631 SCRA 652, SEPTEMBER 29, 2010, 3RD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V JUANITO CABIGQUEZ ALASTRA

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: In 2001, the victim AAA,widowed mother of ten children, was robbed of P3,000 cash
and P7,000 worth of grocery items at gun point inside their store by Romula Grondiano. After
such act, the look out Juanito Alastra entered the store and rape AAA in front of three of her
minor children. The trial court found Cabigquez and his co-accused guilty of qualified rape and
robbery. They were also ordered to pay indemnity, moral damages and actual damages in the
sum of P10,000 for the stolen items and cash. For the actual damages the trial court took judicial
notice of the value of the stolen goods.

The appellant questioned the amount of actual damages insisting there was no basis for the actual
cost of the items taken from the store. The Court of Appeals sustained such award.

ISSUE: WON the trial court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of the stolen
goods?

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court cited the case of People v Martinez wherein the court ruled
that the trial court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of stolen goods because these
are matters of public knowledge or capable of unquestionable demonstration. Judicial
cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence
since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve.
Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume are undeniably within
public knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable demonstration. Here, what is involved
are common goods for everyday use and ordinary stocks found in small sari-sari stores like
private complainants store, i.e., milk, soap, coffee, sugar, liquor and cigarettes. The RTC was
thus correct in granting the reasonable amount of P10,000.00 as computed by the private
complainant representing the value of stolen merchandise from her store.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS.

SERENO, J.:

FACTS: Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship upon naturalization
as a citizen of the USA. Sometime on 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was granted and he
subsequently executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign citizenship. In November 2009,
Amando filed for a certificate of candidacy and won the said election. But prior from his
declaration as winner, a pending action for disqualification was filed by one of the contenders for
the position. It was alleged that Arnando was not a citizen of the Philippines, with a certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Amando's nationality is USA-American and a certified
true copy of computer-generated travel record that he has been using his American passport even
after renunciation of American citizenship.

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as
having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American
Citizenship and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship.

ISSUE: WON one’s continued use of a foreign passport renouncing foreign citizenship amount
to an undoing of the renunciation earlier made?

HELD: The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as
public documents of a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication
thereof." Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in
deciding a case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States
"providing that a person who is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of
Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to
expatriation." American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time
Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own
declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law
that serves as the basis for Arnado’s disqualification to run for any local elective position.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American
citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship.
It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S.
passport at least six times.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that
the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making
the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a
foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow
act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. Arnado’s
continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to what the
dissent wants us to believe.