1
E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
[ G.R. No. 100113, September 03, 1991 ]
RENATO L. CAYETANO, PETITIONER, VS. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON.
JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, AND HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions.
While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in
this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." (Italics supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C
of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." (Italics supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be
an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon
he:
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the
law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law."
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340
Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105
Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation
in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive
field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings,
they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at
all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953
ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N. E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.]
179 A. 139, 144]). (Italics ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974--1975) listed the dimensions of the
practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and
public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of
the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute.'" (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that
it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation
which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the
Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Commissioner will please
proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for
by Section 1 is that 'They must be Members of the Philippine Bar' - I am
quoting from the provision 'who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.'"
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA.
We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent
in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up
on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available

whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of
the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years
is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer
is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in
the Article on the Commission on Audit?
"MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although
it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work: it will involve legal
work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would
have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit.
And, therefore, the answer is yes.
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"Mr. OPLE, Thank you."
x x x (Italics supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among
others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission
on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Italics supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many
ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many
lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke,
Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p.
15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term,
as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and
members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized
as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.
In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of
law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpfully defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593).
The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in
or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140
A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn.
325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram,
op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once
the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role
for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms,
and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating
a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to
litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public
image and the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind
reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late
Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an
attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and
non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business
counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the
surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will
engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice will usually perform at least some legal services
outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as
tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer
is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work
to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer
to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
2
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation
work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically,
so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both
by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common
of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, hereinbelow
quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those members participating in
various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of
the corporate law research function accompanied by an
accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed,
the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the
appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional
structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment
thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by
those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early

introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with
either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal-policy level of decision-
making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar
types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems
would require the services of an astute attorney because of the
complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously
referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people
could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one,
the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some
large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law
firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters.
Other corporations have a staff large enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who
handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or
jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws
research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other
than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management. (Italics supplied)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be frustrating
to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short,
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more
closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged
by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one
of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working
in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas
jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm
of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce
Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4)
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the
arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law
teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation
Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3)
types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances
which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles,
with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning
that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
public entities but with each other often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within
the corporation is rapidly changing. The modern corporate lawyer
has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating
in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these
new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws
are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. (Italics supplied)
The practicing lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental
policies toward the promotion and management of technology.
New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies
or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
3
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional
forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are
lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka
and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Italics
supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial
structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term
and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be
related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such
as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment,
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate
lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are
challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate
effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance considerations. (Underscoring
supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found
an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the
role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable
users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New programming
techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more
accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Italics
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law
department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Italics supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based
models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all kinds of
negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in
these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They
differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned
with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences
attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice
and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The
general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel bear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships
with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions
with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex
make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law
is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to
give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not to understand
all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very
least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if
only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution" or
make-up of the modern corporation. (Business Star, "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4)..
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have
more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each
aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast
tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma
of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office
as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null
and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional
license fees as a lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled
the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his
stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-
countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and
project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal
and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL,
Monsod's, work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accredition hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity
and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference
for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission,
a guasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990)
and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for
which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia-Munoz--Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Italics supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty.
Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a
team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of
the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an
official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
4
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Underscoring
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it
lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus,
the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into
five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events
of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory
Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August
26-31, 1973). (Italics supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than
purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan
agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted
and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction
with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
(Italics supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the
contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements
of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open
to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle
which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said; 'They carry no banners, they beat no
drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not
the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.' (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar
of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice
of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking

into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor - verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement - that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143
SCRA 327, the Court said:
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide." (italics supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case,
and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has
no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with
the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for
a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law."
(Italics supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at
bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of
its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of
bond, etc.... (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that
his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped
notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of
the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz
states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice "... is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase
by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers
almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in
advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law.
In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr.
Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of
persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an
elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks
one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing,
how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And
even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1)
If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus
5
in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2)
In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3)
If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that
giveth life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the
procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
"No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall flow from his veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the
procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
[ A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008 ]
MANUEL L. LEE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee
charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the
Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a
spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent
Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the
spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay
and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire
estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he

devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of
complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before
respondent on June 30, 1965.[1] Complainant, however, pointed out
that the residence certificate[2] of the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.[3]
Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his
signature as donor in a deed of donation[4] (containing his purported
genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his
deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were "in any
way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in
all angle[s]."[5]
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the
residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo.
He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely
copied from their respective voters' affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was
on file in the archives division of the Records Management and
Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(NCCA). In this connection, the certification of the chief of the
archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT
executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available
in this Office['s] files.[6]
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the
complaint against him contained false allegations: (1) that
complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that
the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that
complainant was "not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last
will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by
respondent per affidavit[7] of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of
Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit[8] of the
children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee,
Jr. xxx."[9]
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to
harass him because the criminal case filed by complainant against
him in the Office of the Ombudsman "did not prosper."
Respondent did not dispute complainant's contention that no copy
of the will was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed
that no copy of the contested will could be found there because
none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause
of action against him as he (complainant) did not first file an action
for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the
inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[10]
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty
of violation of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in
the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an
infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 1[11] and Rule
1.01[12] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).[13] Thus, the
investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three
months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated
May 26, 2006, resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondent's failure to comply with the
laws in the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino
B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one
year and Respondent's notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.[14]
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his
estate, to take effect after his death.[15] A will may either be notarial
or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the
execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution
of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution
of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity.[16]
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to
be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition,
it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.[17]
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and
Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered
void.[18] This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.[19] The
importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was
segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and
embodied in a distinct and separate provision.[20]
6
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in
going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be
his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or
her own free act and deed.[21] The acknowledgment in a notarial
will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator's wishes long
after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the
manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question
shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor
substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial
witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the
notation of the testator's old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by
respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was
required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of
notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:[22]
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries
public. They are required to certify that the party to every document
acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its
number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded,
considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized documents.[23] A notary public, especially a
lawyer,[24] is bound to strictly observe these elementary
requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence
certificate upon notarization of a document or instrument:
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula]
residence tax. Every contract, deed, or other document
acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon
that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula]
residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax,
and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such
certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each [cedula]
residence certificate as aforesaid.[25]
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the
Residence Tax Act[26] which stated:
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges
any document before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such
person xxx with whom such transaction is had or business done, to
require the exhibition of the residence certificate showing payment
of the residence taxes by such person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish
the true and correct identity of the person to whom it is issued, as well
as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having
allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate,

respondent failed to comply with the requirements of both the old
Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of
his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of
Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to
furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives division, Article 806
provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witness. The notary public shall not be required
to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk
of Court. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent's failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division
a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary
action.
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make
the necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The
old Notarial Law required the entry of the following matters in the
notarial register, in chronological order:
nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him;
person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;
witnesses, if any, to the signature;
date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;
fees collected by him for his services as notary;
give each entry a consecutive number; and
if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of
the instrument.[27]
In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned
rule, respondent contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and
entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a
photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented
a photocopy of a certification[28] stating that the archives division
had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless
it is shown that the original is unavailable. The proponent must first
prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the original,[29]
otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the
photocopy of respondent's notarial register was not admissible as
evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to
comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary
evidence.
In the same vein, respondent's attempt to controvert the certification
dated September 21, 1999[30] must fail. Not only did he present a
mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000;[31] its
contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will
in his notarial register.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care[32] and utmost fidelity
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be
undermined.[33]
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render
the entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view
of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the
testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to
identify the instrument and to confirm its contents.[34] Accordingly,
respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the
will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of
duty.[35]
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of
duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper
judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his
commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his
notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by
law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding
cedula certificates.[36]
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for
violation of his oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of
Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[37] and Canon 1[38] and
Rule 1.01[39] of the CPR.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws
of the land.[40] For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to
a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law
and the dispensation of justice.[41]
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an
obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities
well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant
of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for
others to emulate.[42] Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model
in the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned.[43]
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.[44] A
breach of these conditions justifies disciplinary action against the
erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a
finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional
misconduct.[45] These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include
disbarment, suspension and reprimand.
7
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.[46] We
have held in a number of cases that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution[47] and should not be decreed if any
punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine will
accomplish the end desired.[48] The rule then is that disbarment is
meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.[49]
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of
the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he
"exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due
regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with the
elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx," we find
that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such
recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from
the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of
his commission[50] and his perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public.[51]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found
guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyer's Oath;
(2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and
(5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one year and his notarial commission REVOKED. Because he
has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary
public and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED
from reappointment as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar
Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
[ A.C. No. 2387, September 10, 1998 ]
CLETO DOCENA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM
On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto
Docena against Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr., on grounds of
malpractice, gross misconduct, and violation of attorney's oath.
It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyers on
appeal in Civil Case No. 425 for Forcible Entry. While the appeal was
pending before the then Court of First Instance of Eartern Samar,
Branch I, respondent required therein defendants-appellants Docena

spouses to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,000.00
allegedly to stay the execution of the appealed decision.
To raise the required, complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of
P3,000.00 from the Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the
Development Bank of the Philippines; borrowed P2,140.00 from a
private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00
from the Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank,
wherein respondent himself acted as guarantor (tsn, Session of July 8,
1983, pp. 33-34). The amount of P4,860.00 was produced by
complainant in response to respondent's letter dated September 2,
1979 (Exh. "C", tsn, p. 26, ibid.) demanding delivery of the aforesaid
amount, thus:
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Docena:
I wish to remind you that today is the last day for the deposit of the
balance of P4,860.00.
Atty. Batica was in court yesterday verifying whether you have
deposited the said balance and the Honorable Judge informed him
that you have until today to deposit the said amount.
I wish to inform you that the Honorable Judge will be in Sta. Fe
tomorrow for rural service.
We will be waiting for you tomorrow September 22, 1979, at Sta. Fe as
you promised.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar
rendered a decision on the appealed case in favor of the Docena
spouses.
After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to
withdraw the supersedeas bond of P10,000.00 but he thereupon
discovered that no such bond was ever posted by respondent.
When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but
he never complied with such undertaking despite repeated
demands from the Docena spouses.
In his answer the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the
P10,000.00 was his attorney's fees for representing the Docena
spouses in their appeal. But this self-serving allegation is belied by the
letter (quoted above) of respondent himself demanding from the
Docena spouses the balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be
deposited in court to stay the execution of the appealed decision of
the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to return the
P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also an admission that the money
was never his, and that it was only entrusted to him for deposit.
After due investigation and hearing, the Intergrated Bar of the
Philippines recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year and ordered to return the amount of
P8,500.00 (he had earlier paid complainant P1,500.00, but nothing
more) within 1 month from notice, and should he fail to do so, he shall
be suspended indefinitely.
The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount
involved may be small, but the nature of the transgression calls for a
heavier sanction. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that:
Canon 1. x x x
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Canon 16. x x x
Canon 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received from the client.
Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral
character is not a condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to
maintain one's good standing in the exclusive and honored fraternity
(Villanueva vs. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707 [1995]).
It has been said time and again, and this cannot overemphasize, that
the law is not a trade nor a craft but a profession (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 1983, p. 1). Its basic ideal is to render public service and to
secure justice for those who seek its aid. [Mayer vs. State Bar, 2 Call2d
71, 39 P2d 206 (1934), cited in Agpalo, id.] If it has to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its
ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also,
by their live, accord continuing fidelity to them. (Agpalo, id) By
extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation,
respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so base,
so low and dishonorable, and most contemptible. He has sullied the
integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded the
peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible
conduct, which is reflective of his depraved character, respondent
has made himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys. He
should be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby
DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his
name from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent is likewise ordered to
return the amount of P8,500.00, the balance of the money entrusted
to him by complainant Docena, within one (1) month from the finality
of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
8
[ A.C No. 4749, January 20, 2000 ]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997,
complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar,
alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for
a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R.
Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he
only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least
three years already, as shown by the following attached sample
pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex A
-
"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in
Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B
-
"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in
Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM
Annex C
-
"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not
Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule
139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and
appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal
Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional
tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension
of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also
by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also
copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas, as shown by:
his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter
No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim.
Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the
Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in
the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated
December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred
to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be
respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the
order,[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal
Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18,
1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his
IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any
amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the
complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case
was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his comment-memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent
alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using
in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP,
respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted
member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no
longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981
Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995
conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of
encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was
set aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City
Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision
of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also
had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or
privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income
Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of
law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a
farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is
located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior
Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432
which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as
an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his
detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited
practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated
Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights
as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the
exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully
and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is
willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests,
charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again
irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the
complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is
reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief
in all food faith, to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution[6] adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found
respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was
denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here
for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's
suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-
indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings
(Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his
use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
9
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP
Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted
by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes
as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case.
In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when
he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it
clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had
only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's
Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled
the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R.
number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his
actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in
law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that,
as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court,
at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the
years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that
he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in
good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with
the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside
as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the
practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that
his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants

senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not
include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP
dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in
the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty.
However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application
of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty.
Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION
FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption
from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged
unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after
being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year
2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the
years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil
Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment[3] stating inter
alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice
of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys
as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as
determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the
Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members
has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar
Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no
exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the
Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the
cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by
respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and
reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could
have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to
stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been
stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status
for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by
this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the
annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what
he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governors Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive
practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual
membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering
that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived
from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of
annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property
right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice
of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to
10
active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the
community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to
exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service
from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of
the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives
of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is
an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of
a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes
of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of
the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice
of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the
integration of the Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members
of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed,
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the
Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation,
while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation,
it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray
the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with
it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of
law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his
required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in
the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in
the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of
practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from
payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the
IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership
in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board
of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members
under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such
inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of
removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial
Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and
is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions,[11] one of which is the payment
of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss
of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP
dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed
by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a
warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice
of law.
SO ORDERED.
[ G. R. No. L-12426, February 16, 1959 ]
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER, VS. CELEDONIO
AGRAVA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE PHILIPPINES PATENT
OFFICE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for
prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity
as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing
that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the
purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination
to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice
before said office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It
would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding
similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association
that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent
Office, and that consequently, the act of the respondent Director
requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take
and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
11
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such
as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation
of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General,
maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve
entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as
a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be
handled not only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the
prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; * * * that the
Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-
judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from
those who would wish to handle cases before such bodies, as in the
prosecution of patent cases before the Patent Office which, as
stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application
of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of
provisions of law; * * * that the action taken by the respondent is in
accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the
Patent Law of the Philippines, which is similar to the United States
Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent
Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed
by respondent. * * *."
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent Law of the United
States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe
examinations to determine as to who may practice before the United
States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so
by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would
appear to have been holding tests or examinations the passing of
which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before
the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right
of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of
the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And
we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with
respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines[1] and
any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or
administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to
whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the
preparation and prosecution of patent applications. etc., constitutes
or is included in the practice of law.
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation m court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters

connected with the law incorporation sendees, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a
wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare
of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations
to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion
of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I.) 179 A. 139, 144). (Italics ours)
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before
the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and
other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent,
their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the
Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and
scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be
conducted and all orders and decisions of the Director of Patents
have to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as
other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice
before', the Patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence
of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence
and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides
that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public
order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an
invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known
or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the
inventor named in the application for patent, or if it was patented or
described in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign
country more than one year before the application for a patent
therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for
more than one year before the application for the patent therefor.
Section 10 provides that the right to the patent belongs to the true
and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns, and
Section 12 says that an application for a patent may be filed only
by the inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Sections 25
and 26 refer to correction of any mistake in a patent. Section 28
enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although
any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the
Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a
patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for
cancellation. Sections 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of
the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents
in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any
time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was
granted, any person may apply for the grant of a license under a
particular patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented
invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial
scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is
not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if
by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable
terms or by reason of the conditions attached by him to the license,
purchase, lease or use of the patented article or working of the
patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a
new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or
invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health
or public safety. All these things involve the application of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge,
training and experience for which a member of the bar has been
prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of
the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions
of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
"* * * the applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design,
any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a
compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the
Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the Director."
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction
of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of
the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should
be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the
nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
"* * * commissioner in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues,
interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial junctions.
12
Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to
give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal
fees." (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Italics supplied).
"* * *. The Commissioner has the only original initiatory" jurisdiction that
exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty
to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper
subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent
is a judicial junction. In passing on an application the commissioner
should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact,
as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article
invented. * * *." (60 C.J.S. 460). (Italics supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar,
because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or
other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it
advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and
scientists in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the
drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought
to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application
for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his client, is required
to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by
a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the
law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before
him to submit to an examination, even if they are already members
of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165,
is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and that the U. S.
Patent Office in its Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office
in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he
(respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention
to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
"Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of attorneys and a
register of agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered
the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent
applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patent. Registration in the Patent
Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person
registered to practice before the Patent Office.
"(a) Attorneys at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted
to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any
State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and
complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the
register of attorneys.
*******
"(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to
practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of

Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner
and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish
to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral
character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and
scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise
competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and
prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order
that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking
to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the
qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character
and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and
technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is
held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an
examination may be waived in the case of any person who has
served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office."
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of
the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the
United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
"The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations
governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persona
representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may
require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being
recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that
they shall show they are of good moral character and in good
repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them
to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are
likewise competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons
in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other
business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after
notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either
generally or in any particular case, from further practice before his
office any person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent or
disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply
with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud
in any manner, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or
by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall
be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed
upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so
suspended or excluded by the district court of the United States for
the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such
proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine." (Italics
supplied).
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No.
165 being: similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is
authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that
persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an
examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for
purposes of comparison:
"Sec. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business
in the Patent Office."
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far,y are different
from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards
authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of
those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U. S.
Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require
attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and
competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their
clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or
examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law,
Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not
been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such
authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to
practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief
of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders
not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient
administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect
the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau.
Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs
shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, make all
rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code.
Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth
Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall
promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules
and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureaus of
Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the
Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce
the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and
clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers
to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they
are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would
be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus of Internal
Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are
more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of
accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions,
depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and
the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also
require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise
transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an
examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the
Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for
the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
13
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of
the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation
of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of
the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that
appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.
[ A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz
charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the
latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors;
he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent
who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on
January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following
exchange transpired:
xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the
case, replied:
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his
appearance xxx xxx.
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is
misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:
"Your Honor, I'm not xxx xxx."
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.
Respondent's imputations were uncalled for and the latter's act of
compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or
not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as
respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared
for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent's
imputations of complainant's misrepresentation as a lawyer was
patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to
threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was

handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words
"appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!" were uttered were totally
with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule,
incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondent's display of improper attitude,
arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties
both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the
court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are
sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding
appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations
should be imposed on the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed
against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as
counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed
several civil and criminal cases including him to further complainant's
illegal practice of law; complainant's complaint occurred during a
judicial proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent
himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalog thus the
presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating "[i]n
today's hearing both lawyers appeared;" because of which,
respondent stated: "Your honor I would like to manifest that this
counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this
case is not a lawyer," to which complainant replied: "The counsel very
well know that I am not yet a lawyer;" the reason he informed the
court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding
judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and
complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer
when he stated: "for the plaintiff your honor;" he stated "pumasa ka
muna" out of indignation because of complainant's temerity in
misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against
him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated:
"It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete
vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540);" in another malicious prosecution
being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family
pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City,
they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as
counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla
Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruz's motion to appear as counsel,
the motion is likewise denied, movant not having satisfied the
requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative
case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in
Tagalog in open court "Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa
Huwes! OK?" the same was dismissed by the Honorable Court's Third
Division which stated among others: "That the questioned remarks of
respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to
complainant's actuations and taking into account that complainant
is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the court on a matter
which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the
part of the complainant." Respondent prays that the complaint
against him be dismissed for lack of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for
a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the
undersigned noted that respondent's averment that the utterances
he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not
hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the case
in question under trial before the said court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he
made in open court against the complainant had been the basis for
his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending
trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.
Likewise respondent did not refute complainant's allegation that in
1979 he was held in contempt and was not allowed to practice law
for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed
against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as
A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his
dealing with others.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by
the respondent in the manner, substance and tone of his voice which
was not refuted by him "that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna"
in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but
insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken
nor passed the bar examination required of them.
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in
informing the court if it was his purpose relative to complainant's
appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf
but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule
138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances
in his professional dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the
other party as in this case
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to
annul and set aside the recommendation of the investigating
commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of
merit.
14
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe
the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every
case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the
Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the
Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important function of
the requirement that the decision of the Board of Governors state the
facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is
required of the decisions of courts of record, thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to
enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings with
which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to
appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the
Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the
process of legal reasoning.[2]
In this case, the Board of Governors' resolution absolving respondent
of any misconduct does not contain any findings of facts or law upon
which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule
would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the
controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the
issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on
appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of
justice and speedy disposition of cases.[3] This case falls within the
exception.
We hold that respondent's outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa
ka muna" does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when
respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant is not a
lawyer to correct the judge's impression of complainant's
appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002,
noted that complainant is a lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though
uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent's
suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat
of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has
been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for
words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing
cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even
contemptuous language.[5]
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not
precluded from litigating personally his cases. A party's right to
conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court:
 15

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of

the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid
of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the
foregoing provision, thus:
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do
everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its
termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those
qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably
rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage,
prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they
are not considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not
practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself."

The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the

exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as
attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined
by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges
and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or
habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was
she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.[7]
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are
licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.
Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly.[8] Though a lawyer's
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no
place in the dignity of judicial forum.[9]

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera

for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more
circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the court.

SO ORDERED.