Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Hon.

Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 107671

February 26, 1997

Facts:

In 1983, the spouses Paulino and Purificacion Ochoa (Ochoa Spouses) filed a complaint
for abatement of nuisance and damages against Remman Enterprises. After trial, the
court rendered judgment ordering Remman Enterprises to “stop and desist from
draining their waste matter, solid and liquid, to the estate of the Ochoa spouses”.

Sometime on March 26, 1990, a complaint for indirect contempt was filed by the Ochoa
Spouses also against Remman Enterprises. The substance of the complaint is that
Remman Enterprises defied the previous orders issued by the trial court and continued
to flood the Ochoa estate with wastes from the company’s hog farm.

A hearing was held and the branch clerk of court was authorized by the trial court to
conduct an ocular inspection and was directed to submit a report immediately upon
termination thereof. The clerk of court reported his findings to the trial court which, in
turn, rendered a judgement holding Remman Enterprises guilty of indirect contempt.

Petitioner questioned the trial and appellate courts’ decision of adopting the findings of
the commissioner declaring them guilty of polluting the Ochoa Estate. Petitioner argues
that the power to determine the existence of pollution is vested in the National Pollution
Control Commission, now the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), under P.D.
No. 984.

Issue:

1.) Whether the Environmental Management Bureau is the proper agency to

determine if the pollution in the Ochoa Estate was caused by Remman Enterprises.

Held:

No, the court ruled that an action for abatement of nuisance and damages is
outside the jurisdiction of the Environmental Management Bureau. Citing the case of
Mead v. Argel, the last paragraph of Section 833 of P.D. 984 delineates the authority to be
exercised by the (National Pollution Control) Commission. The provision excludes from
the authority of the Commission only the determination of and the filing of court actions
involving violations of the New Civil Code on nuisance.” Hence, this case does not fall
within the exclusive authority and jurisdiction of said Commission, which has been
reorganized into the Environmental Management Bureau.
City of Angeles vs. Court of Appeals and Timog Silangan Development Corporation

G.R. No. 97882

August 28, 1996

Facts:

In a Deed of Donation, which was subsequently amended, Timog Silangan Development

Corporation (Donor) donated 51 parcels of land, located in Timog Park residential
subdivision, as open spaces to the local government of the city of Angeles (Donee) with
an aggregate area of 50,676 square meters, more or less. The donation was subject to a
condition that only a Sports Complex will be constructed upon the donated land and non-
compliance with said condition would be a ground for the revocation of the Deed of
Donation.

Sometime on July 1988, the Donee started constructing a drug rehabilitation center on a
portion of the donated land. Upon learning thereof, the Donor protested such action for
being in violation of the terms and conditions of the amended deed and prejudicial to its
interest and to those of its clients and residents. The Donor then filed a case in court for
the revocation of the Deed of Donation alleging breach of the condition.

Issue:

1.) Whether the Donor is legally bound under Presidential Decree No. 1216 to donate
to the city or municipality the “open space” allocated exclusively for parks,
playgrounds and recreational use.
2.) Whether the percentage of the “open space” allocated exclusively for parks,
playgrounds and recreational use is to be based on the “gross area” of the
subdivision or on the total area reserved for “open space
3.) Whether the condition imposed by the Donor is valid and may it rescind the
donation for violation of the said condition.

Held:

1.) Yes, Presidential Decree No. 1216 provides that the developer of a subdivision
shall provide adequate roads, alleys and sidewalks. For subdivision projects one
(1) hectare or more, the owner or developer shall reserve thirty per cent (30%) of
the gross area for open space. Upon determining the space allocated for the
recreational park, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated
by the owner or developer to the city of municipality and it shall be mandatory for
the local governments to accept provided, however, that the parks and
playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association of the project with
the consent of the city or municipality concerned. No portion of the parks and
 playgrounds donated thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose or
purposes.

2.) Yes, it can be inferred from the law that the “gross area” for the open space refers
to the entire subdivision area. P.D. 1216 was an attempt to achieve a happy
compromise and a realistic balance between the imperatives of environmental
planning and the need to maintain economic feasibility in subdivision and housing
development, by reducing the required area for parks, playgrounds and
recreational uses from only 3.5%, 7% or 9% of the entire area of the subdivision
depending on whether it is low, medium or high density.

3.) No, the condition to build a Sports Complex is not valid and the Deed of Donation
may not be revoked because of non-compliance. It is well-settled that conditions
may be imposed provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy.
Since P.D. 1216 clearly requires that the 3.5% to 9% of the gross area allotted for
parks and playgrounds is “non-buildable,” then the obvious question arises
whether or not such condition was validly imposed and is binding on the Donee.
It is clear that the “non-buildable” character applies only to the 3.5% to 9% area set
by law. If there is any excess land over and above the 3.5% to 9% required by the
decree, which is also used or allocated for parks, playgrounds and recreational
purposes, it is obvious that such excess area is not covered by the non-buildability
restriction and may be subjected to a condition. Since the donated land constitutes
only a little more than 5% of the gross area of the subdivision, which is less than
the 7% gross area required to be allocated for non-buildable open space in medium
density subdivision, there is no “excess land” to speak of. This means that the
condition to build a sports complex on the donated land is contrary to law and
should be considered as not imposed. Furthermore, the Donor can no longer
revoke the Deed and ask for the return of the donated land because the law makes
it non-alienable once donation is made.
Pasong Bayabas Farmers vs. Court of Appeals and Timog Silangan Development
Corporation

G.R. No. 142359

May 25, 2004

Facts:

Credito Asiatic, Incorporated (CAI) undertook to develop its 75 hectare property into a
residential and industrial estate where some industrial sites and low cost housing projects
would be established. It applied with the Municipal Council of Carmona for an ordinance
approving the zoning and the subdivision of the property. The National Planning
Commission approved the plan and on May 1976, the Municipal Council of Carmona
approved Kapasiyahang Bilang 30, granting the application and affirming the project.
Subsequently, after a consolidated survey was approved by the Bureau of Lands, the lots
were subdivided and the aforesaid titles were cancelled. TCT Nos. 144149, 144150 and T-
144151 were issued in lieu of the said titles. Meanwhile, the CAI secured a locational
clearance for the project from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC).
Although the Municipal Council of Carmona had already approved the conversion of the
property into a residential area, nevertheless, the CAI filed an application under Republic
Act No. 3844 with the Office of the Minister of Agrarian Reform for the conversion of a
portion of the 75-hectare property consisting of 35.80 hectares covered by TCT No. 62972
located in Barrio Kabilang-Baybay, Carmona, Cavite, from agricultural to residential. The
property was to be used for the Hakone Housing Project

On November 1992, a Petition for Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed before
the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals. They alleged that they were farmers of Bo. 14,
Pasong Bayabas River, Barangay F. De Castro, GMA, Cavite. The farmers claimed that
since 1961, they had been occupying a parcel of public agricultural land originally owned
by General Dionisio Ojeda with an area of twenty-seven hectares, more or less, adjacent
to Pasong Bayabas River. They tilled the said agricultural lands and planted it with rice,
corn, vegetables, root crops, fruit trees and raised small livestock for daily survival.

The farmers requested that the DAR order an official survey of the aforesaid agricultural
lands. The farmers and twenty (20) others banded together and formed a group called
Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. (PBFAI). PBFAI alleged that since 1961, its
members had been in actual possession, as tenants of General Dionisio Ojeda, of the 27-
hectare property, located in Pasong Bayabas, Cabilang Baybay, Carmona, Cavite covered
by T-69810 owned by the LDC (now CAI). They applied for the compulsory coverage of
the property under CARL before the DAR in 1992, and on October 6, 1995, the CAI caused
the survey of the property and commenced bulldozing activities that may illegally
convert the land from agricultural to non-agricultural.

Issue

1.) Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)?

Held:

No, Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to
agriculture as conferred in the said law and not classified as industrial land. Agricultural
lands are only those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it
covers all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect
only on June 15, 1988. But long before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit
had already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to nonagricultural or
residential land. Furthermore, the failure of the respondent to complete the housing
project before June 15, 1988, even if true, did not have the effect of reverting the property
as agricultural land.