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Abstract: This paper considers the claim that C. G. Jung used a Lamarckian model of
evolution to underwrite his theory of archetypes. This claim is challenged on the basis
of Jung’s familiarity with and use of the writings of James Mark Baldwin and Conway
Lloyd Morgan, both of whom were noted and forceful opponents of neo-Lamarckian
theory from within a neo-Darwinian framework. The paper then outlines the evolu-
tionary model proposed by Baldwin and Lloyd Morgan, which has come to be known
as Baldwinian evolution or the Baldwin effect. This model explicitly views psychological
factors as central to the evolutionary process. Finally, the use of Baldwinian thinking
in contemporary theorizing regarding language and other symbolic systems is reviewed
and suggestions are made regarding the implications of Baldwinian models for theory
building in analytical psychology.
[An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the National Conference of
Jungian Analysts, Santa Fe, New Mexico, October 18, 1999, under the title,
‘Evolution, psychology, and the emergence of the psyche’.]
Introduction
In 1919, C. G. Jung presented a paper, entitled ‘Instinct and the Unconscious’
(Jung 1960), at a symposium in London jointly sponsored by the Aristotelian
Society, the Mind Association, and the British Psychological Association. At
the symposium, several papers, all with the same title, were presented by
prominent figures in British psychology. Jung alone represented the continent.
Generally speaking, this paper is referenced for one of two reasons; it repre-
sents Jung’s first public use of the terms archetype and collective unconscious,
and it is the first instance where Jung refers to the archetypes as being ‘engraved
on the human mind’. This latter expression is taken by some commentators to
be indicative of Lamarckian tendencies in Jung’s thought (Stevens 1990). Jung
As Sulloway also shows (p. 440), one of the preferred means used by Freud’s
followers to exonerate Freud of the charge of pervasive Lamarckism was to
locate Lamarckian tendencies in the late works of Freud and then blame Jung
– and sometimes Ferenczi – for having introduced such misguided thinking
into psychoanalysis.
On its face the claim that Jung was responsible for Freud’s Lamarckian
commitments is difficult to understand. Jung never mentions Lamarck in the
collected works, if the general index is any guide, and Lamarck is not discussed
in the Freud/Jung correspondence. Jung was, to be sure, deeply interested in
what he called ‘a phylogeny of the mind’ (Jung 1961, para. 521). Roazen observes
that Jung was ‘far more prone to cite phylogenetic interpretations than was
Freud himself’, and Freud’s objection that Jung had a tendency to ‘seize on a
phylogenetic explanation before the ontogenetic possibilities had been ex-
hausted’ (Roazen 1975, p. 261), but all that meant was that Jung was interested
in the evolutionary history of the mind, with no implied commitment to any
particular theory of evolution. Phylogeny refers to the historical development
of a species over evolutionary time, regardless of what evolutionary model one
embraces. Ontogeny refers to the developmental history of an individual
organism. Thus Freud’s objection to Jung’s phylogenetic interests simply refers
to Jung’s failure, in Freud’s mind, to exhaust the possible causes of pathology
in the development of the individual prior to opting for a more evolutionary
or phylogenetic explanation. Indeed, the notion that Jung’s phylogenetic inter-
ests prompted Freud to embrace Lamarckism, as proposed by Jones and others,
is spurious, for, as both Sulloway and Kitcher make clear, Freud’s commitment
to Lamarckism significantly predated his work with Jung.
Nevertheless, defenders of Jung have found it necessary to finesse the
charge of Lamarckism in Jung by arguing that his theories do not require a
Lamarckian basis, as Freud’s so manifestly do. Thus Anthony Stevens remarks
in his book, On Jung, that ‘the collective unconscious is a respectable scientific
hypothesis, and one does not have to adopt a Lamarckian view of evolution
to accept it’ (Stevens 1990, p. 36). Rather, Stevens argues, one can interpret
Jung’s ideas about the collective unconscious and the archetypes in terms
derived from later developments in evolutionary theory and comparative
psychology, to make sense out of Jung in more contemporary terms. Stevens
is correct, but his comments leave open the question of what exactly Jung
himself thought his position was in relation to evolution, Lamarckism, and the
basis for his vision of a phylogeny of the mind. It also leaves open the question
of what Jungian theoreticians at the beginning of the 21st Century are to do with
theoretical constructs that appear to be based on 19th Century assumptions.
These are the issues that I intend to address in the rest of this paper. While,
regrettably, Jung did not leave behind a detailed working out of his position
on evolution, I hope to show that there are some hints, at least by 1919, and
perhaps earlier, that he was well aware of the inadequacy of Lamarckian
thinking and in fact rejected it. Additionally, I hope to show that an alternative
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Lamarckism
Jean-Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de Lamarck (1744–1829), is
often imagined as some sort of flat earther or equally benighted crank whose
ghost Darwin decisively laid to rest with the publication of On the Origin of
Species (Darwin, 1859/1964). In reality, Lamarck was one of the leading
zoologists of his time and was decisive in setting in motion research into how
life on earth had changed over time. He was a vigorous opponent of creation-
ist views, and in that degree helped set the stage for Darwin. The essence of
his theory was that characteristics acquired by an organism in response to
environmental imperatives were directly passed on to that organism’s offspring.
This is the so-called doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.
Additionally, Lamarck viewed the transformation of life as fundamentally
progressive. In other words, life was moving toward ever-higher degrees of
success and well-being. Although Lamarck was opposed to traditional religious
views of creation, this progressivist point of view did reflect his own deistic
inclinations.
Although Darwin disliked any association between his theories and
Lamarck’s, their actual differences had less to do with the inheritance of
acquired characteristics than with the idea of progressive change. Darwin’s
innovation in thinking about change was the theory of natural selection
applied to variation among organisms. But we must keep in mind that until
the work of Gregor Mendel was rediscovered in 1900, no one had any idea
what the unit of variation was. Indeed, Darwin himself proposed that the
somatic cells of adult individuals all contributed, by way of particles he called
‘gemmules’, to the constitution of the reproductive cells. This notion, which
Darwin termed ‘pan-genesis’, was nothing more nor less than straightforward
Lamarckism. What mattered to Darwin was that there was no inherent direc-
tionality to his theory. If two animals both acquired the ability to stretch their
necks to eat leaves higher up, pan-genesis would allow both of them to pass that
04_Hogenson/D/5L 06/09/2001 5:16 pm Page 595
characteristic along to their offspring. But it was natural selection that would
determine which variation would be most successful, and thereby determine
which bit of stretching would enjoy the greatest success in reproduction. And
that determination was entirely dependent on the circumstances of the moment.
There was no deistic incline toward ever-higher levels of organization.
Thus as late as the 1890s, the Lamarckian dimensions of Darwin’s theory
still formed an essential aspect of the theory of evolution. Indeed, some of
Darwin’s closest and most devoted followers, notably George John Romanes,
were open exponents of what had come to be called neo-Lamarckism, advocating
the inheritance of acquired behavioural, if not morphological, characteristics.
Romanes, for example, in his book Mental Evolution in Animals, proposed
that a hen, who had raised several broods of ducklings and had become
habituated to their taking to the water, had in fact acquired a new instinctual
response when she would fly to a rock in the middle of a pond and wait for
her charges (Romanes, 1884/1969). Freud, Sulloway recounts, was an avid
reader of Romanes, particularly of his subsequent book, Mental Evolution in
Man (1888 in Sulloway 1979, p. 247f).
A contrary point of view, however, was emerging. In Germany August
Weismann debunked Lamarckian views of morphogenesis by amputating the
tails of several generations of rats and demonstrating that all of their offspring
were nevertheless born with tails. In the United States and England, two
figures will concern us, James Mark Baldwin and Conway Lloyd Morgan.
Baldwin was the leading child psychologist in the United States and one of the
first social psychologists until a sexual indiscretion lead to his academic exile
from Johns Hopkins University in 1909. He subsequently took up residence in
Paris where, until his death in 1934, he continued to write and met regularly
with his long time friends Pierre Janet and Théodore Flournoy, through whom
he influenced the young Jean Piaget (1982). Jung, of course, was deeply influ-
enced by Janet, and personally close to Flournoy, and thus we may imagine
that he became familiar with Baldwin’s work under their influence. C. Lloyd
Morgan was the leading comparative psychologist in the United Kingdom,
working primarily at Glasgow University. He was also a close friend and the
literary executor of George Romanes, although he was intensely critical of
Romanes’ neo-Lamarckism. These researchers, Weismann, Baldwin, Morgan,
and others became known as the neo- or ultra-Darwinians. For them, the notion
of the inheritance of acquired characteristics was anathema (Richards 1987).
While Baldwin and Morgan were committed neo-Darwinians, as psycho-
logists they were also concerned with the relationship of mind to the process
of evolution. Baldwin and Morgan took seriously Romanes’ questions regarding
the influence of learning and habit on the inheritability of behaviour.
Evolution under natural selection is a slow process, Romanes argued, but
some environmental demands require quite rapid adaptation if survival is
going to be insured. This means, Romanes went on, that intelligent action will
be engaged to solve the problem, and in so doing natural selection, which is
04_Hogenson/D/5L 06/09/2001 5:16 pm Page 596
average is 38.8% (Durham 1991). Why is this the case? As it happens, the
ability to absorb lactose plays an important role in the ability to fix vitamin D
in the absence of sunlight, and, in consequence, to retain calcium. Hence, the
ability to absorb lactose has distinct survival value in northern latitudes where
sunlight is at a premium. But how is this capability acquired? Both populations
have long traditions of animal husbandry – they raise a lot of cows. So we have
the first step in a cultural pattern that underlies a biologically evolved trait.
But cows alone are not enough, you have to do something with the milk.
In the Mediterranean, India, and other warm climates, it is common to reduce
milk to one or another cultured form, such as butter, yogurt or cheese. These
forms of milk product are more readily stored in warm climates, but they also
have greatly reduced levels of lactose in them, as the bacteria used to culture the
milk digests most of the lactose. In Northern Europe, on the other hand, large
quantities of raw milk are consumed, with lactose constituting an important
element in the diet.
What probably happened was that as Indo-European populations migrated
north, those members of the population who could absorb lactose enjoyed
higher rates of survival and prospered enough to pass along more genes for
lactose uptake than other members of the population. However, this evolu-
tionary process presupposed a variety of cultural innovations, beginning with
animal husbandry itself, which allowed migration to take place at all. In other
words, natural selection was no longer natural in the sense of simply respond-
ing to the natural environment. It was now a culturally driven natural selection.
Biologically, the entire process still took place by means of natural selection,
but the human cultural ability to learn animal husbandry, and consequently
alter the environment to meet the needs of the organism, i.e., to cultivate a
means of overcoming vitamin D deficiencies in Northern climates, meant that
natural selection was going on under the supervision, if you will, of the human
psyche. Processes such as this are often referred to as ‘co-evolutionary’, but
they are in fact examples of the Baldwin effect because an element of behav-
ioural plasticity is involved in the process of setting up the environment of
biological evolutionary adaptation. Human plasticity and the ability to learn
ways to cope with or alter the environment, thereby altering the context
within which natural selection operates, established a place for the workings
of the mind in the evolutionary process, without giving in to the neo-
Lamarckian commitment to the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The
genome, in the Baldwinian model, is still only affected by variation and
natural selection. But the environmental conditions under which the selection
is taking place are at least partly shaped by the human psyche.
credit for, it would be a mistake to claim that he was deeply informed or that
he cared a great deal about controversies in the field of evolutionary theory.
Nevertheless, he was familiar with the work of both Baldwin and Morgan,
and this familiarity appears to have helped form the basis for what he does
have to say about evolution. He cites Baldwin in Wandlungen und Symbole der
Libido (The Psychology of the Unconscious) (Jung 1991), regarding Baldwin’s
work on the social foundations of language, and Morgan is cited in both
‘Instinct and the Unconscious’ and ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’. After 1896
Baldwin introduced his evolutionary thinking into most of his works, if only
in a tangential manner. Jung’s reference in Wandlungen is to Baldwin’s three
volume Thought and Things or Genetic Logic, published between 1906 and
1911 (Baldwin 1906), which, while it is does not provide an explicit discussion
of the 1896 thesis, is nevertheless clear on Baldwin’s evolutionary commitments.
Jung’s references to Morgan are to his book of 1896, Habit and Instinct (Morgan
1896a), which is a sustained critique of neo-Lamarckism culminating in his
own rendering of the evolutionary mechanisms that would later be referred to
as the Baldwin effect.1
Returning then to 1919, what can we say about Jung’s supposed Lamarckism
in light of what we can infer about his familiarity with Baldwin and Morgan?
One striking aspect of this short paper is that Jung’s arguments run counter to
a naïve endorsement of Lamarckism, and, read as examples, in fact come across
as a rather clearly worded rejection of the inheritance of acquired character-
istics. How so? Jung actually proceeds on two fronts, one having to do with
the nature of instinct and the other having to do with the situatedness of the
organism, what Jung comes to call its image.
To argue his first point, Jung draws a distinction between genuinely instinctual
behaviour, which he sees as compulsive in nature, but shared by all members
of a species, and the compulsive behaviour associated with phobias and neuroses.
The definition of instinctual behaviour as behaviour that has an all or nothing
quality to it, a definition advanced by W. H. R. Rivers, a strong advocate for
Freud and another participant in the symposium, is too broad because com-
pulsiveness is also associated with individual phobias. Indeed, Jung points out
that we naturally make this distinction when we recognize that a compulsive
fear of snakes is not only shared among humans, but also among other primates,
while a compulsive fear of chickens would immediately be recognized as a
phobia unique to a given individual. What is important here is that under
a neo-Lamarckian interpretation a phobic response to chickens on the part of
one individual should be no different from the chicken which raised ducks,
thereby acquiring, as Romanes commented at the time, ‘the basis of a new in-
stinct’ (Romanes 1884/1969, p. 215). This was precisely why Lamarckism was
so important to Freud; he had to have a means by which a singular historical
event – the primordial killing of the father by the band of brothers, postulated
in Totem and Taboo – could give rise to the elaborate apparatus of the
Oedipus complex. But this is not the position taken by Jung. To the contrary,
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Jung distinguished between genuine instincts and compulsions that are not
instinctual. A Lamarckian, on the other hand, would have argued that the
children of a person with a chicken phobia would inherit a chicken phobia,
just as Freud argued that subsequent generations have inherited the anxiety
associated with the primal killing of the father.
Jung’s second argument, which also conflicts with Lamarckism but plays a
role in the development of Baldwinian theory, is the case of the yucca moth.
In Habit and Instinct, C. Lloyd Morgan describes the breeding behaviour of
the yucca moth. The moth emerges from its chrysalis state on the one night
that the yucca plant opens its flower for pollination. The female moth mates
and then gathers a bit of pollen from one plant, flies to another plant and
makes a small incision into which it lays its eggs. It then closes the incision
with the pollen ball and dies. The flower closes and the fertilized eggs and the
now fertilized ova of the plant develop together. Upon hatching, the moth larvae
eat some of the plant ova, but leave behind many more, thus allowing for
the propagation of the plant. On Morgan’s account, experiments conducted
with the plant demonstrated that the moth was the only natural means by
which the yucca plant could be fertilized, and the yucca plant was essential for
the development of the moth larvae (Morgan 1896a, p. 14)
Both Morgan and Jung point out that the reproductive behaviour of this
moth is instinctual, but could not be the result of learning turned into instinct
by Lamarckian transmission because the entire reproductive sequence takes
place in only one day. Morgan does not go much further with his analysis of
the behaviour of the moth, but Jung does. Invoking Henri Bergson, Jung pro-
poses that in addition to the instincts one may posit the functioning of intuition
which, he argues, allows for the workings of a ‘hunch’, by means of which the
organism apprehends a complex situation, in the development of the organism
(Jung 1960, para. 269). Jung goes on to argue that it is the combination of this
kind of intuition, ‘namely the archetypes of perception and apprehension’ with
the instincts that comprise the collective unconscious (Jung 1960, para. 270).
Baldwin knew Bergson, and appreciated his work in philosophy and the
theory of evolution. He also – correctly – distinguished Bergson from vitalists
such as Hans Driesch, pointing out, in Thought and Things, that Bergson’s
theories are perfectly compatible, in their actual application, with Darwinian
evolution (Baldwin 1906, vol. 3, p. 275). Indeed, as we will see shortly, the notion
that a hunch or guess plays a role in the later development of Baldwinian theory,
as proposed by Jung – albeit without direct reference to Baldwin; the role of
intuition, or having a hunch about a situation, may have been unusually
prescient on Jung’s part. But Jung’s concern regarding the yucca moth has
more to do with the way in which he views the situatedness of the organism.
Although this point is often missed by his followers and critics alike, Jung’s
original thinking regarding the theory of archetypes, which actually originates
in his reflections on the word association test and the theory of the complex,
falls within the frame of what we would now call cognitive neuroscience
04_Hogenson/D/5L 06/09/2001 5:16 pm Page 600
(Spitzer 1992). As Jung remarks near the end of ‘Instinct and the Unconscious’,
‘Archetypes are typical modes of apprehension, and wherever we meet with
uniform and regularly recurring modes of apprehension we are dealing with
an archetype …’ (Jung 1960 para. 280, Jung’s emphasis). At this point Jung
associates the archetype with the behavioural role of the instincts, and remarks,
just prior to the last passage that the ‘primordial image might suitably be
described as the instinct’s perception of itself’ (Jung 1960, para. 277, Jung’s
emphasis). In the case of the yucca moth, Jung remarks that there must be some
image of the yucca plant that ‘triggers off’ the instinctual response that leads
to the moth’s reproductive behaviour (ibid.). What does he mean by image?
Jung repeats this nearly thirty years later in his important essay, ‘On
the Nature of the Psyche’ where he uses another interesting insect example,
that of the leaf-cutting ant. Beginning with a comment on evolution, Jung
remarks:
In view of the structure of the body, it would be astonishing if the psyche were the
only biological phenomenon not to show clear traces of its evolutionary history, and
it is altogether probable that these marks are closely connected with the instinctual
base. Instinct and archaic mode meets in the biological conception of the ‘pattern of
behaviour’. There are, in fact, no amorphous instincts, as every instinct bears in itself
the pattern of its situation. Always it fulfils an image, and the image has fixed qual-
ities. The instinct of the leaf-cutting ant fulfils the image of ant, tree, leaf, cutting,
transport, and little ant-garden of fungi. If any one of these conditions is lacking, the
instinct does not function, because it cannot exist without its total pattern, without
its image … The same is also true of man: he has in him these a priori instinct-types
which provide the occasion and pattern for his activities, in so far as he functions
instinctively. As a biological being he has no choice but to act in a specifically human
way, and fulfil his pattern of behaviour … They [the primordial images] are not just
relics or vestiges of earlier modes of functioning; they are the ever-present and bio-
logically necessary regulators of the instinctual sphere, whose range of action covers
the whole realm of the psyche and only loses its absoluteness when limited by the
relative freedom of the will. We may say that the image represents the meaning of
the instinct.
