Do Not Share - Collated - 40 Cases

LABREL – 40 CASES – QUIZ
EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE (Feb. 11, 2019)
Case 1: SHARKUS
QUITCLAIM NOT BAR TO FILING OF DISMISSAL CASE
PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PACIFIC CARPET

MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, MR. PATRICIO LIM and MR. DAVID
LIM,petitioners,vs.IGNACIO B. TAGYAMON, PABLITO L. LUNA, FE B. BADAYOS, GRACE
B. MARCOS, ROGELIO C. NEMIS, ROBERTO B. ILAO, ANICIA D. DELA CRUZ and
CYNTHIA L. COMANDAO, respondents. [G.R. No. 191475. December 11, 2013.] 
PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION. vs TAGYAMON

G.R. No. 191475
December 11, 2013.
Facts:
• Respondents Ignacio B. Tagyamon, Pablito L. Luna, Fe B. Badayos, and Cynthia L.
Comandao were supervisors of petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corp.
(PCMC).
• Last March 15, 2004, they received a memorandum of dismissal from the petitioner.
They were informed that the petitioner was implementing a retrenchment program in
accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code. They were paid their separation pay
and executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim.
• Claiming that they were aggrieved by petitioner’s decision to terminate their
employment, the respondents filed separate complaints against the petitioner for illegal
dismissal. They insisted that their acceptance of separation pay and signing of
quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit of illegal dismissal case.
Issue:
• Whether or not acceptance of separation pay and signing of quitclaim bars filing for
illegal dismissal.
Held:
• NO. It can safely be concluded that economic necessity constrained the respondents
to accept the petitioners’ monetary offer and sign the deeds of release, waiver and
quitclaim. That respondents are supervisors and not rank-and-file employees does not
make them less susceptible to financial offers, faced as they were with the prospect of
unemployment. The Court has allowed supervisory employees to seek payment of
benefits and a manager to sue for illegal dismissal even though, for a consideration,
they executed deeds of quitclaims releasing their employers from liability (Ariola v.
Philex Mining Corp., 503 Phil. 765, 780 (2005) at 789).
• There is no nexus between intelligence, or even the position which the employee held
in the company when it concerns the pressure which the employer may exert upon the
free will of the employee who is asked to sign a release and quitclaim. A lowly
employee or a sales manager, as in the present case, who is confronted with the same
dilemma of whether (to sign) a release and quitclaim and accept what the company
offers them, or (to refuse) to sign and walk out without receiving anything, may
succumb to the same pressure, being very well aware that it is going to take quite a
while before he can recover whatever he is entitled to, because it is only after a
protracted legal battle starting from the labor arbiter level, all the way to this Court, can
EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.
AFABLE.ALMALBIS.LIWAG.ODULIO.RAMIL.RIPARIP.ROLLAN.
SOLANA.BRUAN.SOLIS.TACLAS.TOLENTINO.Z TORRES
he receive anything at all. The Court understands that such a risk of not receiving
anything whatsoever, coupled with the probability of not immediately getting any
gainful employment or means of livelihood in the meantime, constitutes enough
pressure upon anyone who is asked to sign a release and quitclaim in exchange of
some amount of money which may be way below what he may be entitled to based on
company practice and policy or by law.

Case No. 2 – ANGELA
APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA INVOLVING EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION v. EPIFANIO MEJARES, REMEGIO C. BALURAN,

JR., DANTE SAYCON, and CECILIO CUCHARO, represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC
[G.R. No. 208986. January 13, 2016.]
FACTS:
• Respondents Mejares, Baluran, Saycon and Cucharo were among the complainants
representes by their labor union named ""Nagkahiusang Mamumuo ng Bit, Djevon, at
Raquilla Farms sa Hijo Resources Corporation" (NAMABDJERA-HRC) who filed with
NLRC an illegal dismissal case against Hijo Resources Corporation (HRC).
• Complainants alleged that HRC, formerly know an Hijo Plantation Incorporated (HPI),
is the owner of agricultural lands in Davao del Norte which were planted primarily with
Cavendish bananas. In Dec. 2003, HRC's application for the conversion of its
agricultural lands into agri-industrial use was approved.
• Complainants claimed that there were employed by HPI as farm workers in HPI's
plantation . In 2001, they were absorbed by HRC but they were working under the
contractor-growers: Bit Farm, Djevon Farm and Raquilla Farm. They asserted that thse
contractor-growers received compensation from and were under the control of HRC.
They further alleged that the contractor-growers did not have their own capitalization,
farm machineries, and equipment.
• On July 1, 2007, complainants formed their union NAMABDJERA-HRC, registered
with DOLE and on Aug, 24, 2007, filed a petition for certification election before DOLE.
• When HRC learned that complainants formed their union, the 3 contractor-growers
filed with DOLE a notice of cessation of business operations. In Sept. 2007,
complainants were terminated from their employment on the ground of cessation of
business operations by the contractor-growers of HRC. On Sept. 19, 2007,
complainants filed a case for ULP, illegal dismissal and illegal deductions with prayer
for moral and exemplary damages and atty's fees before NLRC.
• DOLE Med-Arbiter issued an order dismissing NAMABDJERA-HRC's petition for
certification election on the ground that there was no employer-employee
relationship between complainants and HRC. Complainants did not appeal the
Order of Med-Arbiter but pursued the illegal dismissal case they filed.
• On Jan. 4, 2008, HRC moved to inhibit Labor Arbiter Sagmit and moved to dismiss the
complaint for illegal dismissal. The motion to dismiss was anchored on the following
arguments: (1) Lack of jurisdiction under the principle of res judicata; and (2) The
Order of the Med-Arbiter finding that complainants were not employees of HRC, which
complainants did not appeal, had become final and executory.
LABOR ARBITER: Denied the motion to inhibit and motion to dismiss. Labor Arbiter Sagmit
held that res judicata does not apply. Citing the cases of Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. v.
IAC and Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. v. Pepito, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the decision of the
Med-Arbiter in a certification election case, by the nature of that proceedings, does not
foreclose further dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-existence of employer-
employee relationship between them. Thus, the finding of Med-Arbiter Jasa that no
employment relationship exists between HRC and complainants does not bar the Labor Arbiter
from making his own independent finding on the same issue. The non-litigious nature of the
proceedings before the Med-Arbiter does not prevent the Labor Arbiter from hearing and
deciding the case.
NLRC: Labor Arbiter Sagmit gravely abused her discretion in denying HRC's motion to
dismiss. The NLRC held that the Med-Arbiter Order dismissing the certification election case
on the ground of lack of employer-employee relationship between HRC and complainants
constitutes res judicata under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, and thus, warrants
the dismissal of the case. The NLRC ruled that the Med-Arbiter exercises quasi-judicial power
and the Med-Arbiter's decisions and orders have, upon their finality, the force and effect of a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.
CA: Certification proceedings before the Med-Arbiter are non-adversarial and merely
investigative. On the other hand, under Article 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases. Although the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter are also described as non-litigious, the Court of Appeals noted that
the Labor Arbiter is given wide latitude in ascertaining the existence of employment
relationship. Thus, unlike the Med-Arbiter, the Labor Arbiter may conduct clarificatory hearings
and even avail of ocular inspection to ascertain facts speedily. Hence, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the decision in a certification election case does not foreclose further dispute
as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship between HRC and
the complainants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Med-Arbiter Order dismissing the certification election case on the ground
of lack of employer-employee relationship between HRC and complainants constitutes res
judicata
HELD: NO
There is no question that the Med-Arbiter has the authority to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between the parties in a petition for certification election. BLR
has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to inter alia, decide all disputes, grievances or
problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether
agricultural or nonagricultural. Necessarily, in the exercise of this jurisdiction over labor
management relations, the med-arbiter has the authority, original and exclusive, to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties.
Apropos to the present case, once there is a determination as to the existence of such a
relationship, the med-arbiter can then decide the certification election case. As the authority
to determine the employer-employee relationship is necessary and indispensable in the
exercise of jurisdiction by the med-arbiter, his finding thereon may only be reviewed and
reversed by the Secretary of Labor who exercises appellate jurisdiction under Article 259 of
the Labor Code, as amended.
In this case, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order dismissing the certification election case
because of lack of employer-employee relationship between HRC and the members of the
respondent union. Considering their termination from work, it would have been futile for the
members of the respondent union to appeal the Med-Arbiter's order in the certification election
case to the DOLE Secretary. Instead, they pursued the illegal dismissal case filed before the
NLRC.

The Court is tasked to resolve the issue of whether the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal
case, is bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non-existence of
employer-employee relationship between the parties in the certification election case -- NO!
The facts in this case are very similar to those in the Sandoval case. In Sandoval, the DOLE
Undersecretary reversed the finding of the Med-Arbiter in a certification election case and
ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between the members of the
petitioner union and SSI, since the former were employees of the subcontractors.
Subsequently, several illegal dismissal cases were filed by some members of the union
against SSI. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties, citing the resolution of the DOLE Undersecretary in the
certification election case. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC ruling and held that the
members of the petitioner union were employees of SSI. On appeal, this Court affirmed the
appellate court's decision and ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in relying on
the pronouncement of the DOLE Undersecretary that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties. The Court cited the ruling in the Manila Golf case that the
decision in a certification election case, by the very nature of that proceeding, does not
foreclose all further dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-existence
of an employer-employee relationship between them.
The Med-Arbiter's order in this case dismissing the petition for certification, election on the
basis of non-existence of employer-employee relationship was issued after the members of
the respondent union were dismissed from their employment. The purpose of a petition for
certification election is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their
collective bargaining with the employer. The respondent union, without its member-
employees, was thus stripped of its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter's decision in the
certification election case. Thus, the members of the respondent union were left with no option
but to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal
dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter on the basis of the pronouncement of the
Med-Arbiter in the certification election case that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties, which the respondent union could not even appeal to
the DOLE Secretary because of the dismissal of its members, would be tantamount to
denying due process to the complainants in the illegal dismissal case. This, the Court
cannot allow.
Petition DENIED.

Case No. 3
=> APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA INVOLVING EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE

RELATIONSHIP
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION (SSC) vs. RIZAL POULTRY and LIVESTOCK

ASSOCIATION, INC., BSD AGRO INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and
SAN DIEGO
Arranged by: Liwag, Angelene L.
CHARACTERS:
• Angeles - complainant
• SSC – gov’t office
• Rizal Poultry Inc. and BSD Agro – Companies (Poultry business)
• San Diego – owner of Rizal Poultry Inc. and BSD Agro
FACTS:
Angeles had earlier filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against BSD Agro and its owner,
San Diego. The Labor Arbiter initially found that Angeles was an employee and that he
was illegally dismissed. --- On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the LA's Decision and
held that no employer-employee relationship existed between Angeles and Rizal Poultry
Inc. and BSD Agro -- that the duties performed by Angeles, such as carpentry, plumbing,
painting and electrical works, were not independent and integral steps in the essential
operations of the company, which is engaged in the poultry business. Angeles elevated the
case to the CA via petition for certiorari. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling and upheld the
absence of employer-employee relationship. Angeles moved for reconsideration but it was
denied by the CA. No further appeal was undertaken, hence, an entry of judgment was made.
At any rate, the SSC did not take into consideration the decision of the NLRC. It denied Rizal
Poultry Inc. and BSD Agro's motion to dismiss -- SSC's ratio: Decisions of the NLRC and other
tribunals on the issue of existence of employer-employee relationship between parties are not
binding on the SSC. At most, such finding has only a persuasive effect and does not constitute
res judicata as a ground for dismissal of an action. While it is true that the parties before the
NLRC and in this case are the same, the issues and subject matter are entirely different. The
labor case is for illegal dismissal with demand for backwages and other monetary claims, while
the present action is for remittance of unpaid SSS contributions. although in both suits the
respondents invoke lack of employer-employee relationship, the same does not proceed from
identical causes of action as one is for violation of the Labor Code while the instant case is for
violation of the SSS Law. A subsequent MR by respondents was likewise denied. The SSC
reiterated that the principle of res judicata does not apply in this case because of the "absence
of the indispensable element of 'identity of cause of action.'"
Respondents sought recourse before the CA by way of a petition for certiorari. The CA
reversed the rulings of the SSC and held that there is a common issue between the cases
before the SSC and in the NLRC; and it is whether there existed an employer-employee
relationship between Angeles and respondents/Rizal Poultry and BSD Agro. Thus, the
case falls squarely under the principle of res judicata, particularly under the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment, as enunciated in Smith Bell and Co. v. Court of Appeals.
SSC's CONTENTIONS:

-SSC maintains that the prior judgment rendered by the NLRC and CA, that no employer-
employee relationship existed between the parties, does not have the force of res judicata
by prior judgment or as a rule on the conclusiveness of judgment. It contends that the labor
dispute and the SSC claim do not proceed from the same cause of action in that the action
before SSC is for non-remittance of SSS contributions while the NLRC case was for illegal
dismissal. The element of identity of parties is likewise unavailing in this case. Aside from
SSS intervening, another employer, Rizal Poultry, was added as respondent in the case
lodged before the SSC. There is no showing that BSD Agro and Rizal Poultry refer to the
same juridical entity. Thus, the finding of absence of employer-employee relationship
between BSD Agro and Angeles could not automatically extend to Rizal Poultry.
Consequently, SSC assails the order of dismissal of the case lodged before it.
-SSC also claims that the evidence submitted in the SSC case is different from that
adduced in the NLRC case. Rather than ordering the dismissal of the SSC case, the CA
should have allowed SSC to resolve the case on its merits by applying the Social Security Act.
Rizal Poultry Inc. and BSD Agro’s CONTENTIONS:

-findings of the NLRC are conclusive upon the SSC under the principle of res judicata
and in line with the ruling in Smith Bell v. Court of Appeals. Respondents argue that there is
substantially an identity of parties in the NLRC and SSC cases because Angeles
himself, in his Petition, treated Rizal Poultry, BSD Agro and San Diego as one and the
same entity.
-oppose the view given by SSC that the evidence to prove the existence of employer-
employee relationship obtaining before the NLRC and SSS are entirely different. Respondents
opine that the definition of an employee always proceeds from the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.
ISSUE: Whether res judicata applies so as to prevent the SSC from resolving anew the
existence of employer-employee relationship, which issue was previously determined in the
NLRC case?
RULING: Yes, res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" applies. The
judgment in the NLRC case pertaining to a finding of an absence of employer-employee
relationship between Angeles and respondents is conclusive on the SSC case.
• Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule
39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment
in Rule 39, Section 47 (c). There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first
case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of
judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether
or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will
depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment
between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that
same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of
action is not required but merely identity of issue.
• The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior
judgment" would apply. || If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be
shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of
judgment" applies.
----Verily, the principle of res judicata in the mode of "conclusiveness of judgment" applies
in this case. The first element is present in this case. The NLRC ruling was affirmed by
the CA. It was a judicial affirmation through a decision duly promulgated and rendered final
and executory when no appeal was undertaken within the reglementary period. The
jurisdiction of the NLRC, which is a quasi-judicial body, was undisputed. Neither can the
jurisdiction of the CA over the NLRC decision be the subject of a dispute. The NLRC case was
clearly decided on its merits; likewise on the merits was the affirmance of the NLRC by the
CA.
With respect to the fourth element of identity of parties, we hold that there is substantial
compliance.
The parties in SSC and NLRC cases are not strictly identical. Rizal Poultry was impleaded as
additional respondent in the SSC case. Jurisprudence however does not dictate absolute
identity but only substantial identity. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a
community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even
if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.
BSD Agro, Rizal Poultry and San Diego were litigating under one and the same entity
both before the NLRC and the SSC. Although Rizal Poultry is not a party in the NLRC case,
there are numerous indications that all the while, Rizal Poultry was also an employer of
Angeles together with BSD Agro and San Diego. Angeles admitted before the NLRC that he
was employed by BSD Agro and San Diego from 1985 until 1997. He made a similar claim in
his Petition before the SSC including as employer Rizal Poultry as respondent. Angeles
presented as evidence before the SSC his Identification Card and a Job Order to prove his
employment in Rizal Poultry. He clarified in his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed before
SSC that he failed to adduce these as evidence before the NLRC even if it would have proven
his employment with BSD Agro. Most significantly, the three respondents, BSD Agro, Rizal
Poultry and San Diego, litigated as one entity before the SSC. They were represented by
one counsel and they submitted their pleadings as such one entity. Certainly, and at the very
least, a community of interest exists among them. We therefore rule that there is substantial
if not actual identity of parties both in the NLRC and SSC cases.
As previously stated, an identity in the cause of action need not obtain in order to apply
res judicata by "conclusiveness of judgment." An identity of issues would suffice.
The remittance of SSS contributions is mandated by the Social Security Act of 1997: SEC. 22.
Remittance of Contributions. — (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding Section shall
be remitted to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the
month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe.
Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable for their
payment and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay
besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date the
contribution falls due until paid. . .
The mandatory coverage under the Social Security Act is premised on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. which provides:
SEC. 9. Coverage. — (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon all employees not
over sixty (60) years of age and their employers. . .
Section 8 (d) of the same law defines an employee as any person who performs services
for an employer in which either or both mental or physical efforts are used and who
receives compensation for such services, where there is an employer-employee
relationship. The illegal dismissal case before the NLRC involved an inquiry into the
existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship. The very same
inquiry is needed in the SSC case. And there was no indication therein that there is an
essential conceptual difference between the definition of "employee" under the Labor
Code and the Social Security Act.
In the instant case, therefore, res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment"
applies. The judgment in the NLRC case pertaining to a finding of an absence of employer-
employee relationship between Angeles and respondents is conclusive on the SSC case.
A case in point is Smith Bell and Co. vs. CA, contrary to SSC, is apt and proper reference.
Smith Bell availed of the services of private respondents to transport cargoes from the pier to
the company's warehouse. Cases were filed against Smith Bell, one for illegal dismissal before
the NLRC and the other one with the SSC, to direct Smith Bell to report all private respondents
to the SSS for coverage. While the SSC case was pending before the CA, Smith Bell
presented the resolution of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-44620, which affirmed the NLRC,
Secretary of Labor, and Court of Appeals' finding that no employer-employee relationship
existed between the parties, to constitute as bar to the SSC case. We granted the
petition of Smith Bell and ordered the dismissal of the case. We held that the
controversy is squarely covered by the principle of res judicata, particularly under the
rule on "conclusiveness of judgment." Therefore, the judgment in G.R. No. L-44620 bars
the SSC case, as the relief sought in the latter case is inextricably related to the ruling in G.R.
No. L-44620 to the effect that private respondents are not employees of Smith Bell. The
Court further stated that the doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" also applies in criminal
cases.
In SSC Case No. 9-15225-01, Angeles is seeking to compel Rizal Poultry and Agro to remit
to the SSS all contributions due for and in his behalf, whereas in NLRC NCR CA 018066-99
(NLRC RAB-IV-5-9028-97-RI) Angeles prayed for the declaration of his dismissal illegal. In
SSC No. 9-15225-01, Angeles, in seeking to enforce his alleged right to compulsory SSS
coverage, alleged that he had been an employee of petitioners; whereas to support his
position in the labor case that he was illegally dismissed by petitioners BSD Agro and/or San
Diego, he asserted that there was an employer-employee relationship existing between him
and petitioners at the time of his dismissal in 1997. Simply stated, the issue common to both
cases is whether there existed an employer-employee relationship between private
respondent and petitioners at the time of the acts complaint of were committed both in SSC
Case No. 9-15225-01 and NLRC NCR CA 018066-99 (NLRC RAB-IV-5-9028-977-RI).

The issue of employer-employee relationship was laid to rest in CA G.R. SP. No. 55383,
through this Court's Decision which has long attained finality. Our affirmation of the NLRC
decision was an adjudication on the merits of the case.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the instant case falls squarely under the
umbrage of res judicata, particularly, under the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
Following this rule, as enunciated in Smith Bell and Co. and Carriaga, Jr. cases, We
hold that the relief sought in SSC Case No. 9-15225-01 is inextricably related to Our
ruling in CA G.R. SP No. 55383 to the effect that private respondent was not an
employee of petitioners.
The NLRC decision on the absence of employer-employee relationship being binding

in the SSC case, we affirm the dismissal by CA of the SSC case.
=>WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.

Case No. 4 - marivic
Topic: Burden of Proof Employer-Employee Relationship
Bitoy Javier vs. Fly Ace Corp. et al.

G. R. No. 192558, February 5, 2012
Facts:
➢ A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by petitioner Javier before the Labor Arbiter
➢ Petitioner Javier alleged that he was an employee of the respondent Fly Corp. and was
hired as pahinante.
➢ Javier executed an Affidavit of one Benjie Valenzuela, to prove that he was an
employee of Fly Corp.
➢ One morning, Javier was barred from entering the premises of Fly Corp
➢ When he asked the reason why, the guard on duty replied that it was upon the
instruction of Mr. Ong, and when he asked Ong, Ong said, “tanungin mo ang anak
mo.”
➢ It turned out that Ong had been courting his daughter Annalyn
➢ Javier was thereafter terminated from his employment, thus he filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal
➢ Fly Ace was engaged in the business of importation and sales of groceries
➢ Fly Ace alleged that Javier was not its employee, Javier was contracted by Ong as
extra helper on pakyaw basis and presented acknowledgment receipt to prove
payment
➢ Fly Ace contended that there was no illegal dismissal
➢ Fly Ace averred that there is no employer-employee relationship
➢ According to Fly Ace, Javier was not issued with ID, no benefits, he was not required
to observe definite hours of work, not required to report daily, free to work elsewhere
➢ Fly Ace has no control over him
➢ The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that Javier
failed to present proof that he was a regular employee
➢ On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled in favor of Javier
➢ On appeal by Fly Ace to the CA, the CA reversed the decision of the NLRC
➢ Thus, the instant Petition for Review filed by Javier
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Javier was not a regular employee of
Fly Ace (or who has the burden of proving the existence of employee-employer relationship).

Held:
➢ No. The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Javier was not an employee of Fly
Ace.
➢ The employee, especially in illegal dismissal cases has the burden of proving the
existence of employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence
➢ On the other hand, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal of an
employee was for a valid cause
➢ Javier failed to establish or substantiate his claim that he was an employee of Fly Ace
or that the failed to prove the existence of employer-employee relationship
➢ To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power
of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct. Of these elements,
the most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right
to control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means
and methods by which the result is to be accomplished.
➢ In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist
in his case. He could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as
a regular employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly Ace could
dictate what his conduct should be while at work. In other words, Javiers allegations
did not establish that his relationship with Fly Ace had the attributes of an employer-
employee relationship on the basis of the above-mentioned four-fold test. Worse,
Javier was not able to refute Fly Aces assertion that it had an agreement with a hauling
company to undertake the delivery of its goods. It was also baffling to realize that Javier
did not dispute Fly Aces denial of his services exclusivity to the company. In short, all
that Javier laid down were bare allegations without corroborative proof.
➢ Petition denied.

Case No. 5 - CHA

TOPIC: WHETHER OR NOT THE LABOR ARBITER IS BOUND BY THE RULING OF THE
MED ARBITER ON THE ISSUE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EPIFANIO P. MEJARES, REMEGIO

C. BALURAN, JR., DANTE SAYCON, and CECILIO CUCHARO, represented by
NAMABDJERA-HRC, respondents.
FACTS
- Respondents were employees of HPI (HIJO PLANTATION INCORPORATED)
- HPI was renamed as HRC (HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION-PETITIONER in this
case) and respondents was employed as contractor-growers
- The respondents formed a UNIOIN called NAMABDJERA-HRC
- When HRC learned that the respondents formed a union, the respondets were terminated.
- Respondents filed with the NLRC an illegal dismissal case against HRC.
- DOLE Med Arbiter ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between
respondents and HRC.
- Respondents instead of filing an appeal pursued the illegal dismissal in which HRC filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground the the decision of the Med Arbiter had become final and
executory because of respondents failure to appeal.
- The LA ruled that the finding of the Med Arbiter does not bar the Labor Arbiter from making
his own independent finding on the same issue thus the LAorder the respondents to file
their position papers with the NLRC. (ruled in favor of respondents)
- The NLRC ruled that the Med-Arbiter exercises quasi-judicial power and the Med-
Arbiter's decisions and orders have, upon their finality, the force and effect of a nal
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. (ruled in favor of HRC)
- CA ruled in favor or respondents hence this appeal
ISSUE
Whether the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal case, is bound by the ruling of the
Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non-existence of employer-employee relationship
between the parties in the certification election case?
Ruling
No
- The Med arbiter has the authority original and exclusive to determine the existence of an
E-E relationship betwwen the parties. The decision of Med Arbiter may only be reviewed
and reversed by the Sec of Labor who exercise appellate jurisdiction under Article 259 of
Labor Code
- In this case, the Med Arbiter's order in this case dismissing the petition for certification,
election on the basis of non existence of employer-employee relationship was issued after
the members of the respondent union were dismisseed from their employment.
- The purpose of a petition for certification election is to determine which organization will
represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer.
- The respondent union, without its member employees was thus stripped of its personalty
to challenge the Med-Arbiter's decision in the certification election case.
- Thus, the members of the respondent union were left with no option but to pursue their
illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter.
- To dismiss the illegal dismmisal case filed before te LA on the basis of the pronouncement
of the Med Arbiter in the ceritification election case that there was no employer-emplyee
relationship between the parties, which the respondent union could not even appeal to the
DOLE Secretary because of the dismisaal of its members, would be tantamount to denying
due process to the complainants in the illegal dismissal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 29 August 2012 Decision and the 13
August 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04058MIN.
__

IMPORTANTE!!! BASAHIN MAIGI!!
Case No. 6 -
2 topics ito ha?
1 - PRESENTATION BEFORE THE LABOR ARBITER OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

NOT PRESENTED TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING INVESTIGATION
2 - RULE ON THE FILING OF PLEADING NOT DONE PERSONALLY
arranged by: Liwag, Angelene L.

__
ALBERTO J. RAZA vs. DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC. and MAMORU ONO
CHARACTERS:
Raza - was hired as a driver by Daikoku Electronics
One - Daikoku Electronics' President
FACTS:
Raza claims that his working days and hours depended on Ono's schedule and needs, so it
was not unusual for him to be ordered to work from very early in the morning up to past
midnight of any day, including Sundays.
One evening, Raza dropped Ono off at the latter's residence (Pacific Plaza Condo in Makati
City). But Raza, instead of parking the company vehicle at the condominium building's parking
area, drove the vehicle to his home and parked it there overnight (shala-er si driver!). The
next morning, as Raza was about to fetch Ono, the latter confronted him and asked why the
vehicle was not at the condo parking lot. Raza replied with a lie, telling Ono that he parked the
car at the condo building but in the wrong slot. Three (3) days later, Raza was served a
company Notice of Violation of the Code of Conduct for Dishonesty. Raza submitted his written
explanation wherein he admitted bringing the car to his home without permission and lying
about it to Ono. He apologized for these infractions but he also indicated that he was previously
told by Ono that he could use the car if he needed to.
The company's Investigation Committee conducted a hearing wherein Raza again admitted
bringing the car home and lying about it to Ono, but Raza reiterated that there were previous
occasions when Ono authorized him to bring the vehicle home. Recommendation: suspension
for twelve (12) days without pay for the offenses of parking the company vehicle at home
without authority and for lying about it. However, disregarding such recommendation, the
company's General Affairs Manager Gaytano sent a letter terminating Raza's services for
dishonesty. Daikoku Company explain that the harsher punishment was imposed because at
the meeting of the board of directors, Ono denied permitting Raza to use the company car and
even presented a report from the Pacific Plaza Security Office stating that from May 1 to July
20, 2003, Raza did not park the company car at the said building for a total of 31 instances,
all without authority nor permission -- ayy nakoooo!
Raza filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for damages and attorney's fees.
LA: in favor of Raza - dismissal was unlawful daw - violations of Raza daw are unsubstantiated
by evidence. so syempre Employer appealed sa NLRC -- the NLRC dismissed the appeal due
to Daikoku's failure to include a certificate of non-forum shopping and lack of proper

verification.
A motion for reconsideration with manifestation and compliance was filed by rDaikoku. It was
duly opposed by Raza, who alleged that the same was filed out of time.***** Raza states that
the deadline for filing the said motion was October 21, 2005, but there was allegedly a
certification from the postmaster that the latter's office was without any clear record of mailing,
or even a record of mailing or dispatch. Raza admits, however, that the envelopes sent to the
NLRC and his counsel all indicate through stamps and handwritten markings that the mailing
date was October 21, 2005. ***
NLRC: reinstated the appeal of respondents and ruled that the application of technical rules
of procedure may be relaxed to meet the demands of substantial justice; set aside the findings
of the LA and ruled in favor of Daikoku; Raza was not illegally dismissed since the infractions
he committed were a just cause for dismissal.
CA: rejected Raza's allegation that Daikoku' s motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's
Resolution was filed late with the NLRC, stating that Raza failed to substantiate such allegation
with evidence. Then, it found that Raza's dishonesty, consisting of parking the vehicle at his
home overnight and lying about it to Ono, is deserving of the sanction of dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether Daikoku's Motion for Consideration was submitted on time with the NLRC?
RULING: Yes.
Raza's contentions are untenable.
RULE ON THE FILING OF PLEADING NOT DONE PERSONALLY --

At any rate, this Court finds nothing out of the ordinary nor irregular in the mailing of the motion
of respondents as would put in doubt the timeliness of its filing. The mailing of the motion was
done on the deadline for the filing and service of such, which was October 21, 2005, as
indicated by the post office on the envelopes as well as in the registry receipts sent to the
NLRC. Thus, the motion is considered filed on that date and the filing was on time. Petitioner
does not dispute but even admits the fact that the envelopes and registry receipts bear that
date. *** The rule is that whenever the filing of a motion or pleading is not done
personally, the date of mailing (by registered mail), as indicated by the post office on
the envelope or the registry receipt, is considered as the date of filing (ITO HA?????)
The fact that the post office indicated October 21, 2005 on the envelope and receipts as the
mailing date, as examined first-hand by the NLRC based on its records, entitles respondents
to the presumption that the motion was indeed mailed on said date. Official duties — in this
case, of a post office employee are presumed to be regularly performed, unless there is an
assertion otherwise and the one so asserting rebuts such with affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. In addition, the stamps and marks made by the postal
w orker are considered entries in the regular course of duty which are considered accurate
unless proven otherwise.
The postmaster's belated certification that there is no clear record of mailing or dispatch or
that dispatch or delivery was done on a later date does not contradict the fact of mailing done
on October 21, 2005. On the contrary, the evidence disputes the postmaster's certification.
In Raza's own Second Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt, the post office's copies of
Registry Receipt Number 1421 (which corresponds to the mailing done to Raza's counsel
(Atty. Gesmundo) of his copy of the motion) and Receipt Number 1422 (which corresponds to
the mailing of the NLRC's copy) were submitted in evidence to the NLRC. 43 The receipts
were clearly marked "V. Gesmundo" and "NLRC," respectively, the names of the recipients.
44 Then, the date November 2, 2005, which appears thereon and which the postmaster
certified as the date of "dispatch" does not negate the fact of mailing done on October 21,
2005. That the mail was dispatched or delivered by the postal service on a later date that it
was deposited or "mailed" by the sender is only logical. And it is only probable that there would
be a delay of a few days between the mailing and delivery. As to the alleged absence of a
"clear record of mailing," the same only refers to the office's own record, but the stamps and
marks of October 21, 2005 on the envelopes are also a record and are reliable evidence of
mailing done on that date. ****** Also, it has been held that between the belated
certification of the postmaster and the marking or stamping done by the post office at
the time of mailing, the latter is preferred as evidence for having been done closer to
the transaction in question, especially in this case when the postmaster's certification
does not even clearly allege nor prove any irregularity or mistake made in such marking
or stamping.
_
Raza has no evidence of having obtained permission other than his mere assertion.
The Court expects proof from Raza because his claims go against ordinary experience and
common practice among companies. A company's executive vehicle is usually for the personal
service of the person to whom it is assigned and is supposed to be available solely to the latter
at any given time. It is rarely made available for the personal use and service of the chauffeur
even if the executive is already home and retired for the night and the chauffeur himself has
to go to his own residence that is away from his master's residence. By taking the vehicle out
and driving it to his home, the driver exposes such company property to the risk of damage or
loss due to collisions, theft or even untoward incidents such as a fire or civil disturbance. There
is also a risk of company liability to third persons arising from such use. In addition, such use
is not free of costs, since the extra journey entails fuel use, wear and tear, and other allied
expenses. Therefore, it can be safely held that use of a company vehicle for a driver's personal
needs is more of an e x ce p t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e r a t h e r t h a n t h e n o r m . I t ca n n o
t b e p r e s u m e d a s bestowed on every employee, not even a chauffeur, so that one who
claims to have it has the obligation to provide proof of his authority, permission or privilege for
the use to be considered warranted.
In the present situation wherein Raza has already been found guilty of numerous acts of
driving the company vehicle for his personal use without prior authority, the Court cannot
expect and require the employer company to wait for one more such instance of unauthorized
use or for actual damage to be caused by such use before the company can be considered
justified in penalizing the erring employee.
___
ito naman re PRESENTATION BEFORE THE LABOR ARBITER OF DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE NOT PRESENTED TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING INVESTIGATION~
Court disagrees with the Labor Arbiter's finding that the infractions were too light and do not
merit the supreme sanction of dismissal. The arbiter's finding is grounded on her incorrect
disregard of the security guards' report on the thirty-one (31) alleged prior incidents, which she
claimed was not included in the notice of violation and was not presented during the hearing
by the investigating committee. **
-- the presentation of the security guards' report for the first time with the Labor Arbiter through
the respondents' Position Paper is neither too late nor improper. For one thing, the NLRC is
not restricted by the technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the
application of its rules in hearing and deciding labor cases.
Revised Rules of Procedure - 2011 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission:
Section 2. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives
of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines and other relevant legislations, and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement of
labor disputes.
Revised Rules of Procedure and the NLRC Rules:

Section 10. Technical rules not binding. — The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard
to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
And far more importantly, it is precisely at the stage of the filing of the position paper that
the parties are required to submit "supporting documents and affidavits" to bolster
their causes of action or defenses, as the case may be. Hence, it was just proper and
the most opportune time that the said report was presented at that stage and at the
level of the Labor Arbiter.
Then, too, it is with the Labor Arbiter that Raza had the chance to refute, contradict or
deny the veracity of the report. He had every opportunity to present his own
controverting evidence to impeach the credibility of such evidence. He did none of that.
The fact that he is often tired right after driving Ono to the latter's residence every night and
the fact that he is still required to report early the next day does not entitle him to the use of
the company car as his own service vehicle, as such entails risks and expenses to the
company that the latter has not consented to facing. The Court likewise fails to see how the
personal use of the car could have greatly benefited Raza's work performance, since he
himself claimed in his Position Paper that he did not live far, as he also resided in Makati City,
which is the same city as his master Ono's residence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Case No. 7 – Mikhail IMPORTANTE!!! BASAHIN MAIGI!!
[G.R. No. 189255. June 17, 2015.]
JESUS G. REYES, petitioner, vs. GLAUCOMA RESEARCH
FOUNDATION, INC., EYE REFERRAL CENTER and MANUEL B.
AGULTO, respondents.
TOPIC: EFFECT OF VERIFICATION NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES ON

NOTARIAL PRACTICE
FACTS
The instant petition arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by petitioner Reyes
against respondent Glaucoma Research with the NLRC.
• August 1, 2003, Petitioner Reyes was hired by respondent Glaucoma as
administrator of the latter's Eye Referral Center (ERC);
• Petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Manuel Agulto (Agulto), who is the Executive
Director of respondent corporation, informing the latter that he has not been
receiving his salaries since February 2005 as well as his 14th month pay for 2004;
petitioner did not receive any response from Agulto; on April 21, 2005, petitioner was
informed by the Assistant to the Executive Director as well as the Assistant
Administrative Officer, that he is no longer the Administrator of the ERC;
subsequently, petitioner's office was padlocked and closed without notice; he

still continued to report for work but on April 29, 2005 he was no longer allowed by
the security guard on duty to enter the premises of the ERC.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
there is no employer-employee relationship between them because respondents
had no control over petitioner in terms of working hours as he reports for work
at anytime of the day and leaves as he pleases; respondents also had no control
as to the manner in which he performs his alleged duties as consultant.
LABOR ARBITER: DISMISSED

Petitioner failed to establish that the elements of an employer-employee relationship
existed between him and respondents because he was unable to show that he was, in
fact, appointed as administrator of the ERC and received salaries as such; he also failed to
deny that during his stint with respondents, he was, at the same time, a consultant of various
government agencies such as the Manila International Airport Authority, Manila
Intercontinental Port Authority, Anti-Terrorist Task Force for Aviation and Air Transportation
Sector; his actions were neither supervised nor controlled by the management of the ERC;
petitioner, likewise, did not observe working hours by reporting for work and leaving
therefrom as he pleased; and, he was receiving allowances, not salaries, as a consultant.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION: REVERSED LA’s DECISION

NLRC declared petitioner as respondents' employee, that he was illegally dismissed and
ordered respondents to reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and privileges with full backwages. The NLRC held that the basis upon which the
conclusion of the LA was drawn lacked support; that it was incumbent for respondents to
discharge the burden of proving that petitioner's dismissal was for cause and effected after
due process was observed; and, that respondents failed to discharge this burden.
COURT OF APPEALS: ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF THE

NLRC AND REINSTATED THE DECISION OF THE LA
The CA held that the LA was correct in ruling that, under the control test and the economic
reality test, no employer-employee relationship existed between respondents and petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Glaucoma Research petition for certiorari filed with the CA should have
been dismissed on the ground that it was improperly verified because the jurat portion of the
verification states only the community tax certificate number of the affiant as evidence of her
identity. –NO!
Whether employer-employee relationship exists between him and respondents. –NO!
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE:
This Court has already ruled that competent evidence of identity is not required in
cases where the affiant is personally known to the notary public. 9
Thus, in Jandoquile v. Revilla, Jr., 10 this Court held that:
If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show
their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under
Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which
an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary
public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the
instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation
before the notary public as to such instrument or document.
Thus, if the affiant is personally known to the notary public, the latter need not
require the former to show evidence of identity as required under the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, as amended.
Applying the above rule to the instant case, it is undisputed that the attorney-in-fact
of respondents who executed the verification and certificate against forum shopping, which
was attached to respondents' petition filed with the CA, is personally known to the notary
public before whom the documents were acknowledged. Both attorney-in-fact and the
notary public hold office at respondents' place of business and the latter is also the legal
counsel of respondents.
Heirs of Amada Zaulda v. Isaac Zaulda: [G]ranting, arguendo, that there was non-
compliance with the verification requirement, THE RULE IS THAT COURTS SHOULD
NOT BE SO STRICT ABOUT PROCEDURAL LAPSES WHICH DO NOT REALLY IMPAIR
THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
SECOND ISSUE:
The Court is not persuaded.
It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. 16 If he
claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on
the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. 17 The
test for determining on whom the burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as
to which party would be successful if no evidence of such matters were given.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and
engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the
presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of
control of the putative employee's conduct. Most determinative among these factors is
the so-called "control test."
What was glaring in the present case is the undisputed fact that petitioner was never
subject to definite working hours. He never denied that he goes to work and leaves therefrom
as he pleases. 31 In fact, on December 1-31, 2004, he went on leave without seeking
approval from the officers of respondent company. On the contrary, his letter 32 simply
informed respondents that he will be away for a month and even advised them that they
have the option of appointing his replacement during his absence. This Court has held that
there is no employer-employee relationship where the supposed employee is not
subject to a set of rules and regulations governing the performance of his duties
under the agreement with the company and is not required to report for work at any
time, nor to devote his time exclusively to working for the company.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 20, 2009 and August 25, 2009, respectively,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 104261, are AFFIRMED.
_

Case No. 8 – Solana - IMPORTANTE!!! BASAHIN MAIGI!!
EVIDENCE PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
MISAMIS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE (MORESCO II), petitioner,

vs. VIRGILIO M. CAGALAWAN, respondent.
[G.R. No. 175170. September 5, 2012.]
Note: Nadiscuss din natin to sa LabStan before
In labor cases, strict adherence with the technical rules is not required. This liberal policy,
however, should still conform with the rudiments of equitable principles of law. For instance,
belated submission of evidence may only be allowed if the delay is adequately justified
and the evidence is clearly material to establish the party's cause.
Facts:
➢ Moresco Appointed Cagalawan as Head for a line crew then he was transferred to another
area but only as a crew member.
➢ In a letter dated May 15, 2002, cagalawan assailed his transfer claiming he was effectively
demoted to his position as head of the disconnection crew to a mere member. He also
averted that such transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial to him.
➢ In a memorandum dated May 16, 2002 the Ke-e explained that said transfer was not a
demotion since he was holding the position only by mere designation and not appointment.
Meanwhile and in view of Cagalawan’s transfer, Ke-e issued an order recalling the former’s
previous designation as Acting Head of the disconnection crew of the Balingasag sub-
office.
➢ Cagalawan stopped reporting for work and filed a Complaint for constructive dismissal. As
evidence, Cagalawan submitted a certification executed by head of disconnection crew
attesting that said sub-office was not undermanned. During the proceedings before the
NLRC, MORECO II submitted a letter from Area Manager Engr. Canada requesting for two
additional disconnection linemen in order to attain the collection quota allocated in his area.
➢ MORESCO II failed to file a position paper before the labor arbiter.
➢ In its appeal against an adverse decision of the labor arbiter, it invoked the liberal
application of the rules and prayed for the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
to admit its evidence on appeal.
➢ The evidence consisted of a letter dated May 8, 2002 addressed to its General Manager
Amado Ke-e, from the area manager of its Gingoog City sub-office, requesting for two
additional disconnection linesmen in order to attain its collection quota. The evidence was
presented to justify the transfer of respondent Virgilio Cagalawan to its Gingoog sub-office.
Issue: Whether the evidence is admissible
Held: NO
Labor tribunals, such as the NLRC, are not precluded from receiving evidence submitted on
appeal as technical rules are not binding in cases submitted before them.
However, any delay in the submission of evidence should be adequately explained and
should adequately prove the allegations sought to be proven. In the present case,
MORESCO II did not cite why it had failed to file its position paper or present its cause before
the labor arbiter despite sufficient notice and time given to do so.
Only after an adverse decision was rendered did it present its defense and rebut the
evidence of Cagalawan, by alleging that his transfer was made in response to the letter-
request of the area manager of the Gingoog sub-office asking for additional personnel to meet
its collection quota which lends credence to Cagalawan’s theory that it may have just been
fabricated for the purpose of appeal. Nevertheless, Cagalawan, for his part, faithfully complied
with the transfer order but with the reservation to contest its validity precisely because he was
not adequately informed of its real basis.
Letter-request is not sufficient.
Standing alone, it is self-serving and cannot be considered competent evidence to

prove accuracy of allegations. The letter provides no more than bare allegations which
deserve not even the slightest credit. When there is doubt between the evidence submitted by
the employer and that by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the
employee. An employer’s cause could only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and
not on the weakness of the employee’s evidence.
"The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent." MORESCO II has
miserably failed to discharge the onus of proving the validity of Cagalawan's transfer.
Clearly, not only was the delay in the submission of MORESCO II's evidence not explained,
there was also failure on its part to sufficiently support its allegation that the transfer of
Cagalawan was for a legitimate purpose. This being the case, MORESCO II's plea that its
evidence be admitted in the interest of justice does not deserve any merit.
Hence, Cagalawan was constructively dismissed.

__

#9 – solis - Evidence Presented For The First Time On Appeal
Leopard Security And Investigation Agency vs. Tomas Quitoy, Raul Sabang And Diego
Morales
G.R. No.186344. February 20, 2013.|SOLIS
Facts:
• Sabang along with 3 others were hired as security guards by Leopard Security and
Investigation Agency (Leopard) and were assigned in Cebu, where they reside, to the
different branches of its only client Union Bank.
• Union Bank served a notice to Leopard, terminating the parties’ security service
contract effective at the end of business hours of 30 April 2005. Leopard informed
Sabang et al, on 30 April 2005 of the termination of its contract with Union Bank.
• On 3 May 2005, respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid 13th month
pay and SIL, damages as well as attorney’s fees against Leopard, Union Bank, its
Regional Service and Operations.
• With the complaint already docketed before the RAB No. VII of the NLRC in Cebu City,
Leopard sent on 10 May 2005 a notice requiring respondents to report for work to its
Mandaluyong City office. As respondents failed to do so, Leopard alleged that it issued
show cause letters on 21 June 2005, requiring the former to explain why they should
not be administratively sanctioned for their unexplained absences.
• LA found Leopard liable for the illegal dismissal of respondents. Faulting Leopard for
informing respondents of the termination of their services only on 30 April 2005 despite
Union Bank’s 1 April 2005 advice of the termination of its security service contract, the
Labor Arbiter ruled that the 10 May 2005 report to work order did not show a sincere
intention on the part of LSIA to provide respondents with other assignments.
• NLRC modified LA’s decision, finding that the filing of the complaint on 3 May 2005
was premature but upheld the Labor Arbiter’s award of separation pay, 13th month pay
and SILP.
• Belatedly submitting documents to prove its payment of SILP, Leopard filed a motion
for reconsideration of the foregoing decision which was, however, denied for lack of
merit in the NLRC’s 23 July 2007 Resolution.
Petitioner’s contention: Leopard faulted the NLRC for ignoring the evidence it submitted
alongside its motion for reconsideration to prove the payment of respondents’ SILP for the
years 2003, 2004 and 2005.
Issue: WON evidence presented first time during appeal in a labor case should be admitted.
Held: Yes. NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal,
because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. Considering that
labor officials are, in fact, encouraged to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts
speedily and objectively, with little resort to technicalities of law or procedure, Leopard
correctly faults the CA for likewise brushing aside the evidence of SILP payments it submitted
during the appeal stage before the NLRC.
* Regarding Illegal dismissal issue: SC found that there was no illegal dismissal on the part of
Leopard and abandonment of employment on the part of respondents. Court found that the
latter’s reinstatement without backwages is, instead, in order.

WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
dated 26 September 2008 is, accordingly, MODIFIED to direct the reinstatement of
respondents in lieu of the award of separation pay and to deduct the sum of P1,025.00 from
the SILP individually awarded in favor of respondents. The rest is AFFIRMED .
____________________________
TOPIC: 8. RULE ON THE FILING OF PLEADING NOT DONE PERSONALLY →  -
tolentino
(This is also a case under SUFFICIENCY OF APPEAL BOND)
SMART COMMUNICATIONS vs. SOLIDUM
G.R. No. 197763 December 7, 2015
FACTS:
• April 26, 2004: Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) hired Jose Leni Solidum (Solidum)
as Dept. Head of Smart Prepaid/Buddy Activations under the Product Marketing
Group.
As a department head, he shall approve project proposals coming from his
marketing assistants and product managers/officers. If the Company decides
to engage the services of a duly accredited creative agency, the department
head will coordinate with it to discuss the details of the project. The
implementation details and total amount of the project will then be included in
a Cost Estimate (CE) submitted to the Company, routed for approval, and
returned to the selected agency for implementation. After the project is carried
out, the agency will bill the Company by sending the CE with attached invoices
and other supporting documents.
• September 21, 2005: Solidum received a Notice to Explain from the Company
charging him with acts of dishonesty and breach of trust and confidence xxxx to
defraud Smart by conceptualizing fictitious marketing events, appointing fictitious
advertising agencies to supposedly carry out marketing events and submitting fictitious
documents to make it appear that the marketing events transpired.
• Solidum received a copy of the Notice on the same date. Pending administrative
investigation, Solidum was placed under preventive suspension without pay for a
period of thirty (30) days.
• In a letter, Solidum denied the charges and claimed that he never defrauded nor
deceived the Company in his transactions.
• Continued audit investigation revealed that Solidum approved/noted several CEs
covering activities for which payments were made but did not actually carried out.
Thus, the Company issued another Notice to Explain. Solidum was again preventively
suspended for another ten (10) days.
• Solidum then sent a letter to the Company requesting copies of the pertinent
documents so he can prepare an intelligible explanation. In another letter, Solidum
stated that the investigation is highly suspicious and his extended suspension imposed
undue burden. He also reserved his right to present evidence. In his last letter dated
October 28, 2005,10Solidum declared that he shall no longer receive or entertain
notices or memorandum, except the final decision resolving the administrative charges
against him.
• Thereafter, the Company issued a letter dated November 2, 2005, alleging that
Solidum refused to accept the documents that he had requested. Using this allegation,

the Company imposed an additional preventive suspension often (10) days on

Solidum. (20 days in total for the additional preventive suspension)
• Then Company decided to dismiss Solidum for breach of trust in a Notice of Decision
dated November 9, 2005.11 Corollarily, a Notice of Termination was served on him on
November 11, 2005.
LABOR ARBITER
• Nov. 19, 2005: Solidum filed a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal with
money claims before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC claiming that his extended
suspension and subsequent termination were without just cause and due process.
• July 3, 2006: LA declared that the extended period of suspension without pay was
illegal and that Solidum was unjustly dismissed from work without observance of
procedural due process. He was ordered reinstated and was awarded backwages and
monetary claims.
NLRC:
• The Company appealed the adverse decision of the labor arbiter to the NLRC but was
initially denied for having been filed out of time and/or for non-perfection
• Records show that Smart received a copy of the Decision on "July 10, 2006"; However,
Smart filed their appeal only on "July 25, 2006" x x x already beyond the reglementary
ten (10) calendar day period for filing an appeal to the Commission. x x x ALSO, the
appeal bond attached to it is not accompanied by a security deposit or collateral.
• In its MR, the Company insisted that the appeal was filed within the reglementary
period considering that it received the labor arbiter's decision only on July 13, 2006
and not July 10, 2006. It presented among others the Certification from Makati Central
Post Office, the pertinent page of the letter carrier's Registry Book, and the respective
affidavit of the letter carrier and the Company's receiving clerk.
• Also, the surety bond was secured by its goodwill and the alleged lack of collateral or
security will not render the bond invalid in view of the surety's unequivocal commitment
to pay the monetary award.
• NLRC issued a Resolution dated January 26, 2009 14 reversing its earlier ruling and
giving due course to the appeal. It upheld the certification of the postmaster over the
registry receipt and found that there was substantial compliance with the bond
requirement
CA
• Solidum appealed to the CA.
• The CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the NLRC that petitioner Jose Leni
Solidum be paid his salaries and benefits which accrued during the period of his
extended preventive suspension.
• Both parties moved for reconsideration which the CA denied
ISSUES:
• In G.R. No. 197763, Smart raises the following issues:

(A) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring illegal the second preventive
suspension imposed by petitioner Smart upon the respondent.
(B) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring that petitioner Smart may not place
the respondent under another preventive suspension after discovery of additional
offenses notwithstanding that the offenses committed by the respondent warrant
another preventive suspension.

