(4) Respondents were trying to cover-up their negligence by blaming the termites for
the loss of the records. Complainants had in their possession copies of the orders
issued by respondent judge himself indicating that the same had long been submitted
for decision.4
Respondent judge denied the charges against him. He offered these defenses:
116
(1) He was appointed as judge of RTC, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57
only on March 19, 1992 and assumed office in May 1992. Thereafter, he was
designated as the acting presiding judge of the RTC, Bacolod City, Branch 45 on June
30, 1993.5 He went back to Branch 57 only in April 2002.6 During the interim period
or before his return to Branch 57, he was designated as the acting presiding judge in
RTC, Bacolod City, Branch 41, Mambusao, Capiz and Marikina.7
(2) Upon inquiry from the court personnel who had been and still assigned in Branch
57, the records of Civil Case No. X-82 could not be traced or located and that the
entry in the docket book did not indicate the status of the case and was haphazardly
done. If it would still be possible, reconstruction of the records of the case was the
only and best way by which complainants could be apprised of the actual status of
the case. The Branch 57 personnel under his watch had nothing to do with the loss
of the records of Civil Case No. X-82.
(3) The case records of Civil Case No. X-82 remained with Branch 57 when he was
transferred to RTC, Bacolod City, Branch 45 since the records of the cases assigned
to him in Branch 57 did not follow him wherever he was assigned. Furthermore, these
records could and should not be brought outside of the court’s premises without any
court order.
(4) The audit team sent by the Supreme Court on March 21, 2000 found that Civil
Case No. X-82 was not among the civil cases that remained not acted upon for a long
time.8 When another audit team came on June 16, 2005, the case was never brought
up. This team perused the docket books and found everything in order.
(5) When he was ordered to return to Branch 57 in 2002, Civil Case No. X-82 was not
among the cases in the inventory he signed when he resumed his post.9
On the other hand, respondent Atty. Mary Emilie T. Villanueva averred that:
(1) She assumed as branch clerk of court of Branch 57, on January 10, 2000. When
she assumed her position, there was no existing list of cases submitted for decision
and she had to conduct and prepare a physical and actual inventory of all the pending
cases assigned to Branch 57. Civil Case No. X-82 was not included in the inventory
she prepared and signed by former presiding judge Roberto S.A. Javellana. Also, it
was not among those civil cases found by the audit team sent by the Supreme Court
on March 21, 2000 as not having been resolved within the required period.10
(2) When she assumed office, she realized that the former clerks of court and officers-
in-charge of Branch 57 did not keep a proper recording/docketing of the cases
assigned to and decided by the said court. So she instructed the clerks-in-charge to
properly fill in the docket books the dispositive portions of the court’s decisions or
final orders before endorsing the records of these cases to the office of the clerk of
court.
(3) Sometime in March 2006, the complainants (spouses Cañal) went to her office to
follow-up the status of Civil Case No. X-82 after inquiring by phone. She informed
them she had the records of the case searched prior to their arrival but they were not
found. In the course of her investigation, she came to know that the records of the
case were lost long ago. Even the former clerk of court, Atty. Riah Debulgado, tried
to look for them during the latter months of 1995 and early months of 1996 but failed
to find them. She showed them the page in the docket book showing the entry
relevant to the case. She assured complainants that their office will help them with
the reconstruction of the records. Her averments found support in the affidavits of
the court’s stenographer, sheriff IV, and clerk III (in-charge of the records of all the
civil cases).11

