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Introduction:
The term "natural law" is ambiguous. It refers to a type of theories of
moral, as well as to a type of theories of law. In this outline, natural law will be
considered only as theories of law. That is not to say that theory of law can be
adequately identified and pursued independently of moral and political theory. Nor is it
to deny that there are worthwhile natural law theories much more concerned with
foundation issues in ethics and political theory than with law or legal theory. In the
present outline, “natural law theory” is to be taken as shorthand for natural law theories
just insofar as they bear on law, how they are connected to human rights, changes in
viewpoint from the medieval or classical period to present, how it is closely associated
to natural right and other theories of or about it. This focus has the important incidental
effect that many historically important differences between natural law theorists can be
omitted, differences which pertain more to the foundations of normativity than to the
nature and functions (or “the concept”) of positive law. To speak coherently of “natural
law,” it is necessary to refer to the objective content of such a law. In its fundamental
determinations, this law is immutable. However, the awareness of its historical value, of
the contents which it expresses, and the importance that this law has for individuals,
and for societies, matures with the growth of an ethical consciousness, which can never
stop without causing the stunting of humanity’s spiritual progress. Natural law is not an
invention of Catholicism. Some would suggest this in order to summarily dismiss the
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History of Natural law theory and Human rights.
Rights
Greek thinkers, most especially the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, debated the
old Greek dichotomy of phusis and nomos amidst the economic and political
fermentation of fifth-century Athens and in so doing initiated the natural law tradition.
inherent character of a being or material reality – but the term also encompasses what a
thing or being will become, its process of blossoming. Diametrically opposed to ‘nature’
in early Greek thought is nomos. Nomos means both ‘law’ and ‘custom,’ and, unlike
nature, is something essentially man-made. Even in the archaic myths of Homer and
Hesiod, men establish their nomoi in opposition to nature and to the ordinances of the
gods. For example, Prometheus steals fire from the gods and Hercules subdues nature
Plato and Aristotle challenged it by asking whether there were fundamental, universal
ethical principles common to all men. Plato, arguing against the sophists, claimed that
such principles (i.e. laws) do exist and that they have their moorings in nature itself.
Aristotle distilled and developed this notion that such laws are inscribed in nature and
Subsequent proponents of natural law introduced the theory into the Latin
language, through which it was transmitted for over a millennium. Cicero appropriated
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Greek conceptions of the theory, and, as Augustine and Aquinas would later do,
the question of how there may be a universal natural law when the laws and customs
amongst peoples differ and how it is that men sometimes establish ‘laws’ which are not
truly just. Augustine’s argument was iniusta lex non est lex: an unjust man-made law is
not truly a law but a violation of the natural law to which it should conform. Aquinas
further clarified and systematized the classical theory of natural law, integrating
Aristotle’s teleological view of the world into a more complete metaphysical vision, in
which man’s ultimate end was union with and contemplation of God.
or of arbitrary divine will, but as the main instrument by which a benevolent and
omnipotent Lawgiver guided the community of his creatures to happiness. Free will
accounted for the differences in human laws, because, in their understanding of the
world, men could choose whether to conform their actions to the abiding natural law and
cooperate with the Lawgiver’s plan. The idea that God had providentially given all
human beings the natural ability to discern and obey the right rules of action was highly
influential in subsequent Western thought, and played a conspicuous role in the rhetoric
natural law, critically inheriting the main traditions of natural law or quasi–natural law
thinking in the ancient world (including the Platonic, and particularly Aristotelian and
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Stoic traditions) and bringing elements from these traditions into systematic relation in
the framework of a metaphysics of creation and divine providence. His theory sets the
The fundamentals of Aquinas’s natural law doctrine are contained in the so-
Questions 90 to 108 in the first part of the second part of the three-part Summa.
extracting the teaching in those Questions (or often the more strictly philosophical
Questions 90 to 97) and representing it as Thomas’s natural law thinking tout court.
