Political Law II

[Assignment for February 18, 2019]

(a) Read pages 477-552, The Law on Public Officers and Election Law, De Leon, 8th ed., 2014.
(b) Read pages 125-141, Political Law II Syllabus.
(c) Assigned Cases [due on February 22, 2019]:
 Is Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615, which imposed airtime limits on radio and tv
political advertisement, violative of the people’s right to suffrage?
GMA Network vs. Comelec, G.R. 205357, Sept. 2. 2014

Yes [c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process
and of the First Amendment freedoms Candidates and political parties need adequate
breathing space· Including the means to disseminate their ideas. This could
not be reasonably addressed by the very restrictive manner by which the respondent
implemented the time limits in regard to political advertisements in the broadcast media.

 Is Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f) of Comelec Resolution No.
9615 which prohibits the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material,
inter alia, in PUVs and public transport terminals, violative of the right of the people
to suffrage?
1-UTAK vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206020, Apr. 14, 2015

Yes, since it violates freedom of speech. Freedom of speech and of the press preserves other
rights since curtailment in the dissemination of information affects the vital right of suffrage.
The aforementioned sections are prior restraints on speech. It restraints the owners of the
vehicles to express their preference and convince others to agree with them.

 Is the biometrics validation and the penalty of deactivation under RA 10367, an

unconstitutio-nal substantive requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage?
Kabataan PL vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 221318, Dec. 16, 2015

No, it is a valid regulation that assists in the identification for purposes of ensuring that the
right to vote is exercised only by that person. It is not a burden on the right rather it enhances
the fundamental right. It provides mechanisms to ensure the identity of the voter and prevent
multiple votes from a single individual.

„[t]he right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege
granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise
it for the public good Registration regulates the exercise of the right
of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.

 Whether or not the fear of vote buying justify the Comelec to deactivate the “voter
verified paper audit trail” function of the voting counting machine?
Bagumbayan vs. Comelec, GR. No. 222731, March 8, 2016

Court has no authority to review. The reason behind the legislature’s choice of adopting
biometrics registration notwithstanding the experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in
its implementation, or its concomitant failure to address equally
pressing election problems, is essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond the pale of
judicial scrutiny

 In the P240million diagnostics and repair of the PCOS machines, can the Comelec
resort to direct contracting with Smartmatic-TIM under Section 52 (h), BP Blg. 881?
Yes, Section 52(h) of B Blg.881 basically allows Comelec to engage in negotiations or sealed bids id
it finds the requirements of public bidding impractical to observe. BP 881 was passed before the
advent of both GPRA and RA8463. The Court deems that said provision remains valid and
effective, absent its express repeal.

 Whether or not the Extended Warranty Contract (Program 1), being a part of the 2009
AES Contract, even required public bidding?

Yes, The Extended Warranty Contract (Program 1) cannot be validated by the mere expedient of
characterizing the same as a part of the 2009 AES Contract. The services of repair and
refurbishment cannot be procured from Smartmatic- TIM through an “extended warranty” mode,
unless this court assents to a blatant circumvention of the procurement law. Smartmatic-TIM
warrants that its parts, labor and technical support and maintenance will be available to the
COMELEC, if it so decides to purchase such parts, labor and technical support and maintenance
services, within the warranty period stated, i.e., ten (10) years for the PCOS, reckoned from May
10, 2010. Since Article 8.8 is a mere warranty on availability, it entails a subsequent purchase
contract, founded upon a new consideration, to be effectively invoked. However, by no means
does this provision dispense with the need to bid out the ensuing purchase contract. Neither does
this presuppose that the COMELEC is · for the stated period of ten (10 years) · already beholden to
Smartmatic-TIM. Certainly, the COMELECÊs hands cannot be hamstrung by a mere warranty on
availability, which is precisely a warranty provision that should operate in its favor.

Bishop Pabillo vs. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 216098 and 216562, April 21, 2015

 Does the COMELEC have legal and constitutional bases to regulate expressions made
by private citizens who are not candidates?
Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, Jan. 21, 2015

No, if it does not pass the clear and present danger test and there is no compelling and substantial
state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of
freedom of expression.

The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political
candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It
is true that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidates real
levels of expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend to have an
effect on the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too broad a remedy that
can stifle genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective
enforcement will be the least restrictive means to the fundamental freedom.

 Does the power of the Comelec to regulate franchises extend to regulating the posting
of campaign materials on PUVS, private vehicles and transport terminals?

No, because the prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of
the owners of the PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs
and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences
under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or
permit to operate.

 What is “captive-audience doctrine”?

The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape
from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The captive audience doctrine recognizes
that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in
which the communication cannot be avoided. A regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from
some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others. Such selective
 restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or
the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure

 Is Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f) of Comelec Resolution No.
9615 which prohibits the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material,
inter alia, in PUVs and public transport terminals, justified under the “captive-
audience doctrine”?
1-UTAK vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206020, Apr. 14, 2015

No, COMELEC citing the US case of Lehman was misplaced since the political advertisement
was intended for PUVs owned by the city government. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the
advertisements that may be posted on their properties.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their properties.

 In view of her proclamation and oath-taking before the Speaker of the House, did the
Comelec lose jurisdiction over Reyes disqualification case?
 Reyes vs. Comelec, G.R. 207264, June 25, 2013

No since her proclamation lacked basis. If an individual is a duly proclaimed winner and having
taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.

However in the instant case, before her proclamation in May 18, 2013 there was already a standing
and unquestioned cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy which is a definite bar to
her proclamation. Petitioner is in error when she says that HRET has jurisdiction since the case
must involve a member of the House. The fact alone that one won the elections and has been
Proclaimed does not, to be sure, make him a member of the House. To become a member, the
candidate to the position must win the election, take an oath, and assume office when his term
begins. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at
Present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for
such membership Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, the
decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was
Correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was
finally decided by the COMELEC.

 Does the Comelec have jurisdiction over challenges on qualification of candidates for
President and Vice-President?
Grace Poe vs. Comelec, GR. Nos. 221697, 221698-700, March 8, 2016

No, for the COMELEC to determine, the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification
must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a
judgment of a competent court or tribunal. If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior
finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification „provided by law or the Constitution,
neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or
she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found.

 May the COMELEC prevent the conduct of a recall election for lack of specific budgetary
allocation therefor
  Goh vs. Bayron, G.R. No. 212584, Nov. 25, 2014

No, it is true that to be valid an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific
purpose however the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into different related
subcategories of the same nature. For example the purpose may be specific even if it is broken
down into different related subcategories of the same nature. For example, the purpose can be
to „conduct elections, which even if not expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall
elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific to fund elections, which naturally
and logically include, even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also special or recall
elections. In this case, the 2014 GAA, there is a specific line item appropriation for the
„Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes

 Can the COMELEC defeat the exercise of the people's original legislative power for lack of
budgetary allocation for its conduct?

No, Initiatives; Referendum; Initiative and referendum are the means by which the sovereign
people exercise their legislative power, and the valid exercise thereof should not be easily defeated
by claiming lack of specific budgetary appropriation for their conduct. The Court reiterates its
ruling in Goh v. Bayron, 742 SCRA 303 (2014), that the grant of a line item in the FY 2014 GAA for
the conduct and supervision of elections constitutes as sufficient authority for the COMELEC to
use the amount for elections and other political exercises, including initiative and recall, and to
augment this amount from the COMELECÊs existing savings.

 Has the COMELEC the power to review whether the propositions in an initiative petition are
within the power of the concerned Sanggunian to enact?
Mamerto vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 213953, Sept. 26, 2017

As the Court ruled in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections, 262 SCRA
492 (1996), the COMELEC is likewise given the power to review the sufficiency of initiative
petitions, particularly the issue of whether the propositions set forth therein are within the power
of the concerned sanggunian to enact. In as much as a sanggunian does not have the power to
create a separate local legislative body and that other propositions in Marmetoe’s initiative
petition clearly contravene the existing laws, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition and cannot be
ordered to conduct and supervise the procedure for the conduct of initiative elections

(d) Prepare for a short quiz.