43. BF Corporation vs.

Manila International Airport Authority, 556 SCRA 684

Facts:
Mitsubishi Corporation (Mitsubishi), Tokyu Construction Co., Ltd. (Tokyu), A.M. Oreta& Co., Inc. (Oreta), and BF formed
themselves into the MTOB Consortium (Consortium) to participate in the bidding for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Terminal II (NAIA II) Project. MIAA awarded the contract to the Consortium, recognizing that the
Consortium was a distinct and separate entity from the four member corporations.
Unfortunately, the four members had serious business differences, including the division of the contract price, forcing BF
to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City, an action for Specific Performance, Rescission, and Damages with
application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The RTC served a TRO on Tokyu, the lead partner of the Consortium.
During the hearing on the preliminary injunction, MIAA stressed its position that it should not be dragged into the dispute
since it was a consortium internal matter. Thereafter, in an amended complaint, BF dropped MIAA as a party-defendant.
When the project was nearing completion, BF filed a second amended complaint. In it, BF pleaded causes of action
against Tokyu, Mitsubushi, and Oreta which have all submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, and also MIAA
who had possession of money to be paid to Tokyu. BF claimed it was entitled to a proportionate share of the money
based on the Consortium agreement. Thus, BF asked that MIAA be re-impleaded as a party-defendant so it could obtain
complete relief.4
In an Order dated May 24, 2001, the RTC directed that MIAA be re-impleaded as a party-defendant. It said that BF’s
earlier move to drop MIAA as a party-defendant should not preclude it from re-impleading MIAA which still has the
obligation to pay the remainder of the contract price.
Issue:
Whether or not the MIAA can still be re-impleaded as a party-defendant.
Ruling:
No. As to the issue of estoppel, we agree with the CA that BF is now estopped from re-impleading MIAA. While the Rules
allow amendments to pleadings by leave of court, in our view, in this case, it would be an affront to the judicial process to
first include a party as defendant, then voluntarily drop the party off from the complaint, only to ask that it be re-
impleaded. When BF dropped MIAA as defendant in its first amended complaint, it had performed an affirmative act upon
which MIAA based its subsequent actions, e.g. payments to Tokyu, on the faith that there was no cause of action against
it, and so on. BF cannot now deny that it led MIAA to believe BF had no cause of action against it only to make a complete
turn-about and renege on the effects of dropping MIAA as a party-defendant months after, to the prejudice of MIAA.
MIAA had all reasons to rely on the CA’s decision that it was no longer a party to the suit. Under the doctrine of estoppel,
an admission or representation is conclusive on the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying on it. A person, who by deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner, is barred from
adopting an inconsistent position, attitude, or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another.
44. 44. El Oro Engraver Corporation vs. CA
FACTS:
Everett Construction Supply, Inc. (respondent) is engaged in the sale of construction supplies. El Oro Engraver Corporation
(petitioner) is one of its customers. Whenever respondent sold merchandise to its customers, it would prepare a Sales
Invoice for the transaction in quadruplicate copies. An employee of respondent would bring the original and duplicate
copies of the Sales Invoice to the customer for signature upon receipt of the merchandise. Respondent would either
append the original copy of the Sales Invoice to the Statement of Account or return it to the customer upon payment of
the merchandise..

On 25 March 1985, respondent filed an action for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages against petitioner upon
failure to respond to the demand letter.

The trial court ruled that respondent has the burden of showing that a valid debt exists. The trial court did not accept
respondent's argument that the original of some Sales Invoices were already with petitioner. The trial court ruled that if
the Sales Invoices were already with petitioner, it gives rise to the presumption that the debt had been paid. The trial
court concluded that petitioner did not receive the goods and such goods might have been delivered to somebody else.
CA ruled that petitioner'ssilence for more than four years is an admission of its liability to respondent under the Sales
Invoices and the Statements of Account.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed a reversible error in modifying the trial court's decision.

RULING:

No.As a general rule, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. This rule is subject to exceptions,
such as when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory.

In this case, the trial court only considered the original copies of the Sales Invoices presented by respondent. The trial
court did not consider the Sales Invoices which did not have the signature of petitioner's representative. The trial court
concluded that the merchandise must have been delivered to someone else instead of to petitioner.

Rosita P. Lee (Lee), respondent's Treasurer, explained that it is the company practice to prepare four copies of Sales
Invoices. Respondent's delivery personnel would bring two copies of the Sales Invoices at the time of the delivery - the
original and a duplicate copy. Both copies were supposed to be signed by petitioner's representative. Respondent's
delivery personnel would leave the duplicate copy with petitioner and retain the original copy of the Sales Invoice.
Whenever respondent made a collection, it would prepare a Statement of Account and it would send the Statement of
Account, together with the original copies of the Sales Invoices, to petitioner.
The Court applied estoppel in pais where one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he
ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such
other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence
of such facts. The petitioner's silence for four years is tantamount to admission of the entries in the Statements of
Account sent by respondent.
45. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO TESTON

By virtue of a Deed of Conditional Sale, Romeo Teston purchased, on installmentbasis, two (2) parcels of land
situated in Masbate, Teston from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Teston defaulted in the payment of his
amortizations. Consequently, DBP rescinded their contract of conditional sale. DBP thereafter transferred the two (2)
parcels of land to the government. It was subsequently found out that Teston had also voluntarily offered the two parcels
of land for inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under the
VoluntaryOffertoSell.TestonfiledbeforetheDepartmentofAgrarianReformAdjudicationBoard (DARAB) a Petition against
DBP alleging that under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
RepublicActNo.6657,DBP‘srighttorescindthesalewasextinguishedbyoperationoflaw.The DARAB Regional Adjudicator
dismissed Teston‘s petition on the ground that Teston has never
beentheowneroftheland,hencecouldnothavevalidlyofferedthepropertyundertheVoluntary Offer to Sell scheme. On
appeal, the DARAB affirmed the Regional Adjudicators decision. The Court of Appeals modified the Trial Court‘s decision
by ordering DBP to return to Teston the
P1,000,000downpaymentpaidbyTestonwithoutrequiringthelattertopresentevidence.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in modifying DARAB‘s decision ordering DBP to return to Teston the
P1,000,000 downpayment allegedly paid by Teston

HELD:

YES.

It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and
must be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The
judgment must be secudumallegataetprobata.Dueprocessconsiderationsjustifythisrequirement.Itisimpropertoenteran
order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an
opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental
purposeoftherequirementthatallegationsofacomplaintmustprovidethemeasureof recovery is to prevent surprise to the
defendant. To require DBP to return the alleged P1,000,000 without first giving it an opportunity to present evidence would
violate the Constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,or property without due process of law.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of onesdefense.
46. 46. Equitable PCI Banking Corporation v RCBC Capital Corporation Facts

On May 24, 2000, petitioners Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc., as
sellers, and respondent RCBC Capital Corporation (RCBC), as buyer, executed a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) for the
purchase of petitioners interests in Bankard, representing 226,460,000 shares, for the price of PhP 1,786,769,400.
Thereafter, in a letter of May 5, 2003, RCBC informed petitioners of its having overpaid the purchase price of the subject
shares, claiming that there was an overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to PhP 478 million, resulting in the
overpayment of over PhP 616 million. Thus, RCBC, in accordance with Sec. 10 of the SPA, filed a Request for Arbitration
dated May 12, 2004 with the International Chamber of Commerce-International Court of Arbitration (ICC-ICA). In the
request, RCBC charged Bankard with deviating from, contravening and not following generally accepted accounting
principles and practices in maintaining their books, hence, violated the representations and warranties of petitioners in
the SPA. Per RCBC, its overpayment amounted to PhP 556 million. It thus prayed for the rescission of the SPA, restitution
of the purchase price.

To the Request for Arbitration, petitioners filed an Answer dated July 28, 2004 denying RCBCs inculpatory
averments stating also that the period for filing of the asserted claim had already lapsed.
Arbitration in the ICC-ICA proceeded after the formation of the arbitration tribunal with Justice Kapunan
dissenting, rendered a Partial Award On the matter of prescription, the tribunal held that RCBC’s claim is not time barred.
As such, the tribunal concluded, RCBC’s claim was filed within the three (3)-year period. The tribunal also exonerated
RCBC from laches, the latter having sought relief within the three (3)-year period prescribed in the SPA. Petitioners came
directly to this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Ruling :

Whether or not the Court can Overturn an Arbitral Award rendered by the ICA
No. As a rule, the award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the
law or as to the facts. Courts are without power to amend or overrule merely because of disagreement with matters of
law or facts determined by the arbitrators. They will not review the findings of law and fact contained in an award, and
will not undertake to substitute their judgment for that of the arbitrators, since any other rule would make an award the
commencement, not the end, of litigation. Errors of law and fact, or an erroneous decision of matters submitted to the
judgment of the arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and honestly made. Judicial review of an
arbitration is, thus, more limited than judicial review of a trial. Nonetheless, the arbitrators’ awards is not absolute and
without exceptions. The arbitrators cannot resolve issues beyond the scope of the submission agreement. The parties to
such an agreement are bound by the arbitrators’ award only to the extent and in the manner prescribed by the contract
and only if the award is rendered in conformity thereto. Thus, Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law provide grounds
for vacating, rescinding or modifying an arbitration award. Where the conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and
2040 of the Civil Code applicabletocompromisesandarbitrationareattendant,thearbitrationawardmayalsobeannulled.
x xxx Finally, it should be stressed that while a court is precluded from overturning an award for errors in determination of
factual issues, nevertheless, if an examination of the record reveals no support whatever for the arbitrators’
determinations, their award must be vacated. In the same manner, an award must be vacated if it was made in “manifest
disregard of the law."

A party asking for the vacation of an arbitral award must show that any of the grounds for vacating, rescinding, or
modifying an award are present or that the arbitral award was made in manifest disregard of the law. Otherwise, the
Court is duty-bound to uphold an arbitral award. To justify the vacation of an arbitral award on account of “manifest
disregard of the law,” the arbiter’s findings must clearly and unequivocally violate an established legal precedent.
Anything less would not suffice.

Section 15. Hearing by arbitrators The arbitrators shall be the sole judge of the relevancy and materiality of the evidence
offered or produced, and shall not be bound to conform to the Rules of Court pertaining to evidence. Arbitrators shall
receive as exhibits in evidence any document which the parties may wish to submit and the exhibits shall be properly
identified at the time of submission.

As to the Appeal to this COURT

This is a procedural miscue for petitioners who erroneously bypassed the Court of Appeals (CA) in pursuit of its appeal.
While this procedural gaffe has not been raised by RCBC, still we would be remiss in not pointing out the proper mode of
appeal from a decision of the RTC confirming, vacating, setting aside, modifying, or correcting an arbitralaward.

Rule 45 is not the remedy available to petitioners as the proper mode of appeal assailing the decision of the RTC
confirming as arbitral award is an appeal before the CA pursuant to Sec. 46 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise
known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, or completely, An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative
Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for other
Purposes, promulgated on April 2, 2004 and became effective on April 28, 2004 after its publication on April 13, 2004.
Even if we entertain the petition, the outcome will be the same.
47. Gomez vs Montalban

Facts: LitaMontalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the amount of P40,000 with a voluntary proposal on her part
to pay 15% interest per month. Montalban failed to com- ply with her obligation so Gomez filed a complaint in the RTC for
sum of money. Sum- mons was served but despite her receipt, she still failed to file an Answer. She was de- clared in
default and upon motion, Gomez was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering Montalban to pay Gomez.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that there was no proper service of summons
since there was no personal service. She alleged that one Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre was not authorized to receive summons
and that her failure to file an Answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence (FAME). The Petition was
set for hearing but counsel for respondent failed to appear before the court hence the dismissal of the Petition.
Montalban filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the Petition stating that counsel’s failure to appeal
was unintentional to which the RTC granted. To this in- stance, Gomez filed a Petition for Reconsideration.

Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction

Held: Yes. it is irrelevant that during the course of the trial, it was proven that
respondent is only liable to petitioner for the amount of P40,000.00 representing the prin- cipal amount of the loan;
P57,000.00 as interest thereon at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from 26 August 1998 until the present; and
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Contrary to respondent's contention, jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on the amount ultimately substantiated
in the course of the trial or proceedings nor be affected by proof showing that the claimant is entitled to recover a sum in
excess of the jurisdic- tional amount fixed by law. Jurisdiction is determined by the cause of action as alleged in the
complaint and not by the amount ultimately substantiated and awarded.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause
of action. The na- ture of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are
the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims assertedtherein.
48. 48. Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal inICA GR.161957 Feb. 28,2005

Jorge Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd., et al.

FACTS: As claimowner of mineral deposits located w/in the Addendum Area of Influence in Didipio, in the provinces of
Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya, Gonzales entered into a co-production, joint venture and/or product-sharing agreement w/
Geophilippines, Inc, and Inmex Ltd. Under the agreement, Gonzales granted Geophilippines exclusive right to explore and
survey the mining claims for a period of 36 months within which the latter could decide totake an operating agreement
on the mining claims and/or develop, operate, mine and otherwise exploit the mining claims and market any and all
minerals that may be derived therefrom. The period was extended for 3 more years. Gonzales and respondent mining
companies applied for a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA). Respondents executed the Operating and
Financial Accommodation Contract (OFAC)[Climax-Arimco and Climax Mining Ltd. As first parties and Australasian
Philippine Mining as 2ndparty.] Climax Mining and Australasian entered into a memorandum of agreement—Climax
transferred the FTAA toAustralasian.

Gonzales filed before the Panel of Arbitrators, Region II of the MGB of DENR, seeking the nullity/termination of the
Addendum Contract, the FTAA, and the OFAC on the ground of fraud and oppression and/or VIOLATION of Section 2,
Article XII of the CONSTITUTION perpetrated by these foreign RESPONDENTS, conspiring and confederating with one
another and with each other. The Panel of Arbitrators dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Gonzales filed MR, it was granted because the Panel believed that the case involved a dispute involving rights to mining
areas and a dispute involving surface owners, occupants and claim owners/concessionaires. Although the Panel opined
that the issues raised were civil in nature, and should be w/in the jurisdiction of regular courts. Thus, while the Panel
granted the MR, it held that it had no jurisdiction regarding the constitutionality of the Addendum Agreement and the
FTAA.
Respondent filed MR. Denied. Appealed to CA. CA granted appeal, declaring that the Panel of Arbitrators did not have
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, said the Court of Appeals, is
limited only to the resolution of mining disputes, defined as those which raise a question of fact or matter requiring the
technical knowledge and experience of mining authorities.
It was found that the complaint alleged fraud, oppression and violation of the Constitution, which called for the
interpretation and application of laws, and did not involve any mining dispute. The CA also observed that there were no
averments relating to particular acts constituting fraud and oppression. It added that since the Addendum Contract was
executed in 1991, the action to annul it should have been brought not later than 1995, as the prescriptive period for an
action for annulment is four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud. When petitioner filed his complaint before
the Panel in 1999, his action had already prescribed. Also, the CA noted that fraud and duress only make a contract
voidable, not inexistent, hence the contract remains valid until annulled. The CA was of the opinion that the petition
should have been settled through
arbitration under Republic Act No. 876 (The Arbitration Law) as stated in Clause 19.1 of the Addendum Contract. The CAs
declared the Panel of Arbitrators’ decision invalid. CAdenied Gonzales’MR.
ISSUE: WON the dispute between the parties should be brought for arbitration under Rep. Act No. 876.
HELD: No. Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as
to some provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular
knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the
existence or validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the
contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are
matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the
application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function.
Petitioner also disagrees with the CA ruling that the case should be brought for arbitration under Rep. Act 876, pursuant
to the arbitration clause in the Addendum Contract which states that all disputes arising out of or in connection with the
Contract, which cannot be settled amicably among the Parties, shall finally be settled under R.A. 876. He points out that
respondents Climax and APMI are not parties to the Addendum Contract and are thus not bound by the arbitration clause
in said contract.
We agree that the case should not be brought under the ambit of the Arbitration Law, but for a different reason. The
question of validity of the contract containing the agreement to submit to arbitration will affect the applicability of the
arbitration clause itself. A party cannot rely on the contract and claim rights or obligations under it and at the same time
impugn its existence or validity. Indeed, litigants are enjoined from taking inconsistent positions. As previously discussed,
the complaint should have been filed before the regular courts as it involved issues which are judicial in nature. Whether
the case involves void or voidablecontracts is still a judicialquestion.
“It is only in the event that the arbitration agreement or clause is itself void, inexistent, or inoperative that the arbitral
tribunal’s jurisdiction may be questioned.”
Fraud and duress = only makes the contract voidable
49. Sales v Barro (2008)

Facts: This case originated from the ejectment complaint filed by the petitioners against the respondent, before Br.
28 of the MeTC of Manila. Petitioners alleged that (1) they are owners of the lot described in TCT No. 262237 of the
Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila; (2) the respondent constructed a shanty thereon without theirconsent;
(3) the respondent and his co-defendants have not been paying any rent to the petitioners for their occupation
thereof; (4) the respondent and his co-defendants refused the formal demand made by the petitioners for them to
vacate the subject lot; and (5) the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay 464, Zone 46, 4thDistrict, Manila issued
the necessary Certification to File Action.

In his answer, the respondent denied the allegations of the complaint, and claimed that
(1) his construction was tolerated by the petitioners, and (2) he does not remember receiving any demand letter and
summons from the barangay

MeTC found in favor of the petitioners. The respondent appealed to the RTC which affirmed in totothe assailed MeTC
decision.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and accordingly dismissed the petitioners complaint. First of all, not all
elements of Unlawful Detainer were present to grant MeTC jurisdiction over the case. The complaint, if any, was really
one of forcible entry, but even so, it was still defective because there was no showing of any prior physical possession
by petitioners. (As required by law)

Petitioner claims that respondent is, nevertheless estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Issue: Can respondent still question thejurisdiction?

Ruling: Yes. The petitioners argue that the respondent is already estopped because the respondent failed to assail the
jurisdiction of the MeTCat the earliest opportunity and actively participated in the proceedings before it. The
respondent counters that he could not be held guilty of estoppel because he questioned in his answer and pleadings
petitioner’s allegation that he was served a demandletter.

By questioning the veracity of the allegation of the existence of a jurisdictional requirement, he, in effect, questioned
the jurisdiction of the MeTC in trying the case.

It is well-settled that a courts jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is
that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
render
judgment on the action.The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over
the cause of action or subject matter of the case.In any event, even if respondent did not raise the issue of jurisdiction,
the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case. In this sense, dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction may even be ordered by the court motuproprio.
50. Tijam vs Sibonghanoy

GR. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968

Facts: The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of
interest filed by SerafinTijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses MagdalenoSibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was
originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the
Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which
the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.). As prayed for in the
complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants’ properties, but the same was soon dissolved
upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the
Surety, on the 31st of the samemonth.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The
writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety’s
bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46–49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds,
namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under
the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its
counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief: “to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under
the bond inquestion”

Not one of the

assignment of errors raises the question of lack of jurisdiction. neither directly nor indirectly on the lowercourts.
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never
raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.
Issues: Whether or not the surety is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the coutrt
Held: Yes. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstancesof the present case, a party may be barred by laches
from invoking this plea for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active
participation of said party invoking the plea. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting
a right or claim to be enforced orasserted. It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.
Upon this same principle is what we said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
1963, supra, to the effect that we frown upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, No. L-21450 April 15,1968

51. 51. ORMOC SUGARCANE PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. CA

Facts: Petitioners Ormoc Sugarcane Planters’ Association, Inc. (OSPA), Occidental Leyte Farmers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. (OLFAMCA), Unifarm Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (UNIFARM) And Ormoc North District Irrigation
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (ONDIMCO) are associations organized by andwhose members are individual sugar
planters (Planters) while respondents Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (Hideco) and Ormoc Sugar Milling Co, Inc.(OSCO) are
sugar centrals engaged in grinding and milling sugarcane delivered to them by numerous individual sugar planters, who
may or may not be members of an association such as petitioners.

According to petitioners, the relationship between the respondents and individual planters is governed by milling
contract. In their contract specifically Article XX provides that all differences and controversies which may arise between
the parties concerning the agreement shall be submitted for discussion to a Board of Arbitration, consisting of five (5)
members; two (2) of which shall be appointed by the centrals, two (2) by the Planter and the fifth to be appointed by the
four appointed by the parties. Petitioners filed 2 petitions with the RTC for Arbitration under R.A. 876 for Recovery of
Equal Additional Benefits, Attorney’s Fees and Damages, against respondents HIDECO and OSCO without impleading any
of their individual members. They argued that respondents unduly accorded the independent Planters more benefits and
thus prayed that an order be issued directing the parties to enter upon with arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the milling contracts. Respondents argued that there was no milling contract entered into. It was only the individual
Planters, and not petitioners, who had legal standing to invoke the arbitration clause in the millingcontracts.

Petitioners had no legal standing whatsoever to demand or sue for

arbitration. The RTC held that there was an existing milling contract and that the petitioners have the right to sue in behalf
of the planters. However, upon appeal of the respondents, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence,
thispetition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners sugar planters’ association demand arbitration from respondents in their own name
without impleading the individual Planters.

Held: There are two modes of arbitration: (a) an agreement to submit to arbitration some future dispute, usually
stipulated upon in a civil contract between the parties, and known as an agreement to submit to arbitration, and (b) an
agreement submitting an existing matter of difference to arbitrators, termed the submission agreement. Article
XX of the milling contract is anagreement to submit to arbitration because it was made in anticipation of a dispute that
might arise between the parties after the contract’s execution. In an agreement for arbitration, the ordinary elements of
a valid contract must appear, including an agreement to arbitrate some specific thing, and an agreement to abide by the
award, either in express language or by implication. In the case at bar, there were more than two thousand (2,000)
Planters in the district at the time the case was commenced at the RTC in 1999. Only eighty(80)
 Planters who were all members of OSPA were shown to have such an agreement to arbitrate, included as a stipulation in
their individual milling contracts. Petitioners do not have any agreement to arbitrate with respondents. The other
petitioners failed to prove that any of their members had milling contracts with respondents, much less, that respondents
had an agreement to arbitrate with the petitioner associations themselves. Assuming arguendo that all the petitioners
were able to present milling contracts in favor of their members, it is nonetheless undeniable that under the arbitration
clause in these contracts it is the parties thereto who have the right to submit a controversy or dispute to arbitration.
Moreover, even assuming that petitioners are indeed representatives of the member Planters who have milling contracts
with the respondents and assuming further that petitioners signed the milling contracts as representatives of their
members, petitioners could not initiate arbitration proceedings in their own name as they had done in the present
case. As mere agents, they should have brought the suit in the name of the principals that they purportedly represent. Even
if Section 4 of R.A. No. 876 allows the agreement to arbitrate to be signed by a representative, the principal is still the one
who has the right to demandarbitration.

52. Keppel Shipyard vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation Facts:

KCSI and WG&A JebsensShipmanagement, Inc. (WG&A) executed a Shiprepair Agreement5 wherein KCSI would renovate
and reconstruct WG&A’s M/V "Superferry 3" using its dry docking facilities pursuant to its restrictive safety and security
rules and regulations. Prior to the execution of the Shiprepair Agreement, "Superferry 3" was already insured by WG&A
with Pioneer

In the course of its repair, M/V "Superferry 3" was gutted by fire. Claiming that the extent of the damage was pervasive,
WG&A declared the vessel’s damage as a "total constructive loss" and, hence, filed an insurance claim with Pioneer.

On June 16, 2000, Pioneer paid the insurance claim of WG&A and WG&A, in turn, executed a Loss and Subrogation
Receipt in favor of Pioneer.

Armed with the subrogation receipt, Pioneer tried to collect from KCSI, but the latter denied any responsibility for the loss
of the subject vessel. As KCSI continuously refused to pay despite repeated demands, Pioneer, on August 7, 2000, filed a
Request for Arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.

The Yard and The WG&A are hereby ordered to pay the arbitration costs pro-rata.