Indeed, there is less possibility of distorting Thomas’s theory if one is careful to read the
Theologiae as a whole.
beginners in theology with a systematic, overall account of both the divine nature, as
knowable by faith-enlightened reason, and the divine plan and work of creating and
redeeming the cosmos and ordaining it to a final transfiguration in glory at the end of
history. Thomas’s method in composing the work, as he states in the work’s Prologue,
is to treat of the whole of revealed theology (sacra doctrina) as briefly and clearly as
possible, but according to a strict order whereby the very contours of the subject matter
of the science dictate the architectonic plan and the sequential treatment of questions
within the work. The first Question of theSumma so treats the nature and scope of
theology itself, and once this is established, the work considers the very existence and
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nature of God: God first in His own inner and Trinitarian life, and then in His external
activity of giving being to creatures and ordaining them to perfection or full realization for
The Summa and theology itself are all about God. The divine nature is the
subject matter of the science, and the very first principles or premises that serve as
inferential starting points in the systematic inquiry of theology are those items that God
has revealed to us concerning His nature and His plan and purpose in creating the
cosmos. God Himself and subsequently all creation are studied in the light of these
starting points or first principles. In the order of the Summa, the first part of the work
treats the divine nature in itself and then the free creative production of creatures by
God (angels, humans, and all other animate and inanimate beings). The second part
activity (which union represents the fullest realization of human nature, as we shall see),
and the third part treats Christ and his Church and sacraments, the necessary means
Law, of its various sorts, has a role to play in humans’ full realization of their
nature by free acts (acts over which they have a certain degree of control and
dominion). What role? To ask this question is to seek to grasp Thomas’s natural law
habitual excellence in the exercise of its intrinsic capacities and powers (e.g. cognitive,
creative, affective, productive). Highest among these capacities—the capacity with the
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most potential to enrich and enlarge human nature and so to realize it most
completely—is the human intellect, with its power to come to some understanding of the
nature of whatever exists. Following Aristotle, Thomas teaches that through intellect the
human soul is potentially all things: it ranges over the entire universe of what is, and by
acts of understanding and inferring, it in a certain way brings the entire universe into the
soul. Put another way, in conjunction with the will the intellect expands the soul to
become all that is by a cognitive and affective, but not a physical, union. Again with
Aristotle, Thomas maintains that the highest object of this highest human power, (and
so the appropriate but often hidden or misperceived ultimate and crowning end of all
uncaused cause of the totality of things: Deus (in Aquinas’s Latin) or God.
this first uncaused cause is not merely the best, most self-sufficient, most fully realized
being in the cosmos, but also the artisan-creator and ruler of the cosmos. This first, self-
existent, and infinite being loves the world into existence, according to the model of His
own eternal creative ideas, and orders the totality of individual things, notes as it were in
Created beings without intellect or will (whether animate or inanimate) are willed
into being and directed toward their own perfection in the context of the perfection of the
whole, which perfection they each approach automatically or spontaneously and without
understanding or resistance. Creatures endowed with intellect and will (angels and
humans), however, only fully realize their own potentialities consciously or by uncoerced
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intelligible decision, and so are able to ratify or to frustrate God’s creative purpose. It is
here that we see the role in the divine plan and in human life for law, as human beings
characteristically understand the term: law, Thomas will have it, is an extrinsic source or
Thomas argues outright in the very first article of the first question of the Treatise
on Law, that law (lex) essentially can be seen as an ordinance of reason directing
activity toward some end, goal, or purpose, and the highest end or purpose we have as
humans is our ultimate fulfillment, the full realization of our nature, or “happiness” as is
commonly said in English. Hence all law is meant to sub-serve human happiness. But
law has by common acknowledgement and usage a social function as well: it directs the
activity of some collectivity to a common goal, and it does this authoritatively. So the
true purpose of law is to sub-serve the happiness of all in the community. But law does
not merely recommend or suggest, it binds and commands. Lawmakers in our familiar
experience are thus recognized authority figures within a social community who address
shape their actions in certain specified ways. Because law has this essentially directive
have the status of law, it must also be promulgated, or made public, so that it can
perform its coordinating and directing work. Hence we have Thomas’s famous lapidary
definition of law in the Treatise: it is “an ordinance of reason for the common good,
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God, the ultimate cause of all being, activity, and development in everything that
is, is nothing if not caring for the community of creation, and as universal creator He has
authority to the highest degree with respect to His intelligent creatures. Is He not the
lawmaker-lawgiver par excellence? He is, Thomas thinks, since God satisfies the
condition for this appellation perfectly. Elaborating on an earlier theological tradition but
God’s making that is co-eternal with His own nature. This is the Eternal Law (lex
aeterna) through which the divine intellect creatively designs and directs all creatures to
a common end (the common end of the universe), promulgating in time this eternal
ordinance of His reason by the very act of creating beings and endowing them with
