Torts Quasi Delict Case Digests Temp1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. QUASI-DELICT
1 Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. vs C & A Construction, Inc. (GR No. 156034, 1
October 1, 2003)
2 Lilius vs Manila Railroad, 27 SCRA 674 4
3 Picart vs Smith, 37 Phil 8 6
4 Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs Baesa, GR No. 7905051, November 14, 1989 7
5 Vergara vs Court of Appeals(GR No. 77679, September 30, 1987) 9
6 Umali vs Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 10
7 Bustamante, et al. vs CA (GR No. 89880, February 6, 1991) 11
8 Medardo Cadiente vs. Bithuel Macas (GR No. 161946, November 14, 2008) 12
9 Phoenix vs IAC, GR No. 65295 13
10 McKee vs IAC, GR No. 68102 16
11 Lambert Ramos vs COL Realty Corp, GR No. 184905, August 28, 2009 19
12 Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs CA, GR No. 53401, November 6, 1989 21
13 Li vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 117944, February 7, 1996 22
14 Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. vs C & A Construction, Inc. (GR No. 156034, 1;26
October 1, 2003)
15 People vs Ritter (GR No. 88582, March 5, 1991) 26
II. DAMAGES
16 Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs CA, et al. (GR No. 126850, April 28,
2004)
17 Filipinas Broadcasting Network vs Ago Medical and Educational Center (GR No.
141994, January 17, 2005)
18 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, et al. vs BA Finance Corporation (GR
No. 179952, December 4, 2009)
19 Simex International (Manila) Incorporated vs. CA (GR No. 88013, March 19,
1990)
20 Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs Alfonso Verchez, et al. (GR No.
164349, January 31, 2006)
III. HUMAN RELATIONS

21 Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs CA, et al. (GR No. 126850, April 28,
2004)
22 Filipinas Broadcasting Network vs Ago Medical and Educational Center (GR No.
141994, January 17, 2005)
23 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, et al. vs BA Finance Corporation (GR
No. 179952, December 4, 2009)
24 Simex International (Manila) Incorporated vs. CA (GR No. 88013, March 19,
1990)
TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 i|Page

IV. NUISANCE
25 Judge Tanin, ER. Et al. vs CA (GR No. 97477, May 8, 1992)
26 Sitchon, et al. vs Aquino (98 Phil 458)
V. INTERFERRENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

27 Daywalt vs Corporation E pp. Agustinos Recoletos, et al. (39 Phil 58)
VI. LAWS ON INTELLECTUAL CREATIONS

28 Kabushi Kaisha Isetan, et al. vs IAC (GR No. 75420, November 15, 1991)
29 Ang vs Teodoro (74 Phil 50)
30 Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs General Milling Corporation (120 SCRA
804)
VII. CONCEPT
TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 ii | P a g e

QUASI-DELICT
1. Delsan Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. vs. C & A Construction, Inc., 412 SCRA 524, G.R.
No. 156034 October 1, 2003
(Adizas, Alvino Leander)
DOCTRINE: Negligence; The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.—Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. The test for determining the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
-Emergency Rule; Under the rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought about
by his own negligence.
-Quasi-delict; To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee an employer must
overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.—Whenever an
employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection
(culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a
quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of his employee.
Same; The required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the selection but
also to the supervision of employees.
Same; Once negligence on the part of the employees is shown, the burden of proving that he
observed the diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees shifts to the employer.
Same; It is not necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its
employees inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by operation of law; Allegations of negligence
against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to
make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2180 of the Civil Code.
FACTS: Respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing Authority
(NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila.
M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc.,
anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo
TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 1|Page

QUASI-DELICT
oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan
Express received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit
Manila in about eight (8) hours. In the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek
shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested. He
decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge.
At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high and so he ordered his crew to go
full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To
avoid collision, he also ordered a full stop of the vessel which succeeded in avoiding the power
barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the
deflector wall constructed by respondent. The damage caused by the incident amounted to
P456,198.24.11.
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, petitioner claimed that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event.
The complaint filed by respondent was dismissed. The trial court ruled that petitioner was not
guilty of negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident.
Applying the "emergency rule", it absolved petitioner of liability because the latter had no
opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening situation. It further held that
even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot be held liable as the cause
of the damage sustained by respondent was typhoon "Katring", which is an act of God.
On appeal to the CA the decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside. It found Capt. Jusep
guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of
October 21, 1994 and thus held petitioner liable for damages.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending that Capt. Jusep was not negligent in waiting
until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994 before transferring the vessel to the North Harbor
inasmuch as it was not shown that had the transfer been made earlier, the vessel could have sought
shelter. It further claimed that it cannot be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code because respondent failed to allege in the complaint that petitioner was negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees. Granting that Capt. Jusep was indeed guilty of
negligence, petitioner is not liable because it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep
who is a duly licensed and competent Master Mariner.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent.
2. If yes, whether or not petitioner is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the
quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep.
RULING:
1. YES. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have
sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative

QUASI-DELICT
success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of negligence in the present case, but
the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite
knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of
more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction. He cannot claim that he waited
for the sun to rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report
because of the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise.
Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very
cloudy and there was no weather disturbance yet.
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep
showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
observed in the same situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater chances
of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they docked was
very near North Harbor. Even if the latter was already congested, he would still have time to seek
refuge in other ports.
The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the danger in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.]Clearly, the emergency rule is not
applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by
his own negligence.
2. YES. Anent the second issue, we find petitioner vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt.
Jusep.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also the
employer of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty. The
defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep
because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It should be stressed, however, that
the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the selection, but also to the
supervision of employees. It is not enough that the employees chosen be competent and qualified,
inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees.
In Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that due diligence in supervision requires the
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper

QUASI-DELICT
instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the
rules.
In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for
the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and
monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner should therefore be
held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
So also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondent’s failure to allege in its
complaint that the former did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, it was held that it is not necessary
to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees, inasmuch as
its negligence is presumed by operation of law. Allegations of negligence against the employee
and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-
delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
2. Aleko E. Lilius, et al., vs The Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. L-39587, 24 March
1934
(Antido, Zyra Mae)
DOCTRINE: Negligence; Railroad Company; Damages. — A railroad company which does
not install a semaphore at a crossing and does not see to it that its flagman and switchman
faithfully complies with his duty of remaining at the crossing when a train arrives, is guilty of
negligence and is civilly liable for damages suffered by a motorist and his family who cross its line
without negligence on their part.
-Amount of Damages; An indemnity of P10,000 for a permanent deformity on the face and left
leg, suffered by a young and beautiful society woman, is not excessive. An indemnity of P5,000 for
a permanent deformity on the face and legs of a four-year old girl belonging to a well-to-do family,
is not excessive.
-Proof of Damages; In order that a husband may recover damages for deprivation of his wife’s
assistance during her illness from an accident, it is necessary for him to prove the existence of
such assistance and his wife’s willingness to continue rendering the same had she not been
prevented from so doing by her illness.
FACTS: On 10 May 1931, Aleko E. Lilius with his wife Sonja Maria Lilius and his daughter Brita
Marianne Lilius, were driving in their Studebaker car for the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna
on a sight-seeing trip. It was the first that he made said trip and was entirely unacquainted with the
conditions of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at Dyap. At
about seven or eight meters from the crossing, Lilius saw an autotruck parked on the left side of
the road and several people were walking on the opposite side so he slowed down to about 12

QUASI-DELICT
miles per hour while sounding his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus
occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately thereafter,
locomotive No. 713 of The Manila Railroad Company struck Lilius car right in the center.
On the same day, the family were brought to St. Paul’s Hospital, Manila and were treated by Dr.
Waterous. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff suffered several injuries and became highly
nervous and very easily irritated, and for several months had great difficulty in concentrating his
attention on any matter and could not write articles nor short stories for the newspapers and
magazines to which he was a contributor, thus losing some time his only means of livelihood. His
wife, on the other hand, suffered from fractures and lacerated wounds which caused her to undergo
two surgical operations. Meanwhile, the child’s condition was serious and for several days, she
was hovering between life and death but was able to survive her wounds due to a timely and
successful surgical operation.
Prior to the accident, there had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the crossing, nor was
there anybody to warn the public of approaching trains. The flagman or switchman arrived after
the collision. The said flagman and switchman had many times absented himself from his post at
the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The train left Bay station a little late and therefore traveled
at great speed.
Lilius filed a complaint against the Manila Railroad Company and prayed for indemnity for the
material and moral damages suffered by them through the fault and negligence of the company’s
employees. The defendant the Manila Railroad Company denied each and every allegation thereof
and, by way of special defense, alleges that Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife and co-plaintiff,
negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether there was negligence on the part of the Manila Railroad Company and thus
should be held liable for damages.
RULING: We answer in the affirmative.
In view of the foregoing considerations this court is of the opinion and so holds:
(1) That a railroad company which has not installed a semaphore at a crossing an does not see to
it that its flagman and switchman faithfully complies with his duty of remaining at the crossing
when a train arrives, is guilty of negligence and is civilly liable for damages suffered by a motorist
and his family who cross its line without negligence on their part;
(2) that an indemnity of P10,000 for a permanent deformity on the face and on the left leg, suffered
by a young and beautiful society woman, is not excessive;
(3) that an indemnity of P5,000 for a permanent deformity on the face and legs of a four-year old
girl belonging to a well-to-do family, is not excessive; and
(4) that in order that a husband may recover damages for deprivation of his wife's assistance during
her illness from an accident, it is necessary for him to prove the existence of such assistance and
his wife's willingness to continue rendering it had she not been prevented from so doing by her
illness.

QUASI-DELICT
Thus, the defendant Manila Railroad Company alone is liable for the accident by reason of its own
negligence and that of its employees, for not having employed the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of the said employees in the discharge of their duties.
3. Amado Picart v. Frank Smith, Jr., G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918
(Arevalo, Maria Lourdes Isabel)
DOCTRINE: The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the
actor to refrain from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of
the admonition born of this foresight, is the constitutive fact in negligence.
Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other
by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge.
Before he had gotten halfway across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two
more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled
the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left.
He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over
to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the
proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman
would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of
veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly
toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such
close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got
hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
The CFI of La Union absolved Smith of liability. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether Smith was guilty of negligence.

QUASI-DELICT
RULING: YES. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this foresight, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guard against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case, negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would have recognized that
the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm
to the horse and the rider as a reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances,
the law imposed on Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as already stated,
Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
4. Pantranco North Express, Inc. V. Maricar Baesa, G.R. 79050-51, November 14, 1989
(Cañas, Melanie Mei)
DOCTRINE: Last Clear Chance; The doctrine of the last clear chance simply means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
-The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be
applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert

QUASI-DELICT
the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been
aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could
not have known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney
driver David Ico knew of the impending danger.
FACTS: At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, Spouses Baesa, their 4 children,
the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to
go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses.
While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico,
died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions
for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked
the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver.
CA upheld RTC in favor of Baesa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance
to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence.
RULING: NO. Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a
defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may
also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages.
For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly
has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should,
with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. There is nothing to show that the jeepney driver
David Ico knew of the impending danger When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was
encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his
right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing
the jeepney approaching form the opposite direction.
Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual
collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it.
Last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered.

QUASI-DELICT
5. Vergara vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 77679, September 30, 1987

(Capoquian, Genevene)
DOCTRINE: Requisites of a quasi-delict are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by
act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty;
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
FACTS: An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) was filed by
private respondent against petitioner. The action arose from a vehicular accident that occurred on
5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck
belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the private respondent, causing
damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22.
Petitioner also filed a third party complaint against Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation,
alleging that said cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident, belonging to the petitioner, was
insured by the third party defendant insurance company.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. Upon appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the latter court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act or omission can be considered as a "negligent" act or omission
RULING: Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in finding him guilty of fault or
negligence is not tenable. It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-
delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must
respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the
damages.
Private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or omission of petitioner.
The fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to
the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and
then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle;
and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff."2
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to
mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes
can not be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the
accident preventable.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption
of negligence on his part in the selection and supervision of his driver.
The petition is DENIED.