Issue: Whether or not both parties must shoulder the cost of arbitration? Ruling:
Yes. It is only fitting that both parties should share in the burden of the cost of arbitration, on a pro rata basis. We find
that Pioneer had a valid reason to institute a suit against KCSI, as it believed that it was entitled to claim reimbursement of
the amount it paid to WG&A. However, we disagree with Pioneer that only KCSI should shoulder the arbitration costs.
KCSI cannot be faulted for defending itself for perceived wrongful acts and conditions. Otherwise, we would be putting a
price on the right to litigate on the part of Pioneer.
53. SOLEDAD CHANLIONGCO RAMOS VS TERESITA D. RAMOS G.R 144294. March 11, 2003 FACTS:

The late Paulino V. Chanliongco Jr was co-owner of a parcel of land in Tondo, Manila with his siblings. By virtue of
a Special Power of Attorney executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter Adoracion C. Mendoza had sold
the lot to herein respondents. Because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the validity of the sale,
respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims. The RTC upheld the
sale insofar as the share of Narcisa was concerned. It ruled that Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the other
co-owners, because the Special Power of Attorney had been executed in favor only of her mother,Narcisa.

On appeal, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. It held that while there was no Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Adoracion, the sale was nonetheless valid, because she had been authorized by her mother to be the latters sub-
agent. This was not appealed hence became final and executory. On April 10, 1999, petitioners filed with the CA a Motion
to Set Aside the Decision. They contended that they had not been served a copy of either the Complaint or the summons.
Neither had they been impleaded as parties to the case in the RTC. As it was, they argued, the CA Decision should be set
aside because it adversely affected their respective shares in the property without due process; this was denied.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in denying petitioners Motion and allowing its Decision dated September 25, 1995 to take its
course, inspite of its knowledge that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners and
passing petitioners property in favor of respondents, hence without due process oflaw?

HELD:

No. It is well settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law; The only exceptions to this rule are the correction of (1) clerical errors, (2) the so-
called nunc pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. To determine whether the CA
Decision of September 28, 1995 is void, the failure to implead and to serve summons upon petitioners will now be
addressed.

The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC was therefore a real action, because it affected title to or
possession of real property. As such, the Complaint was brought against the deceased registered co-owners: Narcisa,
Mario, Paulino and Antonio Chanliongco, as represented by their respective estates. Clearly, petitioners were not the
registered owners of the land, but represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had no
standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because the latter was represented by an executor
or administrator.[19]Thus, there wasno need to implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the
deceased co-owners had already been madeparties.

Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an inchoate interest
thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had no standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because
the latter was represented by an executor or
administrator. [19] Thus,therewasnoneedtoimpleadthemasdefendantsinthecase,inasmuch as the estates of the deceased
co-owners had already been made parties. As it was, there was no need to include petitioners as defendants. Not being
parties, they were not entitled to be servedsummons.
54. 54. Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Hon. Alberto A. Lerma and Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corporation,

G.R. No. 143581, Jan. 7, 2008.

FACTS: Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. [Korea Tech], a Korean corporation, entered into a contract with Pacific General Steel
Manufacturing Corporation [Pacific General], a domestic corporation, whereby Korea Tech undertook to ship and install in
Pacific General’s site in Carmona, Cavite the machinery and facilities necessary for manufacturing LPG cylinders, and to
initially operate the plant after it is installed.

The plant, after completion of installation, could not be operated by Pacific General due to its financial difficulties
affecting the supply of materials. The last payments made by Pacific General to Korea Tech consisted of postdated checks
which were dishonored upon presentment. According to Pacific General, it stopped payment because Korea Tech had
delivered a hydraulic press which was different in kind and of lower quality than that agreed upon. Korea Tech also failed
to deliver equipment parts already paid for by it. It threatened to cancel the contract with Korea Tech and dismantle the
Carmona plant.

Finally, Pacific General filed before the Office of the Prosecutor a Complaint-Affidavit for estafaagainst Mr. Dae Hyun
Kang, President of Korea Tech. Korea Tech informed PGSMC that it could not unilaterally rescind the contract. Of greater
importance to the present article, KOGIES also insisted that their dispute be settled by arbitration as provided by Article
15 of their contract — the arbitration clause.

Korea Tech initiated arbitration before the Korea Commercial Arbitration Board [KCAB] in Seoul, Korea and, at the same
time, commenced a civil action before the Regional Trial Court [the “trial court”] where it prayed that Pacific General be
restrained from dismantling the plant and equipment. Pacific General opposed the application and argued that the
arbitration clause was null and void, being contrary to public policy as it ousts the local court of jurisdiction.

The trial court denied the application for preliminary injunction and declared the arbitration agreement null and void.
Korea Tech moved to dismiss the counterclaims for damages. Korea Tech filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals [CA]. The court dismissed the petition and held that an arbitration clause, which provided for a final
determination of the legal rights of the parties to the contract by arbitration was against public policy. Further appeal was
made to the Supreme Court by way of a petition forreview.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitration clause is valid.

HELD: YES. “The arbitration clause is valid. It has not been shown to be contrary to any law, or against morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. The arbitration clause stipulates that the arbitration must be done in Seoul, Korea
in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the KCAB, and that the award is final and binding.
This is not contrary to public policy. We find no reason why the arbitration clause should not be respected and complied
with by both parties.”

This ruling, the Court said, is consonant with the declared policy in Section 2 of the ADR Act that “the State (shall) actively
promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the parties to make their own arrangements to
resolve their disputes.” Citing Section 24 of the ADR Act, the Court said the trial court does not have jurisdiction over
disputes that are properly the subject of arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause. In the earlier case of BF Corporation
v. Court of Appeals and Shangri-laProperties, Inc., where the trial court refused to refer the parties to arbitration
notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration agreement between them, the Supreme Court said the trial court had
prematurely exercised its jurisdiction over thecase.

The Court further emphasized that a submission to arbitration is a contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as the law
between the contracting parties and produce effect between them, their assigns and heirs.8 Courts should liberally
review arbitration clauses. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration.

ADDITIONAL INFO:

Re: Enforcement of award in a domestic or international arbitration

An arbitral award in a domestic or international arbitration is subject to enforcement by a court upon application of the
prevailing party for the confirmation or recognition and enforcement of an award. Under Section 42 of the ADR Act, “The
recognition and enforcement of such (foreign) arbitral awards shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court in accordance
with the rules of procedure to be promulgated by the Supreme Court.” An arbitral award is immediately executory upon
the lapse of the period provided by law.

For an award rendered in domestic or non-international arbitration, unless a petition to vacate the award is filed within
thirty (30) days from the date of serve upon the latter, the award is subject to confirmation by thecourt.

For an award rendered in a domestic, international arbitration, the period for filing an application to set it aside is not
later than three (3) months from the date the applicant received the award, otherwise the court shall recognize and
enforce it.

3. Re: Enforcement of foreign arbitral award

In an attempt to allay the fear by Pacific General of submitting its dispute to arbitration in Seoul, South Korea under the
rules of the Korea Commercial Arbitration Board, the

Supreme Court said in obiter dictum:

In case a foreign arbitral body is chosen by the parties, the arbitral rules of our domestic arbitration bodies would not be
applied. As signatory to the Arbitration Rules of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] in the New York Convention on
June 21, 1985, the Philippine committed itself to be bound by the Model Law. We have even incorporated the Model Law in
Republic Act No. 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.”
x xxxxx
“Thus, while the RTC does not have jurisdiction over disputes governed by arbitration mutually agreed upon by the
parties, still the foreign arbitral award is subject to judicial review by the RTC which can set aside, reject or vacate it.”….
Chapter 7 of RA 9285 has made it clear that all arbitral awards, whether domestic or foreign, are subject to judicial review
on specific grounds providedfor.”
The Supreme Court finally held:
“While it (Pacific General) may have misgivings on the foreign arbitration done in Korea by the KCAB, it has available
remedies under RA 9285. Its interests are duly protected by the law which requires that the arbitral award that may be
rendered by KCAB must be confirmed here by the RTC before it can beenforced.”
55. Rockland Construction Co., Inc. vs. Mid-Pasig Land DevelopmentCorporation

543 SCRA 596 (2008) – Domestic Arbitration: Extent of Court Intervention

Rockland offered to lease from Mid-Pasig 3.1-hectare property in Pasig City. This property is covered by TCTs 469702 and
337158 under the control of the PCGG. Rockland sent letter to PCGG, included in the letter is the proposed terms and
conditions of the lease. This letter was also received by Mid-Pasig, but Mid-
Pasigmadenoresponse.Inanotherletter,RocklandsentMBTCcheckforPhp1millionasasignofits good faith and readiness to
enter into the lease agreement under the certain terms and conditions stipulated in theletter.

In a subsequent follow-up letter, Rockland then said that it presumed that Mid-Pasig had accepted its
offerbecausetheP1millioncheckitissuedhadbeencreditedtoMid-Pasigsaccount.Mid-Pasig,however, denied it accepted
Rocklands offer and claimed that no check was attached to the said letter. It also vehemently denied receiving the P1
million check,much less depositing it in its account.

Mid-Pasig replied to Rockland that it was only upon receipt of the latters letter that the former came to know where the
check came from and what it was for. Nevertheless, it categorically informed Rockland that it could not entertain the
latters lease application.

Rockland then filed an action for specific performance seeking to compel Mid-Pasig to execute in Rocklands favor, a
contract of lease over the land. RTC dismissed petitioners complaint; and held that there was no perfected contract of
lease between the parties.

Onappeal,theCAreversedandsetasideRTCdecisiononthefollowinggrounds:(1)therewasnomeeting of the minds as to the

offer and acceptance between the parties; (2) there was no implied acceptance of the P1 million check as Mid-Pasig was
not aware of its source at the time Mid-Pasig discovered the existence of the P1 million in its account; and (3) Rocklands
subsequent acts and/or omissions contradicted its claim that there was already a contract of lease, as it neither took
possession of the property, nor did it pay for the corresponding monthlyrentals.

Issue: Was there a perfected contract of lease? Had estoppel in pais set in?

Ruling: No contract of lease. Mid-Pasig is also not in estoppel in pais. Rockland’s Petition is Denied.

A contract has three distinct stages: preparation, perfection and consummation.—A contract has three distinct stages:
preparation, perfection, and consummation. Preparation or negotiation begins when the prospective contracting parties
manifest their interest in the contractandendsatthemomentoftheiragreement.Perfectionorbirthofthecontractoccurs when
they agree upon the essential elements thereof. Consummation, the last stage, occurs
whentheparties“fulfillorperformthetermsagreeduponinthecontract,culminatinginthe extinguishment thereof.”

The doctrine of estoppel is based on the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice and its purpose is to
forbid one to speak against his own act, representations or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed
and who reasonably relied thereon.—Mid-Pasig is also not in estoppel in pais. The doctrine of estoppel is based on the
grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act,
representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon.
Since estoppel is based on equity and justice,itisessentialthatbeforeapersoncanbebarredfromasserting afactcontrarytohis
act or conduct, it must be shown that such act or conduct has been intended and would unjustly cause harm to those who
are misled if the principle were not applied againsthim.

For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel
may become a tool of injustice.—From the start, Mid-Pasig never falsely represented its intention that could lead Rockland
to believe that Mid-Pasig had accepted Rockland’s offer. Mid-Pasig consistently rejected Rockland’s offer. Further,
RocklandneversecuredtheapprovalofMid-Pasig’sBoardofDirectorsandthePCGGtolease the subject property to Rockland.
As noted by the Court of Appeals, if indeed Rockland believedthatMid-
Pasigimpliedlyacceptedtheoffer,thenitshouldhavetakenpossessionof the property and paid the monthly rentals. But it did
not. For estoppel to apply, the action
givingrisetheretomustbeunequivocalandintentionalbecause,ifmisapplied,estoppelmay become a tool ofinjustice.
56. Transfield Philippines Inc. (TPI) vs Luzon Hydro Corporation(LHC) Facts:

TransfieldPhilippines(Transfield)enteredintoaturn-keycontractwithLuzonHydroCorp.(LHC).Under the contract,

Transfield were to construct a hydro-electric plants in Benguet and Ilocos. Transfield was given the sole responsibility for
the design, construction, commissioning, testing and completion of the Project. The contract provides for a period for
which the project is to be completed and also allows for the extension of the period provided that the extension is based
on justifiable grounds such as fortuitous event. In order to guarantee performance by Transfield, two stand-by letters of
credit were required to be opened. During the construction of
theplant,Transfieldrequestedforextensionoftimecitingtyphoonandvariousdisputesdelayingtheconstruction. LHC did not
give due course to the extension of the period prayed for but referred the matter to arbitration committee. Because of
the delay in the construction of the plant, LHC called on the stand-by letters of credit because of default. However, the
demand was objected by Transfield on the ground that there is still pending arbitration on their request for extension
oftime.
Both Transfield and Luzon filed before separate arbitration tribunals, ICC and CIAC respectively, to determine
whether force majeure would justify the delay. Pending the arbitration proceeding, Transfield filed a complaint for
preliminary injunction against the respondent banks to restrain them from paying on the securities and also against Luzon
to prevent it from calling on the securities. RTC issued a TRO but denied the application for writ of preliminary injunction.
CA affirmed RTC. N.B. When the TRO expired, Luzon was able to withdraw from ANZ.
Issue:

Held:

Whether or not the pendency of arbitral proceedings foreclose resort to the courts for provisional reliefs.

As a fundamental point, the pendency of arbitral proceedings does not foreclose resort to the courts
for provisional reliefs. The Rules of the ICC, which governs the parties’ arbitral dispute, allows the application of a party to
a judicial authority for interim or conservatory measures. Likewise, Section 14 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 876 (The
Arbitration Law) recognizes the rights of any party to petition the court to take measures to safeguard and/or conserve
any matter which is the subject of the dispute in arbitration. In addition, R.A. 9285, otherwise known as the “Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,” allows the filing of provisional or interim measures with the regular courts whenever the
arbitral tribunal has no power to act or to act effectively.
Additional Info:

Neither is there an identity of parties between and among the three (3) cases. The ICC case only involves TPI and
LHC logically since they are the parties to the Turnkey Contract. In comparison, the instant petition
includesSecurityBankandANZBank, thebankssoughttobeenjoinedfromreleasingthefundsofthelettersof credit. The Court
agrees with TPI that it would be ineffectual to ask the ICC to issue writs of preliminary
injunctionagainstSecurityBankandANZBanksincethesebanksarenotpartiestothearbitrationcase, andthat
theICCArbitraltribunalwouldnotevenbeabletocompelLHCtoobeyanywritofpreliminaryinjunctionissued from itsend
57. ABS-CBN vs. WORLD INTERACTIVE NETWORK SYSTEMS (WINS) JAPAN CO.,LTD.

FACTS: Petitioner ABS-CBN entered into an agreement with respondent World Interactive Network Systems (WINS).
Under the agreement, respondent was granted the exclusive license to distribute and sublicense the distribution of
the television service known as "The Filipino Channel" (TFC) inJapan.

A dispute arose when petitioner accused respondent of inserting nine episodes of WINS WEEKLY, into the TFC
programming from March to May 2002, claiming that such insertions were unauthorized thus constituting a material
breach of their agreement. As a result, petitioner notified respondent of its intention to terminate their licensing
agreement.

Thereafter,respondentfiledanarbitrationsuitpursuanttothearbitrationclauseofitsagreementwithpetitioner and
contended that the airing of WINS WEEKLY was made with petitioner's prior approval. It also alleged that petitioner
only threatened to terminate their agreement because it wanted to renegotiate the terms thereof to
allowittodemandhigherfees.Respondentalsoprayedfordamagesforpetitioner'sallegedgrantofanexclusive distribution
license to another entity, NHK (Japan BroadcastingCorporation).

The parties appointed a sole arbitrator in the person of Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar and the latter reached a decision in
favor of respondent.

PetitionerfiledintheCAapetitionforreviewunderRule43oftheRulesofCourtor,inthealternative,apetition for certiorari

under Rule 65 of the same Rules, with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminaryinjunction.

The CA rendered the assailed decision dismissing ABS-CBN’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. It stated that as the TOR
itself provided that the arbitrator's decision shall be final and unappealable and that no motion for reconsideration
shall be filed, then the petition for review must fail. It ruled that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over questions
relating to arbitration. It held that the only instance it can exercise jurisdiction over
anarbitralawardisanappealfromthetrialcourt'sdecisionconfirming,vacatingormodifyingthearbitralaward.

ISSUE: W/N the Court can intervene with the decision of the Arbitrator (as regards the arbitral award)

RULING: Yes.

It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether any instrumentality of the
Government, such as a voluntary arbitrator, has gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and
prerogatives. Any agreement stipulating that the “decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable and that
no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any part of the arbitrator's award may be availed
of” cannot be held to preclude in proper cases the power of judicial review which is inherent in courts. Said the Court,
we will not hesitate to review a voluntary arbitrator's award where there is a showing of grave abuse of authority or
discretion and such is properly raised in a petition for certiorari and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy remedy
in the course of law.

CASE 58 MISSING
59. 59. Ormoc Sugarcane vs CA

Petitioners are associations organized by and whose members are individual sugar planters (Planters) while
respondents are sugar centrals engaged in grinding and milling sugarcane delivered to them by numerous individual
sugar planters, who may or may not be members of an association such as petitioners. According to petitioners, the
relationship between the respondents and individual planters is governed by milling contract. In their contract
specifically Article XX provides that all differences and controversies which may arise between the parties concerning
the agreement shall be submitted for discussion to a Board of Arbitration.

Petitioners filed 2 petitions for Arbitration under R.A. 876 for Recovery of Equal Additional Benefits, Attorney’s Fees
and Damages against respondents HIDECO and OSCO without impleading any of their individual members. They
argued that respondents unduly accorded the independent Planters more benefits and thus prayed that an order be
issued directing the parties to enter upon with arbitration in accordance with the terms of the milling contracts.
Respondents argued that there was no milling contract entered into. It was only the individual Planters, and not
petitioners, who had legal standing to invoke the arbitration clause in the millingcontracts.

Issue: W/N Petitioners have legal standing to invoke the arbitration clause.
Held: No.

In an agreement for arbitration, the ordinary elements of a valid contract must appear, including an agreement to
arbitrate some specific thing, and an agreement to abide by the award, either in express language or by implication.

In the case at bar, there were more than 2,000 Planters in the district at the time the case was commenced. Only 80
Planters who were all members of OSPA were shown to have such an agreement to arbitrate, included as a stipulation
in their individual milling contracts. Petitioners do not have any agreement to arbitrate with respondents. The other
petitioners failed to prove that any of their members had milling contracts with respondents, much less, that
respondents had an agreement to arbitrate with the petitioner associations themselves. Assuming arguendo that all
the petitioners were able to present milling contracts in favor of their members, it is nonetheless undeniable that
under the arbitration clause in these contracts it is the parties thereto who have the right to submit a controversy or
dispute to arbitration. Moreover, even assuming that petitioners are indeed representatives of the member Planters
who have milling contracts with the respondents and assuming further that petitioners signed the milling contracts as
representatives of their members, petitioners could not initiate arbitration proceedings in their own name as they had
done in the present case. As mere agents, they should have brought the suit in the name of the principals that they
purportedlyrepresent.
 60. BENGUET CORPORATION v DENR-MAB
February 13, 2008 FACTS:
On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a RAWOP, wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the
owner of four mining claims respectively named as Bonito-I, Bonito-II, Bonito-III, and Bonito-IV, with a total area of
288.8656 hectares, situated in Barangay Luklukam, SitioBagong Bayan, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

Thus, on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter informing
J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims. However, on February 9, 1999, J.G. Realty, through its President,
Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the
RAWOP on the following grounds:

a. The fact that your company has failed to perform the obligations set forth in the RAWOP, i.e., to undertake
development works within 2 years from the execution of the Agreement;
b. Violation of the Contract by allowing high graders to operate on ourclaim.
c. No stipulation was provided with respect to the term limit of theRAWOP.
d. Non-payment of the royalties thereon as provided in theRAWOP.

On June 7, 2000, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP with the Legaspi
City POA, Region V, docketed as DENR Case No. 2000-01 and entitled J.G. Realty v. Benguet.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: *POA: declared the RAWOP cancelled. *MAB: affirmed POA.

ISSUE: Should the controversy have first been submitted to arbitration before the POA took cognizance of the case

HELD: YES.
On correctness of appeal: Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the
MAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.

Secs. 11.01 and 11.02 of the RAWOP pertinently provide:

11.01 Arbitration

Any disputes, differences or disagreements between BENGUET and the OWNER with reference to anything whatsoever
pertaining to this Agreement that cannot be amicably settled by them shall not be cause of any action of any kind
whatsoever in any court oradministrative agency but shall, upon notice of one party to the other, be referred to a Board
of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one to be selected by BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER
and the third to be selected by the aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed.
11.02 CourtAction
No action shall be instituted in court as to any matter in dispute as hereinabove stated, except to enforce the decision of
the majority of the Arbitrators .
61. 61.HeirsoftheLateSps.LucianoP.LimandSaludNakpilBautistavs.ThePresidingJudgeoftheRegional Trial Court of QuezonCity

FACTS: This is a case for the reconstitution of the TCT of a subject parcel of land in Quezon City, whereas the private-
respondent won because of the non-appearance of the representatives from the OSG.
Petitionersfiledaverifiedpetitionfortheannulmentofthetrialcourt’sdecision.Accordingtopetitioners,
theirparents,spousesLim.Thelotcontainedanareaof795squaremetersmoreorlessandwascovered by TCT No. 27997.
Furthermore, they alleged that their parents had been in actual physical possession of the property, which they continued
after the death of their parents. When a fire allegedly razed the Quezon City Hall in June 1988, among the records
destroyed was the original copy of TCT and thus, one of the petitioners applied for and was issued a reconstituted title in
September1994.
Petitioners claimed that when private-respondent filed for reconstitution, a portion thereof was already
coveredbyanotherTCT.AndpetitionersinsistedthatthePriv.RespondentdidnotcomplywithRA26,as it failed the boundaries of
the land. They also considered committed with extrinsicfraud.
But private respondent Canosa said otherwise. The RTC ruled in favor for Canosa and CA did too.

Now, petitioners, on the one hand, posit that the Court of Appeals erred when it made a finding of fact through a mere
physical comparison of the technical descriptions in the TCTs without first allowing the
partiestovindicatetheirrespectiveclaims,atleastduringthepre-trialormoreproperly,inatrialheldfor the purpose. They also
question the Court of Appeals’ refusal to resolve the issue of ownership of the
subjectlot,arguingthatinapetitionunderRule47,Section6oftheRulesofCourt, theappellatecourtis allowed to be a trier
offacts.
Issue:WhetherornottheCourtofAppealsshouldhavetakencognizanceofthequestionsoffactwhich the petitioners raised in the
petition for annulment ofjudgment?

Ruling: No. Petitioners utterly miss the point. To repeat, with the finding that the property described in their title is
different from that of respondent Cañosa, the petition for annulment of judgment must
necessarilyfail.Andthatshouldputastoponthematter.However,theCourtofAppealsnotedthatboth parties raised issues of
ownership and spuriousness of their respective titles—with petitioners claiming that no records exist in the Quezon City
Assessor’s Office nor in the Taxation (Real Estate Division) of the ownership of respondent Cañosa’s predecessor-in-
interest over a 33,914 sq. m. land in Quezon City, and with respondent Cañosa asserting that the title issued to
petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is a spurious, having emanated from a spurious private subdivision survey (Psd) plan.
Obviously, the validity of the parties’ respective titles is being attacked, in a proceeding which was brought merely to seek
the nullification of an order ofreconstitution.
62. Cornes vs. Leal Facts:

The instant Petition traces its origins from four separate Complaints filed with the Provincial Adjudication Board, Region III
in Tarlac,. filed by petitioners and their predecessors-in interest against respondents Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc. (LEAL
REALTY), Leal Haven, Inc. (LEAL HAVEN), their Managing Director Ernesto M. Legaspi, and all persons claiming rights under
them for maintenance of peaceful possession and for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners contended
that they had been farmers and full-fledged tenants for more than 30 years of an agricultural landholding which was
previously owned and registered in the name of Josefina RoxasOmaña (JOSEFINA) under TCT No. 103275 of the Registry
of Deeds of Tarlac.

The Provincial Adjudicator Benjamin M. Yambao in this four complaints rendered a decision in favor of respondents and
against petitioners. The Provincial Adjudicator found that there was no tenancyrelationship which existed between the
parties.

However despite siding with the Provincial Adjudicator, the Court of Appeals held that notwithstandingthe lack of tenancy
relationship, the compensation agreement executed amongst the parties must berespected and the respondent cannot
ignore such agreement on the ground that that petitioners have longbeen tilling the land for their sole benefit .
Respondents and petitioner filed their respective appeals to thisCourt .

Issue: Whether or not the compensation agreement must be respected Ruling:

Yes. Therefore, LEAL REALTY may not be allowed to ignore the terms of the compensation agreement on the premise that
petitioners have long been tilling the land for their sole benefit. The terms of the compensation agreement must be
respected. Due to LEAL REALTY’s failure to pay the full amount as contained in the compensation agreement, petitioners
were allowed to continue tilling the land for their sole benefit until such time that it is able to pay the balance thereof.

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, merely reinstated the latter’s Decision, which
was silent on the manner in which the compensation agreement may be settled.

(which means the Court could grant judicial relief in enforcing the agreement even if the previous tribunal was silent on it’s
execution)

The records show that out of the amount of ₱160,000.00 stated in the compensation package, LEAL REALTY has already
paid ₱114,000.00 thereof, leaving a balance of ₱46,000.00. This amount should, thus, be paid to JACINTO, PABLO,
JUANITO and FRANCISCO (or their heirs, where applicable) by LEAL REALTY in accordance with the compensation
agreement. In the same vein, LEAL REALTY is enjoined to respect the terms of the compensation agreement by turning
over the 2,500 square-meter lot58 to JACINTO, PABLO, JUANITO, and FRANCISCO as described therein.
63. 63. Santos V Heirs of Lustre G.R. No. 151016, August 6, 2008

Facts: In the Civil Case No. 1330, both Heirs of DomingaLustre, filed with the RTC a complaint for Declaration of the
Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Conveyance and Damages against Froilan Santos, son of the appellant
spouses. In another Civil Case, filed by Lustre's other heirs against the parties of this case, the averred that the sale of the
property to Natividad Santos was simulated, spurious or fake, and that they discovered that the spouses Santos
transferred the property to Froilan Santos when ejectment suit was filed againstthem.

Issue:Whetherornottheactionforreconveyanceonthegroundthatthecertificateoftitlewas obtained by means of a fictitious

deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity.

Ruling: Yes. Any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way, prejudice the heirs who did not join, even if such case
was actually filed in behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if an action for recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent
action by a co-heir who did not join the earlier case should not be barred by prior judgment. When an action for
reconveyance is filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. It follows
then that the respondents' present action is not barred bylaches.\

64. Autocorp Group vs. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation, 556 SCRA 250, G.R. No. 166662 June 27, 2008
FACTS: Autocorp Group, represented by its President, Rodriguez, secured an ordinary re- export bond from private
respondent Intra Strata Assurance Corporation (ISAC) in favor of public Bureau of Customs (BOC), to guarantee the re-
export of 2 units of car (at 2 different dates) and/or to pay the taxes and duties thereon. Petitioners executed and signed
two Indemnity Agreements with identical stipulations in favor of ISAC, agreeing to act as surety of the subject bonds
In sum, ISAC issued the subject bonds to guarantee compliance by petitioners with their undertaking with the BOC to re-
export the imported vehicles within the given period and pay the taxes and/or duties due thereon. In turn, petitioners
agreed, as surety, to indemnify ISAC for the liability the latter may incur on the said bonds
Autocorp failed to re-export the items guaranteed by the bonds and/or liquidate theentries or cancel the bonds, and pay
the taxes and duties pertaining to the said items, despite repeated demands made by the BOC, as well as by ISAC. By
reason thereof, the BOC considered the two bondsforfeited.
Failing to secure from petitioners the payment of the face value of the two bonds, ISAC filed with the RTC an action
against petitioners to recover a sum of money plus AF. ISAC impleaded the BOC “as a necessary party plaintiff in order
that the reward of money or judgmentshallbeadjudgeduntothesaidnecessaryplaintiff.”ThecasewasdocketedasCivil Case
No.95-1584.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the Complaint states no cause of action; and (2) the BOC is an
improperparty.
The RTC denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners thus filed their Answer to the
Complaint,claimingthattheysoughtpermissionfromtheBOCforanextensionoftimetore- export the items covered by the
bonds; that the BOC has yet to issue an assessment for petitioners’ alleged default; and that the claim of ISAC for payment
is premature as the subject bonds are not yet due anddemandable.
ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the BOC “as a necessary party plaintiff in order that the reward of money or judgment shall be
adjudged unto the said necessary plaintiff” is proper
RULING: YES. A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is
to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action. The subject matter of Civil Case No. 95-1584 is the liability of Autocorp Group to the BOC, which ISAC is also bound
 to pay as the guarantor who issued the bonds therefor. Clearly, there would be no complete settlement of the subject
matter of the case at bar—the liability of Autocorp Group to the BOC—
shouldAutocorpGroupbemerelyorderedtopayitsobligationswiththeBOCtoISAC.
BOC is, therefore, a necessary party in the case at bar, and should not be dropped as a party to the present case.

65. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORP vs. WORLD INTERACTIVE NETWORK SYSTEMS JAPAN CO., LTD.

FACTS:

Petitioner entered into a licensing agreement with respondent, a foreign corporation licensed under the laws of Japan, to
which respondent was granted the exclusive license to distribute and sublicense the distribution of the television service
known as "The Filipino Channel" (TFC) in Japan. By virtue thereof, petitioner undertook to transmit the TFC programming
signals to respondent which the latter received through its decoders and distributed to itssubscribers.

A dispute arose between the parties when petitioner accused respondent of inserting nine episodes of WINS WEEKLY, a
weekly 35-minute community news program for Filipinos in Japan, into the TFC programming. Petitioner claimed that
these were "unauthorized insertions" constituting a material breach of their agreement. Consequently, petitioner notified
respondent of its intention to terminate theagreement.

Thereafter, respondent filed an arbitration suit pursuant to the arbitration clause of its agreement with petitioner. It
contended that the airing of WINS WEEKLY was made with petitioner's prior approval. It also alleged that petitioner only
threatened to terminate their agreement because it wanted to renegotiate the terms thereof to allow it to demand
higher fees. Respondent also prayed for damages for petitioner's alleged grant of an exclusive distribution license to
another entity, NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation).

The arbitrator found in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court or, in the alternative, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same Rules, with application for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.alleging serious errors of fact and law and/or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrator. Dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner may avail of, directly in the CA, a petition for review under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition to vacate the award in the RTC when the grounds invoked to
overturn the arbitrator’s decision are other than those for a petition to vacate an arbitral award enumerated under RA
876.

RULING: NO
Insular Savings Bank v. Far East Bank and Trust Company definitively outlined several judicial remedies an aggrieved party
to an arbitral award may undertake:
(1) a petition in the proper RTC to issue an order to vacate the award on the grounds provided for in Section 24 of
RA876;
(2) (2) a petition for review in the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law;and
(3) (3) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should the arbitrator have acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction.

Nevertheless, although petitioner’s position on the judicial remedies available to it was correct, we sustain the dismissal
 of its petition by the CA. The remedy petitioner availed of, entitled "alternative petition for review under Rule 43 or
petition for certiorari under Rule 65," was wrong. Time and again, we have ruled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive and not alternative orsuccessive.

Proper issues that may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 43 pertain to errors of fact, law or mixed questions of
fact and law. While a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should only limit itself to errors of jurisdiction, that is, grave
abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, it cannot be availed of where appeal is the
proper remedy or as a substitute for a lapsed appeal

66. FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. HON. EDWIN D. SORONGON and VALENTIN FONG

Facts: Petitioner Fort Bonifacio Development Corp is a corporation registered under Philippine laws and is engaged in the
business of real estate development. Respondent, Valentin Fong doing business under the name VF Industrial Sales is the
assignee of L & M Maxco Specialist
Construction’s(Maxco)retentionmoneyfromtheBonifacioRidgeCondominiumPhase1(BRCP 1). Petitioner entered into a
trade contract with Maxco wherein Maxcowould undertake the
structuralandpartialarchitecturalpackageoftheBRCP1.LaterpetitioneraccusedMaxcoofdelay in completion of its work and
sent the latter a notice of termination. Petitioner also instructed Maxco to perform remedial measures prior to the
contract expiration pursuant to Clause 23.1 of the contract. Subsequently, Maxco was sued by its creditors including
respondent for debts unrelated to BRCP1.
InordertosettlethecollectionsuitMaxcoassigneditsreceivablesrepresentingitsretentionmoney
fromtheBRCP1intheamountofP1,577,115.90.Respondent(aCREDITORofMAXCO)wrote to petitioner, informing the latter of
Maxco’s assignment in his favor and asking the latter to confirm the validity of Maxco’s receivables. Petitioner replied,
informing the respondent that Maxcodid have receivables, however these were not due and demandable until January of
next year, moreover the amount had to be ascertained and liquidated. Respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money
against petitioner and Maxco RTC Mandaluyong City. Petitioner filed a Motion
toDismissonthegroundoflackofjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter.Petitionerarguedthatsince respondent merely stepped
into the shoes of Maxco as its assignee, it was the CIAC and not the regular courts that had jurisdiction over the dispute as
provided in the TradeContract.

Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling: Yes. The adjudication of Civil Case necessarily involves the application of pertinent statutes and jurisprudence to
matters of assignment and preference of credits. As this Court held in Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v.
Domingo, this task more suited for a trial court to carry out after a full-blown trial, than an arbitration body specifically
devoted to construction contracts. An examination of the allegations in Fong’s complaint reveals that his
causeofactionspringsNOTfromaviolationoftheprovisionsoftheTradeContract,butfromthe assignment of Maxco’s retention
money to him and failure of petitioner to turn over the retention
money.Whileitistruethatrespondent,astheassigneeofthereceivablesofMaxcofrompetitioner under the Trade Contract,
merely stepped into the shoes of Maxco. However, the right of Maxcoto the retention money from petitioner under the
trade contract is not even in dispute.Respondent raises as an issue before the RTC is the petitioner’s alleged unjustified
preference to the claims of the other creditors of Maxco over the retentionmoney.
AlthoughthejurisdictionoftheCIACisnotlimitedtotheinstancesenumeratedinSection4of
E.O. No. 1008, Fong’s claim is not even construction-related at all. This court has held that: “Construction is defined as
referring to all on-site works on buildings or altering
structures,fromlandclearancethroughcompletionincludingexcavation,erectionandassemblyandinstallationof components
and equipment.” Thus, petitioner’s insistence on the application of the arbitration clause of the Trade Contract to Fong is
clearly anchored on an erroneous premise that the latter is
seekingtoenforcearightunderthetradecontract.Thispremisecannotstandsincetherighttothe retention money of Maxco
under the Trade Contract is not being impugned herein. It bears mentioning that petitioner readily conceded the
existence of the retention money. Fong’s demand that the portion of retention money should have been paid to him
before the other creditors of Maxco clearly, does not require the CIAC’s expertise and technical knowledge
ofconstruction.
67. GAMMON PHILIPPINES, INC. V. METRO RAIL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
481 SCRA 209 (2006)

FACTS:
MetroRailTransitDevelopmentCorporation(MRTDC)wasawardedagovernmentcontractbywayofa Build Lease and
Transfer Agreement to undertake the MRT 3 North Triangle Development Project. Among the major components of the
Project was the construction of a four level podiumsuperstructure.

MRTDC through its Project Manager, Parsons Inter Pro Joint Venture give notice to the Gammon of the award to
it of the contract for the construction of the podium superstructure. Shortly thereafter, MRTDC sent a letter to Gammon
notifying the latter of the suspension of all the undertakings because of the currency crisis at that time& according to
Gammon, however, it proceeded to de-water and clean up the project site. On the other hand, MRTDC claims that
before any construction activity could proceed it formally served Gammon a notice confirming the temporary suspension
of all re1uirements under the terms of the contract until such time as clarification of score has been received from the
owners. The only exception to this suspension is the re-design of the projects floor slabs and the
site de-watering and clean up. As a result of its analysis of the impact of the currency crisis, MRTDC decided to
downsize the podium structure to two level and Gammon the submitted reducing the contract price

This proposal was accepted by MRTDC, Gammon qualifiedly accepted the offer but manifested its
willingnesstoconsiderrevisionstothetermsandconditionsoftheNoticeofAward/NoticetoProceed.MRTDC notified Gammon
that it was awarding the contract to Filipinas Systems Inc since Gammon did not accept the terms and conditions of the
NOA/NTP. Consequently, Gammon sought reimbursement of the direct and indirect costs it incurred in relation to
theproject.

MRTDC signified its willingness to reimburse Gammon but rejected the latter’s computation andinstead offered a
fixed cap of 5% of Gammon’s totalclaims.

Dissatisfied with this figure Gammon filed its claim with the CIAC invoking the arbitration clause of the General
Conditions of Contract (GCC) which provides that the arbitration of all disputes claims or questions under the contract
shall be in accordance with CIAC rules.

ISSUE:
WhetherornotCIAChasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverdisputesarisingfromtheconstructioncontracts.

RULING:
Yes. EO 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected
with construction contracts entered into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration. The
CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by
parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the
contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes may involve government or private contracts.

For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary
arbitration.ThejurisdictionoftheCIACmayincludebutisnotlimitedtoviolationofspecificationsformaterials and workmanship;
violation of terms of agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual provisions; amount of damages and
penalties; commencement time and delays; payment default of employer or contractor
andchangesincontractcost.Excludedfromthecoverageofthislawaredisputesarisingfromemployer-employee relationships
which shall continue to be covered by the Labor Code of thePhilippines.

68. UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION VS. TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, 511 SCRA 335

Facts:
 This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the partial reversal of the 21 February 1996 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals Fifteenth Division which modified the Decision2 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC).

The case originated from an action for a sum of money filed by Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation
(Titan) against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation (Uniwide) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
119,3 Pasay City arising from Uniwide’s non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of three projects
covered by agreements they entered into with each other. Upon Uniwide’s motion to dismiss/suspend proceedings and
Titan’s open court manifestation agreeing to the suspension, Civil Case No. 98-0814 was suspended for it to undergo
arbitration.4 Titan’s complaint was thus re-filed with the CIAC.5 Before the CIAC, Uniwide filed an answer which was later
amended and re-amended, denying the material allegations of the complaint, with counterclaims for refund of
overpayments, actual and exemplary damages, and attorney’sfees.

The Arbitral Tribunal promulgated a Decision holding [Uniwide]liable for the unpaid balance and the VAT on this project.
Uniwide filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision which was denied by the CIAC in its Resolution. Uniwide
accordingly filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals,13 which rendered the assailed decision. Uniwide’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its assailedResolution.

Issue:

Whether or not the Decision of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) is final and conclusive and not
reviewable by this Court on appeal.

Ruling:

Yes. Factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court on
appeal.

As a rule, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not
reviewable by this Court on appeal.

This rule, however admits of certain exceptions. In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, 435 SCRA
654 (2004), we ruled that, as exceptions, factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when
the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there
was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to hearevidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to
act as such under Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
to them was not made. Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its
position before the Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of
administrative dueprocess.

69. Gammon Philippines, Inc. v. Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation FACTS:
MRTDC was awarded a government contract by way of a Build Lease and Transfer Agreement to undertake the MRT 3
North Triangle Development Project. Among the major components of the Project was the construction of a four level
 podiumsuperstructure.

MRTDC through its Project Manager, Parsons Inter Pro Joint Venture give notice to the Gammon of the award to it of the
contract for the construction of the podium superstructure. Shortly thereafter) MRTDC sent a letter to Gammon notifying
the latter of the suspension of all the undertakings because of the currency crisis at that time& According to Gammon,
however, it proceeded to de-water and clean up the project site, On the other hand, MRTDC claims that
before any construction activity could proceed it formally served Gammon a notice confirming the temporary suspension
of all re1uirements under the terms of the contract until such time as clarification of score has been received from the
owners. The only exception to this suspension is the re-design of the projects floor slabs and the site de-watering and
clean up. As a result of its analysis of the impact of the currency crisis, MRTDC decided to downsize the podium structure
to two level and Gammon the submitted reducing the contractprice

This proposal was accepted by MRTDC, Gammon qualifiedly accepted the offer but manifested its willingness to consider
revisions to the terms and conditions of the NOA/NTP. MRTDC notified Gammon that it was awarding the contract to
Filipinas Systems Inc since Gammon did not accept the terms and conditions of the NOA/NTP. Consequently, Gammon
sought reimbursement of the direct and indirect costs it incurred in relation to the project.

MRTDC signified its willingness to reimburse Gammon but rejected the latter’s computation and instead offered a fixed
cap of 5% of Gammon’s total claims.

Dissatisfied with this figure Gammon filed its claim with the CIAC invoking the arbitration clause of the General Conditions
of Contract (GCC) which provides that the arbitration of all disputs claims or 1uestions under the contract shall be in
accordance with CIAC rules

ISSUE:
whether or not CIAC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:
Yes, CIAC has jurisdiction over the case. The CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or
connected with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines whether the dispute arises
before or after the completion of the contracts or after the abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes may involve
government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same
to voluntary arbitration. The jurisdiction of the CIACmayinclude but is not limited to violation of
specifications for materials and workmanship, violation of the terms of agreement, interpretati on and/or application of
contractualprovisions.

70. LICOMCEN v. FOUNDATION SPECIALIST

Facts:

The ruling was rendered in the consolidated case of Licomcen, Inc. vs. Foundation Specialists, Inc., G.R. Nos.
167022 and 169678. The dispute arose between mall developer Licomcen, Inc. and contractor Foundation Specialists, Inc.
(FSI) over the suspension of certain works and the payment of billings and other amounts. Licomcen and FSI had a
Construction Agreement, with General Conditions of Contract (GCC), whereby FSI undertook to construct and install
bored piles foundation for the LCC Citimall project in Legazpi City.
Immediately after signing the agreement, FSI began work on the project but in January 1998, Licomcen ordered it
to halt construction due to an administrative case filed against officials of the City Government of Legazpi and Licomcen
before the Ombudsman. The suspension was formalized through a letter of Licomcen’s engineering consultant, E.S. de
Castro & Associates (ESCA), to FSI on January 19, 1998. In its reply letters, FSI claimed payment for work and materials.
ESCA rejected FSI’s claims in a letter dated March 24, 1998.
Three years later, FSI sent a final demand letter to Licomcen for payment of its claims. As this letter was ignored,
FSI filed a request for arbitration with the CIAC in October 2002, claiming unpaid billings, costs, unrealized profit,
 attorney’s fees and interest. Licomcen contested the request, arguing, among others, that (a) the claims were non-
arbitrable because the arbitration clause provides for the arbitration of disputes “in connection with, or arising out of the
execution of the Works,” but FSI’s money claims do not involve a dispute as to the execution of the Works since they do
not involve an issue as to physical construction activities; and (b) FSI failed to comply with the condition precedent that a
dispute must first be referred to Licomcen for resolution, and such resolution may only be assailed within 30 days from
receipt thereof through a notice to contest through arbitration.
The CIAC ruled in favor of FSI, which decision was upheld with some modification by the Court of Appeals. On
appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision with modification and affirmed that the CIAC properly
acquired jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute.
Issue:

WON the CIAC’s jurisdiction is limited only to disputes in connection with or arising out of the execution of the Works.
Ruling:

NO.

CIAC’s jurisdiction cannot be limited by the parties’ stipulation that only disputes in connection with or arising out of the
execution of the Works are arbitrable before the said agency. The mere fact that the parties incorporated an arbitration
clause in their contract ipso facto vested the CIAC with jurisdiction over any construction controversy or claim between
the parties. The parties did not intend to limit resort to arbitration only to disputes relating to physical construction
activities, holding that “an arbitration clause pursuant to E.O 1008 [Construction Industry Arbitration Law] should be
interpreted at its widest signification.” The Tribunal liberally applied the parties’ arbitration clause so that FSI’s
moneyclaims were considered connected with or arising out of construction activities, thereby making such claims
arbitrable.
On the principle that the CIAC’s jurisdiction can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the parties, the Supreme Court also
held that such jurisdiction cannot be subject to a condition precedent. Hence, even ifFSIfailedtotimelycontest
Licomcen’sdenial ofitsmoneyclaimsbyfilingapropernoticeofarbitration within 30 days from the denial, the Supreme Court
ruled that the CIAC acquired jurisdiction of the parties’ dispute due to the mere presence of an arbitration clause in their
constructioncontract.
An arbitration clause in a construction contract should be interpreted in its “widest signification” to enable the CIAC to
acquire jurisdiction over a construction claim

71. 71. Metro Construction Inc v Chatham Properties FACTS :

On 21 April 1994, the parties formally entered into a contract for the construction of the "Chatham House" . . . for
the contract price of price of P50,000,000.00. On 12 July 1994, a Supplemental Contract was executed by and between
the parties whereby CHATHAM authorized MCI to procure in behalf of the former materials, equipment, etc. Under
Section I.04 of the Supplemental Contract, the total amount of procurement and transportation cost[s] and expenses
which may be reimbursed by MCI from CHATHAM shall not exceed the amount of P75, 000,000.00. In the course of the
construction, Change Orders No. 1, 4, 8A, 11, 12 and 13 were implemented, CHATHAM reimbursed MCI the amount of
P60,000.00 corresponding to bonuses advanced to its workers by the latter for the 14th, 16th, and 17th floors.
CHATHAM's payments to MCI totaled P104,875,792.37, representing payments for portions of MCI's progress billings and
x xx additionalcharges..
In April 1998, MCI sought to collect from CHATHAM a sum of money for unpaid progress billings and
other charges and instituted a request for adjudication of its claims with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission CIAC. The CIAC disposed of the specific money claims by either granting or reducing them. On Issue No. 9,
i.e., whether CHATHAM failed to complete and/or deliver the project within the approved completion period and, if so,
whether CHATHAM is liable for liquidated damages and how much. CIAC rendered Judgement in favor of the Claimant
[MCI] directing Respondent [CHATHAM] to pay Claimant [MCI] the net sum of SIXTEEN MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY
SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDREDTWENTY
TWO & 91/100 (16,126,922.91) PESOS. Impugning the decision of the CIAC, CHATHAM instituted a petition for review
with the Court ofAppeals

In upholding the decision of the CIAC, the Court of Appeals confirmed the jurisprudential principle that absent any
showing of arbitrariness, the CIAC's findings as an administrative agency and quasi judicial body should not only be
accorded great respect but also given the stamp offinality.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals can also review findings of facts of the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission(CIAC)

Ruling:

Yes. Through Circular No. 1-91, the Supreme Court intended to establish a uniform procedure for the review of the
final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and other quasi-judicial agencies provided that an appeal therefrom is
then allowed under existing statutes to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The Circular designated the
Courtof Appeals as the reviewing body to resolve questions of fact or of law or mixed questions of fact and law.
It is clear that Circular No. 1-91 covers the CIAC. In the first place, it is a quasi-judicial agency. A quasi-judicial agency
or body has been defined as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making The very definition of an administrative agency
includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to
administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for
technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. The CIACs
primary function is that of a quasi- judicial agency, which is to adjudicate claims and/or determine rights in accordance
with procedures set forth in E.O. No. 1008.
In the second place, the language of Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 emphasizes the obvious inclusion of the CIAC even
if it is not named in the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies. The introductory words [a]mong these agencies are
preceding the enumeration of specific quasi- judicial agencies only highlight the fact that the list is not exclusive or
conclusive. Further, the overture stresses and acknowledges the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies not included in
the enumeration but should be deemed included. In addition, the CIAC is obviously excluded in the catalogue of cases not
covered by the Circular and mentioned in Section 2 thereof for the reason that at the time the Circular took effect, E.O.
No. 1008 allows appeals to the Supreme Court on questions of law.
In sum, under Circular No. 1-91, appeals from the arbitral awards of the CIAC may be brought to the Court of
Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court alone. The grounds for the appeal are likewise broadened to include appeals on
questions of facts and appeals involving mixed questions of fact and law.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from final orders or decisions of the CIAC is further fortified by
the amendments to B.P. Blg.129, as introduced by R.A. No. 7902. With the amendments, the Court of Appeals is
vested with appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi- judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of1948.
72. HEUNGHWA INDUSTRY CO., LTD. V. DJ BUILDERS CORPORATION FACTS:

Heunghwa Industry Co., Ltd. (petitioner) was able to secure a contract with the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) to construct the Roxas-Langogan Road in Palawan.
Petitioner entered into a subcontract agreement with respondent DJ Builders Corporation to do earthwork, sub base
course and box culvert of said project. The agreement contained an arbi- tration clause. The agreed price was not fully
paid, hence, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for "Breach of Contract, Collection of Sum of Money
with Application for Pre- liminary Injunction, Preliminary Attachment, and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Damages”.
Petitioner averred that it was not obliged to pay respondent because the latter caused the stop- page of work. Petitioner
further claimed that it failed to collect from the DPWH due to respond- ent's poor equipment performance. Parties
submit specific issues, such as manpower and equipment standby time, unrecouped mobilization expenses, retention,
discrepancy of billings, and price escalation for fuel and oil usage. The said motion was granted by the RTC.
Petitioner, filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the Order which referred the case to the CIAC, claiming it never
authorized the referral. Respondent opposed the motion contending that petitioner was already estopped from asking for
the recall of the Order.
Issue: whether or not the CIAC has the jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

Yes. CIAC has jurisdiction over the case. The CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the construction dispute was the agreement of the parties and not the Court's referral or- der. The CIAC aptly ruled
that the recall of the referral order by the RTC did not deprive the CIAC of the jurisdiction it had already acquired.
The position of CIAC is anchored on Executive Order No. 1008 (1985) which created CIAC and vested in it "original
and exclusive jurisdiction" over construction disputes in construc- tion projects in the Philippines provided the parties
agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration. The basis of the Court referral is precisely the agreement of the parties in
court, and that, by this agreement as well as by the court referral of the specified issues to arbitration, under Executive
Order No. 1008 (1985), the CIAC had in fact acquired original and exclusive jurisdiction over these issues.
In section 4.2 of the CIAC Rules, the failure despite due notice which amounts to a re- fusal of the Respondent to
arbitrate, shall not stay the proceedings notwithstanding the absence or lack of participation of the Respondent. In such
case, CIAC shall appoint the arbitrator/s in accordance with these Rules. Arbitration proceedings shall continue, and the
award shall be made after receiving the evidence of the Claimant. Therefore, the proceedings cannot then be voided
merely because of the non-participation of petitioner. Section 4.2 of the CIAC Rules is clear and it leaves no room for
interpretation. Therefore, petitioner's prayer that the case be re- manded to CIAC in order that it may be given an
opportunity to present evidence is untenable. Petitioner had its chance and lost it, more importantly so, by its own
choice. This Court will not afford a relief that is apparently inconsistent with the law.
73. Jurisdiction ofCIAC

GR.171624 Dec. 6,2010

BF Homes Inc. v. Manila Electric Company Review on Certiorari petition.

FACTS: BF Homes and Phil.Waterworks and Construction Corporation[PWCC] are owners and operators of waterworks
systems delivering water to over 12,000 households and commercial buildings in BF Homes subdivisions in Parañaque
City, Las Piñas City, Caloocan City, and Quezon City. They invoked their right to refund against Meralco. BF Homes and
PWCC. The water distributed in the waterworks systems owned and operated by BF Homes and PWCC is drawn from
deep wells using pumps run by electricity supplied by Meralco.
Before the RTC, petition to refund by petitioners were granted and Meralco was mandated to refund P11.8m. Meralco’s
MR denied. Petitioners then alleged that Meralco disconnected electric supply to 16 water pumps without notice. Later
Meralco demanded P4.7m from petitioners as payment and requested the 4.7m be deducted from the P11.8 amount to
be refunded. While serving its reply letter, Meralco cut off power supply to 5 other water pumps without notice. Then
Meralco threatened to cut off supply to all pumps if petitioners fail to pay the 4.7m. Meralco sought the dismissal of the
RTC decision on the ground that petitioners filed the instant petition in order to avoid paying the bills.
Meralco then alleged that the SC has no jurisdiction over the matter due to the fact that Meralcois a utility company
whose business is wholly regulated by the Energy Regulatory Commission [ERC] and that the SC decision clearly stated
that respondent is directed to make the refund to its customers in accordance with the ERC decision dated February 16,
1998. Hence, [MERALCO] has to wait for the schedule and details of the refund to be approved by the ERC before it can
comply with the SCdecision.
ISSUE: WON CIAC has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: No. The case does not involve the construction of an establishment/building. What is involved is the issue with
regard to Meralco’s act of cutting off the power supply of petitioners’ water pumps. The jurisdiction lies with the ERC
because the right to refund[it is a right granted to Meralco consumers] invoked by the petitioners was based on an ERC
decision. The petition is dismissed because it should have passed through the ERC first before going to the regularcourts.
Notes: ERC has quasi-judicial function.
 74. HUTAMA-RSEA v Citra Metro Manila 586 SCRA746

Facts: Petitioner and respondent entered into an Engineering Procurement Construction Contract (EPCC) whereby
petitioner would undertake the construction of Stage 1 of the Skyway Project. As consideration, respondent obliged itself
to pay US$369,510,304.00.
Even after the construction concluded and the skyway opened for public use, respondent still failed to make good
its balance. Petitioner, sent a letter to respondent demanding payment. Several meetings were held to discuss a possible
amicable settlement between the parties, but a year has passed and there was no agreement.
Petitioner finally filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Request for Arbitration.
Respondent moved to dismiss, saying that the action was premature since there was no prior filing to the Dispute
Adjudication Board as required under their EPCC. CIAC held that it has jurisdiction, and that prior recourse to DAB is not a
condition precedent. The CA reversed and enjoined CIAC from exercising jurisdiction.

Issues:

1. WON recourse to the CIAC ispremature

2. WON CIAC has jurisdiction over thedispute

Rulings:
1. No. It is true that Clause 20.4 of the EPCC states that a dispute between petitioner and respondent as regards the
EPCC shall be initially referred to the DAB for decision. This does not mean, however, that the CIAC is barred from
assuming jurisdiction over the dispute if such clause was not complied with. Under Section 1, Article III of the CIAC Rules,
an arbitration clause in a construction contract shall be deemed as an agreement to submit an existing or future
controversy to CIAC jurisdiction, “notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration institution or arbitral body in
such contract x xx.”
2. Yes. Executive Order No. 1008 vests in the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or
connected with, contracts entered into by the parties involved in construction in the Philippines. The dispute between
petitioner and respondent has been lingering for almost five years now. A ruling requiring the parties to still appoint a
DAB, to which they should first refer their dispute before the same could be submitted to the CIAC, would merely be
circuitous and dilatory at this point. It would entail unnecessary delays and expenses on both parties, which Executive
Order No. 1008 precisely seeks to prevent.
75. ROMAGO INC VS SIEMENS BUILDING TECHNOLOGIES INC. GR. NO. 181969, OCTOBER 2, 2009

Facts: Petitioner was awarded the sub-contract for the Building Services-Electrical Package for the Insular Life Corporate
Center. Under the consortium agreement equipment supply sub-contract agreement with respondents, it undertook to
deliver the needed electrical equipment for the project for Romago. Respondents made deliveries but Petitioner failed to
pay in full. The former made demands, but they were not paid. Romago refused to pay its obligation which amounted to
Php 16, 937, 612.68, unless respondents compensate petitioner for the total expenses it allegedly incurred in taking over
respondent’s contractual obligations when the earlier demands to pay wereunheeded.
Respondent filed a Request for Arbitration with the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center, Inc. (PDRCI) which was agreed to
by petitioner. After due proceedings, the arbitrator awarded to respondent its claim of the amount mentioned plus legal
interest, attorney’s fees andcosts.
Respondent filed a petition for Confirmation of the Arbitrator’s Decision and instead of filing a motion to Vacate the
Award. The RTC granted the petition, confirmed the award and issued a writ of execution. This had becaome final and
executory. Despite receipt of the Order, Romago did not interpose an appeal. It was only on a later date when Atty Barrios
withdrew his appearance and the law office of MutiaVendas entered appearance that Romago sought for a petition for
relief from judgment. Claiming that Atty. Barrios was sick for 3 weeks and only later were they aware of the orders of
thecourt.
Petitioner opposed and the RTC denied it. Motion for Reconsideration was denied. And upon petition for certiorai to the
CA, Romago raised the issue that the PDRCI had no jurisdiction over the dispute since the contract with SBTI was a
construction contract and was within the jurisdiction of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)

Issue: Whether or not CIAC has jurisdiction.

Held:No. It was a supply contract, thus, not within the jurisdiction of the CIAC. The word construction is defined as
referring to all on-site works on buildings or altering structures, from land clearance through completion, including
excavation, erection, and assembly and installation of components and equipment. By no stretch of the imagination can
the ESSA be characterized as a construction contract. Crystal clear from the provisions of the ESSA is that SBTI’s role was
merely to supply the needed equipment for the Insular Life Corporate Center project. The ESSA is, therefore, a mere
supply contract that does not fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of CIAC.
We also note that the Consortium Agreement between ROMAGO and SBTI contained an arbitration clause, wherein the
parties agreed to submit any dispute between them for arbitration under the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (PCCI), such as the PDRCI. It is well-settled that the arbitral clause in the agreement is a commitment by the
parties to submit to arbitration the disputes covered therein. Because that clause is binding, they are expected to abide
by it in good faith. The CA, therefore, correctly rejected ROMAGO’s assertion that the PDRCI had no jurisdiction over the
suit in the first instance.
We are not unmindful of the settled doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be
reckoned by the court at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. However,
this case falls within the exception. To repeat, ROMAGO actively participated in the proceedings before the PDRCI; even
after an adverse judgment had been rendered by the Arbitrator, it did not assail the PDRCI’s jurisdiction over the dispute.
In fact, during the proceedings for the confirmation of the Arbitrator’s award, ROMAGO’s opposition zeroed in on the
alleged bias and partiality of the Arbitrator in rendering the decision. Even in its petition for relief from judgment filed
with the RTC, the PDRCI’s alleged lack of jurisdiction was never raised as an issue. It was only in its petition for certiorari
with the CA, and after a writ of execution had been issued, that ROMAGO raised the issue of lack ofjurisdiction.

76. GAMMON PHILIPPINES vs METRO RAIL TRANSIT

Facts:In 1996, MRTDC was awarded a government contract toundertake the MRT 3 North Triangle Development P
roject. Gammon submitted a bid to complete the works on the four level podium superstructure, a major
component of the project, for P1.4B. On 27 August 1997, MRTDC issued a
Noticeof Award [NOA] and Notice to Proceed [NTP] in favor of Gammon. Shortly thereafter on 12 September 1997,
MRTDC notified Gammon to suspend all undertakings stipulated in the August NOA/NTP due to currency crisis.

On May 7, 1998, MRTDC rescinded the NOA/NTP dated April 2, 1998. In its place, MRTDC offered another
NOA/NTP dated June 10, 1998 whose terms reduced the original construction period and increased the stipulated
 liquidated damages in case of delay. Gammon qualifiedly accepted the offer but manifested its willingness to
consider revisions to the terms and conditions of the NOA/NTP.

On June 22, 1998, MRTDC notified Gammon that it was awarding the contract to Filipinas (Prefab Building)
Systems, Inc. (Filsystems) since Gammon did not accept the terms and conditions of the June 10, 1998 NOA/NTP.
Consequently, Gammon sought reimbursement of the direct and indirect costs it incurred in relation to the Project.
MRTDC signified its willingness to reimburse Gammon but rejected the latter's computation and instead offered a
fixed cap of five percent (5%) of Gammon's total claims

Dissatisfied, Gammon filed its claim with the CIAC invoking the arbitration clause of the General Conditions of
Contract (GCC) which provides that the arbitration of all disputes, claims or questions under the contract shall be
in accordance with CIAC rules.
ISSUE: WON Claims for moral, exemplary damages, opportunity or business loses are within CIAC’s Jurisdiction.
RULING:No. Moral, exemplary damages, opportunity or business loses in addition to liquidated damages
and Attorney’s fees are excluded from CIAC’s Jurisdiction ,unl;ess the parties mutually agree to submit
these issues for arbitration and to abide by the decision of the arbitrator thereon.

77. Maria Lucia Park Association vs. Almendras

Facts:

Samantha Marie T. Almendras and Pia Angela T. Almendras purchased from MRO Development Corporation a residential
lot located in Maria Luisa Estate Park, Banilad, Cebu City. After some time, respondents filed with petitioner Maria Luisa
Park Association, Incorporated (MLPAI) an application to construct a residential house, which was approved in February
10, 2002.

Upon ocular inspection of the house, MLPAI found out that respondents violated the prohibition against multi-dwelling3
stated in MLPAI’s Deed of Restriction. MLPAI sent a letter to the respondents, demanding that they rectify the structure;
otherwise, it will be constrained to forfeit respondents’ construction bond and impose stiffer penalties.

Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, a Complaint on June 2, 2003 for Injunction,
Declaratory Relief, Annulment of Provisions of Articles and By-Laws with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)/Preliminary Injunction.

MLPAI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to comply with the
arbitration clause provided for in MLPAI’s by-laws.

Petitioner MLPAI contends that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the present controversy, it being a dispute
between a subdivision lot owner and a subdivision association, where the latter aimed to compel respondents to comply
with the MLPAI’s Deed of Restriction, specifically the provision prohibiting multi-dwelling.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the case they filed against MLPAI is one for declaratory relief and
annulment of the provisions of the by-laws; hence, it is outside the competence of the HLURB to resolve.

Issue: Whether or not HLURB has jurisdiction over the present controversy?

Ruling:
Yes. We agree with the trial court that the instant controversy falls squarely within the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), now HLURB.

In the present case, there is no question that respondents are members of MLPAI as they have even admitted it.
Therefore, as correctly ruled by the trial court, the case involves a controversy between the homeowners’ association and
some of its members. Thus, the exclusive and original jurisdiction lies with the HLURB.

The provisions of P.D. No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The
intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the
implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may
take recourse.

78.REP OF THE PH vs FAR EAST ENTERPRISES G.R. No. 176487 08/25/2009

FACTS:
The RP filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain before the RTC of Nasugbu against herein defendants.
Defendants filed their respective answers praying that: the prayer of petitioner for a writ of possession be denied
unless full payment of just compensation would be made after trial on the merits, pay just compensation on
property taken for a previous project. The petitioner was ordered to pay the defendants just compensation before
their properties could be expropriated, and the court granted the petitioners’ prayer. However, the trial court later
on ruled that the fact, as claimed by the plaintiff, that the lands of the movants are idle, raw and undeveloped, with
no houses thereon, does not unmake the same as residential because they were already classified as such long
before this case was filed. The fact that the subject properties may be suitable for agricultural uses does not make it
agricultural because they were classified as residential. Plaintiff cannot question the very contents of its documents
which are parts and parcels of its complaint. It is a cardinal rule in adjective law that pleadings are binding on the
pleader. Petitioner was made to pay an additional deposit. CA found no grave abuse of discretion in RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE: WON the courts, in the first instance, is the proper venue in which to resolve any dispute involving the
classification of lands?

HELD:
No. By questioning the classification of the lands involved, petitioner is, in effect, questioning the propriety,
wisdom and legality of the act of the Municipal Council of Nasugbu, Batangas of reclassifying the subject lands as
Residential. Per certification of the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator/Zoning
Administrator of the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas, the lands of Far East and the Bernasconis sought to be
expropriated were classified as Residential, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 3 dated 3 May 1982, as
approved under Resolution No. 123, series of 1983 dated 4 May 1983 by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (now HLURB57). This Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands
through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB.

In the case before us, the lands in question had long been (almost 20 years) reclassified as residential before
the instant case was filed. All those years, no one questioned the ordinance reclassifying the lands. If petitioner
would like to have the reclassification of the lands involved changed to agricultural, the just and reasonable way of
doing it is to go to the municipal council -- not the courts – that enacted the ordinance and to ask that the lands be
reclassified again as agricultural. The jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, "even if the question[s] involved
[are] also judicial in character." In this manner, we give the respect due to these agencies (the municipal council and
the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission [now HLURB]), which unquestionably have primary jurisdiction to
rule on matters of classification of lands. Well settled is the principle that by reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon; thus their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by
the courts. Accordingly, since specialized government agencies tasked to determine the classification of parcels of
land, such as the Bureau of Soils and the HLURB, among other agencies, have already certified that the subject land
is residential/commercial, the Court must accord such conclusions great respect, if not finality, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.

81. HEUNGHWA INDUSTRY CO., LTD. V. DJ BUILDERS CORPORATION, G.R. NO.

Facts:
 Heunghwa Industry Co., Ltd. (petitioner) is was able to secure a contract with the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) to construct the Roxas-Langogan Road in Palawan.

PetitionerenteredintoasubcontractagreementwithrespondentDJBuildersCorporationtodoearthwork, sub base

course and box culvert of said project. The agreement contained an arbitration clause. The agreed price was not fully paid,
hence, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for "Breach of Contract, Collection of Sum of Money with
Application for Preliminary Injunction, Preliminary Attachment, and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
andDamages".

Petitioner averredthatit wasnotobligedtopayrespondentbecausethelattercausedthestoppageofwork. Petitioner

further claimed that it failed to collect from the DPWH due to respondent's poor equipment performance. Parties submit
specific issues, such as manpower and equipment standby time, unrecouped mobilization expenses, retention,
discrepancy of billings, and price escalation for fuel and oil usage. The said motion was granted by theRTC.

Petitioner, filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the Order which referred the case to the CIAC, claiming it
never authorized the referral. Respondent opposed the motion contending that petitioner was already estopped from
asking for the recall of the Order.

Issue: whether or not the CIAC or the RTC has the jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

YES.

CIAC has jurisdiction over the case. The CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over the construction dispute was
the agreement of the parties and not the Court's referral order. The CIAC aptly ruled that the recall of the referral order
by the RTC did not deprive the CIAC of the jurisdiction it had already acquired.

The position of CIAC is anchored on Executive Order No. 1008 (1985) which created CIAC and vested in it "original
and exclusive jurisdiction" over construction disputes in construction projects in the Philippines provided the parties
agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration. The basis of the Court referral is precisely the
agreementofthepartiesincourt,andthat,bythisagreementaswellasbythecourtreferralofthespecifiedissues to arbitration,
under Executive Order No. 1008 (1985), the CIAC had in fact acquired original and exclusive jurisdiction over theseissues.

In section 4.2 of the CIAC Rules, the failure despite due notice which amounts to a refusal of the Respondentto
arbitrate,shallnotstaytheproceedingsnotwithstandingtheabsenceor lackofparticipationofthe Respondent. In such case,
CIAC shall appoint the arbitrator/s in accordance with these Rules. Arbitration proceedings shall continue, and the award
shall be made after receiving the evidence of the Claimant.Therefore, the proceedings cannot then be voided merely
because of the non-participation of petitioner. Section 4.2 of the CIAC Rules is clear and it leaves no room for
interpretation. Therefore, petitioner's prayer that the case be remanded to CIAC in order that it may be given an
opportunity to present evidence is untenable. Petitioner had itschanceand
lostit,moreimportantlyso,byitsownchoice.ThisCourt willnot affordareliefthat isapparently inconsistent with thelaw.

82. PNCC vs CA
Facts:
A contract for the construction of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academys (PMMAs) Replication Project
located in San Marcelino, Zambales, was entered into between the PNCC and PMMA. Included in the scope of works
for the Replication Project was the construction of a gymnasium building. The construction of said gymnasium was
subcontracted by PNCC to MCS under a Subcontract Agreement . PNCC certified that MCS had satisfactorily
completed the construction of the gymnasium building based on the plans, drawings, and specifications. However,
despite several demands made by MCS, PNCC failed to pay the balance of the contract price left after deducting the
partial payments made by the latter.
 MCS filed with the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal a Request for Adjudication praying for the award of various sums
of money, including interest and damages, against PNCC. For its defense, PNCC alleged that the request for
arbitration was premature, as MCS had no cause of action against PNCC since the latter is still in the process of
paying its obligation to MCS. Furthermore, PNCC claimed that although its payments were made in installments,
said payments were made regularly, contrary to the claim of MCS that said installment payments were irregular
and took a very long period of time. The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal rendered a Decision in favor of MCS and awarded
the latter the following: 1. Principal claim with interest; 2. Attorney’s fees; 3. Reimbursement to the cost of the
arbitration
Issue: W/N CIAC failed to state legal and factual basis for the award of attorney’s feeds and arbitration cost
Ruling:
No. Generally, in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion, courts must sustain the
factual findings of the CIAC arbitrator this being in accordance with the established principle that the
determination of certain questions of fact falling within the peculiar technical expertise of an
administrative agency, must be accorded with great respect, if not finality by the courts.
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal Decision amply explained the bases
for the awards of attorneys fees and arbitration cost. As pointed out by the appellate court, on the basis of its
findings that PNCC exercised gross and evident bad faith in delaying its payment of MCS claims and the law
applicable in such cases, the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal adjudged PNCC liable for attorneys fees and cost of
arbitration. Furthermore, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it said that that there is no justifiable reason to
disturb the findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal as said quasi-judicial body has considered the evidence at hand
and the records clearly show that its decision is amply supported by substantial evidence.

83. First Lepanto Ceramic v CA

Facts:

Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court
which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of
Investments (BOI).

BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the
scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." OppositorMariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor
appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.

CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after
its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI
case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987.

Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules
Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein
runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly
with the Supreme Court.

While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on
the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on
February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing
the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was
previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

84. SHINRYO INC. VS RRN INC.

Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (petitioner) and private respondentRRN Incorporated (respondent) are
domestic corporations organized underPhilippine laws.

It was shown that petitioner and respondent executed an agreement and Conditions of Sub- contract. Respondent
signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of its projects. The parties also agreed that respondent
will perform variation orders for the Phillip Morris
Greenfield Project (Project). In connection with it, petitioner supplied manpower chargeable against respondent.

Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to financial difficulties. Petitioner partially paid
respondent. Respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter to petitioner demanding for the payment of its unpaid
balance.

Thereafter, their dispute was submitted to arbitration to CIAC. The CIAC rendered the assailed decision in favor of the
claimant. Reconsideration to CA. And now certiorari.

Issue: W/N factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
Ruling: Yes.
Despite petitioner's attempts to make it appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is quite clear that what petitioner
seeks is for this Court to recalibrate the evidence it has presented before the CIAC.

Book’s ruling-
Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In
particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.

This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions.

(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of
the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of
Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion resulting in
lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral
Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2) when the findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of administrative due process.

85. Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation vs. Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation, 511
SCRA 335
Facts:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the partial reversal of the 21 February 1996 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals Fifteenth Division which modified the Decision2 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC).
The case originated from an action for a sum of money filed by Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation
(Titan) against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation (Uniwide) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
119,3 Pasay City arising from Uniwide’s non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of three projects
covered by agreements they entered into with each other. Upon Uniwide’s motion to dismiss/suspend proceedings and
Titan’s open court manifestation agreeing to the suspension, Civil Case No. 98-0814 was suspended for it to undergo
arbitration.4 Titan’s complaint was thus re-filed with the CIAC.5 Before the CIAC, Uniwide filed an answer which was
later amended and re-amended, denying the material allegations of the complaint, with counterclaims for refund of
overpayments, actual and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
The Arbitral Tribunal promulgated a Decision holding [Uniwide]liable for the unpaid balance and the VAT on this
project. Uniwide filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision which was denied by the CIAC in its Resolution.
Uniwide accordingly filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals,13 which rendered the assailed decision.
Uniwide’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Decision of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) is final and conclusive and not
reviewable by this Court on appeal.
Ruling:
Yes. Factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court
on appeal.
As a rule, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and
not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
This rule, however admits of certain exceptions. In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, 435
SCRA 654 (2004), we ruled that, as exceptions, factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court
when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2)
there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified
to act as such under Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to
them was not made. Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position
before the Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of administrative due
process.

MISSING 86