spontaneous natural inclinations to move toward their own perfection in the context of
Created beings without intellect and will observe the eternal law, the eternal
the case of human beings, this eternal law directs them spontaneously toward their full
and complete good by ordaining their essential nature to acts of understanding and
desire for the goods constitutive of human perfection or fulfillment. But human beings
have each their own intellect and will, so their spontaneous inclination and subsequent
movement toward that full and complete good is brought about (or not, since it can be
resisted or rejected) by conscious ratification and cooperation, that is, knowingly and
willingly. Thus, in the human world we have the Eternal Law as received and
understood from the inside, as it were, and observed only conditionally: when humans
correctly understand, desire, and act for the goods of human nature (food, drink,
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clothing, shelter, creative activity, knowledge, friendship, etc.) they are freely enacting
observance to the Eternal Law. They are not making a law for themselves, but
are discovering it and appropriating it for themselves. They are discovering and
potentially ratifying in action the divine design-plan for their nature, to which non-rational
creatures witness in whatever they do and undergo, although they are neither cognizant
This for Thomas finally is the natural law (lex naturalis): a sharing from within (or
participation) of the Eternal Law, but not, Thomas insists, something otherwise different
from that first and highest law in the mind of God: “the natural law is nothing else than
the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law.” This participation is available to
revelation: the natural law is observed whenever humans both engage in correct
practical reasoning about what is good and best for them overall in any given
The natural law, according to Aquinas, has certain basic and self-evident
intellect and a modicum of experience of the world. Paraphrasing Thomas, first and
fundamental, is the precept that, “anything good [i.e. that which perfects human nature]
is to be pursued [is the appropriate object of human activity], and the opposite of this
good, evil, is to be avoided in all human acts.” Other basic precepts, but with specific
content, would include those such as: “bodily health is a good to be pursued and bodily
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harm avoided,” or “knowledge is a good to be pursued and ignorance and falsehood
In each case, human reason grasps that some object is perfective of human
nature and so directs that nature toward it by an at least tacit precept or action-guide,
while directing it away from that good’s contrary. The basic precepts of the natural law
command human nature to seek obvious human goods; when the status of some
to determine its status. Not all, however, are equally fit for this task of discernment
about what is good for human nature in general and good for this particular human
being as such.
This natural law instantiating practical reasoning about what is best for humans
Although God’s design-plan for the whole of humanity (for all human acts throughout
cosmic history, that is, and for their orchestration toward the common good of the
cosmos) is perfectly complete and specified in all detail in the divine mind, that portion
of the Eternal Law which concerns humankind in its nature and in its divinely foreknown
history is not fully graspable by the human intellect. Because of this inherent limitation of
the human mind, humans must make their own laws to supplement that portion of the
Eternal Law that they do spontaneously and readily grasp (which portion includes the
fulfillment. They do this correctly either by deriving specific norms from the most basic
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and general principles or precepts of the natural law, or when they give specific shape
to one of these basic and discovered dictates or principles appropriate for a particular
The former derivation of human laws from the natural law Thomas refers to as
“the law of nations” (ius gentium); the latter he refers to as civil law (lex civilis): both
forms of law are, inasmuch as they are legitimately derived from the dictates of the
natural law, normative. That is, they comprise rational requirements for right human
action on Aquinas’s view. Any human law, though, that directly contravenes a dictate of
the natural law ipso facto fails as a law and has the status of an irrational command
instead. Such commands ought only be observed for prudential reasons, such as to
avoid some greater harm that might arise in the social order from the failure to observe
The 14th through the 16th centuries were a period of transition from the Middle
Ages to modernity. There were new developments in the history of natural law thinking,
at least two of them of major importance for American constitutionalism. First, in this
period writers on natural law gave greater emphasis to the rights of the individual, and in
particular to the rights to property and freedom. Second, natural law doctrines of original
freedom and equality were used to derive the legitimacy of law and government from
the consent of the people, sometimes with the implicit or explicit threat of the withdrawal
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Late medieval and early modern theories that derived legitimacy from popular consent
were associated with the emergence of representative institutions that challenged the
more extreme exponents of divine right absolutism. Part of the argument was historical,
basing the king’s authority on a supposed original transfer of authority from the people
to the ruler. That transfer was itself justified by natural-law arguments supporting the
original freedom and equality of all men, arguments that constituted an alternative to
God remained the ultimate source of authority, but the ruler received that authority
through the consent of the people. At first popular consent was expressed by the
nobles, bishops, or corporate groups in the Church and the state. In succeeding
centuries, however, consent became more individualized until it became the decision of
the numerical majority, and the collective rights of the people became the natural rights
of the individual.
