source of his information are disclosed in the record.
These
DOCUMENTS AS EVIDENCE
City of Manila v. Cabangis
G.R. No. L-3898
The plaintiff in this action alleges that the defendant
obstructed the course of a public navigable river, or
waterway, known as Sunog-Apog; that at that time the said
defendant took possession of the said river and converted it
into a private fishing pond; and that he continued in
possession of the said river or waterway up to the time of
the filing of the complaint.
The plaintiff claims the right of possession and control of the
said river, or waterway, and prays for judgment of
possession, together with damages for the alleged unlawful
occupation, and further that the defendant be required to
remove the obstructions placed by him in the said river,or
waterway.
The defendant being in possession of the property, in order
that recovery of possession and control may be had by the
plaintiff, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish
by competent evidence.
Exhibits B and C purport to be maps of the section of the
city of Manila wherein the fisheries in question are situated.
They were offered in evidence to show (1) the existence and
location of the bed of the River Sunog-Apog and (2) the
existence and location of the fisheries of the defendant.
The trial court was of opinion that the evidence of record
sustains an affirmative finding as to each of these facts, and
that the defendant had failed to sustain his allegations of
ownership or of prescriptive rights in the said fishery, and
rendered judgment accordingly in favor of the plaintiff.
Was the trial court correct in admitting the maps?
Yes.
Taken together with the testimony of the city engineer, who
testified as to their accuracy, and the admissions of the
defendant as to the existence and locations of his fisheries,
we think these maps were properly admitted in evidence to
show the location of the subject-matter in litigation by
reference to the Bay of Manila, and the Rivers Maypajo and
Vitas, whose existence and identity have never been
questioned; they were, however, wholly incompetent as
evidence of the existence or location of the River Sunog-
Apog, or as evidence as to the disputed fact that the subject-
matter in litigation, is within the jurisdictional limits of the
city of Manila. The plaintiff failed to establish the authenticity
of these maps as maps of territory included within the
jurisdiction of the present city of Manila and the evidence
shows that the former bed of the River Sunog-Apog, which
appears on one of these maps, was placed there by one of
the engineers of the city of Manila at a time when, according
to the allegations of the complaint, the territory in question
was in the possession of the defendant and used as a fishery,
and neither the authority of the engineer so to do nor the
maps, therefore, so far as they purport to establish the
existence and location of the Sunog-Apog River, are no more
than an expression of opinion of the engineer who prepared
them, unsupported by evidence as to the grounds upon
which his opinion was based.
It is not quite clear from the record whether these maps
were finally admitted as evidence as to the existence and
location of the Rio Sunog-Apog, but granting that they were,
we think their admission for the purpose indicated would not
constitute reversible error, because the fact that the fisheries
in question are within the jurisdictional limits of the city of
Manila and occupy the bed of a former river, or waterway
known as the Sunog-Apog, in proof of which these maps
were offered in evidence, is sufficiently established by other
evidence of record such as photographs of a part of the
fisheries of the defendant and a letter from the defendant to
the attorney for the plaintiff wherein the defendant admits
that the pesquerias in question, which the plaintiff alleges
were unlawfully constructed on the bed of a river, estero, or
waterway known as Sunog-Apog, are located within the
boundary lines of the city of Manila. This admission was
made in the course of an offer to compromise, and the letter
was manifestly inadmissible as evidence against the
defendant over his objection.
Air France v. CA
G.R. No. L-21438
RC and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to
Rome from Manila. RC was issued a first class round trip
ticket by Paris Air. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was
asked by the plane manager of Paris Air to vacate his seat
because a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him.
RC protested but when things got heated and upon advise
of other Filipinos on board, RC gave up his seat and was
transferred to the plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when RC was already in the
Philippines, he sued Paris Air for damages for the
embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, RC
testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take
the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he
was approached by a plane purser who told him that he
noted in the plane’s journal the following:First-class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his
will, and that the captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of RC. The trial
court eventually awarded damages in favor of RC. This was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Paris Air is assailing the decision of the trial court and the
CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to RC was
not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because
allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent
between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of RC testimony
regarding the note made by the purser because the said
note was never presented in court.
Was the court correct in admitting the testimony of RC?
Yes.
The testimony of RC must be admitted based on res gestae.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between RC and the
purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was
still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as
yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous,
and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Heirs of Lim v. Lim
GR NO 172690 MARCH 3,2010
X entered into a partnership agreement with A and B. The
three contributed P50,000.00 each and used the funds to
purchase a truck to start their trucking business. A year
later, X died. The eldest son X2, took over the trucking
business and under his management, the business
prospered. From one truck then became 9 trucks which
were all registered in his own name and acquired also other
vehicles. About sometime, B was killed and eventually X2
also died. Y, the wife of X2 took over the properties but she
intimated to A and the heirs of B that she could no longer go
on with the business. So the properties were divided among
them. Now, the heirs of X, represented by X3, required Y to
do an accounting of all income, profits and properties from
the estate of X2 as they claimed that they are co-owners
thereof. Y refused hence the case. The heirs argued that X2
acquired his properties from the partnership that X formed
with A and B. In court, A testified that X was the partner and
not X2. The heirs testified that X2 was merely the driver of
Jose Lim. The court ruled in favor of respondent Y.
Was the court correct?
Yes.
Under the law, a partnership exists when two or more
persons agree to place their money, effects, labor and skill in
lawful commerce or business with the understanding that
there shall be a proportionate sharing of the profits and
losses among them. A contract of partnership is defined in
the Civil Code as one where two or more persons bind
themselves to contribute money, property or industry to a
common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits
among themselves.
The best evidence would have been the contract of
partnership or the articles of partnership. Unfortunately
there is none in this case, because the alleged partnership
was never formally organized.
X was the partner, then the partnership would have been
dissolved upon his death. Under the law, a partnership is
dissolved upon the death of the partner. Further, no
evidence was presented as to the articles of partnership or
contract of partnership between X, A and B. Unfortunately,
there is none in this case, because the alleged partnership
was never formally organized. Hence, it is X2 who is the
partner and that Y as the wife is the on entitled proceeds of
the business.
Nissan v. United Philippine Scout Veterans
G.R. No. 179470
Respondent X is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of providing security services. it entered into a
contract for security services with petitioner Y, a car dealer.
The former was able to post 18 security guards within Y’s
compound. About sometime, Y informed X, through the
latter’s General Manager, that its services were being
terminated beginning 5:00 p.m. of that day. Verbal and
written request were made by X’ representative however Y
ignored such. X’s Chairman of the Board wrote a, addressed
to Y’s President and General Manager, demanding payment
of the amount equivalent to thirty (30) days of service in
view of Nissan’s act of terminating United’s services without
observing the required 30-day prior written notice as
stipulated under paragraph 17 of their service contract.
As a result of Y’s continued failure to comply with X’s
demands, the latter filed a case for Sum of Money with
damages before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Piñas
City. In its Answer, Y maintained that the above-mentioned
paragraph 17 of the service contract expressly confers upon
either party the power to terminate the contract, without
the necessity of a prior written notice, in cases of violations
of the provisions thereof. Y alleged that X violated the terms
of their contract, thereby allowing Y to unilaterally
terminate the services of United without prior notice.
The trial court pronounced that Y has not adduced any
evidence to substantiate its claims that their contract was
violated; and that absent any showing that violations were
committed, the 30-day prior written notice should have
been observed. Y insists that no judgment can properly be
rendered against it as X failed to offer in evidence the
service contract upon which it based its claim for sum of
money and damages. Y asserts that the resolution of the
case calls for the application of the best evidence rule.
However, court ruled in favor of X on the ground that the
best evidence rule is inapplicable in this case. It pronounced
that the same applies only when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of the document.
Was the court correct?
Yes.
Under the Rules, generally, the best evidence rule applies
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself.
1|P a g e

In this case, the contents of the service contract between Y
and X have not been put in issue. Neither X or Y an disputed
the contents of the service contract; as in fact, both parties
quoted and relied on the same provision of the contract
(paragraph 17) to support their respective claims and
defenses. Thus, the best evidence rule finds no application
here.
People vs. Lim
G.R. No. 80505
The RTC convicted X for the crime of violation of Art. II, Sec.
4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. X, on appeal raised that the court erred in finding him
guilty for the crime despite lack of evidence to prove that he
sold marijuana to the poseur-buyer and that the court erred
in admitting in evidence the xerox copy of the P10.00 bill
allegedly used as buy-bust money under the best evidence
rule. X submits that "one will not sell this prohibited drug to
another who is a total stranger until the seller is certain of
the identity of the buyer."As the Court held, "What matters
is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the
seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale
and delivery of the marijuana leaves."
Was the accused correct in invoking the best evidence rule?
NO
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only
as to whether or not such document was actually executed,
or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding
its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents, other substitutionary
evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible
without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust
money" was not indispensable to the conviction of the
accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had
been adequately proved by the testimony of the police
officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the
accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the
failure to produce the marked money itself would not
constitute a fatal omission.
Heirs of Luna v. Afable
G.R. No. 188299
Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land which was
subjected to compulsory acquisition under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) through a
Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated 20 August
1998 issued by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) and published in a newspaper of general circulation
on 29, 30 and 31 August 1998. Respondents were identified
by the DAR as qualified farmer-beneficiaries; hence, the
corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) were generated, issued to respondents and duly
registered in their names on 12 October 1998. Petitioners
filed before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) Oriental
Mindoro a Petition for "Cancellation of CLOAs, Revocation of
Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and Upholding and
Affirming the Classification of Subject Property and
Declaring the same outside the purview of RA No. 6657."
The petition was anchored mainly on the reclassification of
the land in question into a light intensity industrial zone
pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series of 1981,
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan, thereby
excluding the same from the coverage of the agrarian law.
Accordingly, the HUDCC and the Office of the Deputized
Zoning Administrator tasked to determine the classification
of parcels of land have already certified that the subject
land is industrial, the Court must accord such
pronouncements great respect, if not finality, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary.
Respondents, however, did submit in the proceedings
before then DAR OIC Secretary Ponce an "approved survey
plan" commissioned by the DAR allegedly "showing that only
about 20 hectares or so would be covered by" Ordinance
No. 21. A copy of this plan was nevertheless not attached to
the records of this case.
Decide on the case.
The court is inclined to give more evidentiary weight to the
certification of the zoning administrator being the officer
having jurisdiction over the area where the land in question is
situated and is, therefore, more familiar with the property in
issue. Besides, this certification carried the presumption of
regularity in its issuance and respondents have the burden of
overcoming this presumption. Respondents, however, failed
to present any evidence to rebut that presumption.
At any rate, as already adverted to above, the certification of
the deputized zoning administrator carries more weight by
reason of his special knowledge and expertise and the matter
under consideration being under his jurisdiction and
competence. He is, therefore, in a better position to attest to
the classification of the property in question.
The best evidence respondents could have presented was a
map showing the metes and bounds and definite delineations
of the subject land. Since respondents failed to do so, this
Court is bound to rely on the certifications of the appropriate
government agencies with recognized expertise on the
matter of land classification. Thus, through the certifications
issued by the deputized zoning administrator of Calapan City
and by the HUDCC, petitioners were able to positively
establish that their property is no longer agricultural at the
time the CARL took effect and, therefore, cannot be
subjected to agrarian reform.
Dantis v. Maghinang
G.R. No. 191696
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The case draws its origin from a complaint for quieting of
title and recovery of possession with damages filed by
petitioner R against respondent J before the RTC, docketed
as Civil Case No. 280-M-2002. R alleged that he was the
registered owner of a parcel of land that he acquired
ownership of the property through a deed of extrajudicial
partition of the estate of his deceased father, E, that he had
been paying the realty taxes on the said property; that J
occupied and built a house on a portion of his property
without any right at all; that demands were made upon J
that he vacate the premises but the same fell on deaf ears;
and that the acts of J had created a cloud of doubt over his
title and right of possession of his property. He, thus, prayed
that judgment be rendered declaring him to be the true and
real owner of the parcel of land; ordering J to deliver the
possession of that portion of the land he was occupying; and
directing J to pay rentals and attorney’s fees.
The RTC rendered its decision declaring Rogelio as the true
owner of the entire land.
The RTC did not lend any probative value on the
documentary evidence of sale adduced by J consisting of: 1)
an affidavit allegedly executed by I, R’s grandfather,
whereby said affiant attested, among others, to the sale of
the subject lot made by his son, E, to J, Sr. ; and 2) an
undated handwritten receipt of initial down payment in the
amount of ₱100.00 supposedly issued by E to J, Sr. in
connection with the sale of the subject lot. The RTC ruled
that even if these documents were adjudged as competent
evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that the
purchase price for the subject lot had not yet been
completely paid and, hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound to
deliver the property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found J to be a
mere possessor by tolerance.
The CA held that the receipt was an indubitable proof on the
sale between E and J, Sr. It also ruled that the partial
payment on the purchase price coupled with the delivery of
the res, gave efficacy to the oral sale and brought it outside
the operation of the statute of frauds. A motion for
reconsideration was filed.
Rule on the petition.
The affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot
be accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay
when its probative force depends on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom
it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay
evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-
examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3)
absence of oath.
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay
evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness
stand. The sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The
affidavit was not identified and its averments were not
affirmed by affiant Ignacio. It cannot be deemed a
declaration against interest for the matter to be considered
as an exception to the hearsay rule because the declarant
was not the seller (E]), but his father (I). The second claim, on
the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a
mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to
prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten
receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the highest
available degree of proof must be produced. For
documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best
proved by the production of the document itself to the
exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant
to Rule 130, Section 3 - A secondary evidence is admissible
only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states
that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution
or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the
offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to
satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the
execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and
(3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on
the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution
of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute
the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.
Assuming that the receipt is admissible in evidence, there will
still be no valid and perfected oral contract for failure of J to
prove the concurrence of the essential requisites of a
contract of sale by adequate and competent evidence.
By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of, and to deliver,
a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price
certain in money or its equivalent. A contract of sale is a
consensual contract and, thus, is perfected by mere consent
which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to
constitute the contract. Until the contract of sale is perfected,
it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a
binding juridical relation between the parties. The essential
elements of a contract of sale are: a) consent or meeting of
the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange
for the price; b) determinate subject matter; and c) price
certain in money or its equivalent. The absence of any of the
essential elements shall negate the existence of a perfected
contract of sale.
People v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 167147
Appellant X was sentenced to death by the RTC, for rape
committed against six-year-old AB. A photocopied birth
certificate was presented and admitted to prove the age of
the victim. Rape, such as committed against a 'child below
seven (7) years old', is a dastardly and repulsive crime which
merit no less than the penalty of death pursuant to Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code. This special qualifying
circumstance of age must be specifically pleaded or alleged
with certainty in the information and proven during the trial;
otherwise the penalty of death cannot be imposed.
The case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic
review. However, pursuant to our decision in People v.
3|P a g e
Mateo, this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Was the court correct in admitting the photocopied birth
certificate?
Yes.
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. '
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases: (d) When the
original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office.
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in
the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer.
Clearly, therefore, the presentation of the photocopy of the
birth certificate of AB is admissible as secondary evidence to
prove its contents. Production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in
the case at hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute
the contents of the document and no other useful purpose
will be served by requiring production.
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents
of the photocopied birth certificate; in fact it admitted the
same. Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection
against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same
became a primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the
other party is bound thereby.
Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc
G. R. No. 171701
After the People Power Revolution the President created
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
that was primarily tasked to investigate and recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by M, his immediate
family, relatives and associates. The PCGG, acting on behalf
of the Republic with the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance,
Restitution, Accounting and Damages against M, who was
later substituted by his estate upon his death; IM; and
herein respondents IMM, IMA, BM, TM, and GA.
Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputing
active participation and collaboration of another persons,
viz. C and Y and, IC for the estate of RC, in the alleged illegal
activities and undertakings of M in relation to the ₱200
Billion Pesos ill-gotten wealth allegation.
Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence
against herein respondents. However, the latter objected on
the ground that the documents were unauthenticated and
mere photocopies.
The Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION ADMITTING all the
documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution;
however, their evidentiary value was left to the
determination of the Court. Subsequently, IM, IMM and
BM.; IMA and GA;C and Y filed their respective Demurrers to
Evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting
all the demurrers to evidence except the one filed by IM.
The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of
GA are accordingly lifted.
Were the photocopies submitted and offered as evidence
admissible?
No.
It is imperative to submit the original documents that could
prove the allegations. Thus, the photocopied documents are
in violation of best evidence rule, which mandates that the
evidence must be the original document itself. Furthermore,
petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason
why the originals were not presented, or any compelling
ground why the court such documents as secondary evidence
absent the affiant’s testimony.
The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is
not validly excepted under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 3 (d), when ‘the original document is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office,’ the original thereof need not be presented.
However, all except one of the exhibits are not necessarily
public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN)
of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a
public document but what the plaintiff presented was a mere
photocopy of the purported TSN which was not a certified
copy and was not even signed by the stenographer who
supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules provide
that when the original document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy issued
by the public officer in custody thereof may prove its
contents.
In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there
must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution
of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all
such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in
the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of
the abovementioned requirements were complied by the
plaintiff.
With regard to IMM, BM, IM and GA the court noted that
their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never
established; neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint
their involvement therein. The court held that all presented
evidence are hearsay, for being merely photocopies and that
the originals were not presented in court, nor were they
authenticated by the persons who executed them.
Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed to
provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals
in court. These exhibits were supposed to show the interests
of IMM in the media network XYZ13, BBB-2 and NPR-9, all
three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally, her
alleged participation in dollar salting through DS Apparel and
to prove how M used the P as a dummy in acquiring and
operating the bus company COTRANPAN.
Meanwhile, as far as the Ys were concerned, the court found
the allegations against them baseless. Petitioner failed to
demonstrate how GS used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to
4|P a g e
show that they were dummies of M. Again, the court held Was the trial court correct?
that the documentary evidence relevant to this allegation
was INADMISSIBLE for being mere photocopies, and that the Yes.
affiants had not been presented as witnesses.
A written agreement is presumed to contain all the terms of
Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule the agreement. The rules permit evidence of the terms of the
rendered the offered documentary evidence futile and agreement other than the contents of the writing in the
worthless in alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar following case: Where a mistake or imperfection of the
as the specific allegations herein were concerned. Hence, writing, or its failure to express the true intent and
Sandiganbayan is correct in granting the respondents agreement of the parties, is put in issue by the pleadings.
respective Demurers to evidence.
To justify the reformation of a written instrument upon the
PAROL EVIDENCE ground of mistake, the concurrence of three things are
necessary: First, that the mistake should be of a fact; second,
that the mistake should be proved by clear and convincing
BPI v. Fidelity & Surety Company
evidence; and, third, that the mistake should be common to
G.R. No. L-26743
both parties to the instrument. The rule is, as has been above
stated, that the mistake must be mutual. There may have
LCO Co. executed in favor of the PVO Company, Inc., a been a mistake here. It would, however, seem to be straining
promissory note which contains the sum of 50,000 pesos the natural course of events to hold the Fidelity and Surety
and in case of non-payment of this note at maturity, we Company of the Philippine Islands a party to that mistake.
agree to pay interest at the rate of nine per cent (9%) per
annum on the said amount and the further sum of P5,000 in
BPI v. Fidelity Surety Corp.
full, without any deduction as and for costs, expenses and
GR No. 26743
attorney's fees for collection whether actually incurred or
not which was signed by LCO Co. president, BC.
Company A made a promissory note in favor of Company B
for payment of loan amounting to 1million pesos. Company
Meanwhile, FSC made a notation on the note that the latter
C a surety company made a note on the promissory
obligates itself to hold LCO Co. harmless against loss for
obligating themselves for the Php 100,000.00 loan of
having discounted the foregoing note at the value stated
Company A to company B.
therein, signed by its vice president.
Meanwhile, Company B indorses in blank the promissory to
The PVO Company endorsed the note in blank and delivered
Bank of Cebu in the assumption that the payment has
it to the IPB. It is possible that the PVO Company was paid
already been made to the former by the company B.
the sum of P50,000 therefor. At least after maturity of the
Thereafter , Bank of Cebu collects the Php 100,000.00 to
note, demand for its payment was made on the LCO Co., the
Company C and Company A but failed to get the money
PVO Company, and the FSC, all of whom refused to pay, the
from the same with the defense that they are not obligated
LCO Co. being admittedly insolvent.
to pay Bank of Cebu.
The correspondence of the bank with the FSC is in the
Will the Promissory Note be considered as evidence to favor
record, and is emphasized by the plaintiff as indicative of
Bank of Cebu?
responsibility assumed by the defendant, but is objected to
by the defendant as for minor importance.
No, the bookkeeping entries of the bank for the
PROMISORRY NOTE are hardly competent against a stranger
The effort of the plaintiff on its last appearance in the trial
to the transaction, such as the defendant in this case.
court was to connect up the promissory note of P50,000
with an existing obligation of the PVO Company in the form
"The writing upon which the action is brought does not in
of another promissory note. The evidence was also intended
terms show any obligation in favor of plaintiff ( Bank of
to demonstrate that a clear error had been committed
Cebu) and the action can only be maintained upon the
when reference was made to the LCO Co. in the notation on
theory that the writing does not express the true intent of
the note. The IPB’s theory was confirmed by the trial judge.
the parties. We may surmise that the guarantee in question
His Honor emphasized that the note could not have been
was intended for the benefit of the party who subsequently
discounted by the LCO Co., and that this must logically have
discounted the note, but we cannot be certain."
been done by the IPB. Without paying particular attention
to certain of the assignment of errors, let us ascertain if this
position is tenable and if the IPB has made out its case. Lechugas v. CA
GR No. L399972
The trial court against the FSC and demanded it to pay the
note. The trial court’s judgment as its stands clearly involves Pedro brought a land from Juan. After the purchase of the
a reformation of the contract of guaranty and it is land, a Deed of Sale was executed. The Deed of Sale
elementary that the facts upon which relief by reformation specified lot 14344 as the subject of the contract. When
is sought to put in issue by the pleadings. Maria occupied lot 14344. Pedro filed an ejectment suit
against Maria, thereafter filed a petition for the recovery of

