HUMAN RIGHTS LAW Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty
(WEEK 2)
USA vs. GUINTO
These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of
state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar
but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which
it has not consented.
FACTS:
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base
in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services
in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the
award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included
in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.
2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)
Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after
investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him
guilty and recommended his dismissal.
3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)
Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of
the Air Force Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial,
petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed
from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it
was because of the latter’s acts that he lost his job.
4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)
A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US
military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat
them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this
and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring
the injuries.
ISSUE:
for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of
our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under
this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as
against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government
enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a
blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may
the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country
merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of
their official functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or
private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves
its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such
waiver may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted
by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA
vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged
irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available.
Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake
of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its
proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a
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governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity
because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of
its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from
suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground
that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove,
as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genove’s employment for his
unbelievably nauseating act.
In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter
testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United
States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which
has not given its consent to be sued.
In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer
study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the
defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their
authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made by the
lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.
NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND
CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY
WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs
Guinto)
Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions.
No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)
Holy See vs. Rosario G.R. 101949 (1994)
FACTS:
Petitioner in this case is the Holy See (who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City
in Rome Italy and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Respondent
in this case is Hon. Edilberto Rosario in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of RTC
Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, a domestic corporation engaged
in the real estate business.
The petition started from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5A registered under
the name of the Holy See, is connected to Lot 5B and 5D under the name of Philippine
Realty Corporation. The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal
Nuncio which represented the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican
City, Rome Italy for his residence.
The said lots were sold to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents
Starbright Sales, Inc.
When the squatters refused to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between these two
parties because both were unsure as to whose responsibility was it to evict the
squatters from the said lots. Respondent Starbright insists that the Holy See should
clear the property while Holy See says that Starbright should do it or the earnest
money will be returned.
Since Starbright refused to clear the property, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, returned
P100k earnest money. The same lots were sold to Tropicana Properties.
Starbright filed a suit for annulment of sale, specific performance and damages
against Msgr. Cirilios, Philippine Realty Corporation and Tropicana. The Holy See
moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity of
suit. The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the petitioner already shed off
its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract.
ISSUE:
Can the Holy See invoke sovereign immunity?
RULING:
YES. The Court held that the Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its
non-suability. The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity
for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally
accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall
form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in
the society of nations. In Article 31 (A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, diplomatic envoy (a representative government who is sent on a special
diplomatic mission) shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property.
The DFA certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic
missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local
jurisdiction and is entitled to immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in
this Court.
While the said lot was acquired and bought in the ordinary cause of real estate
business, its acquisition and disposal were not made for profit but claimed that it
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acquired the said property for its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature of the
Philippines.
Besides, the act of selling the land concerned is non-proprietary in nature, or is not
covered by a patent or trademark. The transfer and disposal of property are likewise
clothed with a governmental character as the petitioner did not buy and sell the land
for gain but merely because they cannot evict the said squatters in the property.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading (G.R. No. L-14279)
FACTS:
EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and
garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure
and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central
Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to
regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade
and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the
validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the
Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in
favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.
RULING:
No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence
of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President
which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and
are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal
instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges
of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence between this
and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive
agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult
of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large
variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of
executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements
act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered
into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects
as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights,
etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general
subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to
the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded
independently of any legislation.
Bayan vs Zamora
FACTS:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series
of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998.
Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed
by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the
senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is
applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that,
what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?
RULING:
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Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent
and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find
applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the
number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We
find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding
as a treaty.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of
the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the
said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary
requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and
that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the
consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the
Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments
ironclad duties under a treaty.
RULING:
Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by
a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law
of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable
in the domestic sphere.
“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since
it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation
clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such
courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances.
“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in
the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal
a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are
in conflict with the constitution
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
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FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No.
2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration
or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized
by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any
other government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates
that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that
the government has already constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail
and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive
agreements has been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may
properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null
and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with
the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may,
under the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted
by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.
In Re: Garcia
FACTS:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines
without submitting tothe required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers,
among others, that he is a Filipino citizenborn in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage;
that he had taken and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he
was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission
to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course
graduating as"Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the
law profession in Spain; and thatunder the provisions of the Treaty on Academic
Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RPand Spain, he is entitled to
practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the requiredbar
examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the
Philippine Bar?
RULING:
The court resolved to deny the petition.
Ratio Decidendi:
The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between
the RP and Spaincannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to
govern Filipino citizens desiring topractice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens
of Spain desiring to practice their profession in thePhilippines. Applicant is a Filipino
citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is thereforesubject to the
laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish
nationalsdesiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty
invoked by the applicant aremade expressly subject to the laws and regulations on
the contracting state in whose territory it is desiredto exercise the legal
profession.The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could
not have been intended tomodify the laws and regulations governing admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines, for thereason that the Executive Department
may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of theSupreme Court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power
torepeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the
Philippines.
International School Alliance of Educators vs Quisumbing
FACTS:
Petitioners are employees (teachers) of respondent's school who are receiving less
than their counterparts hired abroad and now cry discrimination. The school
contends that a foreign-hire would necessarily uproot himself from his home country,
leave his family and friends, and take the risk of devaiting from a promising career
path - all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a
foreign land and such person does not enjoy security of tenure as well so the
compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive
on an international level in terms of attracting competent pruofessionals in the field
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of international education. The school's classification between foreign-hires and
local-hires was in the point-of-hire so foreigners hired locally are being classified as
local-hires. Petitioner claims that such classification is discriminatory to Filipinos and
that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. On
the other hand, the Acting Secretary of Labor upheld the point-of hire classification
for the distinction in salary rates. He also stated that The Union cannot also invoke
the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle
of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated
by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification
is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the
same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local
hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in
the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract
them to join the teaching faculty of the School.
Hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Acting secretary erred in upholding the reasonableness of the classification
made by respondent-school.
RULING:
Yes. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention.
Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution 8 in
the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The
very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall
"ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an
affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its
primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities,
closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare," 25 "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and
duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not
merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts,
collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should
such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not
hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School
to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an
invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according
higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not
deserve the sympathy of this Court.
Abbas v. COMELEC
FACTS:
: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734 on
thefollowing grounds:
1) R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the case doesn’t
say)
2) R. A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and not through
the modeof a plebiscite as provided in the Constitution
3) The Constitution provides that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of votes cast
in aplebiscite by all voters residing in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734
says “by amajority or votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite and only those
provinces andcities where a majority of votes cast in favor of the Organic Act shall be
included in theAutonomous Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the Constitution
4) R. A. 6734 includes provinces and cities which do not have the same cultural
andhistorical heritage and other relevant characteristics needed for admission to the
ARMM
5) R. A. 6734 violates constitutional guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as
some itsprovisions run counter to the Koran
6) The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power to the
ARMM iscontrary to the constitutional mandate that the creation of the autonomous
region hingessolely on the result of the plebiscite
7)R. A. 6734 says “…that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such
plebisciteshall be included in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not votefor inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the
existing administrativeregions: Provided however, that the President may, by
administrative determination, mergethe existing regions. This provision, Abbas
claims, is contrary to the Constitutional mandatethat, “No province city, municipality
or barangay may be created, divided, merged,abolishedor its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established withthelocal government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in aplebiscite in the
unitsdirectly affected.” (Art. 10, Sec. 10, 1987 Constitution)
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RULING:
: Abbas is wrong. Reasons:
1) R. A. 6734 as an enactment of Congress, is superior to the Tripoli Agreement, being
asubsequent law to the Tripoli Agreement (though in my opinion it wouldn’t matter
if R. A.6734 was prior to the Tripoli Agreement)
2) The transitory provisions of R. A. 6734 does provide for a plebiscite (1 guess
nobodyreads the transitory provisions)
3) The framers of the Constitution must have intended that the majority of votes
must comefrom each of the constituent units and not all the votes of the provinces
and cities (I couldn’tunderstand how the justices arrived at this conclusion)
4) It is not for the Court to decide on the wisdom of the law concerning the inclusion
of provinces and cities which Abbas claims should not be included in a plebiscite
5) There is no actual controversy yet as to any violation of freedom of religion, only
apotential one
6) The creation of an Oversight Committee is merely procedural and in fact will aid in
thetimely creation of the ARMM
7) The power of the President to merge administrative regions is inherent in his
power of general supervisionover local governments. Besides, administrative regions
are notterritorial or political regions. Examples of administrative regions are Regions
I to XII and theNCR
PHILIP MORRIS V. CA
FACTS:
Petitioners are foreign corporations organized under US laws not doing business in
the Philippines and registered owners of symbols ‘MARK VII,’ ‘MARK TEN,’ and ‘LARK’
used in their cigarette products. Petitioners moved to enjoin respondent Fortune
Tobacco from manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the symbol ‘MARK’
asserting that it is identical or confusingly similar with their trademarks. Petitioners
relied on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law to bring their suit and the Paris
Convention to protect their trademarks. The court denied the prayer for injunction
stating that since petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines, respondent’s
cigarettes would not cause irreparable damage to petitioner. CA granted the
injunction but on a subsequent motion, dissolved the writ.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s mark may be afforded protection under said laws;
(2) Whether or not petitioner may be granted injunctive relief.
RULING:
(1) NO. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no necessity to treat the
matter with an extensive response because adherence of the Philippines to the 1965
international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been acknowledged in La
Chemise. Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving
trademarks, there can be no disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial law
that foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines may maintain a
cause of action for infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark
Law when the legal standing to sue is alleged, which petitioners have done in the case
at hand.
Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of
business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law
but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify
issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the
Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for
petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using
its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have
the personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to
protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market.
(2) NO. More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint as well as in
the very petition filed with this Court indicating that they are not doing business in
the Philippines, for these frank representations are inconsistent and incongruent
with any pretense of a right which can breached. Indeed, to be entitled to an
injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there exists a right to be protected and
that the facts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right. On the
economic repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered by the thought of
having to participate in throwing into the streets Filipino workers engaged in the
manufacture and sale of private respondent’s “MARK” cigarettes who might be
retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many unemployed and unproductive
as a result of the issuance of a simple writ of preliminary injunction and this, during
the pendency of the case before the trial court, not to mention the diminution of tax
revenues represented to be close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other
hand, if the status quo is maintained, there will be no damage that would be suffered
by petitioners inasmuch as they are not doing business in the Philippines. In view of
the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged
in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be
suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed
on the absence of their “right” to be protected.
REYES VS BAGATSING
FACTS:
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought
a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less
7
than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon
Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that
indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City
Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the
US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to
the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we “adhere to
generally accepted principles of international law”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution.
Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats
from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the
generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked
as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and
guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the
City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application
thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The
mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does
not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken all
the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be
applied yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500
feet radius (besides, there’s also the question of whether or not the mayor can
prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an an issue in
this case).
Marcos vs. Manglapus
FACTS:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue travel documents to
former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that
Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified
by the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel
from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the
right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at
bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law,
independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate
and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the
Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights
may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public
health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's
country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to
construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as
those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the
land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that
the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their
return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
8
AGUSTIN VS. EDU

FACTS:
Petitioner Agustin in this prohibition proceeding assailed the validity and
constitutionality of the Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of
Instruction No. 479, providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles. He
contended that the said Letter of Instructions and its implementing rules and
regulations are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society."

Issue:
Whether or not assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and
unconstitutional.

RULING:
The Court decided the petition against the petitioner.

The assailed Letter of Instruction quoted important clauses that the hazards posed
by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals
and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); and, that the said Vienna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended
the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices.

It is undisputable therefore that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution

possesses relevance: “the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land”. The 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt
servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.