In a resolution dated February 12, 2007, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), we referred the administrative case to the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, for
investigation, report and recommendation.12 It was assigned to Justice Francisco P. Acosta who
conducted a hearing on the matter.
From the testimonies and documentary evidence, Justice Acosta ferreted out the following
sequence of events:
(1) Civil Case No. X-82 was filed in 1982 in RTC, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Branch 57, then presided by Judge Macandog, by Atty. Cañal against Cesar Lopez.
(2) There were photocopies of the orders issued by then Judge Cesar D. Estampador
in Civil Case No. X-82, where one Order stated –
As agreed by counsel for both parties, let the continuance of the hearing of this case
be set on October 29, 1987, at 8:30 in the morning, for counsel for the plaintiff to
cross-examine witness Cesar Lopez.
SO ORDERED.
(3) The other orders issued by Judge Estampador were all postponements/resetting
of hearing dates.
(4) In a Motion dated May 21, 1084, Atty. Cañal withdrew as counsel.
(5) Atty. Raymundo Ponteras took over the case from Atty. Cañal, and thereafter,
Atty. Vic Agravante took over from Atty. Ponteras;
(6) Respondent judge was appointed as the presiding judge of Branch 57 on March
19, 1992 and assumed office in May 1992.
(7) Respondent judge was designated as acting presiding judge of Branch RTC,
Bacolod City, Branch 45, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 104-93 dated June 30,
1993, in lieu of Judge Medina who retired, but at the same time he continued to hear
cases in Branch 57 since Judge Roberto S.A. Javellana fully assumed the position of
presiding judge of Branch 57 only in January of 1995.
(8) The last order issued by the respondent judge in Civil Case No. X-82 was
dated November 16, 1994, which read as follows:
All exhibits marked, Exhibit "I" with its sub-markings; Exhibit "5" sub-markings;
Exhibits "6", "7", "8", and "8-A"; Exhibit "9" and "10" are all admitted as part of the
testimony of the witnesses for the defendants, for whatever worth it may be and
thereafter submitted for DECISION.
SO ORDERED.
(9) Respondent judge was designated as the presiding judge of RTC, Bacolod City,
Branch 41 on December 21, 1994, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 225-93,
but assumed office only in January of 1995.
(10) Based on their joint-affidavit dated June 2, 2006, spouses Juanito and Leticia de
Guzman13 averred that sometime in 1994, they went to Branch 57 to follow-up on the
case. They were shown the records thereof and someone from the office asked them
for P300 as traveling expenses of the court’s messenger who would deliver the case
records to respondent judge in Bacolod City since the latter was the one to decide the
said case.
(11) Based on the affidavit of Rudy L. Olorga, he delivered the amount of P300 to the
court messenger at his residence and could even recall where the latter lives.
117
(12) The complainants, however, did not present the court messenger or any person
who could corroborate the foregoing allegations.
(13) Branch 57 clerk-in-charge of civil cases Lilibeth Libutan assumed her duty as
such in July 1996. Per her sworn statement, she had no knowledge of Civil Case No.
X-82, until she heard the former clerk of court, the late Atty. Riah Debulgado say that
she (Atty. Debulgado) had been looking for the said records but could not locate
them.
(14) Respondent clerk of court assumed office only on January 10, 2000. There
was no formal turn-over of all the court’s case records since at that time, only the
judges were required to make and submit a bi-annual docket inventories and to
conduct an inventory upon their assumption of office.
(15) On March 21, 2000, the Supreme Court sent an audit team to Branch 57 and
found out that there were several cases not acted upon for a long period of time but
Civil Case No. X-82 was not one of them as revealed in the resolution of the First
Division of the Supreme Court dated August 28, 2000.
(16) Per the docket Inventory dated July 11, 2000, for the period January to June
2000, submitted by Judge Javellana, Civil Case No. X-82 was not included in said
inventory.
(17) Respondent judge returned to Branch 57 in 2002, pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 18-2002 dated February 7, 2002.
(18) The Supreme Court sent another audit team on June 16, 2005 and found that
no active records had been lost and after going over the court’s docket books, said
team found everything to be in order.
(19) Sometime in March of 2006, someone inquired about the status of the case, and
thereafter, the respondent clerk of court instructed the clerk in charge to look for the
records of Civil Case No. X-82 in all possible places where it may be found, including
in the disposed and archived cases section, but the search yielded nothing.
(20) In the last week of March 2006, complainant Ilda Olorga-Cañal, together with
Atty. Rudy Cañal and some other companions, went to Branch 57 and asked for the
records of Civil Case No. X-82. They were shown the docket book and were informed
that neither the respondent clerk of court nor the clerk in charge had seen said
records.
(21) The Supreme Court directed respondent judge to conduct an
investigation/inquiry regarding Civil Case No. X-82.
(22) The last entry in the docket book pertaining to Civil Case No. X-82 is the order
dated March 5, 1982, terminating the pre-trial. From then on, nothing was entered
therein.14
Based on these findings, Justice Acosta recommended that the complaint for infidelity in the
custody of records be dismissed against both respondents because these records were not in
their custody when they were lost. However, he recommended that respondent judge be held
liable for his negligence in maintaining his court’s docket book and fined P5,000.15
On the Liability of Respondent Judge
Civil Case No. X-82 was submitted for decision in an order issued by respondent judge on
November 16, 1994. Judges of lower courts have 90 days from the time a case is submitted for
decision to decide the same.16Respondent judge was designated as presiding judge of RTC,
Bacolod City, Branch 41 on December 21, 1994 but assumed office in January 1995. The time