5|P a g e
possession against the same defendants and the same
siputed lot. Defendants Maria took Juan to testify before the
trial court.
Based on Juan’ s testimony the lot indicated in the Deed of
Sale which she sold to Pedro was erroneous and not the lot
he intended to sell. Maria’s objection on the ground of
Parole Evidence Rule.
Is Maria correct in using the Parole Evidence Rule as her
defense?
No, while it is true that the Parole Evidence Rule is intended
to safeguard the terms of the contract. The application of
parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable
and the controversy is between one of the parties to the
document and third persons.
Maria as defendant in the case but not parties to the Deed of
Sale executed between Juan and Pedro.
Salimbangon v. Tan
GR No. 185240
Juan Pendoko left a parcel of land to his children located in
Inayawan, Cebu City which the heirs later on subdivided the
land into 5 lots ( lot 001,002, 003, 004 and 005). Because of
the peculiar location of the land the heirs decided to put an
easement, so they work into 2 plans. First was to put
easement in the lot 001 so lot 002 can pass through. Second
was to put easement in lot 004 and 005 and opted to
choose the later due to the small area of lot 001.
Later lot 001 was sold to spouses Martinez and lot 002, 003,
004, and 005 was sold to spouse Padilla. Both introduced
developments on there lot, spouses Martinez erected a
house and two garages and one of his garage can not be
used without an easement. Lot 002 was used lot for
easement and some portions of lot 001.
Owners of 001 complained before the court when spouses
Padilla closed off the access of the easement from lot 002.
Martinez’ went to court for the closure averring that the
intention was to give easement as evidence in deed of sale
and Padilla went to RTC and file motion to extinguished
easement.
Will the Parole Evidence invoked by Martinez correct?
NO, while it is true that Parole Evidence Rule is to safeguard
the intention of the parties Supreme Court right for Parol
Evidence admits exceptions such as this case.
Martinez claims that the partition agreement made Lot 001 a
beneficiary of the easement not just lot D and E.
The Parol Evidence rule precluded the parties from
introducing testimony that tended to alter or modify what
the parties had agreed.
Sps. Liquin v. Visconde
GR No. 177710
Spouses Sussy and Gino Garcia bought a 14344 sqm lot
from Kulas Po and the sale was negotiated by Kimi Dura.
Thereafter, Kimi Dura told spouses that he also purchased
1,050 sqm lot adjacent to the Garcias from Kulas Po where
he built his house thereon. But original owner of the lor
Kulas Po confirmed that 1,050 sqm claimed by the Duras is
part of 14344sqm lot bought from him.
With the consent of the Duras , the Garcias built a house
from the portion of the lot allegedly owned by them . Later ,
upon the advice of Dura’s Lawyer a deed of sale as
embodied in the kasulatan was drawn with the contention
that they are selling 600sqm to the Garcias .
2 years after the Garcias went to court asking for the
‘Kasulatan” to be declared null and void but the Duras is
banking upon the Parole Evidence rule as enshrine in the
KASULATAN?
Will the Parole Evidence Rule a good defense in for the
Duras?
NO, the kasulatan admited as PAROLE EVIDENCE did not
express the true intent of the parties
Lack of consideration was proved by petitioners’ evidence
aliunde showing that the Kasulatan did not express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. The sale contract was
fraudulently entered into through the misrepresentations of
respondents causing petitioners’ vitiated consent.
There can be no doubt that the contract of sale or Kasulatan
lacked the essential element of consideration.
QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES
Tarapen v. People
GR No. 173824
X Was charged with frustrated homicide but was later
charged with homicide instead when the victim Y died. The
version of prosecution shows X struck Y twice on the head
with a stone after an exchange of words this was according
to a testimony given by witness who is a close relative of X.
However, the defense claimed that X only struck Y after the
latter attacked him without provocation on X part.
Will a testimony of a relative against the accused merit
dismissal of a case?
NO, A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the
cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to
exaggerate or give false color to his statements or to
suppress or to pervert the truth,or to state what is false.
A witness relationship to a victim of a crime would even make
his or her testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural
for a relative or a friend as in this case, who is interested in
vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody other than the
real culprit. To warrant rejection of the testimony of a
relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that
independently of the relationship, the testimony was
inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil
6|P a g e
motives had moved the witness to be incompetent.
DISQUALIFICATION BY DEATH OR INSANITY
Babao v. Perez
GR No. 173824
Juan married the niece of Pedro. In 1924, Pedro and Maria
allegedly had a verbal agreement where Pedro was bound
to improve the land of Maria by leveling, clearing, planting
fruits and other crops; that he will act as the administrator
of the land; that all expenses for labor and materials will be
at his cost, in consideration of which Maria in turn bound
herself to convey to Juan or his wife ½ of the land with all
the improvements after the death of Maria . But, shortly
before Maria’s death, she sold the land to another party.
Thus, the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Juan
filed a complaint alleging the sale of the land as fraudulent
and fictitious and prays to recover the ½ land or the
expenses he incurred in improving the land.
The verbal agreement was only told by the surviving parties
and petitioner on this case. Will this hold waters as evidence
to this case?
NO, Their testimony was prohibited by section 26(c) of Rule
123 of the Rules of Court. This rule prohibits parties or
assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf
case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator of a
deceased person upon a claim or demand against the estate
of such deceased person from testifying as to any matter of
fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
The reason for this rule is that "if death has closed the lips of
one party, the policy of the law is to close the lips of the
other.' Another reason is that `the temptation to falsehood
and concealment in such cases is considered too great to
allow the surviving party to testify in his own behalf.'
Accordingly, the incompetency applies whether the deceased
died before or after the commencement of the action against
him, if at the time the testimony was given he was dead and
cannot disprove it, since the reason for the prohibition, which
is to discourage perjury, exists in both instances.
Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co.
GR No. L-2016
X , the president of Y corporation, a foreign corporation
registered and licensed to do business in the Philippines,
held 5000 shares of stock of which 600 had not been fully
paid for but were covered by promissory notes in favor of Y
corporation.
In 1941, P64,500.00 was credited in X favor on account of
the purchase price of the said stocks out of bonuses and
dividends to which he was entitled from the company.
Under an agreement with Y Corp, should he die leaving the
shares unpaid, Y , at his option, may either acquire said
shares by returning to his estate the amount applied
thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the corresponding
shares equivalent to the amount paid thereon.
X died and a proceeding for the settlement of his estate was
instituted. Y corp then filed a claim against the estate and
offered to reacquire the shares sold to X upon return to the
estate of the P64,500 paid thereon. The administrator, W,
however, denied the alleged indebtedness.
During trial, Y Corp presented the testimonies of the chief
accountant and assistant accountant, and of the president
and vice-president-treasurer of the corporation. The trial
court however refused to admit said testimonies on the
ground of incompetency under the Dead Man’s State, as the
witnesses were not only stockholders and members of the
Board of Directors, but officers as well.
Are the officers of a corporation which is a party to an
action against an administrator disqualified from testifying
under the Dead Man’s Statute?
No. To hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from
testifying who are officers or stockholders of a corporation
would be equivalent to materially amending the statute by
judicial legislation. The Dead Man’s Statute disqualifies only
parties or assignors of parties; officers and/or stockholders of
a corporations, therefore, are not disqualified from testifying,
Dead Man’s Statute disqualifies only parties or assignors of
parties, officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not
disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation
which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against
the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person.
Ong Chua v. Carr
53 PHIL 980
A and B entered into a Contract of Sale. A, Chinese and
unable to read/speak English, intended the sale to be a
pacto de retro sale. B, Spanish, drew up the agreement
which did not include a right to repurchase.
Is the Evidence conclusive?
YES the Evidence is conclusive that A had no clear conception
of the contents of the deed. It was written in the English
language, with which the plaintiff was unfamiliar, and he had
to rely on the statements of B as to the contents and of the
deed and was told that the document was sufficient. He had
confidence in B, with whom he had previous business
relations, and it was but natural for him to believe Moore's
statement. Reformation will be given "where there is a
mistake on one side and fraud or unfair dealing on the
other."
Godi v. CA
GR No. L-27434
The three haciendas owned by ABACADA were negotiated
by the late Emilio Rizal, predecessor-in – interest of
petitioners ( Jose Aguinaldo , et al.) sometime in 1949.
However, having insufficient funds to pay the price, Rizal
7|P a g e
with the consent of ABACADA , offered to sell one of the
hacienda to. As alleged the ABACADA will only agree to the
transaction between RIZAL and AGUINALDO only upon
having a guaranty by which JUAN BONIFACIO stood as a
guarantor, for RIZAL in favor of ABACADA . The guarantee
was embodied in a document.
May respondent JUAN BONIFACIO testify on the matters of
fact occurring before the death of EMILIO RIZAL which
contributes a claim of demand upon his estate in violation of
Rule 123, Section 26 Par C, now Rule 130, Section 20
Paragraph (A)?
Yes. JUAN BONIFACIO can testify on matters of fact occurring
before the death of Praxedes Villanueva which contribute a
claim of demand upon his estate in violation of Rule 130,
Section 20, Paragraph (A).
When BONIFACIO took the witness stand, it was in a dual
capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and
as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting & surrender
of fields nos. 4 & 13. Evidently, as defendant in the
counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to
matters of facts occurring before the death of EMILIO RIZAL,
said action not having been brought against, but by the
estate or representatives of the estate / deceased person.
Mendezona v. Vda. De Goitia
GR No. L-31739
Mrs X has been duly appointed as judicial administratrix of
the deceased husband Mr. X who was the representative
and attorney in fact of Y in the joint account partnership
known as AGUA OXINADA, of which Mrs. Y widow of Y owns
a share.
When Mr. X died Mrs. Y went to court to order Mrs. X to
account the dividends due to the latters husband but Mrs Y
told the court that all the book of accounts from his
deceased husband bare no entry of any dividends due to
them.
Will the testimony of Mrs Y should merit the court?
No, the court prohibits a witness directly interested in a
claim against the estate from testifying upon a matter of fact
which took place before the death of the deceased. The
underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect the
intestate estate from fictitious claim.
Babao v. Perez
X was the owner of the parcel of land. Y married X's niece
and both entered into a verbal agreement whereby Y bound
himself in clearing, improving and administering the land
and in consideration of which, X in turn bound herself to
convey to Y or, his wife ½ of land, together with all the
improvements thereon upon her death.
Y started clearing and improving said lands, leaving only 50
hectares unimproved, all of which having been administered
by him incurred expenses thereon.
X sold few days before she died about 127 hectares of the
land. When X and Y died, intestate proceedings were
instituted for the settlement of their estate. Y’s heirs filed
for the recovery of ½ portion of the land and for the
annulment of the sale, and in the alternative, for the
reimbursement of useful and necessary expenses. However
X’s heirs denied the claim that a verbal agreement was
entered into between X and Y. When the case was tried on
the merits, the court overruled to the introduction of oral
testimony to prove the alleged verbal agreement.
Is the oral testimony of the existence of agreement between
X and Y should be admitted?
No.
Testimony was prohibited by section 26(c) of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court. This rule prohibits parties or assignors of
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator of a
deceased person upon a claim or demand against the estate
of such deceased person from testifying as to any matter of
fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
The reason for this rule is that "if death has closed the lips of
one party, the policy of the law is to close the lips of the
other.' Another reason is that `the temptation to falsehood
and concealment in such cases is considered too great to
allow the surviving party to testify in his own behalf.'
Accordingly, the incompetency applies whether the deceased
died before or after the commencement of the action against
him, if at the time the testimony was given he was dead and
cannot disprove it, since the reason for the prohibition, which
is to discourage perjury, exists in both instances.
Testate Estate Fitzsimmons v. Atlantic Gulf
G.R. No. L-2016
Company A made a claim against the estate of Mr. B, the
president of the former, for the payment of a current
account with the company when it resumed operations
after the Japanese invaded the Philippines. Company A
presented the vice-president-treasure and president of the
company to testify regarding the current account of Mr. B
with Company A. However, C, administrator of Mr. B’s
estate, objected on the ground that they are disqualified
under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence.
Are they disqualified?
No. The rule disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties,
and officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not
disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation
which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against
the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person.
Ong Chua v. Carr
G.R. No. L-29512
8|P a g e
X bought properties (land and a building) from spouses Y
with a right to repurchase within 4 years.
Z is interested in buying coconut lands. X and Z agreed on
contract of sale but on the condition that the rights of the
spouses to repurchase the lots should be respected.
According to Z’s lawyer testimony, Z was fully aware of
those rights before the execution of the deed. The deed of
sale was drafted without including the condition of the right
to repurchase.
Because of a mortgage entered into by X on one of the lots,
Z agreed on the proposition that he will pay P13,500 and
promised in writing to pay X the balance of P6.500. But the
parties never redrafted the deed. It was just agreed that Z’s
lawyer will keep all the necessary documents until the lapse
of the period of repurchase.
Z took possession of the deed and immediately presented it
for registration. Thereafter, the spouses Y offered to
repurchase the property but Z declined alleging that he is
the absolute owner because there is no recording in the
deed of any right of the spouses to repurchase.
X filed a case against Z. During the pendency however, Z
died. Is X deposition of facts occurring prior to the death of
Z admissible as evidence?
NO.
The first proposition rests on subsection 7 of section 383 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, which bars parties to an action
or proceeding against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person from testifying as
to any matter of fact occuring before the death of such
deceased person.
Similar provisions are to be found in the statutes of
practically all of the states of the Union, and the rule thus laid
down is now unquestioned. But it has generally been given a
liberal construction to promote justice, and it is held that it
never was intended to serve as a shield for fraud. As stated in
Jones on Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 744:
The evidence of an adverse party is absolutely excluded by an
independent, affirmative enactment making him
incompetent as to transactions or communications with a
deceased or incompetent person. These statutes, however,
do not render the adverse party incompetent to testify to
fraudulent transactions of the deceased, as the statutes are
not designed to shield wrongdoers but the courts compel the
adverse party to clearly establish the alleged fraudulent acts
before admitting such testimony.
And in case of Tongco vs. Vianzon (50 Phil. Rep., 698, 702)
this court said:
Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the object
and purpose of his statute is to guard against the temptation
to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in
question on the part of the surviving party. He has, however,
neglected the equally important rule that the law was
designated to aid in arriving at the truth and was not
designed to suppress the truth.
In this case a number of credible witnesses testified to facts
which conclusively showed that Z's conduct was tainted with
fraud. The plaintiff did not take the witness stand until after
the existence of fraud on the part of Z and been established
beyond a doubt and not by a mere preponderance of
evidence. In these circumstances, we cannot hold that the
trial court erred in not excluding the plaintiff's testimony.
Mendezona v. Goitia
G.R. No. L-31739
X and Y, co-partners in “Tren de Aguadas”, filed claims
against the estate of Z who was the manager of the said co-
partnership and collected the dividends for X and Y. Z, who
was no longer the manager, still received as attorney-in-fact
of both plaintiffs and failed to remit their shares in the
partnership.
X and Y submitted a deposition denying that Z rendered an
account or liquidation until his death. When it was read in
court, Z’s administratrix (widow) objected since section 383,
No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure prohibits a witness who is
directly interested in a claim against the estate of a
decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took
place before the death of the deceased.
The lower court held that Z was an attorney-in-fact of the
plaintiffs in the joint-account partnership and having failed
to remit the dividends upon the shares of X and Y, the
defendant (widow) was then ordered to render a judicial
account of the estate of Z and to pay the plaintiffs.
Are the witnesses directly interested in the claim against the
estate (claimants) are disqualified or prohibited from
testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before the
death of the decedent?
No
The rule is that law prohibits a witness directly interested in a
claim against the estate of a decedent from testifying upon a
matter of fact which took place before the death of the
deceased. However, to apply to them the rule that "if death
has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals those
of the other," would be to exclude all possibility of a claim
against the testamentary estate.
In this case, there has been no such liquidation between the
plaintiffs and the deceased. They testify, denying any such
liquidation. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the X and Y to
prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition
was true, either by bringing into court the books which the
attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep, or by introducing
copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as
was the decedent’s usual or by other similar evidence.
Therefore, a witness who is directly interested in a claim
against the estate of a decedent is not absolutely prohibited
from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before
the death of the deceased.
Garcia v. De Caparas
G.R. No. 180843
X is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm and being tilled by Y as
agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. When X
9|P a g e
passed away, she was succeeded by A, B and C. On the
other hand, Y’s children – D, E and F succeeded him.
Before she passed away, X appointed A as her attorney-in-
fact. After Y died, A and F entered into an agreement
entitled "Kasunduan sa Buwisan", followed by an
Agricultural Leasehold Contract, covering the land. In said
agreements, F was installed and recognized as the lone
agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land. F passed away
and his wife, took over as agricultural lessee.
The landowners A,B and C, on the one hand, and F’s sisters
D and E on the other, entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan
ng Lupa" whereby D and E were acknowledged as F’s co-
lessees. D and E filed a Complaint for nullification of
leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees
against F’s heirs, represented by his surviving.
Is the alleged admission of F that he entered into a sharing
of leasehold rights with the petitioners cannot be used as
evidence against the herein respondent as the latter would
be unable to contradict or disprove the same?
The Petition is denied.
The Affidavit covering F’s alleged admission and recognition
of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a
violation of the Dead Man’s Statute,29 which provides that
"[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the
other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving
his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction." Thus, since F is deceased, and A’s declaration
which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor
entered into with petitioners, and which is now the subject
matter of the present case and claim against Pedro’s
surviving spouse such declaration cannot be admitted and
used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by
reason of her being unable to contradict or disprove such
declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior
death.
Under Section 732 of RA 3844, F’s surviving spouse is entitled
to security of tenure; and under Section 16,33 any
modification of the lease agreement must be done with the
consent of both parties and without prejudicing F’s surviving
spouse's security of tenure.
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE/
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
People v. Francisco
G.R. No. L-568
X, had been previously arrested on charges of robbery. X
requested permission from the chief of police to see his wife
who was at the time in a room of their house. After a few
moments, the escort police heard the scream of a woman.
Running upstairs, he met defendant's wife running out of
the room and holding her right breast which was bleeding. X
was lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year and
a half, on his breast and was dead.
The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the
capital penalty upon the accused, relies mainly on the
affidavit, Exhibit C, Exhibit C is an affidavit signed and sworn
to by X declares that unconsciously his wife and son causing
the death of the latter. However, when X testified in his
own defense in the Court of First Instance, he repudiated his
confession, and alleged torture and violence to have been
exerted upon his person and his mind in order.
Furthermore, the statements of appellant in said Exhibit C
were corroborated by the testimony of his wife on rebuttal.
This leads us to the consideration of the admissibility of the
wife's testimony.
Is the testimony of wife admissible as evidence?
YES
Generally, the rule states that neither a husband nor wife
shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against
the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests;
second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of
the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and
confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its
admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility
exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.
However, as all other general rules, this one has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in
criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound
reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in
support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital
and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which
the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which,
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home.
At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify in the
direct evidence for the prosecution but under circumstances
presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only
testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his
own defense, imputed upon her the killing of their son. By all
rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution, which
had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a
witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in
rebuttal; and the the wife herself the right to so testify, at
least, in self-defense, not of course, against being subjected
to punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant
but against any or all of various possible consequences which
might flow from her silence.
10 | P a g e
 Alvarez v. Ramirez
G.R. No. 143439
Private prosecutor in a criminal case of arson called the
petitioner’s wife without objection from petitioner’s
counsel. Wife testified that it was her estranged husband
who poured and set the house of her sister on fire. A motion
to disqualify the testimony of his wife was filed pursuant to
rules on martial disqualification. Can the wife can testify
against her husband in a criminal case.
Yes.
The reason for the rule on martial disqualification are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is
consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and
confidence of private life, even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness;
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger
of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the
other.
The offense of arson attributed to the husband impairs the
conjugal relation between him and his wife. His act
eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust,
confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal
relationship survives and flourishes… the evidence and facts
presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage
between petitioner and his wife is no longer an interest the
State aims to protect.
Unites States v. Antipolo
G.R. No. L-13109
X was charged with the murder of Y. The trial court
convicted him of homicide. One of the errors assigned is
based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Z, the
widow of Y, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense
concerning certain alleged dying declarations on the ground
that she is not competent to testify unless it be with the
consent of her husband. Since Y is already dead, Z is
disqualified from testifying in this case. Is Z disqualified by
reason of marriage?
No.
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime
committed by one against the other, neither husband nor
wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in
a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be
parties.
The reasons for this rule are thus stated in Underhill's work
on Criminal Evidence (second edition) on page 346:
At common law, neither a husband nor a wife was a
competent witness for or against the other in any judicial
proceedings, civil or criminal, to which the other was a party.
. . . If either were recognized as a competent witness against
the other who was accused of crime, . . . a very serious injury
would be done to the harmony and happiness of husband
and wife and the confidence which should exist between
them.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the
reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section 58 is to
protect accused persons against statements made in the
confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve
the husband or wife to whom such confidential
communications might have been made from the obligation
of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse.
Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of
injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the
manner in which he received those injuries, the
communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the
contrary, such a communication is made for the express
purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the
declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the
cause of his death.
People v. Carlos
G.R. No. L-22948
X was charged of murder because of killing Y. The qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged by the
prosecution evidencing by the letter send by X’s wife. X’s
contention is that it was a self defense.
Is the letter admissible as evidence?
NO.
The court below found that the crime was committed with
premeditation and therefore constituted murder. This finding
can only be sustained by taking into consideration a letter
written to X by his wife and seized by the police in searching
his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated two days before
the commission of the crime and shows that the writer
feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical
violence in dealing with the deceased.
Counsel of X argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged
communication and therefore not admissible in evidence.
The numerical weight of authority is, however, to the effect
that where a privileged communication from one spouse to
another comes into the hands of a third party, whether
legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on
the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby
extinguished and the communication, if otherwise
competent, becomes admissible. (28 R.C.L., 530 and
authorities there cited.) Such is the view of the majority of
this court.
Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows:
For documents of communication coming into the possession
of a third person, a distinction should obtain, analogous to
that already indicated for a client's communications (ante,
par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they were obtained from the
addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be
privileged (for otherwise the privilege could by collusion be
practically nullified for written communications); but if they
11 | P a g e
were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the
addressee's consent, the privilege should cease. (5 Wigmore
on Evidence, 2nd ed., par. 2339.)
The letter in question was obtained through a search for
which no warrant appears to have been issued and counsel
for the defendant cites the causes of Boyd and Boyd vs.
United States (116 U.S., 616) and Silverthorne Lumber Co.
and Silverthorne vs. United States (251 U.S., 385) as authority
for the proposition that documents obtained by illegal
searches of the defendant's effects are not admissible in
evidence in a criminal case. In discussing this point we can do
not better than to quote Professor Wigmore:
The foregoing doctrine (i. e., that the admissibility of
evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means
through which the party has been enabled to obtain the
evidence) was never doubted until the appearance of the ill-
starred majority opinion of Boyd vs. United States, in 1885,
which has exercised unhealthy influence upon subsequent
judicial opinion in many States.
xxx xxx xxx
The progress of this doctrine of Boyd vs. United States was as
follows: (a) The Boyd Case remained unquestioned in its own
Court for twenty years; meantime receiving frequent disfavor
in the State Courts (ante, par. 2183). (b) Then in Adams vs.
New York, in 1904, it was virtually repudiated in the Federal
Supreme Court, and the orthodox precedents recorded in the
State courts (ante, par. 2183) were expressly approved. (c)
Next, after another twenty years, in 1914 — moved this time,
not by erroneous history, but by misplaced sentimentality —
the Federal Supreme Court, in Weeks vs. United States,
reverted to the original doctrine of the Boyd Case, but with a
condition, viz., that the illegality of the search and seizure
should first have been directly litigated and established by a
motion, made before trial, for the return of the things seized;
so that, after such a motion, and then only, the illegality
would be noticed in the main trial and the evidence thus
obtained would be excluded. ... (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd
ed., par. 2184.)
In the Silverthorne Lumber Co. case the United States
Supreme Court adhered to its decision in the Weeks Case.
The doctrine laid down in these cases has been followed by
some of the State courts but has been severely criticized and
does not appear to have been generally accepted. But
assuming, without deciding, that it prevails in this jurisdiction
it is, nevertheless, under the decisions in the Weeks and
Silverthorne cases, inapplicable to the present case. Here the
illegality of the search and seizure was not "directly litigated
and established by a motion, made before trial, for the return
of the things seized."
The letter however, be excluded for reasons not discussed in
the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of X and if she
had testified at the trial the letter might have been
admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on
the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered
for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or
otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements
contained in the letter it might also have been admissible,
but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter
in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on
his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and
its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of
the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the
witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to
cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no
difference between an ordinary communication and one
originally privileged.
The question is radically different from that of the
admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation
between a husband and wife overheard by the witness.
Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that
it relates to a conversation in which both spouses took part
and on the further ground that where the defendant has the
opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his
spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That
cannot apply where the statement is contained in an
unanswered letter.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt
G.R. No. L-21237
A, plaintiff, wrote a letter to his lawyer Atty. B. A photocopy
of the same letter was offered in evidence by the
defendant’s counsel, Atty X, against A. Atty B then
announced that unless Atty X explained how the letter
came to the defense’s possession, he would object the
letter’s admission on the ground that it was a confidential
communication between client and lawyer. Should the letter
be excluded as evidence?
No.
When papers are offered in evidence, a court will take no
notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally,
properly or improperly; nor will it form a collateral issue to
try that question. Even supposing that the letter was within
the privilege which protects communications between
attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter
came to the hands of the adverse party and it makes no
difference how the defense acquired possession. The law
protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by
him to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but
when such a document, containing admissions of the client,
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the
adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
According to Wigmore: “Since the means of preserving
secrecy of communication are entirely in the client's hands,
and since the privilege is a derogation from the general
testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it would be
improper to extend its prohibition to third persons who
obtain knowledge of the communications. One who
overhears the communication, whether with or without the
client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the
privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who
surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in
original or copy.”
People v. Sandiganbayan
12 | P a g e
 G.R. Nos. 115439-41
Respondent Y applied for a free patent over the subject lot
of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey in1976. His
application was approved and an original certificate of title
was issued in his favor. In 1985, however, the Director of
Lands filed an action for the cancellation of Y’ patent and
certificate of title since the land had been designated as a
school site. The trial court nullified said patent and title after
finding that Y had obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application. Z served as counsel of
Y in that case.
The Tanodbayan recommended the criminal prosecution of
Y for violation of Section 3(2) of Republic Act No. 3019 in
that he used his former position as Provincial Attorney to
influence the Bureau of Lands officials to favourably act on
his application for free patent. Again, Z was Y’s counsel of
record therein. A criminal case was subsequently filed with
the Sandiganbayan.
On January 23, 1990, X, sent a letter to the Ombudsman
seeking the investigation of the falsification of public
documents, claiming that Y simulated and certified as true
copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of
arraignment and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during his arraignment on the perjury
charge.
To evade responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, Z claimed that he filed falsified documents upon
the inducement of Y. This was intended to pave the way for
his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated
cases.
Is the projected testimony of Z, as proposed state witness, is
barred by the attorney-client privilege, and is he eligible for
discharge as a particeps criminis.
Yes. A distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed,
and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client.
The Sandiganbayan believes that in the instant case it is
dealing with a past crime, and that Z is set to testify on
alleged criminal acts of respondent Y that have already been
committed and consummated.
But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, the
period to be considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made by the client to the attorney in
relation to either a crime committed in the past or with
respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In
other words, the privileged confidentiality applies only to a
crime already committed, but does not attach to a crime
which a client intends to commit in the future, for purposes
of which he seeks the lawyer's advice.
The Court is reasonably convinced that the requisites for the
discharge of Z as a state witness are present and should have
been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan. Sansaet is
the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of
the falsification charge, and the prosecution is faced with the
task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents
who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their
innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available
for the prosecution of the case; hence there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of Z.
The Sandiganbayan should have taken a holistic view of all
facts and issues herein in disposing of the matter of whether
to allow Z to testify as a state witness, and not merely on the
sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 105938
A case was filed in the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
Phil. through the PCGG against X for the alleged ill-gotten
wealth. Among the defendants in the said case, ACCRA Law
Firm. The PCGG filed an amended complaint excluding Y,
then a partner in the ACCRA Law Firm, on his undertaking
that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom
he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved
in PCGG Case No. 33. Petitioners ACCRA lawyers
subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION"
that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private
respondent Y. The PCGG set a condition that they disclose
the identity of their clients and submission of other
documents substantiating lawyer client relationship. On
March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated
the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of
petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply
with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. ACCRA
Law Firm sought reconsideration of the said decision but
was denied, hence, this petition.
Is the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA
lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the
other information requested by the PCGG?
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be
shrouded in mystery 30 Under this premise, the general rule
in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a
lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of this client.
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well
established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party
suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown
forces. 33
13 | P a g e
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is
however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 35 involved the same exception, i.e.
that client identity is privileged in those instances where a
strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's
identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity
for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his
identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and
circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab
Corporation, 37 prompted the New York Supreme Court to
allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal
the name of his client because this would expose the latter to
civil litigation.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the
said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the client's name is privileged.
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other
situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general
rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a
lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject
matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-
client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the
identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of
the client has been held to be privileged, since such
revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the
identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege
when the client's name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in
the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant
case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to
establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because the
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be not attorney-client
relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal
advice or legal service sought was duly establishes in the case
at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the
three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which
constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of their clients covering their respective
shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily
deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in
their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and
corporate structure, framework and set-up of the
corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated
documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to
their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part
of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in
the aforementioned corporations.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to
reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of
fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the
instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the
rule that the client's name is not privileged information.
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board
G.R. No. 70054
ABC Corporation and DEF Corporation are corporations
engaged in the business of developing residential
subdivisions. Both said corporations obtained several loans
from X Bank, all secured by real estate mortgage in their
various properties in Cavite.
The Monetary Board submitted a report finding that the
bank is insolvent and recommending the appointment of a
receiver. The Monetary Board, based on the report, issued
a resolution finding X Bank insolvent and placing it under
receivership. Subsequently, the Monetary Board issued
another resolution placing the bank under liquidation and
designated a liquidator. X bank filed the petition for
certiorari questioning the validity of the resolutions issued
by the Monetary Board authorizing the receivership and
liquidation of the bank. A temporary restraining order was
issued enjoining the respondents from executing further
acts of liquidation of the bank. However, acts and other
transactions pertaining to normal operations of a bank are
not enjoined. Subsequently, ABC Corporation and DEF
Corporation failed to pay their loans on the due date.
Hence, the law firm of the bank acting as counsel under
authority of the liquidator, applied for extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage over ABC Corporation and DEF
Corporation’s properties. ABC Corporation and DEF
Corporation filed 2 separate petitions for injunction and
prohibition from proceeding with foreclosure sale which
were subsequently dismissed by the court.
Is the report submitted on insolvency of bank is admissible
to result for the closure of the bank?
14 | P a g e
Clearly, the report is based on an incomplete examination of
petitioner bank and outrightly concluded therein that the
latter’s financial status was one of insolvency or illiquidity. In
the instant case, the basic standards of substantial due
process were not observed. Time and again, We have held in
several cases, that the procedure of administrative tribunals
must satisfy the fundamentals of fair play and that their
judgment should express a well-supported conclusion. The
test of insolvency laid down in Section 29 of the Central Bank
Act is measured by determining whether the realizable assets
of a bank are leas than its liabilities. Hence, a bank is solvent
if the fair cash value of all its assets, realizable within a
reasonable time by a reasonable prudent person, would
equal or exceed its total liabilities exclusive of stock liability;
but if such fair cash value so realizable is not sufficient to pay
such liabilities within a reasonable time, the bank is insolvent.
Examination appraises the soundness of the institution’s
assets, the quality and character of management and
determines the institution’s compliance with laws, rules and
regulations. Audit is a detailed inspection of the institution’s
books, accounts, vouchers, ledgers, etc. to determine the
recording of all assets and liabilities. Hence, examination
concerns itself with review and appraisal, while audit
concerns itself with verification.
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
People v. Reyes
G.R. Nos. L-1846-48
X was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Het claims that there exists a major discrepancy in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses with regard to the
place where he was arrested. There is an inconsistency in
the testimonies with respect to the exact address of
appellant, one witness saying that it was at No. 104 Roces
while the other saying that it was at No. 105 Roces,
Is the testimony of witness admissible?
Although there is an inconsistency in the testimonies with
respect to the exact address of appellant, such discrepancy is
of minor importance and does not detract from the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty imposed for
the selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting or distributing
of shabu of less than 200 grams is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua.
Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which has
suppletory application to special laws, penal laws shall be
given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused. X is
entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty
introduced by R.A. No. 7659.
People v. Francisco
G.R. No. L-568
X, had been previously arrested on charges of robbery. X
requested permission from the chief of police to see his wife
who was at the time in a room of their house. After a few
moments, the escort police heard the scream of a woman.
Running upstairs, he met defendant's wife running out of
the room and holding her right breast which was bleeding. X
was lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year and
a half, on his breast and was dead.
The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the
capital penalty upon the accused, relies mainly on the
affidavit, Exhibit C, Exhibit C is an affidavit signed and sworn
to by X declares that unconsciously his wife and son causing
the death of the latter. However, when X testified in his
own defense in the Court of First Instance, he repudiated his
confession, and alleged torture and violence to have been
exerted upon his person and his mind in order.
Furthermore, the statements of appellant in said Exhibit C
were corroborated by the testimony of his wife on rebuttal.
This leads us to the consideration of the admissibility of the
wife's testimony.
Is the testimony of wife admissible as evidence?
YES
Generally, the rule states that neither a husband nor wife
shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against
the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests;
second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of
the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and
confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its
admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility
exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.
However, as all other general rules, this one has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in
criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound
reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in
support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital
and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which
the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which,
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home.
At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify in the
direct evidence for the prosecution but under circumstances
presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only
testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his
own defense, imputed upon her the killing of their son. By all
rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution, which
had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a
witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in
15 | P a g e
rebuttal; and the the wife herself the right to so testify, at
least, in self-defense, not of course, against being subjected
to punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant
but against any or all of various possible consequences which
might flow from her silence.
Alvarez v. Ramirez
G.R. No. 143439
Private prosecutor in a criminal case of arson called the
petitioner’s wife without objection from petitioner’s
counsel. Wife testified that it was her estranged husband
who poured and set the house of her sister on fire. A motion
to disqualify the testimony of his wife was filed pursuant to
rules on martial disqualification. Can the wife can testify
against her husband in a criminal case.
Yes.
The reason for the rule on martial disqualification are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is
consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and
confidence of private life, even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness;
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger
of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the
other.
The offense of arson attributed to the husband impairs the
conjugal relation between him and his wife. His act
eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust,
confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal
relationship survives and flourishes… the evidence and facts
presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage
between petitioner and his wife is no longer an interest the
State aims to protect.
Unites States v. Antipolo
G.R. No. L-13109
X was charged with the murder of Y. The trial court
convicted him of homicide. One of the errors assigned is
based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Z, the
widow of Y, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense
concerning certain alleged dying declarations on the ground
that she is not competent to testify unless it be with the
consent of her husband. Since Y is already dead, Z is
disqualified from testifying in this case. Is Z disqualified by
reason of marriage?
No.
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime
committed by one against the other, neither husband nor
wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in
a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be
parties.
The reasons for this rule are thus stated in Underhill's work
on Criminal Evidence (second edition) on page 346:
At common law, neither a husband nor a wife was a
competent witness for or against the other in any judicial
proceedings, civil or criminal, to which the other was a party.
. . . If either were recognized as a competent witness against
the other who was accused of crime, . . . a very serious injury
would be done to the harmony and happiness of husband
and wife and the confidence which should exist between
them.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the
reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section 58 is to
protect accused persons against statements made in the
confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve
the husband or wife to whom such confidential
communications might have been made from the obligation
of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse.
Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of
injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the
manner in which he received those injuries, the
communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the
contrary, such a communication is made for the express
purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the
declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the
cause of his death.
People v. Carlos
G.R. No. L-22948 March 17, 1925
X was charged of murder because of killing Y. The qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged by the
prosecution evidencing by the letter send by X’s wife. X’s
contention is that it was a self defense.
Is the letter admissible as evidence?
NO.
The court below found that the crime was committed with
premeditation and therefore constituted murder. This finding
can only be sustained by taking into consideration a letter
written to X by his wife and seized by the police in searching
his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated two days before
the commission of the crime and shows that the writer
feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical
violence in dealing with the deceased.
Counsel of X argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged
communication and therefore not admissible in evidence.
The numerical weight of authority is, however, to the effect
that where a privileged communication from one spouse to
another comes into the hands of a third party, whether
legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on
the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby
extinguished and the communication, if otherwise
competent, becomes admissible. (28 R.C.L., 530 and
authorities there cited.) Such is the view of the majority of
this court.
Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows:
16 | P a g e
For documents of communication coming into the possession
of a third person, a distinction should obtain, analogous to
that already indicated for a client's communications (ante,
par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they were obtained from the
addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be
privileged (for otherwise the privilege could by collusion be
practically nullified for written communications); but if they
were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the
addressee's consent, the privilege should cease. (5 Wigmore
on Evidence, 2nd ed., par. 2339.)
The letter in question was obtained through a search for
which no warrant appears to have been issued and counsel
for the defendant cites the causes of Boyd and Boyd vs.
United States (116 U.S., 616) and Silverthorne Lumber Co.
and Silverthorne vs. United States (251 U.S., 385) as authority
for the proposition that documents obtained by illegal
searches of the defendant's effects are not admissible in
evidence in a criminal case. In discussing this point we can do
not better than to quote Professor Wigmore:
The foregoing doctrine (i. e., that the admissibility of
evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means
through which the party has been enabled to obtain the
evidence) was never doubted until the appearance of the ill-
starred majority opinion of Boyd vs. United States, in 1885,
which has exercised unhealthy influence upon subsequent
judicial opinion in many States.
xxx xxx xxx
The progress of this doctrine of Boyd vs. United States was as
follows: (a) The Boyd Case remained unquestioned in its own
Court for twenty years; meantime receiving frequent disfavor
in the State Courts (ante, par. 2183). (b) Then in Adams vs.
New York, in 1904, it was virtually repudiated in the Federal
Supreme Court, and the orthodox precedents recorded in the
State courts (ante, par. 2183) were expressly approved. (c)
Next, after another twenty years, in 1914 — moved this time,
not by erroneous history, but by misplaced sentimentality —
the Federal Supreme Court, in Weeks vs. United States,
reverted to the original doctrine of the Boyd Case, but with a
condition, viz., that the illegality of the search and seizure
should first have been directly litigated and established by a
motion, made before trial, for the return of the things seized;
so that, after such a motion, and then only, the illegality
would be noticed in the main trial and the evidence thus
obtained would be excluded. ... (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd
ed., par. 2184.)
In the Silverthorne Lumber Co. case the United States
Supreme Court adhered to its decision in the Weeks Case.
The doctrine laid down in these cases has been followed by
some of the State courts but has been severely criticized and
does not appear to have been generally accepted. But
assuming, without deciding, that it prevails in this jurisdiction
it is, nevertheless, under the decisions in the Weeks and
Silverthorne cases, inapplicable to the present case. Here the
illegality of the search and seizure was not "directly litigated
and established by a motion, made before trial, for the return
of the things seized."
The letter however, be excluded for reasons not discussed in
the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of X and if she
had testified at the trial the letter might have been
admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on
the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered
for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or
otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements
contained in the letter it might also have been admissible,
but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter
in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on
his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and
its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of
the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the
witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to
cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no
difference between an ordinary communication and one
originally privileged.
The question is radically different from that of the
admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation
between a husband and wife overheard by the witness.
Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that
it relates to a conversation in which both spouses took part
and on the further ground that where the defendant has the
opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his
spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That
cannot apply where the statement is contained in an
unanswered letter.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt
G.R. No. L-21237
A, plaintiff, wrote a letter to his lawyer Atty. B. A photocopy
of the same letter was offered in evidence by the
defendant’s counsel, Atty X, against A. Atty B then
announced that unless Atty X explained how the letter
came to the defense’s possession, he would object the
letter’s admission on the ground that it was a confidential
communication between client and lawyer. Should the letter
be excluded as evidence?
No.
When papers are offered in evidence, a court will take no
notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally,
properly or improperly; nor will it form a collateral issue to
try that question. Even supposing that the letter was within
the privilege which protects communications between
attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter
came to the hands of the adverse party and it makes no
difference how the defense acquired possession. The law
protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by
him to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but
when such a document, containing admissions of the client,
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the
adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
According to Wigmore: “Since the means of preserving
secrecy of communication are entirely in the client's hands,
and since the privilege is a derogation from the general
testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it would be
improper to extend its prohibition to third persons who
17 | P a g e
obtain knowledge of the communications. One who
overhears the communication, whether with or without the
client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the
privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who
surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in
original or copy.”
People v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 115439-41
Respondent Y applied for a free patent over the subject lot
of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey in1976. His
application was approved and an original certificate of title
was issued in his favor. In 1985, however, the Director of
Lands filed an action for the cancellation of Y’ patent and
certificate of title since the land had been designated as a
school site. The trial court nullified said patent and title after
finding that Y had obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application. Z served as counsel of
Y in that case.
The Tanodbayan recommended the criminal prosecution of
Y for violation of Section 3(2) of Republic Act No. 3019 in
that he used his former position as Provincial Attorney to
influence the Bureau of Lands officials to favourably act on
his application for free patent. Again, Z was Y’s counsel of
record therein. A criminal case was subsequently filed with
the Sandiganbayan.
On January 23, 1990, X, sent a letter to the Ombudsman
seeking the investigation of the falsification of public
documents, claiming that Y simulated and certified as true
copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of
arraignment and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during his arraignment on the perjury
charge.
To evade responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, Z claimed that he filed falsified documents upon
the inducement of Y. This was intended to pave the way for
his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated
cases.
Is the projected testimony of Z, as proposed state witness, is
barred by the attorney-client privilege, and is he eligible for
discharge as a particeps criminis.
Yes. A distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed,
and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client.
The Sandiganbayan believes that in the instant case it is
dealing with a past crime, and that Z is set to testify on
alleged criminal acts of respondent Y that have already been
committed and consummated.
But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, the
period to be considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made by the client to the attorney in
relation to either a crime committed in the past or with
respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In
other words, the privileged confidentiality applies only to a
crime already committed, but does not attach to a crime
which a client intends to commit in the future, for purposes
of which he seeks the lawyer's advice.
The Court is reasonably convinced that the requisites for the
discharge of Z as a state witness are present and should have
been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan. Sansaet is
the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of
the falsification charge, and the prosecution is faced with the
task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents
who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their
innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available
for the prosecution of the case; hence there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of Z.
The Sandiganbayan should have taken a holistic view of all
facts and issues herein in disposing of the matter of whether
to allow Z to testify as a state witness, and not merely on the
sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 105938
A case was filed in the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
Phil. through the PCGG against X for the alleged ill-gotten
wealth. Among the defendants in the said case, ACCRA Law
Firm. The PCGG filed an amended complaint excluding Y,
then a partner in the ACCRA Law Firm, on his undertaking
that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom
he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved
in PCGG Case No. 33. Petitioners ACCRA lawyers
subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION"
that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private
respondent Y. The PCGG set a condition that they disclose
the identity of their clients and submission of other
documents substantiating lawyer client relationship. On
March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated
the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of
petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply
with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. ACCRA
Law Firm sought reconsideration of the said decision but
was denied, hence, this petition.
Is the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA
lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the
other information requested by the PCGG?
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be
shrouded in mystery 30 Under this premise, the general rule
in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a
lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of this client.
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well
established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
18 | P a g e
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party
suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown
forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is
however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 35 involved the same exception, i.e.
that client identity is privileged in those instances where a
strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's
identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity
for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his
identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and
circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab
Corporation, 37 prompted the New York Supreme Court to
allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal
the name of his client because this would expose the latter to
civil litigation.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the
said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the client's name is privileged.
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other
situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general
rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a
lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject
matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-
client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the
identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of
the client has been held to be privileged, since such
revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the
identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege
when the client's name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in
the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant
case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to
establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because the
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be not attorney-client
relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal
advice or legal service sought was duly establishes in the case
at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the
three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which
constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of their clients covering their respective
shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily
deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in
their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and
corporate structure, framework and set-up of the
corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated
documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to
their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part
of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in
the aforementioned corporations.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to
reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of
fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the
instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the
rule that the client's name is not privileged information.
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board
G.R. No. 70054
ABC Corporation and DEF Corporation are corporations
engaged in the business of developing residential
subdivisions. Both said corporations obtained several loans
from X Bank, all secured by real estate mortgage in their
various properties in Cavite.
The Monetary Board submitted a report finding that the
bank is insolvent and recommending the appointment of a
receiver. The Monetary Board, based on the report, issued
a resolution finding X Bank insolvent and placing it under
receivership. Subsequently, the Monetary Board issued
another resolution placing the bank under liquidation and
designated a liquidator. X bank filed the petition for
certiorari questioning the validity of the resolutions issued
by the Monetary Board authorizing the receivership and
liquidation of the bank. A temporary restraining order was
issued enjoining the respondents from executing further
acts of liquidation of the bank. However, acts and other
transactions pertaining to normal operations of a bank are
not enjoined. Subsequently, ABC Corporation and DEF
Corporation failed to pay their loans on the due date.
Hence, the law firm of the bank acting as counsel under
authority of the liquidator, applied for extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage over ABC Corporation and DEF
Corporation’s properties. ABC Corporation and DEF
19 | P a g e
Corporation filed 2 separate petitions for injunction and
prohibition from proceeding with foreclosure sale which
were subsequently dismissed by the court.
Is the report submitted on insolvency of bank is admissible
to result for the closure of the bank?
Clearly, the report is based on an incomplete examination of
petitioner bank and outrightly concluded therein that the
latter’s financial status was one of insolvency or illiquidity. In
the instant case, the basic standards of substantial due
process were not observed. Time and again, We have held in
several cases, that the procedure of administrative tribunals
must satisfy the fundamentals of fair play and that their
judgment should express a well-supported conclusion. The
test of insolvency laid down in Section 29 of the Central Bank
Act is measured by determining whether the realizable assets
of a bank are leas than its liabilities. Hence, a bank is solvent
if the fair cash value of all its assets, realizable within a
reasonable time by a reasonable prudent person, would
equal or exceed its total liabilities exclusive of stock liability;
but if such fair cash value so realizable is not sufficient to pay
such liabilities within a reasonable time, the bank is insolvent.
Examination appraises the soundness of the institution’s
assets, the quality and character of management and
determines the institution’s compliance with laws, rules and
regulations. Audit is a detailed inspection of the institution’s
books, accounts, vouchers, ledgers, etc. to determine the
recording of all assets and liabilities. Hence, examination
concerns itself with review and appraisal, while audit
concerns itself with verification.
People v. Reyes
G.R. Nos. L-1846-48
X was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Het claims that there exists a major discrepancy in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses with regard to the
place where het was arrested. There is an inconsistency in
the testimonies with respect to the exact address of
appellant, one witness saying that it was at No. 104 Roces
while the other saying that it was at No. 105 Roces,
Is the testimony of witness admissible?
Although there is an inconsistency in the testimonies with
respect to the exact address of appellant, such discrepancy is
of minor importance and does not detract from the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty imposed for
the selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting or distributing
of shabu of less than 200 grams is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua.
Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which has
suppletory application to special laws, penal laws shall be
given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused. X is
entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty
introduced by R.A. No. 7659.
Navallo v. Sandiganbayan
X was sued for malversation of public funds with the
Sandiganbayab. One of the key evidences against him was
the audit report filed by the Auditor Y. X’s defense is that he
was pressured into signing the document by G, his superior.
However when X was cross-examined, he admitted that he
signed the document due to the high respect and goodwill
he had for his predecessor and that he was merely
persuaded to sign the document. The Sandiganbayan
convicted him of the crime on the basis of his admission. X
now appeals the decision arguing that the decision is
erroneous. Decide?
The decision of the Sandiganbayan is correct. Section 26 ,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides The act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him. This is the rule because no
man could declare anything against himself unless such
declarations were true. In this case X made the admission, in
court ,of his own volition, contradicting his own defense and
nothing in the Rules of Court or Jurisprudence would prevent
this admission from being used.
Heirs of Jose Barredo v. Besaes
X, a logger sued Y, his employer, for firing him without
cause. Y entered into a compromise agreement with X
allowing X and his family to stay in the company bunkhouse
for free until they could find their own home. Y attempted
to sell the lot with the bunkhouse to W. Before the sale
could be completed, X filed a case claiming that he was a
tenant and that the land should not be sold. His primary
evidence was the compromise agreement between Y and X,
which he claims shows the tenancy agreement. The court
ruled in favor of X, is the decision correct?
No, the court is wrong. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence and Jurisprudence provides that an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability. The rule is so
because the law favors the resolution of disputes rather than
its continuation. If every compromise agreement was used as
evidence then no compromise could ever be reached.
People v. Janjalani
X conspired with Y to blow a mall. The plot worked and the
mall was destroyed. However soon after X and Y were
caught police. Y was interviewed by a reporter and
confessed to the crime. In court Y testified in the same
manner. The court ruled to dismiss the complaint stating
that according to Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
an extrajudicial confession could is not admissable against
the co-conspirators. Is the court right?
No, the court is not correct. Jurisprudence holds that an
extrajudicial confession may be be admissable against the co-
accused of a confessor if the confessor makes the same
20 | P a g e
statement in court. This would then transform it into a
judicial admission which is admissable against the confessor
and the co-accused or conspirators. In this case as Y testified
to the same in court, then he has made a judicial admission
which is admissable as evidence against both parties.
Tan v. Rodil Enterprises
Rodil Enterprises leased a property from the government.
He then subleased an area to Lucio Tan (petitioner). When
Lucio Tan refused to pay his rent, Rodil sued him and asked
him to vacate the premises. Lucio Tan then offered to pay
off his outstanding rent, with no reply. The court eventually
ruled against Lucio Tan stating that while normally they
would never use a compromise agreement as evidence of
liability, they could not overlook the frank representations
made by Lucio Tan’s counsel admitting to the liability. Hence
this case. Did the courts make the right decision?
Yes. In Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals the court held: The admissibility or non-admissibility
of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and
the intent of the party making the offer should be
considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but
offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and
avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in
the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the
existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to
settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to
prove such indebtedness
In this case petitioner made it abundantly clear that he
recognized the lease. He made representations in court
admitting the same and he even filed a motion to deposit the
rentals with the METC. Thus he can be held liable.
Boston Bank of the Philippines v. Manalo
X entered into a contract with Y to buy a house. Y then sold
another house and lot to W and allowed W to pay in
installments. When X was unable to pay for the property, he
was sued for specific performance. X counters claiming that
as the other buyers were allowed to pay on installments, he
should be allowed to pay on installments as well. Is X
correct?
No. X, is not correct. Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing
at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or
similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be
received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the
intent of the parties. Hence unless X is able to prove that this
is a business habit and that Y intended to give all buyers this
right, X’s contention is wrong.
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA
Abay Jr. v. People
X conspired with Y to kill A. After they killed A, X and Y were
arrested by the police. To save himself Y testified that X and
he had conspired to kill A to the police and the court. The
court convicted X for murder on the basis of Y’s testimony. X
appealed his conviction saying that as Y’s extrajudicial
admission is inadmissible as it is hearsay. Decide
X’s contention is without merit. Settled is the rule that when
the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at
the trial, it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes instead a judicial
admission, being a testimony of an eyewitness admissible in
evidence against those it implicates. Here, the extrajudicial
confession of Aban was affirmed by him in open court during
the trial. Thus, such confession already partook of judicial
testimony which is admissible in evidence against the
petitioners.
Tamargo v. Awingan
X and Y conspired to kill H. After H was killed, Y was caught
by the police and he confessed to them that he and X did
indeed plot to kill H. X was convicted only on the basis of the
extrajudicial confession. X appeals the case saying the the
extrajudicial confession of Y should be inadmissible as
evidence against him as it violates the res inter alios acta
rule and does not fall under any of the exceptions. If you
were the judge how would you decide?
X’s contention has merit. The rule on res inter alios
acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Thus an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is
not admissible against his or her co-accused and is
considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission
made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court: Admission by conspirator, however for this
rule to apply three things need to be shown a) the conspiracy
be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself b)
the admission relates to the common object and c) it has
been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out
the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the
alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional
right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and
to cross-examine them.
In this case none of that was shown as the only basis for his
conviction was the confession. Thus as this evidence is
inadmissible, the conviction should be overturned.
People v. Bustamante
X was convicted of robbery by the testimony of Y. X
questioned his conviction based on one witness. Decide
It is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a single
witness, if credible, is enough to warrant conviction. There is
no need for corroborating or even cummulative evidence if
the testimony of the witness is clear and credible. Thus as
long as the testimony is credible, then a person can be
convicted on that alone
People v. Larranaga
21 | P a g e

X was convicted of rape due to the testimony of Y, a
criminal. X claims that the testimony of a known criminal
should not be enough to convict him. The prosecution on
the other hand insists that the testimony should be believed
as it is compatible with the physical evidence. Decide
Jurisprudence has stated that testimony of a witness is made
believable due to other corroborative evidences that may be
present. In one case it was stated that the testimony was
made believable and credible due to its high compatibility
with the physical evidence. In this case as that is clearly
present then the testimony should be believed.
Villanueva v. Sps. Branoco
X donated a lot to Y who sold it Z. Afterwards X sold the lot
to W. W then filed a case to eject Y from the property. The
case reached trial and the court ruled in favor of W. Is the
court correct?
No, the court is not correct. The donation of X to Y meant
that X had divested himself of ownership of property. This
made very clear due to the fact that X did not make
reservation of ownership over the property. Clearly then X
meant to give the property to Y. This means that as Y has the
title over it, then Y’s sale to Z is proper and valid.
HEARSAY
Torralba v. People
G. R. No. 153699
Choy Torralba was the host of a radio program called "Tug-
Ani ang Lungsod" which was aired in Cebu City. An
information for libel was filed against him because of
statements he made concerning the late CFI Judge Agapito.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Segundo Lim, Atty.
Hontanosas, and Gabriel Sarmiento. The prosecution relied
upon Exhibit D, a tape recording of 11 April 1994 when
Torralba allegedly made his libelous statements against
Judge Hontanosas.
Segundo Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate
a tape recorder and that instead it was his adopted
daughter, Shirly Lim, or his housemaid, who recorded
Torralba’s radio program. He maintained, however, that he
was near the radio whenever the recording took place and
had actually heard Torralba’s radio program while it was
being taped.
This prompted Torralba to pose a continuing objection to
the admission of the said tape recordings for lack of proper
authentication by the person who actually made the
recordings. Despite Torralba’s objection to the formal offer
of these pieces of evidence, the court a quo eventually
admitted the three tape recordings into evidence.
Was it proper for the lower court to admit in evidence Lim's
tape recording? Explain.
No. It was not duly authenticated by Lim's adopted daughter,
and absent that authentication, the tape recording is
incompetent and inadmissible evidence.
It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible
because of its form where a proper foundation has been laid
to guarantee the genuineness of the recording. In our
jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a
tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative
value, the following requisite must first be established, to wit:
(1) A showing that the recording device was capable of
taking testimony;
(2) A showing that the operator of the device was
competent;
(3) Establishment of the authenticity and correctness of
the recording;
(4) A showing that changes, additions, or deletions have
not been made;
(5) A showing of the manner of the preservation of the
recording;
(6) Identification of the speakers; and
(7) Showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily
made without any kind of inducement.
In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper
foundation for the admissibility of the tape recording was
not adhered to. Lim categorically admitted in the witness
stand that he was not familiar at all with the process of tape
recording and that he had to instruct his adopted daughter
to record Torralba’s radio broadcasts.
The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness
saw Torralba broadcast the alleged libelous remarks. Lim was
implying that he was listening to "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" at
that time. But such bare assertion on the part of Lim,
uncorroborated as it was by any other evidence, fails to meet
the standard that a witness must be able to "recognize the
voice of the speaker." Being near the radio is one thing;
actually listening to the radio broadcast and recognizing the
voice of the speaker is another.
The Supreme Court is not inclined to confer probative
value on the testimony of private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas particularly in the light of his declaration that he
did not listen to Torralba’s radio show subject of this petition.
He simply relied on the tape recording handed over to him by
Lim.
The tape recordings being inadmissible and there being no
other witness to the broadcast, there insufficiency of
evidence meriting a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Sps. Fernando and Viloria v. Continental Airlines
G.R. No. 188288
Fernando agreed to buy airline tickets on board Continental
Airlines, Inc. (CAI) after Margaret Mager of Holiday Travel
(HT) agency informed him that there were no available seats
at Amtrak, an intercity passenger train. Subsequently,
Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight. Since
alternative flight would be more costly and would mean
travelling by night, Fernando opted to request for a refund.
22 | P a g e
Mager denied his request as said tickets were non-
refundable. When Fernando saw an Amtrak station nearby,
he made inquiries and was told that there were seats
available anytime. Fernando confronted Mager with the
Amtrak tickets, telling her that she had misled them into
buying CAI tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was
already fully booked. Fernando reiterated his demand for a
refund but Mager denied it.
Fernando went to CAI’s ticketing office to have the tickets
replaced by a single round trip ticket to Los Angeles under
his name, he was informed that Lourdes’ ticket was non-
transferable, thus, cannot be used for the purchase of a
ticket in his favor.
Spouses Viloria filed a complaint against CAI for bad faith
and misrepresentation. They claim that the price at which
CAI was willing to issue the new tickets is an advertisement
appearing on a newspaper stating that airfares from Manila
to Los Angeles or San Francisco cost US$856.00.
Is the newspaper clipping presented admissible as evidence
in the case? Explain.
No. Newspaper clippings are hearsay if they were offered for
the purpose of proving the truth of the matter alleged.
There is also no showing that Spouses Viloria were
discriminated against in bad faith by being charged with a
higher rate. The only evidence the petitioners presented to
prove that the price of a round trip ticket between Manila
and Los Angeles at that time was only $856.00 is a
newspaper advertisement for another airline company, which
is INADMISSIBLE for being "hearsay evidence, twice
removed." As ruled in Feria v. Court of Appeals;
“Newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice
removed" and are therefore not only inadmissible but
without any probative value at all whether objected to or
not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the
truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article
is admissible only as evidence that such publication does
exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.”
People v. Cusi
G.R. No. L-20986
Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, and Montano were
charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they
pleaded not guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt. Bano of
the Police Force was testifying as a prosecution witness
regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by the
accused Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting
his participation in the commission of the offense charged,
revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit
the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of
them.
Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo
objected upon the ground of hearsay. The respondent judge
then directed the witness to answer the question and name
his co-conspirators except the names of those who had
raised the objection.
Is the action of the court proper? Explain.
No. The testimonial evidence in the case is not hearsay, if the
purpose is merely to establish the fact that the statement
was made.
While the testimony of a witness regarding a statement
made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of
the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that
the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer is
only to establish the fact that the accused had mentioned to
the witness the names of those who conspired with him to
commit the offense charged, without claiming that said
statement or the answer to be given by the witness would be
competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons
so named really conspired with accused. It is held that the
question propounded to the witness was proper and the
latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the
understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be
taken as competent evidence to show that the persons
named really and actually conspired with accused and later
took part in the commission of the offense.
Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. No. 146710-15
It began in October 2000 when allegations of corruption
were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee which leads to an impeachment suit. The expose
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 20, the
Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his
post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA,
becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
After Estrada’s impeachment proceedings were aborted and
his resignation from the Presidential post, a cluster of legal
problems started appearing. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion including among others, bribery and graft and
corruption, plunder, perjury, serious miscounduct,
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds. A
special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the
respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against
the petitioner.
Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that
may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted Petitioner also
contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be
stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed
23 | P a g e
against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his
guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has
developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in
violation of his right to due process. He assails the Decision
for adverting to newspaper accounts of the vents and
occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. A
diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the
“Philippine Daily Inquirer” was presented as a narration of
events in showing the reaction of petitioner.
Explain the court’s decision on petitioner’s resignation prior
to the evidence presented.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not
write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacañang Palace after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. The court used the totality test to arrive at the
conclusion that petitioner has resigned, as referred to and
analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and
posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as
president. All these events are facts which are well-
established and cannot be refuted.
Contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo,
the Angara Diary was used to decipher the intent to resign on
the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not
unusual for courts to distill a person’s subjective intent from
the evidence before them.
The use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay
rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences
arrived at by the court from the facts narrated in the diary
but that does not make the diary inadmissible as evidence.
During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was
treared as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time
were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during
and after transition period.
It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged
the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving
the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going
to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the
people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Estrada’s reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the president which
he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join
him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Cornejo v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. L-58831
Cornejo was convicted of a crime of Estafa. The judgment of
conviction was based on the findings of the trial court that
petitioner Cornejo employed criminal deceit in falsely
holding himself out as duly authorized by reason of his office
to inspect and investigate privately-owned buildings, by
which misrepresentation he was able to inveigle
complainant to agree to have the floor area of her house
and store measured and to have a plan thereof drawn by
the petitioner for a fee less than that supposedly officially
charged for said service.
Complainant Chua presented (Exhibit B) a Certification of
Pasay City Engineer Jesus Reyna that accused was not
authorized to conduct inspection and investigation of
privately-owned buildings. The petitioner contends that the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in
admitting in evidence Exhibit B [Certification of Pasay City
Engineer Jesus Reyna] without the author thereof taking the
witness stand and thereby depriving the petitioner of his
constitutional right of confrontation
Will the petitioner contention about Exhibit B prosper?
Explain.
No.
Where the statement or writings attributed to a person who
is not on the witness stand are being offered not to prove the
truth of the facts stated therein but only to prove that such
statements were actually made or such writings were
executed, such evidence is not covered by the hearsay rule.
Philippine Realty v. Firematic Philippines
G.R. No. 156251
Philippine Realty and Holdings Corporation (PRHC), entered
into a Construction Agreement with Firematic Philippines,
Inc. (Firematic) for the installation of a sprinkler system.
PRHC alleged that Firematic had violated the terms and
conditions of the contract, committed fraud in the
performance of its obligations under the two contracts, one
of which is in actually delivering and installing pumps that
were not genuine "Peerless" products, non-UL listed and
non-FM approved.
Petitioner insists that the fire pumps supplied and installed
by respondent are fake and are "not of Peerless origin"
based on the manufacturer of the Peerless pumps verbally
informed Connel Bros. that the subject fire pumps "are not
of Peerless origin." However, petitioner failed to present the
signatory of the letters signed by E.L. Sta. Maria, Jr. to testify
on the veracity of the contents of the letters presented;
thus, respondent was not given the opportunity to cross-
examine him. It also appears that the person who signed the
letters had no personal knowledge of the facts stated
therein, as he claimed that he had been "verbally advised"
that the manufacturer of Peerless pumps never had direct
negotiation with Technotrade, and as such, the latter is not
a dealer of the pumps.
The court agreed with Firematic that the documents
presented in evidence by PRHC to prove that the pumps
24 | P a g e
supplied by Technotrade were not genuine "Peerless"
pumps are inadmissible for being hearsay.
Is the court correct? Explain.
Yes.
Well-entrenched is the rule that a private certification is
hearsay where the person who issued the same was never
presented as a witness. The same is true of letters. While
hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of
objection by the adverse party’s counsel, it is nonetheless
without probative value. Stated differently, the declarants of
written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be
presented at the trial for cross-examination. The lack of
objection may make an incompetent evidence admissible,
but admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Indeed, hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not has no probative value.
National Power Corp. v. Bernal
G.R. No. 180979
NAPOCOR is a government owned and control corporation,
for the purpose of undertaking development of
hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines and
NAPOCOR is authorized to exercise the power of eminent
domain. Bernal is a registered owner of a parcel of land
along the highway. NAPOCOR filed an expropriation suit
against respondent for NAPCOR needs to acquire an
easement over Bernal's property. The parties filed a partial
compromise agreement to the RTC, and the RTC proceeded
to determine the amount of just compensation. The RTC
appointed tree commissioners to assess the fair market
value of the subject property. Thereafter, the
commissioners submitted their report to the RTC
recommending that the just compensation be at P
10,000.00 per square meters. NAPOCOR filed an opposition
asserting that it was not substantiated by any official
documents or registered deeds of sale of the subject
property's neighboring lots. That the report was not based
on any document evidenced is hearsay and should be
disregarded by the court and the property should be P
3,500.00 per square meters considering the resolution of
Provincial Appraisal Committee of Cavite, which was denied
by the RTC. The NAPOCOR made an appeal and contended
the same.
Is the commissioner report not based on documentary
evidence or hearsay? Explain.
Yes. A commissioner’s report of land prices which is not
based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay
and should be disregarded by the court.
It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative
and devoid of any actual and reliable basis. First, the market
values of the subject property’s neighboring lots were mere
estimates and unsupported by any corroborative documents,
such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned,
tax declarations or zonal valuation from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential dwellings and
commercial establishments. The report also failed to
elaborate on how and by how much the community centers
and convenience facilities enhanced the value of
respondent’s property. Finally, the market sales data and
price listings alluded to in the report were not even
appended thereto.
The submitted report by the commissioners in not evidenced
by any document (market sales data and price listings, etc.) in
support of the price of the subject property. The just
compensation should be redetermined by the RTC.
Dantis v. Maghinang
G.R. No. 191696
The case draws its origin from a complaint for quieting of
title and recovery of possession with damages filed by
petitioner Rogelio Dantis (Rogelio) against respondent Julio
Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) before the RTC. Rogelio alleged
that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); that he acquired
ownership of the property through a deed of extrajudicial
partition of the estate of his deceased father, Emilio Dantis.
Julio claimed that he was the actual owner of the land
where he was living; that he had been in open and
continuous possession of the property for almost thirty (30)
years; the subject lot was once tenanted by his ancestral
relatives until it was sold by Rogelio’s father, Emilio, to his
father, Julio Maghinang, Sr. (Julio, Sr.); that later, he
succeeded to the ownership of the subject lot after his
father died; and that he was entitled to a separate
registration of the subject lot on the basis of the
documentary evidence of sale and his open and
uninterrupted possession of the property.
One of the documentary evidence, which the court alleged
as hearsay, is of sale adduced by Julio, Jr. is an affidavit
allegedly executed by Ignacio Dantis (Ignacio), Rogelio’s
grandfather, whereby said affiant attested, among others,
to the sale of the subject lot made by his son, Emilio, to
Julio, Sr. (Exhibit "3").
Is the court correct? Explain.
Yes. Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence
and, thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary weight.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion
of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) absence
of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and
3) absence of oath.
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay
evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness
stand. The sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The
affidavit was not identified and its averments were not
affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be
excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible
hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration against
interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to
25 | P a g e
the hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller
(Emilio), but his father (Ignacio).
DYING DECLARATION
People v. Maramara
G.R. No. 110994
Cresenciano Maramara is guilty beyond reasonable of
homicide for the killing of Miguelito Donato. Although
accused-appellant presented his testimony, the
prosecution's version of the killing of Miguelito are as culled
from the testimonies of his younger brother Ricardo Donato
and father Regarder Donato. As before Miguelito expired,
Regarder Donato asked who shot him and Miguelito replied
that it was accused-appellant.
Guided by these long standing doctrinal pronouncements,
the principal basis of the court's assessment is (1) Ricardo
Donato's eyewitness account of how accused-appellant shot
Miguelito Donato and (2) Regarder Donato's recollection of
his son Miguelito's dying declaration, as truthful testimonies
coming from credible witnesses. Thus, the prosecution
witnesses Ricardo and Regarder Donato positively identified
accused-appellant as Miguelito Donato's killer forming
Maramara’s conviction.
Is the court correct? Explain.
Yes.
At the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabrication are
stilled. A victim’s utterance after sustaining a mortal wound
may be considered pure emanations of the incident.
Regarder Donato's testimony regarding Miguelito's
identification of the accused-appellant as his assailant
certainly qualifies as a dying declaration that is worthy of
credence. For a dying declaration to be admissible in
evidence, these requisites must concur: (1) that death is
imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that
the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates
to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; (4) that
the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) that the declaration is
offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant's death is the
subject of inquiry. 19 The degree and seriousness of the
wounds suffered by the victim Miguelito Donato and the fact
that his death supervened shortly thereafter may be
considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was
made by him with the full realization that he was in a dying
condition. 20 The victim Miguelito Donato's dying declaration
having satisfied all these requisites, it must be considered as
an evidence of the highest order because, at the threshold of
death, all thoughts of fabrication are stilled. A victim's
utterance after sustaining a mortal wound may be considered
pure emanations of the incident.
People v. Molo
G.R. No. L-44680
After the couple Venacio Gapisa and Simeona Rapa-Gapisa
had retired for the night, Simeona heard and indistinct
sound of murmur and gnashing teeth. Venacio was asleep
by then. Although seized by fear, Simeona managed to peep
through the dilapidated buri wall and saw Dominador Molo
attired only in short pants, alone. She tried to awaken
Venacio but he did not respond. Molo had already climbed
up the stairs and barged into the house. When he found
Venacio asleep near the door, he immediately grabbed the
latter’s left wrist and started hacking the old man. Venacio
woke up and tried to fight back but he was unable to
retaliate because Molo started hacking him again. Simeona
rushed out of the house and called for help. Her son
Alejandro and Roman Mangaring ran towards the house and
there they found Venacio bleeding profusely. When
Alejandro took his father in his arms, Venacio told him that
he was boloed by Boslo, the name by which Molo was
known in their locality. Roman also asked Venacio who his
assailant was and the latter answered Boslo. Venacio was
rushed to the hospital where he died a few minutes after
arrival.
Was the statements made by Venacio to Alejandro and
Roman admissible? Explain
Yes. Verbal statements made by victim to his son and a
neighbour while mortally wounded that accused was his
assailant are dying declarations.
The statements of Venacio identifying Molo as his assailant to
Alejandro and Roman are dying declarations. Considering the
nature and extent of the wounds, eight in all, Venancio must
have realized the seriousness of his condition and it can
therefore be inferred that he made the incrimination under
the consciousness of impending death, which, in fact,
supervened barely 4-1/2 hours after he was boloed.
People v. Bautista
A was accused of the murder of B. In proving that A
murdered B, the prosecution presented the police blotter
which contains the alleged dying declaration of B. In the
police blotter, C, with his signature, attested that B declared
that A shot him. Is the evidence presented enough to
convict the accused?
No.
A dying declaration, also known as
an ante mortem statement or a statement in articulo mortis,
is admissible under the following requisites: (1) that death is
imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that
the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates
to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; and (4)
that the declaration is offered in a case wherein the
declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.
In the case at bar, it may be correctly rejected, the ante
mortem statement of the victim. It has been held that if the
dying declaration was made orally, it may be proved by the
26 | P a g e
testimony of the witness who heard the same or to whom it
was made.[31]
The entry of the same statement in the police blotter alone
will not suffice to confer upon it the desired evidentiary
weight. Entries in police blotters are only prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[32]
People v. Basay
A, B and C were accused of the crime of multiple murder
with arson. It was alleged that the said accused killed D and
E, and later the children of the latter F and G through
burning the house.
F,6 years old, survived at first, and was taken to the hospital
for treatment. She had an infected throat and abdomen due
to the burns thereby leaving her incapable of clear
communication. After a few days, she died. It was alleged
that F made a dying declaration. The testimony of the
Doctor who cared for F before her death was presented as
evidence. The doctor testified that F could not talk when she
came to the hospital. Was there a proper dying declaration?
No.
In a dying declaration the following must be present: (1) that
death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact;
(2) that the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates
to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; and (4)
that the declaration is offered in a case wherein the
declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.
In this case, the dying declaration was made by a person who
is not competent, otherwise stated, the witness was not
competent to make the statement. Aside from being a minor,
her condition at the time she supposedly gave her statement
made it impossible for her to have communicated effectively.
People v. Cabrillas
A and B was accused of the murder of C. Both used a long
"sundang" in killing C. The prosecution presented 2
witnesses , a witness who is a relative of the victim and the
granddaughter of the C who was with him during the
incident.althoug C was stabbed multiple times, he was still
brought to the hospital and was able to survive only to give
a dying declaration. C personally identified A and B as the
perpetrators. B however alleged that the evidence of the
prosecution was weak because of the inconsistencies of the
testimony of the witnesses. Will inconsistencies overcome a
dying declaration?
No.
Minor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial
matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as
their positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrators of the crime
A dying declaration is an evidence of the highest order; it is
entitled to the utmost credence on the premise that no x x x
person who knows of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation. At the brink of death, all
thoughts on concocting lies disappear.
In this case, the dying declaration made by C is controlling.
The inconsistencies of the testimony of the witnesses were
irrelevant as it was clear that their testimony was agreed on
the fact that A and B committed the crime.
Zarate v. Gingoog
G , a homelosexual, was suddenly stabbed by Z after G
refused to give a cigarette. G was criticaly injured when he
was brought to the hospital. After operation of his intestine,
he was interrogated by a police officer and positively
identified Z as the perpetrator. A case for frustrated murder
was filed against Z. The latter was convicted on the basis of
the positive identification of the sole witness G, only of the
crime of frustrated homicide due to the absence of
treachery. Is a positive identification given more weight than
alibi?
Yes.
It is well settled that positive identification, where categorical
and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive
on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter,
prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving weight in law.
For this reason, the defense of alibi and denial cannot
prosper in the light of the positive identification by
complainant G that it was Z who stabbed him.[
Philippine Press v. CA
P owner of P corp. was asked multiple times by the agents if
president marcos to sell his corp. P refused. However, when
a General of the AFP was sent by Marcos, P agreed to sell. P
now files a case for annulment of sale due to vitiated
consent due to force or intimidation. The RTC did not annul
the sale because there was no clear evidence that marcos
had an ill motive. It rationated that the testimony of the
general who died does not prove marcos' ill motive. Is the
RTC correct?
Yes.
The all too familiar rule is that a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his own knowledge. [20] There
can be no quibbling that petitioners witnesses cannot testify
respecting what President Marcos said to Gen. Menzi about
the acquisition of petitioners newspaper, if any there be,
precisely because none of said witnesses ever had an
opportunity to hear what the two talked about.
Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay rule by
invoking the exception under the declaration-against-interest
rule. In context, the only declaration supposedly made by
Gen. Menzi which can conceivably be labeled as adverse to
his interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in
27 | P a g e
offering to acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must
making a statement contrary to his own interest, a render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
declaration conveying the notion that the declarant
possessed the authority to speak and to act for the President People v. Bernal
of the Republic can hardly be considered as a declaration
against interest. A was accused of kidnapping B. However, the body of B was
never found. On the basis of other testimonies of witnesses
Petitioner next assails the Court of Appeals on its conclusion and other circumstances, A was convicted. Was the
that Martial Law is not per se a consent-vitiating conviction valid despite the absence of the Body?
phenomenon. Wrote the appellate court: [21]
Yes.
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in
People v. Toledo establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with
enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be
reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor,
A and B had agreed to fight with the use of bolos. A died
motive may be sufficient to support a conviction.
instantaneously. B, before his death, made a declaration
that it was only A and B that fought and no other person. C
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made
however was alleged to be part of the fight. Witnesses were
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
presented to show the fact of his participation. Will the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
evidence presented overcome a dying declaration?
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
No.
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to
be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
has been said on high authority, is excluded by courts in the
United States that adhere to the principles of the common
With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest
law. One universally recognized exception concerns the
from the present provision, it is safe to assume that
admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits
declaration against interest has been expanded to include all
the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of
kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or
third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or
even penal.[11]
proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that
the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the
tending to show that he committed the crime are not
following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or
competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the
interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said
Fuentes v. CA
declaration the declarant was aware that the same was
contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant
A was accused of stabbing B. B made a dying declaration had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
declaring that A killed her. A alleged that B mistook his true.[12]
identity for his cousin. Later, C a relative of A made a
declaration against his own interest that he killed B. RTC
Parel v. Prudencia
convicted B,is the conviction correct?
A filed a case for forcible entry against D. A alleged that they
No.
are given the right to possess the lot in question. D on the
other hand alleged that A has no title. A presented the
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that
testimony of his father which he declares that he is not the
pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of
true owner but is given the right to possess the lot. Is such
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he
declaration admissible?
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in
Yes.
the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made
position would not have made the declaration unless he
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
himself or his successors in interest and against third
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the
persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.11
position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third
a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be
persons.
available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact
28 | P a g e