• In G.R. No. 197836, Solidum raises the following issues

A. Whether or not the public respondent CA Decision ruling that the appeal of private
respondent Smart filed with public respondent NLRC was well taken within the
reglementary period, is in accordance with law, rules and prevailing jurisprudence.
B. Whether or not the public respondent Court of Appeal's Decision dated April 4, 2011
and Resolution dated July 14, 2011, considering private respondent Smart's appeal
with the NLRC as perfected by upholding the validity of the appeal bond posted by said
private respondent Smart even if there was no security deposit or collateral, is in
accordance with Section 4 and 6, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of
Procedure, NLRC Memorandum Circular 1-01, series of 2004, and prevailing
jurisprudence.
C. Whether or not the public respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to
consider the evidence petitioner showing that even up to the present, or more than five
(5) years after the expiration of the 10-day reglementary period to file a perfected
appeal with the NLRC on July 20, 2006, private respondent Smart still fails to provide
petitioner with a certified true copy of the surety bond and copy of the security deposit
required for the perfection of the appeal under Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC
Revised Rules of Procedure.
D. Whether or not the public respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the validity of the appeal bond filed by private respondent Smart
despite the fact that both the appeal bond and collateral securing the said bond had
long expired.
xxxx
RULING:
• The petitions must be denied.
• Solidum's 2nd preventive suspension is valid
• In G.R. No. 197763, Smart contended:
• On the same vein, the respondent was validly placed under second preventive
suspension for the reason that pending investigation of separate and distinct set of
offenses committed by the respondent as contained in the second Notice to Explain
dated 21 October 2005 , his continued presence in the company premises during the
investigation poses serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer
and co-workers.[17]
On the other hand, Solidum claims that his preventive suspension of 20 days is an
extension of his initial 30-day suspension and, hence, illegal and constitutes
constructive dismissal.
• Smart's position is impressed with merit.
• The relevant provisions regarding preventive suspensions are found in Sections 8 and
9 of Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Omnibus
Rules), as amended by Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997, which read as follows:
Section 8. Preventive suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned
under preventive suspension only if his continued employment poses a serious and
imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.
Section 9. Period of suspension. No preventive suspension shall last longer than
thirty (30) days.The employer shall thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in
a substantially equivalent position or the employer may extend the period of
suspension provided that during the period of extension, he pays the wages and other
benefits due to the worker. In such case, the worker shall not be bound to reimburse
the amount paid to him during the extension if the employer decides, after completion
of the hearing, to dismiss the worker, (emphasis supplied)
By a preventive suspension an employer protects itself from further harm or losses
because of the erring employee. This concept was explained by the Court in Gatbonton
v. National Labor Relations Commission:[18]
• Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the

company's property pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or
misfeasance committed by the employee. However, when it is determined that there
is no sufficient basis lo justify an employee's preventive suspension, the latter is
entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of preventive suspension. (emphasis
supplied)
• While the Omnibus Rules limits the period of preventive suspension to thirty (30) days,
such time frame pertains only to one offense by the employee. For an offense, it cannot
go beyond 30 days.
• However, if the employee is charged with another offense, then the employer is entitled
to impose a preventive suspension not to exceed 30 days specifically for the new
infraction. Indeed, a fresh preventive suspension can be imposed for a separate or
distinct offense. Thus, an employer is well within its rights to preventively suspend
an employee for other wrongdoings that may be later discovered while the first
investigation is ongoing.
• Smart was able to uncover other wrongdoings committed by Solidum during the
investigation for the initial charges against him. These newly discovered
transgressions would, thus, require an additional period to investigate. The first
batch of offenses was captured in the September 21, 2005 Notice to Explain issued by
Smart. For these offenses, Solidum was issued a preventive suspension without pay
for 30 days.
• The preventive suspension of 20 days is not an extension of the suspension
issued in relation to the September 21, 2005 Notice to Explain but is a totally
separate preventive suspension for the October 21, 2005 Notice to Explain. As
earlier pointed out, the transactions covered by the 30-day preventive suspension are
different from that covered by the 20-day preventive suspension. Such being the case
the court a quo was incorrect when it treated said suspension as an "extension" and,
consequently, it is a miscue to award Solidum the payment of back salaries and
benefits corresponding to the 20-day preventive suspension of Solidum.
As to the issues raised by Solidum in G.R. No. 197836, the same are bereft of merit.
• Smart's appeal from the Decision of the labor arbiter was filed within the
reglementary period
Solidum contends that Smart's motion for reconsideration of the labor arbiter's
Decision was filed out of time. The issue here is: When did Smart receive a copy of
the Decision? The confusion originated from the date stamped by the receiving clerk
of Smart on the receiving copy of the Decision as July 10, 2006. Smart claims that the
stamped date was erroneous as it actually received a copy of the Decision only on July
13, 2006. Such claim is supported by the certification from the postmaster of the Makati
Central Post Office, the letter carrier's Registry Book, and the affidavits of the letter
carrier and Smart's receiving clerk. With such overwhelming evidence, there can be
no other conclusion except that Smart received a copy of the Decision on July 13, 2006
and filed their motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 10-day period on July
25, 2006, as July 24, 2006 fell on a Sunday. Thus, Smart's Motion was timely filed.
Smart substantially complied with the requirements of an appeal bond

Solidum claims that the lack of proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond
renders the bond irregular and the appeal legally infirm.
We disagree.
As aptly found by the NLRC, substantial compliance with the rules on appeal bonds
has been repeatedly held by this Court to be sufficient for the perfection of an appeal:
xxxx As provided in Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, in case of a judgment
involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
However, not only in one case has this Court relaxed this requirement in order to bring
about the immediate and appropriate resolution of cases on the merits. In Quiambao
v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court allowed the relaxation of the
requirement when there is substantial compliance with the rule. Likewise, in Ong v.
Court of Appeals, the Court held that the bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed
when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when
the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. The Court held that "while the
bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain
cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the Rules or
where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial
bond."[20]
Furthermore, considering that it is the NLRC that has interpreted its own rules on this
matter, the Court is inclined to accept such interpretation. The Court has held, "By
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters
falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on those
matters."[21] Moreover, the NLRC properly relaxed the rules on appeal bonds.
In short, a substantial compliance may be allowed by the NLRC especially in this case
where the party which submitted the bond is a multibillion company which can easily
pay whatever monetary award may be adjudged against it. Even if there is no proof of
security deposit or collateral, the surety bond issued by an accredited company is
adequate to answer for the liability if any to be incurred by Smart.
---------------------------------------OTHER ISSUES-------------------------------------------
• Smart's appeal from the Decision of the labor arbiter was filed within the
reglementary period
• Solidum contends that Smart's motion for reconsideration of the labor arbiter's
Decision was filed out of time.
• The issue here is: When did Smart receive a copy of the Decision?
• The confusion originated from the date stamped by the receiving clerk of Smart on the
receiving copy of the Decision as July 10, 2006. Smart claims that the stamped date
was erroneous as it actually received a copy of the Decision only on July 13, 2006.
Such claim is supported by the certification from the postmaster of the Makati Central
Post Office, the letter carrier's Registry Book, and the affidavits of the letter carrier and
Smart's receiving clerk. With such overwhelming evidence, there can be no other
conclusion except that Smart received a copy of the Decision on July 13, 2006 and

filed their motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 10-day period on July 25,
2006, as July 24, 2006 fell on a Sunday. Thus, Smart's Motion was timely filed.
• Smart substantially complied with the requirements of an appeal bond
• Solidum is not entitled to reinstatement
Xxxx Similarly, Solidum contends that he did not receive other documents necessary
for him to be apprised of the charges against him. Such are also issues of fact. The
NLRC ruled on this matter in this wise:
The Commission is likewise not convinced with the finding of Labor Arbiter Pati that
complainant was deprived of due process when he was not furnished copies of the
documents he referred to in his letter dated October 24, 2005 thereby prompting him
not to attend the hearings on October 26 and 28, 2005. There is evidence to show
that respondents furnished copies of the documents requested by complainant
but which the latter refused to received when they were sent to his residence.25 x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
• Solidum was a managerial employee of Smart
• The rulings of trial court in criminal cases generally do not bind the labor
tribunals
WHEREFORE, the petition of Jose Leni Z. Solidum in G.R. No. 197836 is

hereby DENIED. The petition of petitioners Smart Communications, Inc, et al. in G.R.
No. 197763 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The CA Decision dated April 4, 2011 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of salaries and benefits that
accrued during the period of extended preventive suspension is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Topic: Contempt Powers of the NLRC – ZEE IMPORTANTE!!! BASAHIN MAIGI!!

Title: Federico S. Robosa, et al. vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 176085, February 8, 2012
Petitioner: FREDERICO ROBOSA et al.- rank and file employees of respondent, officers of
the union
Respondent: Chemo-Technische Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI) – acquired by Proctor and
Gamble
Facts:
• CTMI Employees Union-DFA, led by the petitioners filed a petition for certification
election at CTMI to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the company. It
failed to garner the votes required.
• Later on, respondent issued a memorandum demobilizing its sales territories and
abolishing its system of truck-sales representatives while simultaneously informing the
sales group of a new system(Salon Business Groups).
• Petitioner union asked for the withdrawal of respondent’s directives but the latter
ignored it. Instead it issued a notice of termination of employment of sales drivers due
to the abolition of their position.
• Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices against
CTMI, it also moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.
• During the compulsory arbitration proceedings, the union was prompted to file it to the
NLRC which then issued a TRO. It was upgraded to a writ of preliminary injunction
when the respondent refused to comply.
• Respondent moved for consideration but was denied by the NLRC who then directed
Labor Arbiter Cristeta Tamayo to hear the motion for contempt as urged by the union.
• The NLRC heard the contempt charge but issued its dismissal.
• Petitioner moved for reconsideration and subsequently sought relief from the CA.
However, the CA opined that the dismissal is not subject to review by an appellate
court. Hence this petition raising the issues.
Issue:
1. Whether the NLRC has contempt powers;
2. Whether the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable; and
3. Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the contempt
charge against the respondents.
Held:
1. Under Article 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any
offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in
accordance with law. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the
Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court.
• Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to
initiate indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be
observed only when there is no law granting them contempt powers. Article
218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered
or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect
contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have not improperly brought the indirect
contempt charges against the respondents before the NLRC.
2. The CA held that the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges against the
respondents amounts to an acquittal in a criminal case and is not subject to appeal.
This ruling is grounded on prevailing jurisprudence.
• The case cited Mison jr. v. Subido where Justice Reyes stressed “the contempt
proceeding far from being a civil action is of a criminal nature and of summary
character in which the court exercises but limited jurisdiction. It was then
explicitly held: Hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie from
the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt of court.”
3. No. The assailed NLRC ruling did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It rightly
avoided probing into issues which would clearly be in excess of its jurisdiction for they
are issues involving the merits of the case which are by law within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. The NLRC can inquire into them only on
appeal after the merits of the case shall have been adjudicated by the labor arbiter. An
act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when it was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit and
AFFIRM the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
__

Topic: PROBATIVE VALUE OF UNSUBSCRIBED AFFIDAVITS - Sharkus

CABALEN MANAGEMENT CO., INC vs. QUIAMBAO
G.R. No. 169494
March 14, 2007
Facts:
• It is a well-established rule that the employer has the burden of proving a valid
dismissal of an employee, for which it must be for a just or authorized cause and with
due process.
• Jesus Quiambao, et al. were charged of tip pocketing and swapping of dining order
slips with bar order slips, among others. They were dismissed from employment due
to said acts. They filed a case against Cabalen Management Co., Inc. (Cabalen) for
illegal dismissal but the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission was in favor of Cabalen. Quiambao, et al. elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals and the CA ruled otherwise. Cabalen sought to set aside the decision of
the CA which reversed the earlier rulings provided for by the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC. They also questioned the Resolution given by CA which denied their Motion for
Reconsideration.
• The assailed CA decision held that except for respondents Vizier Inocencio and
Vincent Edward Mapa whose petitions were dismissed pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7
of the Rules of the Rules of Court and Section 4 (a) of the Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, herein Quiambao, et al. were illegally dismissed from their employment. The
Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision, hence, Cabalen’s Motion for
Reconsideration became subject of this Resolution. To the Motion, Quiambao, et al.
filed their Opposition.
Issue:
• Whether or not Quiambao, et al. were illegally dismissed
Held:
• YES. It is a well-established rule that the employer has the burden of proving a valid
dismissal of an employee, for which two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must
be for any of the causes expressed in the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must be
accorded due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself.
• To establish a just or authorized cause for dismissal, substantial evidence or
“such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion” is required. Further required is that an
employee sought to be dismissed must be served two written notices before the
termination of his employment. The first notice must appraise him of the
particular acts or omissions upon which his dismissal is grounded; the second,
to inform him of the employer’s decision to terminate his employment. While the
failure of the employer to comply with these notice requirements does not make
the dismissal illegal as long as a just or authorized cause has been proved, it
renders the employer liable for payment of damages because of the violation of
the worker’s right to statutory due process.
• In the instant case, only photocopies of the statements of Balen and Malana form
part of the records despite Cabalen’s reliance thereon to prove respondents’
purported transgressions. Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC

held that the unsigned photocopies of daily time records (DTRs), which were
presented by the therein employer to show that its employee was neglectful of
his duties, were of “doubtful or dubious probative value.”
• Cabalen, et al. did not even heed their own procedures on disciplinary actions. The
only facts extant in the records are that respondents were issued above-said
Corrective Action Report (CARE) Forms asking them to explain their alleged infractions
within 48 hours; and they subsequently received notices of dismissal after they
submitted their written explanations. There is, however, nothing to show that before
their dismissal, Quimbao, et al. were informed of their immediate supervisors’ decision
to terminate their services, or that they were thereafter invited to an administrative
investigation before the HRD manager or officer who is tasked to conduct the
investigation in the presence of the employees’ immediate supervisor/s and the
witnesses, if necessary, as provided under Section IV of the company’s Code of
Conduct.
• No record of any administrative investigation proceeding, which under the company’s
rules was to be “minuted,” had also been presented. Hence, only Cabalen’s allegation
that the statements of the witnesses were taken as part of the administrative
investigation is before this Court. Allegations without proof do not deserve
consideration.
• Finally, on the dismissal of Quiambao allegedly on the ground of business losses, it
was incumbent upon Cabalen, et al. to prove it by substantial evidence. It did not,
however. In fact, Quiambao presented documents to disprove the validity of his
retrenchment on that ground. For petitioners’ failure to discharge its burden then, this
Court is constrained to hold that Quiambao’s dismissal was not valid.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

Topic: COMPLIANCE WITH PERIOD TO APPEAL MANDATORY - angela

FERNANDO G. MANAYA v. ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INCORPORATED
[G.R. No. 168988. June 19, 2007.]
FACTS:
• Manaya alleged that he was initially hired by Alabang Country Club, Inc. (ACCI) as a
maintenance helper. He was later designated as company electrician. He continued to
work for ACCI until he was informed by Engr. dela Cruz that his services were no
longer required by the company. Manaya alleged that he was forcibly and illegaly
dismissed without cause and without due process on 22 Aug 1998. Hence, he filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter.
• ACCI denied that Manaya was its employee. It countered by saying that Manaya was
employed by First Staffing Network Corporation (FSNC), with which ACCI had an
existing Memorandum of Agreement.
• Thus, by virtue of a legitimate job contracting, Manaya, as an employee of FSNC, came
to work with respondent, first, as a maintenance helper, and subsequently as an
electrician. ACCI prayed for the dismissal of the complaint insisting that Manaya had
no cause of action against it.
Labor Arbiter: Manaya is a regular employee of ACCI. His dismissal from the service having
been effected without just and valid cause and without the due observance of due process is
hereby declared illegal.
NLRC: ACCI's appeal was dismissed. NLRC found that ACCI's counsel of record Atty. Mailon
received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on or before 11 December 2000 as shown by
the postal stamp or registry return card. Said counsel did not file a withdrawal of appearance.
Instead, a Memorandum of Appeal dated 26 December 2000 was filed by the respondent's
new counsel, Atty. Arizala. Reckoned from 11 December 2000, the date of receipt of the
Decision by respondent's previous counsel, the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal by its new
counsel on 26 December 2000 was clearly made beyond the reglementary period. The NLRC
held that the failure to perfect an appeal within the statutory period is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional. The appeal having been belatedly filed, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter had
become final and executory. ACCI filed an MR which the NLRC denied.
ACCI filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals.
CA: Granted the petition and ordered the NLRC to give due course to ACCI's appeal of the
Labor Arbiter's Decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed an error when it ordered NLRC to give due course to
the appeal of ACCI even if said appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period of 10 days
for perfecting an appeal.
HELD: YES.
In granting the petition, the CA relied mainly on the case of Aguam v. Court of Appeals, where
this Court held that litigation must be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. The
appellate court further justified the grant of respondent's petition by saying that the negligence
of its counsel should not bind the respondent. It is axiomatic that when a client is represented
by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client. In the absence of a notice of withdrawal or
substitution of counsel, the Court will rightly assume that the counsel of record continues to
represent his client and receipt of notice by the former is the reckoning point of the
reglementary period. As heretofore adverted, the original counsel did not file any notice of
withdrawal. Neither was there any intimation by respondent at that time that it was terminating
the services of its counsel. For negligence not to be binding on the client, the same must
constitute gross negligence as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process.
This does not exist in the case at bar. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the
client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in
the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment, valid and regular
on its face. Even more, it is ACCI's duty as a client to be in touch with his counsel so as to be
constantly posted about the case. It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status
and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that all it has to do is sit back,
relax and await the outcome of the case.
On this score, we hold that the notice to respondent's counsel, Atty. Mailon on 11
December 2000 is the controlling date of the receipt of the decision.
Remarkably, in highly exceptional instances, the Court have allowed the relaxing of the rules
on the application of the reglementary periods of appeal. Technicality should not be allowed
to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the
parties. In all these, the Court allowed liberal interpretation given the extraordinary
circumstances that justify a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Clearly, the policy of
liberal interpretation is qualified by the requirement that there must be exceptional
circumstances to allow the relaxation of the rules. Absent exceptional circumstances, we
adhere to the rule that certain procedural precepts must remain inviolable, like those
setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is
doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to
avail oneself of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The rules, particularly
the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law,
must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless
delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.
Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted
by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the right
to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right
to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
In this particular case, we adhere to the strict interpretation of the rule for the following reasons:
Firstly, in this case, entry of judgment had already been made which rendered the Decision
of the Labor Arbiter as final and executory.
Secondly, it is a basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and in interpreting the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration. The interpretation herein made gives
meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article
4 of the Labor Code that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions
of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor
of labor." Indeed, there is no room for liberality in the instant case "as it would render futile the
very purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted." As so rightfully enunciated, "the
liberal interpretation in favor of labor stems from the mandate that the workingman's welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration." This Court has repeatedly ruled that
delay in the settlement of labor cases cannot be countenanced. Without doubt, to allow the
appeal of the respondent as what the Court of Appeals had done and remand the case to the
NLRC would only result in delay to the detriment of the petitioner. Nothing is more settled in
our jurisprudence than the rule that when the conflicting interest of loan and capital are

weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-
balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the under-privileged worker.
Thirdly, respondent has not shown sufficient justification to reverse the findings of the Labor
Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC. Pertinent provision of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 223. APPEAL. — Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only
on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft an
corruption;
(c) If made purely on question of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the 8nding of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable
damage or injury to the appellant.
Under the above provision, to obtain a reversal of the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the
respondent must be able to show in his appeal that any one of the above instances exists.
Respondent failed to show the existence of any of the above. A more than perfunctory reading
of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter shows that the same is supported by the evidence on
record.
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED.

=> EFFECT OF LATE SERVICE OF THE COPY TO APPEAL TO WINNING PARTY
MANILA MINING CORPORATION vs. LOWITO AMOR, ET AL.
arranged: Liwag, Angelene L.
CHARACTERS:
• MANILA MINING CORPORATION - domestic corporation which operated a mining claim
in Placer, Surigao del Norte, in pursuit of its business of large-scale open-pit mining for
gold and copper ore.
• LOWITO AMOR, ET AL. - were regular employees of petitioner Manila Mining Corporation
FACTS:
-In compliance with existing environmental laws, MANILA MINING CORPORATION
maintained Tailing Pond No. 7 (TP No. 7), a tailings containment facility required for the
storage of waste materials generated by its mining operations. When the mine tailings being
pumped into TP No. 7 reached the maximum level in December 2000, MANILA MINING
CORPORATION temporarily shut down its mining operations pending approval of its
application to increase said facility's capacity by the DENR-EMB. Although the DENR-EMB
issued a temporary authority for it to be able to continue operating TP No. 7 for another six (6)
months and to increase its capacity, MANILA MINING CORPORATION failed to secure an
extension permit when said temporary authority eventually lapsed. MANILA MINING
CORPORATION served a notice, informing its employees and the DOLE of the temporary
suspension of its operations for six months and the temporary lay-off of 2/3 of its employees.
After the lapse of said period, petitioner notified the DOLE that it was extending the temporary
shutdown of its operations for another six months.
-Adversely affected by MANILA MINING CORPORATION's continued failure to resume its

operations, LOWITO AMOR, ET AL. filed the complaint for constructive dismissal and
monetary claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
-Executive Labor Arbiter Pelaez rendered a Decision holding MANILA MINING

CORPORATION liable for constructive dismissal in view of the suspension of its operations
beyond the six-month period allowed under Article 286 of the Labor Code -- cause of
suspension of MANILA MINING CORPORATION's business was not beyond its control
(Lowito Amor, et al. to have been constructively dismissed + separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month pay or to at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher, a fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one whole year, moral
damages and exemplary damages in the amount of P10K and P5K), respectively, for each of
the respondents and attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent in the total amount of
P2,138,190.02.
***Aggrieved, MANILA MINING CORPORATION filed its memorandum of appeal before

the NLRC and moved for the reduction of the appeal bond to P100K, on the ground that
its financial losses in the preceding years had rendered it unable to put up one in cash and/or
surety equivalent to the monetary award. ---- In opposition, Amor et al moved for the dismissal
of the appeal in view of the fact that, despite receipt of the appealed decision on 24 November
2004, MANILA MINING CORPORATION mailed their copy of the memorandum of appeal
only on 7 February 2005. Amor et al also argued that the appeal bond tendered by MANILA
MINING CORPORATION was so grossly disproportionate to monetary award for the same to
be considered substantial compliance with the requirements for the perfection of an appeal
from a Labor Arbiter's decision.

that the continued suspension of petitioner's operations was due to circumstances beyond its
control, the NLRC ruled that, under Article 283 of the Labor Code, respondents were not even
entitled to separation pay considering the eventual closure of their employer's business due
to serious business losses or financial reverses.
Amor et al filed the Rule 65 petition for certiorari which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
00609. Insisting that MANILA MINING CORPORATION's memorandum of appeal was 6led
65 days after the lapse of reglementary period for appeal, respondents called attention to the
fact that, as grossly inadequate as it already was vis-à-vis the P2,138,190.02 16 monetary
award adjudicated in their favor, the check in the sum of P100Kdeposited by petitioner by way
of appeal bond was dishonored upon presentment for payment. Aside from the fact that the
Labor Arbiter's 25 October 2004 Decision had already attained 6nality, respondents faulted
the NLRC for applying Article 283 of the Labor Code absent allegation and proof of compliance
with the requirements for the closure of an employer's business due to serious business
losses. --- In its comment, on the other hand, petitioner claimed that, having caused the same
to be immediately funded, the check it issued for the appeal bond had since been deposited
by the NLRC. Insisting that the cessation of its operations was due to causes beyond its
control, petitioner argued that the subsequent closure of its business due to business losses
exempted it from paying separation pay.
CA: CA ruled that Manila Mining Corp. failed to perfect its appeal therefrom considering that
the copy of its 3 December 2004 Memorandum of Appeal intended for respondents was
served the latter by registered mail only on 7 February 2005. Aside from posting an unusually
smaller sum as appeal bond, petitioner was likewise faulted for replenishing the check it issued
only on 1 April 2005 or 24 days before the rendition of the assailed NLRC Decision. Applying
the principle that the right to appeal is merely a statutory remedy and that the party who seeks
to avail of the same must strictly follow the requirements therefor, the CA decreed that the
Labor Arbiter's Decision had already attained 6nality and, for said reason, had been placed
beyond the NLRC's power of review.
ISSUE: Whether the failure of a party to serve a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the
opposing party is a jurisdictional defect and does bar the NLRC from entertaining the appeal?
RULING: No.
right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. A party who seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of
the rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost. Insofar as appeals from decisions
of the Labor Arbiter are concerned, Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides
that, "(d)ecisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the [NLRC] by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt
of such decisions, awards or orders." In case of a judgment involving a monetary award,
the same provision mandates that, "an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the [NLRC] in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from." Alongside the requirement that "the appellant shall furnish a copy of the
memorandum of appeal to the other party," the foregoing requisites for the perfection of an
appeal are reiterated under Sections 1, 4 and 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure in
force at the time petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter's October 2004 Decision.

SECTION 1. PERIODS OF APPEAL. — Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter

shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, resolutions or orders of the Labor
Arbiter . . . . If the 10th . . . day . . . falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a holiday, the last day
to perfect the appeal shall be the next working day.
SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL. — (a) The Appeal shall be filed
within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be verified by
appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, with proof of
payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided
in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by memorandum of appeal in three (3)
legibly typewritten copies which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments
in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant
received the appealed decision, resolution or order and a certificate of nonforum
shopping ***************with proof of service on the other party of such appeal. A mere
notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop
the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
--Having received the LA’s Decision on 24 November 2004, petitioner had ten (10) calendar
days or until 4 December 2004 within which to perfect an appeal. Considering that the latter
date fell on a Saturday, petitioner had until the next working day, 6 December 2004, within
which to comply with the requirements for the perfection of its appeal. Our perusal of the record
shows that, despite bearing the date 3 December 2004, petitioner's memorandum of appeal
was subscribed before Notary Public Recidoro only on 6 December 2004. Without proof as
to the actual date of filing of said pleading being presented by both parties, the CA discounted
the timeliness of its filing in light of the established fact that the copy thereof intended for
respondents was only served by registered mail on 7 February 2005. Since proof of service of
the memorandum on appeal is required for the perfection of an appeal from the decision of
the Labor Arbiter, the CA ruled that "respondents filed its appeal not earlier than 07 February
200[5], which is way beyond the ten-day reglementary period to appeal."
As allegation is not evidence, however, the rule is settled that the burden of evidence lies with
the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. As the parties claiming the non-perfection of
petitioner's appeal, it was, therefore, respondents (Amor et al) who had the burden of
proving that said memorandum of appeal was, indeed, filed out of time. By and of itself,
the fact that the copy of memorandum of appeal intended for respondents was served upon
them by registered mail only on 7 February 2005 does not necessarily mean that
petitioner's appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision was filed out of time. On the
principle that justice should not be sacrificed for technicality, it has been ruled that the
failure of a party to serve a copy of the memorandum to the opposing party is not a
jurisdictional defect and does not bar the NLRC from entertaining the appeal.
Considering that such an omission is merely regarded as a formal lapse or an
excusable neglect, the CA reversibly erred in ruling that, under the circumstances,
petitioner could not have filed its appeal earlier than 7 February 2005.
The question regarding the appeal bond rises from the record which shows that, in addition to
its memorandum of appeal, petitioner filed a 6 December 2004 motion for the reduction of the
appeal bond on the ground that the cash equivalent of the monetary award and/or cost of the
surety bond have proven to be prohibitive in view of the tremendous business losses it
allegedly sustained. As supposed measure of its good faith in complying with the Rules,
petitioner attached to its motion Philam Bank Check No. 0000627153, dated 6 December
2004, in the amount of P100K only. As pointed out by respondents, however, said check was
subsequently dishonored upon presentment for payment for insufficiency of funds. In its 1 April
2005 Ex-Parte Manifestation, petitioner informed the NLRC that it "only learned belatedly that
the same check was dishonored" as there appeared to be "an inadvertent mix-up as other
checks issued for [its] other obligations were negotiated ahead [thereof], leaving an insufficient
balance in its account." As a consequence, petitioner claimed that "the deficiency in deposit
has been promptly and immediately replenished as soon as the check's dishonor was
reported" and that the same may already be re-deposited at any of NLRC's depositary banks.
The issue that has bedevilled labor litigation for long has been clari6ed by the ruling in
McBurnie v. Ganzon, et al., which built on and extended the ruling that while it is true that
reduction of the appeal bond has been allowed in meritorious cases on the principle that
substantial justice is better served by allowing appeals on the merits,7 it has been ruled that
the employer should comply with the following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond
shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the 6ling of the motion to reduce bond
shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
McBurnie ruling:
(a) The filing of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be entertained by the NLRC subject to
the following conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a reasonable
amount is posted;
(b) For purposes of compliance with condition no. (2), a motion shall be accompanied by the
posting of a provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10), of the monetary
award subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages and attorn
(c) Compliance with the foregoing conditions shall suffice to suspend the running of the 10-
day reglementary period to perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC;
(d) The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion to reduce bond and
determine the 6nal amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance
with the standards of meritorious grounds and reasonable amount; and
(e) In the event that the NLRC denies the motion to reduce bond, or requires a bond that
exceeds the amount of the provisional bond, the appellant shall be given a fresh period of ten
(10) days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the
required appeal bond.
In this case, we see that with no proof to substantiate its claim, petitioner moved for a
reduction of the appeal bond on the preferred basis of serious losses and reverses it
supposedly sustained in the years prior to the rendition of the Labor Arbiter's decision.
The first condition may be left for the nonce. As to the second condition, we may
consider that the amount of P100K supposedly posted was provisional bond sufficient
to suspend the running of the 10-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal from the
Labor Arbiter's decision.
That would however not improve petitioner's position one bit.