QUASI-DELICT
6. Teodoro C. Umali vs. Hon. Angel Bacani (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and Fidel H. Saynes,
G.R. No. L-40570, 30 January 1976
(Cello, Caleb)
DOCTRINE: Quasi-delicts; An electric plant company which fails to use ordinary foresight in
taking necessary precaution to eliminate tall banana plants which when blown by a moderate wind
could trigger danger, vis-a-vis, its electric lines; which after a storm and foreseeable damage to
its lines that could endanger life and limb did not cut off electric power from its plant; and which,
after being made aware, thru one of its employees, that a live wire had been cut by the action of
the storm, did not take precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire, is negligent
and liable for damages for death of 3½ year old boy who went to the place where live wire is
located and got into contact with it.
Contributory Negligence; Where negligence of electric utility plant was proximate cause of death
of child, parental negligence in allowing the child to go to place where fallen live wire was located
is merely contributory.
FACTS: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala, Pangasinan.
During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant
(AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of
which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground.
The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a labourer of the AEP, asked him
to fix it, but the ltter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for
a lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of
Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where
the broken line wire was and got I contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently
died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the proximate cause of the boy’s death is due to fortuitous event- storm.
2. Whether or not the boy’s parent’s negligence exempts petitioner from liability.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
1. A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part
of defendants’ employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With
ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of
moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.
2. Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim
in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants’ lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages to be awarded. This law may be
availed of by the petitioner bt does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner’s liability for injury
TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 10 | P a g e

QUASI-DELICT
caused by his employee’s negligence is well-defined in paragraph 4 of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
7. Bustamante, et al. vs. CA, GR No. 89880, February 6, 1991

(Maat, Butch)
DOCTRINE: Doctrine of last clear chance; The doctrine broadly states that the negligence of
the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that
the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence.
The doctrine does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce
its contractual obligations.
It cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should
be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril and it cannot be
involved as between defendants concurrently negligent.
FACTS: At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a gravel
and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor No. Y2231 and
Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion
(barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off
the said wall from the driver’s seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of
the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained.
The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each
other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the passengers. It could not be
determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of them which was the
proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the liability of the two drivers for their negligence
must be solidary. The Court of Appeals ruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver had the
last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the
hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.
RULING: The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners and drivers
of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of
the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.”
Furthermore, as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint
tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by
reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants
concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that
another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided the injury. The Court is
convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last

QUASI-DELICT
clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against
both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in
absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
8. Medardo AG. Cadiente vs. Bithuel Macas, G.R. No. 161946. November 14, 2008.
(Dado, Ardill Geos)
DOCTRINE: Contributory Negligence; The underlying precept on contributory negligence is

that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full, but must proportionately bear the conse-quences of his own negligence.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone else is primarily
responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause.
FACTS: Bithuel Macas, a highschool student, while standing on the shoulder of the road was
bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Cimafranca which resulted to the amputation of
both legs up to the groins of the victim. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the
name of Atty. Cadiente, who then claimed that when the accident happened, he was no longer the
owner of the Ford Fiera since he already sold it to Engr. Jalipa on March 28, 1994.
The victim's father, filed a complaint for torts and damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente
before the RTC of Davao City. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa. Jalipa,
however, filed a fourth-party complaint against Abubakar, to whom Jalipa allegedly sold the
vehicle on June 20, 1994.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente and
Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for damages to the plaintiff for their own
negligence. The Court of Appeals denied their appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, hence not entitled to
recover damages.
2. Whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally liable to the
victim.
RULING:
1. After a careful consideration of the parties submissions, we find the petition without merit.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and

QUASI-DELICT
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for
his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full, but must proportionately bear the
consequences of his own negligence. The defendant is thus held liable only for the damages
actually caused by his negligence.
2. Coming now to the second and third issues, this Court has recently reiterated in PCI Leasing
and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., that the registered owner of any vehicle,
even if he had already sold it to someone else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever
damage or injury the vehicle may cause. We explained,
Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee
or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said
responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property
with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the
public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the
injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor
Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him
would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by
disproving his ownership.
In the case of Villanueva v. Domingo, we said that the policy behind vehicle registration is the
easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury
caused by the vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one
whose identity cannot be secured.
9. Phoenix vs IAC, GR No. 65295, March 10, 1987

(Maat, Butch)
DOCTRINE: Doctrine of last clear chance; is a common-law theory adopted to mitigate the
harshness of the "contributory negligence of the plaintiff rule under which in common-law
countries plaintiff is barred from any recovery, unlike in our system of law where the Civil Code
expressly states that it will merely reduce the amount to be recovered.
- Doctrine of last clear chance in common law cannot be applied as a general rule in negligence
cases in our civil law system.
Contributory negligence may result in 20% reduction of damages. Turning to the award of
damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on
one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, we believe that the demands
of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20%
of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private

QUASI-DELICT
respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and
Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages
and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course
entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced
award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.
FACTS: Private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner
meeting in which Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets
at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when
his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump
truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction was parked on the
right hand side of General Lacuna Street, facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked
askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning"
reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that
evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the
permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the
left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio
suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown"
and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which
Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and
Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without
his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised
due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court in favor of Dionisio. Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the IAC, which affirmed
the decision; hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether the proximate cause of the accident was due to Dionisio or to the petitioners.
RULING: It was due to the petitioners. Private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the
accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he
extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road
lane.

QUASI-DELICT
Nonetheless, the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the
wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner
Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand,
is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck
and the private respondent's car would a probability not have occurred had the dump truck not
been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street
and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's
negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer
to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the Petitioners
describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner which the
truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to
private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk
the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering
nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump
truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more
from Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human
experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under
the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligence among other reasons, because of
failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who
sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later wig
spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that
event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may
foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. ... In all of these cases there is an intervening
cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's
negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial
and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come
to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the
defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall
fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and
that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).

QUASI-DELICT
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory
here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent
Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that
Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The
historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another
common law doctrine or rule that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's
negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant.
The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who
had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his
employer Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate
court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this
presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring
the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning,
when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner
in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing
of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
10. McKee vs. IAC, GR No. 68102, July 16, 1992.

(Dela Cruz, Jovy Noriette)
DOCTRINE: Negligence; The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi¬delict

is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. —As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in
a quasi¬delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, “in the case of independent civil action under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal
case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action.
- In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang
would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private
respondents.—What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the
criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not
parties therein. It would have been entirely different if the petitioners’ cause of action was for
damages arising from a delict, in which case private respondents’ liability could only be subsidiary
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment

QUASI-DELICT
of conviction in the criminal case against Galang would have been conclusive in the civil cases
for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents.
- Definition of negligence—Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, thus: “x x x Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do
(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(T)he failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.’
- Emergency Rule- “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have
been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.—
- Definition of proximate cause—Proximate cause has been defined as: “x x x ‘that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”
-Doctrine of last clear chance; The doctrine states that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise
of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party.—Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences
of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to
avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.
-Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver’s negligence
in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was in law the proxi¬mate cause of
the collision; Employers directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.

QUASI-DELICT
FACTS: It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere
between Angeles City and SanFernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli
Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, andKim, as well as Kim’s babysitter,
Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City (northward) in a
Ford Escort.
Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang,
was headed in the opposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to
Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as it was carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice,
which weighed 10 metric tons. As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the
southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from the right side of the road into the Escort’s lane. As the
boys were going back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his
horn. He was then forced to swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his
headlights on, applied his brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get
back into the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck. The collision occurred on the bridge.
The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter,
Loida, on whose lap she was sitting. Loida was seated in the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher,
and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort, received physical injuries from the
collision.
An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting
in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges in the information.
The conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR
and the denial by the SC of his Petition for Review. Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by
the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and her husband for the death of
Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were impleaded against as the
employers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict.
These cases were eventually consolidated. The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded
the respondents damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the
dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it was Galang’s inattentiveness or
reckless imprudence that caused the accident. However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR,
the IAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Koh’s
car invaded the lane of the truck and the collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise
to the presumption that Koh was negligent.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Galang’s negligence caused the collision.
2. Whether or not Tayag and Manalo are liable for damages.
RULING: 1. Yes. The lower court held that Jose Koh was negligent for improperly invading the
lane of the truck. This is unwarranted because it is manifest that no negligence can be imputedto

QUASI-DELICT
Koh. In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813) the Court held that: The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence. It is manifest that
no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were
even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the
records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the
bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly
established through the testimony of Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the
testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap. Clearly, therefore, it was
the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care
necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident.
2. Yes. It was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision
which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the
private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the
resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their
employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
11. Lambert Ramos vs COL Realty Corp, GR No. 184905, August 28, 2009
(Maat, Butch)
DOCTRINE: Quasi-Delicts; If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by
the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is
imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third person, assuming of
course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint
is made; The act of crossing an avenue which is prohibited by law constitutes negligence.—
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz.: Article 2179.
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. If the master is injured by the negligence of a
third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s
negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third person,
assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which
complaint is made. Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of