for rendering a decision had not lapsed at the time of his transfer and he did not render one
before he was transferred and replaced by Judge Javellana.
The question now is: who had custody of the records of Civil Case No. X-82 when they were
lost?
According to affiants Juanito and Leticia de Guzman, the records were still with Branch 57 when
they followed up on the case sometime in 1994 after the same was submitted for decision. They
were told that they had to give P300 to the court’s messenger for the latter to bring the records
to Bacolod City so that the respondent judge could decide the case. From this statement, it is
safe to assume that when the respondent judge left Branch 57, the records were still there.17
However, from the sworn affidavit of Lilibeth L. Libutan, clerk in charge of civil cases of Branch
57, the records of Civil Case No. X-82 could not be found when she assumed office in July 1996.
She stated that Atty. Riah Debulgado, former branch clerk of court, also looked for the missing
records during the latter months of 1995 and early months of 1996 but failed to locate them.18
In Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Sergio D. Mabunay, RTC, Branch 24, Manila,19 we held
that cases which are raffled to a branch belong to that branch unless re-raffled or otherwise
transferred to another branch in accordance with established procedure. Judges who are
transferred do not take with them cases substantially heard by them and submitted to them for
decision unless they are requested to do so by any of the parties and such request is endorsed
by the incumbent presiding judge through the OCA:
Basically, a case once raffled to a branch belongs to that branch unless reraffled or otherwise
transferred to another branch in accordance with established procedure. When the Presiding
Judge of that branch to which a case has been raffled or assigned is transferred to another
station, he leaves behind all the cases he tried with the branch to which they belong. He does
not take these cases with him even if he tried them and the same were submitted to him for
decision. The judge who takes over this branch inherits all these cases and assumes full
responsibility for them. He may decide them as they are his cases, unless any of the parties
moves that his case be decided by the judge who substantially heard the evidence and before
whom the case was submitted for decision. If a party therefore so desires, he may simply
address his request or motion to the incumbent Presiding Judge who shall then endorse the
request to the [OCA] so that the latter may in turn endorse the matter to the judge who
substantially heard the evidence and before whom the case was submitted for decision. This
will avoid the "renvoir" of records and the possibility of an irritant between the judges concerned,
as one may question the authority of the other to transfer the case to the former. If coursed
through the [OCA], the judge who is asked to decide the case is not expected to complain,
otherwise, he may be liable for insubordination and his judicial profile may be adversely affected.
Upon direction of the Court Administrator, or any of his Deputy Court Administrators acting in
his behalf, the judge before whom a particular case was earlier submitted for decision may be
compelled to decide the case accordingly.
We take this opportunity to remind trial judges that once they act as presiding judges or
otherwise designated as acting/assisting judges in branches other than their own, cases
substantially heard by them and submitted to them for decision, unless they are promoted to
higher positions in the judicial ladder, may be decided by them wherever they may be if so
requested by any of the parties and endorsed by the incumbent Presiding Judges through the
[OCA]. The following procedure may be followed: First, the Judge who takes over the branch
must immediately make an inventory of the cases submitted for decision left behind by the
previous judge (unless the latter has in the meantime been promoted to a higher court). Second,
the succeeding judge must then inform the parties that the previous judge who heard the case,