The theory under which declarations against interest are
received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that
the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such
evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such
declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary
or moral interest.9
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner’s
father and had adequate knowledge with respect to the
subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino
categorically declared that while he is the occupant of the
residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is
owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is
safe to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial
to himself as well as to his children’s interests as his heirs.10 A
declaration against interest is the best evidence which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute.11 Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973,
the year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his
death, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit
even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had
been filed by respondent against him (Florentino) and
petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which the trial
court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that
petitioner entered the house against the latter’s will and held
that the remedy of respondent was to file an action for
ejectment;12 and even when a complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988
which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that
respondent’s action should be an accion publiciana which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.13
Dantis v. Maghinang
P filed an action for quieting of title against D alleging that
the latter is occupying a portion of his lot. D countered that
the land he is occupying was sold by P's father to his father
and he subsequently reacquired it. D presented an undated
written receipt of initial down payment alleged yo have
been made by his father. Is the receipt admissible?
No.
According to Rule 130, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, when
the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution
or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
In this case, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it. P was able to establish a prima facie case in his favor to
show his exclusive ownership of the disputed land. The duty
now shifts to D to contradict P's prima facie case otherwise a
verdict must be returned in favor of D.
PEDIGREE
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals
P obtained a loan from D and executed a promissory note
containing particular terms such as the deadline when
payment is to be made, that the loan is payable on monthly
installments and an acceleration clause. Subsequently, P
defaulted in payment thus D filed an action for collection of
sum of money. A decision was rendered in favor of D. P
contends that the court disregarded the significance of the
statements in the promissory note other than the
acceleration clause. Rule on P's contention.
The contention of P is untenable.
According to Rule 130, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, In
the construction of an instrument, where there are several
provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible,
to be adopted as will give effect to all.
If P will be permitted ti enforce only a statement in the
promissory note, all other provisions dealing with the
payment of monthly installments and the acceleration
clause would be rendered nugatory. P's interpretation of the
promissory note was one sided and is way beyond what is
clearly stipulated by the parties.
Jison v. Court of Appeals
R filed an action for recognition of paternity and filiation
against P who is purported to be his father. R presented 11
witnesses comprising of relatives and former employees of
P. R also presented documents like school records where P's
name appears to be the father of R. P contends that he
never knew R and the testimony of the witnesses are not
enough for the reason that all most of the witnesses were
only second cousins of P. Can the testimony and the
documents be admitted?
Rule 130 Section 40 of the Rules of Court provides that the
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
While it is true that the law provides for its inadmissibility
unless the persons who made the document testified in
court, the scope of the enumeration is only limited to objects
which are considered as family possessions. Common
reputation in the family and not the common reputation in
the community is the material element if evidence in order to
establish pedigree.
Solinap v. Locsin
R field a petition for issuance of letters of administration of
the estate of his alleged father. R presented a certificate of
live birth issued by the local civil registrar of Ilo-Ilo city. P
opposed the petition on the ground that the certificate
presented was spurious. P on his part presented a certificate
of live birth issued by the Civil Registrar General of Manila
but the court granted the petition. Is the court correct?
29 | P a g e

No.
Section 23 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter.
Birth certificate offers only a prima facie evidence of filiation
and maybe refuted by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary
worth cannot be sustained where there exist strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
Gravador v. Mamigo
P is a principal of a public elementary school who was given
a notice of separation by the school superintendent on the
ground that he was already more than 65 years old which is
the mandatory age for retirement. P filed an action for quo
warranto and adduced evidence such as I. D.s which tend to
show that he was born in 1911. His brother also executed an
“ ante litem motam” declaration and assertion of family
tradition showing that his brother was his younger sibling. Is
the evidence admissible?
Yes.
Although a person can have no knowledge pf the date of his
birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from
his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an
assertion of family tradition.
Thus, P established his date of birth not only by evidence of
family tradition but by a declaration : ante litem motam”
which constitutes pedigree.
People v. Villanueva
R was charged wuth the crime of rape committed against his
minor daughter. The court then ruled that R is guilty and
thereby sentencing him with death penalty. R appealed
contending that he was wrongfully sentenced with death
penalty since the qualifying circumstance of minority if the
victim was not satisfactorily proved. IS R correct?
No.
According to Section 40 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
In this case, in the absence of authentic documents showing
the age of the victim maybe proven by testimony which is
clear and credible of the victims mother or any person who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree.
People v. Flores
R who is 19 years of age was charged with the crime of rape
committed against his step daughter in the presence and full
view of the victim's mother. The court found him guilty and
imposed death penalty upon him. R argued that the victim
was not a minor and interposed “sweethearts defense”.
Thus he should not be sentenced with death since P failed to
prove that the victim was of minor age. Is R correct?
No.
According to Section 40 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
While it is true that P failed to prove and adduce evidence of
the victim, R cannot escape the penalty of death since it was
done in full view of the victims mother.
Tecson v. Comelec
P initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify D
and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that D made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming
to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according
to P, his parents were foreigners; his mother was an
American and his father was a Spanish national.
Documentary evidence adduced by P would tend to indicate
that the earliest established direct ascendant of D was his
paternal grandfather. While the record of birth of D's
grandfather had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the
time of his death. Is D a natural born Filipino Citizen?
Yes.
According to Section 3 of the Rules of Court, when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
30 | P a g e
public officer or is recorded in a public office
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given
to the entries made therein could be grounded on the sense
of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, the
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and
the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that D's grandfather was at
any other place during the same period. In his death
certificate, the residence of D's grandfather was stated to
be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time
of his death was also his residence before death. It would be
extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives
Office would have had complete records of all residents of
the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
RES GESTAE
Air France v. Carrascoso
P issued to D, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket
from Manila to Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the
Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class
seat because there was a "white man" who had better right
to the seat. The planes crew recorded in his notebook a
notation reads as follows "First-class passenger was forced
to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene". Is it admissible as evidence?
Yes.
From a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the
dialogue happened, the impact of the startlig occurrence was
still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as
yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous,
and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines.
And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been an
easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted D's testimony.
If it were really true that no such entry was made, the
deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
Aballe v. People
P killed a child while under the influence of alcohol and
marijuana. The cops were advised that P is a possible
suspect. When the cops looked for P, they found him
coming out from the bathroom and wearing what appears
to be a shirt with blood stains on it. Upon seeing the cops,
the accused without anyone asking him admitted that he
killed the child. Does the occurrence constitute as res
gestae? Is such admission admissible?
Yes.
The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged may be given as evidence against
him.
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a
witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as
to the substance of what he heard, if he heard and
understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated
verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance.
Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation is not applicable to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary
manner, whereby the accused orally admitted having slain
the victim.
People v. Reyes
P a Huk rebel, was charged with murder of two law
enforcement officers while seriously injuring another law
enforcement officer. He later became a state witness, and
testified the manner on how the murders and severe
physical injuries were committed. Is the admission he made
admissible as evidence?
Yes.
The Rules of Court provide under Sec. 42, Rule 130.
Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and
giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of res
gestae.
In the case at bar, enough has been gathered in the
testimony in open court and are considered admissible and
part of res gestae.
People v. Dela Cruz
P is accused of killing his neighbour due to an altercation
with regards to their vehicles. The witnesses claimed that P
was the shooter, despite not seeing him shoot the victim
but on grounds that they saw smoke coming from the side
of petitioner’s jeep. It was further bolstered by the by the
testimony of a cop on the scene of the crime who claimed
that he heard from the spectators/bystanders who
witnessed the crime, and shed light as to the identity of the
culprit. The court admitted the testimony of the cop, who
relied his information from the bystanders. Is such
admission proper?
Yes.
Although the people who gave this information were not
presented on the witness stand, this Court still resolve to
admit and consider this spontaneous exclamation from the
spectators competent as part of res gestae.
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Res Gestae refers to those examinations and statements
made by either the participants, the victim(s) or spectators to
a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. As borne by evidence on record,
all the elements of res gestae are sufficiently established,
insofar as the aforequoted spontaneous utterance is
concerned:
a.) The principal act (res gestae) – the killing of the
victim in broad daylight – is a starling occurrence;
b.) The statements were made before the declarants
had time to contrive or devise - that is, within several
minutes after the victim was shot;
c.) That the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances – the
identity of the assailant is a material and vital information
that concerns the aforementioned starling occurrence.
In the case at bar, the incident was reported to SPO3
Patriarca at around 2:45 in the afternoon of June 16, 1993,
while the latter was on duty, and immediately, they rushed to
the scene of the crime to investigate.
People v. Cariquez
P is the mother of the minor victim who died due to severe
physical abuse, that the victim endured from P and her live
in partner. P argues that the court erred in admitting the
testimonies of her neighbors and sister who acquired
knowledge on the alleged abuse from the decedent herself,
and claims that they are merely hearsay and are thus
inadmissible, is her contention correct?
No.
It is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Sec 42.
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a
starling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequently thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae.
So also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received
as part of the res gestae.
In the case at bar, the startling occurrences were the tortures
inflicted on the victim, who when asked who caused them
spontaneously pointed to her mother and live in partner.
That sometime may have lapsed between the infliction of the
injuries and the disclosure, it must however, be pointed out
in uniformity as to the interval of the time that should
separate the occurrence of the starling event from the
making of the declarations. What is necessary is that the
injuries sustained by the victim prior to the incident was
inflicted by the mother and live in partner.
People v. Tampus
P and his companion were charged with the murder of D. P
and his companion admitted to the guard upon their
surrender claiming that the murder was motivated by
revenge. The officer of the day investigated the incident
right away. In his written report submitted on the same day,
it was established that P and his companion stabbed the
victim inside the comfort room on the chest and neck. Two
days after the killing, another prison guard investigated P
and his companion and obtained their extrajudicial
confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted the
victim. P’s counsel however, contends that such testimony
should not be admissible as it violates P’s right to have a
counsel and to remain silent, is the counsel correct?
No.
The truth is that, even before Lahoz investigated the killing, P
and his companion had already admitted to the killing, after
coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they
surrendered to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom
they encountered, and they revealed to him that they
committed an act of revenge. The spontaneous statement,
elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae
and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt.
People vs. Sace
P while under the influence of alcohol, was accused of rape
and murder of AAA. He admitted to the commission of the
crime upon interviewed by a barangay tanod. Is such
admission admissible?
Yes.
Under the Revised Rule on Evidence, a declaration is deemed
part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur:
1.) The principal act, the res gestae, is a starling
occurrence;
2.) The statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise;
3.) The statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstance.
In the case at bar, all these requisites were present. P had
just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence,
AAA’s death. His admission was made while he was still under
the influence of said starling occurrence and before he had
an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story.
People vs. Lauga
P is accused of raping her own minor daughter. The victim
informed her brother, and later they informed their
grandmother of the occurrence of the bestial act. They later
sought the help of a certain Moises Boy Banting, a bantay
bayan with their precarious situation. Moises later found P
in his house, and invited him to the police station. At the
32 | P a g e
police outpost, P admitted the crime because he was unable
to control himself. P contends that such admission should
not be admissible as evidence, as he was not assisted by a
lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.
Is he proper?
Yes.
The law provides that the bantay bayan are recognized by the
local government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay levels.
In the case at bar, without ruling on the legality of the actions
performed by Moises, any inquiry he makes has the color of a
state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided
for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise
known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. The extrajudicial
confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
is inadmissible as evidence.
People v. Tulagan
P and his companions are accused of stabbing the victim
that led to his death. The court convicted P on the
admission of Valentin de Guzman to Natalia Macaraeg on
the circumstance of the murder, was the action of the court
proper?
No.
Section 36, Rule 130 provides that statements made by a
person while a starling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
res gestae.
In the case at bar, the statement is not admissible as part of
the res gestae; and considered as an oral confession; it is
admissible only against Valentin de Guzman, not against any
other person. More importantly, not every statement made
on the occasion of a startling occurrence is admissible as part
of res gestae; only such that appear involuntary and
spontaneous wrung are admissible.
DBP Pool vs. Radio Mindanao Network Inc.
R, is a radio broadcasting company that has radio stations all
over the country. P is an insurance company, R and P later
entered into a fire insurance contract where R insured his
transmitter, furniture, fixtures and other facilities. P’s radio
station later was burned down due to the acts of the
Communist Party (REBELS) and thus R does not want to pay
the amount, as it is an exception as provided for in the
contract. The court of the strength of the testimony of the
witnesses, who are law enforcement officers, held that it
was the REBELS who are responsible after a thorough
investigation, and thus awarded judgment in favor of P. Is
the testimony of the law enforcement officers admissible?
No.
The Rules of Court provide, under Sec. 42, Rule 130.
Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and
giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of res
gestae.
In the case cited, it shows that these statements were made
by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot be
said however, that these utterances were made
spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar
and Lt. Col. Torres received the bystanders’ statements while
they were making their investigations during and after the
fire. It is reasonable to assume that when these statements
were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time
and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and
exchange information, not to mention theories and
speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting
situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot
therefore be ascertained whether these utterances were the
products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk
is not remote.
Borromeo vs. CA
P is the administrator of the estate of S, the heirs of S and A
argue over a land in question, the heirs of S claim that an
equitable mortgage was intended instead of an absolute
sale as shown by the inadequacy of the price tendered. C
the daughter of S claims that she was present while the
transaction took place, and that the transaction was truly
intended as a mortgage, when her father S borrowed money
from A. C intends to present her testimony with the notes
that were drafter on that faithful day. Is it admissible as
evidence?
Yes.
According to the law, statements acts or conducts
accompanying or so nearly connected with the main ion as to
form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate qualify, or the
act, are admissible as part of res gestae. The attendant
circumstances and the statements then made by the pudes
are admissible as part of res gestae to show the execution of
a contract, and, where relevant, matters said and done which
are parts of res gestae of the negotiation and execution of a
contract and the relation of the parties. Matters attendant
upon a sale or conveyance may also be admissible part of the
res gestae.
In the case at bar, the testimony of C may nor, be free from
bias, she being the daughter of the deceased S, the same
should not, however, be totally rejected on the ground alone,
considering that it appears to be clearly and sufficiently
supported by memoranda which, as already stated are
admissible in evidence.
ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
33 | P a g e
 Aznar v. Citibank
G.R. No. 164273
Aznar decided to treat his family for an Asian Tour using his
Citibank credit card. When they were in Kuala Lumpur, they
decided to purchases things to which the credit card was
dishonored for over the limit. Eventually the travel agency
further dishonored the card and even mentioned that the
petitioner be a swindler. In that note, they decided to go
back Philippines and instantly filed a complaint for
damages.
To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar
presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT,
issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with the signature
of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his
card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over
the limit, banking this contention with Section 43 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court as his legal basis. On the other
hand, to prove that they did not blacklist Aznar's card,
Citibank's Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores,
presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained
the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar's
trip.
The trial court held that as between the computer print-out
16 presented byAznar and the Warning Cancellation
Bulletins 17 presented by Citibank, the latter had more
weight as their due execution and authenticity were duly
established by Citibank
Whether or not Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence is applicable in the case at bar to support the
admissibility of Exhibit G.
NO.
Re-stating Section 43 of Rule 130, it reads:
Said provision reads:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at,
or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC, there appears on the
computer print-out the name of a certain "Victrina Elnado
Nubi" and a signature purportedly belonging to her, and at
the left dorsal side were handwritten the words "Sorry for
the delay since the records had to be retrieved. Regards.
Darryl Mario." It is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who
encoded the information stated in the print-out and was the
one who printed the same. The handwritten annotation
signed by a certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was
Mario who printed the same and only handed the print-out
to Nubi. The identity of the entrant, required by the provision
above mentioned, was therefore not established. Neither did
petitioner establish in what professional capacity did Mario
or Nubi make the entries, or whether the entries were made
in the performance of their duty in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
Canque v. CA
G.R. No. 96202
RDC Construction entered into 2 contracts with Socor
Contruction as sub-contractor for her projects with the
government. On May 28, 1986, Socor sent a bill marked as
Exhibit C representing the balance of Canque for materials
delivered and services rendered by Socor under the two
contracts. However, Canque refused to pay, claiming that
private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts.
Hence, Socor brought a suit in the RTC to recover from the
Canque. During the trial, Socor presented Dolores Aday, its
bookkeeper to testify on the entries of their Book of
Collectible Accounts. RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Socor, citing Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court and
argues that the entries in question constitute "entries in the
course of business" sufficient to prove deliveries made for
the government projects. Canque however, argues that the
entries in Socor's Book of Collectible Accounts cannot take
the place of the delivery receipts and that such entries are
mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible.
The question is whether the entries in the
Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) constitute competent
evidence to show such delivery.
No.
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books
requires the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the
country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in
the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in
the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral
or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty. 16
As petitioner points out, the business entries in question do
not meet the first and third requisites. Dolores Aday, who
made the entries, was presented by private respondent to
testify on the account of RDC Construction. It was in the
course of her testimony that the entries were presented and
marked in evidence. There was, therefore, neither
justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries
as the person who made them was available to testify in
court.
ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
Jose v. Michaelmar Shipping Services
G.R. No. 169606
34 | P a g e
Michaelmar Philippines engaged the services of Jose, Jr. as
oiler of M/T Limar. In connection with the employment
contract, Jose, Jr. signed the declaration on the no alcohol,
no drug policy of the company. A random sample was
conducted on all officers and crew members of the vessel,
and subsequently found that Jose was positive of Marijuana.
Hence, he was repatriated to the Philippines. Jose filed a
complaint against Michaelmar for Illegal Dismissal, on the
ground that the Drug Test result contain no signature of the
person who conducted the drug examination, which was
contention found support in the decision of the NLRC.
Whether or not there is no just cause for his dismissal
because the drug test result is unsigned by the doctor.
In Canque v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the
requisites for admission in evidence of entries in the course
of business: (1) the person who made the entry is dead,
outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were
made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer; (3) the person who made the entry was in a position to
know the facts stated in the entries; (4) the entries were
made in a professional capacity or in the performance of a
duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
Here, all the requisites are present: (1) Dr. Heath is outside
the country; (2) the entries were made near the time the
random drug test was conducted; (3) Dr. Heath was in a
position to know the facts made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath
made the entries in his professional capacity and in the
performance of his duty; and (5) the entries were made in
the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
The fact that the drug test result is unsigned does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Jose, Jr. was not found
positive for marijuana.
Lao v. Standard Insurance Co.
G.R. No. 140023
Lao was an owner of a truck insured by Standard Insurance.
The subject truck met an accident sometime in April 1985,
which led Lao to file an Insurance claim for the proceeds of
his policy.
The insurance company denied the claim having found out
after their independent investigation that the truck driver of
the insured vehicle did not possess a valid Driver’s license,
as shown in the police blotter. Lao contended that the
police blotter is not admissible and lacks probative value
considering that the testimony of the investigating
policeman does not match the blotter after testifying that a
different person was indeed behind the wheels during the
incident and not Leonardo Anit who failed to possess a
driver’s license.
Whether a Police Blotter is admissible as evidence and has a
probative value considering that the entry therein was
belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony
of the investigating policeman himself.
Yes.
Entries in police records made by a police officer in the
performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative
value may be either substantiated or nullified by other
competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little
probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and
considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute
the facts stated therein.
In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the
information subject of the controversy.
Wallem Maritime v. NLRC
G.R. No. 108433. October 15, 1996
Hired by Wallem Shipmanagement, Joselito Macatuno,
private respondent, was a seaman on board the
M/T Fortuna of Liberian registry.
While the vessel was at the port of Kawasaki, Japan, an
altercation took place between Macatuno and Gurimbao, a
fellow Filipino against a cadet/apprentice officer of the same
nationality as the captain of the vessel. The altercation was
caused by the private respondent and another crewmember
who were arguing when the latter insisted to shove and
throw dirty oil to Japanese waters, to the former’s strong
opposition. The captain witnessed the altercation and
entered the incident in the tanker’s logbook. He summoned
the two Filipinos at his cabin. The
captain told them to pack their things as their services are b
eing terminated. As a consequence, the
two were repatriated to the Philippines where they lodged
complaints for illegal dismissal with the POEA.
Petitioners contend that the two Filipinos had been
delinquent on board the vessel as shown by the records of
the captain’s logbook.
Whether a copy of an official entry in the ship captain's
logbook can be used as a vital evidence in the dismissal of
respondent seamen provided that an investigation was
conducted before the dismissal.
No.
No investigation was conducted by the ship captain before
repatriating private respondent, the contents of the logbook
have to be duly identified and authenticated lest an injustice
result from a blind adoption of such contents which merely
serve as prima facie evidence of the incident in question.
Moreover, what was presented in the Haverton Shipping case
was a copy of the official entry from the logbook itself. In this
case, petitioners did not submit as evidence to the POEA the
logbook itself, or even authenticated copies of pertinent
pages thereof, which could have been easily xeroxed or
photocopied considering the present technology on
reproduction of documents. What was offered in evidence
was merely a typewritten collation of excerpts from
what could be the logbook because by their format, they
35 | P a g e
could have been lifted from other records kept in the vessel
in accordance with Article 612 of the Code of Commerce.|||
Manalo v. Robles Transportation
The plaintiffs are parents of the deceased 11 year old kid
who was ran over by a taxi in an accident. They filed the
action against the taxicab company to enforce its subsidiary
liability.
To prove their case, the plaintiffs introduced a copy of the
decision in the criminal case convicting the driver of
homicide through reckless imprudence, the writs of
execution to enforce the civil liability, and the returns of the
sheriff showing that the two writs of execution were not
satisfied because of the insolvency of the driver, the sheriff
being unable to locate any property in his name.
The appellant also claims that in admitting as evidence the
sheriff's return of the writs of execution to prove the
insolvency of Hernandez, without requiring said official's
appearance in court, it was deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine said sheriff.|||
Whether or not the Sheriff’s Return of the Writ of Execution
is covered by the Official Records rules and thus an
exception to the hearsay rule.
Yes.
A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public
official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
and forming part of official records, and is prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. (Rule 39, section 11 and
Rule 123, section 35, Rules of Court.) The sheriff making the
return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his
entry.
Herce v. Municipality of Cabuyao
A certain parcel of land was made a subject of dispute, to
which parcel was situated in Cabuyao Laguna. Petitioner on
the said dispute was awarded with the subject property.
Meanwhile, Municipality of Cabuyao filed, on May 15, 1996,
a petition for the reconstitution of its alleged title over the
disputed property before the RTC Laguna, arguing that it
was issued a decree of registration over the said property as
early as 1911.
Petitioner asserts that there is no record of Decree No. 4244
that was purportedly issued in favor of the municipality on
March 3, 1911 other than the entry in the Ordinary
Registration Book of the LRA. Petitioner insists that the lack
of documentary proof and the fact that respondent
municipality never had possession of the subject property
prove that it never owned the disputed property.
Whether or not the entry in the Ordinary Decree Book,
showing that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911
is not a sufficient documentary proof to prove the fact that
the Municipality has acquired title over the subject
property.
No.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given
to the entries made therein could be grounded on (1) the
sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement
made, (2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of
that duty, (3) the routine and disinterested origin of most
such statements, and (4) the publicity of record which makes
more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary
Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree
No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911, is presumed to have
been regularly issued by the accountable public officers who
enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the performance
of their functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the
issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality of
Cabuyao cannot be overturned without any countervailing
proof to the contrary.
Fernandez v. CA
G.R. No. 108366
X and Y filed a case against Z for Recognition and Support.
X and Y presented the following documentary evidence:
1. Certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Z as
their father;
2. The baptismal certificate of X which also states that
Z is his father;
3. Photographs of Z taken during the baptism of X;
and
4. Pictures of respondent Z and X taken at the home
of the mother of X.
X and Y also presented the following testimonial evidence:
1. Three (3) witnesses, who told the trial court that
the mother of X and Y had, at different times, introduced Z
to them as her "husband".
2. The priest who administered the baptismal rites
who testified that Z was the one who presented himself as
the father of X during the latter's baptism.
Are these evidence sufficient proof of filiation or paternity?
NO. The evidence is insufficient to prove filiation or paternity.
1. The certificates of live birth of X and Y identifying Z
as their father are not competent evidence on the issue of
their paternity. The records do not show that Z had a hand in
the preparation of said certificates.
2. The baptismal certificates of X naming Z as his father
has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that Z
participated in its preparation. In Berciles vs. Systems, et al.
128 SCRA 53 (1984):
“As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is
that although the baptismal record of a natural child
describes her as a child of the record the decedent had
no intervening, the baptismal record cannot be held to
36 | P a g e
be a voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The reason
for this rule that canonical records do not constitute the
authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to
prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such
canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which
the priest may certify by reason of his personal
knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence,
like the administration of the sacrament upon a day
stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record
with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of
prior and distinct facts which require separate and
concrete evidence.”
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), the
Court also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the
veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
3. X and Y cannot rely on the photographs showing the
presence of Z in the baptism of X. These photographs are far
from proofs that Z is the father of X. As explained by Z, he was
in the baptism as one of the sponsors of X. The latter's
testimony was corroborated by another sponsor.
4. The pictures taken in the house of the mother of X
and Y showing Z showering affection to X fall short of the
evidence required to prove paternity. As held in Tan vs.
Trocio, 192 SCRA 764:
“. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness
Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual
closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing
with him and giving him paternity. The same must be
said of . . . (the) pictures of Jewels and Respondent
showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other.
Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and
much less would prove violation of complaint's person
and honor.” (Emphasis supplied)
5. Their mother's testimony is highly suspect as it is
self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity
of X and Y.
6. X and Y capitalize on the testimony of the priest who
solemnized the baptismal ceremony of X. However, there is
no proof that the priest is a close friend of X and Y's mother,
and Z, which should render unquestionable his identification
of Z during X's baptism. In the absence of this proof, the
Court does not concede that the said priest who officiates
numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can
remember the parents of the children he has baptized.
In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Locsin
G.R. No. 146737
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven
(11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.[1] died
intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E.
Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration"
(docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that
he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
the deceased.
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992,
the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin,
Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the
lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondents petition for letters of administration. They
averred that respondent is not a child or an
acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin,
who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to
be appointed administrator of the intestate estate,
respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as
Exhibit "D")[3] of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
found in the bound volume of birth records in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit
"D" contains the information that respondent's father is
Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of
the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures
(Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and
authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from
which Exhibit "D" was machine copied, respondent
presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City. She produced and identified in court the
bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the
alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is
included.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They
submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General,
Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8",[5] indicating that
the birth of respondent was reported by his mother,
Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain
the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed
as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born
on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on
January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth
No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1,
1958 revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8"
appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before
respondent's birth. This scenario clearly suggests that
Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as
witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He
testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and
Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City)
appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") are forgeries. He thus concluded that the said
Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously
inserted into the bound volume of birth records of the
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
Which of the two documents - Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine?
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil
Registry, a copy of which is transmitted to the Civil
Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is
37 | P a g e
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
However, if there are material discrepancies between
them, the one entered in the Civil Registry General
prevails.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section
23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that
"(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this
case, the glaring discrepancies between the two
Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have
overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the
Local Civil Registry.
What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil
Registry General.
Africa v. Caltex
G.R. No. 12986
In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the
Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal
Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed
from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the
opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose
was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses.
The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and
heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged
owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the agent in
charge of its operation, for damages
The reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fir
e Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Portions of the first two reports ar
e as follows:
1. Police Department report: —
Investigation disclosed that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18, 19
48, while Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a ta
nk truck, plate No. T-5292 into the underground tank of the
Caltex Gasoline Station located at the corner of Rizal Avenue
and Antipolo Street, this City, an unknown Filipino lighted a
cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main v
alve of the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline fume
s, fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of Leandro Flores in pull
ing off the gasoline hose connecting the truck with the unde
rground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, the fl
ames scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline wa
s spouting. It burned the truck and the following accessorias
and residences.
2. The Fire Department report: —
In connection with their allegation that the premises was (si
c) subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and cigarette
stand, the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a ph
otograph taken during the fire and which is submitted here
with. it appears in this picture that there are in the premises
a coca-cola cooler and a rack which according to informatio
n gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and m
atches, installed between the gasoline pumps and the under
ground tanks.
Are the reports admissible in evidence?
No.
There are three requisites for admissibility under the Section
44 of Rule 130: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer
, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) t
hat it was made by the public officer in the performance of hi
s duties, or by such other person in the performance of a dut
y specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or o
ther person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stat
ed, which must have been acquired by him personally or thro
ugh official information.
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be consi
dered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the report
s as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not withi
n the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the i
nvestigation.
Was knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them thr
ough official information? As to some facts the sources there
of are not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo
Medina, referred to as an employee at the gas station were t
he fire occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver of the tank truck fr
om which gasoline was being transferred at the time to the u
nderground tank of the station; and to respondent Mateo Bo
quiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V-Africa, give any
reason as to the origin of the fire.
To qualify their statements as "official information" acquired
by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who m
ade the statements not only must have personal knowledge o
f the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statem
ents for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by th
e reporting officers through official information, not having b
een given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
Barcelon, Roxas Securities v. CIR
G.R. 157064
38 | P a g e
X, a corporation engaged in the trading of securities. It filed
an Annual Income Tax Return year, 1987 on 14 April 1988.
BIR issued an assessment for deficiency income tax of
P826,698.31 covered under Formal Assessment Notice No.
FAN-1-87-91-000649. However, petitioner denies having
received an assessment notice from respondent.
Respondent presented the BIR record book where the name
of the taxpayer, the kind of tax assessed, the registry receipt
number and the date of mailing were noted. The BIR
records custodian, Ingrid Versola, also testified that she
made the entries.
Is the BIR record book and the testimony of its record
custodian, Ingrid Versola, admissible as entries of official
records?
No.
In the case of Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc, Supreme Court held
that there are three requisites for admissibility under the rule
just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that
the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of
the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by
him personally or through official information.
In the case at bar , the entries made by Ingrid Versola were
not based on her personal knowledge as she did not attest to
the fact that she personally prepared and mailed the
assessment notice. Nor was it stated in the transcript of
stenographic notes how and from whom she obtained the
pertinent information. Moreover, she did not attest to the
fact that she acquired the reports from persons under a legal
duty to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds
no application in the present case. Thus, the evidence offered
by respondent does not qualify as an exception to the rule
against hearsay evidence. Furthermore, independent
evidence, such as the registry receipt of the assessment
notice, or a certification from the Bureau of Posts, could have
easily been obtained. Yet respondent failed to present such
evidence.
** The right of the government to assess and collect the
alleged deficiency tax is barred by prescription. The evidence
offered by the respondent fails to convince this Court that
Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 was
released, mailed, or sent before 15 April 1991, or before the
lapse of the period of limitation upon assessment and
collection prescribed by Section 203 of the NIRC. Such
evidence is insufficient to give rise to the presumption that
the assessment notice was received in the regular course of
mail.
Salmon, Dexter and Co v. Wijangco
G.R. No. L-21649
On Oct. 8, 1920, a contract was entered into between A and
B for the purchase and sale of a tractor and threshing
machine upon the conditions specified in said contract. The
price of the machineries sold Is P12,400, payable by
installments as follows: P400 at the signing of the contract
sale, to wit, October 8, 1920; P4,000 upon the delivery of
said machineries by B to A; another P4,000 on June 15,
1921, and, finally, another P4,000 on December 15, 1921. A
claims payment for the tractor with legal interest. B denies
generally and specifically the facts alleged in the complaint
and alleged that
(a) That the tractor and threshing machine, which is
the subject-matter of the contract set out in the second
paragraph of the first cause of action and which was sold by
A to B, does not meet the conditions specified and
guaranteed in the aforesaid contract of sale (b) That in the
month of April, 1921, B has notified A of the fact that the
threshing machine sold to him pursuant to the contract
above referred to could not thresh 300 cavans per day, as
was guaranteed in said contract, and offered to return the
aforesaid tractor and threshing machine, but A, without
answering said offer, let the time elapse until the filing of
the herein complaint.(c) That all the amounts claimed in the
herein complaint are based on the contract set out in
paragraph 2 of the first cause of action, which as above
stated, was violated by A.
Is the certificate issued by the Director of Agriculture is
admissible in evidence as an official document issued by a
public officer authorized by law?
Yes.
The statistics prepared by the Bureau of Agriculture is chiefly
based on the quarterly reports of the municipal presidents
made pursuant to section 2202 of the Administrative Code,
which provides:
The president of each municipality shall, upon forms to be
supplied by the Director of Agriculture, and in such detail as
shall be required by him, make quarterly reports of the
condition of agriculture and live stock in his municipality, and
of such other matters as relate to the development of those
interests.
The reports so made shall be submitted to the municipal
council, and, if approved, a copy thereof shall be forwarded
to the office of the provincial governor, a second copy to the
representative from the district, a third copy to the Director
of Agriculture, and a fourth copy shall be filed in the office of
the municipal secretary.
Under such circumstances, we hold that the certificate issued
by the Director of Agriculture is admissible in evidence as an
official document issued by a public officer authorized by law.
Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, vol. 3, section 1636,
speaking of exceptions to the rule as to the inadmissibility of
hearsay evidence, among other things, says:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Certificates. — Every officer has an implied duty or
authority to prepare and deliver out to an applicant a
certificate stating anything which has been done or observed
by him or exists in his office by virtue of some authority or
duty, and the certificate is admissible.
39 | P a g e
 Tarapen v. People
G.R. No. 173824
X was charged before the RTC of Baguio City with Frustrated
Homicide for attacking and assaulting Y.The day after, the
victim died from the injuries he sustained. As a
consequence, an amended information was filed charging
petitioner with Homicide.
The trial court convicted X of Homicide. The trial court
found the prosecution’s version of the incident credible. The
trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court convicting
petitioner.
The defense tries to destroy the version of witnesses that
the victim was hit from behind by arguing that same is not
corroborated by medical findings. Witnesses’ claim that Y
was hit on the right side of the head was, according to the
defense, negated by the findings of Dr. Mensalvas that Y
suffered injuries on the "left frontoparietal and left
frontotemporo parietal" areas of his head. The findings of
Dr. Mensalvas mean that the victim was facing X when hit by
the shovel contrary to the prosecution’s claim that Y was hit
by X from behind.
Which medical findings should this Court believe?
The SC gives more weight to the medical certificate of Dr.
Cala, because the same was issued by a government doctor.
By actual practice, only government physicians, by virtue of
their oaths as civil service officials, are competent to examine
persons and issue medical certificates which will be used by
the government. As such, the medical certificate carries the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions
and duties.
Moreover, under Section 44, Rule 130, Revised Rules of
Court, entries in official records made in the performance of
official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. Dr. Cala’s findings that the victim sustained injuries on
the right side of his head are, therefore, conclusive in the
absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this case. We
cannot consider the contents of the medical certificate issued
by Dr. Mensalvas sufficient to controvert the findings of Dr.
Cala. As held by this Court, an unverified medical certificate
not issued by a government physician is unreliable.
Even assuming arguendo that we give more weight to the
medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas, this does not
mean that the testimonies of witnesses shall be disbelieved.
It is noted that Dr. Mensalvas testified that the victim
sustained a wound on the right side of his head, possibly
caused by a steel shovel. Such a finding is consistent with the
claim of witnesses that the victim was hit on the right side of
the head. Though there can be inconsistencies of the
testimonies of the witnesses with Dr. Mensalvas’s other
findings (i.e., injuries on the left portion of the head) this
does not mean that we should totally doubt and discard the
other portions of their testimonies.
Department of Justice v. Michael Alfio Pennis
G.R. No. 169958
Mike Pen was born in Queensland, Australia to Al Pen, an
Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos, allegedly a Filipino
citizen. In March 1999, He filed a petition for recognition as
Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI).
BI Associate Commissioner issued an order granting Mike
Pen’s petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. In a
2nd Indorsement, the Secretary of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) disapproved the order. However, upon submission of
additional documents, BI Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez
granted the order.
Thereafter, Mike Pen was drafted and played for the Red
Bull, a professional basketball team in the Philippine
Basketball Association (PBA).
Later on, the Senate Committees jointly submitted
Committee Report recommending, among other things, that
(1) the BI conduct summary deportation proceedings
against several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including
respondent; and (2) the DOJ Secretary conduct an
immediate review of all orders of recognition. Respondent
was included in the list on the ground that verification on
the authenticity of the above documents reveals highly
suspicious circumstances.
His alleged mother and other relatives, are not known and
have never existed in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
According to the affidavits executed by Barangay Captain
Ramon Soliman and Barangay Treasurer Condrado P. Peralta
of the abovementioned place, there are no Quintoses or
Tomedas that have lived or have resided in the said
barangay.
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in finding that respondent is a
Filipino citizen.
The petition has no merit
SC affirmed the decision of CA. In this case, the SC sustain the
CA that the evidence presented before the BI and the DOJ
have more probative value and must prevail over the
statements of Soliman and Peralta before the Senate
Committee.
His mother’s certificate of birth in the civil registrar of Nueva,
Ecija was issued on the basis of an application for late
registration, which is ten (10) years after the date of birth.
The SC agree with the CA that while the affidavits of Soliman
and Peralta might have cast doubt on the validity of Quintos
Certificate of Live Birth, such certificate remains valid unless
declared invalid by competent authority. The Rule stands that
documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
40 | P a g e
evidence of the facts stated therein.
LEARNED TREATISE
Seguritan v. People
G.R. 172896
A was charged with homicide when he inflicted head injuries
which caused the death of his neighbor B.
Prosecution’s version of events: A punched the left and right
temple of the victim, causing the latter to fall and hit his
head on a hollow block used as a makeshift stove;
The defense’s version: the victim was about to punch him
but fell down due to a heart attack, hit his head on the
hollow block; he also presented the Municipal Health Officer
who signed the certificate that the cause of death was
cardiac arrest
The lower court convicted the A of the crime of homicide
based on the eyewitness testimony of C, B’s uncle,which is
consistent with the autopsy findings
Did the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC
convicting him of homicide on the basis of the autopsy
findings and eyewitness testimony?
Yes.
Factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great
weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings
are supported by substantial evidence on record.
OPINION RULE
Chinabank v. CA
For failure of Atty. A to settle his obligation with the bank,
the latter foreclosed the mortgage by which the loan was
secured and an auction sale was then scheduled. The
property subject of the mortgage was however owned by R.
R was subsequently surprised to receive a foreclosure notice
from the notary public and denied having signed the
documents as surety. R claimed that she was made to
believe to sign the documents as a mere witness to the
execution of the documents and that she could not have
read its contents as she was blind, through the testimony of
her children. The bank, in its defense, interposed that R’s
heirs could have easily submitted a medical certificate
attesting to the supposed blindness of R or made an
opthamologist take the witness stand. Rule on the bank’s
contention.
The bank’s contention is not correct.
The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert
witnesses applies only to such matters clearly within the
domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which may be
testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Thus, to prove
whether one is blind, it is not necessary to submit a medical
certificate attesting to the blindness or to require an expert
witness, such as an ophthalmologist, to testify to such fact,
since the fact of blindness can be determined through
common knowledge and by anyone with sufficient familiarity
of such fact.
In this case, Avelina, then alive during the trial of the case,
categorically testified and attested to her own blindness.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes
P and R got married and lived with respondent’s family who
shouldered the couple’s living expenses. When their first
child was born, financial difficulties started. Trying to prove
his worth, he quit work from his family employment and
ventured on his own. However, his businesses failed so
petitioner became the single-income earner of the
household. When things did not work out according to his
plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such as
stubbornness sarcasm and drug intake. This became the
source of their marital conflicts. One time, petitioner
confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital
affair. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only
unable to provide financially for their family, but he was,
more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful
to her and their family. One of the last episodes that sealed
the fate of their marriage was a surgical operation on
petitioner to which the respondent remained indifferent.
This urged petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the
latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Testimonies of two clinical psychologists and a
psychiatrist was presented in evidence during trial which
made the trial court reach into a decision of declaring the
marriage between the parties null and void. Are the expert
witnesses’ testimony admissible?
Yes.
The lack of personal examination and interview of
respondent, or any other person diagnoses with personality
disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the
doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. For
another, the doctors’ assessment were not based solely on
the narration of personal interview of the petitioner but also
on the testimonies of other informants who were closely
related to respondent. Moreover, even without the experts’
conclusions, the factual antecedents alleged in the petition
and established during trial (totality of evidence), all point to
the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated.
Roxas v. Arroyo
P, an American citizen of Filipino descent originally joined an
immersion in conducting initial health survey in Tarlac when
she was abducted. She was then blindfolded, taken to what
she believed was a military camp and was detained there for
allegedly being a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines – New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). Her detention
was coupled with several interrogations and days of torture.
After she was released, she sought sanctuary by filing a
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petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data and
impleaded public officials on the belief that it was
government agents who were behind her abduction and
torture. The appellate court stressed that petitioner merely
believed that the military was behind her abduction thus
absolved the public respondents. Rule on the weight and
sufficiency of P’s testimony.
P’s testimony is merely circumstantial.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to
parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement
depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other
pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving
the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct
evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred
over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote
and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and
directly ascertain.
Capili v. Cardana
J, a school child was walking along the perimeter fence of
her school when a branch of caimito tree fell on her, causing
her death Her parents then filed a case for damages against
the school principal, alleging that the latter took no action in
cutting the tree despite being reported on the possible
danger the tree posed to passerby. The principal denied the
accusation saying that she did not know that the tree was
already dead and rotting. The trial court dismissed the
complaint for failure of the J’s parents to establish
negligence on the part of the principal. Is the court’s
decision correct?
No.
The fact, however, that J, died as a result of the dead and
rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree
was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls
for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident
was of such character as to warrant an inference that it
would not have happened except for the defendant’s
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management
or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling
of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the
death of J was a result of principal’s negligence, being in
charge of the school.
Santos v. NSO
P filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against R for failure
to pay its monthly rentals. In its defense, R contended that P
does not have the right to receive the rental payment, he
having lost the property through an extrajudicial foreclosure
from his failure to settle his loan obligation with Chinabank.
P contended that the rule on estoppel, as a conclusive
presumption, applies to this case because there is nothing
to show that his title to the subject property had expired, or
had been conveyed to another, or had been defeated by a
title paramount and that the dispute between him and
China Bank concerning the ownership of the subject
property is still pending litigation. Is P’s contention correct?
No.
The rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to a
qualification. It does not apply if the landlord’s title has
expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been
defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the
commencement of lessor-lessee relationship. Thus, it can be
said that there was a change in the nature of petitioner’s title
during the subsistence of the lease that the rule on estoppel
against tenants does not apply in this case. Petitioner’s
reliance on said conclusive presumption must, therefore,
necessarily fail since there was no error on the part of the CA
when it entertained respondent’s assertion of a title adverse
to petitioner.
Marquez v. Fernandez
An administrative complaint was filed against R, a
stenographer, for her frequent unauthorized absences and
tardiness. The DTR from September to November 2004
showed that she had incurred tardiness/undertime almst
everyday and at some point, when it was indicated that she
was on vacation leave, there were no prior notices for the
leaves, as required by the rules. R then submitted a medical
certificate stating that she was treated at a hospital for her
medical problems. Verification with the hospital, however,
revealed otherwise and was shown that her medical
certificate had been allegedly falsified. Rule on the
presumption. Rule on the culpability of R.
The facts and evidence, coupled with respondent’s
admission, sufficiently established her culpability.
Rule 131, Sec. 3 on the rules of evidence enumerated the
disputable presumptions which will prove satisfactory if
uncontradicted by other evidence such as the innocence of a
person of a crime or wrong.
Although there is a disputable presumption that R is innocent
of a wrong, regarding her supposed justifiable absences, her
use of a falsified medical certificate proved otherwise. R’s use
of a false medical certificate constitutes an act of dishonesty
under Civil Service Rules. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and
falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting
the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the
first offense.
Century Savings Bank v. Samonte
Spoused R obtained a loan from the bank secured by a deed
of real estate mortgage. For failure to settle their obligation
42 | P a g e
despite repeated demands, the same was extrajudicially
foreclosed.The public auction sale took place with P as the
winning and highest bidder. The spouses subsequently
executed a contract of lease. After some time, the spouses
interposed the validity of the auction sale on the ground
that it failed to comply with the posting requirements. P
argued that the publication of the notice of sale already
constitutes sufficient compliance with the notice
requirements. Is the auction sale valid?
Yes.
It is an elementary rule that the "burden of proof is the duty
of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary
to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law." In Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, the Court
explicitly ruled that foreclosure proceedings enjoy the
presumption of regularity and that the mortgagor who
alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of proving such
fact.
PRESUMPTIONS
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Metro Star Suprema,
Inc.
GR No. 185371
A Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy issued by Revenue
District No 67 was served upon Metro Star demanding
payment of deficiency value-added tax and withholding tax
payment in the amount of P292,874.16. Metro Star filed a
petition for review with the CTA denying that it received a
Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) and claiming that it
was not accorded due process. The CTA ruled in favor Metro
Star for the CIR’s failure to discharge its duty and present
any evidence to show that indeed the former received the
PAN.
Was the CTA correct?
Yes, the CTA was correct.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that while a letter is
deemed received by the addressee in the course of the mail,
this is merely a disputable presumption subject to
controversion and a direct denial thereof shifts the burden to
the party favoured by the presumption to prove that the
mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee.
The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are (a) that
the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid, and
(b) that it was mailed. Once these facts are proved, the
presumption is that the letter was received by the addressee
as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the
ordinary course of the mail. But if one of the said facts fails to
appear, the presumption does not lie.
In this case, the CIR could have simply presented the registry
receipt or the certification from the postmaster that it mailed
the PAN, but failed. Neither did it offer any explanation on
why it failed to comply with the requirement of the service of
the PAN.
Alferez v. People of the Philippines
GR No. 182301
Alferez was charged with three counts of violation of BP 22
for issuing three unfunded checks in the total amount of
P830,998.40 as payment of the construction materials e
purchased from Cebu ABC Sales. Instead of presenting
evidence, Alferez filed a Demurer to Evidence approximately
tn months fter the prosecution rested its case and averred
that the prosecution failed to show that he received the
notice of dishonour or demand letter. The trial court denied
the Demurer to Evidence and adjudged ALferez as guilty of
the crime charged. The CA denied Alferez’ appeal. It that the
registry receipt and the return card adequately show the
fact of receipt of the Notice of Dishonor.
Is the registry receipt and registry return card alone without
presenting the the person who mailed and/or served the
demand letter is sufficient notice of dishonour as required
by BP 22?
No.
The presumption (knowledge of insufficient funds) arises
when it is proved that the issuer had received the notice, and
that within five banking days from its receipt, he failed to pay
the amount f the check or to make arrangements for its
payment. The full payment of the amount appearing in the
check within five banking day from notie of dishonour is a
complete defense. Accordingly, procedural due process
requires that a notice of dishonour be sent and received by
the petitioner to afford the opportunity to avert prosecution
under BP 22.
It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of
dishonour was sent to the petitioner. It is also incumbent
upon the prosecution to show that the drawer of the check
received the said notice because the fact of service provided
for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonour by the drawee of the check.
In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the
demand letter, together with the registry receipt and the
return card, allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there was
no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the
registry card. Receipts for registered letter and return
receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be
properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the
letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonour.
Heirs of Ocha v. G&S Transport Corporation
GR No. 170071
Jose Marcial Ochoa died on the night of March 10, 1995
while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G &
S Transport Corporation, a common carrier. The heirs of
Ochoa sent G & S a letter demanding that the latter
indemnify them for Jose’s death, his lost of earning capacity
and funeral expenses in the total amount of
P15,000,000.00. The then filed a Complaint for Damages
when G & S failed to heed on the demand letter. The heirs
43 | P a g e
alleged that G & S, as a common carrier is under legal
obligation to observe and exercise extraordinary diligence in
transporting its passengers to their destination safely and
securely. In its answer, G & S claimed that it exercised the
diligence required of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees including the
taxicab driver Padilla.
Is G & S liable as a common carrier for the breach of the
contract of carriage?
Yes.
“In a contract of carriage, it is resumed that the common
carrier is at fault when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact,
there is even no need for the court to make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common
carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by
evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.”
Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to overcome this
presumption. Both the trial court and the CA fund that the
accident which led to Jose Marcial’s death was due to the
reckless driving and gross negligence of G & S’ driver, Padilla,
thereby holding g & S liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for
breach of contract of carriage.
Metrobank v. Tobias III
GR No. 177780
Tobias applied for a loan from Metrobank and offered his
property covered by TCT No. M-16751 as collateral.
Metrobank approved a credit line of P40,000,000.00 and
caused the annotation of the deed of real estate mortgage
on the TCT referenced as Entry no. 26897. Tobias defaulted
on his loan obligation in which the mortgage was forclosed
and the property was sold to Metrobank as the highest
bidder. When the certificate of sale was presented for
registration to the Registry of Deeds – Malabon, no
corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found
in the registry vault. It was found that the Serial No.
4348590 appearing in TCT No. M-16751 had been issued to
TCT No. M-15363 in the name of another person. Upon
investigation by the PAOCTF, it was concluded that TCT M-
16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were
fictitious. Thus, a compliant foe Estafa through falsification
of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in
relation to Articles 172 (1) and 171 () of the Revised Penal
Code to which the city prosecutor found probable cause.
The DOJ granted the appeal of Tobias establishing good faith
in purchasing the subject property and ruled that the
presumption that the possessor of a falsified document was
the author of the falsification did not apply because it was
always subject to the qualification or reference as to the
approximate time of the commission of the falsification. In
the present case, Metrobank submits that the presumption
of authorship was sufficient to establish probable cause to
hold Tobias for trial; that the presumption applies when a
person is found in possession of the instrument, makes use
of it, and benefits from it; and that there is no requirement
that the legal presumption shall only apply in the absence of
a vli explanation from the person found to have possessed,
used and benefited from the forged document.
Is Metrobank correct?
No.
The presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be
accepted and acted upon where no evidence upholds the
contention for which it stands. The presumption that
whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger
applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.
IN this case, Tobias was able to explain on how he came to
possess the spurious document. Hence, the presumption
does not apply.
Abbas v. Abbas
GR No. 183896
Seyd, Pakistani citizen, filed for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Gloria, a Filipino citizen, on the ground of
the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article
4 of the Family Code. The that Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite issued a certification to the effect that the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage contact
of Seyd and Gloria, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the
number of another marriage license issued to a certain
Arlindo Getaldo and Myrna Mabalingan. Acting on Gloria’s
appeal, the CA held that the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent
search for the marriage license of Gloria and Seyd was
conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.
Was the CA correct?
No.
Under Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is
disputable presumption that an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence
to the contrary. The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.
In this case, no such affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus, the presumption
must stand. In fact, proof does exist that a diligent search
having been conducted, as Marriage License no. 996967 was
indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the
names in said license does not correspond to those of Gloria
and Seyd does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of their
office.
Heirs of Luna v. Afable
GR No. 188299
Petitioners were co-owners of a lot which was subjected to
compulsory acquisition in 1998 under the Comprehensive
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Agrarian Reform Program. They filed a Petition for the
Cancellation of CLOAs, Revocation of Notice of Valuation
and Acquisition and Upholding and Affirming the
Classification of the Subject Property and Declaring the
same outside the purview of RA 6657. The petition was
anchored on the reclassification of the subject land into a
light intensity industrial zone pursuant to Municipal
Ordinance No. 21 Series of 1981 as certified by the Office of
the Deputized Zoning Administrator, Urban Planning and
Development Office, thereby excluding the same from the
coverage of the agrarian law.
Does the certification proves that petitioners’ land falls
within the area classified as light intensity industrial zone?
Yes
The court is inclined to give more evidentiary weight to the
certification of the zoning administrator being the officer
having jurisdiction over the area where the land in question is
situated and is, therefore , more familiar with the property in
issue. Besides, this certification carried the presumption of
regularity in its issuance and respondent have the burden of
overcoming this presumption. Respondents, however, failed
to present any evidence to rebut that presumption.
People v. Laba
GR No. 199938, January 28, 2013
At the check-in area of the Manila Domestic Airport, a non-
uniformed personnel frisker physically searched the person
of Laba and asked the latter to remove his rubber shes
when he suspected something was inside it. Upon
inspection of the rubber shoes, the frisker discovered three
plastic sachets containing shabu – two on the left shoe and
one in the right shoe. Upon qualitative examination, the
confiscated sachets which contained a total of 196.63 grams
tested positive of metaylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. Laba was convicted for violation of Section
5, Article II of RA 9165.
Is Laba guilty of transporting dangerous drugs prohibited
under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165?
Yes.
It may be reasonable inferred from the Congres (in enacting
the law) taht if a person is found to have more than five (5)
grams of shabu in his possession, then his purpose in carrying
them is to dispose, traffic, or sell it.
“The presumption of the law is that, if he carries with him
more than five grams, that is not for his personal
consumption. He is out to traffic the rest of it”,
Representative Cuenco quoted.
In this case, Laba was apprehended inside the irport with a
substantial amount or 196.63 grams of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu in his possession.
LAYING THE PREDICATE
People v. Molo
GR No. L-44680
Molo was charged for murder for killing Venncio Gapisa. The
victim’s wife, Simeona Gapisa, was an eye-witness to the
alleged murder. Laba, in seeking for acquittal, questioned,
among his assignment of errors, the alleged inconsistencies
and incredible assertions in Simeona’s testimony. He
contends that inconsistencies eist between Simeona’s
statement given to the police and her testimony in court,
relative to (1) the precise moment when Simeona
recognized the accused and (2) whether there was a
conversation between Simeona and the accused.
Was Laba correct with regards to the credibility of Simeona?
No.
The records show, however, that the alleged statement given
to the police was neither offered as evidence nor shown to
the witness in order to enable her to explain the
discrepancies if any in accordance to Section 16, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. The proper bast was, therefore, not laid to
impeach Simeona’s testimony on the basis of alleged
inconsistent statements which she allegedly made before the
police.
At any rate, the inconsistencies were inconsequential.
Inconsistencies on minor details or on matters that are not of
material consequence as to affect the guilt or innocence of
the accused do not detract from the credibility of the
witnesses. The discordance in their testimonies on collateral
matters heightens their credibility and shows that their
testimonies are not coached or rehearsed. Far from being
evidence of falsehood, they could justifiably be regarded as a
demonstration of good faith.
People of the Philippines v. Buduhan
GR No. 178196
Robert Buduhan and Rudt Buduhan were found guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide with
respect to the deceased Larry Erese and of the crime of
homicide with respect tot he deceased Romualde Almeron.
The prosecution presented as witness among others Cherry
Rose Salazar, an employee of the establishment where the
crime was committed. On its appeal, appellants insist that
Cherry Rose is not a credible witness in view of the
conflicting answers she gave in her sowrn statement before
the police, in the preliminary investigation of the case and in
her testimony in an open court. Appellants called attention
to the fact that during the preliminary examination, Cherry
Rose stated a man wearing a white Giordano Tshirt shot
Larry and pointed out to Guinchicna as the man in white
shirt. However, in open court, she identified Robert as the
man who was wearing a white Giordano tshirt.
Do the inconsistencies of the witness affect her credibility?
No.
45 | P a g e
Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that “Before a witness can be impeached by
evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must
be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and
places and the persons present, and he must be asked
whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to
explain them If the statements be in writing they must be
shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them.”
The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid
before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a
witness is founded upon common sense and is essential to
protect the character of the witness.
In this case, the statements made by Cherry Rose during
preliminary investigation with respect to the identities of the
accused were not related to her during trial. No opportunity
was ever afforded he to provide an explanation. Without
such explanation, whether plausible or not, there is no basis
to evaluate and assess her credibility, on the rationale that i
is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness
in reconciling her conflicting declarations that she should be
deemed impeached.
REFERENCE TO MEMORANDUM
Figueras v. Serrano
GR No. 28208
Figueras filed an action to collect the balance of professional
fees for medicals services amounting to P52,229 with legal
interest plus moral damages and cost of action. According to
the complaint, the services for which compensation was
claimed consist in medical attendance during 1919, 1920
and 1921, on Primitiva Serrano as well as her father Leandro
Serrano , for which purpose the plaintiff, who at that time
lived in Vigan, had to make trips t the town of Cabugao. It is
also alleged that Leandro promised to pay plaintiff’s trip to
the town of Cabugao at the rate of P4 per kilometer.
Exhibits Q and R are objected to by the defendant as not
duly identified and as incompetent evidence. It is true that
witnesses testified that they recognized the writing in said
notebook as plaintiff’s, but there is no proof that the notes
in these exhibits were written with the knowledge and
consent, or even in the presence of Leandro Serrano.
Neither does it appear that such notes were made at the
time of the visits and professional services referred to
therein, or that they were written about that time. The
plaintiff alleges that said entries are corroborated by the
witness Florendo, Fomoso, Figueras and Arcebal, the first
three of whom are chaffuers who successively took the
plaintiff to Cabugao, among themselves fixed the total
number of trips to Cabugao at about one hundred.
Should the testimony of the witnesses be given credence to
establish the number of trips to cabugao ?
No.
The number of times testified to by the witnesses, is, as it
could not otherwise be inferred from their own testimony,
mere conjecture, without sufficient assurance of
approximation, much less exactness. What these witnesses
definitely established and wherein they corroborate the
notebooks Exhibits Q and R, is that plaintiff made trips to
Cabugao, a facts admitted by the defendant. But also to the
number of said trips, which is the point in question, the
testimony of these witnesses, with all its uncertainty on this
point, cannot be considered as either direct or corroborative
evidence.
Therefore, the plaintiff’s evidence does not supple data
legally competent to ascertain the number of times he was in
Cabugao to render professional devices to Primitiva Serrano.
People of the Philippines vs. Florencio Odencio and
Guiamelon Mama
G.R. No. L-31961
A and B appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of North Cotabato, finding them guilty of two
separate crimes of murder of the deceased C. The
prosecution offered the testimony of Patrolman D, who
interrogated C when C was brought to a medical clinic and,
the deceased told Patrolman D that his assailants were A
and B. Due to the critical condition of C, he was not able to
sign his dying declaration as exhibited by the prosecution.
These the same statements were corroborated by the
widow of C, E that she positively identified A and B who
caused the fire shot at her husband. The defendants
opposed on the admissibility of the dying declaration as it
was not signed by the deceased.
Decide on the case.
The appeal must be denied.
It is settled that a dying declaration may be oral or written. If
oral, the witness, who heard it, may testify thereto without
the necessity, of course, of reproducing exactly the words of
the decedent, if he is able to give the substance thereof. An
unsigned dying declaration may be used as a memorandum
by the witness who took it down.
Applying in the case, although the dying declaration of C was
not signed, the same was substantially given by Patrolman D
during his testimony. Therefore, the unsigned dying
declaration of C is admissible as evidence against A and B.
Juan T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, Emmanuel B. Aznar
and Jose B. Aznar,
G.R. No. L-31740
In its per curiam resolution, the Court of Appeals overturned
its previous decision and allowed Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and
C-5, which were put into Memoranda by C as admissible as
evidence in supporting D, the administrator of the estate of
the deceased B, who claimed that the contracts executed
between A and deceased B, the father of C, were deed of
absolute sale and not contracts of equitable mortgages. A,
the opponent contended that the the Court of Appeals
erred because the Memoranda offered by C is biased as C
will benefited on the result of the case. Also, A contended
46 | P a g e
that Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5 are not part of the res
gestae.
Is the Court of Appeals correct in reversing its decision?
No.
It is provided in Sec. 42, Rule 130 that statements made by a
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
Moreover, SEC. 10 of Rule 32 states that a witness may be
allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything
written by himself or under his direction at the time when
the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other
time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew
that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such
case the writing must be produced and may be inspected by
the adverse party and such evidence must be received with
caution.
In this case, Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5 cannot be given
credit as these were not part of res gestae because C, the
offeror of such exhibits, who claimed that these were her
notes during the transactions of her deceased father and B,
was not a party to the contract and her presence is
questionable. In fact, her testimony was self-serving and
unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts asserted. The
Memoranda suffered defect as it duly uncorroborated with
other witnesses. The Court of Appeals failed in receiving the
evidence with caution therefore such exhibit is devoid of
credibility.
PART OF TRANSACTION
Eagleridge Development Corporation, et. al v. Cameron
Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.
G.R. No. 204700
A, substituted B, and attempted to collect a sum of
P10,232,998.00 exclusive of interests and/or damages from
C. However, C requested A to produce Loan Sale and
Purchase Agreement (LSPA) between C and B in order
inspect and photocopy the said Agreement. Despite of the
request, A refused to present the Agreement because it falls
under confidential rule and violates the parol evidence rule.
Is A correct in refusing to produce the LSPA as it violates
parol evidence rule?
No.
Section 9 of Rule 130 provides that when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement. But, a party may provide additional
evidence to modify or explain the terms if such is put in
pleading.
Applying in the case, the parol evidence rule does not apply
to A and C who are not parties to the deed of assignment
and does not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be
prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete
terms of the deed of assignment. Even assuming that Rule
130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under
the second paragraph is when the party puts in issue the
validity of the written agreement, as in the case a
quo.Therefore, LSPA can be presented.
PROOF OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT
Emmanuel B. Aznar vs. Citibank, N.A. (Philippines)
G.R. No. 164273
X is a holder of a credit card and claims his credit card was
not honored in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore
and Indonesia. And when he tried to use the same in I Tour
and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase
plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason
that his card was blacklisted by the Y Bank. To prove that
respondent blacklisted his credit card, X presented a
computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT,
issued to him by I Agency with the signature of one which
shows that his card in question was “DECL OVERLIMIT” or
declared over the limit.
Rule on the admissibility of the computer print-out.
The electronic document is devoid of merit.
It is provided in Section 20 of Rule 132 that whenever any
private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
In this case, X, who testified on the authenticity, did not
actually see the document executed or written, neither was
he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of V who handed to him said
computer print-out. Therefore, X failed to demonstrate how
the information reflected on the print-out was generated and
how the said information could be relied upon as true.
Tan Shuy vs. Spouses Gullermo Maulawin and Paring Cariño-
Maulawin
G.R. No. 190375
T extended a loan to G in the amount of P 420,000. In
consideration thereof, G obligated himself to pay the loan
and to sell lucad or copra to T. T alleged that despite
repeated demands, G remitted only P 23,000 in August 1998
and P 5,500 in October 1998, or a total of P 28,500.He
claimed that respondent had an outstanding balance
of P 391,500. G countered that he had already paid the
subject loan in full as supported by pesadas issued by E and
V. T questions the authenticity of the pesadas.
Are pesadas be admitted as evidence?
Yes.
Under Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court before any
private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
47 | P a g e
Any other private document need only be identified as that
which it is claimed to be.
Applying in the case, E and V confirmed their penmanship
and handwriting who issued these pesadas. Clearly, there
was due execution of the pesadas or the private documents
in which it is fairly authenticated. Therefore, it is admissible
as evidence.
Torres vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 193531
To file a motion for reconsideration against X’s dismissal
from his employment, X sent his letter of reconsideration to
P Corporation via facsimile or fax transmission. However, it
was not receive by P Corporation resulting the lapse of his
appeal because the facsimile or fax transmission was not
considered a valid mode in filing his reconsideration.
Assuming that facsimile or fax transmission is considered as
a valid mode of filing, may it be admissible as evidence
which falls under the best evidence rule?
No.
It is settled in Garvida v. Sales, Jr, G.R. No. 124893, April 18,
1997, that it is found inadmissible as evidence the filing of
pleadings through fax machines because a facsimile or fax
transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter. A facsimile is not
a genuine and authentic pleading. Without the original, there
is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed
by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham
pleading.
Applying in the case, the subject of inquiry is the letter of
reconsideration of X which was allegedly sent via fax
transmission. Clearly, it cannot be admitted as evidence
because it was not the original document submitted and that
it devoid authentication and signature on X’s part.
GENUINESS OF SIGNATURE
Spouses Patricio and Myrna Bernales vs. Heirs ofJulian
Sambaan
G.R.No. 163271
As a proof of ownership, Spouses B offered the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1970 which had alleged
forged signatures of J and G. The opposition objected on the
admissibility of the evidence which is the Deed of Absolute
Sale. The trial court and the appellate court ruled that it was
indeed a forged deed of sale. The Spouses appealed the said
decision.
Rule on the admissibility of the document.
The Deed of Sale should not be admitted.
Well-settled is the rule that when a fact is accorded finality
and supported by substantial evidence on the record, it is
that amounted of relevant evidence. The conclusions and
findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight
on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and
cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position
to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses while testifying in the case. The fact that the
CA adopted the findings of fact of the trial court makes the
same binding upon this court.
In this case, there is substantial evidence to support the
Court of Appeals and trial court’s conclusion that the
signatures of J and G in the Deed of Absolute Sale were
forged. Thus, it is held that with the presentation of the
forged deed, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, the registered owner did not thereby lose
his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed
acquire any right or title to the said property.
Irene K. Nacu, substituted by Benjamin M. Nacu, Ervin K.
Nacu, and Nejie N. De Sagun vs. Civil Service Commission and
Philippine Economic Zone Authority
G.R. No. 187752
In a dismissal case, N opposed on the evidence presented by
the PEZA on the ground that her questioned signatures
were not substantially proven and N was deprived of cross-
examining the witness who gave the testimony against her.
N questions the admissibility of the testimony. Rule on the
issue.
The testimony can be admitted as evidence.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum
of evidence required is substantial evidence which means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Also settled is that, in
administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.
In this case, the opportunity to cross-examine the said
witness is unavailing because it is a valid administrative
procedure that witnesses may not be presented for cross-
examination as distinguish in a full blown trial. Therefore, the
testimonies of the witnesses, the statements made during
the preliminary investigation, and the findings of the PNP
Crime Lab on its examination of the signatures on the SOS,
amounted to substantial evidence that adequately supported
the conclusion that N was guilty of the acts complained of. N
allegations of unreliability, irregularities, and inconsistencies
of the evidence neither discredited nor weakened the case
against Nacu.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa namely: Ruby B. Ochoa,
Micaela B. Ochoa and Jomar B. Ochoa vs. G & S Transport
Corporation
G.R. No. 170071
In a Complaint for Damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City which was raffled to Branch 164 of said
court. The heirs of M sued G and S Transport for breach of
contract of carriage when G and S failed to transport M
48 | P a g e
safely. The trial court awarded P6,537,244.96 for the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased which was based on the
Certification given by the USAID of M’s annual income. On
appeal, CA deleted the award because it was tainted and
self-service only.
Rule on the admission of USAID’s certification.
The USAID’s Certification of M’s annual income must be
admitted.
It is settled that "self-serving evidence" is not to be taken
literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent's
interest. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to
acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at
some place and time out of court.
In this case, there is credibility of the certification offered by
USAID and is presumed of authenticity, due execution and
correctness of said certification have not been put in issue
either before the trial court or the CA as to its being self-
serving. Verily, the USAID certification cannot be said to be
self-serving because it does not refer to an act or declaration
made out of court by the heirs themselves as parties to this
case. Therefore, the Certification must be admitted.
Re: Complaint of Concerned Members of Chinese Grocers
Association Against Justice Socorro B. Inting of the Court of
Appeals
A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-177-CA-J
In an unsigned letter complaint for administrative action
and disbarment filed against J for gross neglect of judicial
duties, complainant X offered as evidence the uncertified
copy of the Death Certificate of its alleged agent who
allegedly sold the disputed land to Y. Complainant X
questions the order of J in granting the issuance of New
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate to Y despite
the statement in the Affidavit of Deed of Sale that said agent
died prior to the execution of the contract.
Rule on the admissibility of the uncertified death certificate.
The uncertified death certificate cannot be admitted as
evidence.
It is settled that if a document is a public document, to prove
its contents, there is a need to present a certified copy of this
document, issued by the public officer in custody of the
original document.
In this case, Complainant had not presented any other
evidence to support the charge of misconduct leveled against
J. The complainants only offered as evidence a mere
photocopy of its agent’s Certificate of Death. Clearly it is lack
of certification from the in-charged public officer. Thus, it is
inadmissible as evidence, and is considered a mere scrap of
paper without any evidentiary value. In the absence of proof
of misconduct, the presumption that respondent regularly
performed her duties will prevail.
OFFICIAL RECORD
ATCI Overseas Corp. v. Lenchin
X was hired by petitioner ABC Overseas Corporation in
behalf of its principal-co-petitioner – YZ Corp. in Kuwait.
Under the MOA,all newly-hired employees undergo a
probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by
Kuwait’s Civil Service Board. X was terminated from
employment, allegedly she did not passed the probationary
period.X filed illegal dismissal case against ABC Overseas
Corp and YZ Corp. The Labor Arbiter, found there was no
just cause to warrant dismissal, ordered former to pay her
back wages, representing X salary for the three months
unexpired portion of her contract. NLRC and CA affirmed
the Labor Arbiter’s decision. ABC Overseas Corp appealed
SC, contending that the contract of employment itself
provides the applicable law which is the Kuwait’s Law with
respect to separation and, termination of employees, and
that the Lower tribunal failed to respect contractual
obligation freely entered by parties.
Is the contention of petitioner correct?
No.
In this case foreign law was not alleged and proved by the
petitioner in accordance to Rule 132, Section 24 and 25 in the
Revised Rules of Court. The foreign law is treated as a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Processual presumption comes into play.
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Dee
X petition the court for issuance of letters of administration
of the intestate estate of his husband Y in the RTC-Dagupan
City. A, the daughter of Y from his first marriage, petition
the court of the same letters of administration of his
49 | P a g e
father’s estate. The court consolidated both petition. RTC
dismissed the petition of X, on the ground that she is not a
party in interest of the special proceeding, in reference of
the criminal case of bigamy filed aganst her in RTC-
Pangasian, which dismissed, for reason that Y was a
divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not
recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage
between him and petitioner was not valid. CA affirmed RTC
decision. Hence, X elevated the case to the Supreme Court,
contenting that, her marriage to Y is valid, since Y is a U.S.
citizen, the latter having obtained divorce decree in the
country which he is a national.
Is X a real party in interest in the special proceeding case,
and should be accorded with letters of administration of her
alleged husband Estate?
Case should be remanded to trial court.
It is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in
Crim. Case was dismissed, we had already ruled that under
the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. The
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven.
Foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE
Heirs of Lacsa v. CA
Heirs of X filed an action for recovery of possession and
cancellation of title, based on the allegations that A and B,
and their predecessors-in-interest, thru stealth, fraud and
other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or
possessing the property, and succeeded in transferring the
title to said property in his name, to the damage and
prejudice of the petitioners. And B, in their defense,
presented a certified true copy of Deed of Sale
authenticated by the Register of Deeds. Applying the
Ancient Document Rule under Rule 132 of Rules of Court,
RTC and CA, ruled in respondents favor. Hence, Heirs of X,
filed an appeal to the Supreme Court, contending that in
order for a document to be classified as an "ancient
document", it must not only be at least thirty (30) years old
but it must also be found in the proper custody and is
unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from
suspicion. Since the "first pages" of said documents do not
bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto, this
constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited
alterations.
Is the petitioner correct in this case?
No. Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient
document to be exempt from proof of due execution and
authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30)
years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements
are fulfilled:
(1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine; and
(2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances
of suspicion.
The first document, Exhibit , entitled 'Traduccion Al
Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" was
executed on 7 April 1923 whereas the second document,
exhibit, entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was executed
on 20 January 1924. These documents are, therefore, more
than thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the aforementioned
documents were certified as exact copies of the original on
file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by
the Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further certification
with regard to the Pampango translation of the document of
extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives
division, Bureau of Records Management of the Department
of General Services.
Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document
rule" that a document must be unblemished by any alteration
or circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of
the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages,
therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the
documents in question, which were certified as copied of the
originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are
genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of
suspicion.
NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS
Go v. Costelo
X filed by complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), charging respondent Y, Sheriff IV of
the Regional Trial Court, with grave misconduct, falsification
and abuse of authority. One of the allegations stated in the
complaint, that Y falsified the entries in the Certificate of
Sale by stating that it was executed and notarized by a
certain Atty. Z, when in truth a certified photocopy of the
notarial book of Atty. Z shows that no such document was
notarized on said date or immediately thereafter. Trial Court
ordered Y be dismissed from the service for Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty and unfit of a judicial officer, which
50 | P a g e
was affirmed by OCA. On his motion for reconsideration, Y
presented an affidavit of Atty. Z, recanting his earlier
affidavit and testimony that his signature in the Certificate
of Sale was falsified. Hence, instant petition to Supreme
Court.
Is the lower correct in giving more credence of Atty. Z’s
testimony in the open court to testify personally in relation
to his first affidavit, prior to his recantation, than his belated
affidavit?
Yes.
The entries denominated as Document 161, Page 37, Book 3,
Series of 2000, appearing on the Certificate of Sale were
forged, falsified and fictitious entries.
Document No. 161, Page No. 37, Book 3, Series of 2000 as
entered in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Atty. Z,
refers to a document denominated as Cancellation and
Discharge of Mortgage, executed by and between Spouses
Fileo and Angeles Arias, and Baruel Rimandaman, Leonila B.
Pepito and Alfredo Lagora, and not the Certificate of Sale
issued by the respondent sheriff.
Court’s observation and examination of the said entries on
page 37 of the Notarial Register of Atty. Z, appears to be
genuine and authentic, without any erasure or alteration,
written in freehand writing and in chronological order of
events, written in the middle portion of page 37 of the
notarial registry, indicative that the document entered
thereto is the true act of the notary public in recording his
transaction for the day, pursuant to his oath of office.
Unchuan v. Lozada
X and Y were the registered co-owners of parcel of land,
sold the lots to their nephew Z. The Deed of Sale was later
notarized and authenticated at the Philippine Consul’s
Office Upon receipt of said documents. The latter recorded
the sale with the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Accordingly,
TCT were issued in the name of Z. Pending registration of
the deed, petitioner A, caused the annotation of an adverse
claim on the lots, filed an action to declare the Deed of Sale
void and to cancel TCT. A claimed that X donated an
undivided share in the lots to her under an unregistered
Deed of Donation. The Trial Court rendered decision,
declaring the Deed of Donation Null and Void on basis that
Notarial Records Division disclosed that the Deed of
Donation purportedly identified in Book No. 4, Document
No. 48, and Page No. 35 Series of 1987 was not reported
and filed with said office. CA Affirmed trial courts order. A
filed an appeal to SC.
Is the lower Court correct in declaring the Deed of Donation
NULL and Void?
Yes.
When the law requires that a contract be in some form in
order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract
be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and
indispensable.
Here, the Deed of Donation does not appear to be duly
notarized. In page three of the deed, the stamped name of
Cresencio Tomakin appears above the words Notary Public
until December 31, 1983 but below it were the typewritten
words Notary Public until December 31, 1987.
A closer examination of the document further reveals that
the number 7 in 1987 and Series of 1987 were merely
superimposed. This was confirmed by petitioner’s nephew B,
who testified that he saw petitioner’s husband write 7 over
1983 to make it appear that the deed was notarized in 1987.
Moreover, a Certification from Clerk of Court of the Notarial
Records Division disclosed that the Deed of Donation
purportedly identified in Book No. 4, Document No. 48, and
Page No. 35 Series of 1987 was not reported and filed with
said office. Pertinent to this, the Rules require a party
producing a document as genuine which has been altered
and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a
part material to the question in dispute, to account for the
alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by
another, without his concurrence, or was made with the
consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise
properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not
change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails
to do that, the document shall, as in this case, not be
admissible in evidence.
Heirs of Arcilla v. Teodoro
X initially filed with the Regional Trial Court an application
for land registration of two parcels of land located. X alleged
that, with the exception of the commercial building
constructed thereon, she purchased the subject lots from
her father, Y, as shown by a Deed of Sale, the latter acquired
the said lots by virtue of the partition of the estate of his
father, Z, evidenced by a document entitled Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate. X also presented as evidence an
Affidavit of Quit-Claim in favor of Y, executed by herein A as
Heirs of W, brother of Y. Heirs of W, filed opposition,
contended that they are the owners pro-indiviso of the
subject lots including the building and other improvements
constructed thereon by virtue of inheritance from their
deceased parents, spouses Sps. W. Insisting that the
documents which were presented in evidence by
respondent to prove her ownership of the subject lot are
rife with defects and inconsistencies. Trial court and Ca
declared X is the owner of said lands in question.
Is the lower correct in admitting Documents Evidencing
ownership of Y?
Yes.
These documents are all notarized. It is settled that a
notarized document is executed to lend truth to the
statements contained therein and to the authenticity of the
signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of
regularity which can be overturned only by clear and
convincing evidence.
51 | P a g e
Petitioners' bare denials of the contents of the subject
documents will not suffice to overcome the presumption of
their regularity considering that they are all notarized. To
overthrow such presumption of regularity, the countervailing
evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant, which petitioners failed to present.
Lazaro v. Agustin
D filed petition for judicial partition on the strength of an
affidavit allegedly executed by Y, wherein she purportedly
acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property
with her siblings A, B and C. Heirs of Y prayed that X’s
complaint be dismissed contending that at the time the
affidavit was supposed to have been signed and sworn to
before the notary public, Y was already bedridden and an
invalid who could not even raise her hand to feed herself.
MTCC, RTC, CA, all ruled in favor of dismissing petition for
Extrajudicial Partition.
Is the decision of the lower court correct in dismissing filed
Extrajudicial Partition filed by D?
Yes.
Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect
to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a
notary public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.
Moreover, not all notarized documents are exempted from
the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not
automatically become a public document just because it
contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions that attach to
notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is
beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.
Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity
accorded by law to notarized documents. While indeed, a
notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a
deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its
contents. As earlier discussed, the presumption is not
absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. The presumption cannot be made
to apply to the present case because the regularity in the
execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the
proceedings below where its prima facie validity was
overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances under
which it was supposedly executed, as well as the testimonies
of witnesses who testified on the improbability of execution
of the sworn statement, as well as on the physical condition
of the signatory, at the time the questioned document was
supposedly executed. The trial and appellate courts were
unanimous in giving credence to the testimonies of these
witnesses. The Court has repeatedly held that it will not
interfere with the trial court's determination of the credibility
of witnesses, unless there appears on record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. The reason for this is that the trial court was
in a better position to do so, because it heard the witnesses
testify before it and had every opportunity to observe their
demeanor and deportment on the witness stand.
Alcantara v. Nido
X, is the owner of an unregistered land with an area of 1,939
square. Y Administrator of X’s property, accepted the offer
of W to purchase a 200-square meter portion of X’s. W paid
downpayment and the balance was payable on installment.
W constructed their house and with consent of Y, W
occupied an additional 150 square meters of the lot.
Years Later, Y, acting as administrator and attorney-in-fact
of X, filed a complaint for recovery of possession with
damages and prayer for preliminary injunction against W
.The lower court ruled that since respondent’s authority to
sell the land was not in writing, the sale was void under
Article 1874 of the Civil Code. Hence the W filed petition to
SC, on the basis of a General Power of Attorney Executed by
X in favor of Y, issued in Foreign Country.
Is the lower court correct in not admitting the General
Power of Attorney as Evidence to Conclude Authority of Y to
sell X’s Property?
Yes.
Unfortunately, the General Power of Attorney presented
cannot also be the basis of respondent’s written authority to
sell the lot.
Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record
or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
embassy or legation consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
From the foregoing provision, when the special power of
attorney is executed and acknowledged before a notary
public or other competent official in a foreign country, it
cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is certified as such in
accordance with the foregoing provision of the rules by a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept of said public document and
authenticated by the seal of his office. A city judge-notary
who notarized the document, as in this case, cannot issue
such certification.
Since the General Power of Attorney was executed and
acknowledged in the United States of America, it cannot be
admitted in evidence unless it is certified as such in
accordance with the Rules of Court by an officer in the
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foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the United
States of America. Hence, this document has no probative
value.
Ono v. Lim
X in action for quieting of title, initiated before Regional Trial
Court, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the
name of Y, Lim’s deceased mother and predecessor-in-
interest. The Lot was sold by Sps. Z, et al., and that although
the deed evidencing the sale had been lost without being
registered. W the only legitimate heir of Sps. Z et al., had
executed in favor of Luisa a notarized document
denominated as confirmation of sale, which was duly filed in
the Provincial Assessor’s Office. TY opposed X’s petition,
contending that they had the certificate of title in their
possession as the successors-in-interest of Sps. Z, et al. But
RTC ruled in favor of X, that the signature of Antonio on
the confirmation of sale was genuine, thereby giving more
weight to the testimony of the notary public, which affirmed
by CA. TY filed petition in SC, claiming that their
predecessors-in-interest, Sps. Z, et al., never sold Lot to
Luisa; and that the confirmation of sale purportedly
executed by Antonio was fabricated, his signature thereon
not being authentic.
Is the lower court correct in not upholding herein
contention?
Yes.
It is emphasized, too, that the CA upheld the conclusion
arrived at by the RTC that the signature of Antonio had not
been simulated or forged. The CA ruled that the testimony of
the notary public who had notarized the confirmation of sale
to the effect that Antonio and Luisa had appeared before him
prevailed over that of the petitioners’ expert witness. The
concurrence of their conclusion on the genuineness of
Antonio’s signature now binds the Court.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of
the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight
of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that means, in the last
analysis, probability of the truth.24 It is evidence that is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.
Abadanio v. Martin
Sps. X filed an action for quieting of title or recovery of
possession of a parcel of land filed against Y, et al, on basis
of document of Sale (Compra Y Venta) executed by Y and Z,
the co owners of an undivided share of the land own by
them as their inheritance. A et.al, the petitioner’s in this
case, insists that the sale of the portion pertaining to Y and Z
never took place. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Sps. X, on the
basis that that although the Compra Y Venta was not
annotated either on the OCT, the validity of the sale was not
vitiated. The registration or annotation is required only to
make the sale valid as to third persons.
Is the lower correct in upholding the document of sale?
No.
In the present case, we find that the trial court based its
judgment on a misapprehension of facts, as well as on the
supposed absence of evidence which is contradicted by the
records.
Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y
Venta to their complaint. According to respondent, the
original of said document was in the office of the Register of
Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office
but their request was refused. No other evidence but these
bare assertions, however, was presented to prove that the
original is indeed in the custody of the Register of Deeds or
that respondents’ due and diligent search for the same was
unsuccessful.
The Rule states that when the original document is
unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the
offer in evidence of the document was made in accordance
with any of the exceptions allowed under the abovequoted
rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the document as
genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on
such assumption.
The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect
that the document presented contained the same notarial
inscription as the Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed
of Partition and the Compra Y Venta, though executed on
different days, were notarized on the same day, and both
documents contained the signatures of the same witnesses
and the same notarial inscription.
We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in
the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in
its favor the presumption of regularity.
In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial
inscription would not have invalidated the sale – if indeed it
took place – the same error would have meant that the
document cannot be treated as a notarial document and
thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The
document would be taken out of the realm of public
documents whose genuineness and due execution need not
be proved.
Gabunas v. Scanmar
G.R. No. 188637
In a claim for sickness allowance and permanent disability
benefits by X against A Corporation, the CA affirmed the
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findings of the NLRC. The former disregarded the allegations
of X that he had notified A Corporation about his medical
problem while on board a vessel and upon disembarkation
and gave credence to the Affidavit of witness Z, A
Corporation’s Manning Manager, which attests to the
contrary.
Is the CA correct in giving credence to the Affidavit?
Yes.
A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It has in
its favor the presumption of regularity, which may only be
rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to
exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.
Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. The
burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due
execution of a notarial document lies in the one contesting
the same.
In this case, X failed to present convincing evidence to rebut
the assertions made by Z on a crucial point. While the
Affidavit of Z could be considered self-serving, there was
absolutely no evidence to rebut this Affidavit; hence, the
Affidavit must be believed.
Philippine Trust Company v. CA
G.R. No. 150318
In an action for reconveyance, the trial court ruled that the
claims of the defendant were not supported by evidence.
The latter countered that the allegations were supported by
documents and an Answer to Interrogatories, and claimed
that since the Answer to Interrogatories is a notarized
document, it is a public document which is conclusive as to
the truthfulness of its contents.
Is the argument of the defendant tenable?
No.
Not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. Section 23, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter.
Hence, under Section 23, notarized documents are merely
proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution, and of
the date of the latter, but is not prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. In the case at bar, the notarized Answer
to Interrogatories is proof that defendant had been served
with Written Interrogatories and that the same was executed
on the date stated thereon.
Sps. Lehner v. Chua
G.R. No. 174240
X filed an action for reconveyance against Y alleging that the
subject lots were transferred in the name of Y by virtue of a
forged Deed of Transfer. The trial court rendered a decision
in favor of Y. In reversing the decision of the trial court, the
CA did not upheld the deed of transfer executed by X in
favor of Y for the following reasons:
(1) the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the
Notarial Section of the RTC which supposedly attested that a
copy of the subject Deed of Transfer is on file with the said
court, was contradicted by the Certification issued by the
Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the same
office as well as by the testimony of the court employee
who prepared the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court,
to the effect that the subject Deed of Transfer cannot, in
fact, be found in their files;
(2) respondent's categorical denial that she executed the
subject Deed of Transfer; and
(3) the subject document did not state the date of
execution.
Did the court erred in not upholding the deed of transfer?
No.
Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides as
follows:
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law,
may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of
the execution of the instrument of document involved.
While notarized documents carry evidentiary weight
conferred upon them with respect to their due execution and
enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be
rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to
exclude all controversy as to falsity, the presumptions that
attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long
as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A
defective notarization will strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument.
In the case at bar, the CA pointed out dubious circumstances
and irregularities attendant in the alleged notarization of the
Deed of Transfer.
OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
Doronio v. Doronio
G.R. No. 169454
A private deed of donation was executed by spouses A and
B in favor of X. It appears however that in the description of
one of the properties donated, there is significant
discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of
adjacent property based on the original certificate of title,
written in Spanish language, and on the deed of donation.
Y, the owner of the adjacent property based on the deed of
donation, filed an action for reconveyance and damages
54 | P a g e
against X alleging that spouses A and B intended to donate
only one-half of the property. In his comment, X admitted
the contents of the original certificate of title. A judgment
was rendered in favor of X. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision and based its conclusion on the disparity of the
technical description of the property under the original
certificate of title and the deed of donation.
X fault the CA for admitting the original certificate of title in
evidence on the ground that it is written in Spanish
language. He posits that “documentary evidence in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted in evidence, unless
accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino.”
Is the argument of X tenable?
No. The argument is untenable.
Jurisprudence dictates that the requirement that documents
written in an unofficial language must be accompanied with a
translation in English or Filipino as a prerequisite for its
admission in evidence must be insisted upon by the parties at
the trial to enable the court, where a translation has been
impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue. Where such
document, not so accompanied with a translation in English
or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either
by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the
language in which the document is written is understood by
all, and the document is admissible in evidence.
In the case at bar, since X did not object to the offer of said
documentary evidence on time, it is now too late in the day
for him to question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence
not objected may be deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. This is
true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible and
would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at
the proper time.
OFFER OF EVIDENCE
Parel v. Prudencio
G.R. NO. 146556
In a complaint for recovery of possession and damages filed
against Z, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision. The
records show that although Z’s counsel asked that he be
allowed to offer his documentary evidence in writing, he,
however, did not file the same. The documentary evidence
which were not formally offered in evidence were marked
during the presentation of the testimony of Z’s witnesses
and were part of their testimonies. The CA did not consider
the documentary evidence presented by Z and ruled that
there was no supporting document which would sufficiently
establish factual bases for the trial court’s conclusion.
Was the CA correct in not considering the documentary
evidence presented by Z in arriving its decision?
Yes.
Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified. A formal
offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his
findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule
that the mere fact that a particular document is identified
and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
In this case, Z’s counsel failed to make a formal offer of his
documentary evidence before the trial court. Thus, the CA
was correct in not considering the documentary evidence
presented by Z.
Seguritan v. People
G.R. No. 172896
A was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide both by the trial court and the appellate court.
The autopsy report showed that the victim died of traumatic
head injury attributed to A. A contends that the one month
delay in the autopsy of the victim’s body and its embalming
compromised the results thereof. To substantiate his claim,
he quotes a part of the book, viz:
"a dead body must not be embalmed before the autopsy.
The embalming fluid may render the tissue and blood unfit
for toxilogical analyses. xxx."
"the body must be autopsied in the same condition when
found at the crime scene. A delay in the performance may
fail or modify the possible findings thereby not serving the
interest of justice."
The prosecution was not given the opportunity to object as
the book or a portion thereof was never offered in evidence.
Would the contention of A warrant a reevaluation of the
evidence?
No.
Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
In the present case, the allegation that the results of the
autopsy are unworthy of credence was based on a book that
was neither marked for identification nor formally offered in
evidence during the hearing of the case. Any evidence which
a party desires to submit to the courts must be offered
formally because a judge must base his findings strictly on
the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
Yu v. Lim Yu
G.R. No. 154115
In an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal
partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical
abuse, A moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
and ad testificandum to certain officers of an insurance
55 | P a g e
company to compel production of the insurance policy and
application of a person suspected to be her husband’s
illegitimate child. The trial court declared an application for
insurance and an insurance policy as inadmissible evidence
in view of a circular letter issued by the Insurance
Commission which presumably prevents insurance
companies from divulging confidential and privileged
information pertaining to insurance policies and in view of
Article 280 of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil
Registry Law, both of which prohibit the unauthorized
identification of the parents of an illegitimate child.
a. Does the trial court have the discretion to deny A’s
motion to attach excluded evidence to record under Section
40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court?
No.
While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude
evidence, such power is exercised only when the evidence
has been formally offered. For a long time, the Court has
recognized that during the early stages of the development
of proof, it is impossible for a trial court judge to know with
certainty whether evidence is relevant or not, and thus the
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality should be avoided.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the
insurance policy were yet to be presented in court, much less
formally offered before it. In fact, private respondent was
merely asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and
subpoena ad testificandum.
b. Would A’s tender of excluded evidence render
moot a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
since such move evinced that she had another speedy and
adequate remedy under the law?
No.
Section 40, Rule 132 provides:
Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence.—If documents or
things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the
offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the
record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state
for the record the name and other personal circumstances of
the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is
made, the evidence must have been formally offered before
the court. And before formal offer of evidence is made, the
evidence must have been identified and presented before
the court. While A made a "Tender of Excluded Evidence,"
such is not the tender contemplated by the above-quoted
rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and application were
not formally offered much less presented before the trial
court. It was not the kind of plain, speedy and adequate
remedy which private respondent could have resorted to
instead of the petition for certiorari she filed before the
Court of Appeals. It did not in any way render the said
petition moot.
Heirs of Saves v. Heirs of Saves
G.R. No. 152866
A case for Reconveyance, Partition and Damages was filed
by X alleging that a lot was fraudulently acquired by Y and
that the latter fictitiously sold the lot to Z. The following
exhibits were not formally offered at the trial court
proceedings but were nonetheless, utilized by the Court of
Appeals as basis for reversing and setting aside the trial
court’s decision:
a. Exhibit "1" which is a document entitled "Motion
for the Issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title" filed by Y.
The records would show that it is the same document that
X’s witness identified in his testimony and marked as Exhibit
"I." Only X was able to formally offer the said document; and
b. Exhibit "2" which is the Torrens title that was
issued to Z after she bought the lot from Y. The records of
the case bear out that the document was identified by Z
during the continuation of her direct examination, was
expressly alleged in X’ Appellees’ Brief filed with the Court of
Appeals, and was relied upon in order to put forward X’s
main theory.
c. Decide on the admissibility of the exhibits.
Both Exhibits “1” and “2” are admissible.
Under Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified. However, in cases decided by Supreme Court, it
relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally
offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court
provided the following requirements are present, viz: first,
the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.
In the case at bar, the records would show that the above
requisites have been satisfactorily complied. Exhibit "1" was
incorporated and made part of the records of this case as a
common exhibit of the parties. That only X was able to
formally offer the said motion as Exhibit "I" most certainly
does not mean that it can only be considered by the courts
for the evidentiary purpose offered by X. It is well within the
discretion of the courts to determine whether an exhibit
indeed serves the probative purpose for which it is offered.
With regard to Exhibit “2”, X did not merely acknowledge the
existence of such but in fact relied upon it in order to put
forward her main theory. Verily, it is inconsistent for X to
claim that Exhibit “2” proves her theory and in the same
breath assail it as inadmissible.
Dycoco, et. al v. Orina, et. al.
G.R. No. 184843
A is alleged to have executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM)
in favor of B. A, represented by his attorney-in-fact filed a
complaint for annulment of the REM claiming that his
signature was forged, to prove which they presented
various documents, including a passport and a Special
Power of Attorney executed abroad, notarized and certified
in accordance with Public Act No. 2103 to show that A was
56 | P a g e
not in the Philippines on the alleged date of execution. In B’s
comment/opposition to A’s formal offer of evidence, the
passport was objected to as being “immaterial, irrelevant
and impertinent.” The appellate court, in affirming the trial
court’s dismissal of the complaint, held that since A was not
presented on the witness stand to establish the
genuineness, due execution and contents of the
documentary evidence, no probative value can be ascribed
thereto.
Was the appellate court correct in requiring A to be
presented on the witness stand?
No. There was no necessity to present A on the witness
stand.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court, it held that a party’s
comment to a formal offer of evidence, objecting a
document as being “immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent”
is a virtual admission of the authenticity of the entries of such
document. Moreover, under Section 2 of Public Act No. 2103,
an instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated
in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the
acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance
with the requirements provided under such Act.
In the case at bar, the passport was objected to by B as being
“immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent” and the Special
Power of Attorney was notarized and certified in accordance
with Public Act No. 2013, which effectively dispenses with the
requirement of presenting A on the witness stand.
Star Two, Inc. v. Ko
G.R. No. 185454
A complaint for specific performance was filed by RCBC
against X and Y as sureties. The trial court, in dismissing the
case, stated that there was sufficient evidence to prove that
X paid an amount more than the limit provided under their
surety agreement. RCBC raised the question on the
admissibility of the evidence in support of the dismissal of
the case. The subject pieces of evidence were presented in
support of X and Y’s motion for reconsideration of the denial
of their motion to dismiss. The documents, however, were
not offered in evidence.
Did the trial court correctly considered and relied on
documents which were not formally offered in evidence?
Yes.
Indeed, as provided under Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified. This rule, however, admits of an
exception, provided that the evidence has been identified by
testimony duly recorded and that it has been incorporated in
the records of the case.
In this case, the subject pieces of evidence were presented in
support of X and Y’s motion for reconsideration of the denial
of their motion to dismiss. The pieces of evidence were thus
identified, marked in evidence, and incorporated in the
records of the case. Clearly, the trial court correctly admitted
and considered the evidence of respondents warranting the
dismissal of their case.
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
People v. Valero
G.R. No. L-45283-84
Accused is sentenced to death for double murder and
frustrated murder due to poisoning. The prosecution
presents three witnesses to prove the charge against the
defendant. Among the three witnesses, A and B testified as
to what P told them after interviewing the latter through
sign language. P, who was present during the incident, was
never made a witness by the prosecution or the defense;
nor was he cross-examined. Is the information conveyed by
P to A and B admissible?
No. The evidence is purely hearsay. The presentation of such
evidence likewise violates the principle of res inter alios acta.
The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the
presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence
or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his
failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give
such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may
make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no
probative value.
To give weight to the testimonies of A and B, whether
considered as hearsay evidence or as part of res gestae and
make the same the basis for the imposition of the death
penalty gravely violates the constitutional right of the
defendant to meet the witnesses face to face and to subject
P to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only effective
means to test the truthfulness, memory, intelligence, and in
this particular case, the ability of the deaf-mute, P, to
communicate with the outside world. In conflict between a
provision of the constitution giving the defendant a
substantive right and mere technical rules of evidence, it shall
give effect to the constitution.
Hebron v. Loyola
G.R. No. 168960
In a case of partition and damages concerning two parcels
of land, A alleged that B and C have relinquished their
respective shares in the said properties in consideration of
the financial support extended by her mother, X. Both the
trial court and the CA found that petitioner A was not able
to prove the waiver or assignment of their shares. A
contends that she has no affirmative allegation to prove,
hence, the burden of proof is on the respondents and not
on her. Is the contention of A meritorious?
The contention is without merit.
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Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1. Burden of Proof.- Burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law.
From the above provision it is clear that the defendant, not
only the plaintiff, also has a burden of proof. The plaintiffs
have the duty to establish their claims. And, it is the
defendants who have the duty to establish their defenses.
The defense of A is that B and the heirs of C have waived or
sold their shares in the subject properties. This alleged fact is
denied by the respondents. Hence, this is the fact that is at
issue and this alleged fact has to be proven by petitioner, A,
who is the one who raised the said alleged fact. The burden
of proof of the defense of waiver or sale is on petitioner A.
In the matter of the Intestate Estates of Delgado
G.R. No. 155733
In the settlement of the intestate estates of A and B, the
existence of their marriage was contested in determining
whether the claimant's successional rights fall within the
ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. Petitioners
alleged that A and B were never married. In support thereof,
they assert that no evidence was ever presented to
establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or
place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that
B retained the surname of A. So did X, her son with A.
Nevertheless, oppositors insist that the absence of a record
of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no
marriage ever took place. Is there a disputable presumption
of marriage? Explain.
Yes.
A presumption is an interference of the existence or non-
existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from
proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into
presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions
of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
Although a marriage contract is considered a primary
evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no
marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of
marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly
establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Corpus v. Sarmiento
G.R. No. L-45137
An information charging A and B with estafa was filed before
the CFI of Pampanga. To prove its case, the prosecution
presented during the trial the private complainant X, as its
only witness. Thereafter, petitioners, believing the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, moved to dismiss the case by way of demurrer to the
evidence. The trial judge Y denied the motion. By way of
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, petitioners
contend that Y lost jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of
the case and that he was duty-bound to acquit them,
considering his finding that “xxx the prosecution established
a prima facie case of estafa alleged in the information
against said accused on the evidence presented so far on
record”. Petitioners further argue that in a criminal case,
conviction can be had only upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt and not on a mere prima facie case. If you are a
justice of the Supreme Court, how would you rule on the
matter? What is a prima facie case?
If I would be a justice of the Supreme Court I would deny the
petition for lack of merit.
There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of
the accused is established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court
denies petitioners' motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to
evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established
a prima facie case against them, they assume a definite
burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce
evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima
facie case against them. This is due to the shift in the burden
of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners
would seem to believe.
When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in
a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the burden of proof
does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial
with the party upon whom it is imposed—the prosecution. It
is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party
depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of
the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is
met by evidence which balances that introduced by the
prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.
A prima facie case need not be countered by a
preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater
weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of
plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient.
As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof.
Should it happen that at the trial the weight of evidence is
equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate
against plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot
prevail.
In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss, required them to present their evidence. They
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refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of
their guilt. The inevitable result was that the burden of
evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at
least, raises a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.
A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be
sufficient to counter-balance the general presumption of
innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and
controlled by evidence tending to contradict it, and render it
improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it, and
the establishment of a prima facie case does not take away
the presumption of innocence which may in the opinion of
the jury be such as to rebut and control it.
Abarquez v. People
G.R. No. 150762
The prosecution charged A with the crimes of homicide and
attempted homicide. The trial court found A guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of
homicide. In convicting A, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals relied mainly on the testimony of X. X testified that
he was held by A on the shoulders, thus preventing him to
help Q who was grappling with Y, and allowed the latter to
pursue his criminal act without resistance. It was, however,
shown that A was trying to stop X from joining the fray, not
from helping Q. X admitted that while restraining him, A was
scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was
not shown that A was stopping X from helping Q. In a
petition before the Supreme Court, A alleges that the
prosecution's evidence does not satisfy the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support his conviction as an
accomplice. If you are the judge, would you convict A based
on the evidence presented? Explain.
No. When there is doubt on the guilt of the accused, the
doubt should be resolved in his favor.
Applying the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue
of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.
The equipose rule finds application if, the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce conviction. Briefly stated, the need of
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime
charged is found lacking.
DPB Pool v. Radio Mindanao Network Inc.
In a claim for insurance proceeds, DBP Insurance Company
denied RB Corporation claim, contending that the cause of
damage was an excepted risk under the insurance contract
since the loss was occassioned by a fire that was due to
the intentional act committed by the members of the
communist group, XXX. The insurance company presented
as evidence the testimony of Lt. Col. Y and SPO3 W who
were admittedly not present when the fire occurred. Their
testimony was limited to the fact that an investigation was
conducted and in the course of the investigation they were
informed by bystanders that “heavily armed men entered
the transmitter house, poured gasoline in it and then lighted
it. After that, they went out shouting “Mabuhay ang XXX”. If
you were the judge, would you admit the evidence
presented? Why or why not?
No. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows
of his personal knowledge, which means those facts which
are derived from his perception. A witness may not testify as
to what he merely learned from others either because he
was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the
truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon
serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of
hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given
under oath or solemn affirmation and, more importantly,
have not been subjected to cross-examination by opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon
whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court
statement depends.
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to
those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made
as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for
the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did
not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness
who heard the declarant complies with the following
requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood;
and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.
It is not convincing to accept the declarations as part of res
gestae. While it may concede that these statements were
made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it
cannot be said however, that these utterances were made
spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood. The bystanders’
statements were received while making the investigations
during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that
when these statements were noted down, the bystanders
already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk
to one another and exchange information, not to mention
theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in
disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It
cannot therefore be ascertained whether these utterances
were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere
idle talk is not remote.
People v. Murcia
G.R. No. 182460
M was convicted by the Trial Court for the crime of Arson. In
his appeal, the appellate court considered the following
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circumstances to establish an unbroken chain of events
pointing to the logical conclusion that appellant started the
fire: First, accused-appellant A returned inside E's house
after chasing H with a bolo and after being pacified by R and
J; Second, during the resumption of their drinking session, R
and H saw a thick smoke emanating from E's house
particularly the window of accused-appellant Murcia's room
in the ground floor; Third, H peeped through the said
window and saw accused-appellant M throwing cartons of
clothes into the fire. Meanwhile, E, who was then cooking at
the second floor, went downstairs and saw the fire coming
from the room occupied by accused-appellant M in the
ground floor; Fourth, R saw accused-appellant M stabbing F
and A, among other persons. E saw his sister F with blood
oozing from her mouth. Accused-appellant M met him at
the ground brandishing a knife at him which prevented him
from helping the wounded F and forced him to run away for
safety. E's other sister, A, was also seen wounded and lying
unconscious in the canal; and fifth, the houses of E and his
neighbors were razed by fire and the commission of the
crime of arson resulted in the demise of F whose remains
were burned beyond recognition. However, nobody directly
saw appellant burn the house. Would the above
circumstantial evidence justify a conviction? Explain.
Yes. In this case, however, there is no direct evidence to
establish the culpability of appellant. At any rate, direct
evidence is not the sole means in establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Established facts that form a chain of
circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or imple a
conscious process of reasoning towards conviction. Indeed,
rules on evidence and principles in jurisprudence have long
recognized that the accused may be convicted through
circumstantial evidence.
In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence,
the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave
no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal
responsibility of the accused.
People v. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 187683
The accused, A was convicted for the crime of Parricide, for
killing his wife X, based on the testimony of the lone witness
B. The following facts were established: first, immediately
preceding the killing, A physically maltreated X, not merely
by slapping her as he claimed, but by repeatedly slapping
punching and kicking her. Second, it was A violently dragged
the victim inside their house, by pulling her hair. Third, in Dr.
V's report, X sustained injuries in different parts of her body
due to X's act of physical abuse. Fourth, the location and
extent of the wound indicated A's intent to kill the victim.
The Report revealed that the victim sustained a fatal stab
wound, lacerating the upper lobe of her right lung, a vital
organ. The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the
deceased manifests A's intention to extinguish life. Finally,
as found by both the RTC and CA, only A and X were inside
the house, other than their young daughter. A, as
represented by the PAO, claimed that the CA erred in
appreciating B's testimony, since the latter merely testified
on the non-mortal wounds that X suffered when the couple
were outside the house. Insofar as the actual killing was
concerned, Joel's testimony was merely circumstantial. As
the counsel for the prosecution, what would you invoke to
sustain A's conviction? Explain.
I would insist that the court cannot find reason to discredit
the the circumstances established as fact as well as the
testimony of B and the report of Dr. V, since circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction.
As held in the case People vs Castillo: Direct evidence of the
commission of the offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt.
Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence
provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While no
general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all
the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, is the guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the
possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty or "that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required.
People v. Notarion
G.R. No. 181493
Appellant, X, was convicted by the RTC and CA for the
special complex crime of rape with homicide based on the
following circumstantial evidences: 1. The victim and the
accused were inside a single room house; 2. The
uncontroverted fact that the victim was lying motionless on
the floor while the accused was sitting and putting on his
short pants; 3. There was no other person in the house; 4.
The accused threatened to kill the witness (Cabague) and
the latter's relatives if he (the witness) says anything on
what he saw; 5. The witness did not see any wound or blood
on the motionless body of the victim; 6. Death of the victim
by strangulation; 7. The victim's dead body was found about
ten (10) meters away from the house (of Cabague). In
addition thereto, BBB narrated that appellant was nervous
and uneasy when he met him along the road on the night of
25 July 2001. When he told appellant that he was looking for
AAA, appellant dropped his torch and hurriedly walked
away. Further, Dr. G testified that AAA was raped because
human spermatozoa and several wounds were found in and
near AAA's vagina. Appellant, however, interposed the
defense that he cannot be convicted on the basis of mere
circumstantial evidences. If you were the judge, would you
sustain the appellant's defense? Explain.
No. All of the foregoing circumstances, which were duly
proven, undoubtedly constitute an unbroken chain of events
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leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant
raped and killed AAA.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a
degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and
produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required
or that degree of proof which produces a conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.39 This was sufficiently established in the
case at bar.
In rape with homicide, the evidence against the accused is
usually circumstantial. The nature of the crime, in which only
the victim and the rapist-killer would have been around
during its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense
particularly difficult because the victim could no longer testify
against the perpetrator. Thus, resorting to circumstantial
evidence is almost always inevitable, and to demand direct
evidence to prove in such instance the modality of the
offense and the identity of the perpetrator would be
unreasonable.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there
is more than one circumstance; (2) the inference is based on
proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances
produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the accused.
People v. Gerald alias Pedro
G.R. No. 191271
Both the trial court and the CA found the accused, A, guilty
for the he special complex crime of rape with homicide
using circumstancial evidences. In sustaining the decision of
the trial court, the CA ruled in this wise based on the
evidence presented by the prosecution: “The appellant was
seen walking towards the direction of the short-cut road to
Wao where the body of the child victim was found. He
admitted that he used that road in going home. According
to BBB, she saw appellant pass by her house at around
3:30pm. That was also the time when AAA was supposed to
be on her way home using the short-cut road. Appellant
confirmed that BBB saw him and that he had spent the day
drinking liqour. “
“He was admittedly at the scene of the crime at the time the
child was discovered to be missing. Moreover, he was the
only person seen going to that road. He admitted that he
saw no one else using that road. Appellant stated that he
arrived at his home at around 5:00 that same afternoon. By
his own testimony, he was there at the scene of the crime at
around the time it happened. There can be no doubt that he
raped and killed AAA as he was the only one out there in the
"short-cut" road.”
The appellant interposed the following defense: (a) The
estimated time of death of AAA did not preclude the
possibility that other culprits had perpetrated the crime; (b)
The prosecution failed to establish that he had caused the
bite marks found on AAA; (c) He had never been found to be
in the company of the victim; (d) It was not shown that he
had gone to the place where her cadaver was found; (e)
While he was seen going towards the direction of the crime
scene, this fact does not conclusively prove that he had
raped and killed the victim; (f) His soiled clothes were not
found at or near the area where the crime was committed,
but were taken from his house without the benefit of a
search warrant.
What are the requirements for circumstantial evidence to
be sufficient for conviction? Would you support the
conviction? Why or why not?
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when the
concurrence of the following factors obtain: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as would prove
the crime beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances
and facts must be absolutely incompatible with any
reasonable hypothesis propounding the innocence of the
accused.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish the
existence of an unbroken chain of circumstances that lead to
no other logical conclusion but the guilt of the accused.
Hence, I would not support the conviction because the
circumstances presented by the prosecution do not form a
solid and cohesive narrative that proves with moral certainty
its contention that A perpetrated these heinous acts. To
synthesize, the only circumstances cited to implicate him in
the crime are the following: (a) he passed through the
shortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m. on 31 December 1998; (b)
Vicky did not see anyone else use that road from 3:00 p.m. to
5:00 p.m. on that day; and (c) the soiled garments
confiscated from him were identified to have been the same
ones he was wearing then.
To an unprejudiced mind, the fact that A was the only one
whom Vicky saw pass through the shortcut to Wao from
3:00p.m. to 5:00 p.m. does not logically lead to any
conclusion regarding his participation in the raping and killing
of AAA. It is a mere conjecture that can be refuted by other
equally conceivable and rational inferences. It is possible that
Vicky might have failed to see the perpetrator, because he
came from the same place as AAA; but, instead of traversing
the shortcut after raping and killing the victim, actually went
back to his point of origin. Neither can the mere fact that A's
clothes were soiled isolate him as the only probable suspect,
considering that his garments were not found anywhere near
the scene of the crime, but at his own home.
As a consequence, the circumstances borne out by the
records are severely insufficient to establish the culpability of
A as one may reasonably extrapolate other possible scenarios
other than those pointing to his guilt. The evidence in this
case having fallen short of the standard of moral certainty,
any doubt on the guilt of the accused should be considered in
favor of his acquittal.
People v. Tamano
G.R. No. 188855
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X was charged with rape committed against Y, a 17-year old
"mongoloid," a mental retardate or feeble-minded girl with
a mental age of a child below 12 years of age. The
prosecution presented Y as witness, together with other
witnesses. X denied the commission of the crime and
argued that the prosecution miserably failed to overcome
the presumption of innocence in his favor, claiming that Y’s
story of defloration was highly questionable. May Y’s
testimony suffice to prove X’s conviction of the crime
charged?
Yes.
While it is true that the credibility of one who is a mental
retardate may be difficult to determine, still, it can be
ascertained by deducing from the manner she testifies in
court as to the surrounding facts of the crime committed. For
as long as her testimony is straightforward, candid and
unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material
points, and her demeanor is consistent with one who has
been a victim of rape, bolsters her credibility with the verity
born out of human nature and experience, thus, must be
given full faith and credit.
In the case at bench, notwithstanding Y’s mental condition,
her testimony is logical, clear, convincing, credible and
sufficient to hold X guilty of the crime charged. As against the
positive identification and credible testimony of Y, mere
denials of X cannot prevail to overcome conviction. The
straightforward narration of Y on how she was raped coupled
by her categorical identification of X as the malefactor sealed
the case for the prosecution
People v. Larranaga
G.R. Nos. 138874-75
Several accused were charged with the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape committed against A and B. The lower
court found them guilty based on the physical as well as
testimonial evidence, among which was the testimony of X,
an accused discharged as state witness; testimonies of
witnesses who saw the accused in the mall where the
victims were abducted, witnesses who saw the accused near
the place where the body of the victim A was found,
witnesses who saw the accused buy beverages and heard
voices of quarreling male and female emanating from the
van. The accused questions the credibility of X to testify due
to his tainted record. The accused denied the allegations
and interposed alibi as their defense. Several witnesses for
the defense were excluded by the court; hence, they argued
that their right to due process was violated. Rule on the
arguments of the accused.
The arguments of the accused are unmeritorious.
In deciding a criminal case, physical evidence is one of the
highest degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all
witnesses put together. Being evidence that is negative in
nature and self-serving, alibi cannot attain more credibility
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on
clear and positive evidence.
In this case, the details given by X are of such nature and
quality that only a witness who actually saw the commission
of the crimes could furnish. The body of the victim A was
found in a ravine in the place specified by X. His testimonies
were likewise corroborated by several other witnesses who
saw incidents of what he narrated. This case is a balance
scale whereby perched on one end is
appellants’ alibi supported by witnesses who were either
their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end
is the positive identification of the herein appellants by the
prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way, related to
the victims.
Sps. Magno v. Heirs of Parulan
G.R. No. 183916
Spouses X filed a petition to cancel the title of a parcel of
land registered in the name of Y, alleging that a portion of
their land was included in Y’s land. The spouses presented
as evidence two Tax Declarations in the name of their
predecessor in interest, the questioned EP/OCT,
photographs of the property, as well as the Report and
Recommendation of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
Legal Officer. On the other hand, Y presented a Kasunduan
sa Pamumuwisan between Y’s ancestor and its landlord, an
endorsements and grant of request for survey, the
Approved Subdivision Plan of Y’s lot, and the accompanying
Lot Data Computation for the land of Y and X’s predecessor
in interest. The DARAB and CA ruled that Spouses X have
failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish that the
contested lot was part of their property. Did the spouses
establish their claim based on the evidence they presented?
No.
Substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. A Petition to correct/cancel an Emancipation
Patent can prosper only if petitioners are able to present
substantial evidence that a portion of their lot was
erroneously covered by the patent.
In this case, the evidence presented by petitioners was
insufficient to controvert the accuracy of the technical
description of the land properly covered by the subject
EP/OCT. A mere tax declaration cannot defeat a certificate of
title. As pointed out by the DARAB, petitioners should have
presented expert witnesses or initiated a relocation survey of
Lot 1306 to establish the alleged errors in the technical
description of the subject EP. In contrast to the evidence
adduced by Spouses X, the EP /OCT they sought to impugn
contained a technical description of the metes and bounds of
Y’s property.
San Mateo v. People
G.R. No. 200090
Y filed a complaint charging X of violation of BP 22 by
allegedly issuing several checks which were dishonoured for
62 | P a g e
lack of sufficient funds. Both the RTC and CA found X guilty,
as all the elements for violation of B.P. 22 had been
sufficiently proven. The third element of notice of dishonour
was duly established during the trial by the following facts:
(1) X’s unjustified refusal to claim the demand letter sent to
her by registered mail despite three notices from the
postmaster; (2) X’s various letters to Y requesting the latter
to defer the deposit of her checks; and (3) her statement in
her Amended Affidavit that Y’s act of depositing the nine
checks resulted in the closure of her account. Did the
prosecution prove X’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
No.
To be liable, the three elements of the crime must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The law creates the presumption
that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of
funds when he issued a check and the bank dishonored it,
which arises only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a written notice of dishonor and that, within five
days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the
check or to make arrangements for its payment. Receipts for
registered letters including return receipts do not themselves
prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve
as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of
dishonor.
Here, the second element was not sufficiently established.
The presentation of the registry card with an
unauthenticated signature does not meet the required proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused received such
notice. Since there is insufficient proof that X actually
received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that she
knew of the insufficiency of her funds cannot arise.
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Ramos v. CA
G.R. No. 124354
An action for damages was filed against Drs. Y and Z, the
surgeon and anesthesiologist who performed surgery on X.
During the administration of the anesthesia, the nail beds of
X turned bluish, and X later on fell into a coma, which was
due to the alleged improper intubation by the
anesthesiologist. The plaintiffs offered the testimony of A, a
nurse and a sister-in-law of X who was present during the
surgery. A testified that she noticed the bluish discoloration
of X’s nail beds and testified that she heard Dr. Z saying “ang
hirap i-intubate nito, o lumalaki ang tiyan” when Dr. Z
inserted the endotracheal tube. The CA considered A not
competent to testify whether or not the intubation was a
success. Is A competent to testify on the matter?
Yes.
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is
permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of
injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony
because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.
When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must
do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission
complained of and the injury sustained while under the
custody and management of the defendant without need to
produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard
of care.
In the case at bar, although witness A is not an
anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon matters on
which she is capable of observing such as, the statements
and acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances,
and manifest conditions which are observable by any
one. This is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur where the testimony of expert witnesses is not
required.
Capili v. Cardana
G.R. No. 157906
X, the principal of SR Elementary School, was sued for
damages by the parents of Y, a minor who died when a
branch of a rotten tree located within the perimeter of the
school fell on her. X argued that she was not negligent about
the disposal of the tree since she did not observe any
indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of
her teachers inform her that the tree was already rotten. On
the other hand, the plaintiffs argued that X knew that the
tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have done in the same situation. Will X be
presumed liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor?
Yes.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, petitioner’s
negligence is presumed once respondents established the
requisites for the doctrine to apply. The requisites for the
doctrine are, viz: (1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have happened except
for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with
the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.
Applying the doctrine to the instant case, it is presumed that
the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree
which caused the death of Y was a result of X’s negligence,
being in charge of the school.
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
Herrera v. Alba
G.R. No. 148220
In a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages, X, a minor, represented by his mother, sought the
taking of DNA Paternity Testing against Y, the putative
father. Y denied that he is the biological father and opposed
the DNA testing contending that it has not gained
acceptability. The RTC AND CA ordered the taking of the
test. Y now seeks to be enlightened of whether a DNA test is
a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation. He asks for the conditions under which DNA
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technology may be integrated into our judicial system and
the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in
a paternity suit. Rule on the arguments advanced by Y.
Y must undergo the DNA Paternity Test.
In assessing the probative value of DNA Analysis as evidence,
courts should consider the following data: how the samples
were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In
paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of
these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA
profile. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which
match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types
do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the
father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the
father.
From the foregoing, DNA is a valid probative tool to
determine filiation.
People v. Vallejo
G.R. No. 144656
X was charged of rape with homicide committed against Y.
Among the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
were the result of the DNA testing conducted on the vaginal
swabs from Y taken during autopsy and buccal swabs and
hair samples from X and Y’s parents. The Forensic Chemist
of the NBI who conducted the tests testified that the vaginal
swabs of the victim contained the DNA profiles of accused-
appellant and the victim. The DNA analysis is questioned by
X arguing that the prosecution failed to show that all the
samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated,
considering that these specimens were already soaked in
smirchy waters before they were submitted to the
laboratory. Rule on whether the court should give probative
value on the DNA Analysis results.
Yes.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts
should consider, among others things, the following data:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.
In the case at bar, the buccal smears and strands of hair and
nails taken from Y tested negative for the presence of human
DNA because of the inadequacy of the specimens submitted
for examination, and not the possibility that the samples had
been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results
of their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the
victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA which,
upon analysis by the experts, showed the DNA profile of X.
The totality of the evidence points that X is guilty of the crime
charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or
circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with
the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his
innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force,
may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
Ong v. Diaz
G.R. No. 171713
A complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for
support pending litigation was filed by minor Y, represented
by her mother, against X. The RTC ruled that Y is an
illegitimate child of X. While the case was pending appeal
with the Court of Appeals, X died. The CA later ruled to
remand the case to the lower court for the issuance of an
order to conduct DNA Analysis, with whatever remaining
DNA samples that may be obtained from X. The counsel for
the estate of X argued that it was error for the Court of
Appeals to issue such order for the reason that it is no
longer feasible because of X’s demise. Is the argument of X’s
counsel correct?
No.
The New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA
testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation.
Under Section 4 thereof, the term "biological sample" means
any organic material originating from a person’s body, even if
found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing.
This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues,
hairs and bones.
In this case, it can be said that the death of X does not ipso
facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Thus,
even if X already died, any of the biological samples as
enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA
testing. In this case, petitioner estate of X has not shown the
impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample
that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
People v. Umanito
G.R. No. 172607
X was charged with rape committed against Y. Z was born
out of the crime. X was found guilty by the RTC and Court of
Appeals. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was
remanded for the conduct of DNA testing under the New
Rules on DNA Evidence. DNA samples were extracted from
X, Y and Z. THE NBI Forensic chemist who conducted the
examination testified that using the Powerplex 16 System,
DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA
paper taken from X, Y, and Z showed that there is a
Complete Match in all of the fifteen (15) loci tested between
the alleles of X and Z; that based on the above findings,
there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that X is the
biological father of Z. X did not object to nor present
evidence to controvert the results of the DNA analysis. Will
the result of the DNA Testing suffice to convict X of the
crime of rape?
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Yes.
Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC (Rule on DNA Evidence)
provides that: "If the value of the Probability of Paternity is
99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of
paternity. Under Rule 131, Sec 3 of the Rules of Court,
disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
In the case at bar, the disputable presumption that was
established as a result of the DNA testing was not
contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering
that X did not object to the admission of the results of the
DNA testing nor presented evidence to rebut the same.
Hence, based on the result of the DNA analysis conducted by
the National Bureau of Investigation, Forensic Division, X is
the biological father of Z. Given that the results of the court-
ordered DNA testing conform with the conclusions of the
lower courts, the conviction of X is sustained.
Lejano v. People
A has been accused of rape and was convicted before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. On January 1, 1999 while on
appeal, the accused reiterated his motion for DNA testing.
Court issued a Resolution granting the request of A to
submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from the
victim’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still
under the safekeeping of the NBI. Unfortunately, the NBI
informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial
court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen
was not among the object evidence that the prosecution
offered in evidence in the case. This outcome prompted A to
file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has
resulted in the denial of his right to due process. Rule on his
motion.
Motion should be denied. Due process does not require the
State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be
useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad
faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the
State presented a medical expert who testified on the
existence of the specimen and A in fact sought to have the
samae subjected to DNA test. When the accused raised the
DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist,
the country did not yet have the technology for conducting
the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized
its admissibility as evidence. On the other hand, the idea of
keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court
rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed,
the accused did not bring up the matter of preserving the
specimen in the meantime.
Ople v. Torres
A and her son B sued B’s alleged biological father, X, for
support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City
RTC. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order
directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing, which X opposed by invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to
dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the parties
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the
expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court. Is the Court of Appeals correct in affirming
the RTC’s decision?
Yes. The CA committed no error. In the case of Ople v Torres,
the court categorically declared “In no uncertain terms, we
also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance
public service and the common good... Intrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that
enhance public service and the common good”.
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Cruz vs Nuez-Apao
Complainant, A, has a pending case before the Court of
Appeals. He filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered
complainant’s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by
the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not
reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the
case. In line with this, A was in desperate need of help that
can speed up his case before the CA. He contacted B, an
Executive Assistant II of the acting Division Clerk of Court of
CA, whom he learned from his sister-in-law. B texted A, that
a favorable decision can be made provided P1Million be
given to her. B texted A that they have to meet at times
Plaza Un Avenue. A and B met and negotiated for a lower
price, but to no avail. They arranged for another meeing,
but now, A coordinated to matter with GMA 7 Imbestigador,
where assistance from PAOCTF was sought for an
entrapment operation. Eventually the PAOCTF operators
executed the entrapment and investigated the respondent.
B now claims that the text messages cannot be used as
evidence before the Court. Rule on B’s Contention.
B’s contention is unmeritorious. The text messages are now
covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone
conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms
of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
"Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by
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the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case,
complainant who was the recipient of said messages and
therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their
contents and import. B admitted that the cellphone number
reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the
messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt
respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text
messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel
signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages
between her and complainant. It is also well to remember
that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the
probative value of the text messages as evidence in
determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this
case.
NPC v. Codilla
On April 20, 1996, M/V DibenaWinm being operated and
owned by Bangpai shipping company under its hip agent
Wallen shipping Inc., accidentally bumped the power barge
of NAPOCOR. The latter filed a complaint for damages on
april 26, 1996 before the sala of the respondent judge.
During the presentation of evidence, the petitioner
presented as pieces of evidence Xerox copies, to which such
was admitted by the court. However, a motion to strike out
the evidence was filed before the court to which the court
ordered that such pieces of evidence be stricken out of the
records but has to be attached to the documents for proper
disposition by the appellate in case of appeal before the
latter. The petitioner aver that such documents be admitted
for the basic reason that such is within the purview of the
electronic evidence. Rule on petitioner’s averment.
Petitioner’s averment is bereft of merit. Section 1 of Rule 2 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally
signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or
other means which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document. For the purpose of these
Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used
interchangeably with "electronic data message".
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents
therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can
a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation
A, engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling
stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the B, an
international trading company with head office in Seoul,
South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City,
Philippines. The two corporations conducted business
through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. B would send the pro forma invoices
containing the details of the steel product order to A; if the
latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his
signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to the
respondent, again by fax. B filed a civil action for damages
due to breach of contract against A before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City. In its complaint, B alleged that A
breached their contract when he refused to open the letter
of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining
100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2. After B rested its case,
A filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that B failed to
present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on
which the civil action was based. Decide on A’s argument.
A’s argument is meritorious. The terms “electronic data
message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is
not admissible as electronic evidence.
A was a slot machine operator supervisor at PAGCOR.
Within the period November 2066 to March 2007, there
was a complaint filed before the office of the HR
department of the respondent for the involvement of A in
the allege padding of the credit meter reading of the slot
machines. Consequently, A was dismissed. A filed a motion
for reconsideration for the said judgment through facsimile
transmission. The Administrative tribunal denied such
motion, affirmed by the CSC and further affirmed by the
appellate court. Rule on the propriety of the motion for
reconsideration through a facsimile transmission.
The MR through a facsimile transmission is improper.
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the
transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter
by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time,
and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
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specified amount of electric current. The current is
transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via
microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an
image of the elemental area in the proper position and the
correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other
device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as
a facsimile.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is,
at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its
face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic
and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may,
in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as
electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation,
We determined the question of whether the original
facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or
"electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic
Commerce Act, and we said:
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data
message" and "electronic document," as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is
not admissible as electronic evidence.
Chato vs. HRET
A renewed her bid in the May 10,2010 elections as
representative of the Second Legislative District of
Camarines Norte, composed of the seven (7) Municipalities.
B who was proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010 having
garnered a total of 51,707 votes as against A’s 47,822 votes,
or a plurality of 3,885 votes. On May 24, 2010, A filed an
electoral protest before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal(HRET), assailing the results in all the 160
clustered precincts in four (4) municipalities, In its
Resolution No. 11-208, the HRET directed the copying of the
picture image files of ballots relative to the protest. A argue
that the picture images of the ballots cannot be considered
“official ballots”.
No. The picture images of the ballots, as scanned and
recorded by the PCOS, are likewise “official ballots” that
faithfully captures in electronic form. The votes cast by the
voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such,
the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the
paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may bused for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.
Maliksi v. COMELEC
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed X the winner for the position of
Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Y, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, brought an election
protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of
votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held
a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the
revision, declared Y as the duly elected Mayor of Imus
commanding X to cease and desist from performing the
functions of said office. X appealed to the COMELEC. In the
meanwhile, the RTC granted Y motion for execution pending
appeal, and Y was then installed as Mayor. In resolving the
appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to
the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use
of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. The
first division declared X as the duly elected Mayor. Y filed a
motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been
denied his right to due process because he had not been
notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the
resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were
secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there
was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not
been preserved. Rule on Y’s argument.
Y is mistaken. Rule 4 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC36 is clear on this
issue. It states:
SECTION 1. Original of an Electronic Document. - An
electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of
an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown
to reflect the data accurately.
SECTION 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. - When a
document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart
produced by the same impression as the original, or from the
same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic recording, or by
chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques
which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or
duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not
be admissible to the same extent as the original if: (a) a
genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the
original; or (b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or
inequitable to admit the copy in lieu of the original. The
ballot images, which are digital, are electronically generated
and written in the CF cards when the ballots are fed into the
PCOS machine. The ballot images are the counterparts
produced by electronic recording which accurately reproduce
the original, and thus are the equivalent of the original. The
digital images of the physical ballots are electronically and
instantaneously generated by the PCOS machines once the
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physical ballots are fed into and read by the machines.
Hence, the ballot images are not secondary evidence. The
official physical ballots and the ballot images in the CF cards
are both original documents. The ballot images in the CF
cards have the same evidentiary weight as the official
physical ballots.
RULE OF WRIT OF AMPARO
Yano v. Medina
G.R. No. 186640
A and B alleged that their respective sons C and D were
allegedly abducted detained by military personnel. They
further alleged that E, niece of a neighbor, later informed
them that she had seen two men inside Camp Servillano
Aquino of the Northern Luzon Command (Nolcom) and at
the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Army’s 71st Infantry
Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, whom E later identified as
C and D after respondents had shown her their
photographs. Contending that the victims’ life, liberty and
security had been and continued to be violated on account
of their forced disappearance, A and B prayed for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims’
bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of
certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and
permanent protection orders, and the rendition of
judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. The military officers denied having custody of the
victims. They posited that the proper remedy of
respondents was to file a petition for the issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, since the petition’s ultimate objective
was the production of the bodies of the victims. The Court
of Appeals is convinced that petitioners have not adequately
and convincingly established any direct or indirect link
between respondents individual military officers and the
disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson. Neither did the
concerned Philippine Army Units have exerted fully their
efforts to investigate and unearth the truth and bring the
culprits before the bar of justice.
Was the Court of Appeals correct in not categorically
denying the privilege of Writ of Amparo?
No.
The appellate court resolved the case on the basis of the
credibility of E as a witness. While her story of how she saw
the subject two missing persons appeared initially as
plausible, however, her credibility as a witness had been
successfully destroyed by the witnesses presented by the
respondents who categorically stated that her reputation is
bad and who is known to invent stories. Notably, Antonina
Galang never did see the faces of the two but were known to
her through photographs. Certainly, there may be a
difference between photographs and the faces in person.
What is thus left for the Court to resolve is the issue of
whether the grant of the RELIEFS30 by the appellate court
after finding want of substantial evidence are valid and
proper.
The requisite standard of proof – substantial evidence -
speaks of the clear intent of the Rule to have the equivalent
of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted,
in resolving amparo petitions.
To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present
case failed to measure up to that standard– substantial
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. Since respondents did not avail of
any remedy against the adverse judgment, the appellate
court’s decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond
the ambit of review.
RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Roxas v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 189155
Roxas had an immersion here in the Philippines, enrolled
herself in an exposure program. One day, after doing survey
work, she was abducted by armed men. There the
abductors told her that she was adbucted by reason of her
being member of the CCP-NPA. She was interrogated by
them and was tortured. The armed men introduced
themselves as part of the Special Operations Group and with
that, Roxas also knew the names of some of them. After 5
days of being held captive, she was realeased by the armed
men.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well
as the suppresion of any existing government files or
records linking her to the CCP-NPA, petitioner filed a Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data while she impleaded public
officials to answer for her abduction and torture.
Can Roxas be granted the Writ of Habeas Data
No.
HABEAS DATA was conceptualized as a judicial remedy for
enforcing a right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals. It operates to protect a
person’s rights to control information regarding himself,
particularly, in the instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.
The indispensable element is a showing, at least substantially,
that a violation or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security has happened, which the petitioner
has failed to do.
There is no evidence that any of the public respondents have
violated or threatened a right to privacy of the petitioner.
There wasn’t even evidence that they had access to the
photos and videos.
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF
2002
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 People v. Alberto
G.R. No. 179717
An informant went to the Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) of the
Makati Police Station to inform PO1 A that B was selling shabu. An
entrapment team was thus immediately formed. PO1 A was
designated as poseur-buyer and was provided with a P500.00 bill
marked money. The informant contacted the B through a cellular
phone and they agreed to meet at J.P. Rizal Extension, Comembo,
Makati City, to consummate the transaction. Whereupon, the
informant and the police team proceeded to the designated area.
Upon their arrival, the informant approached the appellant and
introduced the poseur-buyer, PO1 A. B asked PO1 A how much
shabu he needed and the latter handed over the P500.00 buy-bust
money. The appellant then gave a small plastic sachet containing a
white crystalline substance. The entrapment team arrested B and
retrieved from her the buy-bust money. The sachet containing the
white crystalline substance was marked with the initials NDA1[4]
and sent to the crime laboratory for examination. The examination
showed that the contents of the plastic sachet weighed 0.25 gram
and are positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,
a dangerous drug. The trial court convicted the accused for the
violation of RA 9165, which was later affirmed by the CA.
Was the accused’s conviction is proper when the court gave full
weight and credence to the incredible testimony of the
prosecution’s sole witness, PO1 A
Yes.
In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, the
pivotal issue usually boils down to the question of credibility of
witness. The testimonies of the police officers who apprehended
the accused in a buy-bust operation are usually accorded credence
because of the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duty, which presumption may be overturned only if there is
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary or that they were
inspired by improper motive.
Moreover, non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team
with Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Law is not fatal as long as
there is justifiable ground therefor and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team
People v. Gonzaga
G.R. No. 184952
An Information charging A with violation of Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as
"The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," as amended, was filed
in the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31,
through a buy bust operation made by SPO2 B as the poseur
buyer and other team members. With them in the buy bust
operation, is a confidential informant who introduced the
accused with SPO2 B. The accused contended that the
alleged shabu recovered from him was never authenticated
for the reason that the arresting officers failed to comply
with the rules on chain of custody of evidence.
Was the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating the provisions of R.A 6425.
Yes.
Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal Sale of Shabu.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must concur: "(1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and, (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti.
In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to prove all
the essential elements of illegal sale of shabu. Appellant was
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the
person who sold the shabu presented in court. SPO2 Male,
the poseur-buyer, testified that he bought the shabu from
appellant during a legitimate buy-bust operation. SPO2 Male
narrated the circumstances leading to the consummation of
the sale of illegal drugs and the arrest of appellant:
A thorough review of the records reveals that there is no
broken chain in the custody of the seized items, later on
determined to be shabu, from the moment of their
confiscation by the buy-bust team, to their turn-over at the
police station, to the time same were brought to the forensic
chemist for examination, and their subsequent presentation
in court during trial. It was duly established by documentary,
testimonial, and object evidence, including the markings on
the plastic sachets containing the shabu, that the substance
examined by the forensic chemist was the same as that taken
from appellant.
People v. Magpayo
G.R. No. 187069
The officers on duty at the Alabat Police Station in Quezon
received information from an asset that A was selling shabu
in Barangay 5, Alabat, Quezon. A team immediately
dispatched to the area by the Chief of Police, X, to conduct a
buy-bust operation. PO1 B, the designated poseur-buyer,
approached A out the buy-bust. PO1 B first handed the
marked money to appellant who then handed him what was
presumed to be shabu. The rest of the team immediately
rushed to the scene, arrested appellant and frisked him for
deadly weapon. The searched yielded four more plastic
sachets containing a white crystalline substance.
A assails, among other things, the failure of the buy-bust
team to comply with the procedural requirements of Sec. 21
of the implementing rules of R.A. 9165, particularly the
marking of evidence after seizure and confiscation, the
conduct of a physical inventory and the prescribed
witnesses to the buy-bust operation alleged that no
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) was made by the buy-bust team, contrary to the
mandate by the above-mentioned provision. However, the
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Trial Court found him guilty of violation of RA 9165, and was
later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Did the police operatives committed lapses in the handling
of drugs taken from the accused which seriously undermine
the integrity of the seized substance which would eventually
result in the acquittal of the accused?
Yes.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must be duly established: (1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires
evidence, not only that the transacted drugs actually exist,
but evidence as well that the drugs seized and examined are
the same drugs presented in court.
In the case at bar, the buy-bust team committed lapses in the
handling of the drugs taken from accused which seriously
undermine the integrity of the seized substance.
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedures is required
because of the unique characteristic of illegal drugs,
rendering them indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily
open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by
accident or otherwise. Hence, the rules on the measures to
be observed during and after the seizure, during the custody
and transfer of the drugs for examination, and at all times up
to their presentation in court.
In the present case, the records do not show that the above-
mentioned procedural requirements were complied with. No
physical inventory and photographs of the seized items were
taken. Likewise, no prior coordination with the PDEA, prior to
and after the conduct of the buy-bust operation, was made.
People v. Martinez
G.R. No. 191366
On September 2, 2006, a concerned citizen entered the
precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in the
house of A in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. The police
officers and members of the Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) team heed to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City.
Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales
was located. As the police officers entered the gate of the
house, they saw B coming out of the side door and
immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw
accused A, C, D, E and F in a room. The four were surprised
by the presence of the police. In front of them were open
plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled
used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil. The
accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct.
The items found in the room were seized and turned over to
the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer.
The latter conducted a laboratory examination on the seized
items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used
aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The
accused were subjected to a drug test, they were found to
be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The accused were convicted for violation of RA 9165 in the
Trial Court which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Are the items that were seized in and turned over to the
Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory admissible as
evidence against the accused.
No.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional
guarantee, intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as
into their houses, papers and effects. Sec. 2, Art. III, of the
1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket
prohibition against all searches and seizures without warrant.
Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed
even in the absence of a warrant — (i) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain
view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk;
and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused
was illegal and the subject items were confiscated as an
incident thereof. The apprehending officers should have first
conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and
address of one of the accused were already ascertained.
After conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should
have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The
arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is
likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an
unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest
are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the very corpus delicti
of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its
inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.
People v. Ditona
G.R. No. 189841
The Drug Enforcement Group of the Olongapo City Police
had received reports of rampant selling of illegal drugs at
Compound 7-9th Street, Barangay Ilalim, Olongapo City.
Within the election period, the police conducted a buy-bust
operation at the place. SPO1 A, acting as a poseur-buyer,
and an informer met the accused B in front of the latter’s
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house. SPO1 A gave B the marked money consisting of two
P100 bills in exchange for one plastic sachet of shabu.
At a signal, the other police officers rushed towards the gate
of the compound to make the apprehension but, before
they could reach SPO1 Flores and Ditona, the latter noticed
their movement and ran into his house. The officers
arrested him there and four others who were then sniffing
shabu and preparing aluminum tin foils.
The police frisked them and found the marked money on
Ditona’s person together with transparent plastic sachets
containing what appeared to be shabu substance and one
cal. 22 magnum revolver with six live ammunitions. They
confiscated the marked money, the suspected shabu
substance in sachets, the gun, and the ammunitions. Upon
laboratory examination, the substance proved positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Did the prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt
Ditona’s guilt for illegal possession of and sale of shabu.
No.
To successfully prosecute an accused for selling illegal drugs,
the prosecution has to prove: (1) the identities of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. On the other
hand, for an accused to be convicted of possession of illegal
drugs, the prosecution is required to prove that: (1) the
accused was in possession of prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
In both instances, the State has to prove as well the corpus
delicti, the body of the crime. It must be shown that the
suspected substance the police officers seized from the
accused is the same thing presented in court during the trial.
Thus, the chain of custody rule is essential to ensure that
doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed
through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of
the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the
forensic chemist, and finally to the court. The witnesses
should be able to describe these movements to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and
that no one who did not belong in the chain had access to the
same.
Here, the prosecution dismally failed to prove the corpus
delicti since there were substantial gaps in the chain of
custody of the seized drugs which raised doubts on the
authenticity of the evidence presented in court.
People v. Hong Yeng E and Tsien Chua
G.R. No. 181826
Atty. A ordered Special Investigator B to place accused C
under surveillance and arrange a possible buy-bust involving
him. Subsequently, B went to Jollibee, Masangkay Branch,
together with another officer for a pre-arranged meeting
with C. The latter agreed to sell two kilograms of shabu to B
for P600,000.00 per kilogram. He was to deliver the shabu in
the evening of the following day at the same place. B
caused the preparation of boodle money, consisting of 24
bundles of 100 10-peso bills with four 500-peso bills to
cover the top and the bottom of each bundle. As agreed,
the NBI agents met with C again. C arrived but requested
the police buyers to meet him at Lai-Lai Restaurant. D and E
arrived and approached C. Upon the latter’s instruction, D
handed over the plastic bags she had to B. Convinced that
these contained shabu, Before giving the marked money as
payment, B lit his cigarette, the signal that the buy-bust had
been completed. C and D were arrested subsequently.
Was there a consummated illegal sale of prohibited drugs?
No.
To prove the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution's evidence should establish the following
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. Absent any of these two elements, the
prosecution’s case must fail.
Here, while B claimed that C offered to sell to him two
kilograms of shabu for P1.2 million and that he agreed to buy
the same, the sale was not consummated.
It is material in illegal sale of dangerous drugs that the sale
actually took place. What consummates the buy-bust
transaction is the delivery of the drugs to the poseur-buyer
and, in turn, the seller’s receipt of the marked money. While
the parties may have agreed on the selling price of the shabu
and delivery of payment was intended, these do not prove
consummated sale. Receipt of the marked money, whether
done before delivery of the drugs or after, is required.
R.A. No. 1379
Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho
G.R. No. 185685
A concerned citizen filed a complaint regarding the alleged
unexplained wealth of A, then Chief of the Special
Investigation Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
Cebu City. To support the allegation, the complainant
attached copies of bank certifications from various banks
where A has accounts with which appeared to have an
aggregate bank deposit of P5,798,801.39 but he denied
ownership of such. In support of his position, he presented
the Joint Affidavit of his brothers and nephew which alleged
that he and his siblings planned to put up a business. A
presented a Special Power of Attorney, wherein his brothers
and nephew designated him as the trustee of their
investments in the business venture they were intending to
put up and authorized him to deposit their money into his
questioned bank accounts to defray business-related
expenses. However, this was questioned by the
Ombudsman because of its authenticity.
The Ombudsman found out that A did not declare such
deposit in his SALN and adjuged him of dishonesty because
such act of not declaring said bank deposits in his SALN,
which were disproportionate to his and his wife’s salaries,
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constituted falsification and dishonesty. The Court of
Appeals which relied on the documentary, however, found
A guilty of negligence only and reduced the penalty to
suspension from office for six months, without pay.

Was the Court of Appeals correct in reversing the ruling of

the Ombudsman?

No.

Section 2 of R.A. 1379 states that "whenever any public

officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to
have been unlawfully acquired."

By mandate of law, every public official or government

employee is required to make a complete disclosure of his
assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any
questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter
usually results from non-disclosure of such matters. Hence, a
public official or employee who has acquired money or
property manifestly disproportionate to his salary or his other
lawful income shall be prima facie presumed to have illegally
acquired it.

It should be understood that what the law seeks to curtail is

"acquisition of unexplained wealth." Where the source of the
undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted, then it is
"explained wealth" which the law does not penalize.

In this case, A did not only failed to disclose his bank accounts
containing substantial deposits but he also failed to
satisfactorily explain the accumulation of his wealth or even
identify the sources of such accumulated wealth. The
documents that he presented, like those purportedly
showing that his brothers and nephew were financially
capable of sending or contributing large amounts of money
for their business, do not prove that they did contribute or
remit money for their supposed joint business venture.

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