G.R. No.
L-3246 November 29, 1950 During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.
Luis Contreras for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar
for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
finding the appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs.
The following facts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on
his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife,
Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live in the house of his
half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same
municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a
month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was
sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous
quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and
stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing
a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia
toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband
Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the
floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found
by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest
daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her
mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement,
Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy
because according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the
reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he
suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his
had become indifferent to him (defendant).
Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in
the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not
testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail
where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather
strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would
remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that
at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would
refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison authorities;
and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone
by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was
opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an
attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and
therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree with the
lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez,
who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from
wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he
must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at
the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of
Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and
applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo
Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to
43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances
may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason;
that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that
the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely
deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not exclude imputability.2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to
imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive
evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that
he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be
voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in
order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his
insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it
was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being
feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at
having killed his wife. From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we
quote the following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate
that the accused was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion,
and other testimony to the effect that, while in confinement awaiting trial,
defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense
of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement appears to have
been due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an
imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has
not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that
he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five
children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of
school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra.
And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the
extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief
that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an
imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The
fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a
mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an
imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to the
observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said that
when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias
Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant.
However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only
frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have
aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of
thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those
unfortunate beings, simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been
fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after she fell down to
the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her
for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he
thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the
authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down
and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife,
and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus
saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his
conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. It
seems that the prosecution was not intent or proving it. At least said aggravating
circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace
court or in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the
doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of this aggravating
circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded
warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in
either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely
that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of
action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would
diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating
circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The
accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance to offset them, at first we thought of the possible applicability of the
provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the purpose of
imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide,
which is reclusion perpetuato death. It will be observed however, that article 64
refers to the application of penalties which contain three periods whether it be a
single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which
forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not
true in the present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is composed only
of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to
the application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or
two indivisible penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear
that article 63 is the one applicable in the present case.
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the
Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant
to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous mitigating
circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by
article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties,
namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code
must be applied. The Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited
such moral turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the
provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the
attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency after
appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement.

Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the
is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating judgment of the lower court with the modification that the appellant will be
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar legal credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.
provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil. 37), Appellant will pay costs.
involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two
Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present
cases above cited, and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty,
Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said the following:
this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his
And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death
mitigating circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.
without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the next lower to
Moran, Bengzon, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.
that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80
above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of
article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30,
1879.)

Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is
inevitable and which, under the law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to
the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal Code; and.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that
a proper petition be filed with the executive branch of the Government in order
that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested in it
by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next lower.
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial Court of the Third
Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the
crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an
information charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the
felony of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province
of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate
intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen
Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the chest, stomach, throat and other parts
of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly caused the
death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her
sex, the crime was committed inside the field office of the Department of Agrarian
Reform where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking
advantage of superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987
between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person,
identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at
the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the
accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua
several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of
the DAR's office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed
weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan
reveals that the victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter
part of February, 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning
the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so many documents from the
accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure in the Department
of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it my own way."
Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he
spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the
untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of
the commission of the offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the
accused. According to her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982
when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in December 1983, her husband
again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish his
two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical
treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had
his monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his
farming. The couple, instead, operated a small store which her husband used to
tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep
thought always; maltreating their children when he was not used to it before;
demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing
any child when their children quarrelled with other children. There were also times
when her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in
truth they were not. On the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time,
her husband complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did not bother to
buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he
went back to the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer
there. She got worried as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She
returned home only when she was informed that her husband had arrived. While
on her way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak"
(translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-
in-law's house with people milling around, including the barangay officials. She
instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that is the only
cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if
he would not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that
he chose to live longer even in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband
was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their conversation.
(See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband
exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay official
did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to
Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental
Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order
of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports
of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane long
before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity
was classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular
accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However,
he was not able to finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone
medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he claimed that he was not aware
of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only came to know
that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN,
pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat
testified that the accused was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments
secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the accused suffered
from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness. Both
attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow rehabilitated
after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further
testified that the accused is functioning at a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620,
September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for
the crime of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as
follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual
damage, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of
the criminal act. The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious
adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was apprehended and arrested in Metro
Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade arrest. This to
the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he
committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted
by the defendant-appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the
accused was insane during the commission of the crime changed.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged
cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally
responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a
mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal
responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts
without the least discernment; that there be complete absence or deprivation of
the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border
between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major
criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible
impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false
belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under
the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the
delusion test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which
no rational person would believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when,
by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between
right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the time
destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from
such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test
or criterion for insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of
insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that
insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain,
or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality,
functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered
function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered
volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged and perverted
condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An
insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of
his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on
the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and
appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his previous character and
habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person
whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of
inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a
reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct
testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish
insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts:
thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through
which we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound
mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National
Center for Mental Health, concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis
or insanity classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular
accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of the crime charged.
(Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by
perceptual disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse
control, impairment of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices.
The accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the
brain, therefore, is permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused
was permanent and did not have a period for normal thinking. To quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid
intervals unfortunately are not present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of
psychosis may be treated with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus,
although the defect of the brain is permanent, the manifestation of insanity is
curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since
January of 1987, thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the
patient has been mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be
allowed to scan my record, the record reveals that the patient had a stroke in
Riyadh about seven (7) months before his contract expired and he was brought
home. Sometime in January of 1987, the first manifestation is noted on the
behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self,
complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss of appetite; and that
was about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National
Center for Mental Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused
has been insane since January of 1987 or three (3) months before the commission
of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion based on the
testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of medical and
psychological examinations on the accused when he was confined therein.
However, We are still in quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or
not during the commission of the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though
he may be insane, has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or
few weeks prior to the commission of the crime charged the accused confronted
the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter. He complained
against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against
the victim. We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused
Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you
met the accused at your residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, accused told
me that he wanted to know from my wife why she was asking so many documents:
why she was requiring him to be interviewed and file the necessary documents at
the Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he wanted to know why my wife did not want
to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the landholding of his deceased father
in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife
the late Belen Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of
his father, what did you tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this
question of me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her
office to make a request for the transfer of the landholding in the name of his
deceased father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment
of the accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for
the transfer of the landholding in the name of my father and my name."
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be
mentally ill during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person
to confront a specified person who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the
accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the memory, We infer
from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves
that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the
appellant could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed
it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused,
when asked by the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his
lawyer is not yet in Court and that he is waiting for his counsel to appear and
because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the postponement of the hearing
of the case and to reset the same to another date. With those facts, do you
consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory
examination, in short all the assessment necessary to test the behavior of the
patient, like for example praying for postponement and fleeing from the scene of
the crime is one situation to consider if the patient is really insane or not. If I may
elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the illness, the
violent behavior, then he appears normal he can reason out and at the next
moment he burst out into violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is
one of the difficulties we have encountered in this case. When we deliberated
because when we prepared this case we have really deliberation with all the
members of the medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like for
example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular moment he
was aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed
the victim in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words
because he was aware when he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August
2, 1983; emphasis supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The
statement of one of the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez,
that the accused knew the nature of what he had done makes it highly doubtful
that accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As stated by the trial
court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was
sane. The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was
carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that
the accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the
attack classified the killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused
ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times,
he was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight
in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was
conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p.
63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the
evidence presented. (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the
privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and
therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the
accused.1âwphi1 However, in the defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of
insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the
starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800,
Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all
acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts were done
unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes
insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52
Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and
as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and
satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity.
Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the
presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and
intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through
a general plea of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125334 January 28, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRESENCIO TABUGOCA, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the joint decision1 rendered by Branch 18 of the
Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela in Criminal Cases Nos. 2386 and 2387 finding
accused-appellant Cresencio Tabugoca guilty of two counts of rape committed
against his very own daughters and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in the first case and the death penalty in the second.
In two informations simultaneously filed on January 20, 1995 in the aforesaid trial
court, accused-appellant was accused of raping his daughters in two separate
incidents. The information in Criminal Case No. 2386 charges him as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of March, 1992 in the municipality of Naguilian,
province of Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means
of force, intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own
daughter JACQUELINE A. TABUGOCA, a girl of 14 years old (sic), against the latter's
will and consent.2
The information in Criminal Case No. 2387 alleges:
That on or about the 9th day of December, 1994, in the municipality of Naguilian,
province of Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means
of force, intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own
daughter JINKY A. TABUGOCA, a girl of 12 years old (sic), against the latter's will and
consent.3
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when duly arraigned separately on the two
indictments with the assistance of counsel de officio.4 After a consolidated trial on
the merits, on March 15, 1996 the court a quorendered the decision now under
mandatory review.5 The commission of the two felonies was found by the lower
court to have been attended by the aggravating circumstances of relationship and
intoxication purposely sought by accused-appellant to embolden him to commit the
same.
In Criminal Case No. 2386, accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and directed to indemnity Jacqueline Tabugoca in the sum of
P50,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 2387, wherein the crime charged was committed
after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 on December 31, 1993,6 he was
condemned to suffer the capital punishment of death and ordered to indemnify
Jinky Tabugoca in the sum of P50,000.00.
The trial court arrived at the conclusion that, beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellant had committed the crimes charged on the bases of the testimonies of the
victims, as corroborated by the medical reports, and the testimony of the physician
who examined them.
The respective complainants in Criminal Cases Nos. 2386 and 2387, namely,
Jacqueline Tabugoca and Jinky Tabugoca, are the daughters of accused-
appellant.7 This was not denied by him. He even expressly declared during his
testimony that Jacqueline8 and Jinky9 are his daughters.
Complainant Jacqueline testified that she and her three younger sisters, Janet, Jinky
and Jewel, lived under the sole care of their father after their mother died on
August 28, 1991. While she and her sisters were sleeping in their house at Barangay
Roxas, Naguilian, Isabela at around 10 o'clock in the evening of March 28, 1992, she
was roused by her father who asked her to scratch his back. It turned out, however,
that accused-appellant had other intentions that night aside from relief from his
itchy discomfort.
While Jacqueline was thus scratching her father's back, he told her to stay and wait
for a while. Without any intimation, accused-appellant then removed her shorts
and underwear and made her lie down beside him. Jacqueline could only cry at this
point. As soon as she was completely disrobed, accused-appellant inserted his penis
into her vagina. With his manhood inside his daughter, accused-appellant warned
her not to tell anyone of his dastardly act if she would not want to be harmed
(makaala ka kaniak). Complainant was so petrified
with fear that she did not even dare ask her father why he was sexually molesting
her.10
Jacqueline was twelve years and three months old at the time of the incident, she
having been born on December 27, 1979.11
Because of the incident, Jacqueline harbored ill-feelings against her father, and she
reportedly became the object of gossip by her classmates in school. 12 However, she
did not tell anyone about her ordeal at the hands of her own father until she
learned that the same misfortune had befallen her sister, Jinky.
In Criminal Case No. 2387, complainant Jinky declared in the court below that her
father tried to rape her in the early morning of December 9, 1994. While she was
cleaning some articles in their house, accused-appellant approached her and then
took off his clothes. He then ordered Jinky to lie down and he removed her shorts
and panty. Thereafter, he inserted his penis into her vagina. Jinky cried and
complained to her father that she was in pain. Accused-appellant explained that it is
ordinary to feel pain because it was her first time to experience coitus.
After a while, he did not persist anymore in his sexual pursuit. Appellant lay down
beside Jinky and told her that they will continue the following day. At dawn of
December 10, 1994, accused-appellant made another attempt to carnally molest
Jinky. This time, however, Jinky resisted, thereby causing appellant to just lie down
and leave her alone.13
Jinky was only 12 years and nine months old at the time of the incident, she having
been born on March 5,1982.14
Later, on the same day, while Jacqueline and Jinky were watching television at their
grandmother's house nearby, Jinky confided to her grandmother about the sexual
abuses of her father against her. Upon hearing the revelations of her sister,
Jacqueline also disclosed to her grandmother her own experience with her father
two years before.15
The victims' grandmother, Perlita Alejandro, forthwith brought her granddaughters
to the police authorities and then to the Municipal Health Officer of Naguilian for
physical examination. The two were examined on December 12, 1994 by Dr.
Maryann M. Fontanares.16
For Criminal Case No. 2386, with respect to Jacqueline, the doctor reduced her
findings into a medico-legal certificate17 attesting as follows:
LEGAL FINDINGS:
1. PE findings: essentially normal except for the anxiety that the victim exhibited
2. Internal Examination : multiple healed lacerations/scars at 3, 5, 6 and 9 o'clock
positions of the hymen.
: introitus admits two fingers with ease
. . . no other findings
noted . . .
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Impression : The above findings suggest that the victim was forcibly abused and the
incident, the first one happened long ago based on the healed scars of the hymen.
For Criminal Case No. 2387, regarding Jinky, the medico-legal
certificate18 of the doctor states:
LEGAL FINDINGS:
1. The vulva is edematous although the hymen is intact. . . . no other findings noted
....
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The above findings suggest that full penetration was not successful although
attempts were done based on the swelling vulva of the victim.
During her testimony in court, Dr. Fontanares explained that the lacerations found
on Jacqueline's hymen were the result of sexual intercourse which happened
approximately on the date alleged. She added that, aside from the swelling of
Jinky's labia, she also found out that they were tender and reddish. 19
After the examination, Jacqueline executed a criminal complaint20 for rape against
accused-appellant, while Jinky charged accused-appellant with frustrated rape in
her own criminal complaint.21
At the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of his having been completely
unaware of what transpired on March 28, 1992 and on December 9, 1994 as he was
very drunk on those occasions.
According to him, he does not know if he had sexually assaulted his daughter,
Jacqueline. He only came to know of the complaint of Jacqueline against him after
the policemen who arrested him on December 10, 1994 told him thereof. On the
same day, Jacqueline allegedly informed him that he was drunk on March 28, 1992,
but he claimed that he could not recall if indeed he drank liquor that day. He then
surmised that perhaps he did drink liquor based only on the supposed statement of
Jacqueline.22
With regard to the complaint of Jinky, accused-appellant similarly declared in the
lower court that he drank liquor in their house on December 9, 1994, Again, he
claimed that he could not recollect the ensuing events after he had finished
drinking. He was allegedly merely in formed by the arresting policemen on
December 10, 1994 that Jinky was accusing him of attempted rape.
Jacqueline, on cross-examination, stated that her father smelled of liquor and may
have taken some drinks at the time of the incident.23 On the part of Jinky, she
testified in turn that her father was drunk on the night of December 9, 1994. 24
Accused-appellant claimed that he learned to drink liquor after his wife died on
August 28, 1991. Prior to his wife's death, he was not used to drinking alcoholic
beverages. He later resorted to alcohol whenever he would remember his deceased
wife, but he allegedly drank only once in a while.
Accused-appellant also opined that Jacqueline and Jinky must have filed their
respective complaints in order to get back at him for castigating or whipping them
whenever they committed mistakes.
In view of the gravity of the crimes charged and of the penalty imposable therefor,
we patiently considered and thoroughly deliberated on all the arguments and
defenses presented by defendant-appellant not only in his brief but even in his
memorandum before the trial court, with all the possible implications and
possibilities thereof, no matter how specious and ridiculous some of them may
appear to be. We have likewise taken into account the socio-economic status and
the apparent intellectual level of accused-appellant as may be gleaned from the
record.
After much thought and reflection, we find no reason to depart from the judgment
of the court a quo.
On its own, the defense presented by accused-appellant before the lower court is
pitifully and completely unavailing. In law and in truth, he neither denied the
charges against him nor raised any absolutory cause in his defense. His feeble
excuse of having been under the influence of liquor in order to disclaim knowledge
of his felonious acts does not inspire belief al all. The defense did not even comply
with the evidentiary elements whereby he could claim intoxication as a mitigating
circumstance. The categorical and untraversed testimonies of his daughters as to
how he committed the bestial outrage, and their identification of accused-appellant
as their defiler, remain uncontroverted and fully establish the charges.
Accused-appellant's pretext that he could not remember the events of March 28,
1992 and December 4, 1994 is rendered more effete in light of the arguments in his
memorandum25 submitted before the lower court. There, he claimed exemption
from criminal liability on the ground of insanity brought about by intoxication,
invoking therefor some dicta in American jurisprudence.
We have held that the law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a
crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has necessarily the
consequent burden of proving it.26 Further, in order that insanity may be taken as
an exempting circumstance, there must be complete depreciation of intelligence in
the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment.
Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not preclude imputability. 27
Accused-appellant has utterly failed to overthrow the presumption of sanity. The
defense did not present any expert witness, any psychiatric evaluation report, or
any psychological findings or evidence regarding his mental condition at the time of
the commission of the offenses. Accused-appellant's charade of amnesia is
evidently a desperate gambit for exculpation. Yet, amnesia, in and of itself, is no
defense to a criminal charge unless it is shown by competent proof that the accused
did not know the nature and quality of his action and that it was wrong. Failure to
remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused when the
crime was performed.28
Also in the same memorandum, accused-appellant posits that he cannot be
prosecuted for rape in Criminal Case No. 2386 because the criminal complaint of
Jinky only accuses him of frustrated rape. With such a charge, he argues that the
trial court's jurisdiction to punish him is limited only to said offense and cannot
cover consummated rape.
This is a meritless argument. When it is said that the filing of the complaint by the
offended party in cases of rape is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the
complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding, but it is not the complaint which
confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in
it by the Judiciary Law.29 Since the penalty for the rape in Criminal Case No. 2387 is
properly within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court, 30 then Branch 18 of the
Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela may hear and try the offense charged in the
information and impose the punishment for it.
In People vs. Bangalao, et al.,31 we convicted an accused of rape committed against
a minor as charged in the information, despite the allegation in the complaint that
the rape was committed through force and intimidation, on this ratiocination:
It must be borne in mind that complaints are prepared in municipalities, in most
cases without the advice or help of competent counsel. When the case reaches the
Court of First Instance, the Fiscal usually conducts another investigation, and
thereafter files the information which the results thereof justify The right and
power of the court to try the accused for the crime of rape attaches upon the filing
of the complaint, and a change in the allegations thereof as (to) the manner of
committing the crime should not operate to divest the court of jurisdiction already
acquired.
In his brief,32 accused-appellant contends that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. In support of this lone assignment of error, he
seeks to capitalize, among others, on the failure of Jacqueline to immediately report
the crime. Such failure, appellant contends, renders doubtful the truth of her
accusation.
The failure of complainant Jacqueline to immediately report the incident to the
authorities does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the charge in
Criminal Case No. 2386. It is a settled decisional rule that delay in reporting a rape
case committed by a father against his daughter due to threats is justified. 33 In the
numerous cases of rape that have reached this Court, we find that it is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal, for some time, the assaults on their honor
because of the rapist's threat on their lives.34
In many instances, rape victims simply suffer in silence. With more reason would a
girl ravished by her own father keep quiet about what befell her. Furthermore, it is
unfair to judge the action of children who have undergone traumatic experiences
by the norms of behavior expected of mature individuals under the same
circumstances.35
In People vs. Melivo,36 we declared that:
. . . Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence,
cannot be taken against the victim. A rape victim's actions are oftentimes
overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is this fear, springing from the initial
rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror,
which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and submissiveness.
Incestuous rape magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person normally
expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Furthermore, in incest, access
to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, proximity magnifying the
sense of helplessness and the degree of fear.
This Court further trenchantly observed in the same decision that:
In all of these and other cases of incestuous rape, the perpetrator takes full
advantage of his blood relationship, ascendancy and influence over the victim, both
to commit the sexual assault and to intimidate the victim into silence.
Unfortunately for some perpetrators of incestuous rape, their victims manage to
break out from the cycle of fear and terror. In People vs. Molero we emphasized
that "an intimidated person cowed into submitting to a series of repulsive acts may
acquire some courage as she grows older and finally state that enough is enough,
the depraved malefactor must be punished.
We cannot therefore expect young Jacqueline to disregard the threat to her life and
immediately cry rape in the face of the threats of her father and his constant
presence in their home.
Accused-appellant next asserts in his brief that Jacqueline filed her complaint in
Criminal Case No. 2386 only out of sympathy with, and by way of revenge for what
her father had done to, her younger sister. We find it opportune to discuss,
together with this contention, the lame excuse of the defense before the trial court
that Jacqueline and Jinky filed their complaints because they suffered beatings from
accused-appellant. We find that the motive imputed to the sisters are grossly
implausible and insufficient to make them falsely charge their own father. It is
highly inconceivable that they would claim having been raped just because their
father spanks them whenever they commit mistakes.
Mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino
family invent a charge that would only bring shame and humiliation upon them and
their own family and make them the object of gossip among their classmates and
friends. It is unbelievable that Jacqueline would fabricate a serious criminal charge
just to get even with her father and to empathize with her sister. The sisters would
not contrive stories of defloration and charge their own father with rape unless
these stories are true. For that matter, no young Filipina of decent repute would
falsely and publicly admit that she had been ravished and abused considering the
social stigma thereof.37
At their tender age, Jacqueline and Jinky needed sustenance and support from their
father. They certainly were aware that they would be deprived of a provider once
their accusations against him are proven. In fact, the consequences of filing a case
of rape are so serious that an ordinary woman would have second thoughts about
filing charges against her assailant. It requires much more for a thirteen-year old or
a twelve-year old provincial lass to devise a story of rape, have her private parts
examined, subject herself to the indignity of a public trial and endure a lifetime of
ridicule. Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would at the
least put her own father for the rest of his remaining life in jail and drag herself and
the rest of her family into a lifetime of shame.38
Thus, the unfounded claim of evil motives on the part of the victims would not
destroy the credibility reposed upon them by the trial court because, as we have
held, a rape victim's testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a
close relative of having been raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her
father.39 Furthermore, the testimony of the victim who was only twelve years old at
the time of the rape as to the circumstances thereof must be given weight, for it is
an accepted rule that testimonies of rape victims who are young and of tender age
are credible.40
Accused-appellant also faults the trial court for not duly appreciating the testimony
of Jinky to the effect that he only attempted to rape her and then desisted after she
felt some pain. In relation to this, appellant maintains that there was no rape in
Criminal Case No. 2387 because of the absence of lacerations on Jinky's vagina as
found after medicolegal examination.
It is axiomatic in criminal law that in order to sustain a conviction for rape, full
penetration of the female genital organ is not required. It is enough that there is
proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the
female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even
without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices to warrant conviction for rape.
The rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is not
indispensable to a conviction for rape. Thus, a finding that the victim's hymen is
intact and has no sign of laceration does not negate a finding that rape was
committed.41
Jinky, being young and unschooled in the ways of the law, may have entertained
the notion that complete penile penetration is necessary when she declared that
her father only attempted to rape her. She was, of course, not in any position to
legally distinguish consummated from attempted rape. This matter concerns a
conclusion of law addressed to the judgment of the courts. The declaration of Jinky
that her father inserted his penis into her vagina and the finding of swelling in her
labia are enough to prove that rape was committed as these are telltale signs of
entry into the vaginal lips.
Accused-appellant contends in his memorandum that the prosecution failed to
prove the employment of force and intimidation against complainants in both
criminal cases. Corollary to his reliance on the absence of force or intimidation, he
asseverates in his brief that the absence of resistance from Jinky suffices to hold
that the sexual intercourse was voluntary. The defense then begs for this Court's
liberality in considering that Jinky was moved to engage in copulation by a spirit of
adventurousness.
There is no doubt that the appellant had carnal knowledge of his two daughters.
The fact of sexual intercourse was indubitably shown by the testimonies of the
complainants, the medical report and testimony of Dr. Fontanares, and even by the
alternative submission of appellant that his sexual intercourse with Jinky was
consensual. Clinging to his vain hope for acquittal, he then claims that the element
of force or intimidation essential in rape is lacking in the cases filed against him.
In direct refutation of appellant's theory, we once again declare that in incestuous
rape, it is not necessary that actual force and intimidation be employed. It is
sufficient that the accused exercised a pervasive influence and control over the
victim.42 Even if there was no violence employed in the sexual congress, the moral
influence of appellant over the complainant suffices to constitute it into the crime
of rape.43
In People vs. Mabunga,44 where we convicted the accused for raping his thirteen-
year old daughter, we held that:
. . . Hence, even assuming that force or intimidation had not been actually
employed, the crime of rape was nevertheless committed. The absence of violence
or offer of resistance would not be significant because of the overpowering and
overbearing moral influence of the father over the daughter which takes the place
of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused
having no blood relationship with the victim.
The rationale for such a ruling can be found in our discourse in People
vs. Matrimonio45 to the effect that:
In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's moral
ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation.
That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the father's parental authority,
which the Constitution and the laws recognize, support and enhance, as well as
from the children's duty to obey and observe reverence and respect towards their
parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino
children and are recognized by law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his
daughter's will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants.
Thus two forms of intimidation under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code were
recognized in Matrimonio, that is (1) threats and (2) overpowering moral influence.
Accused-appellant exercised such moral influence over herein complainants. Being
the victims' father, accused-appellant had that moral ascendancy and influence
over his daughters which, in itself, was sufficient to intimidate and force them to
submit to his desires.46 The fact that no resistance was offered by Jinky did not in
any way qualify the coitus as freely consented to by her. Judging accused-
appellant's threats and intimidation in the context of Jinky's understanding at the
time of the rape, it can readily be concluded that her will to resist was overcome by
her father's strong parental authority.
As we held in the aforecited case of Mabunga, in rape the manner, form and
tenacity of resistance of the victim therein are dependent on a number of factors,
among which are the age and size of the victim, as well as of the aggressor himself;
the degree of actual force and intimidation employed; and, of utmost importance,
the relationship between the rapist and his prey. Complementary thereto, we ruled
in People vs.Navarrete47 that —
It must be emphasized also that considering the relationship between father and
daughter, the degree of force or intimidation need not be the same as in other
cases of rape where the parties involved have no relationship at all with each other;
because the father exercises strong moral and physical control over his daughter.
Parenthetically, we digress to observe that for rape to exist it is not necessary that
the intimidation employed be so great or of such character as could not be resisted.
It is only necessary that the intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose
which the accused had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is
therefore enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to
the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at the
moment or thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the
incident. Intimidation would also explain why there are no traces of struggle which
would indicate that the victim fought off her attacker.48
With the previous beatings Jinky received from accused-appellant, resistance could
not have been expected from her. She dared not risk another whipping from her
father should she defy his advances. Coupled with the respect demanded from Jinky
by her father no matter how unreasoning, the gap between their ages, and Jinky's
own youthful immaturity, the lack or resistance from Jinky becomes easily
understandable. And, if resistance would after all be futile because of continuing
intimidation, as in the strong moral dominance of accused-appellant, then offering
none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim's
participation in the sexual act voluntary.49
The insistence of accused-appellant that Jinky consented to his advances is
downright ridiculous. It is hard to believe that a daughter would simply give in to
her father's lascivious designs had not her resistance been overpowered.50 If Jinky
had consented to the sexual intercourse, she would have kept it to herself and not
denounce it immediately as rape. Jinky's crying during the sexual act, and her
evasion of her father's advances the following day, belie his pretense that she
voluntarily participated in the intercourse. There is no showing whatsoever that
complainant Jinky is a sexually perverted woman or one of extremely loose morals.
Consent obtained by fear of personal violence is no consent at all. Though a man
puts no hand on a woman, yet if by the use of mental and moral coercion the
accused so overpowers her mind out of fear that as a result she dare not resist the
dastardly act inflicted on her person, accused is guilty of the crime imputed to
him. 51 On the other hand, it is hard to accept that Jinky was that audacious as to
seek and satisfy worldly pleasures from her own father. To cite Navarrete again, no
daughter in her right mind would voluntarily submit herself to her own father
unless there was force or intimidation, as a sexual act between a father and a
daughter is extremely revolting.
On the matter of the imposable penalties in the crime of rape when attended by
modifying circumstances, it is opportune to make some clarifications in light of
succeeding amendments to Article 335 of the Code. With respect to simple rape,
whether in the original codal provision or after the amendments thereto, the
penalty being the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua is not affected by
the presence of ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances. However, under
the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 4111 consisting of the so-called
"qualified" form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, or when an attempted or frustrated rape is accompanied by
homicide, for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the presence of
generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances will determine whether the lesser
or the higher penalty will be imposed.52
Republic Act No. 7659 has added seven more attendant circumstances which, in
effect also create other variants of "qualified" rape punishable with the single
indivisible penalty of death. In line with the immediately preceding observation, the
presence of ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances would be of no
moment since the death penalty shall be imposed regardless of the number of any
of them.53The only possible basis for a reduction of such penalty under the rules for
graduating penalties under the Code is the presence of a privileged mitigating
circumstance.54
Now, it used to be the accepted doctrine that in crimes against chastity, such as
rape, relationship was always aggravating.55 However, among the "qualifying"
circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 is the situation when the victim
is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Obviously, in such a factual milieu,
relationship having been used as an element in that "qualified" form of rape, the
same circumstance cannot be used again to aggravate the penalty to be imposed on
the offender.56
In the case at bar, therefore, relationship cannot be applied as an aggravating
circumstance. However, we are persuaded to affirm the attendance of intoxication
as an aggravating circumstance on the additional finding that it was habitual on the
part of accused-appellant. Indeed, he admitted in his memorandum57 that he took
liquor to forget the memory of his wife ever since she died on August 28, 1991.
Such admission, together with the declarations of his daughters and his own
testimony in court that he was also inebriated on the two occasions when he
separately raped the victims, reasonably yields the inference that accused-appellant
was a habitual drunkard.
Yet, even on the remote assumption ex gratia argument that intoxication can be
considered as a mitigating circumstance in his favor, its presence would not affect
the two penalties imposed by the court below. Being indivisible penalties, reclusion
perpetua and death must be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
The rule, however, is slightly different with respect to the civil liability.
On this point, we note that the lower court did not award moral and exemplary
damages to either Jacqueline or Jinky Tabugoca. Having suffered wounded feelings
and social humiliation,58 Jacqueline is entitled to an award of moral damages
therefor.59 In view of the presence of an aggravating circumstance, exemplary
damages should also be awarded to her.60 An appellate proceeding in a criminal
case, whether at the instance of the accused or by mandatory provision of law,
throws the whole case open for review, hence this modification by reason of the
oversight of the trial court.
On the other hand, while Jinky is entitled to actual or compensatory damages, no
moral damages may be awarded to her because no sufficient evidence was
introduced in the court a quo which would have entitled her thereto.61 However,
exemplary damages call be awarded to her since she has been correctly granted
compensatory damages and the offense against her was committed with an
aggravating circumstance.62
WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan,
Isabela, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2386 and 2387 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that accused-appellant Cresencio Tabugoca is further ordered (1) in
Criminal Case No. 2386, to pay Jacqueline Tabugoca the additional amounts of
P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (2) in
Criminal Case No. 2387, to pay Jinky Tabugoca the further amount of P25,000.00 by
way of exemplary damages.
Two Members of the Court voted to impose on appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25
of Republic Act No. 7659, upon the finality or this decision, let the records of this
case be forwarded immediately to the Office of the President of the Philippines for
possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.
People v. Rafanan
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by
way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The prosecution’s evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita
Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the
mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias ‘Baket Ines’ with a salary of P30.00 a
month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same
house at Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married
and had two children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the
mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their
house about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the time was the
accused. At 11:00 o’clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help
him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he
suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said, ‘Come, let us have sexual
intercourse,’ to which Estelita replied, ‘I do not like,’ and struggled to free herself
and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which
he pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should
she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants
and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of the complainant
and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and
struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not
to report the matter to her mother or to anybody in the house, otherwise he would
kill her.cralawnad
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not
leave the house of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of
the accused that evening and the following morning she scrubbed the floor and did
her daily routine work in the house. She only left the house in the evening of March
17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned
what happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a
quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house.
When Estelita’s mother confronted her and asked her why she went home that
evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the
following morning on March 18, 1976 that the complainant told her mother that
she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what happened to her daughter, the
mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the house of Patrolman
Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis,
Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of the father of the complainant. He
advised them to proceed to the municipal building while he went to fetch the
accused. The accused was later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo,
Exhibit ‘E’, which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant. 1
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to
trial and in due course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted
the Appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Assignment of Errors
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on
the testimony of the complainant and her mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution,
‘Exhibits B and C’.
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as
to the mental condition of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime of rape.chanrobles law library
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape
was suffering from insanity." 2
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose
testimonies he contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do
testimony of complainant on direct examination that she immediately went home what he wanted to do. He was able to do what he wanted to do.
after the rape incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross examination to
the effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day. Q This ‘kutsilyo’ you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please
Complainant, in saying that she left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged demonstrate, if any?
to have contradicted her mother who stated that she (the mother) went to the
store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and brought Estelita home. A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet
long.).
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her
on cross examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and
inconsequential details which do not touch upon the manner in which the crime x x x
had been committed and therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the
complainant. 3