QUASI-DELICT
crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited
by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for
any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.
-Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
FACTS: On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan Avenue,
Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate Number
XDN 210 (owned by C.O.L. Realty Corporation and driven by Aquilino Larin) and a Ford
Expedition bearing Plate Number LSR 917 (owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by Rodel
Ilustrisimo). A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat sustained injuries, she was immediately
rushed to the hospital for treatment. C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly
driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda
Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos’) Ford Espedition
violently rammed against the car’s right rear door and fender.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to
indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property. Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the
repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The
demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on
quasidelict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City. Ramos
denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s)
driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident.
Ramos asserted the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the
concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection. The MeTC
rendered the Decision dated 1 March 2006 exculpating (Ramos) from liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos is solidarily liable for the negligence of Rodel Ilustrisimo.
RULING: No. If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring
contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his
superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third person, assuming of course that the
contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan
Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it

QUASI-DELICT
was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered
by respondent from the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the
MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within
the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the
accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such
crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing
construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of
Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when
the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it
cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause
of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks
to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will
have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of
contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate
respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s negligence which is the proximate result of the accident.
CA’s decision reversed, RTC’s decision reinstated.
12. Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs CA, GR No. 53401, November 6, 1989
(Espedilla, Carl Angelo)
DOCTRINE: Negligence; When an act of God combines with defendant’s negligence to produce
an injury, defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent
conduct.—While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person
may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim’s death. It
was through the intervention of petitioner’s negligence that death took place. x x x Indeed, under
the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the
general public” . . . considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of

QUASI-DELICT
care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger.
The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons
have a right to be” (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner
having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim’s death
was solely due to a fortuitous event. “When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence
of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted
but for his own negligent conduct or omission.
FACTS: A strong typhoon engulfed the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and
flooding in its wake. The deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the
house towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, a commercial establishment. While
wading in waist-deep flood, Nana Belen, in an unfortunate accident, had suffered and died in a
circulatory shock electrocution. An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that the deceased could have died either by drowning or
by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to the electric company.
That the deceased installed an electrical wire enclosing the iron gate and fence to deter the area
from burglars.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be held liable for the death of Isabel Lao Juan.
RULING: While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no
person may be held responsible, however, it was through the intervention of petitioner’s negligence
that death took place.
Under the circumstances, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general
public “… considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care
required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The
duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons
have a right to be“. “The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve
itself from liability by arguing that the victim’s death was solely due to a fortuitous event.” When
an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission
Hence, the heirs of Nana Belen, may not be barred from recovering damages caused by petitioner’s
negligence.
13. Li vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 117944, February 7, 1996

(Gabor, Rex Bernard)
DOCTRINE: QUASI-DELICT; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, DEFINED. —
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for
his own protection. (Keeton and Dobbs, Et Al., Prosser and Keaton On Torts, 451 [1984] citing
Second Restatement Of Torts, Sec. 463.)

QUASI-DELICT
PRINCIPLE OF "EMERGENCY RULE," CONSTRUED; APPLICATION THEREOF

DEPENDS ON THE OVER-ALL NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. — Courts have
traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is
not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such
situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous
situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under the "emergency rule" adopted
by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 (1988) cf. Siegl v. Watson, 195 NW 867,
an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. While the
emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately
weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases
is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoughtful
care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled
by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient
for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists.
NEGLIGENCE, DEFINED. — "Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which
creates an undue risk of harm to others." It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
We stressed, in Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674 (1969), that negligence is the
want of care required by the circumstances.
CAR OWNER IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE
OF "BONUS PATER FAMILIAS." — In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not
demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the
company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of
Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome
the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car
to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.
FACTS: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was
driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway
to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake
Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were
people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the
people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car’s
condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights,

QUASI-DELICT
alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of
the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was
suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in
the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact Valenzuela was thrown
against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground.
She was pulled out from under defendant’s car. Valenzuela’s left leg was severed up to the middle
of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to
the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg,
left up to distal thigh (above knee)." She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was
eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00)
and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.
Valenzuela filed an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries
sustained in the vehicular accident.
Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be held liable for damages because
the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela’s own negligence. Alternatively,
he argues that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence ought to be
mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Li was negligent.
2. Whether or not in the event that the Court finds Li negligent, such negligence must be
mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
3. Whether or not Li’s employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and severally liable with
Li for damages.
RULING: 1. Yes. According to Li, in his narration to the San Juan Police, he put on his brakes
when he saw the Valenzuela’s car in front of him, but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery;
that goes to show, that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were it
otherwise, he could have easily completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the bumping of
Valenzuela, notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery. If, indeed, he was running slow,
as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the wet and slippery road, he
could have avoided hitting Valenzuela by the mere expedient of applying his brakes at the proper
time and distance. It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his testimony, which is
contrary to what he told the police immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more
believable, that he did not actually step on his brakes, but simply swerved a little to the right when
he saw the on-coming car (some other car) with glaring headlights, from the opposite direction, in
order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car of Valenzuela which was
properly parked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to swerve
a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car, considering that
Aurora Blvd. is a double lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and there is

QUASI-DELICT
plenty of space for both cars, since his car was running at the right lane going towards Manila and
the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao.
2. No, since Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Courts
have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency
is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such
situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous
situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under the "emergency rule" adopted
by this court in Gan vs Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence.
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for
stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other
motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a
dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her
not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a
no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other
motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close
to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in
danger, she did what was best under the situation. As narrated by the lower court: "She stopped at
a lighted place where there are people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if
needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot
reach her home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona
Car." Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuela’s
car was parked very close to the sidewalk. The sketch which he prepared after the incident showed
Valenzuela’s car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists
passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself corroborated by the testimony of
witness Rodriguez.
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by
the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances
which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led
her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was
evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
3. Yes. In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li.
No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine
or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a

QUASI-DELICT
company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of
bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries
sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
14. Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. vs C & A Construction, Inc. (GR No. 156034, October 1,
2003)
(Gacho, Leo | Refer to Case Number 1 under Quasi-Delict)
15. People vs Ritter, GR No. 88582, March 5, 1991

(Gervacio, Melton Fredrick)
DOCTRINE: Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled
doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what
has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
(Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not require proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the
records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public
policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino
children, enticing them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior
of all adults in the Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual
exploitation committed by the appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering
the circumstances of the case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the
amount of P30,000.00.
FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a
hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted
a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario
300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the following
day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987,
Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to
Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using
forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She was having

QUASI-DELICT
peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her vagina 3 months
ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him guilty of rape with homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ritter was liable for rape and homicide.
RULING: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the
incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As
evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified
that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which
caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed
already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a
Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the
victim’s heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.

Torts Quasi Delict Case Digests Temp1

Încărcat de

Informații document

Descriere originală:

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Torts Quasi Delict Case Digests Temp1

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

TABLE OF CONTENTS

III. HUMAN RELATIONS

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 i|Page

V. INTERFERRENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

VI. LAWS ON INTELLECTUAL CREATIONS

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 ii | P a g e

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 1|Page

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 2|Page

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 3|Page

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 4|Page

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 5|Page

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 6|Page

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 7|Page

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 8|Page

5. Vergara vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 77679, September 30, 1987

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 9|Page

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 10 | P a g e

7. Bustamante, et al. vs. CA, GR No. 89880, February 6, 1991

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 11 | P a g e

DOCTRINE: Contributory Negligence; The underlying precept on contributory negligence is

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 12 | P a g e

9. Phoenix vs IAC, GR No. 65295, March 10, 1987

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 13 | P a g e

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 14 | P a g e

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 15 | P a g e

10. McKee vs. IAC, GR No. 68102, July 16, 1992.

DOCTRINE: Negligence; The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi¬delict

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 16 | P a g e

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 17 | P a g e

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 18 | P a g e

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 19 | P a g e

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 20 | P a g e

CA’s decision reversed, RTC’s decision reinstated.

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 21 | P a g e

13. Li vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 117944, February 7, 1996

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 22 | P a g e

PRINCIPLE OF "EMERGENCY RULE," CONSTRUED; APPLICATION THEREOF

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 23 | P a g e

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 24 | P a g e

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 25 | P a g e

15. People vs Ritter, GR No. 88582, March 5, 1991

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 26 | P a g e

TORTS and DAMAGES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ‘18-‘19 27 | P a g e

S-ar putea să vă placă și