Leoncia Balogbog and Gaudioso Balogbog, petitioners, versus Honorable

Court of Appeals, Ramonito Balogbog and Generoso Balogbog,

respondents.
G.R. No. 83958 March 7, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arnibal who died inestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older
brother, Gavino, but he died predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents
brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they
were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that they were entitled to the
one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners
denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single
and without issue in their parents’ residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu.

Respondents presented witnesses. One testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be
husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child because they performed at his
campaign rallies. The witness also contended that he attended their wedding in which
Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a councilor, acted
as one of the witnesses. The second witness testified that private respondents are
the children of Gavino and Catalina. He likewise attended the wedding and was in fact
accompanied Catalina and carry her wedding dress. He also said that he was
a carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the
coffin of the couple’s son, Petronilo, who died when he was six. Catalina Ubas likewise
testified that after the wedding, she was handed a “receipt,” presumably a wedding
certificate by Fr. Jomao-as and was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino
lived together in Obogon and begot three children. She stated that after the death of
Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated.
Private respondents presented certificates from the Local Civil Registrar and by the Parish
Priest of Asturias.

On the other hand, petitioner testified that Gavino died single. She denied that her
brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents.
The petitioner likewise presented a witness stating that Gavino died single and
that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriado after the war. He added
that Catalina had children by a man she married before the war.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased Gavino
Balogbog.

Held:

Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted
only by cogent proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners claim that the certification
presented by private respondents was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages
by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does
not contain an entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents’ parents.
This contention has no merit. Private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence.
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation
of the family and the sanctity of the family s a matter of constitutionalconcern. What is in
issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiations of private
respondents as their children. Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner
Gaudioso Balogbog admitted that Ramonito is his nephew. This admission of relationship
is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It is considered as a
reliable declaration against interest.

FRANCISCO HERMOSSISIMA, plaintiff vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, et.al., defendant
No.L-14628. September 30, 1960

FACTS:

The complainant Soledad Cagigas is thirty six years old, a former high school teacher and
a life insurance agent. The petitioner Francisco Hermosisima is ten years younger than
complainant, and an apprentice pilot. Intimacy developed between them and thus
sometime 1953 after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin. In
February 1954, the woman advised the man that she is pregnant whereupon the man
promised to marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born June 1954 in a
private clinic. However, subsequently the man married one Romanita Perez. Hence,
Soledad filed a complaint against Francisco for acknowledgement of her child as a natural
child of the petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages
for alleged breach of promise to marry. The CFI declared the child a natural daughter of
the defendant, ordered Francisco to support the child by giving a monthly alimony,
awarded actual damages and moral damages. On appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed
the assailed decision however increased the amount for actual and moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the award for moral damages is valid.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that no moral damages can be had in the instant case because it
was the woman who virtually seduced the man by surrendering herself to him because
she a girl ten years older was overwhelmed by her love for him, she wanted to bind him
by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

WASSMER V VELEZ
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married
on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to
postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard
from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default. Judgement
was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages P25,000 as moral and
exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed, thereby
rendered judgment hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a wedding
and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it when matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which holds
liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary damages
may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.
COSCA V PALAYPAYON

Facts:

Complainants Juvy n. Cosca, Edmund B. Eralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora,
are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Cler II, and Process Server, respectively, of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and
Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October
5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery
in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for
cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring
payment of filing fees from exempted entities.

Complainants alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage licenses. Thus, the following couples were able o get married by the
simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of
a marriage license. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to
wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days
after the ceremony. The marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages
in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were
null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six
(6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Registrar will show that there were
notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P 18.50
for each document, although in fact they collected P 20.00 therefore and failed to account
for the difference.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent are guilty of violating the provision of Article 4 of the
Family Code.

Held:

On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code patiently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential
requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while and
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what the court provides for pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal
Code provides that priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.This is of course, within
the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

NAVARRO V DOMAGTOY
 Facts:

On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage between GasparA.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated
from his first wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma D. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on
October 27, 1994. in relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks
exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a
married man separated from his wife , and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied
in the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact
that Mr. Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With
respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between
Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph I of the Family code
which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.

Held:

In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest
error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
void, marriage.

In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica

and Burgos, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for
the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law

Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases,
the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he
is suspended for a period of six months.

PEOPLE V BUSTAMANTE

FACTS:
1. Federico Bustamante was charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
2. The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one Maria Perez on
August 9, 1954, before the Justice of Peace of Binaloan, Pangasinan, a little over a year late, or on
 September 16, 195, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria I. Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-
Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as mayor of the said municipality,
while the first marriage was still subsisting.
3. The defendant contended that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as Nato was
merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do so. He lays
stress on the distinction between “Acting Mayor” and “Vice Mayor acting as Mayor”, urging that while the
former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the second marriage was valid.
2. Whether or not the Vice Mayor has the authority to solemnize the second marriage.

HELD:

Yes, the marriage was valid and Vice Mayor Federico Nato, acting as mayor, has the authority to solemnize
the marriage. As acting mayor, he discharges all duties and wields the power appurtenant to said
office. This instance does not involve a question of title to the office, but the performance of the functions
thereunto appertaining by one who is admitted to be temporarily vested with it. The case even concedes
and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice Mayor whenever the latter is
in an acting capacity. The word “acting,” when preceding the title of an office connotes merely the
temporary character as nature of the same.

ALCANTARA V ALCANTARA

Facts: Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent
Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange
a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest.
They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract,
is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license issued
as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Petitioner has a
mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage.

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issue: Was there an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage between
petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

Held: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence
of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by
a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In
this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The
certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license
was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was
in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official
business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of
his marriage.

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither
he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient
basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of
the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a “fixer” who arranged everything
for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain priest -- will not strengthen his posture. The
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed
in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty
to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

MALLION V ALCANTARA

Facts:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground
of psychological incapacity.

The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.

After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the regional trial courtalleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void
due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.

Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and
forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.

Issue:

Is the action of the husband tenable?

Ruling:

No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or
“estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the
same rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the
rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a
former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving
a different cause of action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the
validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects
therein. The Court finds then that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

GO-BANGAYAN V BANGAYAN JR

TUPAL V ROJO