Fiscal Guillermo:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The commission of the crime was not seriously disputed by appellant. The
testimony of complainant in this respect is clear and
Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you
convincing:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
after he placed the bolo or that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the
court what did the accused do immediately after placing that bolo at your throat
"Fiscal Guillermo:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
and before having sexual intercourse with you?

Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from
A He had sexual intercourse with me.
the door and brought you inside the store after you helped him closed the store.
Now, after the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store
Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?
what happened then?

A I was wearing pants, sir.

A ‘You come and we will have sexual intercourse,’ he said.
Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?
Q And what did you say?

A Yes, sir, I have a panty.

A ‘I do not like,’ I said.

Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do
Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual
with respect to your pants and your panty?
intercourse with him?

A He removed them, sir.cralawnad

A I struggled and cried.

Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?
Q What did the accused do after that?
A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger
that’s why he succeeded.
Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else
happened?
A He went on top of me, sir.
Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?
A He was wearing pants.
Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and
your panty, was he still wearing his pants?
A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants.
Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he
opened?
A I saw his penis.
Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his
penis which you saw, he went on top of you. When he was already on top of you
what did you do, if any?
A I struggled.
Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled
against the accused when he was on top of you?
A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.
x x x
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in getting what he wanted to
get?
Fiscal Guillermo:chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be
allowed to ask a leading question which is a follow-up question?
Witness:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A He inserted his private part inside my vagina.
Fiscal Guillermo:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if
any?
A I felt something that came out from his inside.
Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your
vagina?
A Around five minutes maybe, sir.
Q After that what happened then?
A He removed it.
Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
A No more, sir, he sat down.
Q What, if any, did he tell you?
A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my mother and to anybody
in their house.
Q What else did he tell you?
A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
Q After that where did you go?
A I went home already, sir." 4
The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal
aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions
upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and
ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for
observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was
admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June
1978.
During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental
and physical condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and
Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service,
respectively.
In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning
appellant’s mental condition were set forth:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just
look up whenever questioned but refused to answer.
On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with
dishevelled hair, would stare vacuously through the window, or look at people
around him. He was indifferent and when questioned, he would just smile
inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even when persuaded, and was
emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at times would
pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought. Later on when questioned his frequent
answers are ‘Aywan ko, hindi ko alam.’ His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange
voices ‘parang ibon, tinig ng ibon,’ but cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3
spheres and has no idea why he was brought here." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The report then concluded:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y
Gambawa is found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia,
manifested by carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring
vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional
dullness, mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and
perceptual aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence
cannot stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment." 5
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of
appellant’s mental condition:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his responses. There
is dullness of his affect and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble
alone by himself and would show periods of being irritable saying — ‘oki naman’
with nobody in particular. He claim he does not know whether or not he was placed
in jail and does not know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember
having committed any wrong act"
and the following conclusions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y
Gambawa is at present time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of
irritability cursing nobody in particular, seclusive, underactive, undertalkative,
retarded in his responses, dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself,
preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and
treatment." 6
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having
become "better behaved, responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his
emotional tone, in touch with his surroundings and . . . free from hallucinatory
experiences." During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the
hospital temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically
to the hospital for check-ups. During this period, he was said to have been helpful in
the doing of household chores, conversed and associated freely with other
members of the household and slept well, although, occasionally, appellant smiled
while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small children,
talking in a language he could not understand. The report concluded by saying that
while appellant had improved in his mental condition, he was not yet in a position
to stand trial since he needed further treatment, medication and check-ups. 7
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful
in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly
groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report
concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition
to stand court trial." 8
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who
suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the
hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from schirophrenia
when he raped complainant. 9 The defense next presented Dr. Raquel Jovellano, a
psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified that he had examined and
treated the Appellant.
Appellant’s plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following
are exempt from criminal liability:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the
hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
x x x"
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was
only in People v. Formigones 10 that the Court elaborated on the required
standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from the Commentaries of Judge
Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance
may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason;
that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment; (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47
Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be
a total deprivation of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or
insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person
of intelligence or freedom of will, became mere abnormality of his mental faculties
does rot exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 20,
1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated
with] imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive
evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that
he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be
voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in
order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his
insanity and absence of will are proved." (Emphasis supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases.
11 A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones
established two (2) distinguishable tests (a) the test of cognition — "complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of
volition — "or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will." But our
caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test
relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up
any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was
totally deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete
deprivation of intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person’s volition
naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his
intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where
the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court
has recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with
Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would
diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving
him of the consciousness of his acts." 12
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental
disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and
often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia
praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis and usually develops
between the ages 15 and 30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some
of the symptoms of schizophrenia in the following manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a
disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity.
Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude of the schizophrenic — that is, his
detachment from reality and his consequent autism and the ambivalence that
expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler’s system of
schizophrenia is often referred to as the four A’s: association, affect, autism, and
ambivalence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x with hallucinations in one of the other sensory modalities.
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he
considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making
a diagnosis. Schneider’s first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one’s thoughts
spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient’s behavior,
somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one’s thought controlled, the
spreading of one’s thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having
one’s actions controlled or influenced from the outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the
basis of second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical
appearances. Second-rank symptoms include other forms of hallucination,
perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . .
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external
stimuli are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory
hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two or more voices
talk about the patient, discussing him in the third person. Frequently, the voices
address the patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going on around
him, or are threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the patient. Many
schizophrenic patients experience the hearing of their own thoughts. When they
are reading silently, for example, they may be quite disturbed by hearing every
word they are reading clearly spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in
schizophrenic patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic or
affective psychoses experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or during
limited periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during
the day as they do during the night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief
only in sleep. When visual hallucinations occur in schizophrenia, they are usually
seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in three dimensions, and moving.
Visual hallucinations almost never occur by themselves but always in combination
x x x
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by
reasoning, and that are idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his
cultural environment. They are among the common symptoms of schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the
paranoid type of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen
mysterious power that exercises its influence from a distance is almost
pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all, schizophrenics at one
time or another, and for many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic
whose delusions have kept up with the scientific times may be preoccupied with
atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships that take control over his mind and body. Also
typical for many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of
the world." 14
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting
circumstance, 15 it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases,
the evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental
faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of
intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared
as follows:red:chanrobles.com.ph
"(Fiscal Guillermo:)
Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you
say doctor that he was completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did
in connection with the incident in this case?
A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim
at the time of the commission of the alleged rape?
A Yes, he was conscious.
Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he
will place his penis?
A Yeah.
Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A Yes.
Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic
which you said, it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some
acts that is committed?
A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to
the act is what we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act
of an insane and a normal individual, a normal individual will use the power of
reasoning and consciousness within the standard of society while an insane causes
(sic) already devoid of the fact that he could no longer withstand himself in the
ordinary environment, yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or
psychosis.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the
accused here is suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape?
A Yes, they are also capable.
Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?
A Yes.
Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to
perform all the acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an
insane person?
A Yes, it could be done.
Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense chose to present Dr.
wrong? Nerit.

A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is
wrong but yet there is no inhibition on the individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are
going to commit is wrong?
A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the
inhibition. The reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not]
there, the drive is [not] there. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at
the time of commission of the act charged which, in the current stab of our caselaw,
is critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant
Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had
been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan
was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to
suggest, through Dr. Jovellano’s last two (2) answers above, that a person suffering
from schizophrenia sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also
deprivation of the power of self-control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano’s
testimony, by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any
case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown
if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
In People v. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not
exempting ‘because it does not completely deprive the offender of the
consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under
Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which diminishes the
exercise of the offender’s will-power without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating
circumstance, although it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him
under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes
a single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the
amount of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against Appellant.

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the
burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to
present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately
before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into
the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or
at the very moment the act is committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the
testimonies of the two (2) physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however,
did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of
time. They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or immediately
before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based
on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously,
while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and examined appellant during
G.R. No. 216021, March 02, 2016
SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The expectations of a person possessed with full control of his faculties differ from
one who is totally deprived thereof and is unable to exercise sufficient restraint on
his. Thus, it is but reasonable that the actions made by the latter be measured under
a lesser stringent standard than that imposed on those who have complete
dominion over their mind, body and spirit.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the July 10, 2014
Decision1 and the December 15, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 35894 which affirmed the May 30, 2013 Judgment3 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 03, Tuguegarao City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 13283, finding
accused Solomon Verdadero y Galera (Verdadero) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
In an Information,4 dated September 9, 2009, Verdadero was charged with the
crime of murder for killing Romeo B. Plata (Romeo), the accusatory portion of which
reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused SOLOMON VERDADEROarmed with a Rambo knife, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby inflicting upon
him stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.
Contrary to law.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On June 3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty." During the
pre-trial, he invoked the defense of insanity but did not consent to a reverse trial.
Thereafter, trial ensued.6
Evidence of the Prosecution
The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following:
On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard Plata
(Maynard) and his father Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with
Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report that Verdadero had stolen the
fan belt of their irrigation pump.7
After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made
their way home on a tricycle but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard intended to
buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards a store near the drugstore
while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw
Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.8
Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with the use of
a Rambo knife. He again struck Romeo's upper back, just below the right shoulder.
Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero attempted to attack him as well. He
defended himself using a small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero in the chest. 9
Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The
responding police officers arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie brought
Romeo to a clinic but were advised to bring him to the Cagayan Valley Medical
Center (CVMC). Romeo, however, died upon arrival at the CVMC. Based on the
Post-Mortem Examination Report, his cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and hack
wounds.10
Evidence of the Defense
The evidence for the defense did not refute the material allegations but revolved
around Verdadero's alleged insanity, to wit:
Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric Department as
he claimed to hear strange voices and had difficulty in sleeping. Sometime in 2001,
Miriam Verdadero (Miriam), Verdadero's sister, again brought him to the
Psychiatric Department of CVMC after he became violent and started throwing
stones at a tricycle with a child on board. Verdadero was confined for two (2)
months and was diagnosed to be suffering from mental depression.
On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medications
to address his mental illness. Verdadero would irregularly consult with his doctors
as he had a lifelong chronic disease. Then, in 2009, he was again confined for the
fourth (4th) time at CVMC due to a relapse.
On March 12, 2009, Miriam proceeded to CVMC, after she heard of the stabbing
incident. There, she saw Verdadero removing the IV tubes connected to his body
and, thereafter, locked himself inside the comfort room. Eventually, Verdadero was
given sedatives and was transferred to an isolation room after Miriam informed the
nurses of the incident.11
On March 20, 2009, he was transferred to the Psychiatry Department after Dr.
Leonor Andres-Juliana (Dr. Andres-Juliana) had diagnosed that he was having
difficulty sleeping. Dr. Andres-Juliana opined that Verdadero suffered a relapse, as
evidenced by his violent behaviour.
Acting on the January 4, 2011 Order of the RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen Pagaddu (Dr.
Pagaddu) conducted a mental examination on Verdadero. She confirmed that as
early as 1999, he was already brought to CVMC and that he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia on July 21, 2003. Dr. Pagaddu agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana that
Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of the stabbing incident. 12
The RTC Ruling
On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the
crime of homicide. The dispositive portion of which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused SOLOMON
VERDADERO y Galera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and hereby sentences him:
1. To suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from twelve (12) years
of prision mayor [as maximum] as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; and,
2. To pay the heirs of Romeo Plata the amounts of:
a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages and
c. P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages; and,
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution
failed to establish the presence of treachery and evident premeditation to qualify
the killing to murder. The trial court, however, opined that Verdadero failed to
establish insanity as an exempting circumstance. The trial court posited that
Verdadero was unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the
time he stabbed Romeo or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or
coetaneous with the commission of the crime.
Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The
appellate court agreed that the defense was able to establish that Verdadero had a
history of schizophrenic attacks, but was unable to prove that he was not lucid at
the time of the commission of the offense. The decretal portion of the decision
states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The Judgment, dated
May 30, 2013, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 in
Criminal Case No. 13283, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its
resolution, dated December 15, 2014.
Hence, this present petition, raising the following
ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PETITIONER'S CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF
THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity. He claims
that Maynard even admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind when they
were at the police station before the stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that
Verdadero was having hallucinations after the stabbing incident as testified to by
Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that he had a
relapse at the time of the stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.
In its Comment,15 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that the
present petition presented a question of fact, which could not be addressed in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, it asserted that
the CA did not misapprehend the facts as the evidence presented failed to
completely establish Verdadero's insanity at the time of the stabbing.
In his Manifestation (in Lieu of Reply),16 Verdadero indicated that he would no
longer file a reply as his petition for review already contained an exhaustive
discussion of the issues.
The Court's Ruling
The present petition primarily assails the conviction despite his defense of insanity.
Before delving into the merits of the case, a discussion of the procedural issue is in
order.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45;
Exceptions
The OSG argues that the Court should not entertain Verdadero's petition for review
as it principally revolves around the issue of his insanity — a question of fact which
should no longer be addressed in a petition for review. The Court disagrees.
Generally, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as it is limited to reviewing only questions of law. The
rule, however, admits of exceptions wherein the Court expands the coverage of a
petition for review to include a resolution of questions of fact. In Laborte v.
Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers' Cooperative et al.,17 the Court reiterated the
following exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised under Rule
45, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The present petition mainly delves into Verdadero's state of mind at the time of the
stabbing incident. Obviously, it is a question of fact, which, ordinarily is not
entertained by the Court in a petition for review. As will be discussed below, the
Court, nevertheless, finds that the circumstances in the case at bench warrant the
application of the exception rather than the rule.
Insanity must be present at the time the crime had been committed
To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming
that he had suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an
imbecile or an insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter had
acted during a lucid interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved for there is a presumption that the acts penalized by law are voluntary.18
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was
brought to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was
diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July
21, 2003; (4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a
relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first
confinement in 1999 until the stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have
suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.
Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia and the only
thing left to be ascertained is whether he should be absolved from responsibility in
killing Romeo because of his mental state.
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish
between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions.19 A showing that an accused is suffering from a mental disorder,
however, does not automatically exonerate him from the consequences of his act.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 20
In People v. Florendo,21 the Court explained the standard in upholding insanity as an
exempting circumstance, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is
deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment because of complete
absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In People v. Isla,22 the Court elucidated that insanity must relate to the time
immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with
which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he must be adjudged guilty for the said
offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability
under a plea of insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was
completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and
(2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or
immediately before the commission of the offense.
In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of the crime
because such defense is in the nature of a confession or avoidance. 23 As such, he is
duty bound to establish with certainty that he was completely deprived, not merely
diminished, of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime. Failing
which, Verdadero should be criminally punished for impliedly admitting to have
stabbed Romeo to death.
Proving insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the mental state
of the accused. In People v. Opuran24 the Court explained how one's insanity may
be established, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of
proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of
which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then
determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties
which is manifested in language and conduct. xxx
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may
be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational
basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
In the earlier case of People v. Austria,25 the Court elucidated that evidence of the
mental condition of the accused during a reasonable period before and after the
commission of the offense is material, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is
permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition during a reasonable period
before and after. Direct testimony is not required nor are specific acts of
disagreement essential to establish insanity as a defense. A person's mind can only
be plumbed or fathomed by external acts. Thereby his thoughts, motives and
emotions may be evaluated to determine whether his external acts conform to
those of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, clear and convincing
circumstantial evidence would suffice.
Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the Court
finds that Verdadero sufficiently proved that he was insane at the time of the
stabbing. Thus, the Court takes a view different from that of the CA as the latter
concluded that Verdadero's insanity was not clearly proven.
It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental state at the
exact moment the crime was committed. This, however, is not fatal to the finding
that he was insane. His insanity may still be shown by circumstances immediately
before and after the incident. Further, the expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr.
Pagaddu may also be taken into account.
Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a relapse at the
time of the stabbing incident. During her testimony, she stated as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On direct examination
Atty. Tagaruma
Q: By the way what was the mental condition of the accused referred which
involved your diagnosis as a life long chronic disease?
Witness
A: The accused was diagnosed schizophrenia, sir.
Q: When for the first time Solomon Verdadero was diagnosed with schizophrenia?
A: It was on July 21, 2003, sir. xxx
Q: As an expert witness tell the Honorable Court if a person who has relapse of
schizophrenia could distinguish his act?
A: This mental disorder influence (sic) the impulse. It could at the time of the
commission of the crime that the impulse control and judgment of an individual
was affected sir.
Q: Could it be accurate to state that a person who has the relapse of schizophrenia
could not distinguish any act from right or wrong?
A: There is a possibility, sir.
Court
Q: Why did you say that Solomon Verdadero has the possibility of relapse upon
admission on March 19, 2009?
A: There was a period of relapse meaning the symptom was present and there must
be a remission if the symptom is abated, your Honor.
xxx
Atty. Tagaruma
Q: You have read for the record the report of Dr. Juliana on the alleged violent
behavior of Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 which is the date of the
incident, as an expert psychiatrist is it possible that the violent behavior of
Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 was the basis of Dr. Juliana in diagnosing
that the accused was in relapse upon admission on March 12, 2009?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Following the remark of scientific conclusion of Dr. Juliana, Dr. Janet Taguinod
and the conclusion made by you, is it also your conclusion that Solomon
Verdadero was in relapse on March 12, 2009 due to violent behavior?
A: Yes, sir.
On cross examination
Prosecutor Aquino
Q: But definitely during the disorder of the patient, the relapse would somewhat be
continued even when medications is administered to him?
A: The symptom is controlled although there is a circumstances (sic) that the
patient may have relapse (sic) even with medication, sir.
Q: If a continuous medication was undertaken by the accused-patient in this case
could that have a long effect on his mental condition?
A: Continuous medication could somehow control the symptom and not absolutely
eradicate the symptom.
Q: On March 12 , 2009 the accused-patient was on a lucid interval, in view of the
medication undertaken as of January 19, 2009?
A: It's haphazard, sir.
xxx A: Yes, sir.

Court xxx
Q: Madam witness what type of schizophrenia the accused was diagnosed?
A: Undifferentiated, your honor.26 Q: Sometimes he boxes when he is not in his proper mind, what aberrant behavior
did you observe from him?
[Emphases Supplied] A: That's the only thing I observed and sometimes he steal (sic), sir.

Dr. Paggadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was suffering a
Q: For a long time that Solomon Verdadero is your neighbor does his relapse or
relapse of his schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. In contrast, she
what you called not in his proper mind occurred often?
was hesitant to opine that Verdadero might have been in a lucid interval because of
A: It occurred once in a while, sir.
the medications taken. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the
testimony of an expert witness, that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time he
Q: When you said it occurred once in a while, this relapse may occur once a week?
stabbed Romeo.
A: Yes, sir.

Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the observations made

Q: Prior to March 12, 2009, when did you first observe that Solomon Verdadero
by Maynard, a witness for the prosecution. In his testimony, Maynard gave his
appears not in his proper mind?
opinion on Verdadero's behavior and appearance when they met at the police
A: He was not in his proper mind for a long time, sir.
station, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: Maybe it could be 5 months before March 12, 2009?
On cross examination A: Yes, sir.

Atty. Tagurama xxx

Q: Having made the report against Solomon Verdadero, do I (sic) correct to say that
you are familiar with Solomon Verdadero even before March 12, 2009? Court
A: Yes, sir. Q: You testified that you observed the accused not in his proper mind for the
passed (sic) years before this incident was he also violent like what happened on
Q: Tell us why you are familiar to him even prior to March 12, 2009? March 12, 2009?
A: We are neighbors, sir.
Witness
Q: You are immediate neighbors? A: Yes, your honor.
A: Yes, sir
Q: When you went to the police station you allegedly reported the stolen fan belt
Q: Since you are neighbors with Solomon Verdadero you see him almost a (sic) do I get you right that Solomon Verdadero was with you at the police station?
time? A: Yes, your honor.
A: Yes, sir. I saw him daily.
Q: When he was with you at the police station what did you observe?
Q: When you see Solomon Verdadero daily you see his actuation? A: He was not again in his proper mind (sumro manen), your Honor.

xxx
Q: Can you describe his appearance?
A: His eyes was (sic) very sharp and reddish.
xxx
Q: As far as his appearance is concern (sic) do you remember his actuation or how
he was reacting?
A: Yes, your honor. He was somewhat drank (sic).
Q: You said that he was not on his proper mind for the passed (sic) years?
A: Yes, your honor.27cralawred
[Emphases Supplied]
Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a long time.
He had observed that there were times that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound
mind as he would sometimes become violent. On the day of the stabbing incident,
Maynard perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he had
reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was immediately transferred
to the psychiatry department because of his impaired sleep and to control him from
harming himself and others.28
These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that drinking
wine, poor sleep and violent behavior were among the symptoms of a relapse, the
same testimony that was used as basis for his previous diagnosis. 29 The evidence on
record supports the finding that Verdadero exhibited symptoms of a relapse of
schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus, Dr. Pagaddu reiterated Dr.
Andre-Juliana's conclusion that Verdadero was having a relapse of his illness on that
fateful day.
Further, on March 22, 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have suffered a relapse
of schizophrenia. Generally, evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime
is immaterial. It, however, may be appreciated and given weight if there is also
proof of abnormal behavior before or simultaneous to the crime. 30
Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost
care and circumspection as the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking
to escape punishment through a general plea of insanity.31 The circumstances in the
case at bench, however, do not indicate that the defense of insanity was merely
used as a convenient tool to evade culpability.
The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already raised the
defense of insanity and remained steadfast in asserting that he was deprived of
intelligence at the time of the commission of the offense. He no longer offered any
denial or alibi and, instead, consistently harped on his mental incapacity. Unlike in
previous cases32 where the Court denied the defense of insanity as it was raised
only when the initial defense of alibi failed to prosper, Verdadero's alleged insanity
was not a mere afterthought.
In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free
him from the responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC
expressly states that "[w]hen an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court." Instead of
incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where his mental
condition may be addressed so that he may again function as a member of society.
He shall remain confined therein until his attending physicians give a favorable
recommendation for his release.
Verdadero still liable for damages in spite of his exoneration
In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from criminal
responsibility. He is, nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the heirs of Romeo for
the latter's death. An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal
and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from the criminal liability.33
The amount of damages awarded, however, must be modified in order to conform
to recent jurisprudence.34 The P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral
damages awarded by the RTC must each be increased to P75,000.00. In addition, an
interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum should be imposed on all
damages awarded computed from the finality of the decision until the same have
been fully paid.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-appellant
Solomon Verdadero yGalera of Homicide by reason of insanity. He is ordered
confined at the National Center for Mental Health for treatment and shall be
released only upon order of the Regional Trial Court acting on a recommendation
from his attending physicians from the institution.

He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Romeo B. Plata the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as stipulated actual
damages, plus interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this decision until the same shall have been fully paid.
G.R. No. 211159
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO OLOVERIO, Accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN,J.:
Passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance need not be felt only in the
seconds before the commission of the crime. It may build up and strengthen over
time until it can no longer be repressed and will ultimately motivate the
commission of the crime.
This is a review of the Decision1 dated January 29, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant Marcelino Oloverio (Oloverio)
of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and the payment of civil
indemnity and damages.
An Information was filed charging Oloverio with the crime of murder.2 The
Information reads:
That at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 2, 2003, at Brgy. Belen,
Palompon, Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused met the victim, DOLFO GULANE, while the latter was
walking on his lonesome, and with treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, stab the said victim using a sharp-pointed bolo, which
the accused has provided for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting mortal
wounds on the different parts of the body of the aforesaid victim causing his
instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Oloverio was arraigned on January 25, 2005, where he pleaded not guilty. Trial on
the merits ensued.4
According to the prosecution, on October 2, 2003, at around 3:00 p.m., Rudipico
Pogay (Pogay) and Dominador Panday (Panday) saw Rodulfo Gulane walking about
five (5) meters away from them with Oloverio trailing behind him. Oloverio
allegedly tapped Gulane’s right shoulder and hacked him on the chest and
extremities with a bolo until Gulane collapsed on the ground. Oloverio then
allegedly took Gulane’s money from his pocket. 5
Pogay heard Oloverio shouting the words, "Patay na ang datu sa Brgy. San Pablo!"
("The rich man in San Pablo is already dead!") Gulane managed to tell Oloverio,
"Man luba ka man, Ling?" ("Ling, why did you stab me?") After, Gulane died.
Panday proceeded to inform Gulane’s family of the incident.6
In his defense, Oloverio alleged that at the time and day of the incident, Gulane had
been accusing him of having an incestuous relationship with his mother. He
allegedly kept his cool and told Gulane to go home, but the latter continued to
mock him by asking in a loud voice, "How many times did you have sexual
intercourse with your mother?" He allegedly asked Gulane to go home again but
the latter angrily replied, "Who are you to tell me to go home?" 7
Gulane allegedly attempted to draw his bolo but Oloverio stopped him by drawing
his own bolo. They grappled with it, and eventually, Oloverio ended up stabbing
Gulane, which resulted in the latter’s death. Accompanied by a barangay tanod,
Oloverio went to the municipal hall to surrender to the authorities. He admitted
that he stabbed Gulane because he could no longer bear the insulting remarks
against him.8
Romulo Lamoste (Lamoste), then Barangay Captain of Barangay Belen, Palompon,
Leyte, alleged that Gulane and Oloverio had an altercation before the incident. He
alleged that Oloverio’s daughter had once confided to Oloverio that Gulane wanted
to touch her private parts. About a month later, he allegedly heard Gulane ask
Oloverio "in a joking manner about his incestuous relationship with his
mother."9 Oloverio allegedly got mad and they ended up fighting, but Lamoste was
able to subdue them. He, however, admitted that he was not present during the
incident.10
On January 29, 2010, Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte
rendered its Decision11 finding Oloverio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
The trial court ruled that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
was not present in this case since it could not co-exist with the presence of
treachery. The only mitigating circumstance it found present was of voluntary
surrender. As murder was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, it imposed
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.12 The dispositive portion reads:
Wherefore, as to the proffer of mitigating circumstances of Passion and Obfuscation
as defined by Art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated, what can be
appreciated only is the voluntary surrender which is covered by Art. 13 par. 7 of the
Revised Penal Code.
So from the evidence extant from the records, the court finds the accused
Marcelino Oloverio, GUILTY of the crime of Murder as the evidence proved the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of Murder as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and therefore
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The voluntary surrender
is none availing as reclusion perpetua is not a divisible penalty as defined by the
Revised Penal Code.
The accused Marcelino Oloverio is also ordered to pay Fifty Thousand (50,000.00)
Pesos damages to the heirs of Rodulfo Gulane.
SO ORDERED.13
The case records were forwarded to the Court of Appeals on May 6, 2010. 14
On January 29, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision 15 affirming the
conviction. It found that Oloverio failed to establish with clear and convincing
evidence that Gulane "committed an unlawful act which sufficiently caused him to
act with passion and obfuscation."16
The Court of Appeals found that Gulane’s act of insulting Oloverio before the
stabbing was unsupported by evidence.17 Instead, it found that treachery was
present since Gulane was unsuspecting when Oloverio suddenly attacked him. The
court also noted that Gulane was already 83 years old and might not have had a
chance to defend himself.18
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua in view of Oloverio’s voluntary surrender.19 It, however,
modified the award of damages to include moral, temperate, and exemplary
damages.20 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 29, 2010 of the RTC, Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte in Criminal Case No. P-
1163 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that with respect to the trial court’s award of
Php50,000.00 damages, this should be understood to represent the civil indemnity.
Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Rodulfo Gulane Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, Php25,000.00 as temperate damages, and Php30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All damages shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of 6%
per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.21 (Emphasis in the original)
On March 18, 2013, Oloverio filed his Notice of Appeal,22 which was favorably acted
upon by the Court of Appeals.23
In compliance with this court’s Resolution24 dated April 2, 2014, Oloverio and the
Office of the Solicitor General separately manifested that they were no longer filing
their supplemental briefs before this court since they have already stated their
arguments in their briefs before the Court of Appeals.25
Upon review of the case records, this court resolves to modify the Decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellant Marcelino Oloverio is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. He is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of passion
and obfuscation and of voluntary surrender.
I
Murder is the act of killing a person under the circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision states:
ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article
24626 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure
or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or
of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other
public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
To be able to sustain a conviction for murder, the prosecution must prove the
following elements:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.27
For murder or homicide, the prosecution must also be able to prove the accused
had the intent to kill.28
The witnesses, Panday and Pogay, positively identified accused-appellant as the one
who stabbed Gulane with a bolo.
Panday stated:
Q: When you saw Rodulfo Gulane walking alone towards Brgy. San Pablo,
Palompon, Leyte, do you recall of any untoward incident that took place?
A: Yes, sir, I saw the incident.
Q: What was that incident?
A: Rodulfo Gulane was killed by [a] certain Marcelino Oloverio.
Q: Now, you said that Rodulfo Gulane was killed by Marcelino Oloverio, what was
used by Marcelino Oloverio in killing the deceased?
A: A bolo.
....
Q: Now, you said that Rodulfo Gulane was killed by Marcelino Oloverio with the use
of this bolo, would you describe to this Honorable Court, how and in what way did
Marcelino Oloverio killed [sic] Rodulfo Gulane?
A: Yes, while Rodulfo Gulane was walking, Marcelino Oloverio held the right
shoulder of Rodulfo Gulane then stabbed him many times and there was
strucking [sic] the victim Rodulfo Gulane.29
(Emphasis supplied)
Pogay also testified:
Q: When you reached Brgy. Belen, what have you observed?
A: I observed Lino stabbed Dolpo [sic] Gulane and when Dolfo Gulane fell down, he
said "Patay na ang datu sa Brgy. San Pablo."
....
Q: If you can recall, how many times did Marcelino Oloverio stab Rodulfo Gulane?
A: Many times and there was also a hacking blow.30
Their testimonies were consistent with the medico-legal findings that Gulane died
due to multiple stab wounds. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals also
found that the witnesses had no ill motive to testify against accused-appellant.31
The intent to kill is established not only by the number of stab wounds found on
Gulane, but also by accused-appellant’s own admission that he stabbed Gulane.32
II
The presence of treachery, however, has not been sufficiently established.
Treachery is defined by the Revised Penal Code as:
ARTICLE 14. Aggravating Circumstances. — The following are aggravating
circumstances:
....
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
For treachery to be appreciated, the following elements must be proven:
(a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.33
In People v. Lobino:34
In People vs. Estrellanes, we declared in no uncertain terms that ‘the mere fact that
the victim had no weapon with which he could have defended himself is not
sufficient to prove the existence of the first element of treachery, for settled is the
rule that treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself.’ [sic] Furthermore, there must be
some evidence, none of which, however, obtains in the instant case, showing that
this mode of assault is deliberately or consciously adopted to insure the execution
of the crime without risk to the offender. Accordingly, if the attack was not
preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden
infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocation on the part of the
victim, then no treachery attended the commission of the crime. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person being attacked[.]35 (Emphasis supplied)
Pogay testified that Gulane was walking down the road when accused-appellant
came up behind him, tapped him on the shoulder, and then stabbed him
repeatedly, thus:
Q: You said Rodulfo Gulane[,] before the stabbing, was heading towards Brgy. San
Pablo, while he was walking where was the accused positioned himself? [sic]
A: He was following the victim and then he tapped the right shoulder and stabbed
him.
....
Pros. Macapugas: Mr. Witness, during the stabbing incident, did you know whether
or not the victim in this case was able to retaliate?
A: No ma’am, he was not able to retaliate.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The mere suddenness of an attack should not be the sole basis in finding treachery.
There must be evidence to show that the accused deliberately or consciously
adopted the means of execution to ensure its success. 37
At the time of the incident, Gulane was already 83 years old. Accused-appellant was
standing behind him. He already had the advantage of surprise with Gulane’s back
turned. Gulane’s advanced age and position would have ensured his death as it
would have prevented him from being able to retaliate.
Instead, accused-appellant tapped Gulane on the shoulder as if to call his attention.
He waited until Gulane was facing him before he started stabbing. The medico-legal
report indicates stab wounds on the chest and extremities,38 proving that Gulane
was stabbed from the front.
In People v. Real:39
As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is
treachery if such mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by him with
the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule
does not apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately
adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused
because of the provocative act of the victim.40(Emphasis supplied)
The attack, while sudden, cannot be said to have been unexpected or unprovoked.
Accused-appellant alleged that before the attack, Gulane had been insulting him
and mocking him in a loud voice, "How many times did you have sexual intercourse
with your mother?"41 This utterance, along with testimonies of Gulane’s previous
insults, would have been sufficient provocation for accused-appellant to stab him.
Since treachery has not been proven, the crime is merely homicide. Under the
Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
article 246 shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and
be punished by reclusion temporal.
The penalties of the accused-appellant must be modified accordingly.
III
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation42 is present in this case.
To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, the accused must be able to prove the following elements:
1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind; and
2. that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.43
In People v. Lobino:44
It has been held that "[T]here is passional obfuscation when the crime was
committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason."
"The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason
which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the
sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a
degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control, because the cause of this
condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense."
Moreover, "the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might have recovered his normal equanimity."45 (Emphasis supplied)
There is no uniform rule on what constitutes "a considerable length of time." The
provocation and the commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a
reasonable length of time has passed during which the accused would have calmed
down and be able to reflect on the consequences of his or her actions. What is
important is that the accused has not yet "recovered his normal equanimity" when
he committed the crime.
To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts must
be examined on a case-to-case basis.
In People v. Mojica,46 Aurelio Mojica was accused of murder for stabbing Diosdado
Tormon to death. He attempted to mitigate his liability by alleging that the victim
humiliated him a month before the incident. The trial court convicted him of
murder without appreciating the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation. This court agreed, stating:
The last point to consider is whether the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation ought to have been appreciated in favor of appellant. What was done
to him on that fateful day of November 16, 1968 when he was subjected to
treatment offensive to his dignity, having been slapped and asked to kneel down in
the attitude of a supplicant, certainly could give rise to the feeling of passion or
obfuscation. There is a host of cases from United States v. Ferrer, a 1901 decision,
to People v. Pareja, decided in 1969, that so attests. Conduct of that character, in
the language of United States v. Salandanan, would ordinarily be expected to have
produced "such powerful excitement as to overcome reason and self-
control." Unfortunately for appellant, however, this mitigating circumstance cannot
be invoked because the killing took place one month and five days later. The
language of Justice Malcolm in United States v. Sarikala is relevant: "As to the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation we likewise cannot agree that it
can be taken into consideration because more than twentyfour hours elapsed after
the insults of Cotton to the accused and the criminal act." In the relatively recent
case of People v. Constantino, such a plea was likewise rejected. There the killing
took place after four days. As pointed out by Justice Romualdez in People v.
Alanguilang: "In order that the circumstance of obfuscation can be considered, it is
necessary to establish the existence of an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and that said act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity." Reference may also be made to People v. Dagatan, where this Court
could not consider the presence of this mitigating circumstance as the act that
caused the resentment "took place long before the commission of the
crime." People v. Gervacio had another way of putting it, "a time not far removed
from the commission of the crime." The lower court, therefore, did not commit any
error in refusing to credit appellant with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.47(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
However, a fight between the accused and the victim prior to the crime is not
always enough to be able to successfully prove that passion and obfuscation
attended it.
This court did not appreciate passion and obfuscation in People v.
Rabanillo,48 where the accused killed the victim 30 minutes after they came to
blows:
Suarez and Magalong testified that before the hacking incident, MORALES
reprimanded RABANILLO in front of their drinking mates for dousing him with
water, which entered into his ear. RABANILLO resented it and felt humiliated.
Hence, a fistfight ensued, but was eventually broken up. The event must have
continued to dominate RABANILLO’s thought that he decided to strike back at the
victim by hacking him to death. Clearly, the assault was made in a fit of anger.
For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from lawful
feelings. The turmoil and unreason that naturally result from a quarrel or fight
should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person
injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control.
The excitement which is inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does
not constitute obfuscation.
Moreover, the act producing obfuscation must not be far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might have regained his normal equanimity. Thus, it has been held that where at
least half an hour elapsed between the previous fight and the killing, the accused
cannot be given the benefit of the attenuating circumstance of obfuscation.
In this case, 30 minutes intervened between the fistfight and the killing of MORALES
by RABANILLO. The attack cannot, therefore, be said to be the result of a sudden
impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury. Having been actuated more by the spirit
of revenge or by anger and resentment for having been publicly berated by
MORALES, RABANILLO cannot be credited with the extenuating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation.49 (Emphasis supplied)
This court clarifies in People v. Bautista:50
The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not
be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or
offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control, because
the cause of this condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission
of the offense.51
This court has also ruled that acts done in the spirit of revenge cannot be
considered acts done with passion and obfuscation.
In People v. Caber,52 Francisco Caber was seen chasing Teodoro Ramirez with a
bladed weapon, locally known as a pisao, and stabbing Ramirez twice, which
resulted in his death.
Caber tried to argue that he stabbed Ramirez in a fit of passion and obfuscation and
alleged that Ramirez raped his wife three (3) days before the incident. This court
rejected the claim:
Even assuming, however, that he really killed Ramirez because of passion or
obfuscation in order to avenge the wrong done to his wife by the victim, still he
cannot be credited with this circumstance as he would then have acted "in the spirit
of revenge." Furthermore, although accused-appellant's wife was allegedly raped by
Ramirez on November 17, 1994, the stabbing incident in question took place three
days later or on November 20, 1994. Thus, the act which was supposed to have
caused passion or obfuscation on the part of the accused-appellant was so far
removed from the date of the stabbing. In United States v. Sarikala, the Court ruled
that the lapse of more than 24 hours, reckoned from the commission of the act
which produced the passion or obfuscation up to the time of the commission of the
felony, constituted a considerable period of time after which such circumstance
would no longer be deemed present.53 (Emphasis supplied)
The facts of this case, however, are similar to that in People v. Real.54 In Real,
Melchor Real and Edgardo Corpuz, his fellow market vendor, engaged in a heated
argument over the right to use the market table to display their fish. The municipal
mayor, then present at the scene, tried to pacify them and told them that they
were arguing over trivial matters. Both parties calmed down after a while.
Corpuz, however, said something to Real, to which Real softly uttered, "You are
being too oppressive." When Corpuz kept walking near the table, Real started to
sharpen his bolo. As Corpuz turned his back, Real hacked him with his bolo which
caused his death.
Real was held liable for homicide, but this court took into account the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation, stating that:
[t]he act of the victim in berating and humiliating appellant was enough to produce
passion and obfuscation, considering that the incident happened in a market place
within full view and within hearing distance of many people. 55
This court also noted:
In the case at bench, the assault came in the course of an altercation and after
appellant had sharpened his bolo in full view of the victim. Appellant's act of
sharpening his bolo can be interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim so the
latter would leave him alone. It was simply foolhardy for the victim to continue
walking to and fro near appellant in a taunting manner while the latter was
sharpening his bolo.56
Accused-appellant admitted that he stabbed Gulane but alleged that they had been
fighting. He alleged that Gulane had been hurling insults at him which provoked him
to react; in effect, he alleged that the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation was present in this case.57
The Court of Appeals rejected his contention and stated that no evidence was
presented to prove that immediately before or at the time of the incident, there
was an altercation between accused-appellant and Gulane that would provoke his
reaction.
Panday testified:
Q: Do you remember if there was any altercation that took place between the
accused and the victim in this case before the incident?
A: I have not heard any argument from both of them and he stabbed Rodulfo
Gulane and Rodulfo Gulane uttered the words in a vernacular, "Man luba kaman
Ling."58
Pogay further testified:
Q: Before the stabbing incident, have you noticed if there was an altercation
between Rodulfo Gulane and Marcelino Oloverio?
A: No, sir.59
Panday, however, clarifies:
Q: Now, before the actual stabbing of the victim in this case, you said there was no
altercation between the accused and Rodulfo Gulane, now, if you can recall[,] if
there was any incident that took place immediately before the stabbing incident?
A: I cannot say any but what I only say is that I only saw the incident. 60 (Emphasis
supplied)
The prosecution could not prove that an altercation might have occurred between
accused-appellant and Gulane before the incident since their eyewitnesses could
only testify to the actual stabbing.
The Court of Appeals also failed to take into account the testimony of Lamoste, the
defense witness.
Lamoste testified that he and accused-appellant worked together, as he was then
the barangay captain and accused-appellant was a barangay tanod. He alleged that
accused-appellant’s daughter once confided to accusedappellant that Gulane told
her that he wanted to touch her private parts. 61
Lamoste testified that about a month before the incident, he witnessed Gulane
telling accused-appellant, "Kumusta na man mo imo mama nagtap-il mo imo mama
naba mo produkto?" ("How is your relationship with your mother have you
produced fruits with your mother?") He alleged that accused-appellant got angry
and tried to attack Gulane, but he was able to intervene and part the two.62
The prosecution did not deny any portion of Lamoste’s testimony and only insisted
that no altercation occurred immediately before the stabbing.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals narrowed its understanding of passion
and obfuscation to refer only to the emotions accused-appellant felt in the seconds
before a crime is committed. It failed to understand that passion may linger and
build up over time as repressed anger enough to obfuscate reason and self-control.
The circumstances of both victim and accused-appellant were also not taken into
account by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellant referred to Gulane as the "datu" or rich man of Barangay San
Pablo. Gulane enjoyed an economic ascendancy over accused-appellant, a
mere barangay tanod.
Gulane not only threatened to molest accused-appellant’s daughter but also
accused him in public of having incestuous relations with his mother. Gulane was
said to have insulted accused-appelant in full view of his immediate superior, the
barangay captain.
Both victim and accused-appellant lived in the small locality of Palompon, Leyte. As
with any small town, it was a place where a person’s degrading remarks against
another could be made the measure of the latter’s character. Gulane’s insults
would have been taken into serious consideration by the town’s residents because
of his wealth and stature in the community.
There was neither a reason given why Gulane acted that way towards accused-
appellant nor any evidence to show that accused-appellant had previously wronged
him.
The prosecution did not deny that Gulane insulted accused-appellant on various
occasions. The witnesses could not state with reasonable certainty that Gulane did
not provoke accused-appellant a few minutes before the incident; they could only
testify to the incident itself and the seconds which preceded it.
In view of these considerations, we find that the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation is present in this case.
IV
According to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable
by reclusion temporal. The trial court and the Court of Appeals considered accused-
appellant’s voluntary surrender to the authorities as a mitigating
circumstance.63 We find no reason to disturb this conclusion.
Considering that there are two (2) mitigating circumstances in accused-appellant’s
favor, the imposable penalty must be that which is next lower to that prescribed by
law. Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ARTICLE 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. —
In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it
be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of
which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the
courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according
to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
....
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the
number and nature of such circumstances.
Accordingly, the imposable penalty is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment, the minimum of which should be within the range of prision
correccional64 and the maximum of which should be within the range of prision
mayor.65
Based on the records, accused-appellant was put under preventive imprisonment
pending his conviction by the trial court.
In accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the time undergone by
accused-appellant under preventive imprisonment shall be credited to his service of
sentence, provided that he has given his written conformity to abide by the
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners. The provision states:
"ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. –
Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the
full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects
thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
"1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more
times of any crime; and
"2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have
failed to surrender voluntarily.
"If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a
counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the
time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment[.]"66
The letter of PGI Gilbert P. Cayubit, Officer-in-Charge of the Leyte Sub-Provincial
Jail, stated that accused-appellant had been transferred to Leyte Regional Prison on
May 4, 2010.67 The transfer to Leyte Regional Prison was also confirmed by SO2
Jorge A. Colanta, Officer-in-Charge of the Leyte Regional Prison, who stated that
accused-appellant was received by the prison on May 27, 2010.68

As the exact length of time cannot be determined with certainty, the trial court
shall determine the exact period of preventive imprisonment that may be credited
in accused-appellant’s favor.

The monetary awards must also be modified. In a prosecution for murder or

homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages may be awarded without need of
further proof other than the victim’s death. 69 The monetary awards of _50,000.00
in civil indemnity and _50,000.00 in moral damages are in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.70Temperate damages may also be awarded in lieu of actual
damages, as in this case where the prosecution failed to prove proof of actual
damages.71 The award of exemplary damages, however, ·must be deleted in view of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.72

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant

Marcelino Oloverio is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

As the crime was attended with the mitigating circumstances of passion and
obfuscation and voluntary surrender with no aggravating circumstance, accused-
appellant Marcelino Oloverio is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for two (2) years, four ( 4) months, and one ( 1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.73 The period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor
if he has given his written confonnity to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.

Accused-appellant Marcelino Oloverio is further ordered to pay the heirs of Rodulfo

Gulane the amounts of P50,000.00 as civi.l indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. All damages awarded shall be
subject to the rate of 6% legal interest per annum from the finality of this Decision
until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 217974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
RESURRECT ON JUANILW MANZANO, JR. and REZOR JUANILLO MANZANO,
Accused
REZOR JUANILLO MANZANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Rezor Juanillo Manzano (accused-
appellant) from the 29 October 2014 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Twentieth Division in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01473 affirming in toto the
17 April 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under
Article (Art.) 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
THE FACTS
The accused-appellant and his elder brother Resurrecion
Manzano (Resurrecion) were charged with murder before the RTC of San Jose,
Antique, in an Information3 docketed as Crim. Case No. 10-07-8009, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 19th day of March 2010, in the Municipality of Hamtic,
Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with knives,
conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with
said knives one Lucio Silava, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds on his body
which caused his instantaneous death.
With qualifying circumstance of treachery and abuse of superior strength.
Contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The parties agreed to have an inverted trial after the accused-appellant who,
pleading not guilty during the arraignment, raised the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. Resurrecion remained at large.
To prove his claim of self-defense, the accused-appellant himself testified. SP02
Roberto Javier (SP02 Javier) of the Hamtic police office took the witness stand to
prove that the accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered.
The prosecution tried to prove its case against the accused-appellant by calling to
the witness stand Dr. Ma. Eva D. Pacificador (Dr. Pacificador), Victoria N.
Silava (Victoria), Atty. Rean S. Sy (Atty. Sy), and Luisa P. Monteclaro (Luisa).
Version of the Defense
At about 9:30 p.m. on 19 March 2010, while the accused-appellant was home
sitting by the window, he saw Lucio Silava (Lucio) throwing stones at his house. The
electric lamppost was lighted, thus, the accusedappellant, who was then eighteen
years old, was sure that it was Lucio.4
The accused-appellant immediately went out to inquire from Lucio why he was
throwing stones at his house but Lucio threw a stone at him that hit his right knee
and caused him to fall down. Lucio rushed towards the accused-appellant to stab
him with a knife but was unsuccessful as they grappled for its possession. It was at
that instance that the accused-appellant called out to Resurrecion, who was home
that time, to run away so that he would not be involved. Because Lucio was very
drunk, the accusedappellant was able to take hold of the knife, but blacked out and
started stabbing Lucio. Thereafter, the accused-appellant ran away and proceeded
to the house of Reno Manzano (Reno), an elder brother, at Barangay San Angel, San
Jose, Antique, where he also met Resurrecion. The following day, the accused-
appellant surrendered to the police authorities. 5
The accused-appellant had known Lucio for eight years already since the latter's
house was in front of his house and were separated only by the road. Accused-
appellant was as tall as Lucio but the latter had a bigger body build. Resurrecion had
a dislocated right shoulder and a smaller build than that of Lucio and the accused-
appellant.6
Version of the Prosecution
At about 9:00 p.m. on 19 March 2010, the spouses Lucio and Victoria were inside
their store fronting the accused-appellant's house. Lucio was having his dinner at
the kitchen inside the store while Victoria was watching the store when the
accused-appellant and Resurrecion called out from the gate saying that they would
buy cigarettes. Because the gate leading to the store was already closed, Lucio told
the accused-appellant and Resurrecion to come.7
Resurrecion stood outside the store and told Victoria that he wanted to buy
Fortune white cigarettes and handed her ₱20.00. The accused-appellant entered
the store and proceeded to where Lucio was having dinner. After realizing that she
had no more stock of the Fortune white cigarette, Victoria told Resurrecion who, in
reply, said that he would no longer buy cigarettes and then proceeded towards the
kitchen. Thereafter, Victoria heard Lucio ask, "What wrong have I committed?"
Victoria rushed to the kitchen and there saw Lucio bloodied and leaning on the
door, while the accusedappellant and Resurrecion were stabbing him. 8
Victoria went out of the store shouting for help and saying that the accused-
appellant and Resurrecion were stabbing Lucio. When Victoria went back inside,
she saw Lucio run outside the store but still within the fenced premises, and the
accused-appellant and Resurrecion were going after him. From where she stood,
Victoria saw Resurrecion hold Lucio's hands while the accused-appellant, who was
positioned behind Lucio, held Lucio’s body with one arm while with his other hand
stabbed Lucio’s back. When Resurrecion released his grip on Lucio, the latter fell
face down but the accused-appellant and Resurrecion continued to stab him
causing Victoria to utter, "I will let you eat the whole body of my husband alive."
The accused-appellant and Resurrecion thereafter ran towards the direction of the
farm.9
Lucio was brought to the hospital but Victoria had to stay behind to find money for
his medical expenses. On her way to the hospital, Victoria was informed that Lucio
had died. Luisa, a cousin of Lucio, took pictures of the dead body. Victoria had the
pictures10 developed and secured Lucio's death certificate.11 Victoria incurred a
total of ₱15,000.0012 for the funeral expenses.13
On 23 March 2010, Dr. Pacificador conducted a postmortem examination on the
body of Lucio, the results of which follow:
Left Anterior Thorax
StabWound # 1 - Horizontal in direction about 3 cm in length located at the left
anterior chest below the left clavicle penetrating the upper lobe of the left lung and
aorta.
StabWound # 2 - Vertical in direction about 3 cm in length located below wound #1
resulting into fracture of 3rd rib.
Right Anterior Thorax
StabWound # 3 - Vertical in direction about 2 cm in length on the left shoulder,
non-penetrating.
StabWound # 4 - Vertical in direction about 4.5 cm in length located below right
clavicle penetrating the upper lobe of the right lung.
StabWound # 5 - Vertical in direction about 4 cm in length below the sternum
penetrating the liver.
StabWound # 6 - Vertical in direction about 4.5 cm in length about 3 cm below
wound # 5 penetrating the liver.
StabWound # 7 - Vertical in direction about 1.5 cm in length below wound # 6 non-
penetrating.
Extremities
StabWound # 8 - Vertical in direction about 3.5 cm in length located on the left
upper arm going through the axilla.
StabWound# 9 - Horizontal in direction about 2.5 cm in length on the left lower arm
below the left antecubital fossa, nonpenetrating
StabWound# 10 - Horizontal in direction about 3 cm in length just below wound # 9
left lower arm.
StabWound # 11 - Horizontal in direction about 2 cm in length located below left
wrist, non-penetrating.
Posterior Thorax
StabWound # 12 - Vertical in direction about 2.5 cm in length just below the neck in
between scapula, non-penetrating.
StabWound # 13 - Vertical in direction about 5 cm in length just below wound# 12,
non-penetrating.
StabWound # 14 - Vertical in direction about 2 cm in length below wound# 13, non-
penetrating.
StabWound # 15 - Horizontal in direction about 1.5 cm in length on the right lumbar
area, non-penetrating.
Cause of death:
Hypovolemic Shock secondary to Hemorrhage secondary to Multiple Stab
Wounds.14
It was a week after the stabbing incident that Atty. Sy took pictures15 of the place
where Lucio was attacked. He saw splatters of dried blood inside the store and
within the fenced perimeter enclosing the crime scene.16
The Ruling of the RTC
According to the RTC, a careful and deeper examination of the facts and
circumstances tend to contradict the accused-appellant's version of the incident
and his claim that he acted in self-defense. In so ruling, the RTC considered the
following: that if there was no intention on the part of the accused-appellant and
Resurrecion to kill Lucio, they could have easily overpowered him because he was
very drunk at that time; it was not convinced that Lucio hit the accused-appellant
on his right knee causing him to fall since the latter failed to present a medical
certificate notwithstanding his contention that he was brought by a police officer to
a doctor for his knee injury; it was not satisfied with the accused-appellant's version
that after he fell down, Lucio held his neck and stabbed him because not once was
the accused-appellant hit; the number of stab wounds sustained by Lucio negates
self-defense; the serious injuries sustained by Lucio demonstrate the accused-
appellant's intent to kill; the splattered blood inside the store and on the bamboo
slats serving as wall of the kitchen are proofs that the incident started at the kitchen
of Lucio’s store and continued outside but still within the fenced perimeter; that
when the accused-appellant blacked out, he was still able to shout at Resurrecion to
run away so as not to be involved in the incident; the portrayal on how the accused-
appellant singlehandedly stabbed Lucio was not worthy of credence; the claim of
the accused-appellant that he hit Lucio frontally was denied by the postmortem
examination results; the only plausible explanation for Lucio's back injuries was that
these were inflicted by either the accused-appellant or Resurrecion or by both of
them; and the accused-appellant had not assailed or contradicted, by testimonial or
documentary evidence, the truthfulness and trustworthiness of Victoria's
testimony.17
On the one hand, the R TC found that the accused-appellant and Resurrecion
conspired as shown by their concerted action of surprising Lucio in the kitchen and,
without justifiable reason, helping each other assault their victim. Moreover, the
RTC ruled that the commission of the felony was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of noctumity which facilitated the assailants' escape. According to the
RTC, it was unfortunate that this circumstance was not properly appreciated as this
was not alleged in the information.18
The RTC, however, was not convinced that the accused-appellant voluntarily
surrendered considering the following reasons: he fled from the locus criminis and
proceeded to Reno's house in San Jose instead of going to the Hamtic police station;
he did not surrender to the San Jose police; and it was Reno who informed the
Hamtic police station of the accused-appellant's presence in San Jose, thus, the
policemen proceeded to Reno's house and took custody of the accused-appellant.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered convicting accused REZORMANZANOyJUANILLO, beyond reasonable
doubt, of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua.
He is also ordered to indemnify the legal heirs of Lucio Silava the amount of
₱75,000.00 for the death of the said victim and to pay the said legal heirs actual
expenses in the amount of ₱15,000.00 as well as moral damages amounting to
₱25,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Feeling aggrieved with the decision of the RTC, the accused-appellant appealed
before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA noted the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of Lucio which made
the claim of self-defense unavailable. According to the CA, the accused-appellant
must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence since he had admitted that he killed Lucio. The CA held that
there was no proof that the RTC failed to appreciate facts and circumstances which
would have merited the accused-appellant's acquitta1.20
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC that treachery and abuse of superior
strength attended the killing of Lucio, and that the accused-appellant had not
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities. 21
In view of its findings, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 20, 2012 of
the RTC, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique in Criminal Case No. 10-07-8009 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
ISSUES
I gruelling examination. These factors are the most significant in evaluating the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND
IMPROBABLE TESTIMONY OF VICTORIA SILAVA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT REZOR MANZANO, AS A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ACTED WITH
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.23
OUR RULING
The appeal does not deserve any merit.
The findings of the RTC
as to the credibility of
witnesses should be
respected especially
when these are affirmed
by the CA.
It has been trenchantly maintained in a catena of cases that when the issues involve
matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of
the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect.24The assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of
conflicting testimonies.25 The factual findings of the R TC, therefore, are accorded
the highest degree of respect especially if the CA adopted and confirmed
these,26 unless some facts or circumstances of weight were overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted as to materially affect the disposition of the
case.27 In the absence of substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court’s
assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are
shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally
bound by the former’s findings.28
It must be noted that it is a general rule in criminal cases that an examination of the
entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct
conclusion; as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it
being the duty of the appellate court to correct such error as may be found in the
judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of the assignment of
errors or not.29 It is for this reason that the Court has painstakingly reviewed the
records of this case; yet, it found no reason to depart from the well-entrenched rule
that the findings of the R TC as to the credibility of witnesses should not be
disturbed considering the absence of any showing that it had overlooked a material
fact that otherwise would change the outcome of the case or had misunderstood a
circumstance of consequence in their evaluation of the credibility of the
witnesses.30
The testimony of Victoria identifying the accused-appellant and Resurrecion as the
ones who assaulted Lucio was positive, convincing, and straightforward, viz:
Q. You said a while ago that your store is lighted with bulb, what is the voltage of
the electric bulb?
A. Ten (10) watts.
Q. So, what did you do after you heard your husband said those words?
A. I immediately went towards the door of the store towards the kitchen area and I
saw my husband leaning on the wall full of blood and the two accused
simultaneously stabbing my husband.
Q. So both of them are holding a knife?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you saw both of them stabbing your husband?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please tell us how near is your door to the [location] of your husband when he
was stabbed?
A. (Witness as this juncture pointed at the distance from the witness stand to the
place occupied by Atty. Rivero which is estimated to be about two (2) meters, as
agreed upon by the prosecution and the defense, as the distance from the door to
the [location] where the husband was stabbed.)
Q. And when you came out of your door that was your distance from your husband
after he was being stabbed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And please describe to us what did you do immediately after coming out of that
door?
A. From the door, I saw my husband leaning on the wall full of blood with the two
accused simultaneously stabbing him.
Q. And you saw that there was no structure blocking your side?
A. No, sir.
Q. While they were stabbing your husband, can you tell us if the two accused
uttered any words?
A. Nothing, sir.
Q. Can you recall while standing how many times did the two accused stab your
husband?
A. I cannot count how many times the two accused stabbed my husband but I saw
both of them stabbing my husband.
Q. At that time your husband is facing you?
A. Yes, sir because he was leaning on the wall.
Q. What did you do next?
A. After that I ran out of [the] house and ran towards the fence and shouted that
Resurrecion and Rezor are stabbing my husband and I went back inside the house
after saying those words.
Q. When you said those words you came back to your house, please tell us when
you came back to your house, you entered the main gate or front of the road?
A. Just in front of our store when I shouted for help.
Q. While standing on the road facing your husband, please tell us what did you see?
A. While I was standing on the road, I saw Resurrecion holding my husband and
holding [his] hands while Rezor was behind my husband and one hand was holding
the body of my husband and the other hand was stabbing at the back of my
husband.
Q. At that point did you see on what portion of the body of your husband was Rezor
stabbing him?
A. At the back.
Q. How far were you from them?
A. Very near. (x x x two (2) meters, as agreed upon by both counsel)
Q. Please tell us, when the two accused Resurrecion and Rezor were holding your A. At that particular moment, I saw Resurrecion holding the two hands of my
husband and Resurrecion was stabbing on the back, in what portion were they husband while Rezor's [other] hand was holding my husband while the other hand
located? was stabbing my husband. I cannot recall which hand was used by him in stabbing
my husband.
A. In front of our store.
xxxx
COURT:
Q. So, are you telling the court that Rezor was in the grip of your husband?
Q. Are you telling the court that the two accused were already outside the store?
A. Yes. Sir.
A. Yes, sir.
xxxx
ATTY. SY:
Q. Now, do you realize that both injuries of your husband were in [the] front
Q. Outside the store but within the gate? portion of his body?

A. Yes, sir. A. Yes, sir.

COURT:
Q. From inside the kitchen, can you tell the court where did the three pass by?
A. My husband was able to run outside the house.
Q. So when your husband ran outside the house, the two accused followed him?
Q. About how many times did you see Resurrecion stab your husband while he was
at the back of your husband?
A. I saw Rezor stabbed my husband once and that was the time that Resurrecion
released my husband from his grip and so my husband fell to the ground facing
down.

A. Yes, sir. xxxx

Q. When you saw your husband and the two accused in that position they were ATTY. SY:
directly in front of your store but still within the gate?
xxxx
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, when your husband fell down, what did you do next?
Q. Is this store lighted?
A. Rezor and Resurrecion helped each other in stabbing him and at that point in
A. Yes, sir, it is lighted with a bulb. time I told Rezor and Resurrecion "I will let you eat the whole body of my husband
alive," and then that was the time the two accused ran away."31
Q. And from your position you can properly see their faces?
It was clear from the testimony of Victoria that she was able to personally witness
A. Yes, sir. when the accused-appellant and Resurrecion assaulted Lucio; and that she could
not be mistaken as to the assailants' identity since the place where the crime
Q. Tell us what happened next?
happened was well-lighted.
Accused-appellant tried to dent the credibility of Victoria by asserting that she did
not actually see the scuffle between him and Lucio as verified by her admission
during the cross-examination by the defense.32
The contention of the accused-appellant is without merit. The records bear out that
Victoria admitted that right after she heard Lucio utter "What wrong did I commit,"
she immediately went to the kitchen and found her husband leaning on the kitchen
door, bloodied, while the accused-appellant and Resurrecion were stabbing him.
Contrary to the claim of the accused-appellant, a review of the testimony of Victoria
would show that what she claimed she did not witness was the scuffle, if there was
any, between Lucio and the accused-appellant prior to her hearing her husband
utter "What wrong did I commit?" It was also pointed out that Victoria had claimed
that she did not hear anything from the accused-appellant and Resurrecion before
she heard Lucio utter these words in a soft and pleading manner, hence,
accentuating the fact that no such scuffle had taken place.
In the same vein, the position of the accused-appellant that Victoria could not have
seen the actions of Lucio and the accused-appellant as she had gone out of the
house to ask for help,33 fails to persuade. Victoria stated that after running out to
the street and shouting for help, she went back inside the fenced premises of the
store; thus, she was able to see Lucio run outside from the kitchen, and saw the
accused-appellant and Resurrecion follow Lucio, get hold of him, and stab him
again.34
In stark contrast to the allegation of the accused-appellant that Victoria's
statements before the trial court were inconsistent and incredible, a perspicacious
review of her testimony sustains a finding that her narration of what happened on
that fateful day of 19 March 2010 was plausible, being consistent in all important
details. For sure, the records are bereft of any showing that Victoria's testimony
was inspired by ill motive or was attended by bad faith. Jurisprudence holds that
when there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the witness
to testify falsely against the accused or to pervert the truth, the logical conclusion is
that no such motive exists, and that the former's testimony is worthy of full faith
and credit.35
We underscore that, except for the alleged inconsistencies which to the mind of the
Court are inconsequential, the accused-appellant failed to proffer any convincing
and material variations in the testimony of Victoria that would warrant the Court to
reverse the RTC’s finding as to her credibility. It is settled in this jurisdiction that as
long as the testimony of the witness is coherent and intrinsically believable as a
whole, discrepancies in minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
veracity or detract from the essential credibility of the witnesses' declarations.36Of
utmost meaning to this case is the ruling laid down in Velasquez v. People,37 viz:
Jurisprudence is replete with clarifications that a witness' recollection of [a] crime
need not be foolproof: "Witnesses cannot be expected to recollect with exactitude
every minute detail of an event. This is especially true when the witnesses testify as
to facts which transpired in rapid succession, attended by flurry and excitement."
This is especially true of a victim's recollection of his or her own harrowing ordeal.
One who has undergone a horrifying and traumatic experience "cannot be expected
to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account" of every minutiae.
The accused-appellant
assumes the burden of
establishing his plea of
self-defense by credible,
clear, and convincing
evidence.
Jurisprudence instructs that an accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under
Article 1138 of the Revised Penal Code admits to the commission of acts, which
would otherwise engender criminal liability.39 Corollary thereto, the rule
consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admit that they
are the authors of the death of the victim, and their defense is anchored on self-
defense, it becomes incumbent upon them to prove the justifying circumstance to
the satisfaction of the court.40 With this admission, the burden of evidence is
shifted to the appellant to prove that all the essential elements of self-defense are
present.41 Verily, to invoke self-defense effectually, there must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was
then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable
means to resist the attack.42Self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal
aggression on the part of the person invoking it.43 Conviction follows if the evidence
for the accused fails to prove the existence of justifying circumstances.44
Accused-appellant contends that he merely repelled the unlawful aggression of
Lucio, viz: when Lucio threw a stone at him that hit his knee; and when Lucio rushed
towards him to stab him. Additionally, accusedappellant avers that his testimony
was credible that he alone inflicted the stab wounds on Lucio.45
To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.46
On the first element, the consistent teaching by the Court on unlawful aggression is
as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be
no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful
aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put
in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril
must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must
establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression,
namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b)the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be
unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression;
and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression
means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that
positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent
unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at
another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack).
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.47
The evidence before the Court palpably lend negative credence to the presence of
unlawful aggression. Primarily, when compared to Victoria's testimony which
withstood the crucible of intense cross-examination by the defense and the
clarificatory questioning by the trial court, accused-appellant’s testimony was not
only incongruous with the evidence on record but also improbable.
The version of the defense was that the unlawful aggression began with Lucio who
was outside the accused-appellant's house throwing stones at its roof. Allegedly,
Lucio likewise threw a stone at the accused-appellant when he came out of the
house which hit his knee and caused him to fall down. Lucio was about to stab the
accused-appellant with a knife but then a scuffle ensued for its possession. When
the accused-appellant got hold of the knife, he "blacked out" and stabbed Lucio
several times.
The defense’s version of the events is swiftly denied by the prosecution’s
pictures48 showing Lucio’s blood splattered in the kitchen of Victoria's store and at
the fenced premises. These pictures are silent evidence that confirm the truth of
Victoria's testimony and easily weaken the defense's version that when the
accused-appellant acted in self-defense to Lucio’s unlawful aggression, they were at
the road in front of accused-appellant’s house. Where the physical evidence on
record runs counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of the physical
evidence must be upheld.49
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant has neither witness nor evidence to
fortify his claim that the unlawful aggression started with Lucio. Self-defense cannot
be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.50 The fact that Resurrecion is
still in hiding instead of giving his testimony before the trial court to boost the
theory proffered by the accused-appellant well confirms the finding that the
defense's version of the events was contrived.
To amplify his position that he acted in self-defense, the accusedappellant tried to
make issue of his absence of motive to stab Lucio. The accused-appellant basically
anchored his position on the ruling laid down by the Court in Borguilla v. Court of
Appeals, 51 that "the absence of motive is important in ascertaining the truth as
between two antagonistic theories or versions of the killing. Herein, it was the
victim who had reason to harm the accused."52
The quoted ruling in Borguilla does not find meaning in this case considering that
the identity of the accused-appellant as the assailant of Lucio has been firmly
established by the prosecution. For sure, even the accused-appellant admitted that
he stabbed Lucio several times after he blacked out. In Borguilla, because of the
contradictory accounts of the event by both parties, the Court resorted to searching
for facts or circumstances which could be used as valuable aids in evaluating the
probability or improbability of a testimony; thus, the Court had appreciated the
presence of motive of the victim to harm the accused in ascertaining which of the
versions was true. In the present case, however, both the testimonial and
documentary evidence of the prosecution demonstrably disproved the defense's
version that unlawful aggression was initiated by Lucio. Also revealing was that, in
contrast to the Borguilla ruling, there was conspicuous dearth of evidence to
establish that Lucio had motive to kill the accused-appellant.
Notwithstanding the accused-appellant's contention that he has no motive in killing
Lucio, we point out that motive is not material in this case. As a general rule, proof
of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt; and the
absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for
the crime charged such as murder.53 To emphasize, "motive is irrelevant when the
accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness. Intent is not synonymous
with motive. Motive alone is not a proof and is hardly ever an essential element of a
crime."54
It is vigorously underscored that the pith and soul of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense is the presence of unlawful aggression; thus, the absence of this
requisite readily converts the claim of self-defense into nothingness even with the
existence of the other elements because the two other essential elements of self-
defense would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to
prevent or repel.55 As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the
victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense.56
Accused-appellant's plea of self-defense is controverted by the nature, number, and
location of the wounds inflicted on the victim, since the gravity of said wounds is
indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to defend.57 The postmortem
examination58 conducted by Dr. Pacificador on the body of Lucio revealed that he
sustained fifteen wounds, four of which were fatal, and that the cause of his death
was hypovolemic shock secondary to hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab
wounds. The findings of Dr. Pacificador justify a declaration that there was
undeniable intent on the part of the accused-appellant to kill Lucio.
The absence of unlawful aggression on the part of Lucio in this case unmistakably
belies the accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete. In view of this, the Court finds no reason to further discuss the other
elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense and will proceed to
determine the offense committed by the accused-appellant.
The crime committed by
the accused-appellant
was murder.
The accused-appellant averred that the trial court erred in convicting him of
murder; he maintained that he was guilty only of homicide in view of the absence
of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength .59
The crime of murder, under Article (Art.) 24860 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is
committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of Art. 246 61 of the
same Code, shall kill another with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means
or persons to insure or afford impunity.62 Jurisprudence provides that to warrant a
conviction for the crime of murder, the following essential elements must be
present: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art.
248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 63
There is no question that the first, second, and fourth elements are present in this
case. It is the resolution of the issue on whether the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength that attended the killing of Lucio can
determine whether the accused-appellant should be held liable for murder. The
presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is
sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.64 On the one hand, if the qualifying
circumstances are not present or cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused may only be convicted with homicide under Art. 24965 of the RPC.66
Both the trial and the appellate courts appreciated treachery and abuse of superior
strength in convicting the accused-appellant of murder.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.67 Treachery is not presumed but
must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself.68 Treachery, whenever alleged in
the information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises
it to the category of murder.69
For the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following
elements must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of
execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or
retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.70
Relative to the first element, the legal teaching consistently upheld by the Court is
that the essence of treachery is when the attack comes without a warning and in a
swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow.71
As to the second element, jurisprudence requires that there must be evidence to
show that the accused deliberately or consciously adopted the means of execution
to ensure its success72 since unexpectedness of the attack does not always equate
to treachery.73 The means adopted must have been a result of a determination to
ensure success in committing the crime.74
Additionally, in murder or homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill;
otherwise, the offender is liable only for physical injuries. 75 The evidence to prove
intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors
before, at the time of or immediately after the killing of the victim. 76
The prosecution established that the accused-appellant and Resurrecion
deliberately made it appear to Victoria and Lucio on the night of 19 March 2010,
that their main purpose in coming to the store was to buy cigarettes. They came at
night when neighbors were probably asleep which would make it impossible for
them to lend assistance to Lucio. Once the accused-appellant and Resurrecion were
allowed to enter the premises, the accused-appellant immediately went inside the
store and proceeded to the kitchen where Lucio was having dinner. In the
meantime, Resurrecion engaged Victoria in a talk by pretending that he was buying
cigarettes but he, too, forthwith went to the kitchen upon being told by Victoria
that she had run out of the cigarette he was looking for. Thereafter, Victoria heard
Lucio uttering softly, "What wrong have I committed"; and then she saw her
bloodied husband being stabbed by the accused-appellant and Resurrecion. The
absence of scuffle among Lucio, the accused-appellant, and Resurrecion
substantiate the finding that the attack was swift and deliberate so that the
unarmed and unsuspecting Lucio had no chance to resist or escape the blow from
his assailants.
The intent to kill by the accused-appellant and Resurrecion was confirmed by the
fact that they were armed with knives when they attacked Lucio who sustained a
total of fifteen wounds. Despite the fact that Lucio was already bleeding from his
wounds, he was able to run away from his assailants who pursued him. Resurrecion
stood in front of Lucio while the accused-appellant held him at the back and both
assailants continued to stab him. According to Dr. Pacificador, there were four fatal
wounds inflicted on Lucio, i.e., wounds numbered 1, 4, 5, and 6 which penetrated
his major organs.77
It must be pointed out that since treachery had qualified the crime to murder, the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily
included in the former.78
The RTC and the CA
were correct in not
appreciating the
mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the
following elements must be present, to wit: (1) the accused has not been actually
arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's
agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.79 The essence of voluntary surrender is
spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to
the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the
authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture.80
Records show that it was Reno who went to the Hamtic police station to request
that they take custody of the accused-appellant who was then in his
house.81 Undoubtedly, when the police went to Reno's house at San Angel, San
Jose, Antique, it was for the purpose of arresting the accused-appellant and not
because he was surrendering to them voluntarily. Simply put, Reno merely
facilitated the accused-appellant's arrest. Thus, without the elements of voluntary
surrender, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the
inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not
spontaneous and therefore cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to
serve as a mitigating circumstance.82
temperate damages of ₱50,000.00. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality
of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

The penalty to be imposed

upon the accused-appellant

Pursuant to Art. 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. Applying Art. 63(2)83 of the RPC, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties,
i.e., reclusion perpetua, shall be imposed upon the accused-appellant in view of the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that attended the killing of
Lucio.

Following the jurisprudence laid down by the Court in People v. Jugueta, 84 accused-
appellant shall be held liable for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00 each. It was also ruled in Jugueta that when
no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded. In this case,
Victoria showed that she spent a total of ₱13,000.00 for the funeral expenses of
Lucio. In conformity with the jurisprudence in Ocampo v. People,85 the temperate
damages of ₱50,000.00 shall likewise be awarded instead of the damages
substantiated by the receipts. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this
decision until fully paid.86

On the loss of earning capacity, it is noted that Victoria failed to substantiate her
claim that her husband was receiving a monthly income of ₱20,000.00. The Court
reiterates its ruling that "for lost income due to death, there must be unbiased
proof of the deceased' average income. Self-serving, hence unreliable statement, is
not enough. "87

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01473 finding the accusedappellant Rezor Juanillo
Manzano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the
award of damages to the heirs of Lucio Silava, as follows: civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00; moral damages of ₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱75,000.00; and
G.R. No. L-48976 October 11, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORO MACBUL, defendant-appellant.
Cesar C. Climaco for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Madamba for appellee.
OZAETA, J.:
Appellant pleaded guilty to an information for theft of two sacks of papers valued at
P10 belong to the Provincial Government of Sulu, alleged to have been committed
on March 9, 1943, in the municipality of Jolo; it being also alleged that he was a
habitual delinquent, having been twice convicted of the same crime on November
14, 1928, and August 20, 1942. The trial court sentenced him to suffer one month
and one day of arresto mayor as principal penalty and two years, four months, and
one day of prision correccional as additional penalty for habitual delinquency.
The trial court found two mitigating circumstances: plea of guilty under paragraph
7, and extreme poverty and necessity under paragraph 10, of article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code; but it took into account the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism in imposing the principal as well as the additional penalty.
The only question raised here by counsel for the appellant is the correctness of the
consideration by the trial court of recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the
purpose of imposing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, counsel
contending that recidivism should not have been taken into account because it is
inherent in habitual delinquency. While that contention is correct, as we have
decided in the case of People vs. Tolentino, 1 Off. Gaz., 682, it is beside the point
here because the error committed by the trial court lies not so much in its having
considered recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of penalizing
habitual delinquency, as in its having considered appellant as a habitual delinquent
at all, it appearing from the information that his two previous convictions were
more than ten years apart. "A person shall be deems to be habitually delinquent, if
within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the
crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes
a third time or oftener." (See last paragraph, article 62, No. 5, of the Revised Penal
Code.) Therefore, appellant's first conviction, which took place in November, 1928,
cannot be taken into account because his second conviction took place in August,
1942, or fourteen years later. Hence within the purview of the Habitual Delinquency
Law appellant has only one previous conviction against him, namely, that of 1942.
The trial court considered extreme poverty and necessity as a mitigating
circumstance falling within No. 10 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which
authorizes the court to consider in favor of an accused "any other circumstance of a
similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned." The trial court predicates
such consideration upon its finding that the accused, on account of extreme
poverty and of the economic difficulties brought about by the present cataclysm,
was forced to pilfer the two sacks of papers mentioned in the information from the
Customhouse Building, which he sold for P2.50, in order to be able to buy
something to eat for various minor children of his. (The stolen goods were
subsequently recovered.) The Solicitor General interposes no objection to the
consideration of such circumstance as mitigating under No. 10 of article 13. We give
it our stamp of approval, recognizing the immanent principle that the right to life is
more sacred than a mere property right. That is not to encourage or even
countenance theft but merely to dull somewhat the keen and pain-producing edges
of the stark realities of life.
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the sentence
appealed from is modified by affirming the principal penalty and eliminating the
additional penalty, without costs.
Yulo, C.J., Moran and Paras, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FLORO BUBAN BARCELA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the March 19, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04961, which affirmed with modifications the January 6, 2011
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna (RTC), in
Criminal Case Nos. 5517-SPL, 5526-SPL and 5527-SPL, finding accused-appellant
Floro B. Barcela (Barcela) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape
committed against AAA,3 and of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault and Violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 and Acts of Lasciviousness, committed against BBB.4
The Facts
Barcela was charged with the following crimes: 1] Qualified Rape, docketed as Crim.
Case No. 5517-SPL; 2] Violation of Article 266-A(2) in relation to R.A. No. 7610,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 5526-SPL; and 3] Violation of R.A. No. 7610 (Acts of
Lasciviousness), docketed as Crim.
Case No. 5527-SPL, in three (3) separate Informations which read:
Crim. Case No. 5517-SPL
That sometime in the year 2002, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
being the stepfather of AAA by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA, a minor, nine
(9) years of age, against her will and to her damage and prejudice.
The crime is qualified by minority and relationship between the offender and
offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case No. 5526-SPL
That on or about November 12, 2004, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
being then the stepfather of BBB, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit sexual assault and/or subject to sexual abuse the latter by
inserting his finger into the genital or private part of the said BBB, a minor, fourteen
(14) years of age, against her will and consent, which act being detrimental to her
normal growth and development.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case No. 5527-SPL
That sometime on 2003 and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousness upon his stepdaughter BBB, a minor, fourteen (14) years of age, by
touching the private part of the said minor, against the latter’s will and consent,
which act is detrimental to the normal growth and development of the said minor
child.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the events was succinctly summarized by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Brief5 as follows:
Private complainants BBB and AAA were living, along with the appellant, their
mother, grandmother and sister in a two-storey house where all of the family
members sleep together in one room in San Pedro, Laguna, because the other
rooms [were] being rented to other people. AAA was seven (7) years old when her
stepfather, appellant Barcela, committed the despicable by sexually abusing her.
She was lying on the floor sleeping one early morning in 2002, when she was
awakened and noticed that her stepfather lifted her clothes and removed her
shorts. Appellant then placed his hand on his organ as AAA lay still with her hands
on the floor shocked by what was happening. Appellant successfully inserted his
penis inside complainant AAA’s vagina. While committing the bestial act, appellant
threatened her not to tell anyone what he was doing to her, otherwise he would kill
her.
Her elder sister BBB also suffered the same horrible fate. On 12 November 2004 at
around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, appellant Barcela made a similar sexual assault
upon BBB who was only fourteen (14) years at that time. It happened while BBB
was sleeping in one room with her stepfather, mother and other sister. Appellant
was lying at her right side. Suddenly, appellant lifted her skirt, removed her
underwear and inserted his finger inside her vagina. After accomplishing the
atrocious act, appellant threatened to kill her if she [would] disclose to anyone
what happened to her. BBB was very afraid because of the threat that she
pretended to be asleep after being raped. On that same night, BBB also saw her
stepfather molesting her sister AAA. BBB also testified that prior to being raped in
2004, appellant had been regularly touching her private organ.
AAA informed her mother, grandmother and her sister BBB of what happened to
her. Sadly, her mother did not believe her but her grandmother and sister BBB (who
also suffered the same fate) believed her. BBB then informed her classmate,
teacher and school principal of the grim experience she and her sister underwent in
the hands of her stepfather. Her grandmother was summoned by the principal and,
together, they reported to the police the rape incidents. In order to protect herself,
AAA stayed at the "Kanlungan" shelter. As a result of the loathsome episode in their
lives, AAA and BBB both felt afraid, ashamed and aggrieved.
Private complainants were eventually examined by Dr. Roy Camarillo, a medico-
legal officer of the Philippine National Police. In his medico-legal report, he
concluded that BBB sustained a shallow healing laceration in her hymen caused by
the insertion of a hard object which may be a penis, finger or a flat hard object. As
regards the examination conducted on AAA, he concluded that there was no
evident injury at the time of the examination but testified that the injury that AAA
incurred may have totally healed as the rape occurred two (2) years from the time
of the examination.6
Version of the Defense
Barcela denied the accusations and alleged the following in his Brief7 to
substantiate his claim of innocence:
Accused Floro B. Barcela is the common law husband of the private complainants’
mother, CCC. They all resided at the two-storey house of CCC’s mother in San
Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna.
On November 12, 2004, the private complainants were sleeping beside their
mother CCC and their half-sister DDD, herein accused-appellant’s daughter with
CCC. He did not rape AAA. Neither did he insert his finger inside BBB’s vagina, nor
threatened either of the two (2) private complainants. He knew of no reason why
the private complainants would accuse him of such crimes charged against him.8
Ruling of the RTC
In its January 6, 2011 Decision, the RTC found Barcela guilty as charged. In its
assessment, the testimonies of AAA and BBB have successfully met the test of
credibility and were found to have been solely motivated by the desire to obtain
justice for the wrong done against them.
The denial proffered by Barcela must then yield to the positive testimonies of the
offended parties. The RTC explained:
The culpability of accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA was clearly established by
private complainants AAA and BBB. In this regard, there is nothing in the records to
show that their testimony was motivated by any other reason other than to bring to
justice the perpetrator of the crimes against them. Indeed, the Court finds that
there is no evidence to show that AAA and BBB were prejudiced against accused
FLORO BUBAN BARCELA that they would impute to him the commission of the
crimes charged if he was not guilty thereof. It must be noted that not only were the
testimony of AAA and BBB convincing and unequivocal, the same were also
backedup by the physical evidence, which is a mute but eloquent manifestation of
truth.9
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment:
1) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape in Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua. In addition, accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA is ORDERED to
pay the victim the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Violation of Article 266-A (2) in relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case No.
5526-SPL and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from
Two (2) years, Four (4) Months and One (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum and to pay the
victim the amounts of ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages
3) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Violation of R.A. No. 7610 (Acts of Lasciviousness) in Criminal Case No.
5527-SPL and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the victim the
amounts of ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.10
Feeling aggrieved, Barcela appealed the RTC judgments of conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s finding of Barcela’s guilt of the crimes
charged. The appellate court lent credence to the testimonies of AAA and BBB,
declaring the same to be credible and sufficient to sustain the conviction. It ruled
that the crime of penile rape committed against AAA and that of rape by sexual
assault committed against BBB were qualified by the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and the relationship between the offender and the
offended party because Barcela was the common-law husband of the victims’
mother. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed RTC
Decision dated January 06, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL (Qualified Rape), Floro Barcela y Buban is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole.
Accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00
as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL (Qualified Sexual Assault in relation to RA 7610),
accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay BBB ₱30,000 as
civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL (Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610),
accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Consistent with the
prevailing jurisprudence, he is ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and to pay BBB
of the amounts of ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱15,000.00 as moral damages and
₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.11
The Issue
Insisting on his innocence, Barcela filed the present appeal and raised this lone
assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE OFFENSES CHARGED ALTHOUGH HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Barcela faults the courts a quo for giving undue faith and credence to the
testimonies of AAA and BBB, contending that the same were laced with
inconsistencies and improbabilities that tainted the veracity of their charges. He
avers that the lack of concrete prosecution evidence showing any unusual behavior
exhibited by AAA and BBB after the alleged commission of the crimes, rendered
said victims’ complaints dubious. Barcela points out that it is incredible that AAA
and BBB would still sleep with him in the same room despite the fact that they had
been previously sexually assaulted by him. He argues that the absence of hymenal
lacerations, healed or otherwise, in the vagina of AAA and the presence of a mere
shallow laceration in the vagina of BBB, together with the inconsistencies in their
testimonies, effectively belied their charges against him.
The Court, however, is not at all swayed by the contentions of Barcela. His
arguments boil down to the credibility of the victims’ testimonies and the weight
and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on the
credibility of witnesses should best be addressed to the trial court because of its
unique position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the
appellate courts.12 The trial judge has the advantage of actually examining both real
and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the
judge’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies and findings of fact are accorded
great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the
reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts
and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings. 13 The rule is even more
stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason
to depart from the findings of the RTC and the CA, together with their respective
calibration of the credibility of the private complainants. AAA and BBB, guileless and
innocent in the ways of the flesh, categorically narrated in detail their ghastly
ordeal in the hands of Barcela. Their respective stories bear the stamp of truth and
candor. There is neither cause nor reason to withhold credence from their
testimonies.
Moreover, Barcela did not establish any ill motive that could have compelled the
private complainants to falsely accuse him of committing the crimes charged. The
failure of Barcela to effectively cite any plausible reason for the private
complainants’ accusations, all the more strengthens the latter’s credibility and the
validity of their charges. Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct
a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself
to public trial or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape and impelled to
seek justice for the wrong done to her.14 The Court finds it hard to believe that AAA
and BBB would fabricate a tale of defilement and make public knowledge that
Barcela robbed them of their virtue and chastity, dragging themselves and their
family to a lifetime of agony and shame, unless motivated by a genuine desire to
obtain redress for the foul deed forced upon them.
Barcela claims that it is incredible that: 1] AAA did not cry out loud when he
allegedly inserted his penis into her tight vagina; 2] BBB just went back to sleep
after he allegedly inserted his finger into her vagina; and 3] private complainants
still opted to sleep next to him despite the incidents. To him, these are contrary to
human nature and could not be the actuations of abused young girls.
The Court is not convinced. Behavioral psychology teaches us that, even among
adults, people react to similar situations differently, and there is no standard form
of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a startling or frightful
experience.15 Let it be underscored that these cases involve victims of tender years,
and with their simple, unsophisticated minds, they must not have fully understood
and realized at first the repercussions of the contemptible nature of the acts
committed against them. This Court has repeatedly stated that no standard form of
behavior could be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement, particularly
a child who could not be expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult.16 At
any rate, it is not inconceivable that the victims continuously slept with Barcela
despite the sexual molestations as it was undisputed that everybody in the victims’
family slept in one room.
The absence of hymenal laceration on AAA and the finding of a shallow vaginal
laceration on BBB are not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The Court has
repeatedly held that the presence of hymenal rapture, vaginal laceration or any
genital injury is not indispensable because the same is not an element of the crime
of rape.17 In the same breath, an intact hymen does not negate the finding that the
victim was raped.18 The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and BBB
cannot exculpate him either. Obviously, the inconsistencies referred to are trivial
and only pertained to inconsequential matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of
rape has been sufficiently proven. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor
matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered
grounds for acquittal.19
In stark contrast to the convincing narration of facts by AAA and BBB are the bare-
faced and shaky defenses of denial and alibi proffered by Barcela. Jurisprudence has
decreed that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
testimony of the complainant and her identification of the accused. 20 Alibi is an
inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily be
fabricated.21 Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.22 Here, not a shred of
competent proof was adduced by Barcela to corroborate his denial and alibi as they
are only supported by his self-serving testimony. Hence, they do not merit any
evidentiary value.
The Court will now determine the specific crimes committed by Barcela with the
corresponding penalties to be imposed and the appropriate damages to be
awarded.
Criminal Case Nos. 5517-SPL and 5526-SPL
The statutory provisions relevant to the present review are Article 266-A and Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which state:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation; xxx
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxxx
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision
mayor.
xxxx
Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the
ten aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article. (Emphases
supplied)
To sustain a conviction for qualified rape, the following elements must concur: a)
the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; b) the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and c)
the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or
intimidation; or when she was deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or
by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.23
In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, the prosecution proved that AAA was only 7 years
old when the penile rape was committed in 2002. Her birth certificate showed that
she was born on September 24, 1994. The prosecution was also able to establish
the fact of sexual intercourse between Barcela and AAA. The Court notes that AAA
told her story by words and demonstrations using male and female dolls. AAA
recounted that while she was lying on the floor of their house, Barcela lifted her
clothes and removed her shorts; that he inserted his penis into her vagina; that she
felt pain; and that he warned her not to tell the incident to anyone, otherwise, he
would kill her. The straightforward narration of AAA of what transpired, and her
categorical identification of Barcela as the malefactor, sealed the case for the
prosecution.
In the crime of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender is a special qualifying circumstance and raises the
penalty to the supreme penalty of death. It is essential that this circumstance must
be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and must be proved
conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be
considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua.24
The aforesaid qualifying circumstance, however, could not be appreciated in
Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL. To begin with, AAA was under 12 years old (only 7
years old) when she was raped in 2002. More importantly, the prosecution failed to
prove the allegation in the information that Barcela was the step-father of AAA at
the time of the commission of the crime. It bears stressing that a stepfather-
stepdaughter relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship, which in this case
is the valid marriage between Barcela and the natural mother of AAA (also of BBB),
and the best evidence to prove the same is the marriage contract. 25 Nowhere in the
record, though, does it show that such certificate of marriage was submitted in
evidence by the prosecution. In People v. Manggasin,26 the Court held that the
qualifying circumstance was not proved because there was no proof of the
allegation that the accused-appellant was the stepfather of the complainant as the
evidence showed that he was not married to the complainant’s mother.
Being regarded as the "tatay," Barcela had gained such moral ascendancy over AAA
and BBB that any resistance normally expected from girls their age could not have
been put up by them. His moral ascendancy and influence over them substituted
for actual physical violence and intimidation as an element of rape. This made them
easy prey for his sexual advances. Barcela’s moral and physical dominion of AAA
and BBB are sufficient to cow them into submission to his beastly desires. No
further proof is needed to show lack of consent of the victims to their own
defilement. Further, record shows that threat and intimidation were indeed
employed by Barcela to consummate the purpose which he had in mind. The threat
of death he communicated to AAA and BBB produced fear in their minds which
made them yield to his bestial demands. In any event, the prosecution need not
prove that Barcela employed force, threat or intimidation against AAA because rape
is committed when the offender had carnal knowledge of the offended party who is
under 12 years of age.
The Court likewise finds convincing the testimony of BBB, which clearly established
that at around 3:00 A.M. of November 12, 2004, she was awakened when Barcela,
who was then sleeping next to her, lifted her skirt, removed her panty and,
thereafter, inserted his finger into her vagina; and that she suffered pain during the
insertion but could not shout for fear that Barcela would kill her. The Court notes
that she consistently and without hesitation pointed to Barcela as the person who
sexually molested her. The prosecution also established that she was only 14 years
old when she was sexually molested as evidenced by her birth certificate.
Taken in this light, the Court affirms Barcela’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 5526-
SPL of rape by sexual assault under Art. 266- A, par. 2 of the RPC, but not in its
qualified form. The special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
were likewise not present. While the minority of BBB was duly proven, the
allegation of stepfather-stepdaughter relationship was not established.
Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common-law spouse or
live-in partner of the mother of victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not alter the
crimes in their qualified form inasmuch as the two separate informations did not
specifically allege such relationship as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he
would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against
him.27 The relationship alleged in the informations is different from that actually
proven. Verily, the CA erred in convicting Barcela of qualified rape in Criminal Case
No. 5517-SPL and qualified rape by sexual assault in Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL.
There being no qualifying circumstance attendant to the commission of rape in
Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, Barcela should be convicted of simple statutory rape
and should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of damages should
also be modified in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 28 AAA is thus awarded the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL, Barcela should be convicted with simple rape by
sexual assault, instead with the penalty of prision mayor as provided in Art. 266-B
par. 7 of the RPC. Considering that there was neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to
Article 64(l)29 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Barcela should
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is prision
correccional (6 months and 1 to 6 years) and the maximum of which is within the
range of prision mayor, in its medium period (8 years and 1 day to 10 years). More
specifically, the Court imposes the penalty ranging from five (5) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. The
Court sustains the CA in awarding ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as
moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages being consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence.30
Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL
The Court also upholds Barcela’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL of Acts of
Lasciviousness committed against a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: x x x. (Italics
supplied)
The elements of sexual abuse under the above provision are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.31
Here, it was proven with certitude that Barcela had repeatedly molested BBB by
regularly touching her vagina since 2003 when she was still in Grade III. This act is
covered by the definition of "lascivious conduct" under Section 2 (h) of the Rules
and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
promulgated to implement R.A. No. 7610:
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether
of the same or opposite sex, with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or private area of a person.
The circumstance of relationship, Barcela being the common-law husband of BBB’s
mother, cannot be considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance to increase
the imposable penalty. While it is true that the alternative circumstance of
relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity 32 (such as Acts of
Lasciviousness), regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower
degree of the offended party, it is only taken into consideration under Article 15 of
the Revised Penal Code "when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity
in the same degree of the offender." The relationship between Barcela and BBB is
not covered by any of the relationships mentioned.1âwphi1
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance is present, the penalty
should be imposed in its medium period.33 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, Barcela should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of
which is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period (8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months) and the maximum of which is
within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua,
in its medium period (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years). Thus, the CA is
correct in imposing the penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.1âwphi1 Likewise, the award of ₱20,000 as civil indemnity; ₱15,000.00 as
moral damages; ₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the fine of ₱15,000.00, are
proper.34
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the March 19, 2013 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04961, which should read:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, finding accused-appellant Floro Buban Barcela
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Statutory Rape under
subparagraph ( d) of Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
to pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.0 ) as civil indemnity; Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL, finding accused-appellant Floro Buban Barcela
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape by Sexual Assault
under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the Court
sentences him to suffer the penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay AAA in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as civil indemnity; Thirty Thousand
Pesos (₱30,000.00) as moral damages; and Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL, finding the accused-appellant Floro Buban Barcela
GUILTY of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to R.A. No. 7610, the Court
1 sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and !one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay the amount of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (Pl5,000.00) as fine; and to pay BBB the amounts of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(₱15,000.00) as moral damages; and ₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages, consistent
with prevailing jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188710 June 2, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MATIMANAY WATAMAMA a.k.a. AKMAD SALIPADA, Accused-Appellant,
TENG MIDTIMBANG (at large), Accused.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated 30 January 2009 in
CA-G.R. CRHC No. 00133, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated 9
June 2005 issued by the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch
22, finding accused-appellant Matimanay Watamama a.k.a. Akmad Salipada guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of Aoubakar Calim
(Calim).
FACTS
Appellant and his co-accused Teng Midtimbang were charged under an
Information3 for murder docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-06. Upon arraignment,
appellant pleaded not guilty. Based on the records, Midtimbang remained at large
as of the date of promulgation of the RTC Decision.4
The evidence for the prosecution established the following: Around eight in the
morning on 26 October 1998, Francisco Arobo, Jr. (Arobo), Calim, and five other
farmers were at the farm of Ali Samad (Samad) located in Sitio Matingao, Malapag,
Carmen, Cotabato. They were ploughing the unplanted area, while Samad was
tending his corn plants. Arobo was five meters ahead of Calimwhen the former
heard gunfire coming from behind. Arobo immediately looked to the rear and saw
Midtimbang and appellant firing gar and rifles at Calim, who was then slumped near
his plow. Midtimbang and appellant were positioned ten (10) meters apart and five
meters obliquely behind Calim. Because of the successive gunshots, Arobo and the
rest of their group scampered to take cover in the shrubbery, while Samad ran
towards the nipa hut at the other side of the farm where his children were
staying.5 Appellant and Midtimbang also fired at Samad, but he was not hit.
Thereafter, the two fled. Samad then reported the incident to a barangay kagawad.6
The postmortem examination by the local municipal health officer showed that
Calim sustained multiple gunshot wounds in the head, chest, right and left thighs,
and right elbow.7
The version of the defense was that appellant was simply mistaken for Teng
Midtimbang because of their physical and facial resemblances. Appellant claimed
that his real namewas Akmad Salipada, not Matimanay Watamama.8Allegedly, on
that fateful morning of 26 October 1998, he was at their house in Sitio Maitum,
Malapag, Carmen, Cotabato. He had just eaten breakfast with his wife,
GuianilaSalipada (Guianila), when they heard seven gunshots. Guianila peeped
through their window and, after a while, Teng Midtimbang and Ali Sampo
Midtimbang passed by their house. The two were carrying rifles. Guianila asked
them where they had come from, and they supposedly told her that they came
from the house of Calim and that they shot him because he had stolen a carabao.
After appellant was criminally charged with the killing of Calim, Guianila allegedly
saw a letter from the wife of Teng Midtimbang addressed to Atty. Tabosares,
appellant’s counsel.9
Zaid Tayuan (Tayuan), a detention prisoner, also testified for the defense. The gist
of his testimony was that he had witnessed the Midtimbang brothers kill Calim, and
that appellant was nowhere in the vicinity of the crime. Tayuan claimed that he
easily recognized them because they were comrades in the Moro National
Liberation Front. Tayuan further said that when the incident happened, he was
resting at his farm in Sitio Maitum, which was just adjacent to Samad’s farm in Sitio
Matingao. He claimed that he was about six meters from the Midtimbang brothers
when they shot Calim to death.10 On cross-examination, however, Tayuan admitted
that Sitio Maitum was about fivekilometers away from Sitio Matingao, and that
their common boundary was a mountain.11
RULING OF THE RTC
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Calim in the amount of ₱50,000.
The RTC noted that if indeed appellant was not acquainted with his co-accused, he
would not have known that they looked alike. Thus, his defense of mistaken identity
was belied by his own testimony and, more important by the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses positively identifying him as one of Calim’s assailants.
Moreover, the trial court ruled that evident premeditation and treachery attended
the commission of the crime, as the evidence showed that the assailants had
planned to kill Calim, a known cattle rustler, and that their attack was so sudden
that it foreclosed any defense by the victim.12
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds and so holds that [the] prosecution was able to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accused Matimanay Watamama
(Akmad Salipada) is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
defined and penalize[d] under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Without
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending to the commission of the crime
accused Matimanay Watamama (Akmad Salipada) is directed to serve the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and its accessories [sic] penalties. The detention of
Matimanay Watamama from May 17, 1999 is counted in full in his favor.
Accused Matimanay Watamama is directed to indemnify the heirs of Abubakar
Kalim the amount of ₱50,000.00. Let Warrant of Arrest be issued against Teng
Midtimbang with no amount of bail fixed.
SO ORDERED.13
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Appellant filed an appeal14 raising the following errors: (1) he was convicted even if
the prosecution had failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the
trial court erroneously disregarded his and Tayuan’s testimonies and, thus, it
wrongly concluded that appellant was Matimanay Watamama.15
The CA affirmed appellant’s conviction for the crime of murder in view of the
presence of treachery but ruled that evident premeditation was not sufficiently
proven by the prosecution. It modified the damages awarded by the RTC and ruled
that appellant should also be made to pay ₱50,000 as moral damages in addition to
the civil indemnity that the trial court had awarded to the heirs of Calim. 16
The CA sustained the RTC’s appreciation of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in relation to appellant’s denial and Tayuan’s assertions. It held that
appellant’s defense of mistaken identity was lame compared to the positive and
categorical testimonies of the two eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution.
Moreover, it ruled that the prosecution’s failure to prove that the real name of
appellant was Matimanay Watamama was not crucial, since he was positively
identified by eyewitnesses. On the other hand, it found the version of Tayuan
incredible, given that his farm was five kilometers away from the farm of Samad,
and that the common boundary of their farms was a mountainous area. It also ruled
that the letter from the wife of Teng Midtimbang, in which Ali Sampo Midtimbang
allegedly owned up to the killing of Calim, was hearsay and self-serving and, hence,
inadmissible.17
The CA, however, overturned the trial court’s finding that there was evident
premeditation. It found no evidence showing when the accused decided to commit
the crime; whether they clung to their determination to commit the crime; and
whether a sufficient period of time had lapsed from the time they decided to
commit the crime until they carried it out, thus giving them enough opportunity to
reflect upon the consequences of their intended act.18
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision convicting appellant for Murder and imposing on him the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that in
addition to the amount of ₱50,000.00 the accused is ordered to pay the heirs of
Abubakar Calim as Civil Indemnity, he is ordered to pay them the amount of
₱50,000.00 as Moral Damages.
SO ORDERED.19
Without filing a motion for reconsideration with the CA, appellant filed the instant
appeal.20 The Court directed the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs.21 Both manifested that they were dispensing with the filing thereof, since
they had exhaustively discussed their arguments in their respective briefs filed with
the CA.22
ISSUE
The ultimate issue presented for the resolution of this Court is whether respondent
was correctly convicted of the crime of murder.
In his Brief,23 appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt his participation in the killing of Calim. He maintained that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses placing him at the scene of crime were
mere conjectures, which did not amount to positive identification. He pointed out
that both witnesses admitted that they ran to take cover after seeing the shooting
incident. Therefore, their testimonies were unreliable, since they were based on
perceptions that were tainted with fear and tension. He also argued that the
fallibility of the witnesses’ supposed positive identification of him was heightened
by the defense evidence proving that he and Midtimbang looked alike, but that the
trial court erroneously disregarded that evidence. Moreover, he maintained that
the prosecution failed to establish treachery and evident premeditation, since none
of its witnesses testified on how the attack on Calim commenced and in what
mode.24
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Brief, 25 maintained that the fact that
the prosecution witnesses did not see the precise moment when Calim was shot to
death did not create any doubt as to the appellant’s identity as one of the
assailants. The OSG also maintained that the prosecution sufficiently established
treachery, since the witnesses’ testimonies clearly showed that Calim was
engrossed in farm work when appellant and Midtimbang attacked him. 26
OUR RULING
We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, rather than murder,
as the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish treachery in the killing of Calim.
The factual findings of the trial court, as well as its calibration of the witnesses’
testimonies and its conclusions, are accorded by this Court with high respect –
especially so if the same are affirmed by the CA.27 An exception to this rule is when,
as in this case, there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has
been ignored or misconstrued by the court.28
For the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove the following: (1)
the offender killed the victim, and (2) the killing was done through treachery, or by
any of the five other qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the
Information.29 There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons by employing means, methods or forms that tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the
defense that the offended party might make. The mere suddenness of the attack
does not amount to treachery. The essence of treachery is that the attack is
deliberate and without warning and is done in a swift and unexpected way,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no chance to resist or
escape. Thus, even frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and
unexpected and the victim is unarmed.30
Appellant argues that treachery cannot be appreciated in this case, because no
evidence was presented showing how the attack commenced. The OSG, on the
other hand, claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed that
appellant and Midtimbang managed to sneak up on Calim and position themselves
behind him to avoid risk of any retaliation. In fact, according to the OSG, the attack
was so sudden and fast that neither Calim nor the others present even noticed the
arrival of the assailants.31
We agree with appellant.
For treachery to be considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at
the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the killing
began, the perpetration of an attack with treachery cannot be presumed. 32 A case
in point is People v. Rapanut,33 in which this Court ruled out treachery as the
eyewitness saw the accused only after the initial sound of gunshots, as obtained in
this case. Circumstances that qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere
conjecture, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of
unquestionable existence. These circumstances must be proved as indubitably as
the crime itself.34
We cannot simply assume that at its inception, Calim was unable to parry the
attack, as he was caught unaware. Both Arobo and Samad admitted that they did
not see how the attack commenced, and that it was the initial gunfire that caught
their attention. Thus, it cannot be said with certainty that the victim was engrossed
in his farm work when he was initially attacked.
Neither can we conclusively say that there was no chance or opportunity for Calim
to defend himself from aggression.
However, we are not persuaded by appellant’s theory of mistaken
identity.1âwphi1 Notably, he did not object to the Information, which identified
him as "Matimanay Watamama" when he entered his plea.35
Witnesses need not know the names of the assailants, as long as they recognize the
latter’s faces. What is imperative is that, on the basis of their personal knowledge,
the witnesses are positive as to the physical identification of the perpetrators, as
obtained in this case.36
Thus, it was sufficient that Arobo and Samad were able to identify respondent in
the crime scene and when they took the witness stand.37
Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses varied on few points. The
inconsistencies in their accounts were minor, and did not make their identification
of appellant any less credible. Arobo stated that Midtimbang was obliquely behind
Calim,38 whereas Samad claimed that

Midtimbang shot the victim from the front.39 Still, both Arobo and Samad
categorically stated that appellant was positioned behind Calim. Moreover, the
location of Calim’s wounds, as found by the examining physician, corroborated their
description of appellant’s position in relation to the victim.

In the light of the positive identification by both witnesses, the alibi of appellant
must fail.40

Besides, he was not able to prove that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime when it happened. It appears, rather, that he lived
near Samad’s farm, and that he was at his house when the crime was committed.
Thus, we are constrained to reject his alibi.

Without evident premeditation, and without any evidence to appreciate the

aggravating circumstance of treachery in the killing of Calim, respondent can only
be held liable as principal for the crime of homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the 30 January 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00133 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant Matimanay
Watamama a.k.a. Akmad Salipada is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of
prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201858 June 4, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JENNY LIKIRAN alias "Loloy", Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Branch 8, for the death of Rolando
Sareno, Sr. (Sareno ). In its Decision1 dated July 17, 2006, the RTC disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder
and imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of [P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity; [P]50,000.00 moral damages;
[P]30,000.00 actual damages, and [P]10,000.00 attorney's fee and to pay the costs.
This court has no jurisdiction over Jerome alias Caro Likiran as he is not impleaded
in the information.
SO ORDERED.2
The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March
19, 2000 in BarangayBugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town
fiesta and a dance was being held at the basketball court. Prosecution witnesses
Celso Dagangon (Dagangon), Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio
Goloceno (Goloceno) testified that on said night, they were at the dance together
with Sareno at around 8:00 p.m. After a few hours, while Mercado and Goloceno
were inside the dance area, Jerome Likiran3 (Jerome), the accused-appellant’s
brother, punched Mercado on the mouth. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado
when he saw that Jerome was armed with a short firearm while the accused-
appellant was holding a hunting knife, so he backed off. Dagangon and Sareno, who
were outside the dance area, heard the commotion. Afterwards, Jerome
approached Sareno and shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-
appellant stabbed him on the back. It was Dagangon who saw the incident first-
hand as he was only three meters from where Sareno was. Dagangon was able to
bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but
Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno suffered multiple gunshot wounds
and a stab wound at the left scapular area.4
The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he
admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion
happened. Heand Jerome stayed within the area where the sound machine was
located and they only heard the gunshots outside. Other witnesses testified in the
accused-appellant’s defense, with Edgar Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing
incident and that it was some other unknown person, and not the accused-
appellant, who was the culprit; and Eleuterio Quiñopa stating that he was with the
accused-appellant and Jerome inside the dance hall at the time the commotion
occurred.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant’s
culpability.5 Prosecution witness Dagangon’s positive identification of the accused-
appellant was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of
murder.6 The RTC also rejected the accused-appellant’s defense of denial as it was
not supported by evidence. It also ruled that alibi cannot favor the accused-
appellant since he failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime on the night of March 19, 2000.7
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto per assailed
Decision8 dated July 27, 2011, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 10439-00
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the accused-
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime. The CA, nevertheless, deviated
from the RTC’s conclusion that there was conspiracy between Jerome and the
accused-appellant, and that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of
the crime. According to the CA, the information failed to contain the allegation of
conspiracy, and the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish that Jerome and
the accused-appellant ganged up on the victim.10
The CA, however, sustained the RTC’s finding of treachery.11
The accused-appellant protested his conviction.12 According to him, the prosecution
failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accused-
appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the assailant
and his culpability.13
Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, including their assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses. Factual findings of the trial court are, except for
compelling or exceptional reasons, conclusive to the Court especially when fully
supported by evidence and affirmed by the CA.14
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity
of the criminal.15In this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime has been adequately established by the prosecution,
more particularly by the testimony of Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the
accused-appellant’s argument that it was impossible for Dagangon to see the
assailant considering that there was no evidence to show that the place where the
crime occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only three meters
away from the accused-appellant and Jerome and had a good view of them.
Moreover, there was no distraction that could have disrupted Dagangon’s
attention. He even immediately identified the accused-appellant and Jerome during
police investigation, and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the
police beforehand that the accused-appellant was one of the suspects.16 Positive
identification by a prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of
the crime is entitled to greater weight than alibi and denial.17 Such positive
identification gains further ground in the absence of any ill motive on the part of a
witness to falsely testify against an accused.18
The accused-appellant also asserted that the information charged him of murder
committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing
his instantaneous death.19 The accused-appellant argued that the evidence on
record established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other person. 20 At this
juncture, the Court notes that the testimony of Dagangon, indeed, identified two
assailants – the accused-appellant and his brother, Jerome; however, it was only
the accused-appellant who was charged with the death of Sareno. Defense
witnesses also testified that Jerome died on March 12, 2005.21
The CA disregarded the accused-appellant’s contention and ruled that "the cause of
death was not made an issue in the court a quo" and the Certificate of Death was
admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of
death.22 And even assuming that the cause of death was an issue, the CA still held
the accused-appellant liable for the death of Sareno on the basis of the Court’s
ruling in People v. Pilola.23
The Court reviewed the records of this case and finds sufficient basis for the CA’s
disregard of the accused-appellant’s argument.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated
upon and admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of
Death issued by Dr. Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and
reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of
fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area."24 Stipulation of
facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used
against the accused.25 In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was
signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be
admitted given that the defense failed to object to its admission. 26 Moreover, a
death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the regular performance of
his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim. 27 Note that the
certificate of death issued by Dr. Dael provides the following:
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate cause : DOA
Antecedent cause : Multiple GSW
Underlying cause : Stab wound scapular area (L)28
The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause of
death.29
More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and
logical consequence resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was
not the shooter, it is nevertheless true that the stab wound he inflicted on Sareno
contributed to the latter’s death. In Quinto v. Andres, 30 the Court stated that:
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter
its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in
producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the
victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the
victim. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away
from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. x x x[.]31 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
The Court, however, cannot agree with the RTC and CA’s conclusion that the killing
of Sareno was attended by treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.
Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements
are shown: a) the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution
affording the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b)
the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted by the offender.32 Treachery is not present when the killing is not
premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately
adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a
result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of
the moment.33
In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact that the
shooting and stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of the moment incident, a
result of the brawl that happened during the barrio dance. The prosecution failed to
show that the accused-appellant and his brother Jerome deliberately planned the
means by which they would harm Sareno. In fact, what was revealed by the
prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an innocent bystander who
unfortunately became a target of the accused-appellant and Jerome’s rampage.
Consequently, the accused-appellant should be liable only for the lesser crime of
Homicide.
In convictions for homicide, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes
the penalty of reclusion temporal, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years.34 In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period,35 or from fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,36 the maximum of the penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant shall be within the range of reclusion temporal
medium,37 and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the RPC for the offense,38 or prision mayor in any of its periods,
which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.39 There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the Court thereby sentences the
accused-appellant to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
With regard to the damages awarded, the Court affirms the award of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00)
moral damages, as these are in accord with the Court's judicial policy on the
matter.40 These, on top of the Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) actual damages
and Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA. Further, the monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of
six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.41
The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's fees awarded by the RTC as there is
nothing on record proving that the heirs of Sareno actually incurred such expense.
Attorney's fees are in the concept of actual or compensatory damages allowed
under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code,42 and absent
any evidence supporting its grant, the same must be deleted for lack of factual
basis.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00484 is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy"
is hereby found guilty of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE, and is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty often (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum. Further, the award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED.
Interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the
damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
In all other respects, the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181843 July 14, 2014
MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the
safety of the accused from the defensive acts of the victim. Unexpectedness of the
attack does not always equate to treachery.
We are asked to decide on a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Court of
Appeals' decision2 dated November 20, 2007 and the Court of Appeals’
resolution3 dated February 18, 2008. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional
Trial Court’s decision4 dated July 2, 2004 that found petitioner guilty of two (2)
counts of frustrated murder and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to 17
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporalas maximum for each count. 5
This case arose out of two (2) informations for frustrated murder filed against
petitioner:
Criminal Case No. Q-00-91821
That on or about the 20th day of April 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and by means of treachery,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attackand assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one GERARDO NAVAL by then and
there stabbing the latter with a sharp bladed weapon hitting him at the left back
portion of his body, thereby inflicting upon said offended party physical injuries
which are necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said
GERARDO NAVAL which save his life, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.6
Criminal Case No. Q-00-91842
That on or about the 20 th day of April 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and by means of treachery,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attackand assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one ROMEO AUSTRIA by then and
there stabbing the latter with a sharp bladed weapon hitting him at the left back
portion of his body, thereby inflicting upon said offended party physical injuries
which are necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said
ROMEO AUSTRIA which save his life, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.7
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleadednot guilty to the offenses charged against
him.8
The prosecution presented private complainants Gerardo Naval and Romeo Austria
as witnesses.9 It also presented Dr. Raisa D. Francisco, Carlos Angeles, and Arnold
Angeles as witnesses.10 Petitioner testified for the defense.11
Facts according to the prosecution
Romeo Austria testified that at around 8:30 a.m. on April 20, 2000, he was playing a
lucky nine game ata wake on Araneta Avenue, Quezon City.12 Miguel arrived, asking
money from Austria so he could buy liquor.13 In response, Austria asked Miguel "to
keep quiet."14 Gerardo Naval "arrived and asked [Austria] to go home."15 There was
an exchange of words between Naval and Miguel.16 Austria "stood up [and] felt that
he was stabbed."17 As he ran home, he noticedMiguel "armed with a knife,"18 this
time chasing Naval.19 Austria was "hospitalized . . . and was . . . confined for more
than a month."20 He spent around ₱110,000.00 for his hospitalization.21 On cross-
examination, Austria testified that he saw Miguel attempt to stab him again. 22
Gerardo Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go
home.23 After he and Miguel had an exchange of words, he "felt a hard blow on his
back."24 Naval retaliated.25 However, he ran away when he saw Miguel holding a
knife.26 Miguel chased Naval who fell on the ground.27 When Naval saw that Miguel
was "about to stab him again, he hit [Miguel] with a bench"28 and left him lying on
the ground, unable to stand.29 According to Naval, "he did not see the [knife] land
on his back."30 Naval was also confined at the hospital but only for six (6) days. 31
Dr. Carlos Angeles testified that "he treated [Austria] for [the] stab wound at [his]
back."32 He declared that Austria could have died without an emergency
operation.33 According to him, "a long and sharp instrument, probably a
knife,"34 could have been used to stab the victim.35 Dr. Arnold Angeles, Naval’s
doctor, testified that "continuous blood loss" 36 could have caused Naval’s death.37
Facts according to the defense
Miguel testified that he saw private complainants at a wake.38 Naval tapped his
back and asked, "Anong problema mo?" to which he answered, "Wala
naman."39 Thereafter, Naval punched Miguel.40 As he was about to stand up, he was
hit by a hard objecton his head, causing him to lose consciousness. 41 He was
brought to UERM Memorial Hospital where Naval identified him.42 He was then
brought to Station 11 in Galas, Quezon City.43 Miguel also testified that only Naval
identified him at the hospital.44
The parties stipulated that Dr. Renan Acosta, supposedly the second defense
witness, conducted Miguel’s examination.45 He issued a temporary medical
certificate and a separate permanent medical certificate. 46
Regional Trial Court
In its decision, the Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of frustrated murder. 47 He was sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayoras minimum, to 17 years and four (4) months of reclusion temporalas
maximum for each count.48 Petitioner was ordered to indemnify Austria ₱25,000.00
as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as actual damages; and Naval ₱25,000.00
asmoral damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate or moderate damages. 49
Petitioner was also ordered to pay the costs of suit.50 The dispositive portion of the
Regional
Trial Court decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Re: Criminal Case No. 00-91841-finding accused MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder hereby sentencing him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Six (6) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor as MINIMUM to Seventeen (17)Years and Four (4) months of
Reclusion Temporal as MAXIMUM and to indemnify private complainant Gerardo
Naval in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (₱25,000.00) Pesos as and by way of
morals [sic] damages and in the absence of evidence, the amount of Ten Thousand
(₱10,000.00) Pesos as and by way [of] Temperate or moderate damages;
2. Re: Criminal Case NO. 00-91841-finding accused MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, hereby sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty [of] Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as MINIMUM to Seventeen (17)years and four (4) months of Reclusion
Temporal as MAXIMUM and to indemnify private complainant Romeo Austria in the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand (₱25,000.00) Pesos as and by way of moral
damages and the amount of One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as actual
damages.
3. To pay the cost of suit.51 (Emphasis in the original)
The Regional Trial Court found thatpetitioner caused the stab wounds of private
complainants.52 Naval and Austria were able to positively identify him and describe
how they obtained their injuries.53
Petitioner’s acts were not attended by evident premeditation as ruled by the trial
court.54 However, there was treachery on petitioner’s end, considering the length of
time it took private complainants to realize that they were stabbed. 55 This,
according to the Regional Trial Court, was a method or form that tended to insure
the execution of an act without risk from the offended party’s defense. 56
Petitioner appealed57 the Regional Trial Court’s July 2, 2004 decision to the Court of
Appeals, raising as issue the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and, hence,
the correctness of his conviction.58
Court of Appeals
In a decision59 promulgated on November 20, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by petitioner’s arguments pointing to
alleged inconsistencies inthe prosecution witnesses’ narratives. It found that the
inconsistency between Naval’s testimony and his sworn affidavit on the number of
times petitioner was hit might be attributed to the fact that "the statement was
taken . . . while he was [still at] the hospital [unable] to fully understand its
contents".60 The Court of Appeals was not persuaded either by petitioner’s
argument that Austria and Naval failed to testify that they saw him stab them.61 The
Court of Appeals held that "no other person could have committed the crime" 62 as
"all the circumstances point to [petitioner] as the author of the crime."63
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court that there was treachery
in this case because"the attack was so sudden and unexpected"64 that "self-defense
was not possible."65
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals’
resolution66 promulgated on February 18, 2008.
Petitioner, in this case, raises the following issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL
WHICH IN EFFECT, AFFIRMS THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION RENDERED BY THE
TRIAL COURT, DESPITE THE PATENT LACK OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER
AND FOR THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE PETITIONER’S GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.67
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the inconsistencies in
Austria’s and Naval’s statements.68 Austria’s statement that only Naval and
petitioner were standing behind him was inconsistent with Austria’s other
statement that "petitioner was on his left side, while [Naval] was on his right
side."69
Petitioner also stresses that Austria’s claim that Naval and petitioner "were still
having an altercation when he suddenly felt a stab blow at his back"70 was
inconsistent with Naval’s alleged failure to mention "that he had an altercation with
the petitioner before the stabbing incident."71 Petitioner claims that it was not
possible for him to have stabbed Austria without Naval noticing since he was having
a heatedexchange of words with Naval.72
Petitioner insists that the claim that "petitioner was armed with a knife"73 was not
proven since "the knife was not recovered."74 Petitioner was left immobile, yet
"nobody bothered to retrieve the knife" 75 he supposedly used in committing the
crimes charged against him.76 Petitioner also points out that other players in the
lucky nine game might have gotten mad at private complainants when Naval
allegedly asked Austria to go home for a drinking spree.77
Petitioner also argues that there was no treachery.78 Even assuming that an assault
was sudden and unexpected, there must be "evidence that [the] mode of assault
was consciously and deliberately adopted to [e]nsure the execution of the crime
without risk to the [petitioner.]"79 Given "private complainants’ superiority in
number"80 and considering that petitioner "was left behind unconscious,"81 private
complainants were not left without "opportunity to retaliate."82
Respondent counters that the "trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve
great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the
recordsome fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which . . . would alter the result
of the case."83
Private complainants point out that the circumstances of the case show treachery
since they were attacked from behind.84 Further, they claim that there was no
warning that they were in danger when they were stabbed. 85
The petition should be partly granted. Treachery did not exist and, hence, petitioner
may only be convicted of two counts of frustrated homicide.
I
Nonetheless, we affirm the findingthat the prosecution’s witnesses were credible.
Petitioner points to alleged inconsistencies that pertain only to collateral and
inconsequential matters. He directs this court’s attention to inconsistent
statements regarding the positions of private complainants at the time of the
incident.86 He also points to the alleged impossibility of him committing the offense
without being noticed by Naval87and to the alleged failure to recover the knife used
in stabbing private complainants.88
These alleged inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, specially with respect to the "principal occurrence and
positive identification"89 of petitioner. Slight inconsistencies in the testimony even
strengthen credibility as they show that the "testimony [was] not
rehearsed."90 What is important is that there is consistency as to the occurrence
and identity of the perpetrator.91
Further, the alleged failure to retrieve the knife supposed to have been used in
perpetrating the offense does not destroy the credibility of the testimonies. 92 The
crime is proved not by presenting the object but by establishing the existence of the
elements of the crime as written in law.93
II
Petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
with two counts of frustrated murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that murder is committed by a
person who kills, under certain circumstances, another person that is not his or her
father, mother, child, ascendant, descendant, or spouse. It provides:
ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusión
temporalin its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage ofsuperior strength, with the aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or
of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other
public calamity. 5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
If these qualifying circumstances are not present or cannot be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused may only be convicted with homicide, defined in
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another withoutthe attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and
be punished by reclusión temporal.
In murder or homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill. If there is no intent
to kill on the part ofthe offender, he or she is liable only for physical injuries. 94
"[I]ntent to kill . . . must beproved by clear and convincing evidence."95 "[It] should
not be drawn inthe absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond
reasonable doubt."96
In Escamilla v. People,97 we said that "[t]he evidence to prove intent to kill may
consist of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of,
orimmediately after the killing of the victim."98
The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender "perform[s] all the acts of
execution which [c]ould produce the [crime]"99 but did not produce it for reasons
independent of his or her will.
In convicting petitioner offrustrated murder, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that petitioner intentionally tried to kill private complainants. He
was the author ofthe stab wounds obtained by private complainants. However, for
reasons independent of his will, he was unable to fully execute the crime.
This court held that "findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are
matters best left to the trial court,"100 which is in the best position to observe the
witnesses’ demeanor while being examined in court.101 This court gives more
weight tosuch findings if affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 102 The exception to the
ruleis when the trial court misconstrued facts which if properly appreciated could
alter the outcome of the case.103
We find that there is nothing in the circumstances of this case that warrants the
application of the exception, with respect to the findings that: 1) there was intent
to kill; 2) petitioner was the willful author of the stab wounds, which almost killed
private complainants; and that 3) petitioner’s failure to kill private complainants
was a result of circumstances independent of his will. Circumstantial evidence was
used to identify the perpetrator in this case. 104
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules ofCourt provides that a person may be convicted
based on circumstantial evidence if the requisites are present. It provides:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.— Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
This court iterated this rule in Trinidad v. People:105
The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstance es is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 106
In this case, the following facts were considered:
1) Petitioner was identified by private complainants to be at the scene of the
crime;107
2) Private complainants were able todescribe how they obtained their injuries; 108
3) Petitioner was seen holding the knife at the scene of the crime;109
4) Only three persons were involved in the incident — private complainants and
petitioner;110
5) Petitioner "was standing very close to the private complainants";111
6) Petitioner was the only one who had an altercation with private
complainants,112 and petitioner was seen chasing and about to stab at least one of
the private complainants;113
7) Private complainants sustained stab wounds;114
8) The stab wounds sustained by private complainants would have been fatal had it
not been given appropriate medical attention.115
The combination of these circumstances "constitute[s] an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the [petitioner], to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person."116
The version offered by petitioner that it was he who was punched and hit with a
hard object117 is not inconsistent with the facts as stated by private complainants. It
may even be true. However, it does not remove such reasonable conclusion that he
was the author of the acts complained about in this case.
Petitioner’s intent to kill is evident from his attempt to stab private complainants
more than once.118 Petitioner chased private complainants after they had tried to
flee from him.119 The wounds inflicted by petitioner were also shown to have been
fatal if no medical attention had been given to private complainants immediately
after the incident.120
Petitioner’s acts did not result in private complainants’ deaths despite petitioner
having already performed all acts of execution of the crime. However, this was not
due to his desistance but due to the timely medical attention given to private
complainants.121
Meanwhile, Dr. Carlos Angeles’ and Dr. Arnold Angeles’ testimonies that private
complainants would have died had no immediate medical attention been given to
them,122 showed that petitioner’s failure to kill private complainants was due toacts
independent of his will.
Based on the foregoing, we do not find reason to disturb the trial court’s and the
Court of Appeals’ findings.
III
However, treachery, as a qualifying circumstance to sustain a conviction of
frustrated murder rather than frustrated homicide, was not proven by the
prosecution.
Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery:
ARTICLE 14. Aggravating Circumstances. — The following are aggravating
circumstances:
....
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.123
The requisites of treachery are:
(1) [T]he employment of means,method, or manner of execution which will ensure
the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the
victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to
retaliate;124 and
(2) [D]eliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of
execution.125
A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on "clear and convincing
evidence."126 Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. 127 Its
existence "cannot be presumed."128 As with the finding of guilt of the accused,
"[a]ny doubt as to [its] existence . . . [should] be resolved in favor of the
accused."129
The unexpectedness of an attack cannotbe the sole basis of a finding of
treachery130 even if the attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s
position was merely accidental.131 The means adopted must have been a result of a
determination to ensure success in committing the crime.
In this case, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously
adopted or reflected on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair
advantage.
The attack might "have been done on impulse [or] as a reaction to an actual or
imagined provocation offered by the victim."132 In this case, petitioner was not only
dismissed by Austria when he approached him for money. There was also an
altercation between him and Naval. The provocation might have been enough to
entice petitioner to action and attack private complainants.
Therefore, the manner of attack might not have been motivated by a determination
to ensure success in committing the crime.1âwphi1 What was more likely the case,
based on private complainants’ testimonies, was that petitioner’s action was an
impulsive reaction to being dismissed by Austria, his altercation with Naval, and
Naval’s attempt to summon Austria home.
Generally, this type of provocation negates the existence of treachery. 133 This is the
type of provocation that does not lend itself to premeditation. The provocation in
thiscase is of the kind which triggers impulsive reactions left unchecked by the
accused and caused him to commit the crime. There was no evidence of a modicum
ofpremeditation indicating the possibility of choice and planning fundamental to
achieve the elements of treachery.
The ability of the offended parties toretaliate and protect themselves may not by
itself negate the existence of treachery. The efforts of the accused to employ means
and method to ensure his safety and freedom from retaliation may not have
succeeded. However, in this case, the ability of the offended parties to have
avoided greater harm by running away or by being able to subdue the accused is a
strongindicator that no treachery exists.
It is, therefore, an error for both the trial and appellate courts not to have
considered the evidence that the offended parties were able to flee and retaliate.
Upon proof of evasion and retaliation, courts must evaluate the evidence further to
ensure whether there can be reasonable doubt for this qualifying circumstance to
exist. This is only in keeping with the presumption of innocence of the accused.
Thus, in the absence of clear proof of the existence of treachery, the crime proven
beyond reasonable doubt isonly frustrated homicide and, correspondingly, the
penalty should be reduced.134
IV
Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty lower by one degree
than that which should be imposed for homicide may be imposed upon a person
guilty of frustrated homicide.
The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Article 50 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated
crime shall be the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
consummated crimes. The penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed must have a
maximum term which canbe properly imposed under the rules considering the
attending circumstances.135 Since there is no attending circumstance in this case,
the penalty of prision mayor in its medium term or eight (8) years and one (1) day
asmaximum should beimposed. The minimum sentence should be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. 136 A penalty
of one (1) year and one (1) day as minimum, prision correccional should, therefore,
be proper.

Furthermore, petitioner’s civil liabilitymust be modified. The award of actual

damages to Romeo Austria should be 88,028.77 since this is the only amount
supported by receipts on record. This is in line with Article 2199137 of the Civil Code,
which limits the entitlement for pecuniary loss to such amount duly proved.

We see no reason to modify the trial court’s award of moral damages, being in line
with Article 2219138 and jurisprudence.139 The trial court’s award of temperate
damages to Naval isalso justified in recognition of the injuries he sustained, which
from their very nature imply damages and do not need to be proved inaccordance
with Article 2216140 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is found guilty
of two (2) counts of frustrated homicide. He is sentenced to a prison term of one (1)
year and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor medium as maximum, for every count. Furthermore, he is
ordered to indemnify a) Romeo Austria ₱25,000.00 as moral damages and
₱88,028.77 as actual damages and b) Gerardo Naval ₱25,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱10,000.00 as temperate ormoderate damages.

Petitioner is also ordered to pay the c.osts of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190322 November 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require that the perpetrator
attack his victim from behind. "Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when
une)(pected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the
attack or avoid it."1
On appeal is the August 28, 2009 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03294, which affirmed with modification the February 21, 2008
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 84, Malolos City, Bulacan. The
RTC convicted Virgilio Amora y Viscarra (appellant) of the crime of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of
the victim Romeo Gibaga (Romeo) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱35,000.00 for
funerale) (penses, and ₱16,770.69 for medical expense.
Factual Antecedents
On November 30, 2004, appellant was charged with murder defined and penalized
under Article248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Pertinent portions of the
Information4 filed against him read:
That on or about the 12th day of September 2004, in San Jose Del Monte City,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a deadly weapon and with intent to kill one
Romeo Gibaga, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said deadly
weapon the said Romeo Gibaga, hitting him on the trunk, thereby inflicting upon
him mortal wound[s] which directly caused his death.
5
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on January 18, 2006, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of eyewitnesses Maricris Alidon
(Maricris), Anselmo Benito (Anselmo), and Aurelio Amora (Aurelio). Linda Gibaga
(Linda), the wife of the victim Romeo, and Dr. Felimon C. Porciuncula, Jr. (Dr.
Porciuncula), the Medico-Legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the body of
the victim, also testified for the prosecution. Their testimonies are summarized
below.
On September 12, 2004 at around 5:45 p.m., Anselmo, Aurelio, and the victim
Romeo were walking on their way to Sampol Market in San Jose Del Monte City.
Maricris and her son were tailing them about four meters behind. As they were
making their way to the market, they saw appellant in his store located on the right
side of the street. Suddenly, appellant rushed towards them and stabbed Romeo
twice - one on the chest and another on the abdomen. They were all caught by
surprise due to the suddenness of the attack. Romeo fell to the ground while
appellant quickly ran away from the scene. Aurelio chased appellant but failed to
catch up with him. Maricriswent to Romeo’s house to inform his wife Linda about
what had just happened.
Upon hearing the news from Maricris, Linda rushedto the scene of the crime but did
not find her husband there as Romeo was already brought by Anselmo to the
Sapang Palay District Hospital. Later on, he was transferred to East Avenue Medical
Center where he died after three days. Linda testified that before Romeo passed
away, he told her that appellant was his assailant.6
Due to Romeo’s injuries and eventualdeath, Linda spent ₱16,770.69 for hospital
expenses, ₱35,000.00 for funeral expenses, and ₱50,000.00 as expenses for the
wake.
Dr. Porciuncula testified that Romeo died due to two fatal stab wounds. The first
stab wound penetrated his chest and pierced his heart while the wound on his
abdomen pierced the pancreas and his small intestines. Both stab wounds
appeared to have been caused by a single-bladed weapon.7
Version of the Defense
The appellant was the lone witness presented by the defense.He declared on the
witness stand that on September 12, 2004, at around 5:45 p.m., he was working as
a construction worker in a site 8 to 9 kilometers away from his residence. On his
way home, Nestor Basco, his neighbor, informed him about a stabbing incident that the victim are additionally awarded Php25,000.00 as temperate damages and
had just taken place near his home. Upon arriving at his house, his wife and his ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
parents told him that the stabbing incident took place in front of their store and
that the alleged assailant passed through their yard to the street at the back. The SO ORDERED.10
alleged assailant managed to escape, and the stabbing was wrongly imputed
Faulting the Decision of the CA, appellant now appeals to this Court advancing the
against appellant. On December 9, 2004, appellant was arrested. He claimed that
same issues he raised before the CA.
he does not know Romeo, whom henever met before the stabbing incident. The
only reason he could think of why he is being falsely accused was that he turned Assignment of Errors
down Anselmo’s request for ₱200.00 to buy shabu. This happened when they were
having a drinking spree with Aurelio the day before the stabbing incident. According Appellant asserts that:
to appellant, Anselmo got infuriated by his refusal and threw a bottle of gin at him.
I
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
On February 21, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of the MURDER DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILTBEYOND
crime of murder. Itfound that the stabbing of Romeo was attended by the REASONABLE DOUBT.
qualifying circumstance of treachery as it was "sudden and unexpected such that
II
[Romeo] was unable to react or defend himself from the assault of [appellant]" 8
GRANTING ARGUENDOTHAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE, THE
The dispositive part of the RTC Decision reads:
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of OF TREACHERY.11
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to
Our Ruling
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the
family of the deceased Romeo Gibaga the following amounts: The appeal has no merit.

1. Php16,770.69 for medical expenses; Appellant argues that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Citing the testimony12 of prosecution witness Aurelio, appellant
2. Php35,000.00 for funeral services; and
posits that the eye witnesses could not have possibly identified the true assailant
3. Php50,000.00 for civil indemnity. because it was already 5:45 p.m. and the place where the stabbing incident
occurred was almost shrouded in darkness. Appellant also stresses that witness
SO ORDERED.9 Aurelio, by his own statement, was drunk at the time of the incident, thereby
impairing his perception and making his judgment in identifying the assailant
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
unreliable. Because there is uncertainty as to the identity of the true malefactor,
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC. It held in its appellant asserts that he is entitled toan acquittal.
August 28,2009 Decision, thus:
We are not persuaded.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 21, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
The RTC is correct in giving weight and credence tothe testimonies of the
Branch 84, Malolos City is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the heirs of
prosecution witnesses, viz:
x x x the Court finds the testimonies of the former ([Maricris, Anselmo, and A: He came from behind, sir.
Aurelio]) straightforward and credible, hence, [deserving] recognition and respect
as truthful account of what actually transpired during the incident in question. The xxxx
Court likewise noted the assertions of [Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] that they are
Q: Considering your position, are you in a position to tell us whether this Romeo
familiar with or know the accused and the victim well since they are neighbors in
Gibaga actually saw the assailant before he was stabbed?
Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan. The Court therefore does not doubt
[Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] in identifying the accused as the attacker and A: Yes, sir.
assailant of [Romeo]. Besides, no evidence was offered to show ulterior motive on
the part of [Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] to testify falsely against the accused. 13 Q: What did he do?

It bears stressing that the RTC Decision finding appellant guilty of the charge was
not based solely on the testimony of Aurelio. Two other eyewitnesses positively
identified the appellant as the person who stabbed Romeo. Anselmo and Maricris
were consistent in their testimonies identifying appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime. Excerpts of their testimonies are reproduced below:
[FISCAL ROQUE:]
A: None, sir.
Q: Why was he not able to react before he was stabbed?
A: Because he was not aware, sir.
Q: Mr. Witness[,] you mentioned that you were able to see this person who
stabbed Romeo Gibaga[. I]f he is now present, can you identify him?

Q: You said that you were walking together with Aurelio Amora and Romeo Gibaga. A: Yes, sir.
[W]hile you were walking, what happened if any?
Q: Kindly look around and point him out?
[ANSELMO BENITO:]
THE INTERPRETER:
A: Romeo Gibaga was suddenly stabbed, sir.
Witness pointed to a person x x x wearing a detainee’s t-shirt who identified himself
Q: In relation to you, where was this Romeo Gibaga before he was stabbed? as Virgilio Amora.

A: He was at myleft side, sir. Q: And you mentioned that Romeo Gibaga was stabbed by this accused whom you
[have just] identified[. W]ere you able to see the weapon that was used in stabbing
Q: How about this Aurelio Amora, where was he?
Romeo Gibaga?
A: Aurelio was at my right side, sir.
A: No, sir.14
Q: While this Aurelio Amora was on your right and this Romeo Gibaga on your left,
xxxx
you mentioned that somebody came and stabbed this Romeo Gibaga[. W]ere you
able to see or notice where this assailant came from before he stabbed Romeo [FISCAL ROQUE :]
Gibaga?
Q: And while you were there going toSampol Market, do you still recall x x x any
A: Yes, sir. unusual incident that transpired?