at least substantially, and before whom it was submitted for decision, may be required to decide
the case. In this event, and upon request of any of the parties, the succeeding judge may
request the Court Administrator to formally endorse the case for decision to the judge before
118
whom it was previously submitted for decision. Third, after the judge who previously heard the
case is through with his decision, he should send back the records together with his decision to
the branch to which the case properly belongs, by registered mail or by personal delivery,
whichever is more feasible, for recording and promulgation, with notice of such fact to the Court
Administrator.
Since the primary responsibility over a case belongs to the presiding judge of the branch to
which it has been raffled or assigned, he may also decide the case to the exclusion of any other
judge provided that all the parties agree in writing that the incumbent presiding judge should
decide the same, or unless the judge who substantially heard the case and before whom it was
submitted for decision has in the meantime died, retired or for any reason has left the service,
or has become disabled, disqualified, or otherwise incapacitated to decide the case.
The Presiding Judge who has been transferred to another station cannot, on his own, take with
him to his new station any case submitted for decision without first securing formal authority
from the Court Administrator. This is to minimize, if not totally avoid, a situation of "case-
grabbing." In the same vein, when the Presiding Judge before whom a case was submitted for
decision has already retired from the service, the judge assigned to the branch to take over the
case submitted for decision must automatically assume the responsibility of deciding the case.20
There is no showing that respondent judge was ever ordered by this Court, through the OCA,
to decide Civil Case No. X-82. Although there was an allegation that the records of the case
were delivered to respondent judge in Bacolod City, there was no proof whatsoever that he
indeed instructed someone from Branch 57 to bring the records to him. Much less was there
proof that the records were in fact brought to the respondent judge in Bacolod City so that he
could decide the case.
Thus, we agree with Justice Acosta that respondent judge could be held liable for infidelity in
the custody of public documents since there was no evidence that the records were lost while
they were in his possession, that he took them with him to Bacolod City or that he destroyed or
concealed them. There was only the self-serving affidavit of Juanito and Leticia de Guzman
offered by complainants which was not corroborated by independent or more reliable evidence.
This did not constitute substantial evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate
to support the conclusion21 that respondent judge was responsible for the loss of the case
records. In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by
substantial evidence, the averments of his or her complaint.22 Furthermore,
[any] administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of
judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be
countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should
be competent.23
Be that as it may, while respondent judge should not be held liable for the loss of the records
of Civil Case No. X-82, we agree with Justice Acosta that the former failed to demonstrate the
requisite care and diligence necessary in the performance of his duty as presiding judge,
specifically in ensuring that the entries in the court’s docket book were updated. Respondent
judge himself admitted that the docket book was filled up "haphazardly."24
Indeed, while it is not the presiding judge who makes the entries in the docket book, still
… the trial judge is expected to adopt a system of record management and organize his docket
in order to bolster the prompt and effective dispatch of business. Proper and efficient court
management is the responsibility of the judge. It is incumbent upon judges to devise an efficient
recording and filing system in their courts so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases
and their speedy disposition.

xxx xxx xxx
Further evidence of Judge Legaspi's inability to implement an efficient recording and filing
system is her failure to maintain her court's civil and criminal docket books since 1983.
While it may be so that her predecessors had similarly failed to maintain these books, Judge
Legaspi has presided over her sala since 1991. Yet, the entries of her docket book are complete
only "from 2000 up." In her defense, it appears that her clerks-in-charge have "confessed to
the impossibility of completing the docket book and attending to their current work at the same
time." Still, it is incumbent on all trial court judges to duly apprise this Court or the OCA of
problems they encounter in the day-to-day administration of their court dockets and records, so
they may receive appropriate guidance and assistance. After all, the responsibility for an efficient
administration of justice lies not only with the trial court judges, but with the judicial system as
a whole.25 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent judge assumed office as the presiding judge of Branch 57 in May 1992. He issued
orders in Civil Case No. X-82, the last being the order dated November 16, 1994, declaring the
case submitted for decision. However, the last entry in the docket book pertaining to the case
was dated March 5, 1982. From then on, several orders were issued by the respondent judge
but these were never recorded in the docket book as they should have been.
Respondent judge was therefore negligent in the discharge of his duties. He failed to observe
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance required of his position. Considering his
administrative authority over the court’s personnel, he should have directed them to be diligent
in the performance of their functions. He neglected to properly supervise them, particularly
those in charge of the docket books, resulting in incomplete entries therein. These violated
Rules 3.08 and 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
Rule 3.08. – A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
Rule 3.09. – A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt
and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of
public service and fidelity.
This constituted simple misconduct,26 defined as a transgression of some established rule of
action, an unlawful behavior or negligence committed by a public officer.27 It is a less serious
offense28 punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one month nor more than three months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.291avvphi1.zw+
Consequently, we fine respondent judge in the amount of P15,000 which is a stiffer penalty
than the P5,000 fine recommended by Justice Acosta. We find this amount reasonable,
considering that respondent judge had already been administratively sanctioned twice before.30
Respondent judge’s compulsory retirement on October 31, 200631 did not render the present
administrative case moot and academic. It did not free him from liability. Complainant filed this
case on April 5, 2006, before respondent judge retired from office. As such, the Court retained
the authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him. Cessation from office because
of retirement does not per se justify the dismissal of an administrative complaint against a judge
while still in the service.32 The P15,000 fine can and shall be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,33 this administrative case against respondent as a judge,
based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the
Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the
Bar.34
119
Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct
constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):
Canon 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and for legal processes.
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the people’s
respect for the law and legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due
to the courts and to judicial officers.35Respondent judge’s negligence also ran counter to Canon
12 of the CPR which provides:
Canon 12 — A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
For such violation of Canons 1, 11 and 12 of the CPR, he is severely reprimanded.
On the Liability of Respondent Clerk of Court
Justice Acosta recommended that respondent clerk of court be absolved of the charge filed
against her. We agree.
Section 7, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates the clerk of court to "safely keep
all records, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his [or her] charge."
Considering that the records of Civil Case No. X-82 could no longer be located in Branch 57
since 1995 and respondent clerk of court assumed her post only on January 10, 2000, these
records were obviously never committed to her charge.
In addition, in the docket inventory of cases dated July 11, 2000 prepared and submitted by
Judge Javellana, Civil Case No. X-82 was not included. Likewise, in our resolution dated August
28, 2000, Civil Case No. X-82 was not in the list of cases still left undecided beyond the mandated
period.
For the same reason, respondent clerk of court cannot be held accountable for the incomplete
entries in the docket book with respect to Civil Case No. X-82.
Moreover, when complainants followed up the case with respondent clerk of court, the latter
conducted an investigation. When the records could not be found, she informed the
complainants and assured them that the court could assist them in reconstituting such records.
Under the circumstances, she did all that she could. It was not shown that she was remiss in
her duties.36
To conclude, while we sympathize with the plight of complainants for the inconvenience caused
by the loss of the records of Civil Case No. X-82, we cannot pin the blame on respondents who
did not have custody of such records when they were lost.
WHEREFORE, retired Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, Branch 57, is hereby found GUILTY of simple misconduct. He is ordered to
pay a FINE in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000), to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
Respondent judge is further hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his violation of Canons 1,
11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The complaint against Atty. Mary Emilie T. Villanueva, clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court,
San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57, is DISMISSED.
 120