While philosophers from Aristotle to Aquinas had generally accepted the premise
that man is inherently a social being whose natural state is political, Thomas Hobbes
proposed quite a different view. He posited that the human state of nature is solitary and
characterized by constant, chaotic warfare in which each man is pitted against every
other in a struggle for survival. Though his intellectual successors would not have so
bleak a view of the state of nature, the notion of individuality characterized the Early
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Hobbes also rejected the idea from Aristotle that man’s nature is teleological (i.e.
ordered toward a particular end or purpose). Whereas Aquinas had argued that the
human person is directed to one ultimate end, namely God, Hobbes conceived of man
Consequently, a government could not exist for the sake of instructing man in virtue.
Instead, for thinkers such as Hobbes and John Locke, government had the exclusive
task of protecting man’s natural rights, foremost among these being the right to self-
preservation.
government, Hobbes and Locke developed theories of social contract, proposing that
men form society (and consequently government) in order to obtain the security,
thinkers agreed that rational social order should be understood first as a contract to
secure natural rights, they differed as to how these rights should be enumerated,
whether they were truly inviolable, what political structures were needed to protect
them, and how far these rights of the individual were tempered by duties towards
others.
tradition, the English Whigs became a dominant, radical force. They argued most
vehemently that the authority of the government is constituted by the consent of the
governed, precisely because governments find their origin in the social contract.
Following from this premise, they advocated constitutional limits on government and
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strict delineation of powers to insure the protection of individual rights. These were the
ideas that were to influence and inspire the American revolutionaries and the Founders
of a new Republic.
For many centuries, natural law was recognized as a type of higher law that
spelled out universal truths for the moral ordering of society based on a rational
understanding of human nature. As a higher moral law, it gave citizens a standard for
determining if the written laws and customs of their nation or any other nation were just
or unjust, right or wrong, humane or inhumane. Today, natural law is not discussed very
much, at least not explicitly. When mentioned at all, it is usually rejected as dangerous
This negative view of natural law can be traced to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679),
whose writings are largely devoted to showing the anarchy and civil wars caused by
appeals to natural and divine laws above the will of the sovereign. Hobbes rejected
traditional higher law doctrines and encouraged people to accept the established laws
and customs of their nations, even if they seemed oppressive, for the sake of civil peace
and security. His critique has been a leading cause of the demise of natural law and the
acceptance of positive law as the only reliable guide for political authority.
One may be equally surprised to learn, however, that many people today
embrace a different (and seemingly contradictory) view of natural law, and this too is
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traceable to Thomas Hobbes. For example, when conscientious people are confronted
with violations of human rights—as in religious theocracies that violate women’s rights
to protest the injustice of those practices and to change them for the better. The
protesters usually deny that they are following natural law, but they obviously are
asserting a belief in universal moral truths that are grounded in human nature—in this
case, the natural equality of human beings that underlies human rights. This
understanding of higher law originates with Hobbes because he was largely responsible
for transforming classical natural law into modern natural rights, thereby beginning the
“human rights revolution” in thinking on natural law. How is it possible for Hobbes and
his followers to embrace seemingly contradictory views of natural law, rejecting one
form as intolerant, self-righteous, and anarchical, while embracing another form as the
universal ideal of social justice? Let us turn to Hobbes for an answer to this puzzle, and,
in so doing, uncover the sources of our modern conceptions of law, rights, and justice.
The key to solving this puzzle is Hobbes’s famous statement about the desire for
power in Leviathan: “So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all
mankind, a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in
death.” What Hobbes means by this sweeping claim is that human nature consists of
ceaseless motion without a natural end that constitutes happiness or felicity; hence,
Hobbes says, “there is no Finis Ultimus (utmost aim) nor Summum Bonum (greatest
continual progress of the desire, from one object to another.” Hobbes’s denial of the
greatest good is the crucial point of disagreement with “the old moral
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philosophers,” Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, who expounded the classical natural law
doctrine.
According to the classical view, man is a rational and social animal who has a
natural inclination to his proper end, happiness, which can be attained by the virtues or
the perfections of mind and character. Classical natural law was therefore
“teleological”: directed to the natural end of human beings and to the good life of virtue
in a just political community. Hobbes rejects the teleological view of human nature as a
false and dangerous illusion. Instead, he sees human nature as the restless striving for
power after power that has no end and therefore no happiness or perfection. The
natural law, and its perfectionist principle of virtue, to modern natural rights, and its
One argument that Hobbes uses to justify the rejection of natural teleology is
metaphysical: the theory that only “bodies in motion” are real and that man is a complex
developed in Leviathan, Part I, which gives the materialist account of man as a creature
of appetites and aversions: seeking pleasure, avoiding pain, and desiring power after
power. The materialist account supports the view that no natural end for man really
exists, only the ceaseless motion of a complex machine. The materialist account also
strengthens the case against the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of man as a rational and
social animal naturally suited by language and friendship to live in a political community.
Hobbes’s model shows that human beings are selfish, competitive, and anti-social, and
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that they are rational only insofar as reason serves the selfish passions. The logical
natural law. Hobbes develops a second argument based on moral experience, showing
that human beings are motivated not only by pleasure and power but also by vanity—a
false estimate of one’s superiority to others. In historical writings, Hobbes shows how
the passion of vanity has undermined traditional political authority where kings have
relied on higher law to gain obedience from the people. The defect of this arrangement
is that traditional higher law doctrines are easily exploited by vain and ambitious men
natural, and common law. Hobbes’s account of the English Civil War (1642–60)
clergymen, democratic Parliamentarians, and lawyers of the common law who sought
recognition for their superior knowledge of higher law, yet who could not agree among
themselves about whose doctrine was right, producing sectarian wars that reduced
English society to the anarchic state of nature. From this frightening analysis, however,
Hobbes draws a hopeful lesson: if higher laws are not equated with intangible goods
like virtue, wisdom, and salvation, then the ills of civilization can be avoided and
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Herein lies the crucial move in Hobbes’s shift from classical natural law to
modern natural rights: the idea of the greatest good is a dangerous illusion because it is
vain, unreal, and never produces agreement; but the minimal good of avoiding death is
the strongest, most real, and most universal passion: “for every man is desirous of what
is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is
death.” In other words, natural law is false and dangerous when it encourages illusory
notions of superiority and implies duties to perfect citizens’ characters or to save their
souls; but natural law is the solution to civilization’s ills when it is defined as the natural
equality of all human beings and the dictate of right reason to avoid death or to preserve
one’s life. The implication is that the root of justice is “not a duty but a right . . . the
Nature is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to
do that which is destructive of his life or which takes away the means of preserving the
same. . . . For though they that speak of this subject used to confound jus and lex (right
and law), yet they ought to be distinguished, because Right consists in liberty to do or
forbear, whereas Law binds to one of them; so that law and right differ as much as
obligation and liberty.” From the new definition of natural law as a right or liberty to
preserve one’s self, Hobbes deduces nineteen commands, such as seek peace; lay
down the right to all things and transfer power to a sovereign; obey the social contract;
avoidance of pride, treating people equally, and acceptance of arbitration and impartial
judges). Hobbes acknowledges that these moral attitudes are social virtues, but they
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are aimed at the minimal good of civil peace rather than the perfection of mind and
character; they also make obedience to positive law the primary duty of natural law,
The influence of Hobbes’s new doctrine has been profound but largely indirect
for absolute monarchy over constitutional government. While Hobbes’s name was
“justly decried,” he convinced many people in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
to change their views of the proper ends of government—from promoting the higher
goods of virtue and salvation to protecting the limited goods of life, personal liberty, and
morality. Hobbes never took the step of later liberal thinkers of advocating constitutional
limits on state power as the best means for securing life, liberty, and property because
he was convinced that fear of the sovereign’s absolute and arbitrary power was the only
way to keep people in line. Yet, once the shift to limiting the scope of government to the
security of rights was widely accepted, a movement away from the absolute monarchy
Hume, Montesquieu, and the Federalist was the logical outcome of the Hobbesian
revision of Thomistic Natural Law theory. The distinctive, and often disputed, areas of
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contribution by the New Natural Lawyers include the following five, which will be the
4. The nature of political authority and the political common good; and
reason, Germain Grisez articulated a number of theses that have been developed and
augmented by the New Natural Lawyers in subsequent decades. The most important
First, the New Natural Law view holds that practical reason, that is, reason
These goods, which are described as constitutive aspects of genuine human flourishing,
include life and health; knowledge and aesthetic experience; skilled work and play;
friendship; marriage; harmony with God, and harmony among a person’s judgments,
choices, feelings, and behavior. As grasped by practical reason, the basic goods give
foundational reasons for action to human agents. Moreover, they are recognized as
good for all human agents; it is equally intelligible to act for the sake of the life of
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Second, these goods, and most of their instantiations in action, are held to be
goodness such that one good may be said to offer all the good of another plus more.