Q: Where? [MARICRIS ALIDON:]

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was this unusual incident, Madam witness?
A: The stabbing incident thathappened to Romeo Gibaga, sir.
Q: And were you able to see who stabbed him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was he?
A: Virgilio Amora, sir.
Q: If he is present today, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around and point him out?
THE INTERPRETER:
The witness pointed to a person who identified himself as Virgilio Amora. 15
It is clear that the witnesses have properly identified the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. Astestified to by the witnesses and correctly ruled by the
RTC and the CA, he was the person who attacked, stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellant tried to impeach the testimonies of Anselmo and Aurelio claiming that
their motive for falsely testifying against him was because of his refusal to give
them money for shabu.
The Court finds that appellant’s assertion is a mere speculation that deserves scant
consideration. His explanation is neither supported by evidentiary proof nor
buttressed by established facts. We have consistently ruled that positive
identification by credible witnesses prevails over self-serving statements of the
accused. Such statements cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over
affirmative declarations of eyewitnesses.
Finally, appellant claims that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was
working at a construction site 8 to 9 kilometers away from the scene of the crime.
He argues that it was thus impossible for him to be the person who stabbed and
killed Romeo.
Appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi must likewise fail.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove(a) that he was present
at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him tobe at the scene of the crime"16during its
commission. "Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access
between the situs criminisand the location of the accused when the crime was
committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been
physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the
crime was committed."17
In this case, the appellant failed to satisfy these requirements. While a distance of 8
to 9 kilometersis quite far, appellant was not able to satisfactorily substantiate his
claims regarding his whereabouts. Aside from his own testimony, appellant did not
bother to present the testimony of other witnesses or any other proof to support
his defense. Since he claimed that his parents and wife saw the stabbing incident
and that the assailant allegedly even entered their yard, it is puzzling why he did not
present them as witnesses to bolster his denial.
In any case, eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant to be present at the
scene of the crime. "Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that positive
identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is
inherently unreliable."18
The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC. The rule is well-
settled that factual findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses
are accorded great weight and utmost respect given that trial courts have firsthand
observation of the witnesses’ demeanor while testifying in court. We shall not
supplant our own interpretation of the witnesses’ testimonies for that of the trial
judge since he is in the best position to determine the issue of credibility of
witnesses. Moreover, in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of
discretion, and especially when the CA, asin this case, has affirmed the findings of
the trial judge, the assessments and conclusions of the trial court shall not be
overturned.
Treachery
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that"[t]here is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make." Thus in order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be
appreciated, the following requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means,
method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from
the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the
latter to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the means, method, or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. "The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape."19
In this case, the appellant’s suddenattack on Romeo amply demonstrates that
treachery was employed in the commission of the crime.1âwphi1 The eyewitnesses
were all consistent in declaring that the appellant in such a swift motion stabbed
Romeo such that the latter had no opportunityto defend himself or to fight
back.20 The deliberate swiftness of the attack significantly diminished the risk to
himself that may be caused by the retaliation of the victim.
It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of Romeo when he thrust the
knife to his torso. Records show that appellant initially came from behind and then
attacked Romeo from the front. In any event, "[e]ven a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no
position to repel the attack or avoid it,"21 as in this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC and
CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder under Article 248 of the
RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Penalties and Awards of Damages
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetuato death. The RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, is correct in holding that the appellant must suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties, by reason of the
absence of any aggravating circumstance. "It mustbe emphasized, however, that
[appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346
which states that ‘persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua,
or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."22
With regard to the award of civil indemnity ex delicto, the same must be increased
from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.23 Civil
indemnity is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime.24 We uphold the CA in awarding moral damages to the
heirs of Romeo in the amount of ₱50,000.00. "As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain
and anguish on the part of the victim’s family."25 We likewise award exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 since the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was proven by the prosecution. When a crime is committed with an
aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary
damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.26 The CA however
erred in awarding temperate damages in lieu of actual damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00. Records show that the RTC already awarded the heirs of the victim
actualdamages consisting of ₱16,770.69 as medical expenses and ₱35,000.00 as
funeral expenses. These expenses were fully supported by receipts.27
Lastly, all damages awarded shall be subject to 6% per annuminterest from the
finality of this Resolution until fully paid, also in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 28, 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03294, which affirmed with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, finding appellant
Virgilio Amora y Viscarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuais AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:
(1) the appellant is not eligible for parole;
(2) the award of civil liability ex delictois increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00;
(3) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga the amount of
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) the award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages is DELETED; and
(5) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga interest at the legal
rate of 6% per annumon all the amounts ofdamages awarded, commencing from
the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015
GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, v. ELPIDIO MALICSE,
SR. AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dated January 20, 2010 , of petitioners Gary
Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva assailing the Decision2 dated August 31, 2007
and Resolution3 dated January 7, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. R. CR.
No. 31719, affirming the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 93-127049, finding petitioners guilty
of attempted murder.
The following are the antecedents:
On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the
house of his sister Isabelita Iguiron (Isabelita) in Pandacan, Manila when all of a
sudden, he heard Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio
confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him, which prompted the former to slap
the latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of alcohol.
The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the
commotion was taking place in order to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio
was eventually persuaded to go home where he drank some coffee. Thereafter,
Elpidio went back to the house of Isabelita to offer reconciliation. On his way there,
he passed by the house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and requested the latter to
accompany him, but was instead told to go back home, leaving Elpidio to proceed
alone.
Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus)
and her son-in-law Gary Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find
their parents. Titus and Gary responded, “putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas ka,
punyeta ka.”
In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and
saw Isabelita's elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a
rattan stick or arnis. Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced the
latter to bow his head but Salvador delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on the
right eyebrow. Salvador attempted to hit Elpidio for the third time but the latter got
hold of the rattan stick and the two wrestled on the floor and grappled for the
possession of the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two and sprayed
something on Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches of
Salvador and to extricate himself, Elpidio bit Salvador's head.
Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter
was about to go out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to
take the tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio walked away from Titus but Gary, still
armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador, with his arnis, including Titus, chased
him.
Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head
with a lead pipe which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his
assailants to stop, but to no avail. Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs,
legs and knees using the rattan stick. While he was simultaneously being beaten up
by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene and Tommy, he tried to cover his
face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his right leg, between the
knees and the ankle of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and knees.
Rolly hit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe, while Tommy hit him with a piece of wood
on the back of his shoulder.
Thereafter, a certain “Mang Gil” tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted
at him: “Huwag makialam, away ng mag-anak ito” and the two continued to maul
Elpidio. The people who witnessed the incident shouted “maawa na kayo” but they
only stopped battering him when a bystander fainted because of the incident.
Elpidio then pretended to be dead. It was then that concerned neighbors
approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH).
Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan
Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao and
petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva. The Information
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, commence the commission of the crime of murder
directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there hitting the head of Elpidio Malicse,
Sr. y de Leon with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of wood and mauling him,
but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than
their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio
Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
They all pleaded “not guilty.” The defense, during trial, presented the following
version of the events that transpired:
Around 4:30 p.m. of June 27, 1993, Salvador was at the second floor of their house
when he heard his tenth son Winston crying while the latter was being castigated
by Elpidio. He went down and told Elpidio to come back the next day to settle. His
wife Isabelita called the Barangay Chairman two blocks away. Barangay Chairman
Joseph Ramos and Elpidio's wife and daughter went to the house and Elpidio was
given warm water, but he showered his daughter and Winston with it. Elpidio was
brought to his house and the former told the Barangay Chairman that it was a
family problem. Elpidio went back to the house of Salvador where Titus was sitting
on the sofa. Elpidio asked Titus to open the door until the former kicked the door
open. Titus escaped through the open door and Salvador went out of the house
because another child was on the roof, afraid that the said child might fall.
Thereafter, Elpidio went to the street.
According to petitioner Gary Fantastico, he was inside their house with his wife and
Titus when the incident occurred. He and his wife ran upstairs, while Titus went out
when Elpidio hit the door. Elpidio had a reputation for hurting people when drunk
and Gary learned that Elpidio was brought to the hospital because he was mauled
by the people.
During trial, one of the accused, Salvador Iguiron died. Eventually, the trial court, in
a Decision dated March 31, 2008, acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and
Tommy Ballesteros but found Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. The dispositive portion of the said
decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds Gary Fantastico
and Rolando Villanueva GUILTY of the crime of attempted murder and sentences
them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1)
day as minimum, to ten (10) years as maximum. They are also ordered to pay the
actual damages of P17,300.00 and moral damages of P10,000.00.
Accused Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners appealed the case to
the CA, but the latter court affirmed the decision of the RTC and disposed the case
as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, we hereby
AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied by the same court.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners stated the following arguments:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT
FROM THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE INCORRECT.
THE INFORMATION ITSELF IN THIS CASE DOES NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS AND
THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS OF THE SPECIFIC CRIME OF ATTEMPTED MURDER.
NOT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF ATTEMPTED MURDER ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
THERE IS NO TREACHERY OR ANY OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO SPEAK OF
IN THIS CASE.
THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
PRESENCE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
THERE ARE MANIFEST MISTAKES IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT.
THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS WAS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE
DEFENSE EVIDENCE, NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.
THE TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDENT THAT IT WAS THE PETITIONERS WHO
ATTACKED HIM IS INDEED UNCORROBORATED AND THUS SELF-SERVING.
CLEARLY, THERE ARE SO MUCH REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT THAT INJURIOUSLY AFFECTED THE
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS AND THESE SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT.
At the outset, it bears stressing that under the Rules of Court, an appeal
by certiorari to this Court should only raise questions of law distinctly set forth in
the petition.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the present case, the issues and arguments presented by the petitioners involve
questions of facts. Therefore, the present petition is at once dismissible for its
failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, that the
petition should only raise questions of law.
The distinction between a “question of law” and a “question of fact” is settled.
There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other
hand, there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact,
the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a
question of law.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At any rate, the arguments of herein petitioners deserve scant consideration.
It is the contention of the petitioners that the Information filed against them was
defective because it did not state all the elements of the crime charged. However, a
close reading of the Information would show the contrary. The Information partly
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of the execution which should
have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other
than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio
Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is clear that all the elements
of the crime of attempted murder has been included.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to
commit a felony, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other
than his spontaneous desistance.8
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements,
namely:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.9
The Court in People v. Lizada10 elaborated on the concept of an overt or external
act, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison
d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the
conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to
be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that
quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which
may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act
or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the
reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty
what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been
the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was
the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission
of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute
the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt
must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt
acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. 11
Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase “not necessarily mortal” in the
allegations in the Information. According to them, the inclusion of that phrase
means that there is an absence of an intent to kill on their part. Intent to kill is a
state of mind that the courts can discern only through external manifestations, i.e.,
acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. In Rivera v. People,12 this Court considered the following factors to
determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors;
(2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of
the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and
the motives of the accused. This Court also considers motive and the words uttered
by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional
determinative factors.13 All of these, were proven during the trial. Needless to say,
with or without the phrase, what is important is that all the elements of attempted
murder are still alleged in the Information. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and
the place wherein the offense was committed.
In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the
Information on the ground that the elements of the crime of attempted murder are
lacking. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of
section 3 of this Rule.
Anent the probative value and weight given to the testimony of Elpidio by the CA
and the RTC, the same is not ridden with any error. In People v. Alvarado,14 we held
that greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witness than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the
commission of the crime. This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-serving
evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is clear from the records that Elpidio was able to make a positive identification of
the petitioners as the assailants, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q. Then what happened next Mr. Witness?
A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador Iguiron, I got out of the door of the
house, then, I saw Gary was hiding in the kitchen door holding an axe. Tonahawk
with blade of ax was dull and had a handle of one foot, with the diameter of one
inch.
Q. Why did you know that the ax blade of the tom was dull? (sic)

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is

A. I also used that.
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
Q. Where do you usually keep that in the house of Iguiron?
A. In the kitchen.
Q. How far is that kitchen from where Gary emerged from?
A. He is right in the kitchen.
Q. Then what happened?
A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador, Gary Iguiron was hiding in the
kitchen door and holding a tomhack (sic) whose edge is dull and he hit me on my
right side and my head and I got injury (sic) and blood profusely oozing, I want to
get hold of the tomhawk (sic).
Q. Were you able to get of the tomhawk (sic) from Gary?
A. No sir.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Q. You said while on that street somebody hit you from behind, who was that?
A. Rolly Villanueva.
Q. Why do you say that it was Rolly Villanueva, considering that it was hit from
behind?
A. Because they were about 5 of them at the main gate of the compound.
Q. Who are they?
A. Rolando Villanueva, Nestor Ballesteros, Tommy Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao,
Saligan Iguiron.
Q. You said you were hit by Rolando from behind, do you have occasion to see first
before you were hit?
A. When I was hit I fell down and I was able to see who hit (sic0, I saw him.
Q. When you fell down, you were able to realize it was Rolando Villanueva who hit
you, you mean you realized what he used in hitting you from behind?
A. It was a pipe. 1/2 inch thick, 24 inches in length.
Q. You said you fell down because of the blow of Rolando Villanueva and you saw
him holding that pipe, how was he holding the pipe when you saw him?
A. When I fell down he was about trying to hit me again.17
In connection therewith, one must not forget the well entrenched rule that findings
of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties as
well as its conclusion on its findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at close
range, the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witness as they testify. 18 The
rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained
by the Court of Appeals.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of Elpidio is corroborated by the
medico-legal findings as testified by Dr. Edgar Michael Eufemio, PGH Chief Resident
Doctor of the Department of Orthopedics. He testified as to the
following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q. And as head of that office, Mr. Witness, why are you here today?
A. Actually, I was called upon by the complainant to rectify regarding, the findings
supposedly seen when he was admitted and when I saw him in one of the sessions
of our Out Patient Department.
Q. When was this follow-up session at your department did you see this
complainant?
A. Based on the chart, I think it was four (4) months post injury when I first saw the
patient.
Q. Why does he has (sic) to make a follow up in your department?
A. Based on this chart, he sustained bilateral leg fractures which necessitated
casting. Normally, casting would take around three (3) months only but since the
nature of his fracture was relatively unstable, I think it necessitated prolong
immobilization in a case.
PROSECUTOR TEVES:
Q. Did you personally attend on his needs on that date when you saw him?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And what could have been the cause of these injuries he sustained?
A. I think one of his leg has close fracture, meaning, probably it was caused by a
blunt injury rather than a hacking injury, one on the left side, with an open wound
which was very much compatible with a hack at the leg area.20
Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of
treachery or any other qualifying circumstance.
In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The
essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered,
two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives
the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.21 From the facts
proven by the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous, thus, the second element
of treachery is wanting. The incident, which happened at the spur of the moment,
negates the possibility that the petitioners consciously adopted means to execute
the crime committed. There is no treachery where the attack was not preconceived
and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the
part of the accused because of the provocative act of the
victim.22chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit
Elpidio Malicsi, Sr. twice on the head as he was entered (sic) the house of the
former. Gary Fantastico hit the victim on the right side of the head with an axe or
tomahawk. The evidence also show that Rolando “Rolly” Villanueva hit the victim
on the head with a lead pipe. And outside while the victim was lying down, Gary hit
the legs of the victim with the tomahawk. lvador also hit the victim with the rattan
stick on the thighs, legs and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private organ
with a piece of wood. The Provisional Medical Slip (Exh. “D”), Medico Legal
Certificate and Leg Sketch (Exh. “D-2”) and the fracture sheet (Exh. “D-4”) all prove
that the victim suffered injuries to both legs and multiple lacerations on his head.
The injury on one leg which was a close fracture was caused by a blunt instrument
like a piece of wood. This injury was caused by Salvador Iguiron. The other leg
suffered an open fracture caused by a sharp object like a large knife or axe. This was
caused by Gary Fantastico who used the tomahawk or axe on the victim. The
multiple lacerations on the head were caused by Gary, Rolly and Salvador as it was
proven that they hit Elpidio on the head. There is no sufficient evidence that the
other, accused, namely Saligan Iguiron Y Malicsi, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor
Ballesteros and Eugene Surigao harmed or injured the victim. Titus having sprayed
Elpidio with the tear gas is not sufficiently proven. Neither was the alleged blow by
Titus, using a piece of wood, on the victim's private organ sufficiently established as
the medical certificate did not show any injury on that part of the body of the
victim.
The said injuries inflicted on the complainant after he went back to his sister
Isabelita's house. When he kicked the door, the melee began. And the sequence of
the injuries is proven by victim's testimony. But it was a lopsided attack as the
victim was unarmed, while his attackers were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk
and lead pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This establishes the element of
abuse of superior strength. The suddenness of the blow inflicted by Salvador on
Elpidio when he entered the premises show that the former was ready to hit the
victim and was waiting for him to enter. It afforded Elpidio no means to defend
himself. And Salvador consciously adopted the said actuation. He hit Elpidio twice
on the head. Treachery is present in this case and must be considered an
aggravating circumstance against Salvador Iguiron. Rolly Villanueva, Gary
Fantastico and Salvador Iguiron were all armed while Elpidio, inebriated, had
nothing to defend himself with. There is clearly present here the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of
by him in the commission of the crime."24 "The fact that there were two persons
who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed
with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the
aggressors and the victim."25 The evidence must establish that the assailants
purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this
advantage.26 "To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked."27 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age,
size, and strength of the parties.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Consequently, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution dated January 7,
2010 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the petitioners are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioners are also ORDERED to pay P17,300.00 as
actual damages, as well as P10,000.00 moral damages as originally ordered by the
RTC. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Anent the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, which is an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum, to ten (10)
years as maximum and ordered them to pay actual damages of P17,300.00 and
moral damages of P10,000.00, this Court finds an obvious error.

For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code states that a penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals
in an attempt to commit a felony.29 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of
the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence
should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium term, which has a
duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years; and that the minimum
should be within the range of prision correccional, which has a duration of six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Therefore, the penalty imposed should
have been imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated January 20, 2010 of
petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva is hereby DENIED.
G.R. No. 206381, March 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL MATIBAG Y DE VILLA @
“DANI” OR “DANILO,” Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Daniel Matibag y
De Villa @ “Dani” or “Danilo” (Matibag) assailing the Decision2 dated September 13,
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 which affirmed in
toto the Decision3 dated August 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Pallocan
West, Batangas City, Branch 3 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 13941, finding Matibag
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
In an Amended Information4 dated May 5, 2005, Matibag was charged with the
crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended,5 the accusatory portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about March 27, 2005 at around 8:40 o’clock [sic] in the evening at Iron
Street, Twin Villa Subdivision, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while
armed with a Beretta Caliber .9MM Pistol with Serial No. 3191M9, a deadly
weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
said pistol one Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan, while the latter was completely
defenseless, thereby hitting him and causing gunshot wounds at his head and chest,
which directly resulted to the victim’s death.
That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm is
attendant in the commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
Matibag entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. After the termination
of the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.7cralawred
The prosecution asserted that at around 8:40 in the evening of March 27, 2005,
Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan (Duhan), who just came from a meeting with the other
officers of the homeowners’ association of Twin Villa Subdivision, was walking along
Iron Street in Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City when Matibag confronted
Duhan, and asked, “ano bang pinagsasasabi mo?” Duhan replied “wala,” and
without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow hitting Duhan on the left cheek and
causing him to teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out his gun and shot Duhan,
who fell face-first on the pavement. While Duhan remained in that position,
Matibag shot him several more times. PO2 Tom Falejo, a member of the Philippine
National Police, positively identified Matibag and stated on record that he arrested
the latter on the night of March 27, 2005. Dr. Antonio S. Vertido who conducted an
autopsy on Duhan confirmed that the latter suffered gunshot wounds in the head
and chest which led to his death. 8cralawred
In his defense, Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida party of
his neighbor when Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the
homeowners’ association. Wanting to settle a previous misunderstanding, Matibag
approached Duhan and extended his hand as a gesture of reconciliation. However,
Duhan pushed it away and said, “putang ina mo, ang yabang mo,” thereby
provoking Matibag to punch him in the face. Matibag saw Duhan pull something
from his waist and fearing that it was a gun and Duhan was about to retaliate,
Matibag immediately drew his own gun, shot Duhan, and hurriedly left the place.
Matibag went to see his police friend, Sgt. Narciso Amante, to turn himself in, but
the latter was unavailable at the time. As Matibag headed back home, he was
stopped by police officers who asked if he was involved in the shooting incident. He
then readily admitted his involvement.9cralawred
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated August 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Matibag as charged,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay
the heirs of Duhan the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, ?59,000.00 as actual damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.11cralawred
The RTC refused to give credence to Matibag’s claim of self-defense as he failed to
prove the presence of unlawful aggression on Duhan’s part, finding that: (a)
Duhan’s words and actions prior to Matibag’s attack could not be considered as a
real threat against him; (b) no firearm was recovered from the victim; (c) Matibag’s
account that Duhan was about to pull something from his waist, which thus led him
to believe that he was about to be shot, remained uncorroborated; and (d) the
number of gunshot wounds Duhan sustained contradicts the plea of self-
defense.12cralawred
Separately, the RTC appreciated the existence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery since the attack was sudden, unprovoked, and without any warning on
the victim who was unarmed and in a defenseless position. 13 Likewise, the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was appreciated since a
firearm was used in the commission of a crime and, hence, considered
unlicensed.14cralawred
Dissatisfied, Matibag appealed15 to the CA.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated September 13, 2012, the CA affirmed Matibag’s conviction in
toto.17cralawred
The CA agreed with the RTC’s findings that: (a) treachery attended the killing of
Duhan as the attack on him was sudden;18 and (b) an unlicensed firearm was used
in committing the crime, which is considered as a special aggravating
circumstance.19cralawred
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld
the conviction of Matibag for Murder.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In the review of a case, the Court is guided by the long-standing principle that
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great
weight and respect. These factual findings should not be disturbed on appeal,
unless there are facts of weight and substance that were overlooked or
misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case. The
Court has carefully scrutinized the records and finds no reason to deviate from the
RTC and CA’s factual findings. There is no indication that the trial court, whose
findings the CA affirmed, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding
facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court on
this score, considering too that it was in the best position to assess and determine
the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.20cralawred
On this score, the Court now proceeds to resolve this case on points of law.
Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the RPC, as amended. In order to warrant a conviction, the
prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person
was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing
is not Parricide or Infanticide.21cralawred
Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
In People v. Tan,22 the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
attacked.23 In People v. Perez,24 it was explained that a frontal attack does not
necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated
if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to
prepare for his or her defense.25cralawred
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed with a
gun, confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the
chest.26 Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by
which it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too
that he was unarmed.27 Matibag also failed to prove that a heated exchange of Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use of
words preceded the incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any impending attack unlicensed firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information, should be
from his assailant.28 The deliberateness of Matibag’s act is further evinced from his appreciated in the imposition of penalty. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866,35 as
disposition preceding the moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out, amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294,36 treats the unauthorized use of a licensed
Matibag was ready and destined to effect such dastardly act, considering that he firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special
had an axe to grind when he confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact that he did aggravating circumstance:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
so, armed with a loaded handgun.29 Based on these findings, the Court concludes
that treachery was correctly appreciated. Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
This finding of treachery further correlates to Matibag’s plea of self-defense. Note
“Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
that by invoking self-defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the commission of the
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
act for which he was charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – x x x.chanrobleslaw
have exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to Matibag
to show that the killing of Duhan was attended by the following circumstances: (a)
xxxx
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation
“If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.30cralawred
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Among the foregoing elements, the most important is unlawful aggression. It is

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
well-settled that there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who cralawlawlibrary
resorted to self-defense.31 Jurisprudence states that not every form or degree of
aggression justifies a claim of self-defense.32 For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent Further, under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term “unlicensed firearm” has
danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, 33 as against the already been expanded as follows:37cralawred
one claiming self-defense.
Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. – The term unlicensed firearm
shall include:
Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted Duhan negates
unlawful aggression in the sense above-discussed. As mentioned, the prosecution
1. firearms with expired license; or
was able to prove that the attack was so sudden and unexpected, and the victim
2. unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime. (Emphasis
was completely defenseless. On the other hand, Matibag’s version that he saw
supplied)
Duhan pull something from his waist (which thereby impelled his reaction),
cralawlawlibrary
remained uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered from the
victim.34 Hence, by these accounts, Matibag’s allegation of unlawful aggression and,
consequently, his plea of self-defense cannot be sustained. The foregoing Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof was
considered, the Court upholds Matibag’s conviction for the crime of Murder, unauthorized under the purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a special
qualified by treachery, as charged. aggravating circumstance. As a result, the imposition of the maximum penalty of
death, which is reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA 9346,38 stands proper.
To this, the Court adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.39cralawred

Finally, case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder, the
heirs of the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime;40 (b) actual or compensatory damages to the extent
proved,41 or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot be provided with certainty;42 (c) moral damages;43 and (d)
exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.44cralawred

In line with recent jurisprudence, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 and
moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are awarded to Duhan’s heirs
without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime and Duhan’s
death. Considering further that the crime was committed with treachery, exemplary
damages in the sum of P100,000.00 is also granted.45cralawred

The award of P59,000.00 as actual damages should, however, be deleted as the

records do not show that the prosecution was able to prove the amount actually
expended. In lieu thereof, P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded to
conform with prevailing jurisprudence.46 In addition, interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid is
imposed on all monetary awards.47cralawred

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated September 13, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 finding accused-appellant Daniel
Matibag y De Villa @ “Dani” or “Danilo” GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordering
him to pay the Heirs of Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan the amounts of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, all with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
judgment until full payment.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary