1AC

Contention One is Cybersecurity

Worker shortages are preventing adaptation of domestic AI now
Cao, 5/23 Sissi, business reporter for Observer. Previously, she covered institutional finance for
Trusted Insight. She is a graduate from the University of Maryland and is originally from Shanghai, China.
("A.I. Buzz Is Causing a Tech Labor Shortage in Both Silicon Valley and New York," 5-23-2018, Observer,
http://observer.com/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-buzz-tech-labor-shortage/ )//DG//MXOM

The viral popularity of artificial intelligence in the tech community in recent years has spurred a surge in demand for
workers with relevant skills. But turning buzz into reality takes time. Even the labor market in the country’s
hottest tech hubs has yet to catch up.¶ A recent survey of 80 leading tech companies in New York City by consulting
firm Accenture and nonprofit Tech:NYC found that, despite a growing hiring need, employers struggle to find
enough qualified candidates to fill tech positions, primarily in artificial intelligence, product engineering and web
engineering. Half of the surveyed companies say they don’t feel optimistic about finding qualified candidates in New York. ¶ The demand
also seems urgent. About half (49 percent) of the companies in Accenture’s survey expressed worry that they won’t
be able to innovate at the current pace if they can’t fulfill hiring needs in the next 12 months.¶ Lynn McMahon,
office managing director for Accenture’s New York Metro region, said a main reason for the rising demand in New York is the rapid digitalization
of companies outside the traditional tech industry. ¶ “Many companies that want to hire tech workers are not
traditional tech companies. They can be in media, finance, marketing and retail,” McMahon told Observer. ¶ Another driver for rising
tech demand is simply the fast entry of startups. Venture capital investment in A.I. startups is currently at a record
high. Between 2016 and 2017, the amount of capital funding for A.I. and machine learning startups doubled from
$6 billion to $12 billion, according to latest statistics by KPMG.¶ But talent wanted by these companies is not evenly
distributed across major markets.¶ “Of the top three technical skills in demand, artificial intelligence is
the most scarce in New York, given the fact that it’s still relatively a new thing. Most artificial intelligence talent is concentrated in Silicon
Valley,” McMahon said, adding that many companies in New York are trying to attract talent from Silicon Valley, as well as other tech hubs like
Seattle and Boston.¶ Unfortunately, Silicon
Valley is plagued with its own talent shortage. In recent months, because
of the area’s skyrocketing housing price, a
growing number of engineers have been moving away to more
affordable cities like Portland. (Not many moved to New York.)¶ “Silicon Valley and New York City are constantly in a race for talent.
And it’s the biggest problem facing companies in these two markets,” said Clay Kellogg, CEO of Terminal, a platform
helping companies hire full-time remote workers. “There are a number of reasons why there’s a shortage of talent in these markets, everything
ranging from the cost of living being extremely high, to immigration law changes that are making it more difficult
to hire foreign tech workers, to the competition from large players like Facebook, Google, Amazon and Apple.Ҧ A competition
for talent has also led to a high turnover rate of engineers. Every year, 25 percent of engineers in Silicon Valley change employers in order to
get a raise, Kellogg estimates.

Existing talent is key – Huge salaries are insufficient to draw people to the field and
education initiatives are always outdated
Boyd 17 Clark, Industry analyst and writer for tech, business, and marketing publications. (“AI
scientists: How can companies deal with the shortage of talent?” 11/8/17,
https://towardsdatascience.com/ai-scientists-how-can-companies-deal-with-the-shortage-of-talent-
11ab48566677, Accessed 7/21/18)//DG//MXOM

The New York Times estimates that there

are only 10,000 people in the world right now with “the education,
experience and talent needed” to develop the AI technologies that businesses are betting on to create a host
 are multiple reasons for this, but a lack of capital investment is
of new economic opportunities.¶ There
certainly not one of them. In the US alone, career advisory platform Paysa has revealed that there are open roles at
top companies with the following aggregate net salaries:¶ Amazon: $227,769,001¶ Google: $130,048,389¶
Microsoft: $75,158,057¶ Facebook: $38,636,827¶ NVIDIA: $34,280,190¶ Undoubtedly, there is a fierce battle for elite
talent and the biggest companies are prepared to pay whatever it takes to win.¶ At Google-owned
DeepMind, which focuses on the development of neural networks to solve AI problems, company records for 2016 showed that their 400
employees were paid an average salary of $345,000 per annum each. There have even been some (almost certainly doomed) suggestions that
an NFL-style salary cap will be required to stop the market from spiraling out of control. ¶ So, why are there so few suitable
candidates for such lucrative roles — some of which run into five- or even six-figure annual packages?¶ First of all,
artificial intelligence is a very broad phrase that is used as an umbrella term for a variety of disciplines including machine
learning, image recognition, and natural language processing. Each of these areas requires a significant level
of mathematical skill combined with industry experience (typically 10 years or more), before someone is ready
to spearhead projects. As a result, talent gaps are harder to fill when we dive deeper to niche specialisms beyond ‘AI scientist’.¶ AI is
also an industry in flux, with new discoveries and innovations changing the landscape on a frequent basis. This creates a paradox; to
become an AI scientist requires years of intense and structured study, but the field of
investigation is constantly shifting. It is therefore difficult for academic institutions to keep their courses
aligned to the needs of the corporate world.¶ In essence, the ambitions for AI far outpace the levels of
specialist knowledge among even the most experienced computer scientists. As Jeff Dean, the head of Google
Brain, put it recently:¶ “We want to go from thousands of organizations solving machine learning problems to
millions.Ӧ In the UK, the Careers and Employability Service predicts a need for more than half a million new workers within the most skilled
digital occupations (including AI) before 2022. The number of computer science graduates in the UK would need to increase ten-fold to meet
that demand.¶ This begins to put the challenge in context. With
thousands of people capable of performing the role of a
senior AI scientist and millions of companies with the potential to profit from the development of
sophisticated AI technologies, something has to give.¶ Furthermore, as businesses as colossal in size as Google make claims
to be “AI-first” in everything they do, it is no surprise that organisations are getting creative to solve the AI scientist recruitment problem.

Absent AI the power grid will remain vulnerable to attacks – Only AI can prevent
collapse
Bowen et al., 18 (Steve Bowen, Charles Butler and Samuel M. Smith, PhD, "Using Artificial
Intelligence to Protect the U.S. Power Grid," 2-1-2018, POWER Magazine,
http://www.powermag.com/using-artificial-intelligence-to-protect-the-u-s-power-grid/ )//DG//MXOM

The U.S. power grid is wide open for attack. More than 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines, interspersed
with hundreds of large electric power transformers and substations span the country, often in remote locations. In
response to growing threats, NERC issued requirements for the physical security of critical transmission stations and substations, and their
associated primary control centers. Meeting these mandates is costly and complicated for utility owners and
operators. Fortunately, new advancements in technology—particularly in the fields of robotics and artificial intelligence—
can offer proactive protection against attackers at a reasonable cost and help utilities achieve
compliance.¶ Power Grid Vulnerability¶ An attack on the power grid can cause significant damage. In fact, the
loss of only nine substations could take down the nation’s entire grid, according to one study. Paul
Parfomak, a specialist in energy and infrastructure policy, noted in a congressional report, “Experts have long asserted that a coordinated
and simultaneous attack on multiple high-voltage transformers could have severe implications for reliable
electric service over a large geographic area, crippling its electricity network and causing widespread, extended blackouts.
Such an event would have serious economic and social consequences.Ӧ Especially vulnerable to attack are
what one former Navy SEAL and U.S. intelligence officer called soft targets. “These are generally remote areas that just have a
fence around them, maybe a camera system … they’re not hard at all to actually take down,” he said in a recent interview. He added,
“For a small handful of people to take down a power grid, it’s just not that hard … this is absolutely one of the easiest
possible things you can do to drive urban areas into total chaos.”¶ The NERC regulations—known as CIP-014—include six basic
requirements, such as a risk assessment to identify critical facilities, independent verification of the risk assessment, and evaluation of the
potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack on these critical stations or substations. Perhaps the
most challenging
requirement is to develop and implement a documented physical security plan. According to the directive, this
plan must have the following elements:¶ Resiliency or security measures designed collectively to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and
respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation.¶ Law enforcement contact and coordination
information.¶ A timeline for executing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.¶ Provisions
to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures.¶ Challenges to Compliance¶ Utility owners
and operators face several barriers to CIP-014 compliance. The biggest one is cost. Traditionally, security has
not been viewed as a sensible investment. A 2006 report from the Electric Power Research Institute noted: “Security
measures, in themselves, are cost items, with no direct monetary return. The benefits are in the avoided costs of potential
attacks whose probability is generally not known. This makes cost-justification very difficult.Ӧ A related concern is the
quality of threat information provided by the federal government and other sources. This information determines what needs to be
protected against and what security measures to take. As Parfomak wrote, “Incomplete or ambiguous threat information—
especially from the federal government—may lead to inconsistency in physical security among grid owners,
inefficient spending of limited security resources at facilities (e.g., that may not really be under threat), or deployment of
security measures against the wrong threat.”¶ Artificial Intelligence Offers Real-World Protection¶ Meeting
CIP-014 requirements takes careful planning and wise use of limited resources. Ballistic walls around the perimeters of critical substations are
not effective, and hiring a full-time guard force—whether armed or not—is simply not feasible, particularly for remote
substations in sparsely populated areas. A more-reasonable, more-effective approach to fences and firearms is the
use of advanced technology.¶ Among the more innovative solutions are tower-mounted robots powered by artificial intelligence
(AI). Such technology connected to a high-speed network could transform a power grid’s passive
security system into an active defense-and-denial physical protection system. Using non-lethal actuators, such as
cameras and sensors, the system detects, delays, and safely thwarts a potential attacker by overwhelming
them with directed, high-intensity sound, lights, and strobes. Figure 1 illustrates how the system delivers these defense
mechanisms to neutralize a target.¶ [Figure Omitted]¶ 1. Defense-and-denial physical protection. Artificial intelligence enables robots to
deliver non-lethal defense mechanisms at a distance, thwarting a potential attack on a utility asset.
Courtesy: PacStar¶ In addition, such a system would deliver actionable intelligence in real time to law
enforcement, so officers can respond appropriately and effectively. The use of AI-driven robotics
technology provides affordable, advanced protection 24/7.

Collapse causes mass death-assumes all impact defense

IBT 11
International Business Times, Solar Flare Could Unleash Nuclear Holocaust Across Planet Earth, Forcing
Hundreds of Nuclear Power Plants Into Total Meltdowns,
http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/213249/20110914/solar-flare-could-unleash-nuclear-holocaust-across-
planet-earth-forcing-hundreds-of-nuclear-power-pl.htm

What happens when there's no electricity? Imagine

a world without electricity. Even for just a week. Imagine New York
City with no electricity, or Los Angeles, or Sao Paulo. Within 72 hours, most cities around the world will
devolve into total chaos, complete with looting, violent crime, and runaway fires. But that's not even the
bad news. Even if all the major cities of the world burned to the ground for some other reason,
humanity could still recover because it has the farmlands: the soils, the seeds, and the potential to
recover, right? And yet the real crisis here stems from the realization that once there is no power grid,
all the nuclear power plants of the world suddenly go into "emergency mode" and are forced to rely on
their on-site emergency power backups to circulate coolants and prevent nuclear meltdowns from occurring. And yet, as we've already
established, these facilities typically have only a few hours of battery power available, followed by perhaps a few days worth of diesel fuel to run their generators
(or propane, in some cases). Did I also mention that half the people who work at nuclear power facilities have no idea what they're doing in the first place? Most of
the veterans who really know the facilities inside and out have been forced into retirement due to reaching their lifetime limits of on-the-job radiation
exposure, so most of the workers at nuclear facilities right now are newbies who really have no clue what they're doing. There are 440 nuclear

power plants operating across 30 countries around the world today. There are an additional 250 so-called "research reactors"
in existence, making a total of roughly 700 nuclear reactors to be dealt with (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/i...). Now imagine the
scenario: You've got a massive solar flare that knocks out the world power grid and destroys the majority of the power grid transformers, thrusting the world into
darkness. Cities collapse into chaos and rioting, martial law is quickly declared (but it hardly matters), and every nation in the world is on full emergency. But that
doesn't solve the really big problem, which is that you've got 700
nuclear reactors that can't feed power into the grid (because all
the transformers are blown up) and yet simultaneously have to be fed a steady stream of emergency fuels to run
the generators the keep the coolant pumps functioning. How long does the coolant need to circulate in these facilities to cool the
nuclear fuel? Months. This is also the lesson of Fukushima: You can't cool nuclear fuel in mere hours or days. It takes months to bring these nuclear facilities

to a state of cold shutdown. And that means in order to avoid a multitude of Fukushima-style meltdowns from

occurring around the world, you need to truck diesel fuel, generator parts and nuclear plant workers to
every nuclear facility on the planet, ON TIME, every time, without fail, for months on end. Now remember,
this must be done in the middle of the total chaos breakdown of modern civilization, where there is no power, where
law enforcement and emergency services are totally overrun, where people are starving because food deliveries have been disrupted, and when looting and violent
crime runs rampant in the streets of every major city in the world. Somehow, despite all this, you have to run these diesel fuel caravans to the nuclear power plants
and keep the pumps running. Except there's a problem in all this, even if you assume you can somehow work a logistical miracle and actually deliver the diesel fuel
to the backup generators on time (which you probably can't). The problem is this: Where do you get diesel fuel? Why refineries will be shut down, too from
petroleum refineries. Most people don't realize it, but petroleum refineries run on electricity. Without the power grid, the refineries don't produce a drop of diesel.
With no diesel, there are no generators keeping the coolant running in the nuclear power facilities. But wait, you say: Maybe we could just acquire diesel from all
the gas stations in the world. Pump it out of the ground, load it into trucks and use that to power the generators, right? Except there are other problems here: How
do you pump all that fuel without electricity? How do you acquire all the tires and spare parts needed to keep trucks running if there's no electricity to keep the
supply businesses running? How do you maintain a truck delivery infrastructure when the electrical infrastructure is totally wiped out? Some countries might be
able to pull it off with some degree of success. With military escorts and the total government control over all fuel supplies, a few nations will be able to keep a few
nuclear power facilities from melting down. But here's the real issue: There are 700 nuclear power facilities in the world, remember? Let's suppose that in the
aftermath of a massive solar flare, the nations of the world are somehow able to control half of those facilities and nurse them into cold shutdown status. That still
leaves roughly 350 nuclear facilities at risk. Now let's suppose half of those are somehow luckily offline and not even functioning when the solar flare hits, so they
need no special attention. This is a very optimistic assumption, but that still leaves 175 nuclear power plants where all attempts fail. Let's be outrageously optimistic
and suppose that a third of those somehow don't go into a total meltdown by some miracle of God, or some bizarre twist in the laws of physics. So we're still left
with 115 nuclear power plants that "go Chernobyl." Fukushima was one power plant. Imagine the devastation of 100+
nuclear power plants, all going into meltdown all at once across the planet. It's not the loss of electricity that's the real
problem; it's the global tidal wave of invisible radiation that blankets the planet, permeates the topsoil, irradiates everything that breathes

and delivers the final crushing blow to human civilization as we know it today. Because if you have 100 simultaneous global nuclear

meltdowns, the tidal wave of radiation will make farming nearly impossible for years. That means no
food production for several years in a row. And that, in turn, means a near-total collapse of the human population
on our planet. How many people can survive an entire year with no food from the farms? Not one in a hundred people. Even beyond that, how many people
can essentially live underground and be safe enough from the radiation that they can have viable children and repopulate the planet? It's a very, very
small fraction of the total population.

Cyberattacks lead to US nuclear retaliation – that escalates – especially true under

Trump
Gideon Rachman, 1-18-2018, "Nuclear weapons are a risky defence against cyber attacks," Financial
Times, https://www.ft.com/content/d2241b68-fc31-11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167)SEM
The world has been living with the threat of a nuclear apocalypse since the 1950s. Over the past decade, intelligence experts have increasingly warned
about the threat of a catastrophic cyber attack. Now the two fears appear to have merged, with the US on the point of revising its
defence policy — to allow the use of nuclear weapons, in retaliation for a devastating cyber attack. The
Trump administration has not yet released America’s revised, “Nuclear Posture Review”. But the draft document has leaked to the press. According to the New York Times, it would
change US policy to allow the first use of nuclear weapons, in response to “attempts to
destroy wide-reaching infrastructure, like a country’s power grid or communications, that would be most
vulnerable to cyberweapons”. Developed nations are now almost completely reliant on the internet and functioning computer systems. That, however, increases
their vulnerability to cyber warfare. Security experts lose sleep worrying about a range of nightmarish scenarios — including viruses that shut down transport infrastructure, such as air-traffic
control; or that disrupt the operations of banks, causing the financial system to seize up. Among the most common horror scenarios are fears for the vulnerability of power generation and

Any nation contemplating a cyber attack, may now also have to consider efforts to disable an adversary’s
distribution.

nuclear capability. In recent years, there have been some indications that these scenarios are moving from the pages of science fiction into reality. A computer
virus that disrupted Britain’s National Health Service last year, seems to have originated in North Korea. As long ago as
2007, operatives in Russia unleashed a “denial-of-service” attack on Estonia, disrupting the operation of the internet there. A

really concerted cyber attack, targeting critical infrastructure, could cause social turmoil and mass casualties. Experts
have considered a number of responses to this threat. There are frequent calls for a new international treaty to establish some rules for cyber space. Intelligence agencies have also considered

Introducing nuclear weapons into the equation is,

the possibilities for cyber-retaliation — and the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities.

however, a new departure. It demonstrates how seriously the US is now taking the threat of cyber warfare; and is clearly

designed to massively increase America’s deterrence capacity. At the same time, however, the policy shift carries considerable risks . By lowering the

bar to the first use of nuclear weapons, it makes nuclear war more thinkable. The dangers of such a move are increased because concerns

about nuclear proliferation are mounting — with North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme making rapid progress, and both Pakistan
and Russia incorporating the early use of nuclear weapons into their war-fighting plans. Another danger is that any nation contemplating a cyber
attack, may now also have to consider efforts to disable an adversary’s nuclear capability. The US, for example, has almost certainly
considered whether, in the event of a war, there are cyber or electronic means of taking out North Korea’s nuclear missiles. Other nations will now have to make similar calculations about the
US.

Mismatched perceptions of cyber capabilities guarantee nuclear escalation

Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay 17 , Gartzke professor polisci university of cali, Lindsay professor
Munk School of global affairs, “Thermonuclear cyberwar”,
https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/3/1/37/2996537

Nuclear command and control increasingly relies on computing networks that might be vulnerable to cyber
attack. Yet nuclear deterrence and cyber operations have quite different political properties. For the most part, nuclear actors can openly
advertise their weapons to signal the costs of aggression to potential adversaries, thereby reducing the danger of misperception and war. Cyber
actors, in contrast, must typically hide their capabilities, as revelation allows adversaries to patch, reconfigure, or otherwise neutralize the
threat. Offensive cyber operations are better used than threatened, while the opposite, fortunately, is true for
nuclear weapons. When combined, the warfighting advantages of cyber operations become dangerous
liabilities for nuclear deterrence. Increased uncertainty about the nuclear/cyber balance of power raises the
risk of miscalculation during a brinksmanship crisis. We should expect strategic stability in nuclear dyads to be, in
part, a function of relative offensive and defensive cyber capacity. To reduce the risk of crisis miscalculation, states should improve rather than
degrade mutual understanding of their nuclear deterrents.
 Contention Two is AI Hegemony
Trump polices are creating a reverse brain drain that fuels China’s tech development.
Sheng, 18 --- writer, editor and content strategist specializing in business, finance and wealth (Ellen,
“Silicon Valley is fighting a brain-drain war with Trump that it may lose,”
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/09/trumps-war-on-immigration-causing-silicon-valley-brain-drain.html,
accessed on 5/29/18, JMP)
After six years at LinkedIn, Vikram Rangnekar wanted to go back to his entrepreneurial roots. There was just one big obstacle. Rangnekar, a
cloud computing developer and former Techcrunch50 winner, was working in Silicon Valley on an H-1B visa. Since H-1B visas are tied to jobs, his
options were limited: Get a job at another company or try to get a visa on his own and start a company. Both came with one huge drawback:
Any change to his job would reset the clock on his green card application. Green cards are allotted by
country; the backlog for citizens from populous countries such as India or China is now more
than 10 years. "We decided the indefinite wait was not for us, and we started thinking about our next play," he said. That next play
turned out to be Toronto. "The permanent-resident process (Canada's green card equivalent) is easy,
and if you have all the points, it takes less than six months. The government is working hard to help and improve the start-up scene,"
he said. Now happily settled in Toronto with his family, he started a site, movnorth.com, to help others like him. "People who have been in the
U.S. for 10 to 15 years and still restricted by a work visa are thinking, where can we invest time and have something more permanent?'"
Alternatives to U.S. citizenship Rangnekar
is one of a growing number of highly educated foreign entrepreneurs in
have started looking at alternatives to the obstacle-strewn path to U.S.
the United States who
citizenship. Hardships for foreign entrepreneurs in the United States have increased as of late, thanks to the
heightened vetting of H-1B visas, Trump's Muslim ban and an increasingly hostile stance toward immigration. Trump, through a number of
executive orders and memos from various U.S. agencies has started narrowing visa requirements. In February the U.S Citizenship and
Immigration Services agency put out a new policy memo requiring "detailed documentation" about H-1B workers employed at third-party work
sites to demonstrate that employees are actually filling specialty roles for which they were hired. The move is designed to cut down on
"benching" — a practice in which employers hire entry-level software engineers from overseas, pay them the minimum required wage or less
and shuffle them to subsidiaries. Although it is important to close some of the loopholes in the H-1B visa program, these actions could also have
unintended consequences. Often lost in the political rhetoric is the fact that immigration is a critical issue for the U.S. economy and our nation's
competitive position. The National Foundation for American Policy found that immigrants have started more than half of the country's billion-
dollar start-up companies. Some of the more prominent examples include SpaceX and Tesla founder Elon Musk, from South Africa, and Google
co-founder Sergey Brin, an immigrant from the former Soviet Union. The H-1B visa is the primary avenue for skilled immigrants to enter the
United States. While it's well known that companies in Silicon Valley rely on H-1B visas, it is also used heavily by companies in New York, Texas
and Washington, D.C. A recent Pew Research Center report revealed that between 2010 and 2016, almost a third of visas went to businesses in
the New York City area. Increased restrictions and rejections of H-1B visas have companies worried. Recent reports suggest that restrictions on
foreign-born workers could have outsized impact on the tech industry. A recent report from the Silicon Valley Competitiveness and Innovation
Project found that the country's largest tech companies rely more on foreign-born workers than domestic ones. In Silicon Valley at least 57
percent of workers in science, tech, engineering and mathematics with a bachelor's degree or higher were born outside the United States, the
report said. According to data from the U.S. Department of Labor, IBM applied for 12,381 H-1B visas last year, Microsoft 5,029 visas and Google
4,897. Brain drain begins For decades the United States has attracted some of the best and brightest. Now some are starting to see the reverse
happen. Vivek Wadhwa, a distinguished fellow and adjunct professor at Carnegie Mellon University's College of Engineering and author of The
Immigrant Exodus: Why America Is Losing the Global Race to Capture Entrepreneurial Talent, said that in his current class at Carnegie
Mellon, not one of the foreign students is looking to stay. Foreign students from India, China and
elsewhere who used to stay are now returning to their home countries to start businesses. This
is alarming because it will adversely impact U.S. innovation, Wadhwa said. "In the next five to 10 years, we're
going to be competing with China and India and Singapore and many other countries all over
the world for talent like never before," he said. The U.S. has seen its share of tech "unicorns" drop dramatically in recent
years, according to data from CB Insights. Of the 214 unicorn start-ups globally, 41 percent are based in the United
States compared to 75 percent in 2013. Meanwhile, the proliferation of tech unicorns from outside has been
increasing, especially from China. China is now home to 36 percent of tech unicorns compared to 12
percent in 2014. If we keep going on the path we are on, China will have more tech unicorns
than the United States. China is catching up to the United States in advanced technology on everything
from artificial intelligence and gene editing to quantum computing, Wadhwa said, adding that once
that happens, "China will be neck-to-neck with Silicon Valley, and then they're going to eat
our lunch." Toughened immigration policies To be sure, U.S. immigration has been difficult for quite some time, but now Trump's
executive orders and antiimmigration rhetoric has further accelerated the trend. Tahmina Watson, Seattle-based immigration attorney and
author of The Startup Visa: Key to Job Growth & Economic Prosperity in America, said she's started to see extreme scrutiny of H-1B visa
applications. Routine applications that were once commonly accepted are now sent back requiring more documentation. H-1B visa extensions
are facing more scrutiny. Watson is also seeing a sudden spike in H-1B visa denials. While some of the scrutiny is an attempt to close loopholes
in the H-1B program, the result is that talented, legitimate applicants are being turned away. Antiimmigration policies will likely hurt American
workers, Watson said, noting that for every H-1B worker, five jobs are created. Another visa that would have been a boost to Silicon Valley's
start-up scene has also been quashed. The international entrepreneur rule, or start-up visa, would have allowed qualified foreign entrepreneurs
to stay in the United States to build businesses. It was set to go into effect last year but has been delayed and looks to be on the chopping
block. "The shortsightedness will be felt in upcoming months and years. To make America great again, scrutinizing business visas is not the way
the United States closes its borders, other countries are courting the world's best
to go," she said. Filling the void As
and brightest to come and start businesses. France introduced a new tech visa program last year, and French president
Emmanuel Macron has said he aims to make France a "Startup Nation." Canada launched a program to fast-track visas and short-term work
permits for highly skilled foreign workers. When the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services department said in June they would stop
premium processing of H-1B visas for up to six months, Canada stepped up and said it would fast-track applications. India's commerce ministry
and various government arms have created innovation labs and incubators in efforts to develop the country's start-up scene, while China has
vowed to invest vigorously in artificial intelligence to create a $150 billion industry by 2030. "In the wake of our administration's policies, it's
becoming easier for others to fill the void," said David Brown, a serial entrepreneur and founder of Techstars, which helps start-ups through
accelerator programs and investment. Brown said that Techstar's Toronto program is reaping the benefit of entrepreneurs who are leaving the
United States for Canada. Whether
the current tide of people leaving becomes a wave has yet to be
determined. But meanwhile, "the rhetoric has got people really stressed. They just want to do work and
spend time with their families, not deal with political pressure," said Rangnekar. "The U.S. is still a great place to be.
It's not too late. Silicon Valley is still the most amazing place in the world; people still want to
be here if they have a choice. The problem is, we give them no choice," Wadhwa said.

There is a massive STEM shortage—job postings and unemployment rates.

NAE 17 – The New American Economy is a think tank founded by Michael Bloomberg and Rupert
Murdoch. It is a coalition of over 500 bipartisan congressman and governors, 3/29/17 ("Sizing Up the
Gap in our Supply of STEM Workers", https://research.newamericaneconomy.org/report/sizing-up-the-
gap-in-our-supply-of-stem-workers//ZidaoW
Each year on April 1, the U.S. government begins accepting applications for the H-1B program, a temporary visa program designed to bring in high-skilled workers from abroad. While the H-1B
program has long been in need of updates and reforms—particularly since many of the wage requirements designed to protect American workers are almost two decades outdated—many
technology firms say it has been instrumental in helping them recruit the talent they need to grow and remain competitive in our increasingly innovation-driven economy. This is because of

The U.S. labor force simply doesn’t have enough workers with the highly
what experts call our country’s skills gap:

specialized training in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (or STEM) that many
employers need to grow and add jobs for American workers overall.1 In recent years, however, some policymakers have raised questions about whether the shortage of
STEM workers is truly as severe as the public has been lead to believe. Individuals making this critique frequently point to data from the U.S. Census showing that three out of every four
Americans with undergraduate degrees in a STEM field go on to work in other professional fields after graduation.2 This leads one to wonder: Are these individuals working in non-STEM

could it be that these U.S.-born workers—many of

occupations because there are not enough STEM jobs available to employ them? Or,

whom are employed in related areas like healthcare and business that are not counted as
STEM—have instead opted to pursue jobs that are either more lucrative or appropriate for
their underlying interests? In this brief, we use data from the Burning Glass Technologies, a leading market analytics firm, to look directly at the number of STEM job
postings in recent years—one of the best real-time indicators of the jobs available to interested workers with relevant STEM training. Labor Insight, a tool produced by Burning Glass, scours
40,000 job boards daily to study the number of type of unique positions being advertised online by U.S. employers. Using that tool, we compare the number of online STEM job postings in
recent years to the number of unemployed STEM workers available to fill them. This technique has been used in the past to determine the magnitude of gaps in our labor market—both by

Our work shows that the United States has a persistent and dramatic shortage of
NAE and other groups.3

STEM workers—a problem that worsened considerably during the first half of the decade. Between 2010 and 2015, the ratio of
STEM jobs posted online to unemployed STEM workers grew dramatically . In 2010, just 5.4 STEM jobs were posted
online for every one unemployed STEM worker. By 2015, such job postings outnumbered unemployed STEM workers

by a factor of almost 17 to 1. While the picture improved moderately in 2016, STEM employers still faced a dire
picture: 13 STEM jobs were posted online for each unemployed worker that year—or roughly 3 million
more jobs than the number of available, trained professionals who could potentially fill them.
Drilling down to specific states, we can see that some communities face far greater shortages of STEM talent than others. In 2015, employers in four relatively rural states faced the largest gap
between the number of STEM jobs advertised online and the size of the unemployed STEM-trained population who could fill them. In each of these states—North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa,
and Nebraska—there were between 45 and 88 STEM jobs posted online for every one unemployed eligible worker. In a total of 14 states, the number of advertised STEM jobs outnumbered
unemployed STEM workers by more than 20 to 1. This group included places as varied as Indiana, Virginia, Arkansas, and Alabama. Our work also reveals one of the reasons why employers

Even in 2010, a period of relatively high unemployment, the

have struggled to find enough STEM workers in recent years.

share of unemployed STEM workers was incredibly low. In 2010, the unemployment rate of U.S.
STEM workers was just 5.9 percent, compared to 9.6 percent for the entire population of American
workers. By 2016, the STEM unemployment rate had fallen to just 2.7 percent. To put that figure in context, the U.S.
government generally defines “full employment” as a period when unemployment falls at 4 percent or below.

China is catching up now and can overtake the U.S.—stealing their workers are key.
Kennedy, 18 --- senior lecturer at the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National
University (5/29/18, Andrew, “OPINION: America Is Playing Defense vs China on Tech Innovation,”
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/96664, accessed on 5/30/18, JMP)

The high-tech rivalry between the United States and China is getting ugly. So far in 2018, the Trump administration has
blocked high-tech acquisitions by Chinese firms, complained about Chinese technology licensing practices at the World Trade Organization and
threatened tariffs on Chinese high-tech imports. The administration has also banned U.S. companies from selling parts to Chinese phone maker
ZTE, though the president has promised to revisit this decision. For its part, China has brandished its own tariffs while also making promises to
protect foreign intellectual property and further open the Chinese economy. Bilateral talks remain underway. Trump would
like the
world to believe the U.S. government has finally taken the offensive against China. But it has not:
China’s government is the one playing offense in the realm of high-tech innovation. With
plenty of encouragement from Beijing, China has emerged as the world’s second-largest investor in
research and development (R&D). It spent US$279 billion on R&D last year, with most of this investment coming from business.
China is now poised to overtake the United States as the world’s top R&D spender within the next decade.
China also makes great efforts to lure back high-tech talent from overseas. In recent years, the
number of Chinese students returning to China from abroad has been around 80 percent of those going
overseas – up from 31 percent in 2007. As a result of all this activity, China is putting points on the board.
China’s score in the prestigious ‘Nature Index’, which tracks article publication in the leading science journals, jumped from 24 percent to 40
percent of the U.S. total from 2012 to 2016. In the corporate world, 376 Chinese firms were among the world’s top 2,500 R&D spenders in
2017. While China’s state-owned enterprises tend to be highly inefficient, other Chinese firms have emerged as leaders in areas from electric
vehicles to e-commerce. China still has a long way to go, to be sure, and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s efforts to exercise
greater control over businesses and society more generally are a step backwards in this regard. But China’s overall progress to
date is striking. In contrast, the U.S. government is playing defense. The measures the Trump administration has
taken this year essentially represent an effort to prevent the U.S. technological lead over China from
shrinking. This is a losing strategy. The United States and China are not playing a basketball game
with one minute left on the clock. Instead, they are competing – and collaborating – in a
relationship that will go on indefinitely. The United States cannot simply try to protect
technologies it has already invented; it must work harder over the next several decades to
extend its status as the world’s technological leader. U.S. political leaders should be much more focused on this
latter challenge than they are. In a clear statement of its priorities, the Trump administration has sought to slash federal science and technology
spending despite a history of bipartisan support for such expenditures. As a result, the
president was a fuming bystander as the
U.S. Congress chose to invest record sums in science and technology in the 2018 budget deal. There is much
more the United States could and should do. Perhaps most important, it could easily compete more
effectively for the world’s top brainpower. The Trump administration claims to support merit-based
immigration, as do many Congressional leaders. If so, it is time to make this a priority. The United States educates
more foreign students than any other country in the world, offers foreign graduates some
opportunity for temporary employment, but then imposes per country caps that make it hard for

those from China and India to receive permanent residency – effectively

encouraging them to go home. Supporting high-tech start-ups is particularly important. Fortunately, the United States
now has a start-up visa program to welcome promising foreign entrepreneurs who wish to found companies in the country: the international
entrepreneur rule. Yet the Trump administration only implemented the rule because a federal judge ordered it to do so – and the
administration is now preparing to rescind it. Even worse, the Trump administration’s repeal of net neutrality will make it harder for many
start-ups to compete with more established firms. Congress can still overturn this decision, but whether it will do so remains unclear. There is
nothing wrong with playing
defense. But it’s only half the game, and China is discovering more and more ways
to put points on the board in any case. If U.S. leaders truly wish to make America ‘great’, they need to
make offense a priority as well.

Only immigrants can bring the military up to speed – funding fails

Doubleday, 18 Justin, managing editor of Inside the Pentagon, where he focuses on defense-wide
topics including budgets, acquisition policy, combatant commands, missile defense and cyber. He has
also worked for ITP sister publications Inside the Army and Inside the Navy. Justin previously reported
for The Chronicle of Higher Education. He graduated from the University of New Hampshire in 2013,
4/9/18 (“Pentagon tech chief: Anti-immigrant policies hurt U.S. in AI race”,
https://insidedefense.com/insider/pentagon-tech-chief-anti-immigrant-policies-hurt-us-ai-race%C2%A0,
Accessed 7/21/18)//DG//MXOM

The Pentagon's chief technologist says restrictive immigration policies are hampering the United States from recruiting
the best experts in artificial intelligence. ¶ Since all it takes is a computer to develop the algorithms behind
machine learning and artificial intelligence, the Defense Department needs to attract top talent
rather than merely outspend adversaries in the field, according to Mike Griffin, the under secretary of defense for research
and engineering. ¶ “It's nice to have compute power and all that stuff, but what we really need to do is to have
a climate which wants to attract the best minds,” Griffin said during a panel discussion on AI held today in Washington. “Since 9/11,
we have really clamped down on a number of different ways in which the United States used to be
attractive to the best and brightest.Ӧ Griffin's comments mirror those of Eric Schmidt, former executive chairman of Google parent company
Alphabet Inc. and current chair of the Defense Innovation Board. Last November, Schmidt noted “ the military is not up to speed on AI” and

highlighted how immigration policies prevent computer scientists from places like Iran from living and working in the

United States.¶ “Let’s talk about immigration,” Schmidt said during the Nov. 1 event in Washington. “Shockingly, some of the very best
people are in countries that we won’t let in to America. Would you rather have them building AI
somewhere else or having them build it here?Ӧ During the panel today, Griffin said he still thinks the United States attracts top
technological talent from around the world, but said the government could do more. ¶ “A
country that has people clamoring to get here
is a better arrangement than having a country where people are trying to get out,” Griffin said. “But we're not
always doing, in regards to our immigration policies, the kinds of things that would cause people to want
to come here, get a great education and stay here.”

Chinese technological superiority undermines U.S. hegemony and ensures tech

weaponization.
Bey, 18 --- Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor (2/6/18, Matthew, “The Coming Tech War With China,”
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/coming-tech-war-china, accessed on 6/5/18, JMP)

The United States is already in the middle of its next great war — even if it's only just starting to realize it. In the
latest National Security Strategy, the White House highlighted China's growing technological
prowess as a threat to U.S. economic and military might. The Asian powerhouse has taken on
a leading role in several critical emerging technologies. Five years ago, by contrast, it was widely perceived as an
imitator in technology, not an innovator. As hard as it may be for Washington to admit, China is catching up in the tech race. The
question now is whether tech firms in the United States, a country that embraces private enterprise and a free
economy, will be able to keep up with their Chinese counterparts' breakthroughs . The Disruptive Power
of Dual-Use Technology Chinese President Xi Jinping has
made developing his country's technological capabilities a key
priority, not only to wean China from its dependence on foreign technology but also to turn it into a
leader in innovation. And sure enough, China is gaining ground on its rivals in the tech realm. The country has chalked up an
array of impressive achievements over the past few years, including its developments in hypersonic
missiles, human gene editing trials and quantum satellites. Of the many emerging technologies China is helping to
advance, though, artificial
intelligence is perhaps the most significant — for Beijing as well as its
adversaries. Google CEO Sundar Pichai recently posited that the advent of AI was "more
profound than ... (that of) electricity or fire." If he oversold the development, he did so only slightly. AI may well
be the most important technological advancement of our lifetime. What makes it so critical is that, much
like aerospace technology or the internet before it, AI will have applications in military as
well as civilian life — and will likely revolutionize both. In the civilian world alone, AI has practically unlimited uses.
The technology already helps power smartphone applications such as visual and audio recognition software and digital personal assistants. As
global data collection rates continue to grow exponentially, AI algorithms will inevitably have to take over processing and managing the glut of
information. AI will also transform the medical industry, diagnosing and treating various illnesses — to say nothing of the other white-collar
jobs the technology will eventually complement or supersede. The military applications, meanwhile, will be no less impressive. In 2016 an
algorithm running on a Raspberry Pi — a $35 computer that fits in the palm of your hand — beat a retired U.S. Air Force colonel every time in a
series of simulated dogfights. The computer, moreover, showed no sign of fatigue over time, unlike its human competitor. As
AI
continues to evolve, it will doubtless work its way onto the battlefield, driving tanks, ships
and perhaps even robotic soldiers. The technology's potential for rapid data processing and analysis
could give troops on the front lines a more complete picture than ever before of their enemy's position
and activities. AI will probably find more applications in asymmetric warfare, too. Islamic State militants in Iraq
and Syria have used drones to deliver explosives to their targets, while Houthi rebels in Yemen have deployed unmanned vessels to carry
waterborne improvised explosive devices. For now, these vehicles are operated by remote control, but in time, they could give way to
autonomous technology. An Eye on AI The possibilities of AI aren't lost on the Chinese president. In a feat of meticulous
blocking, two influential books on the subject stood on the bookshelf behind Xi during his annual televised New Year's Eve address. Weeks
earlier, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released a three-year development plan for AI, part of a larger initiative
launched in July 2017 that includes specific goals for such technologies as artificial neural network processing chips, intelligent robots,
automated vehicles, intelligent medical diagnosis, intelligent drones and machine translation. China's Ministry of Science and Technology
announced in November 2017 that it had formed a sort of dream team made up of the biggest Chinese tech firms — Baidu, Alibaba and
Tencent — to lead the country's AI development alongside voice recognition software developer iFlytek. Each of these companies is hard at
work cultivating the learning algorithms and hardware, and gathering the data, necessary to build a wide range of functional AI platforms.
Baidu, for instance, has started developing open-source programs, such as the autonomous driving platform Apollo, to collect as much data as
possible. Nor
is the importance of AI lost on the U.S. Department of Defense. Like his predecessor, Ash Carter,
Secretary of Defense James Mattis supports the Pentagon's Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx),
despite calls from Republican lawmakers to roll the project into the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. DIUx,
headquartered in Silicon Valley, aims to ensure that the military can quickly adapt and
integrate innovations that come out of California's tech hub. To that end, it awarded tech firm C3 IoT a contract
late last year to develop an AI platform for the Air Force to predict when aircraft and equipment need maintenance. In
the quest to
hone its AI capabilities, the Defense Department hasn't lost sight of China's own progress with the
technology. The country's sheer size sets it apart from other tech innovators such as South Korea or Japan; China could scale up
its rapidly increasing tech abilities and use them against the United States in a way that not even
Russia has managed. With that in mind, Mattis made China's rise in tech a centerpiece of his National
Defense Strategy, highlighting the U.S. government's need to strengthen ties with emerging
tech companies, including AI startups. [graph omitted] A Space Race for the 21st Century Today's mad dash for AI
isn't the first technology race the United States has run. During the Cold War, the country vied against the
Soviet Union to develop a variety of aerospace, nuclear and computing innovations. Washington emerged
victorious from that contest; though the Soviet Union focused its efforts almost exclusively on military applications, it lacked the research and
development capacity of the United States. The size of its critical industries enabled the United States to outstrip the Soviet Union in military
technology while still diverting some of its attention and resources to consumer products. Like
the Soviet Union, China is
interested more in national security and defense than it is in the commercial sector. The difference lies
in China's size and in its economy. The country's immensity could make it a more even match for
the United States in terms of developing and adopting emerging technologies . Given that the country's
population exceeds 1.3 billion people — and that data privacy is a low priority for Beijing — China
offers its AI companies a big
leg-up over their U.S. competitors by giving them access to a huge pool of data. Furthermore, unlike the
tightly controlled Soviet economy that hindered innovation, China's hybrid economy offers individuals
and companies incentive to push the boundaries in tech development. The country's model of capitalism isn't one of
control, though Western media often portray Chinese tech firms as dependent on Beijing to subsidize and direct their activities. Instead, the
central government outlines areas in which it would like companies to operate and provides incentives
to encourage competition. AI is one of those areas, and China's tech giants are eager to outpace one
another in the field. Aware that it missed the boat with smartphone technology, Baidu, for instance, has set its sights on AI as its
opportunity to get an advantage over Tencent, Alibaba and Huawei. For
now, China lags behind the United States in the
tech race, especially in semiconductor development. As the gap between them narrows,
however, the United States will be forced to respond. The challenge for Washington will be that, unlike earlier dual-use
technologies, AI applications will immediately have profound implications for the consumer
electronics market. And because the Chinese and U.S. economies are highly integrated with each other,
China's achievements even in the commercial sector pose a serious threat to the United States.
The question for the United States isn't so much whether China can surpass it in the race to harness
emerging technologies; it's how close the Asian country will come to doing so. China is large
enough that its tech sector could give Silicon Valley a run for its money in terms of market
share if it even comes close to producing the same technologies. For that reason, many U.S. tech firms are
trying to withhold some of their advancements from defense applications in hopes of maintaining a competitive edge in the commercial sphere.
Building a Strategy Once upon a time the United States could rest easy in the knowledge that no other country
could match its combination of physical size and technological ability. Now China can. As a result, the current
U.S. administration is working to develop a more robust response to the United States' budding rival. The White House's investigations into
China's intellectual property policies, calls for greater scrutiny of its foreign investment activities and even proposals to nationalize the fifth
generation wireless protocol, or 5G, network are all initial attempts to counter the country's rise in technology. So far, though, these initiatives
have only provoked backlash in the United States. Forging a comprehensive strategy against China will become all the more important for
Washington as time goes by. The
dizzying pace and unpredictable trajectory of innovation compels tech
companies to constantly broaden their horizons or else jeopardize their competitiveness. But as the same
firms expand their services into more and more industries, they risk running afoul of U.S. antitrust laws. The more companies such as Google,
Amazon and Apple Inc. grow, the bigger the targets on their backs become. Antitrust investigations and busts in the United States, in turn,
could give Chinese companies a prime opportunity to catch up to their competition.

Loss of technological leadership causes Russian-Chinese nuclear conflicts.

Economist, 18 (1/25/18, The Leaders, “The Next War; The growing danger of great-power conflict;
How shifts in technology and geopolitics are renewing the threat,”
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/01/25/the-growing-danger-of-great-power-conflict,
accessed on 6/11/18, JMP)

IN THE past 25 years war has claimed too many lives. Yet even as civil and religious strife have raged in Syria, central
Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq, a devastating clash between the world’s great powers has
remained almost unimaginable. No longer. Last week the Pentagon issued a new national defence
strategy that put China and Russia above jihadism as the main threat to America. This week the chief of
Britain’s general staff warned of a Russian attack. Even now America and North Korea are perilously
close to a conflict that risks dragging in China or escalating into nuclear catastrophe. As our special report this
week on the future of war argues, powerful, long-term shifts in geopolitics and the proliferation of new
technologies are eroding the extraordinary military dominance that America and its allies have enjoyed.
Conflict on a scale and intensity not seen since the second world war is once again plausible.
The world is not prepared. The pity of war The pressing danger is of war on the Korean peninsula, perhaps this year. Donald Trump has vowed
to prevent Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s leader, from being able to strike America with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, a capability that recent
tests suggest he may have within months, if not already. Among many contingency plans, the Pentagon is considering a disabling pre-emptive
strike against the North’s nuclear sites. Despite low confidence in the success of such a strike, it must be prepared to carry out the president’s
order should he give it. Even a limited attack could trigger all-out war. Analysts reckon that North Korean artillery can bombard Seoul, the South
Korean capital, with 10,000 rounds a minute. Drones, midget submarines and tunnelling commandos could deploy biological, chemical and
even nuclear weapons. Tens of thousands of people would perish; many more if nukes were used. This newspaper has argued that the prospect
of such horror means that, if diplomacy fails, North Korea should be contained and deterred instead. Although we stand by our argument, war
is a real possibility (see article). Mr Trump and his advisers may conclude that a nuclear North would be so reckless, and so likely to cause
nuclear proliferation, that it is better to risk war on the Korean peninsula today than a nuclear strike on an American city tomorrow. Even if
China stays out of a second Korean war, both it and Russia are entering into a renewal of great-
power competition with the West. Their ambitions will be even harder to deal with than North Korea’s. Three decades
of unprecedented economic growth have provided China with the wealth to transform its armed forces,
and given its leaders the sense that their moment has come. Russia, paradoxically, needs to assert itself
now because it is in long-term decline. Its leaders have spent heavily to restore Russia’s hard power, and
they are willing to take risks to prove they deserve respect and a seat at the table. Both countries have benefited
from the international order that America did most to establish and guarantee. But they see its pillars—universal human rights, democracy and
the rule of law—as an imposition that excuses foreign meddling and undermines their own legitimacy. They are now revisionist states that want
to challenge the status quo and look at their regions as spheres of influence to be dominated. For China, that means East Asia; for Russia,
eastern Europe and Central Asia. Neither
China nor Russia wants a direct military confrontation with America that
they would surely lose. But they are using their growing hard power in other ways, in particular by
exploiting a “grey zone” where aggression and coercion work just below the level that would risk
military confrontation with the West. In Ukraine Russia has blended force, misinformation, infiltration, cyberwar and economic
blackmail in ways that democratic societies cannot copy and find hard to rebuff. China is more cautious, but it has claimed, occupied and
garrisoned reefs and shoals in disputed waters. China
and Russia have harnessed military technologies invented by
America, such as long-range precision-strike and electromagnetic-spectrum warfare, to raise the cost of
intervention against them dramatically. Both have used asymmetric-warfare strategies to create “anti-access/area denial”
networks. China aims to push American naval forces far out into the Pacific where they can no longer safely project power into the East and
South China Seas. Russia wants the world to know that, from the Arctic to the Black Sea, it can call on greater firepower than its foes—and that
it will not hesitate to do so. If
America allows China and Russia to establish regional hegemonies, either
consciously or because its politics are too dysfunctional to muster a response, it will have given them a
green light to pursue their interests by brute force. When that was last tried, the result was the
first world war. Nuclear weapons, largely a source of stability since 1945, may add to the danger. Their
command-and-control systems are becoming vulnerable to hacking by new cyber-weapons or “blinding”
of the satellites they depend on. A country under such an attack could find itself under pressure
to choose between losing control of its nuclear weapons or using them. Vain citadels What should
America do? Almost 20 years of strategic drift has played into the hands of Russia and China. George W. Bush’s
unsuccessful wars were a distraction and sapped support at home for America’s global role. Barack Obama pursued a foreign policy of
retrenchment, and was openly sceptical about the value of hard power. Today, Mr Trump says he wants to make America great again, but is
going about it in exactly the wrong way. He shuns multilateral organisations, treats alliances as unwanted baggage and openly admires the
authoritarian leaders of America’s adversaries. It is as if Mr Trump wants America to give up defending the system it created and to join Russia
and China as just another truculent revisionist power instead. America needs to accept that it is a prime beneficiary of the international system
and that it is the only power with the ability and the resources to protect it from sustained attack. The
soft power of patient and
consistent diplomacy is vital, but must be backed by the hard power that China and Russia
respect. America retains plenty of that hard power, but it is fast losing the edge in military
technology that inspired confidence in its allies and fear in its foes. To match its diplomacy,
America needs to invest in new systems based on robotics, artificial intelligence, big data and
directed-energy weapons. Belatedly, Mr Obama realised that America required a concerted
effort to regain its technological lead, yet there is no guarantee that it will be the first to
innovate. Mr Trump and his successors need to redouble the effort. The best guarantor of
world peace is a strong America. Fortunately, it still enjoys advantages. It has rich and capable allies, still
by far the world’s most powerful armed forces, unrivalled war-fighting experience, the best systems
engineers and the world’s leading tech firms. Yet those advantages could all too easily be
squandered. Without America’s commitment to the international order and the hard power
to defend it against determined and able challengers, the dangers will grow. If they do, the
future of war could be closer than you think.

The perception of the US declining and China rising is enough to ignite great power
war – technological progress flips the switch
Ward, 14 --- works at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security on U.S.
defense policy and strategy (8/22/14, Alex, “Only US Can Prevent Great Power War; The preconditions
for a hegemonic war currently exist in the world, but the U.S. can still prevent one,”
https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/only-us-can-prevent-great-power-war/, accessed on 6/12/18, JMP)

As the World War I centennial is celebrated, repressed thoughts of great power war once again
begin to surface. With today’s highly “interconnected global economy” underwritten by a liberal order
leading to the “rise of the rest,” it appears unlikely that any state would want to disrupt the current
system. And yet, the constant stream of somber news reignites fears of a calamitous global
catastrophe. In times of international flux, where the worst seems possible, it is important to turn to those who can best interpret these
eras. Inthe case of great power or “hegemonic” wars, there is hardly a greater authority than
Robert Gilpin. In his seminal work on the subject, War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin argues that three preconditions
must be met for a hegemonic war to occur. First, Gilpin believes that the soon-to-be warring parties must feel
there is a “‘closing in’ of space and opportunities.” Second, there must be a general “perception that a
fundamental historical change is taking place.” Finally, events around the world start to “escape human
control.” Notably, all three of these conditions currently exist in the world. Closing In Europe, where great power conflict took place for
centuries, was heavily congested and contested. As powers like Britain, France, Germany and others rose, they fought for influence and
geography at the expense of the others’ territory. Due to the close quarters, any desire for expansion on one country’s part would cause
two powers that would compete in a war — the United
concern in the others. Today, some say, the world is different. The
States and China — are separated by a vast ocean, supposedly making it hard for each to antagonize the
other. This, however, is not true. The map may show an expansive world, but new technologies —
leading to hyperconnectivity and shorter travel times, especially for military equipment — have made
the world “claustrophobic.” To wit, when China announced an “Air Defense Identification Zone” the United States quickly
deployed two B-52 bombers to challenge its claim. And that was using old equipment. Both China and the United States are developing
hypersonic missiles and vehicles. Humanity has already conquered physical space with commercial flight and fast ships. Now, it continues to
shrink space even further for potentially decisive advantage. It is also hard to claim that China and the United States are far apart when they
regularly bump up against each other as they have in the South China Sea. Perception Since the dawn of “Pax Americana” after World War II,
belief in the United States as the undisputed global hegemon remained fairly stable. Until now. According to a recent Pew poll, Americans’
views of the United States as a global power have reached a 40-year low. Indeed, only 17 percent believe that America plays a “more important
and powerful role than ten years ago.” Rightly or wrongly, this perception exists. Even though most people still find the United
States preferable to China, regional powers can use the widespread belief that America is
declining to make their cases for running the system. In fact they are already doing so to a degree. For example,
China’s Global Times reports that 47 percent of people believe China has achieved “major power” status. Should
both perceptions keep trending in the same direction — the United States is declining while China
rises — then the feeling of an historic shift is almost inevitable. Human Control As current events prove, even
the great powers cannot stop horrendous things from happening in the world. From Latin America and Africa to Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, and East Asia, chaos and turmoil run rampant. While this is a particularly bad period for international affairs, it is naïve to think this may be
an isolated epoch. In fact, there
is reason to think the world might grow more unstable in the years ahead. Over
the next 11 years, the world can expect another one billion people, reaching a total of around 8 billion
by 2030. As technology becomes more powerful, it will do two things. First, it will empower the individual, or a
group of individuals, to do great good or great harm. Second, it will allow individuals to be more aware of how the middle
class lives. People around the world will demand similar things, causing stress on governments and
brewing civil unrest and instability. Thus, as people are further empowered and further
angered, the probability that these non-state actors — indeed, normal, everyday people — disrupt
international affairs or geopolitics is high. Governments will continue to have less and less control
of the citizenry, allowing the regular citizen to do with her newfound power what she wills. In essence, we
will see, in a big way, the diffusion of power. Although the world currently satisfies Gilpin’s three preconditions, there need
not be pessimism. For one, current relations between the United States and China are nowhere near the point
where a potential great war between them is possible, and there is no other rivalry nearing that of Washington and Beijing.
Second, some
of the trends that can cause harm, like rapid technological progress, can also be
used to help stabilize the global order. To be sure, technology could be used to curb the
desolation brought on by expectedly low water, food, and energy levels. Finally, and most importantly,
Gilpin’s guidance is certainly not comprehensive. There are more variables for which to account (i.e. the effect of nuclear weapons) that dictate
whether or not a great power war may take place. That said, Gilpin’s framework serves as a good rubric by which to measure the current global
climate. By all measures, this is certainly a dangerous time. But Gilpin’s preconditions shouldn’t be misconstrued as
predictive or fatalistic. Indeed, the United States, as the hegemon, has the capability (and
responsibility) to preserve the international order and lead the world out of this mess . By
keeping good relations with partners and allies, deterring adversaries, reversing the perception of its decline, and
leveraging technological capabilities for global good, there is a decent chance that the U.S.
can make the great-power-war-incubation period fade away. Should the United States not seize this
moment, and ensure that China is a responsible partner in the current global system alongside it,
then the chance of a great power war cannot be dismissed, however remote.

Chinese documents prove they won’t collaborate and will use AI for the military
Ebadi 18 (Bushra, "Artificial Intelligence Could Magnify Social Inequality," Centre for International
Governance Innovation, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/artificial-intelligence-could-magnify-social-
inequality, 5/17/18 MSCOTT)

Research and work on AI in the security field has focused on its military applications, as opposed to
peacebuilding. For example, China’s State Council released their “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence
Development Plan” in July 2017. Upon assessing a translated version of the plan, it is clear that security applications of AI do not
include peacebuilding, mediation or negotiations. While these terms make no appearance in the
plan, the term "military" appears 12 times, while "defence" appears 10 times. France’s AI strategy, For a
Meaningful Artificial Intelligence: Towards a French And European Strategy, makes only one mention of peace, in relation to the impact of AI exports on “regional
peace and security,” while it mentions "defence" 24 times, "military" nine times, "security" 25 times, and "weapons" 17 times. Beyond an overview, the lack of
transparency surrounding the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy makes it difficult to examine which applications of AI are being prioritized in the security
field.

Trump doesn’t thump the global order.

Bershidsky, 18 – 6/11, Berlin-based journalist and columnist for Bloomberg View, the editorial
division of Bloomberg News., (Leonid, “Trump’s Leadership Isn’t Just About Tantrums”,
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-06-11/g7-summit-trump-s-leadership-isn-t-just-about-
tantrums, accessed 7/3/18) Rez ***edited in brackets for comprehension
No matter how tempting it is to write off President Trump’s G-7 antics as the capricious acting out of a big, petulant baby, that’s not going to do the world any good as long as he runs the U.S.
Like it or not, Trump is a world leader trying to position himself between the points of a triangle: established rules and alliances, selfish U.S. interests and his own personality traits. It may
appear that he’s tossed the rules and alliances out the window – at least that’s how it’s seen in Europe and now also in Canada. Trump has pulled the U.S. out of one international agreement
after another, hit allies with high import quotas and teased the flabbergasted leaders of the of the other six G-7 nations with outlandish proposals like readmitting Russia to the club or
scrapping all tariffs altogether. The only reason to air these proposals, knowing they won’t be accepted, is to demonstrate a defiant disregard for the world order as we know it, a disregard

that makes serious people suggest Russian President Vladimir Putin has something on Trump and is making him act in this disruptive way. Trump, however, hasn’t
quite rejected the rules. His tariffs are designed to withstand an attack in the World Trade
Organization because they’re ostensibly dictated by national security, something the WTO allows. It’s a
legal ploy, but it could actually work. He’s gone back on agreements that weren’t ratified by Congress because he’s had the right
to do so. And his persistent demands that North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies spend 2 percent of their economic

output on defense, are meant to uphold rules which others are not keen to follow despite agreeing to them. In any rules-based setup, some rules are
more important than others at different moments; it’s just that Europe doesn’t like Trump’s priorities. One could also argue that Trump hasn’t so much

undermined U.S. alliances as acted to bring into the open the allies’ dependence on the U.S. and remind them they shouldn’t take U.S. support for granted. This
could end up reshaping the relationships as more transparently pragmatic and transactional ones than
they are today. Trump’s bet is that the allies, especially Europeans, will opt to rally around the U.S. anyway because
they have no other viable options. Trump is taking a risk to assert [is asserting] an
unabashed U.S. hegemony, based more on U.S. might and pressure than on
persuasion and consensus. As Henry Kissinger wrote in his 2014 book, “World Order,” The essence of such upheavals is that
while they are usually underpinned by force, their overriding thrust is psychological. Those under assault are challenged to
defend not only their territory but the basic assumptions of their way of life, their moral right to exist and to act in a manner that, until the challenge, had been treated as beyond question.

The natural inclination, particularly of leaders from pluralistic societies, is to engage with the
representatives of the revolution, expecting that what they really want is to negotiate in good faith on the premises of the existing order and arrive at a
reasonable solution. That’s what U.S. allies have been trying to do with Trump; so far, they've refused to believe that the disruption, usually the province of ambitious outsiders, is coming from
the very center of the international order on which they've come to depend. They appear to believe they can negotiate better outcomes or wait Trump out, but Trump rejects both these
scenarios, telling them, in effect, to submit or fight. And then there are the personal likes and dislikes of Donald Trump the man. He clearly resents what he must see as German Chancellor
Angela Merkel’s intellectual condescension, and he treats long-winded, cocky French President Emmanuel Macron as something of a comic figure. His personal stylistic sympathies appear to
lie with leaders who exert absolute power: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Putin. He’s fascinated by their ability to make instant decisions; he thinks
he can do business with them, rather than with Western leaders always looking over their shoulder to their electorates and coming at him with all sorts of slow, fussy scenarios and complex
proposals. There’s not much for Trump’s partners to like about his approach to triangulation. He’s unpleasant to deal with, not interested in consensus, often impossible to pin down. But,
unlike previous U.S. leaders, he provides some clear answers to questions Kissinger asked of the U.S. in his book: What does the U.S. want to prevent or to achieve – alone if necessary or only

Trump’s answers are simple. The U.S. will seek an economic

as part of an alliance? What will the U.S. do or not do when pushed by its allies?

advantage no matter who’s at the other side of the table, it will stretch the rules as much as it can to get
it, and no kind of pressure will divert it from its pursuit of the advantage. These answers, in turn, lead to a question the G-6
leaders and all U.S. allies need to answer: Do they want to be led on these terms or do they have the guts to present an alternative? Leaving this question unanswered is an option, but only if
one believes the U.S. will not re-elect Trump or ever elect another Trump.

American leadership can survive under Trump

Brands 18 – Hal Brands, the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Senior Fellow at the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 18 ("American Grand
Strategy in the Age of Trump", Project Muse, Available Online from https://muse-jhu-
edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/chapter/2061018/pdf, pp. 179, Dsen)

Breathlessness should be avoided in considering the ramifications here: Trump’s behavior will not
cause U.S. power and leadership to collapse overnight, nor does his presidency spell imminent
doom for the system America has done so much to create. America’s core alliances are institutionalized
enough that they will surely outlast Trump; the international trade system has sufficient resiliency and
support from other leading members that it, too, will likely endure, even though it will come under far
greater pressure. America’s international image may recover once Trump departs the scene (as it did after George W. Bush’s presidency), and the United States
will retain, for many years to come, ample hardpower capacity to influence global affairs. The silver
lining, then, is that America is simply too powerful, and the international order it has underwritten too
robust and successful, for Trump to squander this strategic inheritance entirely. The dark cloud, however, is that Trump can
still cause real damage over the course of a fouryear or perhaps eight-year presidency—and the damage will only accumulate the longer this

approach to foreign policy persists.

Realism structures global politics and is inevitable.

de Araujo 14 – professor for Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro ,
(Marcelo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(2): 29-
43)

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a
better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the
threats posed by climate change, grand scale terrorist attacks, or the risk of catastrophic wars. The assumption here is

quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in
human beings’ moral motivation. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there
would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. Although simple and
attractive, this assumption is, as I intend to show, false. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the

future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an old political arrangement that
prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In
my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals
morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in
the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems
to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper
published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the
acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved
moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by
which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of
individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one
endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the
good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions
about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some
authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view,
moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this

Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs

objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea.

relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in
need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory
(Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at
improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly
Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems
to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes
that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral

studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown
enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some

prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson
and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would
like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and

The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one

safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future.

hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly

made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important
problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using
biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral
enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our
moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of
human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial
role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits
provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The
problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in
the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a
“mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has
widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and
Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited
moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the
wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of
our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and
the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not
kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists
like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they
differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human
nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our

both positions are correct in

spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand,

recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for
instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they
would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political
theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors
writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human

tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings
have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and
that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt

to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently
been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself
was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings”
(Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most
influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition
of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by
objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed
over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these
laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over
cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not
a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other
states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are
determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as
Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature
realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman
2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human
nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future,
implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that
violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human
enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu

Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the
and Persson,

main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow
is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests.
Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–
36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of
human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical
research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to
aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the
metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call
attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and
International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation
for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating
behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist
argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary
history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human
nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct
intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in
the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is
likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less
skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s

the question, of course, is

performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But

whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the
survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I
would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within
the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations
from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another
book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s
thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for
our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important
contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself

as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states
are the main, if not the only, relevant actors in the context of international relations; and second, that states compete for power in the
international arena. Moral considerations in international affairs, according to realists, are secondary when set against the state’s

primary goal, namely its own security and survival. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a
result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very

it is this structure that compels individuals

“structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer,

to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its
“anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that
each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior
authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over
morality, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when
political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of
the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,”

even if human beings turn out to become

their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus,

morally enhanced in the future, humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios described by some moral
enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present
structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being
on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for
the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when
the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man

under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short

who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But

time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced
Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong
moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar
to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be
changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international
system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the
moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some
future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While

areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political

leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing
nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see
prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. The idea of a “structure” should not be
understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word

in the absence of the kind of security that

“structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And

law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally
engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the
basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and

power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason
to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or

addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the

perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however,

future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral
enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

Intervention is inevitable AND retrenchment increases the risk of conflict

Brooks and Wohlforth 16 (Stephen G. Brooks, Associate Professor of Government in the Department of
Government at Dartmouth College, and William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor, Professor of Government
in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the
21st Century”, 2016 - New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press, pp. 148-151)//ZidaoW
These mechanisms raise three key questions. First, to what extent are they a function of grand strategy? Clearly, grand strategy cannot change
US preferences. Americans' concern for the plight of others and their basic pro-democracy disposition will remain whatever grand strategy the
country adopts. Hence the salience of the capabilities logic. Undoubtedly, possessing global military intervention capacity expands
opportunities to use force. If it were truly to "come home," the United States would be tying itself to the mast like Ulysses, rendering itself
incapable of succumbing to temptation. Any defense of deep engagement must acknowledge that it increases the opportunity and thus the
logical probability of US use of force compared to a grand strategy of true strategic disengagement. Of course, if the alternative to deep
engagement is an over-the-horizon intervention stance (under which US forces would be stationed at sea and/or back in the continental United
States but configured to be quickly deployable to a theater), then the temptation risk would persist after retrenchment. Indeed, as noted,
even analysts who call for the most decisive form of retrenchment entailing full-scale
abrogation of all US alliances still call for retention of a global intervention capacity second to
none. As yet, no advocate of retrenchment has outlined a grand strategy and supporting military posture that would eliminate the
temptation risk. At best, retrenchment might reduce the temptation risk: a post-retrenchment America will still have
the capacity to intervene in far-flung regions of the world and still be governed by people
who care about others and can make mistakes. There are, however, some dynamics in play that are at least partially a
function of grand strategic choice. Strong versions of retrenchment would entail fewer or no allies, perhaps more capable remaining allies or
nonallied friends, and a lower salience for the official rhetoric of global leadership. These shifts would plausibly engender less temptation,
which raises the second question: What might the price of such reduced temptation risks be in terms of new risks? The
main risk is
that the country may nonetheless decide to intervene after having shed many allies and
partners but retained a powerful latent intervention capacity. A retrenched America would
arguably set fewer imprudent red lines and feel less pressure to demonstrate leadership. But it
would still be deeply interdependent with a world that it cares about, and American leaders
might come to regret having ruled out involvement in some region or on some issue . In previous
eras it was more feasible to sit out foreign wars, picking the opportune moment to engage and build up the required capabilities; in contrast, in
today's much more interdependent world, that period of assessment could be massively costly to the United States. As compared to previous
eras, global economic interdependence-and the US link to the global economy specifically-is now far greater; the financial markets and global
production networks the United States depends on would almost certainly be disrupted by significant wars elsewhere. Environmental
interdependence also matters: even a "small" regional nuclear war could disrupt global temperatures and rainfall patterns, potentially crippling
global agriculture over a sustained period. At least for the foreseeable future, moreover, the United States will be reliant on importing a large
amount of its energy from other parts of the world. In short, there is no longer a neat dividing line be- tween the United States and what
happens "over there." If the analysis of chapters is right, that a world with a retrenched America is likely to have
considerably more tension and risk of war in its key regions, then the probability of some major
turn of events creating a compelling intervention pull on Washington is likely to increase over
what we now observe. And were that to occur, US policymakers may regret having shed
useful allies, since the resulting intervention would be more expensive and harder without
established access and allies. Of course, access could potentially be reestablished, but perhaps not on a sufficiently speedy
timeline. Moreover, it is also doubtful that the facilities themselves will be as usefully maintained by local governments. In turn,
although security partnerships can potentially be reestablished, this would occur with foreign
militaries that would have less experience training and working directly with US forces.
Nevertheless, the upshot is that deep engagement does court more temptation risk than the most comprehensive versions of retrenchment.
And that raises the third question: Empirically, how large is this cost?
 Contention Three is Solvency
The United States federal government should substantially raise the annual limit for
artificial intelligence professionals, eliminate the per-country limits for artificial
intelligence professionals, and exempt the dependents of sponsored artificial
intelligence professionals and artificial intelligence professionals with graduate
degrees in science and engineering fields from the numerical limit. We’ll clarify.

The plan allows the U.S. to attract sufficient permanent skilled immigrants to meet
technological needs
Anderson, 18 --- executive director of the National Foundation for American Policy, a non-partisan
public policy research organization focusing on trade, immigration and related issues, former Executive
Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning and Counselor to the Commissioner at the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (Stuart, “Will Congress Ever Solve The Long Wait For Green Cards?”
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2018/05/21/will-congress-ever-solve-the-long-wait-for-
green-cards/#34b77973763c, accessed on 6/7/18, JMP)

If Congress fails to pass new legislation, some of the most highly skilled professionals in America will be
forced to leave the country or wait decades for employment-based green cards. How did America become
mired in such a mess and what can be done to fix the problem? The Origins of the Problem Back in 1990, when the Immigration Act of 1990 was
passed, Congress had a chance to secure America’s future as a magnet for top talent from all over the world. It failed in this mission. First,
Congress changed the existing H-1 temporary visa category to H-1B, added new requirements and set an annual limit of 65,000. Employers
reached this limit within 6 years – and have also reached it every year for the past 16 fiscal years, encouraging companies to place more
workers outside the U.S. Second, Congress set an annual limit of 140,000 on employment-based green cards (for permanent residence). More
than 20,000 of the green cards each year are devoted to immigrant investors, workers for jobs that don’t require a college degree, religious
workers and others. More importantly, dependents (spouses and children) count against the 140,000 annual limit, accounting for about half of
the total each year. Third, the Immigration Act of 1990 unwisely retained per-country limits on employment-based immigrants. This continues
to make no sense. It would be discrimination if a company said it will only hire a certain number of people of Chinese origin this year, yet
collectively U.S. employers are only allowed to gain permanent residence for a limited number of people from any one country. Companies
should not care where a person was born and neither should Congress. Due
to the combination of the per-country limit and
140,000 employment-based green card allotment, the National Foundation for American Policy
estimates an Indian-born professional in the third preference (EB-3) can wait 10 to 25 years or longer for
an employment-based green card. I have met dozens of individuals who have already waited more than 10 years for a green
card. Congress Misses the Technological Revolution A key reason members of Congress failed in setting workable
employment-based immigration limits in 1990 is they lacked imagination – or any sense of our technological
future. In short, new technologies created a demand for people with technical skills well beyond the annual
limits on H-1B visas and employment-based green cards established in the Immigration Act of 1990. Back in
1990, the World Wide Web did not exist on a global basis for individuals and nobody knew that e-
commerce would become a key aspect of economic life for many consumers. Streaming video? Streaming music?
Social media? Online multiplayer video games? Those who set our immigration limits could not have anticipated any of these developments.
Establishing flexible or market-based limits, instead of fixing in place rigid caps, would have made a great
difference. Consumer devices, most notably the smartphone, have spawned new industries. Just like Netflix couldn’t have sent bulky
videotapes through the mail before the invention of DVDs, Uber and Lyft could not exist without smartphones. New advances continue
to fuel the demand for skilled labor in the U.S. And this comes at a time when only about 20% of the
full-time graduate students at U.S. universities in computer science and electrical engineering are U.S.
citizens (or permanent residents). “Emerging technologies, such as driverless vehicles, may also be increasing
the demand for people with high levels of technical skill, including foreign-born researchers,” noted a
recent National Foundation for American Policy report. “Tesla (207 approved new H-1B petitions in FY 2017), Uber (158)
and General Motors (179) all employ individuals in H-1B status.” The Solution This is actually an easy problem to fix. Congress
needs to take three steps. First, to alleviate the burden on those waiting the longest, Congress could pass H.R. 392. With
323 cosponsors, the bill has achieved a level of bipartisan support unheard of in this age of polarization. “Due to an arbitrary per-country cap in
the employment-based green card laws, immigrants who come here legally on work visas from India or China face a massive backlog for
obtaining their permanent residence,” H.R. 392’s chief sponsor, Rep. Kevin Yoder (R-KS), told me in an interview. “If you do some simple math,
you’ll realize many of these individuals will go their entire lives without ever getting their green card. Whereas, there are individuals who come
here from other smaller nations that can get one in a matter of two to three years.” Yoder’s bill would transition
to an immigration
system that operates without per-country limits in the employment categories. That would dramatically
reduce the wait times for those who have already been waiting a decade or more and allow all new
entrants to gain permanent residence in a more reasonable time frame. Second, Congress should raise
the annual limit well above the 140,000 now permitted each year for employment-based immigrants.
Third, Congress should exempt the dependents of sponsored immigrants from the numerical limit, as
well individuals with graduate degrees in science and engineering fields. For those who worry this will lead to fewer
jobs for U.S. workers, well, stop worrying. “The results of the state-level analysis indicate that immigration does not increase U.S. natives’
unemployment or reduce their labor force participation,” according to a study for the National Foundation for American Policy by economist
Madeline Zavodny. “Instead, having more immigrants reduces the unemployment rate and raises the labor force participation rate of U.S.
natives within the same sex and education group.” The Benefits of Solving the Problem Enacting
these reforms is a humane
solution that will benefit America economically. If U.S. companies can retain and attract top talent
they will better compete in global markets and create more jobs in America. A solution would also help people
like Sunayana Dumala. In February 2017, a racist gunman yelled, “Get out of my country” and shot Srinivas Kuchibhotla and another H-1B visa
holder (Alok Madasani) at Austins Bar & Grille in Olathe, Kansas. (Ian Grillot was shot trying to disarm the shooter.) Srinivas Kuchibhotla’s
employer applied for his green card in 2010. Because of the per-country limit and numerical restrictions in the employment-based category, the
long wait meant Srinivas died before his application was approved. Without permanent residence, his widow, Sunayana Dumala, has no legal
right to live permanently in the United States. Rep. Yoder has worked to help Sunayana stay in the U.S., while also seeking a long-term solution
to the green card problem for high-skilled immigrants. Jyoti Bansal has lived the kind of American Dream success story everyone can embrace –
but it almost didn’t happened. “I waited 7 years for my employment-based green card and I wanted to leave my job and start a new company
but couldn’t,” Jyoti told me in an interview. “What
is most frustrating about the green card process is you have no
control over a major part of your life. I have friends who became frustrated with the uncertainty and
after years of waiting they finally left the U nited S tates.” Finally, in 2007, Jyoti received an employment authorization
document (EAD) as part of the green card process. He left his employer and started AppDynamics. The company, which provides the equivalent
of a 24 hour/7 days a week MRI for a customer’s website, with clients such as HBO, grew to over 900 people and a lofty valuation of $1.9 billion.
That valuation was shattered in January 2017, just before an initial public offering, when Cisco acquired AppDynamics for $3.7 billion. Jyoti
Bansal has moved on to new ventures. But his company that employs over 900 workers and is worth
nearly $4 billion almost never got off the ground because of a flawed immigration law. How many
scientific breakthroughs and entrepreneurial marvels are being stopped before they start by the per-
country limit and our low level of employment-based green cards? It’s time for Congress to fix the
problem.

Specifically, reducing immigration restrictions for AI specialists are key.

Osoba and Welser, 17 Osonde A., engineer at the RAND Corporation and a professor at the Pardee
RAND Graduate School, William, adjunct senior management scientist at the RAND Corporation and a
professor at Pardee RAND Graduate School. (“The Risks of Artificial Intelligence to Security and the
Future of Work”, RAND, 2017, DOI: 10.7249/PE237)
The United States enjoyed substantial advantages in innovation and economic strength in the second half of the last century. The reasons for
this state of affairs and the prospects of its continuation are secondary considerations.9 The point to focus on is that many of the
innovations in AI occurred in the United States and the attending benefits of these innovations accrued
to the United States first. These innovations are diffusing quickly, especially with the strong academic and commercial
push to “democratize AI.” The rise of AI expertise and innovators in other nations (e.g., China’s Baidu, Alibaba, and Didi) is
probably the more indicative signal pointing to the loss of the United States’ first-mover’s advantage in the AI space.
Further complicating the arena is the fact that the United States has ceded dominance in high-performance computing as
those assets have proliferated and become accessible globally. It is no longer tenable to assume the absence of foreign
actors with comparable AI expertise and resources.¶ Suggested response: Assumptions of enduring superiority
in AI related technology and expertise should be discarded to account for the reality that stiff global competition now exists. The
competition may grow stiffer over time as the quality of math and science education in the United States (as measured in cross-
national education surveys like the OECD’s PISA [undated]) continues to rate as “average” or “below average.” Decisionmakers could
adopt a “race-to-the-moon” stance with an appropriately aggressive strategy to invest in AI-related
research and infrastructure. The AI talent pool is and will continue to be a space of tight geopolitical competition. The
standard lever would be to improve STEM educational outcomes the local K–12 pipeline. This is admittedly a complex task
that will likely only yield results at longer time-scales. The AI talent concern serves to make this
task more urgent. There is also significant strategic importance to attracting and securing such talent, and
interested nations should acknowledge that the pool is global in nature and thus requires immigration policies that
prioritize these skill sets. For the United States, immigration policy is a major lever for three reasons: (1) an
uncharacteristically high
percentage of U.S.-resident AI experts are foreign-born or first-generation immigrants; (2)
post-graduate programs where AI expertise develops have been relying on student immigration for many
years now. The U.S. K–undergraduate education pipeline has not been supplying enough native [domestic] graduates interested in supplying
enough 17 native [Domestic] graduates interested in STEM; and (3) the global competition for experts may be close to a
zero-sum game. It is easier to cultivate and retain U.S. tech dominance if experts and would-be
experts immigrate from other competing states.

Consensus of experts agree—immigrants are net positives to the economy with no

impact on wages, neg evidence relies on faulty logic.
Davidson, 15 (Adam, award winning economics writer Founder of NPR’s “Planet Money”,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/magazine/debunking-the-myth-of-the-job-stealing-
immigrant.html?_r=0 3-24)

And yet the economic benefits of immigration may be the -most -settled fact in economics. A recent
University of Chicago poll of leading economists could not find a single one who rejected the
proposition. (There is one notable economist who wasn’t polled: George Borjas of Harvard, who believes that his fellow economists underestimate the cost
of immigration for low--skilled natives. Borjas’s work is often misused by anti-immigration activists, in much the

same way a complicated climate-­science result is often invoked as “proof” that global warming is a
myth.) Rationally speaking, we should take in far more immigrants than we currently do. So why don’t we open up?
The chief logical mistake we make is something called the Lump of Labor Fallacy: the erroneous notion that
there is only so much work to be done and that no one can get a job without taking one from someone else.
It’s an understandable assumption. After all, with other types of market transactions, when the supply goes up, the price falls. If there were suddenly

a whole lot more oranges, we’d expect the price of oranges to fall or the number of oranges that went uneaten to surge. But
immigrants aren’t oranges. It might seem intuitive that when there is an increase in the supply of workers, the ones who were here already will make
 don’t just increase the supply of labor, though; they simultaneously
less money or lose their jobs. Immigrants

increase demand for it, using the wages they earn to rent apartments, eat food, get haircuts, buy cellphones.
That means there are more jobs building apartments, selling food, giving haircuts and dispatching the trucks that move
those phones. Immigrants increase the size of the overall population, which means they increase the size of

the economy. Logically, if immigrants were “stealing” jobs, so would every young person leaving school and
entering the job market; countries should become poorer as they get larger. In reality, of course, the opposite

happens. Most anti-immigration arguments I hear are variations on the Lump of Labor Fallacy. That immigrant
has a job. If he didn’t have that job, somebody else, somebody born here, would have it. This argument is wrong, or at least wildly oversimplified. But it feels so

correct, so logical. And it’s not just people like my grandfather making that argument. Our government policy is rooted in it. The
single greatest bit of evidence disproving the Lump of Labor idea comes from research about the Mariel
boatlift, a mass migration in 1980 that brought more than 125,000 Cubans to the United States. According to David
Card, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, roughly 45,000 of them were of working age and moved to Miami; in
four months, the city’s labor supply increased by 7 percent. Card found that for people already working in Miami,

this sudden influx had no measurable impact on wages or employment. His paper was the most
important of a series of revolutionary studies that transformed how economists think about
immigration. Before, standard economic models held that immigrants cause long-term benefits, but at the
cost of short-term pain in the form of lower wages and greater unemployment for natives. But most economists now
believe that Card’s findings were correct: Immigrants bring long-term benefits at no measurable
short-term cost. (Borjas, that lone dissenting voice, agrees about the long-term benefits, but he argues
that other economists fail to see painful short-term costs, especially for the poor.) Economists have shifted to studying how nations so
quickly adjust to new arrivals. The leading scholar on this today is Giovanni Peri of the University of California, Davis, who has shown that immigrants tend to
complement — rather than compete against — the existing work force. Take a construction site: Typically, Peri has found, immigrants with limited education
perform many support tasks (moving heavy things, pouring cement, sweeping, painting), while citizens with more education focus on skilled work like carpentry,
plumbing and electrical installation, as well as customer relations. The skilled native is able to focus on the most valuable tasks, while the immigrants help bring the
price down for the overall project (it costs a lot to pay a highly trained carpenter to sweep up a work site). Peri argues, with strong evidence, that there are more
native-born skilled craftspeople working today, not fewer, because of all those undocumented construction workers. A similar dynamic is at play on Wall Street.
Many technical-support tasks are dominated by recent immigrants, while sales, marketing, advising and trading, which require cultural and linguistic fluency, are
typically the domain of the native-born. (Whether Wall Street’s technical wizards have, on balance, helped or hurt the economy is a question for another day.)
This paradox of immigration is bound up with the paradox of economic growth itself. Growth has
acquired a bad reputation of late among some, especially on the left, who associate the term with
environmental destruction and rising inequality. But growth through immigration is growth with
remarkably little downside. Whenever an immigrant enters the United States, the world
becomes a bit richer. For all our faults, the United States is still far better developed economically than
most nations, certainly the ones that most of our immigrants have left. Our legal system and our financial
and physical infrastructure are also far superior to most (as surprising as that might sometimes seem to us). So when people
leave developing economies and set foot on American soil, they typically become more productive, in
economic terms. They earn more money, achieve a higher standard of living and add more economic
value to the world than they would have if they stayed home. If largely open borders were to replace
our expensive and restrictive lottery system, it’s likely that many of these immigrants would travel back
and forth between the United States and their native countries, counteracting the potential brain drain
by sharing knowledge and investment capital. Environmentally, immigration tends to be less
damaging than other forms of growth, because it doesn’t add to the number of people on
earth and often shifts people to more environmentally friendly jurisdictions. To me, immigration is
the greatest example of our faulty thinking, a shortsightedness that hurts others while simultaneously
hurting ourselves. The State Department issues fewer than half a million immigrant visas each year. Using the 7 percent figure from
the Mariel boatlift research, it’s possible that we could absorb as many as 11 million immigrants
annually. But if that’s politically untenable, what about doubling the visas we issue each year? It would still be fewer than a million, or less than 0.7 percent of
the work force. If that didn’t go too badly, we could double it again the next year. The data are clear. We would be better off. In fact, the world would be better off.
Whenever I’m tempted by the notion that humans are rational beings, carefully evaluating the world and acting in ways that maximize our happiness, I think of our
meager immigration policies. For me, it’s close to proof that we are, collectively, still jealous, nervous creatures, hoarding what we have, afraid of taking even the
most promising risk, displaying loyalty to our own tribe while we stare, suspiciously, at everyone else. It’s nice to believe that I am part of a more mature, rational
generation, that my grandfather’s old ways of thinking are dying away. But I’m not so sure. We might be a lot more like him than we want to think.