Rather, each of the goods is beneficial to human agents, and hence desirable, in a
unique way; each offers something that the other goods do not. The same is generally
true of particular instantiations of the goods: one way of working, playing, or pursuing
knowledge, for example, may offer benefits that are not weighable by a common
Third, and in consequence of the first two points, the judgments of practical
reason in recognizing the basic goods and directing agents to pursuit of those goods
are not yet moral. Rather, practical reason’s apprehension of and directedness to the
goods is a condition for human actions, all of which, to be genuine actions, must be
oriented to some good. Morality enters in only at the level of deliberation and choice as
regards which goods, or which instantiations of goods, to pursue when faced with
desirable options for choice. The New Natural Lawyers have offered various
formulations of a first principle of morality that captures a reasonable openness to all the
goods across all persons. In Grisez’s most recent work, he argues that human agents
should always make a “contribution to integral communal well-being and flourishing, and
they always can and should avoid intentionally impeding or detracting from integral
communal fulfillment.” This formula replaces an earlier formula which prescribed that
agents must will and act in ways open to “integral human fulfillment.”
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In the 1970s, Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis began to specify the first principle in
terms of a set of “modes of responsibility.” These modes direct agents to certain kinds
of acts, and away from others, by taking into account the ways in which emotions and
non-morally integrated feelings could distort an agent’s openness to the goods, and to
other persons’ fulfillment in the goods. Thus, through hostility towards a good, on the
one hand, or enthusiasm for some good, on the other, agents might be tempted to
damage or destroy an instance of the goods. Or, through arbitrary preference of self, or
those close to one, an agent might unfairly allow damages to be inflicted on another
These modes of responsibility can in turn be further specified with respect to particular
kinds of actions. The best known work of the New Natural Lawyers has focused on the
specification of two of the modes mentioned above, both of which forbid intentional
enthusiasm for some good. In a 1970 essay, “Toward a Consistent Natural Law Ethics
of Killing,” Grisez started to work out the consequences of these principles, arguing that
not only homicide, suicide, direct abortion, and euthanasia are always and everywhere
wrong, but also that capital punishment and intentional killing in war are also morally
forbidden. Grisez and his collaborators also argued in support of the Catholic teaching
The New Natural Law position holds that there are moral absolutes, that is,
norms that specify certain acts as of a sort that are always and everywhere not to be
done. This can be seen in the New Natural Law approach to lies and lying. Following
both Augustine and Aquinas, the New Natural Lawyers hold that it is always wrong to
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lie. Lies are almost always a violation of justice, are always unloving to one’s
interlocutor, and they always violate the integrity and authenticity of the liar.
In more recent years, the New Natural Lawyers have developed an account of a
specifically sexual morality around two claims: first, that marriage is one of the basic
human goods, distinct from life or friendship; and second, that the human person is a
rational animal, a living organism of the human species. The New Natural Lawyers see
3. Theory of Action
Many of the particular claims in applied ethics made by the New Natural Lawyers
are supported by considerations concerning the nature of human action, and indeed, an
action. The New Natural Law’s applied ethics specifies a set of moral norms that direct
practical deliberations and choice in relation to basic goods. Among the norms are
certain moral absolutes that single out types of deliberate behavior that damage or
destroy instances of basic goods. Yet if the formula were not further specified, it would
be unlivable: because the context of choice is that of incompatible options for action, all
of which offer some good not available in the other option(s), all choices involve at least
that damage to goods which results from foregoing the choice of a good. And because
the world is structured according to morally neutral laws of causation, even an act
aimed only at a genuine good can have consequences, in the near or far term, that are
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the concept of intention: it is always wrong, not to cause damage, but intentionally to
Accordingly, the New Natural Lawyers need an account both of what it means to
The account of intention can be expressed using the helpful notion of a proposal
for action. In acting, agents seek to bring about some state of affairs in which a good or
goods will be instantiated (agents thus envisage the state of affairs as offering a
benefit). An agent’s proposal for action is her proposal to do such and such in order to
bring about that state of affairs. Included in the proposal is both the state of affairs
sought (the end) and the instrumentalities by which she will bring about that end (the
means). “Intention” for the New Natural Lawyers encompasses both the end (including
the good-related benefit which is anticipated in that end) and the means by which the
A central point, however, for the New Natural Law account at this juncture is that
the agent as seeking some good that a proposal is considered and adopted. What the
agent intends is thus a matter of this proposal, and of nothing else: facts of the world, of
causality, or of the proximity of one effect to another do not determine the agent’s
intention; and it is thus only by adopting the perspective of the acting person that an
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From this perspective, certain consequences that might, in a more “objective” or
third-personal account of action appear intended, will not in fact be so. Thus Grisez,
Boyle and Finnis have argued that craniotomy, in which a fetus’s head is crushed to
facilitate removal from the mother, need not involve an intention to kill the child. The
intention rather can be “to change the dimensions of the child’s skull to facilitate
removal.” Less controversially, but utilizing the same understanding of action, refusal of
life-saving treatment need not be suicidal if it is done to avoid the burdens of treatment,
and the provision of death-hastening analgesics, on the one hand, and the use of lethal
force in prevention against rape or attack, on the other, need not be homicidal, i.e., it
In 1979, Grisez and Boyle published Life and Death with Liberty and Justice; in
1980, Finnis published Natural Law and Natural Rights. Together the two books marked
the beginnings of a “discussion of political theory” carried on between the three thinkers.
Grisez and Boyle describe their early part in this discussion as conceding “somewhat
too much to political theories that are prevalent in the United States.” By this, they refer
Grisez allowed that it would be wrong for the state to incorporate substantive moral
values, such as the good of life, into its governing principles, and hence into its
conception of the common good of the state. In part this was motivated by a need to
find a principled limit on the state’s sovereignty over the lives, including the moral and
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Finnis’ work in Natural Law and Natural Rights, by contrast, argued for a
perfectionist account of the state: the basic goods of human persons were not to be
ruled out of the practical considerations at the heart of political rule, as in Rawls’s work.
Yet Finnis too, like Grisez and Boyle, has been sensitive to the need for liberty in the
state, and the limits of state sovereignty over individuals; all three oppose the view,
“government should command whatever leads people towards their ultimate (heavenly)
end, forbid whatever deflects them from it, and coercively deter people from evil-doing
authority and the common good that, while rooted in the basic goods, nevertheless sees
families, and groups, while sufficient in one sense for the pursuit of all the basic goods,
including the goods of marriage and religion, are nevertheless thwarted in their pursuit
of these goods by (a) lack of social coordination; (b) the hostility of outsiders; (c) the
predatory behavior of some insiders; and (d) circumstances beyond the control of
individuals that leave them in conditions of more than usual dependence but without the
necessary in order to pursue these goals efficiently and fairly; but together, these goals
directly pursue the basic goods, individually and cooperatively. The political common
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good is thus described by Finnis as “the whole ensemble of material and other
conditions, including forms of collaboration, that tend to favor, facilitate, and foster the
realization by each individual [in that community] of his or her personal development.”
As Grisez notes, “Thomas Aquinas held that the true ultimate end for all human
beings is God alone, attained by the beatific vision.” Grisez’s argument with Aquinas on
St. Thomas argues to the above claim about the beatific vision from the claims
that only the beatific vision could be absolutely fulfilling to human beings and that the
final, or ultimate end of human beings must be absolutely fulfilling. It follows from these
two claims that the beatific vision is the ultimate end. However, the second of these
claims implies, as Thomas shows, that only a perfect good can be taken as one’s final
end; and this in turn implies that an agent can will only one final end at one time (since
willing a second would imply that the first was in some respect imperfect). But, argues
Grisez, this claim is false: someone living in God’s love who nevertheless commits a
venial sin has two ultimate ends, one God, the other the end intended in the venial sin.
So the claims that imply that agents can intend only one end (that the ultimate end must
be absolutely fulfilling, and that only what is regarded as a perfect good can be willed as
a final end) are false; thus St. Thomas’ argument about the beatific vision is unsound.
By contrast, Grisez’s views on our ultimate end are shaped by his understanding
of what we are directed to by the principles of practical reason: the indiscriminate “well-
being and flourishing of ourselves and everyone else;” we thus “reasonably take as our
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ultimate end an inclusive community of human persons along with other intelligent
creatures and God—insofar as we know other intelligent creatures and God and can
Our ultimate end is not, therefore, the beatific vision, but a state of affairs that
includes all persons with whom or for whose sake we can act, including God, with
whose creative activity we cooperate in pursuing basic goods. Grisez calls this state of
affairs “integral communal fulfillment.” By revelation we can know that we are promised
the immortality necessary to achieve this state of affairs, which adequate reflection
reveals to be dynamic and increasing in perfection, rather than static and “complete,” or
unimproveable.
This new account of the ultimate end is meant to replace an earlier account of
the ultimate end and the first principle which, in a sense, divided what the new account
unifies. In an earlier essay, Grisez had argued that the ultimate end of human beings
was a state of affairs: a cooperative relationship with God. And Grisez, Finnis, and
Boyle in a different essay had argued that an ideal – integral human fulfillment –
specified the morally good will by way of the first principle of morality.
On the new account, by contrast, there is still a state of affairs posited as the
and divine. Grisez argues that this state of affairs, which he identifies as the kingdom of
heaven, is itself the object of intention of all upright persons (although not all upright
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possessed of Christian revelation). So the first principle of morality is now linked
together with the ultimate end and prescribes the intending of that end by all upright
persons.
NATURAL RIGHTS
The concept of Natural rights is closely associated with the philosophy or theory
of Natural law. According to this theory, nature or God alone regulates the wisdom and
the activities of men. The kings being the divine origin, as representatives of God, the
rules framed by them were considered divine in nature. But in the age of enlightenment
Hobbes, Locke, Hugo Grotius, Rousseau, Samuel Pufendorf, et.al., challenged the
origin of divine concept to natural law. A natural right is nothing but, rights based on just,
fair and reasonable. This means, the individuals unite themselves to form political
societies through mutual consent, and agree to form a government of their own. It will
enable them to lead their life through common rules and regulations framed by either
them or their representatives. At the same time, they accept a set of legal and moral
duties to be observed or bound by them in the exercise of their rights in order to live in
peace and security without any violence. However, this being the central philosophy
advocated by all philosophers of natural law, there is a difference of opinion that exists
among them. A section of modern naturalists argue that since human rights are closely
associated with the concept of natural rights, there exist no difference between natural
and human rights; both are one and the same. But some traditionalists argue that since
natural rights are not framed by men and are the dictates of right of reason of nature,
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both cannot be equated. According to them, since natural rights are being above the
power of any authority either state or international bodies, and are universal in nature,
they cannot be equated with human rights, because they are adapted by human society
through an international body and not of divine origin. A close examination of both the
above pictures clearly explains the theoretical differences. In a simple manner, natural
rights essentially are the Life, Liberty and Freedom that an individual possess and the
way to live without any disturbance or interference by others. Accordingly, by birth, the
rights are inherited with the body of the individual as the gifts of God or nature. Hence,
they are inherent or inalienable rights. The second picture explains the arguments of the
modern natural philosophers' view that though a human being is born with free will, as a
social animal one has to have minimal limitations in the exercise of their natural rights.
Because, man himself created the modern concept of state, they have to adhere to the
laws framed by the state, so as not to disturb the rights of others. These rights are
otherwise referred to as Legal Rights that are sanctioned by the authority of law which
Conclusion:
The evolution of natural law theory started in the fifth-century with Sophists
accepted dichotomy, but it was until Aristotle came that the first articulated systematic
From Aristotle to the west’s preeminent theorist of the natural law Thomas
Aquinas which states that the natural law is all about God and that the divine nature is
the subject matter of science. The second part of his theory on natural law is the grace-
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aided attainment of a cognitive-affective union with God by human activity and the third
part treats Christ and his Church and sacraments, the necessary means for man’s union
with God. The natural law, according to Aquinas, has certain basic and self-evident
precepts or dictated knowable to any human with a proper functional intellect and a
medium of experience to the world. Paraphrasing Thomas, is the precept that “anything
cost.”
In the 14th century through 16th century period from the Middle Ages to
Modernity, in this period writers on natural law gave greater emphasis to the rights of
the individual, and in particular to the rights to property and freedom. Second, natural
law doctrines of original freedom and equality were used to derive the legitimacy of law
and government from the consent of the people, sometimes with the implicit or explicit
Natural law is essentially a framework law, a skeleton law. It does not ordinarily
give us a concrete norm directly applicable to action here and now in the involved
situations of actual life. It does not, for instance, tell us which of the many possible
forms of laws about property is right in the abstract. Neither the capitalistic nor the
feudal system of property is imposed by the natural law. But it judges each and every
existing system of property in terms of justice. Moreover, natural law does not condemn
the wage contract as such or the socioeconomic order of which the wage contract is so
important a part, but it makes clear that a social order in which the so-called iron law of
wages rules the labor market violates justice and equity. Further, natural law does not
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proclaim that democracy as a form of government is the sole admissible mode of
political organization; yet it does tell us that any form of government, even one that is
decked out in the trappings of democracy, which does not recognize the fundamental
rights of the person and of the family is tyrannical and may, therefore, rightly be
resisted. Natural law, finally, does not say that the Security Council of the United
Nations is, in its concrete form, good and efficient; but it does forbid the independence
of a small nation to be sacrificed out of mere expediency for the sake of the “security” of
a great power. This quality of the unvarying natural law, which elevates it above the
changing historical positive law, which makes it both the ideal for lawmakers and the
critical norm for existing laws, renders it possible for the natural law to govern the
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