Having filed its motion and memorandum on the very last day of the reglementary
period for appeal, moreover, petitioner had no one but itself to blame for failing to post
the full amount pending the NLRC's action on its motion for reduction of the appeal
bond. If redundancy be risked it must be emphasized that the posting of a bond is
indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since it is the posting of a cash or surety bond which
confers jurisdiction upon the NLRC, the rule is settled that non-compliance is fatal and
has the effect of rendering the award final and executory.
CA cannot be faulted for no longer discussing the merits of petitioner's case. Although appeal
is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that the right
thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege.
Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law
is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the
rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory. Once a decision
attains finality, it becomes the law of the case and can no longer be revised, reviewed,
changed or altered. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
6nal at some definite date fixed by law.
Without proof of the serious business losses it allegedly sustained and/or compliance with
the reportorial requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code, petitioner cannot
expediently plead exemption from said liabilities due to the supposed 6nancial reverses
which led to the eventual closure of its business. It is essentially required that the alleged
losses in business operations must be proven for, otherwise, said ground for termination would
be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning business losses
or reverses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees. The condition of
business losses justifying retrenchment is normally shown by audited financial documents like
yearly balance sheets and pro6t and loss statements as well as annual income tax returns
which were not presented in this case.
-> WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Topic: Verification and Certification of Forum Shopping - marivic
Romeo Basan, et al. vs. NLRC and Coca Cola Bottlers

G. R. No. 174365-66, February 4, 2015
Facts:
➢ A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by petitioners Basan, et al. (route helpers)
➢ According to Basan, et al. they were dismissed without just cause and prior written
notice
➢ Basan further alleged that they were continuously hired by Coca Cola to perform duties
necessary and desirable to its business and therefore they are deemed regular
employees
➢ Respondent Coca Cola countered that it hired Busan, et al. merely as temporary route
helpers to act as substitute for its absent regular route helpers for a fixed period in
anticipation of the high volume of work
➢ The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Basan et al. and found that since they were
performing activities necessary and desirable to the usual business of petitioner for
more than the period of regularization, Basan et al. are considered regular employees
➢ The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision
➢ Coca Cola filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which reversed the decision of
the NLRC, and declared that Basan et al. are fixed term employees whose seasonal
employment have been set down
➢ Thus, the instant Petition filed by Basan, et al.
➢ Coca Cola opposed the petition and prayed for its dismissal since the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition was signed by only one of
the petitioners
Issue: Whether the instant petition should be dismissed for failure of ALL the petitioners to
sign the verification and certification of non forum shopping
Held: No.
(on procedural issue)
➢ The general rule is that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping must
be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of them, petitioner
Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be deemed substantial compliance with
the procedural requirement
➢ Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the rule on verification is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged
in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct
➢ Similarly, this Court has consistently held that when under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them
in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification
requirement
➢ Thus, the fact that the petition was signed only by petitioner Basan does not
necessarily result in its outright dismissal for it is more in accord with substantial justice
to overlook petitioners’ procedural lapses. Indeed, the application of technical rules of
procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice.

(on substantive)
➢ for years, petitioners were repeatedly engaged to perform functions necessary to
respondent’s business for fixed periods short of the six-month probationary period of
employment
➢ respondent’s act of hiring and re-hiring petitioners for periods short of the legal
probationary period evidences its intent to thwart petitioner’s security of tenure,
especially in view of an awareness that ordinary workers, such as petitioners herein,
are never on equal terms with their employers.

TOPIC: NEED FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIO/FAILURE TO FILE APPEAL BOND -

CHA
METRO TRANSIT VS PIGLAS-NFWU-KMU
FACTS
- Due to bargaining deadlock, PIGLAS filed a Notice of Strike before NCMB. Consequently
the Sec of DOLE issued an order of return of work but the striking employees refused to
return to work which leads to their termination of the respondents
- Respondents filed with LA for illegal dismisssal, ULP, moran and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
- LA in favor of respondents. Metro Transit are ordered to pay the separation pay and
backwages amounting to P208, 235,68272.
- Metro appealed to NLRC but it was dismissed for non perfection since it failed to post
the required bond
- Metro filed a Petition for Ceriorari ith the CA without filing a Motion for
Reconsideration
- CA dismissed the petition hence this appeal
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorai filed by Metro?
Ruling
- NO
- The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
- With regards to the bond.
Section 6, Rule VI of the Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission, as amended by Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2000provides, to wit:
"SECTION 6 BOND. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional
Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The appeal bond shall either be
in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of
damages and attorney's fees."
- In this case Metro filed a property bond applying the UERM ruling which was conditionally
accepted by the NLRC imposing the following conditions to submit the following
Certied copy of Board Resolution or a Certicate from the Corporate Secretary of
Light Rail Transit Authority stating that the Corporation President is authorized by a
Board Resolution to submit title as guarantee of judgment award; 2) Certied Copy
of the Titles issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City; 3) Certied Copy of
the current tax declarations of Titles; 4) Tax clearance from the City Treasurer of
Pasay City; 5) Appraisal report of an accredited appraisal company attesting to the
fair market value of property within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
- Metro failed to comply with the conditions hence its petition was denied.

IMPORTANTE!!! BASAHIN MAIGI!!
NEED FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/FAILURE TO FILE AN APPEAL BOND
ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE, petitioner, vs. EULALIO GANZON, EGI- MANAGERS, INC.
and E. GANZON, INC., respondents.
FULL TEXT RULING:

In light of pertinent law and jurisprudence, and upon taking a second hard look of the
parties' arguments and the records of the case, the Court has ascertained that a
reconsideration of this Court's Decision dated September 18, 2009 and Resolutions
dated December 14, 2009 and January 25, 2012, along with the lifting of the entry of
judgment in G.R. Nos. 186984-85, is in order.
=> The Court's acceptance of the third motion for reconsideration
At the outset, the Court emphasizes that second and subsequent motions for reconsideration
are, as a general rule, prohibited. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides that "[n]o
second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or 􏰔nal resolution by the same party shall be
entertained." The rule rests on the basic tenet of immutability of judgments. "At some point, a
decision becomes 􏰔nal and executory and, consequently, all litigations must come to an end."
58
The general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration
admits of settled exceptions. For one, the present Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,
particularly Section 3, Rule 15 thereof, provides:
Sec. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. — The Court shall not entertain a second
motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the
higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its
actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when
the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the
parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling
sought to be reconsidered becomes 􏰔nal by operation of law or by the Court's declaration.
XX
In a line of cases, the Court has then entertained and granted second motions for
reconsideration "in the higher interest of substantial justice," as allowed under the Internal
Rules when the assailed decision is "legally erroneous," "patently unjust" and "potentially
capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties." In Tirazona
v. Philippine EDS Techno-Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.), 59 we also explained that a second motion
for reconsideration may be allowed in instances of "extraordinarily persuasive reasons and
only after an express leave shall have been obtained." 60 In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land
Bank of the Philippines, 61 we allowed a second motion for reconsideration as the issue
involved therein was a matter of public interest, as it pertained to the proper application of a
basic constitutionally-guaranteed right in the government's implementation of its agrarian
reform program. In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 62 the Court set aside the decisions of
the LA and the NLRC that favored claimants- security guards upon the Court's review of San
Miguel Corporation's second motion for reconsideration. In Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine
Services, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 63 the Court en banc reversed on a third motion for
reconsideration the ruling of the Court's Division on therein private respondents' claim for
wages and monetary benefits. STaCcA
It is also recognized that in some instances, the prudent action towards a just resolution of a
case is for the Court to suspend rules of procedure, for "the power of this Court to suspend its
own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice
require it, cannot be questioned."64 In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 65 the Court, thus,
explained:
[T]he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. This power to suspend or
even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even
that which this Court itself has already declared to be 􏰔nal, as we are now compelled to
do in this case. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation
of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be
mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why
courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate
language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation." . . . . 66
(Citations omitted)
Consistent with the foregoing precepts, the Court has then reconsidered even decisions that
have attained 􏰔nality, 􏰔nding it more appropriate to lift entries of judgments already made in
these cases. In Navarro v. Executive Secretary, 67 we reiterated the pronouncement inDe
Guzmanthat the power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive
and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared 􏰔nal. The
Court then recalled in Navarro an entry of judgment after it had determined the validity and
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9355, explaining that:
Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall of entries of judgment in
light of attendant extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even disregard rules
of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself
had already declared 􏰔nal. In this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the
movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by the
judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct
interpretation of the provisions of the [Local Government Code (LGC)] with respect to the
creation of local government units. . . . . 68 (Citations omitted)
I n Muñoz v. CA, 69 the Court resolved to recall an entry of judgment to prevent a miscarriage
of justice. This justi􏰔cation was likewise applied in Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, 70
wherein the Court held that:
The recall of entries of judgments, albeit rare, is not a novelty. In Muñoz v. CA, where the case
was elevated to this Court and a 􏰔rst and second motion for reconsideration had been denied
with 􏰔nality, the Court, in the interest of substantial justice, recalled the Entry of Judgment as
well as the letter of transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals. 71 (Citation omitted)
In Barnes v. Judge Padilla, 72 we ruled: [A] 􏰔nal and executory judgment can no longer be
attacked by any of the parties
or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. However,
this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. 73 (Citations omitted) STCDaI
As we shall explain, the instant case also quali􏰔es as an exception to, 􏰔rst, the
proscription against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration, and second, the rule
on immutability of judgments; a reconsideration of the Decision dated September 18, 2009,
along with the Resolutions dated December 14, 2009 and January 25, 2012, is justified by the
higher interest of substantial justice.
To begin with, the Court agrees with the respondents that the Court's prior resolve to grant,
and not just merely note, in a Resolution dated March 15, 2010 the respondents' motion for
leave to submit their second motion for reconsideration already warranted a resolution and
discussion of the motion for reconsideration on its merits. Instead of doing this, however, the
Court issued on January 25, 2012 a Resolution 74 denying the motion to reconsider for lack
of merit, merely citing that it was a "prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to
Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended." 75 In League of Cities
of the Philippines (LCP) v. Commission on Elections, 76 we reiterated a ruling that when a
motion for leave to 􏰔le and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court,
the Court therefore allows the 􏰔ling of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case,
the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading. Similarly in this case,
there was then no reason for the Court to still consider the respondents' second motion for
reconsideration as a prohibited pleading, and deny it plainly on such ground. The Court intends
to remedy such error through this resolution.
More importantly, the Court 􏰔nds it appropriate to accept the pending motion for
reconsideration and resolve it on the merits in order to rectify its prior disposition of the main
issues in the petition. Upon review, the Court is constrained to rule differently on the petitions.
We have determined the grave error in a􏰔rming the NLRC's rulings, promoting results that
are patently unjust for the respondents, as we consider the facts of the case, pertinent law,
jurisprudence, and the degree of the injury and damage to the respondents that will inevitably
result from the implementation of the Court's Decision dated September 18, 2009.
=> The rule on appeal bonds
e emphasize that the crucial issue in this case concerns the su􏰔ciency of the appeal
bond that was posted by the respondents. The present rule on the matter is Section 6, Rule
VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, which was substantially the same provision in effect
at the time of the respondents' appeal to the NLRC, and which reads:
RULE VI APPEALS
Sec. 6. BOND. — In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond. The appeal bond shall either be in cash or surety in
an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
xxx xxx xxx

No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon
the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
The 􏰔ling of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding
paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
IaEScC
While the CA, in this case, allowed an appeal bond in the reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00 and then ordered the case's remand to the NLRC, this Court's Decision
dated September 18, 2009 provides otherwise, as it reads in part:
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving

monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The lawmakers clearly
intended to make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the
employer as inferred from the provision that an appeal by the employer may be
perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word "only" makes it
clear that the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer is the essential and
exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected. . . . .
Moreover, the 􏰔ling of the bond is not only mandatory but a jurisdictional requirement as well,
that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance
therewith renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter 􏰔nal and executory. This requirement is
intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money
judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It is intended to
discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their
employees' just and lawful claims.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, it behooves the Court to give utmost regard to the legislative and administrative
intent to strictly require the employer to post a cash or surety bond securing the full
amount of the monetary award within the 10[-]day reglementary period.Nothing in the
Labor Code or the NLRC Rules of Procedure authorizes the posting of a bond that is
less than the monetary award in the judgment, or would deem such insu􏰔􏰔cient posting
as su􏰔􏰔cient to perfect the appeal.
While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions
that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2)
areasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise
the 􏰔ling of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an
appeal. The quali􏰔cation effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the
cash bond within the 10[-lday reglementary period,the employer is still expected to post the
cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10[-]day period. If the NLRC does
eventually grant the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct
relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the
10- day period. 77 (Emphasis supplied; underscoring ours)
To begin with, the Court recti􏰔es its prior pronouncement — the unquali􏰔ed statement that
even an appellant who seeks a reduction of an appeal bond before the NLRC is expected to
post a cash or surety bond securing the full amount of the judgment award within the 10-day
reglementary period to perfect the appeal.
=> The suspension of the period to perfect the appeal upon the filing of a motion to reduce
bond
To clarify, the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter provides that the 􏰔ling of a motion to
reduce bond, coupled with compliance with the two conditions emphasized in Garcia v. KJ
Commercial 78 for the grant of such motion, namely, (1) a meritorious ground, and (2) posting
of a bond in a reasonable amount, shall su􏰔􏰔ce to suspend the running of the period to perfect
an appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC. 79 To require the full amount of the
bond within the 10-day reglementary period would only render nugatory the legal provisions
which allow an appellant to seek a reduction of the bond. Thus, we explained in Garcia:
CaSHAc
The 􏰔􏰔ling of a motion to reduce bond and compliance with the two conditions stop the
running of the period to perfect an appeal. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the motion to reduce bond, and it may
rule on the motion beyond the 10-day period within which to perfect an appeal.
Obviously, at the time of the 􏰔ling of the motion to reduce bond and posting of a bond in a
reasonable amount, there is no assurance whether the appellant's motion is indeed based on
"meritorious ground" and whether the bond he or she posted is of a "reasonable amount."
Thus, the appellant always runs the risk of failing to perfect an appeal.
. . . In order to give full effect to the provisions on motion to reduce bond, the appellant
must be allowed to wait for the ruling of the NLRC on the motion even beyond the 10-
day period to perfect an appeal. If the NLRC grants the motion and rules that there is
indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then
the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the motion, the appellant may still 􏰔le a
motion for reconsideration as provided under Section 15, Rule VII of the Rules. If the NLRC
grants the motion for reconsideration and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground and
that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC
denies the motion, then the decision of the labor arbiter becomes final and executory.
xxx xxx xxx
In any case, the rule that the 􏰔􏰔ling of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running
of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court may relax the rule. In Intertranz
Container Lines, Inc. v. Bautista, the Court held:
"Jurisprudence tells us that in labor cases, an appeal from a decision involving a
monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond. The
Court, however, has relaxed this requirement under certain exceptional circumstances
in order to resolve controversies on their merits. These circumstances include: (1)
fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage of
justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances of the case combined
with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved." 80 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
A serious error of the NLRC was its outright denial of the motion to reduce the bond,
without even considering the respondents' arguments and totally unmindful of the
rules and jurisprudence that allow the bond's reduction. Instead of resolving the motion
to reduce the bond on its merits, the NLRC insisted on an amount that was equivalent
to the monetary award, merely explaining:
We are constrained to deny respondents['] motion for reduction. As held by the Supreme Court
in a recent case, in cases involving monetary award,an employer seeking to appeal the Labor
Arbiter's decision to the Commission is unconditionally required by Art. 223, Labor Code to
post bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award (Calabash Garments vs. NLRC,
G.R. No. 110827, August 8, 1996). . . . 81 (Emphasis ours)
When the respondents sought to reconsider, the NLRC still refused to fully decide on the
motion. It refused to at least make a preliminary determination of the merits of the appeal, as
it held: SDcITH
We are constrained to dismiss respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents'
contention that the appeal bond is excessive and based on a decision which is a patent nullity
involve[s] the merits of the case. . . . 82
=> Prevailing rules and jurisprudence allow the reduction of appeal bonds.
By such haste of the NLRC in peremptorily denying the respondents' motion without
considering the respondents' arguments, it effectively denied the respondents of their
opportunity to seek a reduction of the bond even when the same is allowed under the rules
and settled jurisprudence. It was equivalent to the NLRC's refusal to exercise its discretion, as
it refused to determine and rule on a showing of meritorious grounds and the reasonableness
of the bond tendered under the circumstances.83 Time and again, the Court has cautioned
the NLRC to give Article 223 of the Labor Code, particularly the provisions requiring bonds in
appeals involving monetary awards, a liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of
resolving controversies on the merits.84 The NLRC's failure to take action on the motion to
reduce the bond in the manner prescribed by law and jurisprudence then cannot be
countenanced. Although an appeal by parties from decisions that are adverse to their interests
is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it is an essential part of our judicial system.
Courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every party has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition
of their cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.85 Considering the mandate of labor
tribunals, the principle equally applies to them.
Given the circumstances of the case, the Court's a􏰔rmance in the Decision dated September
18, 2009 of the NLRC's strict application of the rule on appeal bonds then demands a re-
examination. Again, the emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. 86 Section 2, Rule I of the NLRC Rules of Procedure also provides
the policy that "[the] Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines and other relevant legislations, and to assist
the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement of labor
disputes." 87
In accordance with the foregoing, although the general rule provides that an appeal in labor
cases from a decision involving a monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of
a cash or surety bond, the Court has relaxed this requirement under certain exceptional
circumstances in order to resolve controversies on their merits. These circumstances include:
(1) the fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (2) the prevention of miscarriage of
justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances of the case combined with its
legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved.88 Guidelines that are applicable in the
reduction of appeal bonds were also explained in Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corporation. 89
The bond requirement in appeals involving monetary awards has been and may be relaxed in
meritorious cases, including instances in which (1) there was substantial compliance with the
Rules, (2) surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the
bond, (3) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired
objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4) the appellants, at the very least,
exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary
period. 90
In Blanca􏰔or v. NLRC, 91 the Court also emphasized that while Article 223 92 of the Labor
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, which requires a cash or surety bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from may be considered
a jurisdictional requirement for the perfection of an appeal, nevertheless, adhering to the
principle that substantial justice is better served by allowing the appeal on the merits to be
threshed out by the NLRC, the foregoing requirement of the law should be given a liberal
interpretation. CAIHaE
As the Court, nonetheless, remains 􏰔rm on the importance of appeal bonds in appeals from
monetary awards of LAs, we stress that the NLRC, pursuant to Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure, shall only accept motions to reduce bond that are coupled with the posting
of a bond in a reasonable amount. Time and again, we have explained that the bond
requirement imposed upon appellants in labor cases is intended to ensure the satisfaction of
awards that are made in favor of appellees, in the event that their claims are eventually
sustained by the courts.93 On the part of the appellants, its posting may also signify their good
faith and willingness to recognize the 􏰔nal outcome of their appeal.
At the time of a motion to reduce appeal bond's 􏰔ling, the question of what constitutes "a
reasonable amount of bond" that must accompany the motion may be subject to differing
interpretations of litigants. The judgment of the NLRC which has the discretion under the law

to determine such amount cannot as yet be invoked by litigants until after their motions to
reduce appeal bond are accepted.
Given these limitations, it is not uncommon for a party to unduly forfeit his opportunity
to seek a reduction of the required bond and thus, to appeal, when the NLRC eventually
disagrees with the party's assessment. These have also resulted in the 􏰔ling of
numerous petitions against the NLRC, citing an alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the labor tribunal for its 􏰔nding on the su􏰔ciency or insu􏰔ciency of posted appeal bonds.
It is in this light that the Court 􏰔nds it necessary to set a parameter for the litigants' and the
NLRC's guidance on the amount of bond that shall hereafter be 􏰔led with a motion for a bond's
reduction. To ensure that the provisions of Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure
that give parties the chance to seek a reduction of the appeal bond are
effectively carried out, without however defeating the bene􏰔ts of the bond requirement in favor
of a winning litigant, all motions to reduce bond that are to be 􏰔led with the NLRC shall be
accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary award
that is subject of the appeal, which shall provisionally be deemed the reasonable amount of
the bond in the meantime that an appellant's motion is pending resolution by the Commission.
In conformity with the NLRC Rules, the monetary award, for the purpose of computing the
necessary appeal bond, shall exclude damages and attorney's fees. 94 Only after the posting
of a bond in the required percentage shall an appellant's period to perfect an appeal under the
NLRC Rules be deemed suspended.
The foregoing shall not be misconstrued to unduly hinder the NLRC's exercise of its
discretion, given that the percentage of bond that is set by this guideline shall be merely
provisional. The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion and
determine the 􏰔nal amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance
with the standards of "meritorious grounds" and "reasonable amount". Should the NLRC, after
considering the motion's merit, determine that a greater amount or the full amount of the bond
needs to be posted by the appellant, then the party shall comply accordingly. The appellant
shall be given a period of 10 days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the
appeal by posting the required appeal bond.
=> Meritorious ground as a condition for the reduction of the appeal bond
In all cases, the reduction of the appeal bond shall be justi􏰔ed by meritorious grounds and
accompanied by the posting of the required appeal bond in a reasonable amount.HIAEcT
The requirement on the existence of a "meritorious ground" delves on the worth of the parties'
arguments, taking into account their respective rights and the circumstances that attend the
case. The condition was emphasized in University Plans Incorporated v. Solano, 95 wherein
the Court held that while the NLRC's Revised Rules of Procedure "allows the [NLRC] to reduce
the amount of the bond, the exercise of the authority is not a matter of right on the part of the
movant, but lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing of meritorious
grounds." 96 By jurisprudence, the merit referred to may pertain to an appellant's lack of
􏰔nancial capability to pay the full amount of the bond, 97 the merits of the main appeal such
as when there is a valid claim that there was no illegal dismissal to justify the award, 98 the
absence of an employer-employee relationship, 99 prescription of claims,100 and other
similarly valid issues that are raised in the appeal.101 For the purpose of determining a
"meritorious ground", the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, or from making a
preliminary determination of the merits of the appellant's contentions. 102
In this case, the NLRC then should have considered the respondents' arguments in the
memorandum on appeal that was 􏰔led with the motion to reduce the requisite appeal bond.
Although a consideration of said arguments at that point would have been merely preliminary
and should not in any way bind the eventual outcome of the appeal, it was apparent that the
respondents' defenses came with an indication of merit that deserved a full review of the
decision of the LA. The CA, by its Resolution dated February 16, 2007, even found justi􏰔ed
the issuance of a preliminary injunction to enjoin the immediate execution of the LA's decision,
and this Court, a temporary restraining order on September 4, 2012.
Signi􏰔cantly, following the CA's remand of the case to the NLRC, the latter even rendered a
Decision that contained 􏰔ndings that are inconsistent with McBurnie's claims. The NLRC
reversed and set aside the decision of the LA, and entered a new one dismissing McBurnie's
complaint. It explained that McBurnie was not an employee of the respondents; thus, they
could not have dismissed him from employment. The purported employment contract of the
respondents with the petitioner was quali􏰔ed by the conditions set forth in a letter dated May
11, 1999, which reads:
May 11, 1999 MR. ANDREW MCBURNIE Re: Employment Contract

Dear Andrew,
It is understood that this Contract is made subject to the understanding that it is
effective only when the project 􏰔nancing for our Baguio Hotel project pushed through.
The agreement with EGI Managers, Inc. is made now to support your need to facilitate
your work permit with the Department of Labor in view of the expiration of your contract
with Pan Pacific.
Regards,
Sgd. Eulalio Ganzon (p. 203, Records)
For the NLRC, the employment agreement could not have given rise to an employer-
employee relationship by reason of legal impossibility. The two conditions that form part of
their agreement, namely, the successful completion of the project 􏰔nancing for the hotel
project in Baguio City and McBurnie's acquisition of an Alien Employment Permit, remained
unsatis􏰔ed. 104 The NLRC concluded that McBurnie was instead a potential investor in a
project that included Ganzon, but the said project failed to pursue due to lack of funds. Any
work performed by McBurnie in relation to the project was merely preliminary to the business
venture and part of his "due diligence" study before pursuing the project, "done at his own
instance, not in furtherance of the employment contract but for his own investment purposes."
105 Lastly, the alleged employment of the petitioner would have been void for being contrary
to law, since it is undisputed that McBurnie did not have any work permit. The NLRC declared:
aEHASI
Absent an employment permit, any employment relationship that [McBurnie] contemplated
with the [respondents] was void for being contrary to law. A void or inexistent contract, in turn,
has no force and effect from the beginning as if it had never [been] entered into. Thus, without
an Alien Employment Permit, the "Employment Agreement" is void and could not be the
source of a right or obligation. In support thereof, the DOLE issued a certi􏰔cation that
[McBurnie] has neither applied nor [been] issued [an] Alien Employment Permit (p. 204,
Records). 106
McBurnie moved to reconsider, citing the Court's Decision of September 18, 2009 that
reversed and set aside the CA's Decision authorizing the remand. Although the NLRC granted
the motion on the said groundvia a Decision107 that set aside the NLRC's Decision dated
November 17, 2009, the 􏰔ndings of the NLRC in the November 17, 2009 decision merit
consideration, especially since the 􏰔ndings made therein are supported by the case records.
In addition to the apparent merit of the respondents' appeal, the Court 􏰔nds the reduction
of the appeal bond justi􏰔ed by the substantial amount of the LA's monetary award. Given its
considerable amount, we 􏰔nd reason in the respondents' claim that to require an appeal bond
in such amount could only deprive them of the right to appeal, even
forcethemoutofbusinessandaffectthelivelihoodoftheiremployees.108 InRosewood
Processing, Inc. v. NLRC, 109 we emphasized: "Where a decision may be made to rest on
informed judgment rather than rigid rules, the equities of the case must be accorded their due
weight because labor determinations should not be 'secundum rationem but also secundum
caritatem.'"
=> What constitutes a reasonable amount in the determination of the final amount of appeal
bond
As regards the requirement on the posting of a bond in a "reasonable amount," the

Court holds that the 􏰔nal determination thereof by the NLRC shall be based primarily on the
merits of the motion and the main appeal.
Although the NLRC Rules of Procedure, particularly Section 6 of Rule VI thereof, provides that
the bond to be posted shall be "in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award,"the
merit of the motion shall always take precedence in the determination. Settled is the rule that
procedural rules were conceived, and should thus be applied in a manner that would only aid
the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve
the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. 111
Thus, in Nicol where the appellant posted a bond of P10,000,000.00 upon an appeal from the
LA's award of P51,956,314.00, the Court, instead of ruling right away on the reasonableness
of the bond's amount solely on the basis of the judgment award, found it appropriate to remand
the case to the NLRC, which should first determine the merits of the motion. In University
Plans, 112 the Court also reversed the outright dismissal of an appeal where the bond posted
in a judgment award of more than P30,000,000.00 was P30,000.00. The Court then directed
the NLRC to 􏰔rst determine the merit, or lack of merit, of the motion to reduce the bond, after
the appellant therein claimed that it was under receivership and thus, could not dispose of its
assets within a short notice. Clearly, the rule on the posting of an appeal bond should not be
allowed to defeat the substantive rights of the parties. 113
Notably, in the present case, following the CA's rendition of its Decision which allowed a
reduced appeal bond, the respondents have posted a bond in the amount of P10,000,000.00.
InRosewood, the Court deemed the posting of a surety bond of P50,000.00, coupled with a
motion to reduce the appeal bond, as substantial compliance with the legal requirements for
an appeal from a P789,154.39 monetary award "considering the clear merits which appear,
res ipsa loquitor, in the appeal from the [LA's] Decision, and the petitioner's substantial
compliance with rules governing appeals." 114 The foregoing jurisprudence strongly indicate
that in determining the reasonable amount of appeal bonds, the Court primarily considers the
merits of the motions and appeals.
Given the circumstances in this case and the merits of the respondents' arguments
before the NLRC, the Court holds that the respondents had posted a bond in a
"reasonable amount", and had thus complied with the requirements for the perfection
of an appeal from the LA's decision. The CA was correct in ruling that:
In the case of Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NEECO I) Employees
Association, President Rodolfo Jimenez[,] and members[,] Reynaldo Fajardo, et al. vs.
NLRC, Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NEECO I) and Patricio de la Peña (G.R.
No. 116066, January 24, 2000), the Supreme Court recognized that: "the NLRC, in its
Resolution No. 11-01-91 dated November 7, 1991 deleted the phrase "exclusive of moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees in the determination of the amount
of bond, and provided a safeguard against the imposition of excessive bonds by
providing that "(T)he Commission may in meritorious cases and upon motion of the
appellant, reduce the amount of the bond."
In the case of Cosico[,] Jr. vs. NLRC[,] 272 SCRA 583, it was held:
"The unreasonable and excessive amount of bond would be oppressive and unjust and
would have the effect of depriving a party of his right to appeal."
xxx xxx xxx

In dismissing outright the motion to reduce bond 􏰔led by petitioners, NLRC abused its
discretion. It should have 􏰔xed an appeal bond in a reasonable amount. Said dismissal
deprived petitioners of their right to appeal the Labor Arbiter's decision.
xxx xxx xxx
NLRC Rules allow reduction of appeal bond on meritorious grounds (Sec. 6, Rule VI, NLRC
Rules of Procedure). This Court 􏰔nds the appeal bond in the amount of [P]54,083,910.00
prohibitive and excessive, which constitutes a meritorious ground to allow a motion for
reduction thereof. 115
The foregoing declaration of the Court requiring a bond in a reasonable amount, taking into
account the merits of the motion and the appeal, is consistent with the oft- repeated principle
that letter-perfect rules must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice.116 caIDSH
=> The effect of a denial of the appeal to the NLRC
In 􏰔nding merit in the respondents' motion for reconsideration, we also take into account the
unwarranted results that will arise from an implementation of the Court's Decision dated
September 18, 2009. We emphasize, moreover, that although a remand and an order upon
the NLRC to give due course to the appeal would have been the usual course after a 􏰔nding
that the conditions for the reduction of an appeal bond were duly satis􏰔ed by the respondents,
given such results, the Court 􏰔nds it necessary to modify the CA's order of remand, and
instead rule on the dismissal of the complaint against the respondents.
Without the reversal of the Court's Decision and the dismissal of the complaint against
the respondents, McBurnie would be allowed to claim bene􏰔ts under our labor laws
despite his failure to comply with a settled requirement for foreign nationals.
Considering that McBurnie, an Australian, alleged illegal dismissal and sought to claim
under our labor laws, it was necessary for him to establish, 􏰔rst and foremost, that he
was quali􏰔ed and duly authorized to obtain employment within our jurisdiction. A requirement
for foreigners who intend to work within the country is an employment permit, as provided
under Article 40, Title II of the Labor Code which reads:
Art. 40. Employment permit for non-resident aliens. —Any alien seeking admission to
the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who
desires to engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an
employment permit from the Department of Labor.
I n WPP Marketing Communications, Inc. v. Galera, 117 we held that a foreign national's
failure to seek an employment permit prior to employment poses a serious problem in seeking
relief from the Court.118 Thus, although the respondent therein appeared to have been
illegally dismissed from employment, we explained:
This is Galera's dilemma: Galera worked in the Philippines without proper work permit
but now wants to claim employee's bene􏰔ts under Philippine labor laws.
xxx xxx xxx
The law and the rules are consistent in stating that the employment permit must be
acquired prior to employment. The Labor Code states: "Any alien seeking admission to
employment permit from the Department of Labor." Section 4, Rule XIV, Book I of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations provides:
"Employment permit required for entry.— No alien seeking employment, whether as a
resident or non-resident, may enter the Philippines without 􏰔rst securing an employment
permit from the Ministry. If an alien enters the country under a non-working visa and wishes
to be employed thereafter, he may be allowed to be employed upon presentation of a duly
approved employment permit."

Galera cannot come to this Court with unclean hands. To grant Galera's prayer is to sanction
the violation of the Philippine labor laws requiring aliens to secure work permits before their
employment. We hold that the status quo must prevail in the present case and we leave the
parties where they are. This ruling, however, does not bar Galera from seeking relief from
other jurisdictions.119 (Citations omitted and underscoring ours)
Clearly, this circumstance on the failure of McBurnie to obtain an employment permit,
by itself, necessitates the dismissal of his labor complaint.
Furthermore, as has been previously discussed, the NLRC has ruled in its Decision dated
November 17, 2009 on the issue of illegal dismissal. It declared that McBurnie was never an
employee of any of the respondents. 120 It explained:
All these facts and circumstances prove that [McBurnie] was never an employee of
Eulalio Ganzon or the [respondent] companies, but a potential investor in a project with
a group including Eulalio Ganzon and Martinez but said project did not take off because
of lack of funds.
[McBurnie] further claims that in conformity with the provision of the employment
contract pertaining to the obligation of the [respondents] to provide housing,
[respondents] assigned him Condo Unit # 812 of the Makati Cinema Square
Condominium owned by the [respondents]. He was also allowed to use a Hyundai car.
If it were true that the contract of employment was for working visa purposes only, why
did the [respondents] perform their obligations to him?
There is no question that [respondents] assigned him Condo Unit # 812 of the MCS, but
this was not free of charge. If it were true that it is part of the compensation package as
employee, then [McBurnie] would not be obligated to pay anything, but clearly, he
admitted in his letter that he had to pay all the expenses incurred in the apartment.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the employment contract is valid between
them, record shows that [McBurnie] worked from September 1, 1999 until he met an
accident on the last week of October. During the period of employment, [the
respondents] must have paid his salaries in the sum of US$26,000.00, more or less.
However, [McBurnie] failed to present a single evidence that [the respondents] paid his
salaries like payslip, check or cash vouchers duly signed by him or any document
showing proof of receipt of his compensation from [the respondents] or activity in
furtherance of the employment contract.
Granting again that there was a valid contract of employment, it is undisputed that on
November 1, 1999, [McBurnie] left for Australia and never came back. . . . . 121 (Emphasis
supplied)
Although the NLRC's Decision dated November 17, 2009 was set aside in a Decision
dated January 14, 2010, the Court's resolve to now reconsider its Decision dated
September 18, 2009 and to a􏰔rm the CA's Decision and Resolution in the respondents' favor
effectively restores the NLRC's basis for rendering the Decision dated November 17, 2009.
More importantly, the NLRC's 􏰔ndings on the contractual relations between McBurnie and
the respondents are supported by the records.
First,before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must
􏰔rst be established. 122 Although an employment agreement forms part of the case records,
respondent Ganzon signed it with the notation "per my note." 123 The respondents have
su􏰔ciently explained that the note refers to the letter 124 dated May 11, 1999 which embodied
certain conditions for the employment's effectivity. As we have previously explained, however,
the said conditions, particularly on the successful completion of the project 􏰔nancing for the
hotel project in Baguio City and McBurnie's acquisition of an Alien Employment Permit, failed
to materialize. Such defense of the respondents, which was duly considered by the NLRC in
its Decision dated November 17, 2009, was not sufficiently rebutted by McBurnie. SCHcaT
Second, McBurnie failed to present any employment permit which would have
authorized him to obtain employment in the Philippines. This circumstance negates
McBurnie's claim that he had been performing work for the respondents by virtue of an
employer-employee relationship. The absence of the employment permit instead

bolsters the claim that the supposed employment of McBurnie was merely simulated,
or did not ensue due to the non-ful􏰔llment of the conditions that were set forth in the letter
of May 11, 1999.
Third,besides the employment agreement, McBurnie failed to present other competent
evidence to prove his claim of an employer-employee relationship. Given the parties'
con􏰔icting claims on their true intention in executing the agreement, it was necessary to resort
to the established criteria for the determination of an employer-
xxx xxx xxx
of lack of funds.
If it were true that the contract of employment was for working visa
purposes only, why did the [respondents] perform their obligations to him?

supplied)
of May 11, 1999.
xxx xxx xxx
of lack of funds.
If it were true that the contract of employment was for working visa
purposes only, why did the [respondents] perform their obligations to him?
supplied)
of May 11, 1999.
employee relationship, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's
conduct.125 The rule of thumb remains: theonus probandi falls on the claimant to establish or
substantiate the claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. Whoever claims entitlement to
the bene􏰔ts provided by law should establish his or her right thereto.126 McBurnie failed in
this regard. As previously observed by the NLRC, McBurnie even failed to show through any
document such as payslips or vouchers that his salaries during the time that he allegedly
worked for the respondents were paid by the company. In the absence of an employer-
employee relationship between McBurnie and the respondents, McBurnie could not
successfully claim that he was dismissed, much less illegally dismissed, by the latter. Even
granting that there was such an employer-employee relationship, the records are barren of
any document showing that its termination was by the respondents' dismissal of McBurnie.
Given these circumstances, it would be a circuitous exercise for the Court to remand the case
to the NLRC, more so in the absence of any showing that the NLRC should now rule differently
on the case's merits. In Medline Management, Inc. v. Roslinda, 127 the Court ruled that when
there is enough basis on which the Court may render a proper evaluation of the merits of the
case, the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remanding a case to a
labor tribunal in order "to prevent delays in the disposition of the case," "to serve the ends of
justice" and when a remand "would serve no purpose save to further delay its disposition
contrary to the spirit of fair play."128 InReal v. Sangu Philippines, Inc., 129 we again ruled:
With the foregoing, it is clear that the CA erred in a􏰔rming the decision of the NLRC which
dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In cases such as this, the Court
normally remands the case to the NLRC and directs it to properly dispose of the case on the
merits. "However, when there is enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits of
petitioner's case may be had, the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of
remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case." "It is already an
accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of litigation. If, based on the records,
the pleadings, and other evidence, the dispute can be resolved by us, we will do so to serve
the ends of justice instead of remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings." .
. . . 130 (Citations omitted)
It bears mentioning that although the Court resolves to grant the respondents' motion
for reconsideration, the other grounds raised in the motion, especially as they pertain
to insinuations on irregularities in the Court, deserve no merit for being founded on
baseless conclusions. Furthermore, the Court 􏰔nds it unnecessary to discuss the other

grounds that are raised in the motion, considering the grounds that already justify the dismissal
of McBurnie's complaint.
All these considered, the Court also a􏰔rms its Resolution dated September 4, 2012;
accordingly, McBurnie's motion for reconsideration thereof is denied.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:
(a) The motion for reconsideration 􏰔led on September 26, 2012 by petitioner Andrew
James McBurnie is DENIED;
(b) The motion for reconsideration 􏰔led on March 27, 2012 by respondents Eulalio Ganzon,
EGI-Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon, Inc. is
GRANTED.
The Entry of Judgment issued in G.R. Nos. 186984-85 is LIFTED. This Court's Decision
dated September 18, 2009 and Resolutions dated December 14, 2009 and January 25,
2012 are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 27, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 3, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90845 and CA-G.R. SP No. 95916 are
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. In lieu of a remand of the case to the National Labor
Relations Commission, the complaint for illegal dismissal 􏰔led by petitioner Andrew
James McBurnie against respondents Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon,
Inc. is DISMISSED.
Furthermore, on the matter of the 􏰔ling and acceptance of motions to reduce appeal bond,
as provided in Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, the Court hereby
RESOLVES that henceforth, the following guidelines shall be observed:
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
The 􏰔ling of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be entertained by the NLRC subject to the
following conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount
is posted;
For purposes of compliance with condition no. (2), a motion shall be accompanied by
the posting of a provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
monetary award subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees;
Compliance with the foregoing conditions shall su􏰔ce to suspend the running of the 10-
day reglementary period to perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC;
The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion to reduce bond and
determine the 􏰔nal amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance
with the standards of "meritorious grounds" and "reasonable amount"; and
In the event that the NLRC denies the motion to reduce bond, or requires a bond that
exceeds the amount of the provisional bond, the appellant shall be given a fresh period
of ten (10) days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by
posting the required appeal bond.
SO ORDERED. cHCSDa 

RULE ON AMOUNT OF APPEAL BOND NOT ABSOLUTE
[G.R. No. 180147. June 4, 2014.] LOUIE
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. EMILINDA D.

MACATLANG, ET AL., 1 respondents.
[G.R. No. 180148. June 4, 2014.]
ARIS PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET

AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 180149. June 4, 2014.]
SARA LEE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG,

ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 180150. June 4, 2014.]
CESAR C. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET

AL.,respondents.
[G.R. No. 180319. June 4, 2014.]
FASHION ACCESSORIES PHILS., INC., petitioner, vs. EMILINDA D.

MACATLANG, ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 180685. June 4, 2014.]
EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., petitioners, vs. NLRC, ARIS

PHILIPPINES, INC., FASHION ACCESSORIES PHILS., INC., SARA LEE
CORPORATION, SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., COLLIN BEAL and
ATTY. CESAR C. CRUZ, respondents.
Facts:
• This is a case of six (6) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
pertaining to the P3.4 Billion appeal bond which is equivalent to the
monetary award.
• Sara Lee Philippines Inc. (SLPI) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the manufacture and distribution of personal care products.
• Aris is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of producing
gloves and other apparel.
• FAPI is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of knitted products.

• SLC, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
United States of America, is a stockholder of Aris. It exercised control
over Aris, FAPI, and SLPI which were all its subsidiaries or affiliates.
• Cruz was the external counsel of Aris at the time of its closure.
• Macatlang represents the 5,983 employees whose employment was
terminated upon the closure of Aris.
• In 1995, Aris filed with the Labor and Employment a Notice of
Permanent Closure. All employees of Aris were informed. The
employees staged a strike for violation of duty to bargain collectively,
union busting and illegal closure. But after conciliation, Aris undertook
to pay its employees the benefits.
• In October 1995, Fassion Accessories Philippines, Inc. (FAPI) was
incorporated. The affected employees then filed illegal dismissal
against Aris, alleging that FAPI was organized by the management of
Aris to continue the same business of Aris, thereby intending to defeat
their right to security of tenure. Aris countered that it had complied
with all the legal requirements for a valid closure of business
corporation.
Labor Arbiter’s Decision:
• The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment finding the dismissal of 5,984
complainants as illegal and awarding them the separation pay and
other monetary benefits amounting to P3.4 Billion.
• The Corporations asked the NLRC to reduce the appeal bond to P1
Million each on the grounds that it is impossible for any insurance
company to cover such huge amount and that, in requiring them to
post in full the appeal bond would be tantamount to denying them their
right to appeal. Aris claimed that it was already dissolved and
undergoing liquidation and the complainants already received their
separation pay and other benefits amounting to P4 Million. FAPI,
claimed that its total assets would not be enough to answer for the
awards, and to compel it to post might result in complete stoppage of
operations.
NLRC’S Decision:
• In light of the impossibility for any surety company to cover the appeal
bond and the huge economic losses which the companies and their
employees might suffer if the P3.45 Billion bond is sustained, the
NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond. The NLRC issued an
Order directing the Corporations to post an additional P4.5 Million
bond, bringing the total posted bond to P9 Million.
CA’s Decision:
• Macatlang filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
charging the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the appeal of petitioners despite the gross insufficiency of
cash bond. They declared that the appeal bond must be equivalent to
the amount of the award. The Corporations filed a Motion to Dismiss.
The CA reversed and set aside the resolution of NLRC and deemed
it reasonable to order the posting of an additional appeal bond of P1
Billion. All parties filed their Motion for Reconsideration but were later
denied by the CA.
Petitioner’s Contention:
• The Corporations argue that the Court of Appeals committed serious

error in not dismissing Macatlang’s petitions which are clearly violatice
of the rule against forum-shopping. The Corporations assail the Court
of Appeals in directing the posting of an additional appeal bond of P1
Billion. They contend that the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact
that Macatlang, et al., had already received their separation pay. The
Corporations seek a liberal interpretation to the requirement of
posting of appeal bond in that the NLRC has the power and authority
to set a reduced amount of appeal bond.
Respondent’s Contention:|
• On the other hand, Emilinda D. Macatlang, et al., in their petition for
review on certiorari assert that the appeal of the Corporations had not
been perfected in accordance with Article 223 of the Labor
Code when they failed to post the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from amounting to P3.45 Billion,
submitting that the P1 Billion bond is not equivalent to the monetary
amount of P3.45 Billion.
Issue:
• Whether the appeal bond may be reduced. - YES
Ruling:
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by

the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
Article 223, under Presidential Decree No. 442, was amended

by Republic Act No. 6715 to include the provision on the posting of a
cash or surety bond as a precondition to the perfection of appeal. The
requisites for perfection of appeal as embodied in Article 223, as
amended, are:
1) Payment of appeal fees;
2) Filing of the memorandum of appeal; and
3) Payment of the required cash or surety bond. These requisites

must be satisfied within 10 days from receipt of the decision or order
appealed from.
It is presumed that an appeal bond is only necessary in cases where

the labor arbiter's decision or order contains a monetary award. Conversely,
when the labor arbiter does not state the judgment award, posting of bond
may be excused. Furthermore, when the judgment award is based on a
patently erroneous computation, the appeal bond equivalent to the amount
of the monetary award is not required to be posted.

In sum, the NLRC may dispense of the posting of the bond when
the judgment award is:
(1) Not stated or
(2) based on a patently erroneous computation.
Sans these two (2) instances, the appellant is generally required

to post a bond to perfect his appeal.
The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect
its/his appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if they prevail
in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the
dismissal of the employer's appeal. It was intended to discourage employers
from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their
employees' just and lawful claims. Upon the other hand, the Court did relax
the rule respecting the bond requirement to perfect appeal in cases where:
(1) there was substantial compliance with the Rules, (2) surrounding facts
and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a
liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the
desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4) the
appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by
posting a partial bond during the reglementary period.|
In the NLRC New Rules of Procedure promulgated in 2002, another

qualification to the reduction of an appeal bond was added in Section 6
thereof: “No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on
meritorious grounds, and only upon the posting of a bond in a
reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.” Clearly therefore, the
Rules only allow the filing of a motion to reduce bond on two (2) conditions:
(1) that there is meritorious ground and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is
posted. Compliance with the two conditions stops the running of the period
to perfect an appeal provided that they are complied within the 10-day
reglementary period.
In this case, the motion to reduce bond filed by the Corporations was
resolved by the NLRC in the affirmative when it found that there are
meritorious grounds in reducing the bond such as the huge amount of the
award and impossibility of proceeding against the Corporations' properties
which correspond to a lower valuation. Also, the NLRC took into
consideration the fact of partial payment of P419 Million. The NLRC found
the P4.5 Million bond posted by the Corporations as insufficient, hence
ordering them to post an additional P4.5 Million. Thus, P9 Million was held as
the amount of the bond as reduced. The Court of Appeals found the amount
of the appeal bond adjudged by the NLRC as measly and insufficient and
raised it to P1 Billion.
Therefore, the decision to reduce the amount of appeal bond is not a

blanket power to the NLRC, because the discretion is not unbridled and is
subject to strict guidelines because Art. 223 of the Labor Code is a rule of
jurisdiction that affords little leeway for liberal interpretation. The order of the
NLRC reducing the required appeal bond from Php3.453 BILLION Pesos to
only Php9 MILLION Pesos is in grave abuse of its discretion and therefore
void, not to mention that it is per se unreasonable and without factual basis.
Notably, the computation of the judgment award in this case includes
damages. For purposes of determining the reasonable amount of the appeal
bond, the Court reduced the total amount to P2.9 Billion. The reasonable
amount of the appeal bond was reduced to P725 Million. This directive
already considers that the award if not illegal, is extraordinarily huge
and that no insurance company would be willing to issue a bond for
such big money. The amount of P725 Million is approximately 25% of
the basis above calculated. It is a balancing of the constitutional
obligation of the state to afford protection to labor which, specific to
this case, is assurance that in case of affirmance of the award, recovery
is not negated; and on the other end of the spectrum, the opportunity
of the employer to appeal. By reducing the amount of the appeal bond
in this case, the employees would still be assured of at least substantial
compensation, in case a judgment award is affirmed. On the other hand,
management will not be effectively denied of its statutory privilege of
appeal.
Disposition:
The Decision of the CA is MODIFIED. The Corporations are directed to
post P725 Million, in cash or surety bond, within TEN (10) days from the
receipt of this DECISION. The Resolution of the NLRC is VACATED for
being premature and the NLRC is DIRECTED to act with dispatch to resolve
the merits of the case upon perfection of the appeal.
|

Topic: SUFFICIENCY OF APPEAL BOND - HEZEL

TOYOTA ALABANG, INC., petitioner, vs. EDWIN GAMES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 206612. August 17, 2015.]
Facts:
➢ Games, who worked as a foreman for petitioner Toyota, was sued by the latter for qualified
theft for allegedly stealing vehicle lubricants.
➢ Two years thereafter, Games filed a Complainant for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of
benefits, and damages against Toyota ALabang. The latter, through counsel, failed to file
its Position Paper.
➢ Several re-settings of the hearings ensued. During one hearing, Toyota ALabang
manifested that it had failed to file its Position Paper because its handling lawyer was no
longer connected with the company. Then, in another hearing, Toyota ALabang failed to
appear and even reneged on submitting its pleading.
➢ LA ruled against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay Games P535,553.07 for his
separation pay, backwages, service incentive leave pay and attorney's fees resulting from
his illegal dismissal
➢ Petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration. As a result, the LA's ruling
became final and executory
➢ The LA issued a Writ of Execution, which petitioner sought to quash. It prayed that the
proceedings be re-opened, explaining that it had failed to present evidence because of its
counsel's negligence in filing the appropriate pleadings. The LA denied the claims of
petitioner.
➢ Toyota filed an appeal before the NLRC who denied it for failure to show proof of its
security deposit for the appeal bond under Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, and ruled that the bonding company's mere declaration in the Certification of
Security Deposit that the bond was fully secured was not tantamount to a faithful
compliance with the rule, because there must first be an accompanying assignment of the
employer's bank deposit.
➢ On the merits, the NLRC dismissed the case on the basis of the rule that no appeal may
be taken from an order of execution of a final judgment. For the NLRC, petitioner's failure
to appeal the LA Decision already made the ruling final and executory.
➢ CA affirmed. CA ruled that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
appeal, given that petitioner had failed to comply faithfully with the bond requirement.
Secondly, it echoed the ruling of the NLRC that a final judgment is no longer appealable.
Thirdly, the CA found that Toyota ALabang's own negligence had caused it to lose its right
to appeal.
Issue: Whether CA committed a reversible error in refusing to reopen the proceedings below.
Held: NO. CA did not commit reversible error.
The reopening of a case is an extraordinary remedy, which, if abused, can make a complete
farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. Hence, there
must be good cause on the movant's part before it can be granted.
In this case, petitioner itself was negligent in advancing its case. Toyota ALabang was present
during the mandatory conference hearing in which the latter was informed by the LA of the
need to file a Position Paper but reneged on its submission and failed to exhibit diligence when
it failed to attend the hearing and proceedings. The Court finds that the CA justly refused to
reopen the case in the former's favor.
On the issue of posting a bond
First point: The paraphrased proposition that "an appeal bond is not required in appeals from
decisions of the LA denying a motion to quash a writ of execution" lacks any citation sourced
from a statute or case law. Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011
NLRC Rules of Procedure, uniformly state thus:
In case In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a
monetary award involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of cash
deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of
damages and attorney's fees. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the above rules do not limit the appeal bond requirement only to certain kinds of
rulings of the LA. Rather, these rules generally state that in case the ruling of the LA involves
a monetary award involves a monetary award, an employer's appeal may be perfected only
upon the posting of a bond. Therefore, absent any qualifying terms, so long as the decision of
the LA involves a monetary award, as in this case, that ruling can only be appealed after the
employer posts a bond.
The second point likewise fails to justify the grant of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
This point refers to the proper construction of Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, which demands that an appeal bond must be accompanied by a "proof of security
deposit or collateral securing the bond."
According to the NLRC and the CA, the bonding company's mere declaration in the
Certification of Security Deposit that the bond is fully secured is not tantamount to a
faithful compliance with the rule, because there must first be an accompanying
assignment of the employer's bank deposit. On the other hand, the dissent sees this
declaration as an act that satisfies Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.
For this reason, he opines that the NLRC should have entertained the appeal of petitioner.
Notwithstanding this issue, the NLRC has given a well-founded reason for refusing to entertain
petitioner's appeal, namely, no appeal may be taken from an no appeal may be taken from
an order of execution of a final and executory judgment order of execution of a final
and executory judgment.
An appeal is not a matter of right, but is a mere statutory privilege. It may be availed of
only in the manner provided by law and the rules. Thus, a party who seeks to elevate an
action must comply with the requirements of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure as regards
the period, grounds, venue, fees, bonds, and other requisites for a proper appeal before the
NLRC; and in Section 6, Rule VI, the aforesaid rules prohibit appeals from final and executory
decisions of the Labor Arbiter.

The NLRC's reasoning that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution of a final and
executory judgment is also rooted in case law. Jurisprudence dictates that a final and
executory decision of the LA can no longer be reversed or modified.
After all, just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so
does the winning party have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the
case. On this basis, the CA did not grievously err when it concluded that the ruling of the NLRC
denying petitioner's appeal was not baseless, arbitrary, whimsical, or despotic.

#16 Sufficiency of Appeal Bond - angelique
Smart Communications, Inc., Mr. Napoleon L. Nazareno, And Mr. Ricky P. Isla, vs. Jose
Leni Z. Solidum
G.R. No. 197836. December 07, 2015.|SOLIS
Facts:
• Smart) hired Jose Leni Solidum (Solidum) as Department Head of Smart
Prepaid/Buddy Activations under the Product Marketing Group.
• On September 21, 2005, Solidum received a Notice to Explain from the Company
charging him with acts of dishonesty and breach of trust and confidence.
• In summary, he was charged with violating "various company policies by
misrepresenting and using his position and influence in his grant plot to defraud Smart
by conceptualizing fictitious marketing events, appointing fictitious advertising
agencies to supposedly carry out marketing events and submitting fictitious documents
to make it appear that the marketing events transpired.
• Solidum denied the charges and claimed that he never defrauded nor deceived the
Company in his transactions. Audit investigation, however, revealed otherwise.
• After extension of his preventive suspension he was finally terminated on November
11, 2005.
• Solidum filed a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal with money claims
before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC claiming that his extended suspension and
subsequent termination were without just cause and due process.
• LA ruled in favour of Solidum. NLRC denied the appeal because the bond attached to
it is not accompanied by a security deposit or collateral.
• Upon MOR, NLRC reversed the decision giving due course to the appeal. It found that
there was substantial compliance with the bond requirement.
• CA affirmed the Decision of the NLRC.
Issue: WON an appeal is perfected even though the appeal bond posted lacks a security
deposit or collateral.
Held: In the case at bar, yes. Smart substantially complied with the requirements of an appeal
bond. While it’s true that Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure
states the surety bond shall be accompanied by original or certified true copies of proof of
security deposit or collateral securing the bond, the bond requirement on appeals may be
relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure.
The Supreme Court relaxed this requirement in order to bring about the immediate and
appropriate resolution of cases on the merits. In Quiambao v. National Labor Relations
Commission, this Court allowed the relaxation of the requirement when there is substantial
compliance with the rule. Likewise, in Ong v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the bond
requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. The
Court held that "while the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been
relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the
Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a
partial bond."
Furthermore, considering that it is the NLRC that has interpreted its own rules on this
matter, the Court is inclined to accept such interpretation. The Court has held, "By reason
of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under

their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on those matters." Moreover,
the NLRC properly relaxed the rules on appeal bonds.
The NLRC has the power and authority to promulgate rules of procedure under Article
218(a) of the Labor Code. As such, it can suspend the rules if it finds that the interests
of justice will be better served if the strict compliance with the rules should be relaxed.
In short, a substantial compliance may be allowed by the NLRC especially in this case
where the party which submitted the bond is a multibillion company which can easily
pay whatever monetary award may be adjudged against it. Even if there is no proof of
security deposit or collateral, the surety bond issued by an accredited company is adequate
to answer for the liability if any to be incurred by Smart.