SO ORDERED.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT V. SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN,
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN
HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY
C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL
KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA,
WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO,
ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION,
ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC.,
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL
HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP.,
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING
PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY
TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY.
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one
hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the
other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.[1] It was later
found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers,
stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended
emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the
mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977,
wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying
for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first
acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed
with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of
Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee,
121
Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William
T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel
Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services
and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings &
Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and
Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.[7] After
the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for
proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these
cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the SecondDivision of the Sandiganbayan in Civil
Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then
Solicitor General[10] and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK
by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the
Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared
as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila
and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.[12] It
further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was
beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he
ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official
or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he
used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public
office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11,
2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22,
1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify

filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was
denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11,
2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18] The PCGG
alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment
in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-
bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendozas appearance
on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res
judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of
the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal
profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive
issue.
I Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were
pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not
resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but
surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was
directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and
fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation
duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the
court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other
basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the
poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects
of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did
not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes,
judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from
England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in
England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American
regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations
had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving
gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly
characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary
period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.[20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the United
States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David
122
Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of
uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties
became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time,
legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were
working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal
ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's
duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code,
governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath
and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic
duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to
recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of
confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had
some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these
standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties.
The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties,
and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.[21]
guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were
detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary
sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar
association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike
the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official
imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely
popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new
codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed
sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In
the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their
colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama
State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting
substantive standards of conduct for their members.[22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of
ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the
foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.[23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient
to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that
year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the
canons. Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and
others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in
private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in
government service.[25] These concerns were classified as adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the
matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is
substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and the interests of the current and former are adverse.[26] On the other hand, congruent-
interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to
former government lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the
canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the
ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to

former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-
interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely discretionary actions
would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that
later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice
clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which
he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should
not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added
Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47
of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA
Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked
for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons.
The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the
ABA Canons failed to distinguish between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus
unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification
of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of
Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules
of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-
101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated
the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA
House of Delegates approved the Model Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and
indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement format, where the conduct standards
were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give
better guidance and clarity for enforcement because the only enforceable standards were the
black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the
emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment
discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of
substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.[37] In particular,
the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of
impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite
nature.[38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted
to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and
practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court
123
promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and
provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive
phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly
applicable to both adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor
General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No.
0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains
the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest conflictsufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred
to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former
government lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor
General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)
in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that
Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by
advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain
key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson,
then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor
Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio
T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of
GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised
that the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that
studies and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank
as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized

or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with
safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation
of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation
plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the
foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by
the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting
the proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court
in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where
it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to
GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the banks
liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of
the subject memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial
and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination
Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing
a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust
Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977,
submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended
by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the
Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of
the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor
General involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the
said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In
fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of matter under Rule
6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265,
section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the
head of the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or
agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one
124
of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned
forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may,
upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution
to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank
or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to
immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible
collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its
creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not
limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period
that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its
liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance
of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in
the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of
such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a
person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take
over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of
the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and
other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in
the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to
collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of
the Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of
this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there
is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No
restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central
Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph
of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the
Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or
plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a
bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court.
The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved
upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or
Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the
petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner
or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and
dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay
its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided,
however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-
insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly
evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the
appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the
Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
drafting, enforcing or interpretinggovernment or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of
respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be
that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is entirely different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the
plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with
the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate
in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself involved was in
informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts
and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First
Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor
is related to but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case
No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied
Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock
of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution
and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others,
to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of
the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction
of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying
that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil
Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated by
Rule 6.03. Intervene means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur,
fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of
hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where
the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that
may affect the interests of others.[42]
125
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first
interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.[43] Under the second interpretation, intervene
only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings.[44] We
hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be
remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be
considered as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon
36 provided that a former government lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which
he has investigated or passed upon resulted in unjust disqualification of former government
lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended
only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had substantial
responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a)
provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which
the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special
proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as
the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation
of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for
a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note
that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK.
The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as
a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that
of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a
commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government
service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have
not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning
its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its
interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily
prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause
a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already
difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely
that government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that
the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present
income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income
in private practice.[45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government
service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from
engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause

the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified.[46] Indeed, to make government
service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter.[47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic
to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation.
The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere
guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted the tactical use of
motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of
counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was
so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic
commentary.[48] Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of
Appeals description of disqualification motions as a dangerous game.[49] In the case at bar,
the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many
years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza.
For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four
years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme
Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in
the case at bar were refiled put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that
granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but
probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified
lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. [52]The effects
of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result
in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated
reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government
service. According to Prof. Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or she
can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge
official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by
superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such
freedom.[53] He adds: Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to
quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence.[54] The case
at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent
Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be
endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the
Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him
the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition
of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government
lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the
disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
firm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is
a highly speculative exercise at best[56] which can lead to untoward results.[57] No less than
Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will
have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and
126
its attorneys which the canons seek to protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety
theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct[59] and
some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual
conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant,
government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.[60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries the danger that
former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the
process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act
of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate
GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about
the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure,
there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no
question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working
against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of
the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their
interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no
objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict
of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while
still in government service.[61] The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a
lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting
might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of
the Bar Committee in 1960: The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct
may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive
administration of government policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as
probably excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure
hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client the government. Interviews
with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the best government lawyers the ones
who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates.[65] But again, this
particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against
respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in
later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the
interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the excessive influence of former officials or their clout.[66]Prof. Morgan again warns
against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of
what appears to be an employees influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her
position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x.[67] More, he
contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him
further: x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship
rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker
friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified
or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in
order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism.[68]
III
The question of fairness
 127

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent
interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a
prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to
respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when
respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and
approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the
lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point
they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and
retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the
IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is
denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.
Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.
Chico-Nazario, J., No part.

CATU V. RELLOSA
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located
at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio
Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the
units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a
complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79
of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer
and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint
of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his
task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties,
however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her
request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to
prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After
evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline
respondent.7
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed
against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By
so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said
service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section
7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8
128
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND,PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis
supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice
of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former
Government Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government
service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service."
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
[they] had intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained
of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of
Profession of Elective Local Government Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions."
This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation,
or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members
who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee
of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of
work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not
derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective
local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on
engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus
derogat generalibus.13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service.
They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official
duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayanmay practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular
sessions only at least once a week.14Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice
their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is
no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person
or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to
practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on
the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they
are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not
mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular
sessions only twice a month.16
129
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure
Prior Authority From The Head Of His Department
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at
the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time
be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office
hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not
involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in
any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.
(emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission
of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel
for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of
the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and
promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined
as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service
rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of
the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics
and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.19
 130

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation
of the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that
any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish
copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

CATALAN, JR. V. SILVOSA
A.C. No. 7360 July 24,2012
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito
M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty.
Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared
as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio
(Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case
No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar
Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of
action and recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice
modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a
suspension of two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y
Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case
Atty. Catalan was one of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s
manner of prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel
in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.1Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty.
Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed
manifest bias in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the
Esperon case by arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial
Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling
the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005.
On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a
motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case
for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed
the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to
less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that,
while still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her
findings and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision in
Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse
(Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a homicide case
in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in
detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the
dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation
for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual
entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the
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Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted
Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one
month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six
months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor
from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in the Esperon
case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his
appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any
relationship between himself and the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as "self-serving"
and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and
is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic] not
amount to a crime.’" He further claims that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted,
but his capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted
falling under the category of crimes against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00.
[Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that
he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has made himself
familiar with the parties of the case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case.
The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file
a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is
sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred
more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on
the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty. Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the
accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that
the alleged incident occurred more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this
disbarment case was filed on November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly
cast doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not
be ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no
personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by
the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in
said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The

findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has
been presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge
in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given the penalty
of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from
the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board
of Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension from the practice of law to two
years. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of
the case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides
that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the
oppressed" and on Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the
needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot
Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can only
be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was only to appear
in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his subsequent
participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail.
Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating
his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client
as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest
lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public
policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of
the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to
keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which
is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the
attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5
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Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that
there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with
Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa
made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14
June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran,
then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make
false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the
accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree
of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do
not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the
act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench
and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding
in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt
of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in government service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and
that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the present case.
There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of
public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting
documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa
himself admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
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willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11
we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public
officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of
an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected
with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to
accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an
official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender
to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that
the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him
by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice,
honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Italicization in the original)
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros.
Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the
crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of
Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We
are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty.
Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a
member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a
public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character.
The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this
privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his
name ORDERED STRICKENfrom the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney.
Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of
the Court Administration for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.