1. PNB vs.

Judge Benito Se

FACTS

In accordance with Act No. 2137, the Warehouse Receipts Law, Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery
issued on several dates, the following Warehouse Receipts (Quedans):
(a) March 1, 1989, Receipt No. 18062, covering sugar deposited by Rosa Sy;
(b) March 7, 1989, Receipt No. 18080, covering sugar deposited by RNS Merchandising (Rosa
Ng Sy);
(c) March 21, 1989, Receipt No. 18081, covering sugar deposited by St. Therese
Merchandising;
(d) March 31, 1989, Receipt No. 18086, covering sugar deposited by St. Therese
Merchandising; and
(e) April 1, 1989, Receipt No. 18087, covering sugar deposited by RNS Merchandising.

Receipts substantially in the form, and contains the terms, prescribed for negotiable warehouse
receipts by Section 2 of the law.

Subsequently, Warehouse Receipts Nos. 18080 and 18081 were negotiated and endorsed to
Luis T. Ramos; and Receipts Nos. 18086, 18087 and 18062 were negotiated and endorsed to
Cresencia K. Zoleta.

Ramos and Zoleta then used the quedans as security for two loan agreements—one for P15.6
million and the other for P23.5 million—obtained by them from the Philippine National Bank. The
aforementioned quedans were endorsed by them to the Philippine National Bank.

Luis T. Ramos and Cresencia K. Zoleta failed to pay their loans upon maturity.

Philippine National Bank demanded delivery of the sugar stocks covered by the quedans
endorsed to it by Zoleta and Ramos. Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery refused to comply with the
demand alleging ownership thereof.

Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a verified complaint for
“Specific Performance with Damages and Application for Writ of Attachment” against Noah’s Ark
Sugar Refinery, Alberto T. Looyuko, Jimmy T. Go and Wilson T. Go, the last three being
identified as the sole proprietor, managing partner, and Executive Vice President of Noah’s Ark,
respectively.

Respondent Judge Benito C. Se, Jr., in whose sala the case was raffled, denied the Application
for Preliminary Attachment. Reconsideration therefor was likewise denied.

On January 31, 1991, the Philippine National Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Regional Trial Court likewise denied.

Thereupon, the Philippine National Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals

On December 13, 1991, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the orders of May 2 and
July 4, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the trial court to render summary judgment
in favor of the PNB.
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint against
private respondents for lack of cause of action and likewise dismissed private respondents’
counterclaim against PNB and of the Third-Party Complaint and the Third-Party Defendant’s
Counterclaim. Trial court denied PNB’s Motion for Reconsideration.

PNB filed an appeal from the RTC decision with the Supreme Court by way of a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

Supreme Court reversed and set aside trial judge’s decision and a new one rendered
conformably with the final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the private
respondents Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery, Alberto T. Looyuko, Jimmy T. Go and Wilson T. Go,
jointly and severally to deliver to the petitioner Philippine National Bank, ‘the sugar stocks
covered by the Warehouse Receipts/Quedans which are now in the latter’s possession as
holder for value and in due course.

MR, Supplemental/Second MR and Motion Seeking Clarification of the Decision by private

respondents denied.

Private respondents thereupon filed before the trial court an Omnibus Motion seeking among
others the deferment of the proceedings until private respondents are heard on their claim for
warehouseman’s lien.

On the other hand, on August 22, 1994, the Philippine National Bank filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution and an Opposition to the Omnibus Motion filed by private
respondents.

The trial court granted private respondents’ Omnibus Motion on December 20, 1994 and set
reception of evidence on their claim for warehouseman’s lien. The resolution of the PNB’s
Motion for Execution was ordered deferred until the determination of private respondents’ claim.

Hence this petition.

Contention of the parties

PNB: Private respondents have lost their right to recover warehouseman’s lien on the sugar
stocks covered by the five (5) Warehouse Receipts for the reason that they failed to set up said
claim in their Answer before the trial court and that private respondents did not appeal from the
decision in this regard, dated June 18, 1992.

Private Respondents: Maintained that they could not have claimed the right to a
warehouseman’s lien in their Answer to the complaint before the trial court as it would have
been inconsistent with their stand that they claim ownership of the stocks covered by the
quedans since the checks issued for payment thereof were dishonored. If they were still the
owners, it would have been absurd for them to ask payment for storage fees and preservation
expenses.

ISSUE

Whether the Philippine National Bank should pay storage fees for sugar stocks covered by five
(5) Warehouse Receipts stored in the warehouse of private respondents in the face of the Court
of Appeals’ decision (affirmed by the Supreme Court) declaring the Philippine National Bank as
the owner of the said sugar stocks and ordering their delivery to the said bank.

HELD

We find for private respondents on the foregoing issue and so the petition necessarily must fail.

We are not persuaded by the petitioner’s argument that our said resolution carried with it the
denial of the warehouseman’s lien over the sugar stocks covered by the subject Warehouse
Receipts. We ruled therein that the issuance of the Warehouse Receipts not being disputed by
the private respondents, a summary judgment in favor of PNB was proper. We in effect further
affirmed the finding that Noah’s Ark is a warehouseman which was obliged to deliver the sugar
stocks covered by the Warehouse Receipts pledged by Cresencia K. Zoleta and Luis T. Ramos
to the petitioner pursuant to the pertinent provisions of Republic Act 2137.

Of considerable relevance is the pertinent stipulation in the subject Warehouse Receipts which
provides for respondent Noah’s Ark’s right to impose and collect warehouseman’s lien: “Storage
of the refined sugar quantities mentioned herein shall be free up to one (1) week from the date
of the quedans covering said sugar and thereafter, storage fees shall be charged in accordance
with the Refining Contract under which the refined sugar covered by this Quedan was
produced.”

It is not disputed, therefore, that, under the subject Warehouse Receipts provision, storage fees
are chargeable.

Petitioner PNB is legally bound to stand by the express terms and conditions on the face of the
Warehouse Receipts as to the payment of storage fees. Even in the absence of such a
provision, law and equity dictate the payment of the warehouseman’s lien pursuant to Sections
27 and 31 of the Warehouse Receipts Law (R.A. 2137), to wit:

“SECTION 27. What claims are included in the warehouseman’s lien.—Subject to the provisions
of section thirty, a warehouseman shall have lien on goods deposited or on the proceeds
thereof in his hands, for all lawful charges for storage and preservation of the goods; also for all
lawful claims for money advanced, interest, insurance, transportation, labor, weighing,
coopering and other charges and expenses in relation to such goods; also for all reasonable
charges and expenses for notice, and advertisement of sale, and for sale of the goods where
default has been made in satisfying the warehouseman’s lien.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 31. Warehouseman need not deliver until lien is satisfied.—A warehouseman having
a lien valid against the person demanding the goods may refuse to deliver the goods to him until
the lien is satisfied.”

After being declared not the owner, but the warehouseman, by the Court of Appeals, private
respondents cannot legally be deprived of their right to enforce their claim for warehouseman’s
lien, for reasonable storage fees and preservation expenses.
Considering that petitioner does not deny the existence, validity and genuineness of the
Warehouse Receipts on which it anchors its claim for payment against private respondents, it
cannot disclaim liability for the payment of the storage fees stipulated therein.

Petitioner is in estoppel in disclaiming liability for the payment of storage fees due the private
respondents as warehouseman while claiming to be entitled to the sugar stocks covered by the
subject Warehouse Receipts on the basis of which it anchors its claim for payment or delivery of
the sugar stocks. The unconditional presentment of the receipts by the petitioner for payment
against private respondents on the strength of the provisions of the Warehouse Receipts Law
(R.A. 2137) carried with it the admission of the existence and validity of the terms, conditions
and stipulations written on the face of the Warehouse Receipts, including the unqualified
recognition of the payment of warehouseman’s lien for storage fees and preservation expenses.
Petitioner may not now retrieve the sugar stocks without paying the lien due private respondents
as warehouseman.

While the PNB is entitled to the stocks of sugar as the endorsee of the quedans, delivery to it
shall be effected only upon payment of the storage fees.

Imperative is the right of the warehouseman to demand payment of his lien at this juncture,
because, in accordance with Section 29 of the Warehouse Receipts Law, the warehouseman
loses his lien upon goods by surrendering possession thereof. In other words, the lien may be
lost where the warehouseman surrenders the possession of the goods without requiring
payment of his lien, because a warehouseman’s lien is possessory in nature.
 2. PNB vs. Sayo Jr.

Facts: Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery issued Warehouse Receipts (Quedans) covering sugar
deposited by Sy, RNS Merchandising, and St. Therese Merchandising. These Warehouse
Receipts were negotiated and endorsed to Ramos and to Zoleta. Ramos and Zoleta then used
the quedans as security for loan from the PNB. The quedans were endorsed by them to PNB.
Ramos and Zoleta failed to pay their loans upon maturity. Hence, PNB wrote to Noah's Ark
demanding delivery of the sugar stocks covered by the quedans endorsed to it by Zoleta and
Ramos. Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery refused to comply with the demand alleging ownership
thereof. SC held that private respondents may enforce their warehouseman’s lien and that PNB
is liable for storage fees.

Issues: 1. WON private respondents may enforce their warehouseman’s lien. YES.
2. WON PNB is liable for storage fees. YES.

RULING:
Under the Special Circumstances in This Case, Private Respondents May Enforce Their
Warehouseman's Lien.

The remedies available to a warehouseman, such as private respondents, to enforce his

warehouseman's lien are:
(1) To refuse to deliver the goods until his lien is satisfied, pursuant to Section 31 of the
Warehouse Receipt Law;

(2) To sell the goods and apply the proceeds thereof to the value of the lien pursuant to
Sections 33 and 34 of the Warehouse Receipts Law;

(3) By other means allowed by law to a creditor against his debtor, for the collection from
the depositor of all charges and advances which the depositor expressly or impliedly
contracted with the warehouseman to pay under Section 32 of the Warehouse
Receipt Law; or such other remedies allowed by law for the enforcement of a lien
against personal property under Section 35 of said law. The third remedy is sought
judicially by suing for the unpaid charges.

CAB: Initially, private respondents availed of the first remedy. While the most appropriate
remedy for private respondents was an action for collection, SC already recognized their right to
have such charges and fees determined. The import of SC’s holding was that private
respondents were likewise entitled to a judgment on their warehouse charges and fees, and the
eventual satisfaction thereof, thereby avoiding having to file another action to recover these
charges and fees, which would only have further delayed the resolution of the respective claims
of the parties, and as a corollary thereto, the indefinite deferment of the execution of the
judgment. Thus we note that petitioner, in fact, already acquiesced to the scheduled dates
previously set for the hearing on private respondents' warehouseman's charges. But, it would be
premature to execute the order fixing the warehouseman's charges and fees.

Petitioner is Liable for Storage Fees.

Petitioner insisted that it was a mere pledgee as the quedans were used to secure two loans it
granted.
The SC agreed with this and held that the indorsement and delivery of the receipts by Ramos
and Zoleta to PNB was not to convey title to or ownership of the goods but to secure the loans
by way of pledge. The indorsement of the receipts to perfect the pledge merely constituted a
symbolical or constructive delivery of the possession of the thing thus encumbered. The
creditor, in a contract of real security, like pledge, cannot appropriate without foreclosure the
things given by way of pledge. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void for being pactum
commissorio. The law requires foreclosure in order to allow a transfer of title of the goods given
by way of security from its pledgor, and before any such foreclosure, the pledgor, not the
pledgee, is theowner of the goods. However, the SC held that the warehouseman nevertheless
is entitled to his lien that attaches to the goods invokable against anyone who claims a right of
possession thereon.

The SC held that where a valid demand by the lawful holder of the receipts for the delivery of
the goods is refused by the warehouseman, despite the absence of a lawful excuse provided by
the law itself, the warehouseman’s lien is thereafter concomitantly lost. As to what the law
deems a valid demand, Section 8 of the Warehouse Receipts Law enumerates what must
accompany a demand; while as regards the reasons which a warehouseman may invoke to
legally refuse to effect delivery of the goods covered by the quedans, these are:

(1) That the holder of the receipt does not satisfy the conditions prescribed in Section 8 of
the Act. (See Sec. 8, Act No. 2137)

(2) That the warehouseman has legal title in himself on the goods, such title or right being
derived directly or indirectly from a transfer made by the depositor at the time of or
subsequent to the deposit for storage, or from the warehouseman's lien. (Sec. 16, Act
No. 2137)

(3) That the warehouseman has legally set up the title or right of third persons as lawful
defense for non-delivery of the goods

(4) That the warehouseman having a lien valid against the person demanding the goods
refuses to deliver the goods to him until the lien is satisfied. (Sec. 31 Act No. 2137)

(5) That the failure was not due to any fault on the part of the warehouseman, as by
showing that, prior to demand for delivery and refusal, the goods were stolen or
destroyed by fire, flood, etc., without any negligence on his part, unless he has
contracted so as to be liable in such case, or that the goods have been taken by the
mistake of a third person without the knowledge or implied assent of the warehouseman,
or some other justifiable ground for non-delivery.

The SC explained that regrettably, the factual settings do not sufficiently indicate whether the
demand to obtain possession of the goods complied with Sec. 8. The presumption,
nevertheless, would be that the law was complied with. On the other hand, it would appear that
the refusal of Noah’s Ark to deliver the goods was not anchored on a valid excuse, i.e., non-
satisfaction of the lien over the goods, but on an adverse claim of ownership. Under the
circumstances, this hardly qualified as a valid, legal excuse. The loss of the lien, however, does
not necessarily mean the extinguishment of the obligation to pay the warehousing fees and
charges which continues to be a personal liability of the owners, i.e., the pledgors, not the
pledgee, in this case. But even as to the owners-pledgors, the warehouseman fees and charges
have ceased to accrue from the date of the rejection by Noah to heed the lawful demand by
PNB for the release of the goods. Hence, the time from which the fees and charges should be
made payable is from the time Noah’s Ark refused to heed PNB’s demand for delivery of the
sugar stocks and in no event beyond the value of the credit in favor of the pledgee since it is
basic that, in foreclosures, the buyer does not assume the obligations of the pledgor to his other
creditors even while such buyer acquires title over the goods less any existing preferred lien
thereover.
 3. Century Bankers Insurance Corp. vs. Lagman

FACTS:

Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food Authority (NFA) to engage
in the business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks of palay valued at P5,250,000.00 in his
warehouse at Barangay Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac. Under Act No. 3893 or the General
Bonded Warehouse Act, as amended, the approval for said license was conditioned upon
posting of a cash bond, a bond secured by real estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized
bonding company, the amount of which shall be fixed by the NFA Administrator at not less than
thirty-three and one third percent (33 1/3%) of the market value of the maximum quantity of rice
to be received.

Accordingly, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) issued Warehouse

Bond No. 03304 for P1,749,825.00 on 5 November 1989 and Warehouse Bond No. 02355 for
P749,925.00 on 13 December 1989 (1989 Bonds) through its agent, Antonio Lagman (Lagman).
Santos was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the Philippines,
through the NFA was the obligee. In consideration of these issuances, corresponding Indemnity
Agreements were executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with Ban Lee Lim Santos
(Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and Lagman, as co-signors. The latter bound
themselves jointly and severally liable to Country Bankers for any damages, prejudice, losses,
costs, payments, advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including attorneys fees
and legal costs, which it may sustain as a consequence of the said bond; to reimburse Country
Bankers of whatever amount it may pay or cause to be paid or become liable to pay thereunder;
and to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed and compounded monthly, as well
as to pay attorneys fees of 20% of the amount due it.

Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. When the loan matured,
Santos defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by the warehouse receipts were
no longer found in the bonded warehouse. By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was
compelled to pay P1,166,750.37.

Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money docketed as Civil Case
No. 95-73048 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In his Answer, Lagman alleged
that the 1989 Bonds were valid only for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by
receipts; that the bonds were never renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on 5
November 1990, Country Bankers issued Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was
also valid for one year and that no Indemnity Agreement was executed for the purpose; and that
the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels, and renders no force and effect the 1989 Bonds.

The bond principals, Santos and Ban Lee Lim, were not served with summons because they
could no longer be found. The case was eventually dismissed against them without prejudice.
The other co-signor, Reguine, was declared in default for failure to file her answer.

On 21 September 1998, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Reguine and Lagman jointly
and severally liable to pay Country Bankers the amount of P2,400,499.87. CA reversed the
decision of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1989 bonds were effective only for one (1) year, as evidenced by the
payment of premiums

RULING: Negative.

The official receipts in question serve as proof of payment of the premium for one year on each
surety bond. It does not, however, automatically mean that the surety bond is effective for only
one (1) year. In fact, the effectivity of the bond is not wholly dependent on the payment of
premium. Section 177 of the Insurance Code expresses:

Sec. 177. The surety is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the contract of
suretyship or bond is perfected and delivered to the obligor. No contract of suretyship or
bonding shall be valid and binding unless and until the premium therefor has been paid,
except where the obligee has accepted the bond, in which case the bond becomes
valid and enforceable irrespective of whether or not the premium has been paid by
the obligor to the surety: Provided, That if the contract of suretyship or bond is not
accepted by, or filed with the obligee, the surety shall collect only reasonable amount,
not exceeding fifty per centum of the premium due thereon as service fee plus the cost
of stamps or other taxes imposed for the issuance of the contract or bond: Provided,
however, That if the non-acceptance of the bond be due to the fault or negligence of the
surety, no such service fee, stamps or taxes shall be collected. (Emphasis supplied)

The 1989 Bonds have identical provisions and they state in very clear terms the effectivity of
these bonds, viz:

NOW, THEREFORE, if the above-bounded Principal shall well and truly deliver to the
depositors PALAY received by him for STORAGE at any time that demand therefore is
made, or shall pay the market value therefore in case he is unable to return the same,
then this obligation shall be null and void; otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect
and may be enforced in the manner provided by said Act No. 3893 as amended by
Republic Act No. 247 and P.D. No. 4. This bond shall remain in force until cancelled
by the Administrator of National Food Authority.

This provision in the bonds is but in compliance with the second paragraph of Section 177 of the
Insurance Code, which specifies that a continuing bond, as in this case where there is no fixed
expiration date, may be cancelled only by the obligee, which is the NFA, by the Insurance
Commissioner, and by the court. Thus:

In case of a continuing bond, the obligor shall pay the subsequent annual premium as it
falls due until the contract of suretyship is cancelled by the obligee or by the
Commissioner or by a court of competent jurisdiction, as the case may be.

By law and by the specific contract involved in this case, the effectivity of the bond required for
the obtention of a license to engage in the business of receiving rice for storage is determined
not alone by the payment of premiums but principally by the Administrator of the NFA. From
beginning to end, the Administrator’s brief is the enabling or disabling document.

The clear import of these provisions is that the surety bonds in question cannot be unilaterally
cancelled by Lagman. The same conclusion was reached by the trial court and we quote:
 As there appears no record of cancellation of the Warehouse Bonds No. 03304 and No.
02355 either by the administrator of the NFA or by the Insurance Commissioner or by
the Court, the Warehouse Bonds are valid and binding and cannot be unilaterally
cancelled by defendant Lagman as general agent of the plaintiff.

While the trial court did not directly rule on the existence and validity of the 1990 Bond, it upheld
the 1989 Bonds as valid and binding, which could not be unilaterally cancelled by Lagman. The
Court of Appeals, on the other hand, acknowledged the 1990 Bond as having cancelled the two
previous bonds by novation. Both courts however failed to discuss their basis for rejecting or
admitting the 1990 Bond, which, as we indicated, is bone to pick in this case.

Having discounted the existence and/or validity of the 1990 Bond, there can be no novation to
speak of. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the
obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the
object or principal conditions, or by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating
a third person in the rights of the creditor. For novation to take place, the following requisites
must concur: 1) There must be a previous valid obligation; 2) The parties concerned must agree
to a new contract; 3) The old contract must be extinguished; and 4) There must be a valid new
contract.

In this case, only the first element of novation exists. Indeed, there is a previous valid obligation,
i.e., the 1989 Bonds. There is however neither a valid new contract nor a clear agreement
between the parties to a new contract since the very existence of the 1990 Bond has been
rendered dubious. Without the new contract, the old contract is not extinguished.

Implied novation necessitates a new obligation with which the old is in total incompatibility such
that the old obligation is completely superseded by the new one. Quite obviously, neither can
there be implied novation. In this case, there is no new obligation.
 4. Roman v. Asia Banking Corporation 46 Phil 705

FACTS:

U. de Poli, for value received, issued a quedan covering the 576 bultos of tobacco to the
Asia Banking Corporation (claimant & appellant). It was executed as a security for a loan. The
aforesaid 576 butlos are part and parcel of the 2,777 bultos purchased by U. de Poli from Felisa
Roman (claimant & appellee).

The quedan was marked as Exhibit D which is a warehouse receipt issued by the
warehouse of U. de Poli for 576 bultos of tobacco. In the left margin of the face of the receipt, U.
de Poli certifies that he is the sole owner of the merchandise therein described. The receipt is
endorsed in blank; it is not marked ”non-negotiable” or “not negotiable”.

Since a sale was consummated between Roman and U. de Poli, Roman’s claim is a
vendor’s lien. The lower court ruled in favor of Roman on the theory that since the transfer to
Asia Banking Corp. (ASIA) was neither a pledge nor a mortgage, but a security for a loan, the
vendor’s lien of Roman should be accorded preference over it.

However, if the warehouse receipt issued was non-negotiable, the vendor’s lien of
Roman cannot prevail against the rights of ASIA as indorsee of the receipt.

ISSUE: WON the quedan issued by U. de Poli in favor of ASIA. is negotiable, despite
failure to mark it as not negotiable?

HELD:
YES, it is obvious that the deposit evidenced by the receipt in this case was intended to
be made subject to the order of the depositor and therefore negotiable. That the words
"por orden" are used instead of "a la orden" is very evidently merely a clerical or grammatical
error." The phrase must be construed to mean that U. de Poli was the person authorized to
endorse and deliver the receipts; any other interpretation would mean that no one had such
power and the clause, as well as the entire receipts, would be rendered nugatory.

Moreover, the endorsement in blank of the receipt in controversy together with its
delivery by U. de Poli to the appellant bank took place on the very of the issuance of the
warehouse receipt, thereby immediately demonstrating the intention of U. de Poli and of the
appellant bank, by the employment of the phrase "por orden del Sr. U. de Poli" to make the
receipt negotiable and subject to the very transfer which he then and there made by such
endorsement in blank and delivery of the receipt to the blank.

As hereinbefore stated, the receipt was not marked "non-negotiable." Under modern
statutes the negotiability of warehouse receipts has been enlarged, the statutes having the
effect of making such receipts negotiable unless marked "non-negotiable." (27 R. C. L., 967 and
cases cited.)

Section 7 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, says:

A non-negotiable receipt shall have plainly placed upon its face by the
warehouseman issuing it 'non-negotiable,' or 'not negotiable.' In case of the
 warehouseman's failure so to do, a holder of the receipt who purchased it for value
supposing it to be negotiable may, at his option, treat such receipt as imposing upon the
warehouseman the same liabilities he would have incurred had the receipt been
negotiable.

This section shall not apply, however, to letters, memoranda, or written

acknowledgments of an informal character.

This section appears to give any warehouse receipt not marked "non-negotiable" or "not
negotiable" practically the same effect as a receipt which, by its terms, is negotiable provided
the holder of such unmarked receipt acquired it for value supposing it to be negotiable,
circumstances which admittedly exist in the present case.