SUFFICIENCY OF APPEAL BOND
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, petitioner, vs. MANUEL P. BARRERA,

respondent. - ANGELA
[G.R. No. 197393. June 15, 2016.]
FACTS:
• Manuel Barrera worked for Phil. Savings Bank for 7 years in various capacities. In
2004, he was as a marketing officer and was put in command of the loans department.
• During a quality assurance review, it was discovered that Barrera had allowed a
contractual employee to use his user ID for account booking and approval in the bank's
Integrated Loans System. The unauthorized disclosure of system ID and password
was a violation of bank policy.
• Barrera explained that he did that for the continuity of transactions in instances when
he had to go out of the bank to coordinate with dealers or interview clients. He insisted
that he was merely following a precedent set by the branch head, Mr. Sajo.
• While investigation was pending, the bank discovered another infraction from Barrera
- the unauthorized issuance of bank certifications. The internal audit group found that
he was involved in lending the account of Spouses Ong to different individuals in order
to generate bank certifications in favor of the latter. Bank policy explicitly stated that
"no account shall be allowed to be opened for certification purposes only."
• As a result of the investigation, it was discovered that a Request for Change was
accomplished on 2 June 2004 to change the account name of Sps. Ong to that of Sps.
Bautista. The account number remained the same. Respondent was shown to be a
signatory to the Certification that there existed a deposit with the bank of a sum of
money as of 1 June 2004 in the name of Sps. Bautista. After two days, another Request
for Change was processed to revert the account name to that of Sps. Ong. On 7 June
2004, respondent again signed and approved a bank certification in favor of a certain
Karen Galoyo using the same account number. Documents showed deficiencies in the
signature cards and other requirements for the processing of a request for change of
account name. On 15 February 2005, an administrative hearing was conducted.
• On 15 March 2005, PSBank served on Barrera a Notice of Termination for grave
violation of bank policies, code of conduct, and trust and confidence.
• On 4 April 2005, Barrera filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter: LA ruled in favor of Barrera and ordered his immediate reinstatement,
backwages, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and other benefits. The LA found
that the alleged infractions were never fully substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
• PSBank appealed to the NLRC. Barrera filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of authority to file appeal memorandum and non-perfection thereof. He pointed that
the supersedeas bond was irregular, because the Certification of Accreditation and
Authority issued by the Office of the Court Administrator stated that Phil. Charter
Insurance Corp was only authorized to issue bonds for civil cases.
NLRC: Nevertheless, NLRC gave due course to the appeal and reversed the decision of the
LA. It found that the complainant had been dismissed for cause and afforded due process.
• The NLRC Decision, however, did not address the argument raised in the Motion to
Dismiss regarding the irregularity of the appeal bond. Barrera therefore filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA.

CA: NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when the latter gave due course to the bank's appeal even if it was apparent that
the appeal had not been perfected owing to a defective and irregular appeal bond. The CA
observed that the certification and accreditation issued by the OCA did not state that the PCIC
was allowed to issue bonds relative to labor cases filed before the NLRC. CA further held that
the appeal should not have been given due course because of its non-perfection within the
reglementary period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal bond was sufficient and regular, hence the decision of the
LA is not yet final and executory.
HELD: YES.
In some cases decided by the SC, the Certification of Accreditation and Authority issued by
the OCA also covers an authority to transact surety business in relation to "civil cases only"
and does not include labor cases filed before the NLRC. The Court ruled that the bonds may
also be used for labor cases.
In the present case, the CA overlooked the fact that it is within the province of the NLRC to
accredit surety companies for cases it hears. The SC only accredits surety companies for
judicial courts.
This fact explains why labor cases were not enumerated in the Certification of Accreditation
and Authority issued to the PCIC. This is not to say that the certification issued by the OCA is
worthless before the NLRC. On the contrary, the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC expressly provided that bonds issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Supreme Court are acceptable. In addition, the Court has relaxed the requirement of
posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal when there has been substantial
compliance with the rule. For example, in Del Rosario v. Philippine Journalists, Inc., the Court
allowed the appeal to proceed despite the subsequent revocation of the authority of a bonding
company, because "technical rules of procedure should not hamper the quest for justice
and truth."
We find that the purpose of the appeal bond — to ensure, during the period of appeal, against
any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the
judgment if subsequently affirmed — has been met. Records show that as of 22 January 2011,
the supersedeas bond in the amount of P476,137.39 was still in existence.
NLRC decision is reinstated.

TOPIC: 17. EFFECT OF NLRC’s FAILURE TO RULE ON MOTION TO REDUCE BOND -

tolentino
BEDUYA vs. ACE PROMOTIONS
G.R. No. 195513. June 22, 2015
FACTS:
• Respondent Ace Promotion and Marketing Corporation (APMC), with respondent Glen
Hernandez as its President, is a contractor engaged in the deployment of workers to
various companies to promote products through promotional and merchandising services.
• APMC entered into a Promotional Contract[7] with Delfi Marketing, Inc.[8] (Delfi) whereby
the APMC undertook to conduct promotional activities for the latter's confectionery
products.
• APMC employed workers, including petitioners Marlon Beduya and co. (petitioners), as
merchandisers under fixed-term employment contracts. The last contracts of
employment[9] that petitioners signed were until January 30, 2007.
• In a letter dated December 27, 2006, Delfi notified APMC that their Promotional Contract
will expire effective January 31, 2007.
• January 29, 2007: APMC informed petitioners that their last day of work would be on
January 30, 2007.
LABOR ARBITER
• 3 separate complaints (later on consolidated) for illegal dismissal and money claims
against APMC were filed
• LABOR ARBITER find no credible evidence to prove that they were employed on a
contractual basis; declared complainants to have been illegally dismissed.
• He found unconvincing APMC's allegation that complainants' employment was terminated
due to the expiration of its contract with Delfi considering that it continued to hire new
employees as replacements for complainants.
NLRC
• APMC filed a Memorandum of Appeal with Motion for Reduction of Bond[15] with the
NLRC.
• APMC maintained that complainants were contractual employees. As such, their contracts
of employment were terminated upon the expiration of APMC s Promotional Contract with
Delfi.
• Anent their motion for reduction of appeal bond, APMC contended that the awards granted
to complainants amounting to P6,269,856.89 should be decreased considering that:
(1) eight complainants did not sign the position paper submitted to the Labor Arbiter
and therefore, the monetary awards given in their favor should be excluded in the
computation of the total award; (2) nine complainants already withdrew their
complaints as shown by their Affidavits of Desistance;[16] xxxx → SPOILER: these are
SC’s basis as meritorious and justifiable grounds in ruling for APMC
• Respondents attached a supersedeas bond[17] in the amount of P437,210.00 along with

their appeal.
• Complainants prayed for the dismissal of APMC’s appeal based on insufficiency of the
bond posted
• This resulted in the non-perfection of the appeal of APMC, and consequently, the Labor
Arbiter's Decision had become final and executory.

• NLRC rendered a decision without acting on APMC’s motion for reduction of bond
and the complainants' opposition thereto, on February 23, 2009
• Ruled that complainants are contractual employees hired for a specific duration.
• NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and dismissed the complaints for illegal
dismissal.
• It, however, affirmed the awards of unpaid wages and ECOLA in favor of complainants.
Complainants-Employees’ CONTENTION:
• Complainants (employees): P437,210.00 appeal bond is insufficient and unreasonable
in relation to the total monetary award of P6,269,856.89, which should have warranted the
dismissal of respondents' appeal.
• Complainants pointed out that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it did not
resolve respondents' motion to reduce bond and their opposition thereto with motion to
dismiss before rendering its decision granting the appeal.
• Complainants' MR was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution[22] dated August 4,2009.
CA
• CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.
• It found APMC’s willingness and good faith in complying with the requirements as sufficient
justification to relax the rule on posting of an appeal bond.
• Complainants' MR was denied.
ISSUES
(a) WHETHER XXX THE FILING OF APPEAL WITH MOTION TO REDUCE APPEAL BOND
WILL TOLL THE RUNNING OF THE PERIOD TO PERFECT AN APPEAL – YES provided
the requisites are complied; Exception: If requisites are not complied; Meritorious Grounds
and Reasonable Amount of Bond will still toll the running of the period (just like in this case)
(b) WHETHER X X X AN APPEAL BOND IN THE AMOUNT OF P473,210.00 IS
REASONABLE IN RELATION TO [A POSSIBLE] MONETARY AWARD OF P6,269,856.00 –
YES.
ISSUES from Petitioner’s Arguments:

• WON NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over respondents' appeal for respondents' alleged
failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements on appeal bonds – NO.
• WON NLRC erred in resolving the merits of the appeal without first ruling on
respondents' motion to reduce appeal bond and their opposition thereto with
motion to dismiss. – NO.
RULING:
• The Petition has no merit.
• In case of a JUDGMENT involving a MONETARY AWARD, an APPEAL BY the
EMPLOYER may be PERFECTED ONLY upon the posting of a CASH OR SURETY
BOND issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission
in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
• While Sections 4(a) and 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provide:
SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL. - (a) The Appeal

shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this
Rule; 2) verified by appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of

the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal
which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof,
the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the appellant received
the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly written or
printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required
appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of
this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon
the other parties.
xxxx
SECTION 6. BOND. - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional
Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a bond which shall either be in the form of
cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award,
exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
xxxx
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious
grounds, and only upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in
relation to the monetary award.
• The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the requisites in the
preceding paragraphs shall NOT stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
• The filing of supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional and failure to comply with this requirement renders the decision
of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.[28]
• However, this Court, in many cases,[29] has relaxed this stringent requirement
whenever justified.
• Thus, the rules, specifically Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, allows the reduction of the appeal bond subject to the
conditions that: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious
grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by
the appellant. Otherwise, the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running
of the period to perfect an appeal.
• Still, the rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running
of the period to perfect an appeal is NOT ABSOLUTE.[30]
• In the case at bench, the Court finds that APMC’s motion to reduce appeal bond
was predicated on meritorious and justifiable grounds. First, the fact that eight
complainants failed to verify or affix their signatures on the position paper filed before
the Labor Arbiter merits the exclusion of the monetary awards adjudged to them.
• In Martos v. New San Jose Builders, Inc.,[34] it was held that complainant’s negligence
and passive attitude towards the rule on verification amounted to their refusal to further
prosecute their claims.
• Second, the withdrawal of seven complainants[35] in this case likewise warrants the
reduction of the monetary award rendered against respondents.
• In the recent case of Mcburnie v. Ganzon,[36] the Court has set a provisional
percentage of 10% of the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's
fees, as a reasonable amount of bond that an appellant should post pending
resolution by the NLRC of a motion to reduce bond.
• It is only after the posting of this bond that an appellant's period to perfect an
appeal is suspended.

• Here, after deducting from the total monetary award the amount of attorney's fees and
the amounts awarded to those complainants who did not verify their position papers
and those who had withdrawn their complaints, the total monetary award amounts
to only more than P3 million.[37]
• Hence, the appeal bond of P437,210.00 posted by respondents is in fact even
MORE THAN 10% of the said total monetary award.
• SC finds the amount of bond posted by respondents in the present case to be
reasonable.
• In any event, the Court notes that in Mcburnie, it was held that the required 10% of
the monetary award as appeal bond is merely provisional given that the NLRC still
retains the authority to exercise its full discretion to resolve a motion for the reduction
of bond and determine the final amount of bond that should be posted by an appellant
in accordance with the standards of meritorious grounds and reasonable amount. [38]
• The Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that the NLRC failed to
establish its jurisdictional authority over respondents' appeal.
• Again, the filing of a motion to reduce bond predicated on meritorious grounds coupled
with the posting of a reasonable amount of cash or surety bond is sufficient to suspend
the running of the period within which to appeal.
• As discussed, respondents in this case have substantially complied with these
requirements and, on account thereof, their appeal from the Labor Arbiter's Decision
was timely filed.
• Clearly, the NLRC was conferred with jurisdiction over respondents' appeal thus
placing the same within the power of the said labor tribunal to review
• With respect to the NLRC's failure to initially act upon respondents' motion to
reduce bond and petitioners' opposition thereto with motion to dismiss, suffice
it to say that the same did not divest the NLRC of its authority to resolve the
appeal on its substantive matters.
• The NLRC is not bound by technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in
the application of its rules in deciding labor cases.[39] Further, the NLRC is mandated
to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily
and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest
of due process.[40]
• CA correctly affirmed the NLRC Decision which granted respondents' appeal and
dismissed the illegal dismissal complaints. As aptly found by them, petitioners were
fixed-term employees whose respective contracts of employment had already expired.
Therefore, there can be no illegal dismissal to speak of.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November CA Decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SUFFICIENCY OF A CURRENT-DATED CHECK AS APPEAL BOND - torres
GBMLT MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. MA. VICTORIA H. MALINAO,

respondent. [G.R. No. 189262. July 6, 2015.]
Facts:
• Malinao applied as teacher for deployment abroad. She went through the application
and was interviewed by the president of an Ethiopian University. She was then
endorsed as an accounting lecturer.
• Malinao paid for the fees equivalent to one month salary and signed a Contract of
Employment covering 2 academic years, approved by POEA.
• Upon her arrival in Ethiopia, she was told that her credentials would have to be
reevaluated. She was presented a new contract for signing.
• Doubtful to sign at first, but signed anyway seeing as it is a copy of the original contract.
She was assigned to Alemaya Univ but decided to discontinue because she said that
auditing, not accounting, was her specialization.
• Another lecturer took over and she had no teaching load.
• Malinao’s rank was demoted from lecturer to assistant pursuant to a memorandum
issued by the school (included also a request to sign a new contract reflecting change
of rank and salary)
• Malinao refused and instead went to the Ministry of education to protest the reranking.
• In a meeting, she was shouted at by the VP but subsequently apologized saying that
she thought Malinao was the leader of a protest.
• Another instructor has replaced Malinao because of a students’ petition with the
signatures of such. Malinao checked the memo and saw that some students were not
from her class.
• There was also an issue about the qualification of respondent not having a graduate
degree.
• Malinao answered that she was a CPA and a law graduate, and this, in the PH, is of a
level higher than a master’s degree.
• VP issued the notice of termination, indicating the two instances where the Dept of
Accounting had to replace Malinao.
• The letter indicated that as per Article X sub article 2 of the contract, the employer is
obliged to give employee three months advanced notice as regards contract
termination. In the meantime employee is expected to continue work. Also that Malinao
kept of insulting the school and the students.
• Malinao answered saying that she cannot be terminated based on mere allegations.
She said that the 3 mos prior notice is for termination without cause.
• While waiting for the 3 month period to expire, Malinao was offered a post at the
Internal Audit dept (IAD) and accepted the job. However, she signified in a letter her
change of mind and rejected the post.
• She was then repatriated and signed a quitclaim and release in favor of employer with
900 USD as consideration.
• Malinao filed a case in the Labor Arbiter against Petitioner and Alemaya University for
the unexpired portion of her contract.
• The Labor Arbiter ruled that, Malinao was unduly repatriated in breach of employment
contract and should not be dismissed just because she did not have a master’s degree.
In the end however, LA found that Malinao was constructively dismissed. The amount

of the quitclaim was also unreasonable. Also entitled to moral damages for the verbal
abuse.
• Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. In respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal, she
indicated that when petitioner filed its memorandum of appeal on 20 April 2007, it
issued a check as payment for the appeal bond. The check was presented for payment
only on 23 April 2007. Considering that it takes three days for checks to clear - and
that checks only produce the effect of payment when they have been cashed - the
appeal bond was posted beyond the 10-day reglementary period. Hence, according to
respondent, petitioner's appeal was not perfected, and the labor arbiter's ruling had
attained finality.
• NLRC ruled that the quitclaim was valid and that the termination of employment was
because Malinao rejected the new offer by President Kassa in the IAD. Her
employment did not terminate but was to be continued by the new offer, in a different
capacity. Thus, she was not constructively dismissed.
• The CA reinstated the LA decision. As for the bond, CA ruled that since the check was
encashed only after the allowed period, the appeal was filed out of time. According to
the CA, the rules provide that only a cash or surety bond may be considered as appeal
bond, and noncompliance with the rule was fatal to petitioner's cause.

IMPORTANTE! BASAHIN MAIGI!
AMENDMENTS TO RULES 41, 45, 58 AND 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT [A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC]

RULE 65
SECTION 4. When and Where to File the Petition. — The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition
shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a

board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court
of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only
by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
SECTION 7. Expediting Proceedings; Injunctive Relief. — The court in which the petition is
filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal
case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued,
enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing
of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order
or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed
with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
SECTION 8. Proceedings After Comment is Filed. — After the comment or other pleadings
required by the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear
the case or require the parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of
memoranda or upon the expiration of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations
of the petition are true, it shall render judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.
However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble
costs solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to
administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions
or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.


Topic: PERIOD TO FILE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI - sharkus

LE SOLEIL INT'L. LOGISTICS CO., INC vs. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 199384
September 9, 2015.
Facts:
• On 16 September 2011, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioners for failing to perfect their petition for certiorari within
the 60-day reglementary period provided under the Revised Rules of Court, stating
that (1) the petition was filed three days late on September 5, 2011. Under Section
4, Rule 65 Revised Rules of the Civil Procedure, as amended by AM No. 07-7-12-
SC, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of the
judgment or order denying their motion for reconsideration. Having received a
copy of June 4, 2011 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the
assailed April 25, 2011 Decision on July 24, 2011, petitioners had up to
September 2, 2011 only to file the petition for certiorari; (2) that the petition
contains no statement of the specific material dates showing when petitioners received
a copy of the assailed April 25, 2011 Decision of the court a quo when a motion for
reconsideration was filed, contrary to Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules; and lastly,
(3) that the petition does not state the date of issue of petitioners' counsel's Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required under Bar
Matter No. 1922, dated June 3, 2008.
• Aggrieved by the foregoing resolution, petitioners timely interposed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated
17 November 2011.
Issue:
• Whether or not petitioner Le Soleil’s insistence on the timeliness of the filling of its appeal
has merit.
Held:
• NO. The general rule is that a timely appeal is the remedy to obtain reversal or modification
of the judgment on the merits. This is true even if one of the errors to be assigned on
appeal is the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court rendering the judgment over the
subject matter, or the exercise of power by said court is in excess of its jurisdiction, or the
making of its findings of fact or of law set out in the decision is attended by grave abuse of
discretion. In other words, the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is
mandatory because the failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by
the Rules of Court unavoidably renders the judgment final as to preclude the appellate
court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment.
• Under the foregoing rules, petition for certiorari should be instituted within a period
of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be
assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that
would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their
case. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be
discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. As a corollary,
rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings
are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly
and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.
• Applying the foregoing statutory and jurisprudential rules in the case at bar, we agree with
the disquisition of the CA that petitioners failed to seasonably perfect their appeal
rendering the Decision of the NLRC dated 25 April 2011 and its Resolution dated 14 June
2011, final and executory.
• In this case, there is no debate that petitioners incurred in delay in filing the petition
for certiorari before the appellate court. While petitioners concede that the filing of the
appeal was three days late, they however invoke the indulgence of the Court to liberally
apply the rules to pave the way for the resolution of the case on the merits. A careful
scrutiny of the pleadings submitted by petitioners reveals, however, that there is no
compelling reason to except this case from the operation of the general rule since none of
the exceptions enunciated in the jurisprudence is attendant herein. Certainly, liberality is
not a magic word that once invoked will automatically be considered as a mitigating
circumstance in favor of the party invoking it. There should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules.
• Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience
of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the
efficiency of, our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this
Court cannot trifle with.

Topic: MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION - angela

LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM and
GERALDINE ESGUERRA
[G.R. No. 185220. July 27, 2009.]
FACTS:
• This petition arose from a labor case filed by Caalam and Esguerra against Laguna
Metts Corporation (LMC).
• Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Caalma and Esguerra and found that they were
illegally dismissed by LMC.
• NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Caalam and Esguerra's MR was
denied.
• Counsel for Caalam and Esguerra received the resolution of NLRC on May 26, 2008.
On July 25, 2008, he filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The motion alleged that, for reasons stated
therein, the petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals within the prescribed 60-
day period. Thus, a 15-day extension period was prayed for.
• CA granted the motion and gave Caalam and Esguerra a non-extendible period of 15
days within which to file their petition for certiorari. LMC moved for the reconsideration
of said resolution claiming that extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no
longer allowed under sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007. This was denied by the CA. According to the
CA, while the amendment of the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 admittedly calls
for stricter application to discourage the filing of unwarranted motions for extension of
time, it did not strip the Court of Appeals of the discretionary power to grant a motion
for extension in exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice.
• Thus, this petition. LMC contends that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it granted Caalam and Esguerra's motion for extension of time to file petition for
certiorari as the CA had no power to grant something that had already been expressly
deleted from the rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed
RULING: YES
Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere
expediency of claiming substantial merit. As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing
specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to
prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very
nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
In De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled: Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a period
of 60 days within which to file a petition for certiorari. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable
and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of
discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay
that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.

While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition for
certiorari beyond the 60-day period, the amendments to Rule 65 under
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with
the deletion of the paragraph that previously permitted such extensions.
Last paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 65 previously read: No extension of time to file the petition
shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.
With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, the last paragraph is deleted.
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an

intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made
if there had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The
amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous
to its amendment. If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant
extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have
been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph simply meant that there can no longer be
any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari. The rationale for
the amendments is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing
extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As
the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
In granting the motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari, the CA disregarded
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. The action amounted to a modification, if not outright reversal, by the
Court of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In so doing, the CA arrogated to itself a power it did
not possess, a power that only this Court may exercise. For this reason, the challenged
resolutions were invalid as they were rendered by the CA in excess of its jurisdiction. Even
assuming that the CA retained the discretion to grant extensions of time to file a petition for
certiorari for compelling reasons, the reasons proffered by private respondents' counsel did
not qualify as compelling. Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it
is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule.
While social justice requires that the law look tenderly on the disadvantaged sectors of society,
neither the rich nor the poor has a license to disregard rules of procedure. The fundamental
rule of human relations enjoins everyone, regardless of standing in life, to duly observe
procedural rules as an aspect of acting with justice, giving everyone his due and observing
honesty and good faith. For indeed, while technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest
for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all courts are
devoted.
Petition is GRANTED.

=> MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION
JAIME S. DOMDOM vs. HON. THIRD AND FIFTH DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
arranged by: Liwag, Angelene L.
CHARACTERS:
• Jaime Domdom - Director of Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC)
• Hilconeda Abril - State Auditor V of the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned at the PCIC
FACTS:
By Affidavit, Hilconeda Abril requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the transactions-bases of the claims of Domdom for miscellaneous and
extraordinary expenses as a Director of PCIC, the receipts covering which were alleged to be
tampered.
After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge
petitioner with nine counts of estafa through falsification of documents in view of irregularities
in nine supporting receipts for his claims for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses, after
verification with the establishments he had transacted with. It thus directed the filing of the
appropriate Informations with the Sandiganbayan.
The Informations were separately lodged among the five divisions of the Sandiganbayan. The
First, Second and Fifth Divisions granted petitioner's Motions for Consolidation of the cases
raffled to them with that having the lowest docket number which was raffled to the Third
Division.
The Sandiganbayan Third Division disallowed the consolidation, however, by Resolutions, it

holding mainly that the evidence in the cases sought to be consolidated differed from that to
be presented in the one which bore the lowest docket number. It is gathered from the records
that the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division also denied petitioner's Motion for Consolidation.
Petitioner thus seeks relief from this Court via the present Petition for Certiorari, with prayer
for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the
different divisions of the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the cases against him
during the pendency of this petition.
DOMDOM'S CONTENTION: argues that, among other things, all the cases against him arose
from substantially identical series of transactions involving alleged overstatements of
miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses.
PEOPLE'S CONTENTION: petitioner failed to fie a motion for reconsideration which is a

condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari; that the petition was filed out of time
since a motion for extension to fie such kind of a petition is no longer allowed; that
consolidation is a matter of judicial discretion; and that the proceedings in the different
divisions of the Sandiganbayan may proceed independently as the Informations charged
separate crimes committed on separate occasions.

In the meantime, the Court issued a TRO enjoining all divisions of the Sandiganbayan from
further proceeding with the trial of the cases against petitioner until further orders.
_
ISSUE: Whether a motion for extension makes the filing of a pleading absolutely
prohibited? | Whether a motion for reconsideration is a condition for the filing of a petition for
certiorari?
RULING: No. | No.
Settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct
any actual or perceived error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a
patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; *****where the questions raised
in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court
, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner*** , or the subject matter of
the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; *** and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.
SC finds that the issue raised by petitioner had been duly raised and passed upon by
the Sandiganbayan Third Division, it having denied consolidation in two resolutions;
that the issue calls for resolution and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
petitioner ; and that the issue raised is one purely of law , the facts not being contested.
There is thus ample justification for relaxing the rule requiring the prior filing of a
motion for reconsideration.
"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days."
Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC -- Sec. 4. When and where to file
the petition. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
****counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
⁃ That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a

motion for extension, unlike in the previous formulation, does not make the filing of such
pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have
simply been reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted."
Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the Court's
sound discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within
the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits.

⁃ requisites for the consolidation of cases: A court may order several actions pending
before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, ***
involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same
evidence** , provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and
that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights
of any of the parties.
The rule allowing consolidation is designed to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against
oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, and to simplify the
work of the trial court — in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and
vexation to the parties-litigants.
In the present case, it would be more in keeping with law and equity if all the cases filed
against petitioner were consolidated with that having the lowest docket number
pending with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The only notable differences in
these cases lie in the date of the transaction, the entity transacted with and amount
involved. The charge and core element are the same — estafa through falsification of
documents based on alleged overstatements of claims for miscellaneous and
extraordinary expenses. Notably, the main witness is also the same — Hilconeda Abril.

Topic: Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition - marivic
Republic represented by DPWH vs. St. Vincent de Paul College

G. R. No. 192908, August 22, 2012
Facts:
➢ The instant Petition was filed by the petitioners to assail the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing its Petition for Certiorari for being filed out of time
➢ The instant Petition arose from two cases (two complaints) filed by the Republic
seeking appropriation of certain properties in the name of respondent St. Vincent
➢ The two complaints were later amended by Republic alleging that the subject land
originated from free patent and should be adjudicated to it without just compensation
➢ The RTC issued the order of expropriation
➢ Due to St. Vincent’s refusal to honor the order of expropriation, Republic filed a motion
for issuance of writ of possession which was denied by the RTC
➢ The RTC even ordered for the payment of just compensation to St. Vincent
➢ Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC’s order was denied
➢ Republic then filed with the CA motion for additional time of 15 days within which to
file its petition for certiorari which the CA granted in its resolution dated April 30, 2009,
Republic was given a non-extendible period of 15 days or until May 4, 2009 to file the
petition
➢ The CA then issued a Resolution ordering Republic to show cause why its petition
should be dismissed for being filed out of time, pursuant to A. M. No. 07-7-12-SC
➢ The Republic filed its Compliance and Manifestation, pleading for the relaxation of the
rules by reason of transcendental importance and substantial justice
➢ On 30 October 2009, the CA issued a resolution dismissing the Republic’s motion for
extension for being filed out of time in as much as extensions of time are now
disallowed by A. M. No. 07-7-12-SC
➢ Then again, Republic filed an MR with the October 30, 2009 resolution of the CA,
alleging that it relied in good faith on the April 30, 2009 resolution
➢ The MR was denied, hence, the instant Petition.
➢ St. Vincent contended that the present petition fails to neither allege any circumstance
nor state any justification for the deliberate disregard of a very elementary rule of
procedure
Issue: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the Republic’s petition for
certiorari
Held: Yes. The CA committed an error, the petition is granted.
➢ First, they initially granted the motion in its April 30, 2009 resolution
➢ Second, the CA subsequently dismissed the petition filed by the Republic on the
ground that the same was filed out of time, following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
➢ The CA also relied on the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation that the sixty (60)-day
period within which to file a petition for certiorari is non-extendible. Petitioner Republic,
however, insists that Domdom allows extensions of time to file a petition
➢ What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the
foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation
involves a strict application of the general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed
strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion

for reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an
extension of the sixty (60)-day period subject to the Court’s sound discretion
➢ Thus, Laguna Metts is the general rule but under exceptional circumstances, however,
and subject to the sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant
to Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases
➢ Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republic’s petition: first, due to its own
lapse when it granted the extension and second, because of the public interest
involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP); and finally, no
undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition

Topic: MOTION FOR EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION - cha

ADTEL, INC. and/or REYNALDO T. CASAS, petitioners, vs. VALDEZ, respondent.
Facts
- Adtel hired Marijoy A. Valdez and at the same time Adtel entered into a dealershi
agreement with Marijoy's husband.
- Later on, Adtel terminated Marijoy because of conflict of interest.
- Marijoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter.
- LA ruled in in favor of Adtel
- NLRC ruled in favor of Maijoy. NLRC held that ADTEL failed to substantially prove the
existence of an act or omission personally attributable to Marijoy to serve as a just cause
to terminate her employment.
- Adtel filed motion for reconsideraion which was denied by NLRC.
- On the last day of filing petition for certiorari with CA, Adtel filed a motion for
extension of time with the CA.
- After the last day for filing or the 75th day( 60 +15 ) filed its petition for certioraru with the
CA.
- CA denied motion for extension and dismissed Adtel's petition for certiorari.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in denying the motion for extension of time to file for petition?
Ruling
No.
- The rule is that in filing petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, a motion for
extension is a prohibited pleading. However in exceptional or meritorious cases,
the Court may grant an extension anchored on special or meritorious cases, the
Court may grant an extension anchored on special or compelling reasons.
compelling reasons.
- In this case, Adtel invoke that due to its counsel heavy volume of work, Adtel was
constrained to request for an additional period of 15 days which to file the petition for
certiorari.
- It has been held in Thenamaris Philippines vs CA that heavy workload and resignation of
lawywe in handling the case ae insufficient reasons to justify the relaxation of the
procedural rules under Rule 65.
WHEREFORE , we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated 28 May 2009 and 8 October 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108169.

SURETY BOND NOT NECESSARY ON CERTIORARI

 
JONATHAN I. SANG-AN, petitioner, vs. EQUATOR KNIGHTS DETECTIVE AND
SECURITY AGENCY, INC., respondent. [G.R. No. 173189. February 13, 2013.]
Jonathan Sang-an assails the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) setting
aside the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstating the
decision of the labor arbiter.
He contends more specifically that when respondent Equator Knights Detective and Security
Agency, Inc. (Equator) filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging
grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC, it failed to post a cash or surety bond as required by
Article 223 of the Labor Code. Without complying with this condition, the petition for certiorari
should have been dismissed outright. Does this contention find merit?
Ruling: No.
The requirement of a cash or surety bond as provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code
only applies to appeals from the orders of the labor arbiter to the NLRC. It does not apply to
special civil actions such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In fact,
nowhere under Rule 65 does it state that a bond is required for the filing of the petition.
A petition for certiorari is an original and independent action and is not part of the proceedings
that resulted in the judgment or order assailed before the CA. It deals with the issue of
jurisdiction, and may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court or tribunal
prior to an appeal from the judgment, or to a final judgment where there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy or adequate remedy provided by law or by the rules. (Jonathan I. Sang-an vs.
Equator Knights Detective and Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 173189, February 13, 2013).
=> A cash/surety bond is not needed in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
The requirement of a cash or surety bond as provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code
only applies to appeals from the orders of the LA to the NLRC. It does not apply to special civil
actions such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In fact, nowhere
under Rule 65 does it state that a bond is required for the 􏰔ling of the petition.
A petition for certiorari is an original and independent action and is not part of the proceedings
that resulted in the judgment or order assailed before the CA. It deals with the issue of
jurisdiction, and may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court or tribunal
prior to an appeal from the judgment, or to a 􏰔nal judgment where there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy or adequate remedy provided by law or by the rules.

DEFINITION OF GRAVE ABUSE OF LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC - rollan
[G.R. No. 209822. July 8, 2015.]

DIONISIO DACLES, * petitioner, vs. MILLENNIUM ERECTORS
CORPORATION and/or RAGAS TIU, respondents.
FACTS
• Respondent Millennium Erectors Corporation (MEC) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the construction business.
• On October 6, 2010, petitioner instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal with
money claims against MEC and its owner/manager, respondent Ragas
Tiu (respondents), before the NLRC, National Capital Region.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
Petitioner claimed that he was hired by respondents as a mason in 1998. On June
7, 2010, while he was working on a project in Malakas Street, Quezon City (QC), he
was advised by respondent's officer, Mr. Bongon, to move to another project in
Robinson's Cubao, QC.
However, upon arrival at the site, he was instructed to return to his former job site and,
thereafter, was given a run-around for the two (2) succeeding days. When he
requested to be given a post or assigned to a new project, he was told by the
paymaster not to report for work anymore, prompting him to file the illegal dismissal
complaint, with claims for service incentive leave (SIL) pay, overtime pay, holiday pay,
13th month pay, rest day and premium pay, and salary differentials.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
Respondents denied having illegally dismissed petitioner, claiming that he was a mere
project employee whose contract expired on June 4, 2010 upon the completion of his
masonry work assignment in the Residential & Commercial Building Project (RCB-
Malakas Project) along East Avenue, QC.
They averred that petitioner applied and was hired as a mason on October 8, 2009 and
assigned to the Newport Entertainment and Commercial Center Project in Pasay City (NECC
Project), which was completed on March 3, 2010. Thereafter, petitioner applied anew and was
hired as a mason on April 15, 2010 to work on the RCB-Malakas Project.
LA: LA dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint, finding that petitioner is a project employee
NLRC: NLRC reversed the LA ruling and instead, declared that petitioner was a regular
employee.
]
CA: CA annulled and set aside the NLRC's ruling and reinstated the LA's ruling.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in holding that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in declaring that petitioner was a regular employee, and not a project employee-
NO!
HELD
The petition is without merit.
First, it must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes
judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. To be considered "grave," discretion must be exercised in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its
findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence, "or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion."
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE CA CORRECTLY GRANTED

RESPONDENTS' CERTIORARI PETITION BEFORE IT, SINCE THE NLRC GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS A REGULAR
EMPLOYEE OF MEC WHEN THE LATTER HAD ESTABLISHED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS MERELY A PROJECT EMPLOYEE. On the other
hand, there is no evidence on record to substantiate petitioner's claim that he was employed
as early as 1998. Article 294 36 of the Labor Code,37 as amended, distinguishes a project-
based employee from a regular employee as follows:
Art. 294. Regular and casual employment. — The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
Thus, for an employee to be considered project-based, the employer must show that: (a) the
employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and
scope of which were specified at the time the employee was engaged for such project.
In this case, records reveal that petitioner was adequately informed of his employment status
(as project employee) at the time of his engagement for the NECC and RCB-Malakas Projects.
This is clearly substantiated by the latter's employment contracts 41 duly signed by him,
explicitly stating that: (a) he was hired as a project employee; and (b) his employment was for
the indicated starting dates therein "and will end on completion/phase of work of project."
All told, since respondents have duly proven by substantial evidence that petitioner,
although rehired, was engaged for specific projects, the duration and scope of which were
specified at the times he was engaged, and that he was apprised of his status as a project
employee at the onset, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner was
a regular employee. Therefore, the affirmance of the CA's ruling is in order.

Topic: GROUNDS WHERE Supreme Court MAY RESOLVE ISSUES OF FACTS IN A

PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 - HEZEL
DOMINADOR MALABUNGA, * JR., petitioner, vs. CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL

CORPORATION, respondent.
[G.R. No. 198515. June 15, 2015.]
Note: Magkakaiba kasi ang findings of facts ng LA, NLRC at CA.
Facts:
Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation is a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing steel products. It hired Dominador Malabunga, Jr. as one of its
machinists.
On July 9, 2004, an inventory of Cathay's tools and items at the company warehouse w as
made, and it was found that one aluminum level was issued to Cathay's Fabrication Unit, and
another to Malabunga.
On July 11, 2004, Malabunga returned an aluminum level to the warehouse.
On July 24, 2004, Cathay served a written Notice upon Malabunga, charging the latter with
theft of the aluminum level issued to its Fabrication Unit and requiring him to submit a written
explanation.
Cathay claimed that Malabunga stole the aluminum level issued to the Fabrication Unit and
returned the same to cover up the loss of the one issued to him. In other words, Cathay
accused Malabunga of stealing the aluminum level issued to the Fabrication Unit and returning
the same on July 11, 2004, passing it off as the one that was issued to him previously; by
doing this, Malabunga would then cover up the loss of or failure to return the one that was
previously issued to him.
In his written explanation, Malabunga insisted that the accusation against him was false,
baseless and unfair; that the aluminum level he borrowed on June 28, 2004 was the very same
tool which he returned on July 11, 2004, that when he returned the same, the warehousemen
did not find anything unusual on the level and that he cannot be faulted for the ineptness or
inefficiency of respondent in keeping track of its equipment.
On December 2, 2004, Cathay suspended Malabunga for a period of 30 days and requiring
him to return the value of the lost aluminum level, or P280.00, through salary deductions.
Thus, he was suspended from January 10, 2005 to February 13, 2005. Thereafter, he returned
to work.
On March 2, 2005, petitioner filed a Complaint for Illegal Suspension with the NLRC arguing
that he should not be blamed for the loss of the aluminum level.
Cathay claimed that Malabunga's suspension was valid; that based on the written statements
of the employees and other evidence, Malabunga was found guilty of theft of company
property.
Labor Arbiter dismissed Malabunga's complaint for illegal suspension. The Labor Arbiter held
that substantial evidence — in the form of written statements of Cathay's witnesses positively
identifying Malabunga as returning the Fabrication Unit's aluminum level and not the one
issued to him — warranted the imposition of the penalty of suspension.
NLRC reversed LA’s decision. Catahy relied heavily on the statement of the warehouseman
pointing to the complainant as the one who returned to him the lost aluminum level. But there
is nothing on record, except for such statement, that the item returned by complainant is the
same aluminum level that was lost. What is clear from the records is the admitted fact that the
warehouseman, as correctly pointed out by complainant, failed to immediately call the
attention of the latter upon the receipt of his borrowed item if there was indeed a discrepancy
between the level he borrowed, and [the one] he returned
CA sustained LA’s decision. The CA held that there was reasonable ground to believe that
Malabunga was responsible for the theft of the aluminum level assigned to the Cathay's
Fabrication Unit. It sustained the Labor Arbiter's findings that based on the statements of
Mangahas, Tercero and Nagales — workers at the Fabrication Unit — and the written
explanations of Narvasa and Baetiong, it was established that what Malabunga returned to
the warehouse on July 11, 2004 was the Fabrication Unit's aluminum level and not the one
issued to him; that the aluminum level he returned contained the engraving "Fabrication" and
a dent which was familiar to the Fabrication Unit's workers; and that the inventory records
would show that at the time, Malabunga was the only one who returned an aluminum level to
the warehouse.
Issue: Whether CA erred in vacating the decision and resolution of the NLRC finding
respondent corporation guilty of illegal suspension
Held: YES.
In labor cases, issues of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve, as this Court is not a trier of
facts. However, in exceptional cases, this Court may be urged to resolve factual issues: [3]
where the [Labor Arbiter] and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions. "When
there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the labor tribunals and the CA,
there is a need to refer to the record."
The instant Petition presents not only a situation where the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the
CA differ in their assessment of petitioner's case, but also one where the evidence miserably
fails to support a finding that petitioner committed theft. The Labor Arbiter and the CA — and
the NLRC as well — ignored one material piece of evidence which should have exonerated
petitioner from the theft charge.
Cathay claims that what Malabunga returned to its warehouse on July 11, 2004 was the
Fabrication Unit's aluminum level. This is based on the identical claim of Fabrication Unit
workers — Mangahas, Tercero, and Nagales — that they discovered their lost aluminum level
upon which was engraved the word "Fabrication" and had the familiar dent which, based on
warehouse records, turned out to be that which was returned by petitioner.
However, the warehousemen who are in custody of the Cathay's tools and items tell a different
story. Narvasa, warehouseman, positively declared that what Malabunga returned, and what
he and co-warehouseman Zapanta actually received from Malabunga, was an untarnished
(malinis) and unique aluminum level. In other words, it did not contain any engraving nor bear
any dent, damage or scratch. This directly contradicted the claims of the Fabrication Unit
workers.
If it is true that the Fabrication Unit's aluminum level was supposedly lost sometime in June
2004 which loss was never reported, and subsequently discovered by Tercero to be in the
warehouse all along when he went there to borrow one on July 13, 2004, then it could not be
the case that said aluminum level — which contained an engraving of the word "Fabrication"
and had a dent — was the one Malabunga returned on July 11, 2004.
The declaration of warehouseman Narvasa was categorical; he and his colleague Dennis
Zapanta received from Malabunga an untarnished untarnished aluminum level which had no
dent or damage whatsoever.
With the foregoing finding, the only logical conclusion that may be arrived at is that Malabunga
did not commit theft of the Fabrication Unit's aluminum level.
Petition granted. Decision of NLRC is reinstated.

#25. VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT/RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM - angelique
Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc., Lutz Kunack, and Jose Barin vs. Antonio S. Go
G.R. No. 160913. August 31, 2006| SOLIS
Facts:
• Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and
export of wigs and toupees. Lutz Kunack and Jose E. Barin are the company’s president
and general manager, respectively.
• Antonio S. Go served as Eurotechs operations manager from September 2, 1996 until he
was dismissed on September 27, 1999. As operations manager, his responsibilities
included manpower planning to meet the monthly production targets.
• In 1999, the company suffered production shortfalls. Thus, on September 2 Barin issued
Got a memorandum, strongly advising him to improve his performance. He was
admonished because of the late shipment of 80 units of hairpieces to one of the clients.
• Eurotech issued several memoranda reminding Go to improve his performance until
eventually the company terminated his services citing loss of trust and confidence for his
failure to heed their demands and to respond to the notices sent.
• Go filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, separation pay, backwages, and damages. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor.
• On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. CA set aside the decision of the NLRC and essentially reinstated the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter.
• Go received the Decision of the Court of Appeals on July 21, 2003. Prior to such receipt,
he had executed a quitclaim in consideration of P450,000. Hence, on July 16, 2003, the
Labor Arbiter issued an Order dismissing with prejudice the complaint for illegal dismissal
in view of the said waiver.
• Eurotech moved for reconsideration of the CA’s decision in light of the said settlement.
Go, on the other hand, manifested that he was not represented by his counsel when he
signed the quitclaim. He further alleged that he was in fact advised by petitioners not to
inform his counsel about the quitclaim.
• CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and voided for lack of jurisdiction
the Labor Arbiters Order dismissing the case with prejudice.
Petitioner’s claim: The pendency of respondent’s petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals did not divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction to dismiss the case in view of the
quitclaim. Respondent knowingly and voluntarily executed the waiver in the presence of the
Labor Arbiter. Petitioners further allege that the compromise agreement has the force and
effect of res judicata.
Respondent’s contention: There was no legal or factual basis to terminate him on the ground
of loss of trust and confidence. Allowing an employer to dismiss an employee on a simple
claim of loss of trust and confidence places the employees right to security of tenure at the
mercy of the employer. The petition raises only questions of fact and should therefore be
denied outright.
Issues: 1) WON the respondents dismissal in accordance with law.

2) WON the compromise agreement entered into by the parties valid.
Held: 1) No. Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an employee’s dismissal
must be based on a willful breach and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful
if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished

from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. The employer must
show what standards of work or reasonable work assignments were prescribed which the
employee failed to observe. In addition, the employer must prove that the employees failure
to observe any such standards or assignments was due to his own inefficiency.
Eurotech was unable to prove that such failure was due to respondents inefficiency. The
burden of proof in dismissal cases rests on the employer. In the case at bar petitioners failed
to prove that respondent was terminated for a valid cause. Evidence adduced was utterly
wanting as to respondents alleged inefficiency constituting a willful breach of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by petitioners.
2) Yes. Article 227 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 227. Compromise agreements. Any compromise settlement, including those

involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the
assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be
final and binding upon the parties.
Note, however, that even if contracted without the assistance of labor officials,
compromise agreements between workers and their employers remain valid and are still
considered desirable means of settling disputes
A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the

employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was
entering into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered
into is personal and specific individual consent. Thus, contrary to respondents contention,
the employees counsel need not be present at the time of the signing of the compromise
agreement.
In this case, we find the consideration of P450,000 fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. In addition, records show that respondent gave his personal and specific
individual consent with a full understanding of the stakes involved. In our view, the compromise
agreement in this case does not suffer from the badges of invalidity.
The fact that the Order, which dismissed the case in view of the compromise agreement, was
issued during the pendency of the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals does not divest
the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari is an original action and does not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding.
The Labor Arbiter thus acted well within his jurisdiction. Therefore, the Labor Arbiters Order
dismissing the case with prejudice in view of the compromise agreement entered into by the
parties must be upheld.

VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT/RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM - taclas
VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT/RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM - TACLAS

J-PHIL MARINE, INC., AND/OR JESUS CANDAVA AND NORMAN SHIPPING SERVICE
VS. NLRC AND WARLITO DUMALAOG [AUGUST 11, 2008]
FACTS
• Warlito Dumalaog (respondent), who served as cook aboard vessels plying overseas
before the NLRC a pro-forma filed a complaint against petitioners.
• Warlito thereafter filed two amended pro forma complaints for the award overtime pay,
vacation leave pay, and disability/medical benefits, he having, by his claim, contracted
enlargement of the heart and severe thyroid enlargement in the discharge of his duties
as cook which rendered him disabled. (dismissed by Labor Arbiter for lack of merit)
• NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and awarded US$50,000.00 benefit to
Warlito. It dismisses Warlito’s other claims for lack of basis or jurisdiction.
• Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but it was dismissed for failure to
attach all material documents and defective verification and certification. Hence, this
present Petition for Certiorari.
• During the pendency of the case, Warlito, against the advice of his counsel,
entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. He thereupon, signed a
Quitclaim and Release subscribed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter.
• Petitioners filed a Manifestation informing that, inter alia, they and respondent
had forged an amicable settlement.
• The parties having forged a compromise agreement as respondent in fact has
executed a Quitclaim and Release, the court dismisses the petition.
ISSUE
• Whether the compromise agreement is valid.
RULING
• YES. Art. 227 of the Labor Code provides: Any compromise settlement, including those
involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the
assistance of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The
NLRC or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in
case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement
was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.
• That respondent was not assisted by his counsel when he entered into the compromise
does not render it null and void.
• A compromise agreement is valid as long as consideration is reasonable and the
employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was
entering into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered
into is personal and specific individual consent. Thus, contrary to respondent’s
contention the employee’s counsel need not be present at the time of the signing of
the compromise.
• It bears noting that, as reflected earlier, the Quitclaim and Waiver was subscribed and
sworn to before the Labor Arbiter.
• In the case at bar, there is no showing that Warlito intended to defraud his counsel of
his fees. In fact, the Quitclaim and Release, the execution of which was witnessed by
petitioner J-Phil’s president, notes that 20% attorney’s fees would be paid.
Yes, the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement without a lawyer is proper.

The Supreme Court held that the relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of
agency, and the general rules of agency apply to such relation. The acts of an agent are
deemed the acts of the principal only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority. The
circumstances of this case indicate that respondent's counsel is acting beyond the scope of
his authority in questioning the compromise agreement.
Dumalaog has undoubtedly the right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer
cannot be gainsaid, the only qualification being that if such compromise is entered into with
the intent of defrauding the lawyer of the fees justly due him, the compromise must be subject
to the said fees.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent intended to defraud his counsel of his
fees.

Icompare daw sa Amurao case!!!!! IMPORTANTE! BASAHIN MAIGI!
25. VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT/RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM - tolentino

RADIO MINDANAO vs. DOMINGO YBAROLA
G.R. No. 198662. September 12, 2012
FACTS:
• June 15, 1977; June 1, 1983: Respondents Domingo Z. Ybarola, Jr. and Alfonso E. Rivera,
Jr. were hired, respectively, by RMN. They then became account managers of RMN.
• September 15, 2002: As a result of RMN s reorganization/restructuring; Ybarola’s and
Rivera’s services were terminated
• They were given their separation pay P 631,250.00 for Ybarola, and P481,250.00 for
Rivera.
• December 2002: they executed release/quitclaim affidavits.
• Dissatisfied with their separation pay, the Ybarola and Rivera filed complaints against
RMN and its President, Eric S. Canoy, for illegal dismissal with several money claims,
including attorney s fees.
• They indicated that their monthly salary rates were P 60,000.00 for Ybarola
and P 40,000.00 for Rivera.
Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings

• RESPONDENTS: Ybarola and Rivera argued that the release/quitclaim they executed
should not be a bar to the recovery of the full benefits due them; while they admitted that
they signed release documents, they did so due to dire necessity.
• PETITIONERS: RMN denied liability, contending that the amounts the respondents
received represented a fair and reasonable settlement of their claims, as attested to by the
release/quitclaim affidavits which they executed freely and voluntarily.
LABOR ARBITER
• July 18, 2007: Labor Arbiter Patricio Libo-on dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint, but
ordered the payment of additional separation pay to the respondents P 490,066.00 for
Ybarola and P 429,517.55 for Rivera.
• The labor arbiter adjusted the separation pay award based on the respondents Certificates
of Compensation Payment/Tax Withheld
NLRC
• NLRC set aside the labor arbiter’s decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 6
• The NLRC upheld the validity of the respondents quitclaim affidavits as they failed to show
that they were forced to execute the documents.
• Respondents sought relief from the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
CA
• February 17, 2011: CA granted the petition (in favor of Ybarola and Rivera) and set aside
the assailed NLRC dispositions.
• It reinstated the labor arbiter’s separation pay award, rejecting the NLRC’s ruling
• declared the release/quitclaim affidavits executed by the respondents invalid for being
against public policy, citing two reasons: (1) the terms of the settlement are
unconscionable; the separation pay the respondents received was deficient by at

least P 400,000.00 for each of them; and (2) the absence of voluntariness when the
respondents signed the document, it was their dire circumstances and inability to support
their families that finally drove them to accept the amount the petitioners offered.
Significantly, they dallied and it took them three months to sign the release/quitclaim
affidavits.
• RMN’s MR is denied.
• RMN appealed to SC through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court but it was denied for failure to show any reversible error or grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed CA rulings.
• RMN filed a MR to SC.
ISSUE: (relevant to the topic)

WON CA erred in disregarding the rule laid down in Talam v. National Labor Relations
Commission12 on the proper appreciation of quitclaims – NO.
RMN’s CONTENTION:
• On the release/quitclaim issue, the petitioners bewail the CA’s disregard of the Court’s
ruling in Talam that the quitclaim that Francis Ray Talam, who was not an unlettered
employee, executed was a voluntary act as there was no showing that he was coerced
into signing the instrument, and that he received a valuable consideration for his less than
two years of service with the company.
• They stress, too, that the respondents submitted no proof that they were in dire
circumstances when they executed the release/quitclaim document.
YBAROLA’s and RIVERA’s CONTENTION:
• They argue that the motion is based on arguments already raised in the Petition for Review
which had already been denied by this Court.
• They maintain that as the records show, the petitioners failed to raise the issue in their
appeal to the NLRC and neither did they bring it up in their motion for reconsideration of
the CA s decision reinstating the labor arbiter’s award.
RULING:
• We find the motion for reconsideration unmeritorious. The motion raises substantially
the same arguments presented in the petition and we find no compelling justification to
grant the reconsideration prayed for.
• The petitioners reliance on our ruling in Talam v. National Labor Relations
Commission,17 regarding the "proper appreciation of quitclaims," as they put it, is
misplaced.
• While Talam, in the cited case, and Ybarola and Rivera, in this case, are not unlettered
employees, their situations differ in all other respects.
• In Talam, the employee received a valuable consideration for his less than two years of
service with the company;18 he was not shortchanged and no essential unfairness took
place.
• In this case, as the CA noted, the separation pay the respondents each received was
deficient by at least P 400,000.00; thus, they were given only half of the amount they
were legally entitled to. To be sure, a settlement under these terms is not and cannot be

a reasonable one, given especially the respondents length of service 25 years for Ybarola
and 19 years for Rivera.
• The CA was correct when it opined that the respondents were in dire straits when they
executed the release/quitclaim affidavits. Without jobs and with families to support, they
dallied in executing the quitclaim instrument, but were eventually forced to sign given their
circumstances.
• MR is DENIED.
We Hnd the motion for reconsideration unmeritorious . The motion raises substantially the
same arguments presented in the petition and we Hnd no compelling justification to grant the
reconsideration prayed for.
The petitioners insist that the respondents' commissions were not part of their salaries,
because they failed to present proof that they earned the commission due to actual market
transactions attributable to them. They submit that the commissions are proHt-sharing
payments which do not form part of their salaries. We are not convinced . If these commissions
had been really proHt-sharing bonuses to the respondents, they should have received the
same amounts, yet, as the NLRC itself noted, Ybarola and Rivera received P372,173.11 and
P586,998.50 commissions, respectively, in 2002. 15 The variance in amounts the respondents
received as commissions supports the CA's Hnding that the salary structure of the
respondents was such that they only received a minimal amount as guaranteed wage; a
greater part of their income was derived from the commissions they get from soliciting
advertisements; these advertisements are the "products" they sell. As the CA aptly noted, this
kind of salary structure does not detract from the character of the commissions being part of
the salary or wage paid to the employees for services rendered to the company, as the Court
held in Philippine Duplicators, Inc. v. NLRC. 16
The petitioners' reliance on our ruling in Talam v. National Labor Relations Commission, 17
regarding the "proper appreciation of quitclaims," as they put it, is misplaced. While Talam, in
the cited case, and Ybarola and Rivera, in this case, are not unlettered employees, their
situations differ in all other respects.
In Talam, the employee received a valuable consideration for his less than two years of service
with the company; 18 he was not shortchanged and no essential unfairness took place. In this
case, as the CA noted, the separation pay the respondents each received was deHcient by at
least P400,000.00; thus, they were given only half of the amount they were legally entitled to.
To be sure, a settlement under these terms is not and cannot be a reasonable one, given
especially the respondents' length of service — 25 years for Ybarola and 19 years for Rivera.
The CA was correct when it opined that the respondents were in dire straits when they
executed the release/quitclaim aIdavits. Without jobs and with families to support, they dallied
in executing the quitclaim instrument, but were eventually forced to sign given their
circumstances.
Lastly, the petitioners are estopped from raising the issue of Canoy's personal liability. They
did not raise it before the NLRC in their appeal from the labor arbiter's decision, nor with the
CA in their motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment. The risk of having
Canoy's personal liability for the judgment award did not arise only with the Hling of the present
petition, it had been there all along — in the NLRC, as well as in the CA.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration with
Hnality. No second motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. Let judgment be entered
in due course.

VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT/RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM

i-compare sa Ybarola case
[G.R. No. 167225. October 22, 2014.] LOUIE
RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC., petitioner, vs. MICHAEL MAXIMO

R. AMURAO III, respondent.
Facts:
• In 1989, Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN) hired Michael Amurao (Michael) as a
radio broadcaster for its DWKC-FM station and production manager for its metropolitan
radio operations.
• Years later, RMN decided to reformat and restructure the programming of its DWKC-
FM station to meet demands of the broadcasting industry.
• In 2002, the president of RMN met with Michael and other personnel of the station to
inform them of the management’s decision, advising them that the reformatting and
restructuring of the station’s programs would necessarily affect their employment; but
assuring that they would be paid their retirement pay and other benefits.
• However, Michael and the other personnel refused to sign in receipt when the letters
were served on them. Not long after, however, they accepted the offer of RMN and
executed affidavits relinquishing all their claims against the employer.|5 months after
receiving his benefits and his execution of the quitclaim, Michael filed a complaint
against RMN for illegal dismissal with money claims in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
Labor Arbiter’s Decision:
• The LA declared the dismissal of Michael as illegal on the ground that the reformatting
and restructuring of RMN’s radio programming did not fall under any of just and
authorized causes that would make the termination of his employment valid and
holding the quitclaim Michael signed as void because it was not voluntarily executed.
• RMN appealed to the NLRC, contending that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was
premature for being rendered without first issuing an order either setting the case for
hearing or declaring the same submitted for decision and that the quitclaim signed in
its favor was valid and binding because it is represented voluntarily and reasonable
settlement of Michael’s claim.
NLRC’s Ruling:
• NLRC found no merit in the contention of RMN that the appealed decision was
prematurely rendered. It held that the quitclaim was null and void for not being
voluntarily executed.
• RMN moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied its motion. Consequently, RMN
filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) its petition for certiorari, submitting that the NLRC
thereby committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
jurisdiction.
CA’s Decision:
• The CA denied and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Issue:
• Whether the quitclaim executed by the employee was valid and effective against him.
-YES
Ruling:
Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy.
A quitclaim is invalid or contrary to public policy only:
(1) Where there is clear proof that the waiver was wrangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person; or
(2) Where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face.
In instances of invalid quitclaims, the law steps in to annul the questionable
waiver. Indeed, there are legitimate waivers that represent the voluntary and
reasonable settlements of laborers' claims that should be respected by the Court as
the law between the parties. Where the party has voluntarily made the waiver, with a
full understanding of its terms as well as its consequences, and the consideration for
the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid
and binding undertaking, and may not later be disowned simply because of a change
of mind. A waiver is essentially contractual.
In this case, firstly, Michael acknowledged in his quitclaim that he had read
and thoroughly understood the terms of his quitclaim and signed it of his own volition.
Being a radio broadcaster and production manager, he occupied a highly responsible
position in the company. It would be implausible to hold, therefore, that he could be
easily duped into simply signing away his rights. Besides, the language and content of
the quitclaim were clear and uncomplicated such that he could not claim that he did
not understand what he was signing. Secondly, the settlement pay of P311, 922.00
was credible and reasonable considering that Michael did not even assail such amount
as unconscionably low, or even state that he was entitled to a higher amount. Thirdly,
that he was required to sign the quitclaim as a condition to the release of the settlement
pay did not prove that its execution was coerced. Having agreed to part with a
substantial amount of money, RMN took steps to protect its interest and obtain its
release from all obligations once it paid Michael his settlement pay, which it did in this
case. And, lastly, that he signed the quitclaim out of fear of not being able to provide
for the needs of his family and for the schooling of his children did not immediately
indicate that he had been forced to sign the same. Dire necessity should not
necessarily be an acceptable ground for annulling the quitclaim, especially because it
was not at all shown that he had been forced to execute it. Nor was it even proven that
the consideration for the quitclaim was unconscionably low, and that he had been
tricked into accepting the consideration.
Therefore, the requisites for the validity of Michael’s quitclaim were satisfied.
With the quitclaim having been freely and voluntarily signed, RMN was released and
absolved from any liability in favor of Michael. Suffice it to say that the quitclaim is
ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of an employee's rights only when
the transaction is shown to be questionable and the consideration is scandalously low
and inequitable. Such is not true here.
Note: (Exception to the GENERAL RULE of non-review of factual matters)
• This Court recognizes that the issue concerning the validity of the quitclaim was a
question of fact that is not within the province of a review on certiorari under Rule 45.
However, there is reason to hold that the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion
herein. On that basis, the Court has to delve into the factual issue, and has to review
the evidence again to ensure that its ruling on the issue jibes with the evidence on

record. Its doing so is an acceptable exception to the general rule of non-review of

factual matters.
Disposition:
• The Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision; DECLARES the Affidavit of Release/Quitclaim executed by and
between respondent Michael Maximo R. Amurao III and petitioner Radio Mindanao
Network, Inc. valid and binding; and DISMISSES the complaint for illegal dismissal of
Michael Maximo R. Amurao III.

Topic: VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT/RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM -sharkus

PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC. vs. VINUYA
G.R. No. 197528
September 5, 2012.
Facts:
• On March 5, 2008, respondent Vinuya et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the petitioner Pert/CPM and its President with labor arbiter alleging among
others that the agency deployed them to work as aluminium fabricator/installer for the
agency’s principal, Modern Metal in Dubai, United Arab Emirates for a two-year
employment whose contracts were approved by the POEA providing for nine-hours
working day, salary of 1,350 AED with overtime pay, food allowance, free and suitable
housing (four to a room), free transportation, free laundry and free medical and dental
services.
• However, on April 2, 2007, Modern Metal gave respondents, except Era, appointment
letters different from that of originally signed, increasing their employment terms and
reducing their salaries and allowances and removing certain benefits. Further, the
working conditions were not as promised and they repeatedly complained with their
agency about their predicament but to no avail. Respondents resigned from their job
citing personal/family problems for their resignation except for Era who mentioned the
real reason which is due to the company policy.
• After several weeks, petitioner repatriated the respondent to the Philippines who
shouldered their own airfare except for Ordovez and Enjambre. The agency countered
that the respondents were not illegally dismissed alleging that the respondents
voluntarily resigned from their employment to seek a better paying job. The agency
furthered alleged that the respondents even voluntarily signed affidavits of quitclaim
and release.
• Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint finding that the respondent voluntarily resigned
from their job. Respondent appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and found that the respondents were illegally dismissed. NLRC also
pointed out that the signing of a different employment contract in Dubai is illegal.
Consequently, NLRC ordered the agency and the principal to pay, jointly and severally
the respondents salary, placement fee, and exemplary damages. The petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC but modified their
judgment adjusting the awards particularly the payment of their salaries in the light of
the Court’s ruling in Serrano striking down the clause in Section 10, paragraph 5 of the
RA 8042 which limits the entitlement of illegally dismissed OFW. The agency again
moved for reconsideration reiterating its earlier argument and questioned the
applicability of the Serrano ruling because it is not yet final and effective but was denied
by the NLRC. Petitioner appealed with CA which upheld the decision of the NLRC
finding the resignation letter as dubious.
Issue:
• Whether or not the Compromise agreements (with quitclaim and release) were valid.
Held:
• NO. The compromise agreements (with quitclaim and release) between the
respondents and the agency before the POEA did not foreclose their employer-
employee relationship claims before the NLRC. The respondents, except Ordovez and

Enjambre, aver in this respect that they all paid for their own airfare when they returned
home and that the compromise agreements settled only their claim for refund of their
airfare, but not their other claims. Again, this submission has not been refuted or
denied by the agency.
• On the surface, the compromise agreements appear to confirm the agency's
position, yet a closer examination of the documents would reveal their true
nature. Copy of the compromise agreement is a standard POEA document,
prepared in advance and readily made available to parties who are involved in
disputes before the agency, such as what the respondents filed with the POEA
ahead (filed in 2007) of the illegal dismissal complaint before the NLRC (filed on
March 5, 2008).
• Under the heading "Post-Deployment," the agency agreed to pay Era and
Alcantara P12,000.00 each, purportedly in satisfaction of the respondents' claims
arising from overseas employment, consisting of unpaid salaries, salary differentials
and other benefits, including money claims with the NLRC. The last document was
signed by (1) Anipan, (2) Lumanta, (3) Ladea, (4) Vinuya, (5) Jonathan Nangolinola,
and (6) Zosimo Gatchalian (the last four signing on the left hand side of the document;
the last two were not among those who filed the illegal dismissal complaint). The
agency agreed to pay them a total of P72,000.00. Although there was no breakdown
of the entitlement for each of the six, but guided by the compromise agreement signed
by Era and Alcantara, we believe that the agency paid them P12,000.00 each, just like
Era and Alcantara.
• The uniform insubstantial amount for each of the signatories to the agreement lends
credence to their contention that the settlement pertained only to their claim for refund
of the airfare which they shouldered when they returned to the Philippines. The
compromise agreement, apparently, was intended by the agency as a settlement with
the respondents and others with similar claims, which explains the inclusion of the two
(Nangolinola and Gatchalian) who were not involved in the case with the NLRC. Under
the circumstances, we cannot see how the compromise agreements can be
considered to have fully settled the respondents' claims before the NLRC — illegal
dismissal and monetary benefits arising from employment. We thus find no reversible
error nor grave abuse of discretion in the rejection by the NLRC and the CA of said
agreements.

Topic: VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT/RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM - angela
JAIME N. GAPAYAO v. ROSARIO FULO, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL

SECURITY COMMISSION
[G.R. No. 193493. June 13, 2013.]
FACTS:
• On Nov. 4, 1997, Jaime Fulo died of "acute renal failure secondary to 1st degree burn
70% secondary electrocution" while doing repairs at the residence and business
establishment of Jaime Gapayao at Sorsogon.
• Gapayao extended some financial assistance to Rosario Fulo (widow). On 16
November 1997, Rosario executed an Affidavit of Desistance stating that she was not
holding them liable for the death of her late husband, Jaime, and was thereby waiving
her right and desisting from filing any criminal or civil action against Gapayao.
• On 14 January 1998, both parties executed a Compromise Agreement. The relevant
portion of which is quoted below:
1. The undersigned employer, hereby agrees to pay the sum of FORTY THOUSAND
PESOS to the surviving spouse of JAIME FULO, an employee who died of an accident,
as a complete and full payment for all claims due the victim.
2. On the other hand, the undersigned surviving spouse of the victim having received
the said amount do hereby release and discharge the employer from any and all claims
that maybe due the victim in connection with the victim's employment thereat.
• Thereafter, Rosario filed a claim for social security benefits with SSS. However, upon
verification and evaluation, it was discovered that Jaime was not a registered member
of SSS.
• SSS conducted a field investigation to clarify Jaime's status of employment and found
that he was an employee of Mr & Mrs. Jaime Gapayao.
• Consequently, the SSS demanded that Gapayao remit the social security contributions
of Jaime. When Gapayao denied that Jaime was his employee, the SSS required
Rosario Fulo to present documentary and testimonial evidence to refute Gapayao's
allegations.
• Instead of presenting evidence, Rosario filed a Petition before the SSC. In her Petition,
she sought social security coverage and payment of contributions in order to avail
herself of the benefits accruing from the death of her husband.
• Gapayao disclaimed any liability on the premise that the deceased was not the former's
employee, but was rather an independent contractor whose tasks were not subject to
Gapayao's control and supervision. Assuming arguendo that the deceased was
Gapayao's employee, he was still not entitled to be paid his SSS premiums for the
intervening period when he was not at work, as he was an "intermittent worker who
[was] only summoned every now and then as the need [arose]." Hence, Gapayao
insisted that he was under no obligation to report the former's demise to the SSS for
social security coverage.
SSC: Jaime Fulo was employed by Jaime Gapayao. Gapayao is ordered to pay Rosario Fulo
the appropriate death benefit, pursuant to sec. 13 of the SS Law.
CA: Rosario's husband was an employee of Gapayao and should, therefore, be entitled to
compulsory coverage under the Social Security Law. Having ruled in favor of the existence of
employer-employee relationship between Gapayao and the late Jaime Fulo, it is no longer
necessary to dwell on the other issues raised. Most important, Gapayao entered into a
Compromise Agreement with private respondent and expressly admitted therein that
he was the employer of the deceased.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Compromise Agreement executed by Gapayao and Rosario is valid.
RULING: YES.
It is a valid agreement as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee
signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he or she was entering
into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered into is personal
and specific individual consent. Once executed by the workers or employees and their
employers to settle their differences, and done in good faith, a Compromise Agreement is
deemed valid and binding among the parties.
Petitioner entered into the agreement with full knowledge that he was described as the
employer of the deceased. This knowledge cannot simply be denied by a statement that
petitioner was merely forced or threatened into such an agreement. His belated attempt to
circumvent the agreement should not be given any consideration or weight by this Court.
Petition DENIED. CA's decision is AFFIRMED.
__

=> VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT/RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM
ATTY. EMMANUEL D. AGUSTIN, JOSEPHINE SOLANO, ADELAIDA FERNANDEZ,

ALEJANDRO YUAN, JOCELYN LAVARES, MARY JANE OLASO, MELANIE BRIONES,
ROWENA PATRON, MA. LUISA CRUZ, SUSAN TAPALES, RUSTY BAUTISTA, and
JANET YUAN, vs. ALEJANDRO CRUZ-HERRERA - liwag
CHARACTERS:
• Petitioners - assemblers and/or line leader assigned at the production department of
Podden Inc.
• Herrera - was the President of Podden International Philippines, Inc.
FACTS:
COMPLAINANTS Josephine Solano and 10 others filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
monetary claims and damages against Podden International Philippines, Inc. (Podden) and
respondent Cruz-Herrera. They engaged the services of petitioner Atty. Agustin to handle the
case upon the verbal agreement that he will be paid on a contingency basis at the rate of 10%
of the final monetary award.
The complainants, through Atty. Agustin, obtained a favorable ruling before the LA. No appeal
was taken from the judgment. Hence, on Feb. 2, 1999 a motion for execution was filed.
The NLRC in a resolution dated May 7, 2003 ordered the LA to immediately issue the
corresponding writ of execution for the enforcement of the decision, the total monetary award
of which as of July 20, 1999 reached P3,358,441.84.
On Aug. 6, 2004, respondent Herrera filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the
resolution of the NLRC.
During the pendency of the petition or on August 30, 2005, a joint compromise agreement was
submitted to the CA. In a resolution dated September 30, 2005, the CA approved the
compromise agreement and entered judgment in accordance therewith.
Displeased, Atty. Agustin with the petitioners’ name as his co-petitioners, filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the SC assailing the CA resolution contending, among others, that
the compromise agreement was unconscionable and executed without his knowledge and
consent.
ISSUE: Whether parties may enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention of
their lawyer?
HELD: Yes.
The petition is dismissible outright for being accompanied by a defective certification of non-
forum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead of the complainants as the
principal parties.
It has been repeatedly emphasized that in the case of natural persons, the certification against
forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties themselves and not by the attorney.
The purpose of the rule rests mainly on practical sensibility.
[T]he certification (against forum shopping) must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the
principal parties and not by the attorney. For such certification is a peculiar personal
representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other
tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and
causes of action.
. . . Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have
been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually
filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping
by counsel is a defective certification.
It is apparent that the complainants did not seek the instant review because they have already
settled their dispute with Herrera before the CA. It is Atty. Agustin's personal resolve to pursue
this recourse premised on his unwavering stance that the joint compromise agreement signed
by the complainants was inequitable and devious as they were denied the bigger monetary
award adjudged by a final and executory judgment.
Atty. Agustin ought to be reminded that his professional relation with his clients is one of
agency under the rules thereof “the acts of an agent are deemed the acts of the principal only
if the agent acts within the scope of his authority.”
It is clear that under the circumstances of this case, Atty. Agustin is acting beyond the
scope of his authority in questioning the compromise agreement between the
complainants, Podden and Herrera.
It is settled that parties may enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention
of their lawyer. This precedes from the equally settled rule that a client has an undoubted
right to settle a suit without the intervention of his lawyer for he is generally conceded to have
the exclusive control over the subject–matter of the litigation and may, at any time before
judgment, if acting in good faith, compromise, settle, and adjust his cause of action out of court
without his attorney’s intervention, knowledge, or consent, even though he has agreed with
his attorney not to do so. Hence, the absence of a counsel’s knowledge or consent does
not invalidate a compromise agreement.
Neither can a final judgment preclude a client from entering into a compromise. Rights may
be waived through a compromise agreement, notwithstanding a final judgment that has
already settled the rights of the contracting parties provided the compromise is shown to have
been voluntarily, freely and intelligently executed by the parties, who had full
knowledge of the judgment. Additionally, it must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs and public policy.
In the present case, the allegations of vitiated consent proffered by Atty. Agustin are all
presumptions and suppositions that have no bearing as evidence. There is no proof
that the complainants were forced, intimidated or defrauded into executing the
quitclaims.
Furthermore, it is the complainants themselves who can impugn the consideration of the
compromise as being unconscionable but no such repudiation was manifested before the
Court or the courts a quo.
Further, Atty. Agustin's claim for his unpaid attorney's fees cannot nullify the subject
joint compromise agreement.
A compromise agreement is binding only between its privies and could not affect the rights of
third persons who were not parties to the agreement. One such third party is the lawyer who
should not be totally deprived of his compensation because of the compromise subscribed by
the client. Otherwise, the terms of the compromise agreement will be set aside, and the client
shall be bound to pay the fees agreed upon with his lawyer. If the adverse party settled the
suit in bad faith, he will be made solidarily liable with the client for the payment of such fees.
As the validity of a compromise agreement cannot be prejudiced, so should not be the
payment of a lawyer's adequate and reasonable compensation for his services should the suit
end by reason of the settlement. The terms of the compromise subscribed to by the client
should not be such that will amount to an entire deprivation of his lawyer's fees, especially
when the contract is on a contingent fee basis. In this sense, the compromise settlement
cannot bind the lawyer as a third party. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection
against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse
on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not only to ensure that a lawyer acts in a
proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees. Even if the
compensation of a counsel is dependent only upon winning a case he himself secured for his
client, the subsequent withdrawal of the case on the client's own volition should never
completely deprive counsel of any legitimate compensation for his professional services. In all
cases, a client is bound to pay his lawyer for his services. The determination of bad faith only
becomes significant and relevant if the adverse party will likewise be held liable in shouldering
the attorney's fees.
There is truth to Atty. Agustin's argument that the compromise agreement did not include or
affect his attorney's fees granted in the final and executory LA Decision dated September 27,
1998. Attorney's fees become vested right when the order awarding those fees becomes final
and executory and any compromise agreement removing that right must include the lawyer's
participation if it is to be valid against him.
However, equity dictates that an exception to such rule be made in this case with the end in
view that the fair share of litigants to the benefis of a suit be not displaced by a contract for
legal services.
It must be noted that the complainants were laborers who desired to contest their dismissal
for being illegal. With no clear means to pay for costly legal services, they hired Atty. Agustin
whose remuneration was subject to the success of the illegal dismissal suit. Before a judgment
was rendered in their favor, however, the company closed down and settlement of the suit for
an amount lesser than their monetary claims, instead of execution of the favorable judgment,
guaranteed the atonement for their illegal termination. To make the complainants liable for the
P335,844.18 attorney's fees adjudged in the LA Decision of September 27, 1998 would be
allowing Atty. Agustin to get a lion's share of the P385,000.00 received by the former from the
compromise agreement that terminated the suit; to allow that to happen will contravene the
raison detre for contingent fee arrangements.
Contingent fee arrangements "are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor
client and the lawyer 'especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but
no means with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a
contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the
contingent fee arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek
redress for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated.'"
Further, a lawyer is not merely the defender of his client's cause. He is also, first and foremost,
an officer of the court and participates in the fundamental function of administering justice in
society. It follows that a lawyer's compensation for professional services rendered is subject
to the supervision of the court in order to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession to which he belongs. 39 "[L]awyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers
are not merchants. Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The
returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered." 40
More importantly, Atty. Agustin was not totally deprived of his fees. Under the joint
settlement agreement, he is entitled to receive ten percent (10%) of the total settlement.
We find the said amount reasonable considering that the nature of the case did not
involve complicated legal issues requiring much time, skill and effort.
It cannot be said that Herrera negotiated for the compromise agreement in bad faith. It remains
undisputed that Podden has ceased operations on December 1, 1994 or almost four years
before the LA Decision dated September 27, 1998 was rendered. In view thereof, the
implementation of the award became unfeasible and a compromise settlement was more
beneficial to the complainants as it assured them of reparation, albeit at a reduced amount.
This was the same situation prevailing at the time when Herrera manifested and reiterated
before the CA that a concession has been reached by the parties. Thus, the motivating force
behind the settlement was not to deprive or prejudice Atty. Agustin of his fees, but rather the
inability of a dissolved corporation to fully abide by its adjudged liabilities and the certainty of
payment on the part of the complainants.
Also, collusion between complainants and Herrera cannot be inferred from the fact that Atty.
Agustin obtained lesser attorney's fees under the compromise agreement as against that
which he could have gained if the LA Decision dated September 27, 1998 was executed.
Unless there is a showing that the complainants actually received an amount higher than that
stated in the settlement agreement, it cannot be said that Atty. Agustin was unlawfully
prejudiced. There is no proof submitted supporting such inference.
Under the above circumstances, Herrera cannot be made solidarily liable for Atty.
Agustin's fees which, as a rule, are the personal obligation of his clients, the
complainants. However, pursuant to his undertaking in the joint compromise
agreement, Herrera is solely bound to compensate Atty. Agustin at the rate of ten
percent (10%) of the total settlement agreement. Since the entire provisions of the joint
compromise agreement are not available in the records and only the relevant portions
thereof were quoted in the CA Resolution dated September 30, 2005, the Court deems
it reasonable to impose a period of ten (10) days within which Herrera should fulfill his
obligation to Atty. Agustin.

Topic: Remedies of Third Party Claimant - marivic
Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G. R. No. 126322, January 16, 2002
Facts:
➢ Petitioner Yupangco filed the instant petition to assail the decision of the CA dismissing
his petition on the ground that Yupangco was guilty of forum shopping
➢ Yupangco filed the following actions to assert his ownership over the properties located
in the compound and buildings of Artex, which properties were being erroneously
levied by the Sheriff in a labor case, of which he is not a party, to wit:
1) Notice of Third Party Claim with the Labor Arbiter

2) Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the NLRC
3) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the RTC of Manila (dismissed for lack
of merit)
4) Appeal to the NLRC the order of the Labor Arbiter (appealed case #1)
5) It filed an original petition for mandatory injunction with the NLRC (still pending)
6) Complaint with the RTC of Manila (also dismissed) – the dismissal triggered
the filing of the petition before the Court of Appeals – which Petition was also
dismissed by the Court of Appeals on the ground of forum shopping
➢ Yupangco contended that the filing of a complaint for accion reinvindictoria with the
RTC was proper because it is a remedy specifically granted to an owner (whose
properties were subjected to a writ of execution to enforce a decision rendered in a
labor dispute in which it was not a party) by Section 17 (now 16), Rule 39, Revised
Rules of Court
➢ Yupangco also argued that the reliefs sought and the issues involved in the complaint
for recovery of property and damages filed with the RTC of Manila, were entirely
distinct and separate from the reliefs sought and the issues involved in the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Yupangco pointed out that neither the NLRC
nor the Labor Arbiter is empowered to adjudicate matters involving ownership of
properties
Issues:
1) Whether Yupangco was guilty of forum shopping
2) Whether the CA erred in dismissing Yupangco’s accion reinvindicatoria on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC
Held:
1) No. There was no identity of parties, rights and causes of action and reliefs sought.
➢ The case before the NLRC where Labor Arbiter Reyes issued a labor dispute between
Artex and Samar-Anglo. Petitioner was not a party to the case. The only issue
petitioner raised before the NLRC was whether or not the writ of execution issued by
the labor arbiter could be satisfied against the property of petitioner, not a party to the
labor case.

➢ On the other hand, the accion reinvindicatoria filed by petitioner in the trial court was
to recover the property illegally levied upon and sold at auction. Hence, the causes of
action in these cases were different.
2) Yes. The CA erred in dismissing the case for accion reinvindicatoria (action to
recover possession based on ownership)
➢ A third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision
against a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to protect its
interests. The third party may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and
one will not preclude the third party from availing himself of the other alternative
remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed of
➢ Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies:
a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and
b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the
NLRC.
➢ Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper action with a
competent court to recover ownership of the property illegally seized by the sheriff.
This finds support in Section 17 (now 16), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court


Do Not Share - Collated - 40 Cases

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Do Not Share - Collated - 40 Cases

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

LABREL – 40 CASES – QUIZ

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE (Feb. 11, 2019)

QUITCLAIM NOT BAR TO FILING OF DISMISSAL CASE

PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PACIFIC CARPET

PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION. vs TAGYAMON

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

Case No. 2 – ANGELA

APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA INVOLVING EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION v. EPIFANIO MEJARES, REMEGIO C. BALURAN,

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

=> APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA INVOLVING EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION (SSC) vs. RIZAL POULTRY and LIVESTOCK

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

Rizal Poultry Inc. and BSD Agro’s CONTENTIONS:

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

The NLRC decision on the absence of employer-employee relationship being binding

=>WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

Case No. 4 - marivic

Topic: Burden of Proof Employer-Employee Relationship

Bitoy Javier vs. Fly Ace Corp. et al.

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

Case No. 5 - CHA

HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EPIFANIO P. MEJARES, REMEGIO

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

IMPORTANTE!!! BASAHIN MAIGI!!

2 topics ito ha?

1 - PRESENTATION BEFORE THE LABOR ARBITER OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

2 - RULE ON THE FILING OF PLEADING NOT DONE PERSONALLY

arranged by: Liwag, Angelene L.

One - Daikoku Electronics' President

to Daikoku's failure to include a certiﬁcate of non-forum shopping and lack of proper

Raza's contentions are untenable.

RULE ON THE FILING OF PLEADING NOT DONE PERSONALLY --

Revised Rules of Procedure and the NLRC Rules:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

TOPIC: EFFECT OF VERIFICATION NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES ON

subsequently, petitioner's office was padlocked and closed without notice; he

LABOR ARBITER: DISMISSED

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION: REVERSED LA’s DECISION

COURT OF APPEALS: ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF THE

Whether employer-employee relationship exists between him and respondents. –NO!

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

Case No. 8 – Solana - IMPORTANTE!!! BASAHIN MAIGI!!

EVIDENCE PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL

MISAMIS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE (MORESCO II), petitioner,

➢ MORESCO II failed to file a position paper before the labor arbiter.

Issue: Whether the evidence is admissible

Letter-request is not sufficient.

Standing alone, it is self-serving and cannot be considered competent evidence to

Hence, Cagalawan was constructively dismissed.

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

#9 – solis - Evidence Presented For The First Time On Appeal

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

the Company imposed an additional preventive suspension often (10) days on

• In G.R. No. 197763, Smart raises the following issues:

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

• In G.R. No. 197836, Solidum raises the following issues

• Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the

Smart substantially complied with the requirements of an appeal bond

EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CONTRIBUTORS. DO NOT SHARE.

May 11, 1999 MR. ANDREW MCBURNIE Re: Employment Contract