(Jung 1960, para. 398, Jung’s emphases)
The example of the leaf-cutting ant derives from C. Lloyd Morgan’s book
Habit and Instinct (Morgan 1896a), which Jung apparently continued to use
as a touchstone for his reflections on evolution. That said, what impression
does this passage make on us, and what are the theoretical implications of Jung’s
position? On the face of it, one is tempted to assume, as I believe many do,
that Jung is proposing that the all important governing images, or archetypes,
are really rather complete inner or mental representations of various states of
affairs encountered over evolutionary time. But this would be mistaking. Rather,
it seems to me that Jung takes very seriously the notion that the archetypal is
always imbedded in a context, and that the context is equally as important as
any structure that may be provided by the archetypes. To understand how this
could be the case I want to now move to an examination of the ways in which
04_Hogenson/D/5L 06/09/2001 5:16 pm Page 601
the works of Baldwin and Morgan have come into play in contemporary
theorizing.
at San Diego (Hutchins & Hazlehurst 1990). Basing their work on that of
Hinton and Nowlan, Hutchins and Hazlehurst asked how an evolutionary
process might lead the individuals in a culture to know more about a natural
phenomenon – in this case the relationship between the phases of the moon
and the level of the tides – than any individual would be able to learn in their
lifetime. The crucial insight in this paper was that cultures produce artefacts –
myths, rituals, and objects of various kinds – and that these artefacts have to
be taken into account when viewing evolution in that culture. Put another
way, once you have culture, no matter how simple, evolution under natural
selection no longer takes place in relation to the natural environment alone,
but also in relation to the artefactual environment. This is precisely the situation
outlined above in relation to lactose absorption. But it is also the case that
in a world of artefacts, there are some artefacts that work better than others
in relation to the task at hand and the cognitive capabilities of those who
employ the artefacts. In their simulation, Hutchins and Hazlehurst created
computer ‘citizens’ of a culture concerned with moon and tide variation.
Each citizen was allowed to ‘create an artefact’ that predicted these variations,
then create an offspring and then die. The result of the simulation was that
if a ‘genetic’ learning bias was introduced into the process, successive
generations were increasingly able to judge which artefacts worked the best in
making the predictions, and were thereby able to learn to predict the moon-
tide relationship far faster than would have been the case without the learning
process. Importantly, however, the connectionist networks that were used to
run this simulation were not learning the phases of the moon or the level of
the tides. They were learning, or adapting, to making judgments regarding
how well an artefact created by an individual in the previous generation had
performed in making the prediction. Although Hutchins and Hazlehurst were
less concerned with biological evolution than Hinton and Nowlan, one can
immediately see how this process of cultural learning would influence genetic
evolution under the conditions associated with the Baldwin effect.
So, by the early 1990s Baldwin and Morgan had been resuscitated in at least
some research circles where the importance of their insight was recognized and
applied to a variety of situations. I am even tempted to say that the simulation
of Hutchins and Hazlehurst provides a model for the emergence of archetypes,
but that would be to jump too fast in the direction of interpretation. We first
need to examine a more complex cultural and evolutionary process. Just such
an examination has recently been undertaken by Terrence Deacon, professor
of neuroscience and evolutionary anthropology at Boston University, in his
book, The Symbolic Species (Deacon 1997).
Conclusion
Baldwinian theory and Jungian psychology
I began this paper by arguing that it is a mistake to view Jung as a Lamarckian
in his thinking about evolution. The basis for this argument was the recog-
nition of Jung’s familiarity with and uses of two of the most prominent anti-
Lamarckians of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, James Mark Baldwin
and Conway Lloyd Morgan. I then showed that Baldwin and Lloyd Morgan
overcame the arguments of the neo-Lamarckians by explicitly integrating
the workings of mind, or consciousness, into the evolutionary process. Given
Jung’s already established theoretical commitments regarding a phylogeny of
the mind – the object of complaints by Freud – we would expect him to
embrace this point of view, which I believe he did. That much said, it is still
worth reiterating a point made above: I do not want to argue that Jung was
necessarily a consistently self-conscious Baldwinian in his evolutionary thinking.
04_Hogenson/D/5L 06/09/2001 5:16 pm Page 606
What does this point of view indicate for theory building in analytical psy-
chology? To me, it is precisely in the work of Terrence Deacon, Horst
Hendriks-Jansen, Ester Thelen and others, that the opportunity presents itself
to move forward in our understanding of the theory of archetypes. A revolu-
tion is taking place in cognitive science, in the movement away from ever more
complex and intricately ramified modular or ‘programme’ based models of the
mind, and toward models based on the emergent properties of dynamic, com-
plex, interactive systems. This process parallels important changes taking place
in our understanding of evolution, and the mechanisms that actually shape our
biological being in the world (for a discussion of this point of view in relation
to the theory of archetypes see the recent paper by Saunders and Skar [2001],
‘Archetypes, complexes and self organization’). It is my expectation that these
new avenues of research – situated robotics, dynamic systems theories of
development, the neuro-anatomy of symbolic processes – all of which share
important affinities with Jung’s interest in Baldwinian evolution, will radically
alter what we see in human development and psychopathology, thereby
providing us with new insights into Jung’s theories about the nature of the
human psyche. We may then find, for example, that archetypal theory really
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TRANSLATIONS OF ABSTRACT
Cet article interroge l’idée que C. G. Jung aurait appuyé sa théorie des archétypes sur
le modèle de l’évolution de Lamarck. Cette idée est mise en cause à partir du fait que
Jung connaissait et s’appuyait sur les écrits de James Mark Baldwin et Conway Lloyd
Morgan, qui étaient tous les deux des opposants connus et fervents de la théorie néo-
Lamarckienne à partir d’un cadre de référence néo-Darwinien. L’article donne ensuite
les grandes lignes du modèle de l’évolution proposé par Baldwin et Lloyd Morgan, qui
est maintenant connu comme l’évolution baldwinienne ou effet Baldwin. Dans ce modèle
les facteurs psychologiques sont explicitement vus comme essentiels au processus
d’évolution. Pour finir l’auteur passe en revue l’utilisation de la pensée baldwinienne
dans les théorisarions contemporaines relatives au langage et autres systèmes sym-
boliques, et avance des hypothèses quant aux implications qu’ont l’influence des
modèles baldwiniens sur la construction théorique en psychologie analytique.
Diese Arbeit stellt Überlegungen an zur Behauptung, daß C. G. Jung ein Lamarcksches
Evolutionsmodell verwandte, um seine Archetypentheorie zu unterstützen. Dieser
Behauptung wird widersprochen auf der Grundlage von Jungs Vertrautheit mit und
der Verwendung der Schriften von James Mark Baldwin und Conway Lloyd Morgan,
die beide auf neo-Darwinistischer Grundlage bekannte und machtvolle Gegner der
neo-Lamarckschen Theorie waren. Die Arbeit beschreibt dann in Umrissen das
Entwicklungsmodell, das von Baldwin und Lloyd Morgan vorgeschlagen wurde,
bekannt geworden als Baldwinsche Evolution oder der Baldwin Effekt. Dieses Modell
verwendet explizit psychologische Faktoren als zentral für den evolutionären Prozeß.
Schließlich wird ein Überblick gegeben über den Gebrauch Baldwinschen Denkens
in zeitgenössischer Theoriebildung hinsichtlich Sprache und anderer symbolischer
Systeme. Vorschläge hinsichtlich der Implikationen Baldwinscher Modelle für die
Theoriebildung in Analytischer Psychologie werden unterbreitet.
Note
1. Around the turn of the century there were two lines of thought in biology that have
since fallen into disrepute. One was Lamarckism, or more correctly neo-Lamarckism,
and the other was recapitualsionism, proposed in particular by the German biologist,
Ernst Haeckel. Recapitulationism is unquestionably an important issue in understand-
ing Jung’s thinking – and even more so that of some of his close followers such as Erich
Neumann – but requires its own detailed examination. The present paper confines itself
to the question of Lamarckism in Jung. For a detailed discussion of recapitulationism
see Gould 1977. For a discussion of Neumann’s recapitulationism, and the problems it
poses for Jungian theory see Giegerich 1975.
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