KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION ET. AL. VS. JANOLO, JR. ET. AL.

32 SCRA 140 YEAR| Piercing of Corporate Veil in Fraud & Alter Ego Cases| fgdlj
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence has settled that proceedings the correction of records of nationality or citizenship of
persons in the civil registry are adversarial in nature or one having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from
an ex parte application, one which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest it.
CASE SUMMARY: Kilosbayan assails the decision of the RTC recognizing Ong as a natural-born Filipino citizen, among
others. They contend that the proceeding under Rule 108 is not adversarial in the juridical sense. The SC disagrees.

FACTS:
o Prior to this case was Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, where the Court ruled that Gregory Ong is enjoyed from
accepting his appointment to the Supreme Court or discharging the duties of the position of Assoc. Justice, until he shall
have successfully completed all the necessary steps in an adversarial proceeding, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.
o In line with this, Ong filed a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules Court for the
amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of the entry on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth
before the RTC of Pasig, which Judge Janolo presided.
o In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan assailed orders of the RTC.
o [First Order] The petitioners filed a motion for voluntary inhibition on Aug 6, 2007 which was denied the day after, or
during the first hearing of the case.
o They filed an MR but was only resolved in September.
o [ Second Order] On August 21 (3rd hearing day), the petitioner were declared in default.
o [Third Order] The motion to vacate order of default was likewise denied.
o On October 17, the RTC granted Ong’s petition and recognized him as a natural -born citizen of the PH.
o So in this case, petitioners assert that public respondent erred and committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) in
not voluntarily inhibiting himself from presiding over the case; (b) in declaring herein petitioners as having
defaulted; and (c) in granting the Petition of respondent Gregory S. Ong.
o The Court required the respondents Ong and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment. They contend that the
remedy of the petitioners was incorrect; that they disregarded the hierarchy of courts, and that the verification of the
pleading was defective. (See ruling in notes).
o [Related to topic, which is at the end of the case already] Meanwhile, the petitioners posit that the special
proceedings under Rule 108 do not fall under the juridical concept of adversarial proceedings in the absence of effective
adversaries since the Office of the Civil Registrar is a formal party, while the OSG sided with Ong. Moreover, they admit
that while they are [arties in interest as judicial monitors and observers, are not real adversarial litigants in the juridical
sense.

ISSUE: W/N the petition filed by Ong is in the nature of an adversarial proceeding, thus satisfying the ruling in Kilosbayan v
Ermita? YES, it is an adversarial proceeding.

DISCUSSION:

The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, stated that substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons
recorded in the civil registry are effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Jurisprudence has settled that such proceedings are adversarial in nature or one having opposing parties; contested,
as distinguished from an ex parte application, one which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.

In this case, impleaded as defendants were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other person having or
claiming an interest under the entry sought to be corrected. The interest of the State was amply represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, while petitioners’ interest was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file a responsive pleading.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

NOTES: Other Issues

1. That the petitioners availed of an improper remedy (for a party declared in default)
 This has been resolved in Cerezo v. Tuazon, where the Court said that a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity
of a judgment by default if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly
declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. A party declared in default may
thus alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order of default and the judgment of default.
2. That petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of courts
 The rule on hierarchy of courts is not absolute, and the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition filed directly with it. A direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are
special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
 However, this petition is bereft of even a single allegation of exceptional and compelling circumstance to warrant an
exception to the rule. In fact, this valid objection elicited no response from petitioners, who glossed over all
procedural issues in their Consolidated Reply. If petitioners themselves do not provide the Court some basis for the
direct recourse, the Court is not minded to search for one.
3. That the verification is defective
 The verification is indeed defective since it was verified without stating the basis thereof. The Rules clearly state that
a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records, and a pleading required to be verified which lacks
a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Meanwhile, in the verification herein the affiant states
that he has read the same and all the facts contained therein are true and correct.
 Moreover, the affiant failed to present competent evidence of his identity before the notary public as required under
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The Court cannot assume that the affiant, being a public figure, is personally
know to the notary public, for the jurat does not contain such statement.
4. On the motion for voluntary inhibition
 The petitioners’ reason is that the Judge, Ong, and his counsel are all members of the Beda Law Alumni Association
which publicly endorsed and supported Ong’s petition.
 Sec 1 of Rule 137, par.2 provides that A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
 The import of this rule is that such decision is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on his
rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him.
 The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of
the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence
of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an
acknowledgment of the fact that they are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the
ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms
 No clear and convincing evidence was shown to indicate that public respondent actively sponsored and participated
in the adoption and publication of the alumni associations stand. It is inconceivable to suppose that the alumni
associations statement obliged all its members to earnestly embrace the manifesto as a matter of creed.
5. The Petitioners further complain that Judge Janolo proceeded to hear the case and declared them in default without first
resolving their pending motion.
 The records show that petitioners filed on August 13, 2007 an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the August
7, 2007 Order and for deferment of the hearings set on August 14, 21 and 28, 2007. Petitioners, thereafter, did not
appear in the various settings, they alleging that the question of voluntary inhibition, which they deem to be an
overriding consideration partaking of a highly prejudicial matter, had yet to be resolved by the trial court.
 While there is no specific rule providing for a definite period of time within which to resolve a motion for
reconsideration of an order denying inhibition, judges must endeavor to act promptly on it within the mandatory 90-
day period so as not to interrupt the course of trial.
 What transpired during August 14 was confirmed by the entry of the nunc pro tunc Order of September 17, 2007
making on record the denial of the Omnibus Motion.
 In the case at bar, the trial court actually took judicial action which was, however, by mistake or inadvertence, not
placed in proper form on record. In any event, petitioners neither seriously contest the veracity of the transcript used
as basis for such confirmatory order nor claim any unwarranted prejudice from the fact of its resolution during their
non-appearance in the scheduled hearing.
  Lastly, the disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and partiality of the
trial court. For one, the grant of such is not a matter of right for it is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
i. In considering such motions, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the postponement and (2)
the merits of the case of the movant.
ii. In this case, the requested postponement was premised on the pendency of the motion for reconsideration.
The Omnibus Motion was, however, submitted ex parte and without further arguments from Oppositors,
drawing public respondent to promptly resolve it by denying it.
 As long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct
observed by the magistrate, such opinion even if later found to be erroneous will not prove personal bias or prejudice
on the part of the judge.
6. On the order declaring them in default and denying their motion to vacate order
 For a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be made by
motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of
meritorious defense.
 In this case, the petitioners failed to comply with (1). Their motion was not under oath, and failed to explain why
the movants have not filed any opposition to the petition and was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit.