[G.R. No. 81567. July 9, 1990.]
The rationale behind lawful arrests,
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA.
MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE,
petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA,
BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.
ECISION
PER CURIAM p:
These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the
Court, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of
issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the
bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they
should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the
petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by
virtue of valid informations filed in court against them. LexLib
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their
arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary
investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in
their respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained
have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances
attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas
corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous
complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when
such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit en
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7."
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is
justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto,
viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has
just been committed and the person making the arrest has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it.
without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs.
Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of
criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in
whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed,
had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense,
when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were
clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of
valid informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the
eight (8) petitions is in order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1
February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation
squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it
was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the
hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing
of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January
1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view
of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was
positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on
top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt.
Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural
was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest
and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with
the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons
in Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo
Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified. cdphil
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was
filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and
Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on
9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on
12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15
February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato
Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been
filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The
petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly
dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of
an accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested
while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of
the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State
and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court
in an earlier case:
"From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners
that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without
basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith
under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of
the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and
existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether
as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts
but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion,
than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for
a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause
before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting
of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a
judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing
persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the
rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by
the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of
society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If
killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the
essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in
case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them
while any of these contingencies continue cannot be less justified.
. . ." 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against
Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc."
was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on
17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were
found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando
Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial
court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to
him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
"In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his
arrest, the fact remains that the defendant was actually in court in
the custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient
in form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not
guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty
pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were
irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could
have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil
action for damages against the person who arrested him we need
not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not
sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint and after a trial free from error."
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia
Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified.
When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in
Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra
admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters
to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group.
Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the
National United Front Commission, in charge of finance, and
admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house
of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of
ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no
permit or authority to possess. LLpr
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one
Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had
surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about
the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified
some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the
Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia" a staff
member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from
Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also
pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino
located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the
National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed
under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a
search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal
Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search,
the following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1 ) Colt M1 6A1 long rifle with defaced serial
number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK 8 SN: 260577 &
2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transceiver SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1 ) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constantino could not produce any
permit or authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio
and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to
the CIS Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he
refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he
was a staff member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a
ranking member of the International Department of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August
1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato
Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily
admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the
CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka
Mong", referring to Renato Constantino, and other members of
the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he
is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro,
Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the
following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A
& Co." dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell
datre)" dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic",
dated August 11, 1988.
Also found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper
containing a written but jumbled telephone number of Florida M.
Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St.,
Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts
of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address
the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the place at about
11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as
military agents and after seeking permission to search the place,
which was granted, the military agents conducted a search in the
presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain
of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of
the NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank
deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive
documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester,
11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live
ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a
result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were
brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City,
for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that
the voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other
occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a result,
the said other occupants of the house were released from
custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan
City Fiscal for inquest after which an information charging her
with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion
Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case
No. C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before
this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At
the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested
his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon
City. Accordingly, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf
is now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque
remains for resolution. LLjur
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and
Buenaobra are officers and or members of the National United
Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or
traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed
admitted. 5 As officers and/ or members of the NUFC-CPP, their
arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier
stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of
Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time of
apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license to
possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also
justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the
house of Renato Constantino, they had a bag containing
subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition
for which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock
in the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constantino at
Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by
military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on
their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be
loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their
permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition,
but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC
Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were
the following articles:
a) Voluminous subversive documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one
(1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of
same caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit
tampered with one (1) magazine containing five (5) live
ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as
"KaTed", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their
comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other
documentary evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at
Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as
Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 and 74387, respectively. No bail was
recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with
this Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple,
alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully
arrested without a warrant and that the informations filed against
them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing
and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court
issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had
filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were
unlawfully arrested because there was no previous warrant of
arrest, is without merit. The record shows that Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms
and ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed
against them are null and void for want of a preliminary
investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the
Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
"Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. —
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or
fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the
person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a
proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice.
Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in
the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within
five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the
information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same
right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in
this Rule."
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however,
refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against
them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:
"This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance
with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
that no preliminary investigation was conducted because the
accused has not made and signed a waiver of the provisions of
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that based on
the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe
that the crime has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof."
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the
informations had been filed against them in court. Petitioners
cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant,
of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her
an unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of
this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence
and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a
search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house
located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of
the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya armed in a
car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several
rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of
Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were
brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky
Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess
the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of PD
1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447.
Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this
Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged
therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and
denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in
flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified.
No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was
arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to
Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple,
and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents alleged to have been found in their
possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but
were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to
support their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or
ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the
said arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners
falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these
cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for,
as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is
absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest
that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of
P15,000.00 on each on their heads.' " 6 On the other hand, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners
is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the
result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by
no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel
movement. LexLib
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly
observes:
". . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and
seizure conducted by the military at the residence of Renato
Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino's residence, was
not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the
military. It was a result of an in-depth military surveillance
coupled with the leads provided by former members of the
underground subversive organizations. That raid produced
positive results. To date, nobody has disputed the fact that the
residence of Constantino when raided yielded communication
equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive
documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by
Constantino that other members of his group were coming to his
place, reasonably conducted a 'stake-out' operation whereby
some members of the raiding team were left behind the place.
True enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino's
arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence.
He acted suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the
military authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no
ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only
that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there
to deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of
Constantino and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple
arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the
military agents to believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple
are among those expected to visit Constantino's residence
considering that Constantino's information was true, in that
Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the
circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to frisk and
search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such
as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court
yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that
they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia
on the day they were arrested thereat?.
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military
authorities to effect her arrest without warrant considering that it
was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot
be denied that Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because
the former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity
of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of
paper taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and
Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted
reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances of the events
in question, especially considering that at the time of petitioners'
arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or
subversive documents were found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor
innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place
and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude that
they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and
comprehensive conspiracy.".
VI
In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus
of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of
an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the
General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at
Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and
operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized
for their mutual aid and protection. cdll
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23
November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363
Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister
Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to
hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was
immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of
arrest arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted
him and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded
that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but
the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police
District at Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and
detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he
was brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the
said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was
thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police
Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained, restrained
and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the
petitioner is justified in view of the Information filed against him
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully
arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when
arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the
National Press Club.
"Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers
and operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988,
to force the government to give in to their demands to lower the
prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate
release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-
isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we
heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president
Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the Alliance
Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23,
1988." 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in
order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He
was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering
of drivers and sympathizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and
Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
"Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na
kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng
gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare
parts, bilihin at ang pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda
hanggang sa magkagulo na." 10 (emphasis supplied).
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November
1988. He was invited for questioning and brought to police
headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142
of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules
of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid
information filed with the competent court, he may not be
released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon
posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of
the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to
P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find
no merit in the submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was
illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this
case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14
December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of
men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in
Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the
killing was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on 28
December 1988. Upon questioning, Regala pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of the said
Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without
warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the
police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of
petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an
information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2)
others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 731. cdphil
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail,
but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10
January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his
co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial
court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with
this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989,
the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna,
Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January
1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued
a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing
that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
respondents by reason of an information filed against him with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken
cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail
filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the
strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna are based upon the facts and the law.
Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest
of Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant
to Sec. 5 (b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively
implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo
Bunye II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held
in People vs. Ancheta: 12
"The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by
reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite
for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime.
For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the
agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to
believe that the person sought to be detained participated
therein."
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal
charges have been filed in the proper courts against the
petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before
any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4,
Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing
that:
fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners
point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and
detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against
them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus
is filed before the court that the military authorities file the
criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind
the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert,
stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and
permits lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said
doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court
and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the
petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of
the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the
better practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas
corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which
issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before
whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to
issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the
case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile,
15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into
every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention — from the
moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the
court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such
a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of
our Constitution has in fact been satisfied." This is exactly what
the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should
henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In short,
all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be
promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and
disposition. LLpr
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in
G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's
provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

"Sec. 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it

appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if
the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held
to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment." (emphasis supplied)

At this point, we refer to petitioners' plea for the Court to re-

examine and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs.
Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after
an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant
of arrest or an order of commitment is issued by the court where
said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners claim that the
said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial
regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under
the present democratic dispensation and collides with the basic,
[G.R. No. 197788. February 29, 2012.]
RODEL LUZ y ONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1
respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to
set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
32516 dated 18 February 2011 2 and Resolution dated 8 July
2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which
sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-
Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer,
substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00
o'clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from
the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road,
Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet
(sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused
to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged
down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that
while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket
for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused
was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he
was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents
of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside
it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container
about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that
upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it;
that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon
cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the
accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table
which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of
which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected
shabu. 3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered
a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003,
after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic
chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand,
petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting
of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, 4 the RTC convicted petitioner of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs 5 committed on 10 March
2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he
had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then
subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his
person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The
RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak,
self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its
Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused
RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as
minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and
destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED. 6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a
Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent
to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter
filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE
RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic). 7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure,
because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that
there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even
issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city
ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that
he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully
arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and
apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the
use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in
the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof.
The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet
at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers,
albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal
basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and
arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a
crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No.
98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante
delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully
stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. . . . . 8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the
particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the
entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can
correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. 9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged
down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. 10 It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by
that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under
the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the
arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's license
of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law
enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized
by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of
this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local
traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this
Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a
receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall
authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not
exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of
said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be
extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the
driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of
apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or
revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual
12 provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles
during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting
Vehicles While in Mobile Car. — This rule is a general concept and
will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall
undertake the following, when applicable: . . .
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a
Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR).
Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or
argument with the driver or any of the vehicle's occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest."
There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him,
deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the
issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at
the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In
fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that
the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that
petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place.
Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were
waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into
custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme
Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a
motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be
considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such
questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it
be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the
questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and
the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop
significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the
passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most
States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman's signal to stop
one's car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission. . . .
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in
the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the
doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced
strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns
that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide
whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures
that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against
self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his
constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a
person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at 467. First,
detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively
temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last
only a few minutes. A motorist's expectations, when he sees a
policeman's light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged
to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting
while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may
then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be
allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning
incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from
stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in
which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue
until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id.,
at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are
not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the
police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed,
uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some
discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination,
exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces.
Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least
to some degree. . . .
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous
to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
than to a formal arrest. . . . The comparatively nonthreatening
character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any
suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the
dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary
traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of
Miranda.
xxx xxx xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent
will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed
by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of
action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest."
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a
motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop
thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody"
for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of
protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist
therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the
scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under
custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda
rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly
characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest.
Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest"
at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012,
which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash
helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under
the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine
only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless
arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic
violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the
police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the
latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested
the motorist. In this case, however, the officer's issuance (or
intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an
arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner
was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic
violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be
the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason
for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if
any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might
make could be used against them. 14 It may also be noted that in
this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with
by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings
must also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic
violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to
ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into
confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures"
"generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist," and as much as possible
to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try
to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody
questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested"
when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he
waiting * for his ticket, then there would have been no need for
him to be arrested for a second time — after the police officers
allegedly discovered the drugs — as he was already in their
custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii)
search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop
and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.
15 None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search
incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner's pocket.
Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent. 16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and
convincing evidence. 17 It must be voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by
any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that
petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged
accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent.
In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take
out the contents of his pocket. 18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of
the person giving consent and the environment in which consent
is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant
was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education
and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating
evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9)
the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was
freely and voluntarily given. 19 In this case, all that was alleged
was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule.
While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes
suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that
a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons. 20
In Knowles v. Iowa, 21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a
police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly
issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure
does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car.
The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-
blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist.
Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such
as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a
patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the
"search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the
suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to
preserve evidence for later use at trial. . . . But neither of these
underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is
sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationale — officer safety — is
"'both legitimate and weighty,'" . . . The threat to officer safety
from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in
the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a
custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the
extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into
custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U.S., at
234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer
flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity,
stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id.,
at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a
relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called
'Terry stop' . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296
(1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well
be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous,
immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the
case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra,
at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for
officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional
intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it
does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion
attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search
authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to
search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For
example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms,
supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform
a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable
suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an
occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even
conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any
containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).

Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to
search incident to arrest — the need to discover and preserve
evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a
citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had
been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going
to be found either on the person of the offender or in the
passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he

may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the
earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does
not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 22

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 23 Any evidence obtained in violation of
said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to
the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government. 24

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.
25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused. 26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming
the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED. The bail
bond posted for his provisional liberty is CANCELLED and
RELEASED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008.]
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS
DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA), respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue. THEDcS
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall
be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the
drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. . . . The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening
test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of
drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. . . . The following shall be subjected to undergo
drug testing:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. — Students
of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the school's student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug
testing . . .; STIHaE
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. —
Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random
drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations, . . . for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace.
Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs
shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282
of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service
Law; cAaETS
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a
criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of
not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a
mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those
found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to
the provisions of Section 15 of this Act. TADIHE
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations
on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as
follows: aIHSEc
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. —. . .
xxx xxx xxx
(g) All candidates for public office . . . both in the national
or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug
test, the public will know the quality of candidates they are
electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would
be elected . . . .
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority
vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws,
RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following
rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to
candidates for public office[:] CDAHaE
SEC. 1. Coverage. — All candidates for public office, both
national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and
Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government
forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored
and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. ...
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with
their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees
concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate
lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates
who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list
shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply . . . .
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. —
Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall
prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist
of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed
to comply with said drug test. . . . SCADIT
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file
drug test certificate. — No person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under
Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and
a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections, 1 filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he
seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in
that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of
the Constitution, which states:
SEC. 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at
least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered
voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election. aCTHEA
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for,
elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution
No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification
that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free.
He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing
the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board
and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social
Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit
the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f),
and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue
delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of
drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a
person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached by said provisions. ADSTCI
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Drugs
Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also
seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
that Sec. 36 (c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and
the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the
due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench
and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to
sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed
to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the
constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions. 2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised
in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the
statute sought to be reviewed. 3 But even with the presence of an
actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise
judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought
before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it. 4
To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. 5 HAcaCS
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest. 6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the
Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections,
possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests
in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary
considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to
relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the
transcendental importance and the paramount public interest
involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid
down by the Constitution? and IECcaA
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute
undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36 [g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject
to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator
needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3)
literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated
qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not
possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted
upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards,
as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, 7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
cASEDC
Pimentel's contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36 (g) of RA
9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of
the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform;
no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. 8 In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed. 9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are
subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v.
Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on
legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department
of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are
unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of
each of the departments . . . are limited and confined within the
four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department
can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the
given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority
against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but
over which it cannot leap. 10 EHSIcT
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is
subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation. 11 The substantive constitutional
limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights 12 and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing
the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing
and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36 (g), validly impose qualifications
on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is
also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution. 13
Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36 (g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted
upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The
COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that
"[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test".
Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165
and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum,
requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-
free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled
before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-
compliance with the drug-testing requirement. CHDTEA
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36 (g)
of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non-
compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor
or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument
may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is
optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception,
made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily
suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And
since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it
stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can
only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption
of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would
reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 into a pure
jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it
was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized
elections and the candidates running in that electoral event.
Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate
to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an
implementing issuance. DCcTHa
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having
infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or
eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as
senator.
SJS Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36 [c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA
9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36 (c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165
for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private
employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and
safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous
drugs". This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion
of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an
intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use
of dangerous drugs . . . through an integrated system of planning,
implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies,
programs and projects". 14 The primary legislative intent is not
criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as
a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as
criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should
the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54
and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point: aIAHcE
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to
Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. — A drug dependent
or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by
himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] . . .
apply to the Board . . . for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug
dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth
the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be
examined for drug dependency. If the examination . . . results in
the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she
shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. — A drug dependent under the
voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from
confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under
Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions: ISDHEa
xxx xxx xxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable
to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs.
Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically
impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug
dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate. 15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure 16 under Sec. 2, Art. III
17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long
come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the
validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the
medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and
employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the
issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first
impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive
jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among school
children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School
District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board
of Education), 18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided
cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
cDSAEI
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to
address the drug menace in their respective institutions following
the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After
consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis
drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school
student, was denied participation in the football program after he
refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith
sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter
alia, the Fourth Amendment 19 of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues
raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in
loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not
shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less
privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-
athletes since the former observe communal undress before and
after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes
voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not
invade a student's privacy since a student need not undress for
this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing
because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young.
The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable
search under the Fourth 20 and 14th Amendments and declared
the random drug-testing policy constitutional. ACIDSc
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in
Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school
students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a
member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team
declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-testing
policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th
Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely
undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in
locker rooms, non-athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the
constitutionality of drug testing even among non-athletes on the
basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so
ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-athlete and
an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of
the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the
health of the students. And in holding that the school could
implement its random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that
such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent
might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two
cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than
an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their
parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of
their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably
be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the
right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are
fair, just, and non-discriminatory. EAcCHI
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the
view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students
are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and
policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject
to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited
drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people,
21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up
as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is
conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of
students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable
but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the
student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from
Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is
as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's
laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State
to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested
school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire
student body and faculty. 22 Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea
that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual
students. TAHCEc
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the
mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165
for officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes
in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that
"subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable
cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual
right to privacy", 23 has failed to show how the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of
RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful
and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
Constitution. 24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic,
sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have
made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug
tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been
consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a
citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against
unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively
hereinbelow. 25 EHCDSI
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. 26 In context,
the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's
ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against
unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition
against 'unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad
guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task", to
borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. 28 Authorities are
agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain
paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise
of police power. 29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is
couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone
of the validity of a government search or intrusion. 30 And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is
judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion
on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. 31 In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be
personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing
policy for employees –– and students for that matter –– under RA
9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was
referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary
procedures", the probable-cause standard is not required or even
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in
question. EcICDT
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the
nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which
effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves
as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement.
The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and
the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to
maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced;
and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion
authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is
the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as
formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a
search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"? 32 ESCcaT
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36
of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as
couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards
preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the
employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While
every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the
law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject
of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug
testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36 (d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is
a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in
the company's work rules and regulations . . . for purposes of
reducing the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test,
the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing
methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of
the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact
that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health
(DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody. 33 In addition, the IRR issued by the
DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the "need
to know" basis; 34 that the "drug test result and the records shall
be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to
protect the confidentiality of the test results". 35 Notably, RA
9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the
prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the
violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the
intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
STHAaD
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out
illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well-being of the
citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of
dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the
medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test. 36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at
least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override
the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can
consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age
group, and social-economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state
that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their
ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the
illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug
problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution
of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a
laid back stance with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug
enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to
be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among
employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random
testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the
chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the
problem. aSACED
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the
well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of
the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials
and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and
restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on
public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in
the public service. 37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it
should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional
command, are required to be accountable at all times to the
people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and
efficiency. 38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly
commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the
provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give
unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the
manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug
testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and
officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted.
It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the
case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the
school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice
to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall
take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the
random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to
be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and
compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established. AaDSTH
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue,
in consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and
Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of
Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary
to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools
and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to
the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools
and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how
often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be
conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in
the constitutional landscape. 39 In the face of the increasing
complexity of the task of the government and the increasing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or
entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate
legislation, has become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36 [c], [d], [f], and [g] of
RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of RA 9165, the
Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for
persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from
the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek
entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case
of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds
from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
EHaCTA

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons

charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal
offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless". In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When
persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's
office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone
waive their right to privacy. 40 To impose mandatory drug testing
on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse
still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No.

161658 and declares Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY
GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring
Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its
Sec. 36 (f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are,
accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36 (f)
and (g) of RA 9165. No costs. aTSEcA

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 190710. June 6, 2011.]
JESSE U. LUCAS, petitioner, vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order? In this petition for review on certiorari, we address
this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a
relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated September 25, 2009 and
Resolution dated December 17, 2009. TaCDIc
The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to
Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing) 2 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in
1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao
and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a
prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany
Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen's workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got
pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner,
Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner's father was not stated in
petitioner's certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told
petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969,
petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay
City. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and
petitioner for a period of about two years. When the relationship
of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept
respondent's offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on
her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several
attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts
were in vain. DCHIAS
Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioner's
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner's baptismal certificate; (c)
petitioner's college diploma, showing that he graduated from
Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology;
(d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines,
College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different
newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition.
Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish
filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August
29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear
the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the
petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order 3
setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any
objection to the petition to file his opposition. The court also
directed that the Order be published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished with
copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear
and represent the State in the case. cCTAIE
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September
3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and
Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the
summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on
him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was
required, he was waiving service of summons and making a
voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition
and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of
the subject matter. 4
On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation
and Comment on Petitioner's Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear
the Case. Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition
is adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with
summons. 2005cdasia
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration. 5 Respondent averred that the
petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner
could not have personally known the matters that were alleged
therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of
a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner's father.
Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of
DNA evidence.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondent's motion for
reconsideration, issued an Order 6 dismissing the case. The court
remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba, 7 there are
four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action
which the parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child. The court opined that
petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects
before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which
may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood
group test and DNA test results. The court observed that the
petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present.
Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that
(a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual
relations with respondent, and petitioner's statement as to what
his mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the
certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c)
although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was
no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by
the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to
establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to
present any affirmative defenses. The dispositive portion of the
said Order therefore reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance
with the four procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action
in his petition, his motion for the submission of parties to DNA
testing to establish paternity and filiation is hereby DENIED. This
case is DISMISSED without prejudice. aASEcH
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the
Order dated July 30, 2008, which the RTC resolved in his favor.
Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order 9 setting aside the
court's previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30,
2008 is hereby reconsidered and set aside. cITaCS
Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing) be set for hearing on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the
morning.
SO ORDERED. 10
This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon
by petitioner for filing the petition is premature considering that a
full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court stressed that
the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified,
it included a certification against forum shopping, and it contained
a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section
1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the
allegation that the statements in the petition were not of
petitioner's personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court
also dismissed respondent's arguments that there is no basis for
the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on
the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on
DNA Evidence 11 allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at
the court's instance or upon application of any person who has
legal interest in the matter in litigation. cCAaHD
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated
October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition, 12 reiterating that
(a) the petition was not in due form and substance as no
defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations
were hearsay; and (b) there was no prima facie case, which made
the petition susceptible to dismissal.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009,
and rescheduled the hearing. 13
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
questioning the Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19,
2009. DAcSIC
On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari
in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED
for being meritorious. The assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008
and January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as
SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED. 14
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of respondent, as no summons had been served on him.
Respondent's special appearance could not be considered as
voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of
questioning the jurisdiction of the court over respondent.
Although respondent likewise questioned the court's jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent
to a waiver of his right to object to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person. HTSIEa
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish
illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order to
abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show
that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met. The CA further held that a DNA
testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case, thus:
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to
be absolute, the rule could not really have been intended to
trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could have not
meant to be an instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or
extortion. It could have not been intended to legalize
unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the
situation in this particular case if a court may at any time order
the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in compulsory recognition
cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant
without requiring first the presentation of corroborative proof,
then a dire and absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and
promote harassment and extortion. cDTIAC
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that
it sees the danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a
compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed
to establish prima facie proof. . . . If at anytime, motu proprio and
without pre-conditions, the court can indeed order the taking of
DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the prominent
and well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for
opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [sic]
casual sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as
a means to harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the
paternity of their children may just be taking the chances-just in
case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long past one-time
encounter. Indeed an absolute and unconditional taking of DNA
test for compulsory recognition case opens wide the opportunities
for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for
scandal. 15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the
CA denied the motion for lack of merit. 16
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the
following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER
RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. HCaDET
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE
PERSON OF THE RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY
SUBMITTED VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A
QUO. AIaDcH
I.C
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER
THAN ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE
MOTION (FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO)
FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA TESTING. AaDSEC
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED
AFTER THE PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF
FILIATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS
MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA,
ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE 'FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS OF A TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.' 17
Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his
petition for certiorari the court's lack of jurisdiction over his
person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same,
because issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At
any rate, respondent had already voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking
for affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated September 3, 2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November
6, 2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points
out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has waived
his right to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on
Petitioner's Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence,
the issue is already moot and academic. IaECcH
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature.
Although the caption of the petition does not state respondent's
name, the body of the petition clearly indicates his name and his
known address. He maintains that the body of the petition is
controlling and not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should
not be a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it is not a
legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any
doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply
denied the motion. 18 Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the
Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that there must be a prior
proof of filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that
the CA erroneously relied on the four significant procedural
aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in Herrera v. Alba. 19
Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable
at this point of the proceedings because they are matters of
evidence that should be taken up during the trial. 20
In his Comment, respondent supports the CA's ruling on most
issues raised in the petition for certiorari and merely reiterates his
previous arguments. However, on the issue of lack of jurisdiction,
respondent counters that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, he
raised the issue before the CA in relation to his claim that the
petition was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies
that he waived his right to the service of summons. He insists that
the alleged waiver and voluntary appearance was conditional
upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed required. He
avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot be
considered as waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
such person. cTEICD
The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court
were orders denying respondent's motion to dismiss the petition
for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes
of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before
the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule
is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a
special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither
can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal
unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number
of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it
has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. 21 In the present case, we discern no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying
the motion to dismiss. ACaEcH
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the
court's lack of jurisdiction over his person due to the absence of
summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance of the petition
to establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to
state a cause of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction
was raised before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of respondent, or whether respondent waived his
right to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue
here is actually whether it was necessary, in the first place, to
serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the case. In other words, was the service of summons
jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature
of petitioner's action, that is, whether it is an action in personam,
in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on
personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing
itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a
person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's
interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A
petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which
concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth
certificate, is an action in rem. 22
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective. 23
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in
rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate
filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the
right sought to be established. 24 Through publication, all
interested parties are deemed notified of the petition. AaCcST
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it
is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but
merely for satisfying the due process requirements. 25 This is but
proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect his interest if he so chooses. 26 Hence, failure to serve
summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be
excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact,
the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that
the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been
satisfied, considering that he has participated in the proceedings
in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the
petition to establish filiation.
To address respondent's contention that the petition should have
been adversarial in form, we further hold that the herein petition
to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed
adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of
a defendant, the failure to implead respondent as defendant, and
the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is
adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning
to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. 27 In this petition — classified as an action in rem —
the notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise
satisfied by the publication of the petition and the giving of notice
to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It
satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the
complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the
ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is
essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement
of the cause of action inadequate. 28 A complaint states a cause
of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal
right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant,
and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said
legal right. 29
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by
petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent,
however, contends that the allegations in the petition were
hearsay as they were not of petitioner's personal knowledge. Such
matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot be determined
at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his
evidence. CSHcDT
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of
action, the question submitted to the court for determination is
the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to
constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of
fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth
of the facts alleged in the complaint. 30 The inquiry is confined to
the four corners of the complaint, and no other. 31 The test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint. 32
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and
substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is
incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and
require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his
defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be
ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits. 33
The statement in Herrera v. Alba 34 that there are four significant
procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties
have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in
this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural
aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA's observation
that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case — the first
procedural aspect in a paternity case — is therefore misplaced. A
prima facie case is built by a party's evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading. ACETIa
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack
of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no
evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the
circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that
no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the
latter has just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CA's view that it would be dangerous to allow a
DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and
deserves the Court's attention. In light of this observation, we find
that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to
aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order,
particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus,
address the question of whether a prima facie showing is
necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. CSaHDT
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and
the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the
judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the
requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper
procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
possible sources of error, the available objections to the
admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative
value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the evidence
gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized
effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused
and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis
serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public." 35
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely
provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy
and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. — The appropriate
court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of
any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: DAEcIS
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected
to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; HCSEIT
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the
case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court
may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of
the DNA testing. cSTHAC
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior
court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement
agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be
issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said
conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order,
there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must
first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding
of the test. 36 In these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in
ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to
be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana eloquently explained —
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under
the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made
before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in
various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have
almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood
testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there
is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in
cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action
refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing
must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing. 37

The same condition precedent should be applied in our

jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment
suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a
reasonable possibility of paternity. CTacSE

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a

DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court
may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity
for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence
to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA
testing.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 and
Resolution dated December 17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009
of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.
HCTAEc

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 205821. October 1, 2014.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GARRY DELA
CRUZ y DE GUZMAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
"Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to
ensure integrity in the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs
and drug paraphernalia. This is especially true when only a
miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been
taken from the accused." 1 TIaDHE
This resolves an appeal from a conviction for violation of Sections
5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
On September 15, 2004, accused-appellant Garry dela Cruz (dela
Cruz) was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs in two separate informations, 2 as follows:
Criminal Case No. 5450 (20920)
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, A[R]TICLE (sic) II K OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165)
That on or about September 14, 2004, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to sell,
deliver, transport, distribute or give away to another any
dangerous drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, SELL AND DELIVER to PO1 WILFREDO BOBON y
TARROZA, a member of the PNP, who acted as buyer, one (1)
small heat-sealed transparent plastic pack containing white
crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.0120 gram which
when subjected to qualitative examination gave positive result to
the tests for the presence of METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (shabu) knowing the same to be a dangerous
drug. HSIDTE
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 5451 (20921)
VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165)
That on or about September 14, 2004, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his
possession and under his custody and control six (6) pieces heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white
crystalline substance, each weighing as follows: 1) 0.0135 gram; 2)
0.0183 gram; 3) 0.0542 gram; 4) 0.0197 gram; 5) 0.0100 [gram];
and 6) 0.0128 gram or a total of 0.1285 gram; which when
subjected to qualitative examination gave positive result to the
tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) knowing same
to be a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 (Citations omitted) HAEDCT
As alleged by the prosecution, dela Cruz was arrested in a buy-
bust operation. The buy-bust operation was allegedly conducted
after a civilian informant (the informant) tipped the Zamboanga
City Police Office that a certain "Gary" was selling illegal drugs at
the parking area for buses behind Food Mart, Governor Lim
Street, Sangali, Bunguioa, Zamboanga City (the target area). 4
The buy-bust operation team included PO1 Wilfredo Bobon (PO1
Bobon), as poseur-buyer, and SPO1 Roberto Roca (SPO1 Roca), as
back-up arresting officer. It was agreed that "PO1 Bobon would
remove his bull cap once the sale of illegal drugs was
[consummated]." The buy-bust team prepared a PhP100.00 bill
with serial number KM 776896 as marked money. 5
At around 11:00 a.m. of September 14, 2004, the buy-bust
operation team, accompanied by the informant, went to the
target area. The informant initially brokered the sale of shabu. It
was PO1 Bobon who handed the marked money to dela Cruz in
exchange for one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected
shabu. After which, he removed his bull cap. SPO1 Roca then
arrested dela Cruz. 6 TacESD
Upon frisking dela Cruz, PO1 Bobon supposedly recovered six (6)
more heat-sealed sachets of suspected shabu. PO1 Bobon placed
the sachet he purchased from dela Cruz in his right pocket and the
six (6) other sachets in his left pocket. SPO1 Roca recovered the
marked PhP100.00 bill. 7
Dela Cruz and the seven (7) sachets seized from him were then
brought to the Zamboanga City Police Station. 8 There, PO1 Bobon
taped the sachets. He then marked the sachet from his right
pocket with his initials, "WB." 9 He marked the sachets from his
left pocket as "WB-1," "WB-2," "WB-3," "WB-4," "WB-5," and
"WB-6." 10
On the same day, the seven (7) sachets were turned over to SPO1
Federico Lindo, Jr., the investigating officer, who prepared the
request for laboratory examination. Subsequently, the tests
yielded positive results for shabu. 11
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses PO1 Bobon,
SPO1 Roca, and forensic chemist Police Inspector Melvin L.
Manuel. The sole witness presented for the defense was dela Cruz
himself. 12 AcICTS
For his part, dela Cruz acknowledged that on the morning of
September 14, 2004, he was in the target area. As he was leaving
the comfort room, someone embraced him from behind, while
another poked a gun at him. He was then handcuffed and brought
to an L-300 van which was parked in front of Food Mart. Inside the
van, he was asked if he was Jing-Jong, alias Jong-Jong. Despite his
denials, he was brought to the police station. It was when he was
already detained that he learned that he was charged for violation
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. 13
On August 19, 2010, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13,
Zamboanga City, convicted dela Cruz for violating Article II,
Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and
sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP500,000.00.
He was also convicted for violating Article II, Section 11 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and sentenced to 12
years and one day up to 14 years imprisonment and a fine of
PhP300,000.00. The dispositive portion of this decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5450 (20920), accused GARRY DELA
CRUZ y DE GUZMAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency;
2. In Criminal Case No. 5451 (20921), accused GARRY DELA
CRUZ y DE GUZMAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of TWELVE YEARS AND ONE DAY to FOURTEEN YEARS of
imprisonment and pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P300,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride used as evidence in these
cases are hereby ordered confiscated to be turned over to the
proper authorities for disposition.
SO ORDERED. 14 AEDHST
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, dela Cruz assailed the
prosecution's failure to establish the chain of custody of the
seized sachets of shabu. He also assailed the validity of the buy-
bust operation and the prosecution's failure to present the
informant in court. 15
On May 31, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 16
affirming dela Cruz' conviction in toto. Thereafter, dela Cruz filed
his notice of appeal. 17
In the resolution 18 dated April 15, 2013, this court noted the
records forwarded by the Court of Appeals and informed the
parties that they may file their supplemental briefs.
On June 6, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
manifestation and motion, 19 on behalf of the People of the
Philippines, noting that it would no longer file a supplemental
brief as the brief it filed with the Court of Appeals had adequately
addressed the arguments and issues raised by dela Cruz.
On August 7, 2013, dela Cruz filed a manifestation 20 indicating
that he, too, would no longer file a supplemental brief and that he
was instead re-pleading, adopting, and reiterating the defenses
and arguments in the brief he filed before the Court of Appeals.
For resolution is the issue of whether dela Cruz's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was established.
Subsumed in the resolution of this issue are the issues raised by
dela Cruz in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals, foremost
of which is whether the prosecution was able to establish
compliance with the chain of custody requirements under Section
21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The elements that must be established to sustain convictions for
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs are settled:
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the
transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. acHDTE
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a
dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and
(3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in
possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the
corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 21
With respect to the element of corpus delicti, Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended by
Republic Act No. 10640 provides for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia. Particularly on the matter of custody before a
criminal case is filed, Section 21, as amended, provides:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable,
in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over
said items. TAScID
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure
of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination
results, which shall be done by the forensic laboratory examiner,
shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing
within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report
shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of
dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory:
Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued
immediately upon completion of the said examination and
certification;
The significance of complying with Section 21's requirements
cannot be overemphasized. Non-compliance is tantamount to
failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential
element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these
offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an
accused.
We reiterate the extensive discussion on this matter from our
recent decision in People v. Holgado: 22
As this court declared in People v. Morales, "failure to comply
with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implie[s] a
concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the
identity of the corpus delicti." 23 It "produce[s] doubts as to the
origins of the [seized paraphernalia]." 24
The significance of ensuring the integrity of drugs and drug
paraphernalia in prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 is
discussed in People v. Belocura: 25 cAHIaE
Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
prohibited drug that constituted the corpus delicti itself. The
omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being
actually conducted and warrants the suspicion that the prohibited
drugs were planted evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the
Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating
evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the
moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight
of evidence. It is not enough that the evidence offered has
probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be
sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The
evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it
has an actual connection with the transaction involved and with
the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and
laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are
important. 26 (Emphasis supplied)
In Malilin v. People, 27 this court explained that the exactitude
required by Section 21 goes into the very nature of narcotics as
the subject of prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165:
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect
to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that
has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form
to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham vs.
State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a
substance later analyzed as heroin — was handled by two police
officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court
on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was
in their possession — was excluded from the prosecution
evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized
could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or
baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records
or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least
between the time it came into the possession of police officers
until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition,
testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is
inadmissible. ICaDHT
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not
readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis
to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot
reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the
possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the
same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution
of substances from other cases — by accident or otherwise — in
which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence
was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the
same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases
involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a
more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item
with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that
the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with. 28 (Emphasis supplied)
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by
Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized,
and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4)
respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized;
second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items
seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the
incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of
the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have
been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this
requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating,
or tampering of evidence in any manner.
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance
with Section 21 indicates a failure to establish an element of the
offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-
compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal. As this court stated
in People v. Lorenzo: 29 EHcaAI
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on
the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must
be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established
with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict. 30 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and
integrity of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will not secure a
conviction. Not even the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties will suffice. In fact, whatever
presumption there is as to the regularity of the manner by which
officers took and maintained custody of the seized items is
"negated." 31 Republic Act No. 9165 requires compliance with
Section 21.
Even the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate compliance
but do not actually comply with the requirements of Section 21
does not suffice. In People v. Magat, 32 for instance, this court
had occasion to emphasize the inadequacy of merely marking the
items supposedly seized: "Marking of the seized drugs alone by
the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and
unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165." 33
The exactitude which the state requires in handling seized
narcotics and drug paraphernalia is bolstered by the amendments
made to Section 21 by Republic Act No. 10640. Section 21(1), as
amended, now includes the following proviso, thereby making it
even more stringent than as originally worded:
Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures:
In People v. Nandi, 34 this court explained that four (4) links
"should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated
item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court." 35
In Nandi, where the prosecution failed to show how the seized
items were handled following the actual seizure and, thereafter,
turned over for examination, this court held that the accused
must be acquitted:
After a closer look, the Court finds that the linkages in the chain of
custody of the subject item were not clearly established. As can be
gleaned from his forequoted testimony, PO1 Collado failed to
provide informative details on how the subject shabu was handled
immediately after the seizure. He just claimed that the item was
handed to him by the accused in the course of the transaction
and, thereafter, he handed it to the investigator. AECacT
There is no evidence either on how the item was stored,
preserved, labeled, and recorded. PO1 Collado could not even
provide the court with the name of the investigator. He admitted
that he was not present when it was delivered to the crime
laboratory. It was Forensic Chemist Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. who
identified the person who delivered the specimen to the crime
laboratory. He disclosed that he received the specimen from one
PO1 Cuadra, who was not even a member of the buy-bust team.
Per their record, PO1 Cuadra delivered the letter-request with the
attached seized item to the CPD Crime Laboratory Office where a
certain PO2 Semacio recorded it and turned it over to the
Chemistry Section.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the considered view that
chain of custody of the illicit drug seized was compromised.
Hence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
cannot be applied in this case.
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in
handling the seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the
chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is
made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute
authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a
procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies
when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by
law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption
cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower
courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
THcaDA
With the chain of custody in serious question, the Court cannot
gloss over the argument of the accused regarding the weight of
the seized drug. The standard procedure is that after the
confiscation of the dangerous substance, it is brought to the crime
laboratory for a series of tests. The result thereof becomes one of
the bases of the charge to be filed. 36 (Citations omitted)
As Holgado emphasized, "[e]ven the doing of acts which
ostensibly approximate compliance but do not actually comply
with the requirements of Section 21 does not suffice." 37 In
People v. Garcia, 38 this court noted that the mere marking of
seized paraphernalia, unsupported by a physical inventory and
taking of photographs, and in the absence of the persons required
by Section 21 to be present, does not suffice:
Thus, other than the markings made by PO1 Garcia and the police
investigator (whose identity was not disclosed), no physical
inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items
was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and
its implementing rules. We observe that while there was
testimony with respect to the marking of the seized items at the
police station, no mention whatsoever was made on whether the
marking had been done in the presence of Ruiz or his
representatives. There was likewise no mention that any
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or
any elected official had been present during this inventory, or that
any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the
inventory. 39 (Citations omitted)
In this case, the Regional Trial Court acknowledged that no
physical inventory of the seized items was conducted. 40 Similarly,
there is nothing in the records to show that the seized items were
photographed in the manner required by Section 21. Likewise,
none of the persons required by Section 21 to be present (or their
possible substitutes) have been shown to be present.
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals assert that dela
Cruz must nevertheless be convicted as "it had been clearly
established that the identity of the items were [sic] properly
preserved." 41 They anchor this conclusion on PO1 Bobon's having
supposedly kept the seized sachets in his own pockets: one (1)
sachet in his right pocket and six (6) sachets in his left pocket.
The Court of Appeals reasons: IEHaSc
We found no gap in the prosecution's presentation of the chain of
custody. There was a seizure of seven (7) heat-sealed sachets of
shabu as a result of a valid buy-bust operation. PO1 Bobon and
SPO1 Roca testified how the seizure was conducted. PO1 Bobon
was able to identify the shabu which were involved in the illegal
sale vis-a-vis the one involved in illegal possession because he
knowingly put them in different pockets. The seized drugs were
marked at the police station which was only 200 meters away
from the area where the arrest was made. The identity of these
seized items were secured as PO1 Bobon placed tapes on the
respective heat-sealed sachets of shabu and marked them with his
initials which he later identified in court. 42 (Citation omitted)
The circumstance of PO1 Bobon keeping narcotics in his own
pockets precisely underscores the importance of strictly
complying with Section 21. His subsequent identification in open
court of the items coming out of his own pockets is self-serving.
The prosecution effectively admits that from the moment of the
supposed buy-bust operation until the seized items' turnover for
examination, these items had been in the sole possession of a
police officer. In fact, not only had they been in his possession,
they had been in such close proximity to him that they had been
nowhere else but in his own pockets.
Keeping one of the seized items in his right pocket and the rest in
his left pocket is a doubtful and suspicious way of ensuring the
integrity of the items. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding
that PO1 Bobon took the necessary precautions, we find his
actions reckless, if not dubious.
Even without referring to the strict requirements of Section 21,
common sense dictates that a single police officer's act of bodily-
keeping the item(s) which is at the crux of offenses penalized
under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is fraught
with dangers. One need not engage in a meticulous counter-
checking with the requirements of Section 21 to view with distrust
the items coming out of PO1 Bobon's pockets. That the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both failed to see through
this and fell — hook, line, and sinker — for PO1 Bobon's avowals is
mind-boggling.
Moreover, PO1 Bobon did so without even offering the slightest
justification for dispensing with the requirements of Section 21.
CSIDTc
Section 21, paragraph 1, of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, includes a proviso to the effect that "noncompliance
of (sic) these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said
items." Plainly, the prosecution has not shown that — on
September 14, 2004, when dela Cruz was arrested and the sachets
supposedly seized and marked — there were "justifiable grounds"
for dispensing with compliance with Section 21. All that the
prosecution has done is insist on its self-serving assertion that the
integrity of the seized sachets has, despite all its lapses, immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for
nevertheless been preserved. any other lawful cause.

Apart from the blatantly irregular handling by PO1 Bobon of the
seven (7) sachets, it is also admitted that no physical inventory
and taking of photographs in the presence of dela Cruz or of any
of the other persons specified by Section 21 were conducted. 43
As in People v. Garcia, the mere marking of seized paraphernalia,
will not suffice to sustain a conviction in this case.
The miniscule amount of narcotics supposedly seized from dela
Cruz amplifies the doubts on their integrity. In total, the seven (7)
sachets supposedly contained all of 0.1405 gram of shabu. This
quantity is so miniscule it amounts to little more than 7% of the
weight of a five-centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one-centavo coin
(2.0 grams).
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to
this court within five days from receipt of this decision the action
he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director General
of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the
Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency for their information.
TaISEH
The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the seized sachets
of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.

As we have discussed in People v. Holgado:

While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a

ground for acquittal, this circumstance underscores the need for
more exacting compliance with Section 21. In Malilin v. People,
this court said that "the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake
with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and
is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and
similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily
lives."

xxx xxx xxx

Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of

cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165. All details that
factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative
must be scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened
scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts
of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered. . . . 44
(Citations omitted)

As the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crimes for which dela
Cruz is charged has not been established, it follows that there is
no basis for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It is
proper that dela Cruz be acquitted.

We close by hearkening to the same words with which we ended

in Holgado:

It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with

prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving small-time
drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions
involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases
involving small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts.
While they are certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are
but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels.
Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more
effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the
source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations.
Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to
attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under
doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the
overall picture. It might in fact be distracting our law enforcers
from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug
menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater
amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels. 45

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated May 31,

2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00869-MIN is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Garry dela Cruz y de
Guzman is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered