EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession
of "timber" as defined in SEC. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The FORESTRY Reform Code of the Philippines), as
amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime."
On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of SECTION 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277,
was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican,1 Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar
and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads:
That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without lawful
authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of
assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen
Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the
amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not
constitute an offense. Contending that SEC. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to
"lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner
alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not
specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that
the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.2
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law
nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a
"product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the
easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape
criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of
law.3
On September 24, 1991, the lower court, 4 guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against the
state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an order quashing the information. It held that
the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two
terms. SEC. 3(Q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while SEC. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a
finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under SEC. 68
while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the
lower court categorically stated that:
Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by being cut,
gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, SEC. 68 cannot be made to apply to
lumber.
The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that the case could
be resolved on some other grounds or issues.5
The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of
the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared
and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to
consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.
Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private Land Timber
Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz,
the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of
transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have
presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for
transportation from one point to another.6
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous
because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in SEC. 68 could only mean
a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that SECTION.7
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52.
On June 10, 1992, the lower court8 issued the herein questioned order setting aside the quashal Order of the previous
judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession, without the
required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still,
lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes
"wood" in the definition of forest products.
Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the
lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying
his motion for reconsideration on the ground that SEC. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the
phrase "timber or other forest products."
The petition is devoid of MERIT.
SEC. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President
Corazon C. Aquino, provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products
cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied.)
Punished then in this SECTION are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from
the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the recent case of Mustang, Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals9 this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:
The Revised FORESTRY Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included
in forest products as defined in paragraph (Q) of SECTION 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the
same SECTION in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing
of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board,
pulp, paper or other finished wood product.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses
the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market ."
Simply put , lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute
should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber
without the required legal documents is concerned, SECTION 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus.
Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in SEC. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed
reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and
welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of our FORESTRY laws, rules and regulations;
 WHEREAS, the implementation of our FORESTRY laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised FORESTRY Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our FORESTRY
laws more responsive to present situations and realities; . . .
To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in SEC. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law
should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an
opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law. 10 After
all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence,
to mention lumber in SEC. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:
Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot
be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to
the same extent, prohibited. SEC. 3(Q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised
FORESTRY Code defines forest products, viz., . . .
Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we are to
follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a
person to circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and
escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the
loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. . . . .
If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their possession
were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents contemplated by the
law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and
penalized by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or
other forest products without lawful authority.
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information.
The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross
abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility. 11 Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power. 12
On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. 13 Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are
not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 14
As this Court said:
. . . When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed.
The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari. 15
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or
mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions. 16
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what petitioner
considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him and
three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused
has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion
and, if after trial on the MERITs, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 17
Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is to
proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled
by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be
the subject of a petition for certiorari. 18 The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. 19 An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 20 However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject
of review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts. 21
Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan 22 for his contention that a denial of a motion to quash may be
the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar. The information
herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed, 23 this case may not be considered an
exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.
With respect to the constitutionality of SEC. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider, 24 this
Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a
constitutional matter are present in a case, 25 this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota
of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law.
26
The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the
deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging
floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions
of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a
crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the
foregoing interpretation of SEC. 68 of the Revised FORESTRY Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a
difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have
not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to
proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against,
petitioner.
MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest products in the vicinity of the house of the petitioner,
Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel), the Chief of the ForestProtection Unit of Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) - Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Talibon, Bohol, together with Forest Rangers Urcino Butal
(Butal), Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos (Ramos) went to the petitioner’s house at Balico, Talibon, Bohol on March 15,
1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under the house of the petitioner and at the
shoreline about two meters away from the petitioner’s house. As the DENR personnel tried to investigate from the
neighborhood as to who was the owner of the lumber, the petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR
personnel entered the premises of the petitioner’s house without a search warrant.7
Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, which is equivalent to 452 board feet, were discovered. When the DENR
personnel asked for documents to support the petitioner’s claim of ownership, the latter showed to them Official Receipt No.
35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly bought the said lumber. However, when the DENR personnel
scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions and the species of the lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in
the receipt. The said receipt showed that the petitioner bought 10 pieces of red lawaan lumber with sizes 2x6x18 and 5
pieces with sizes 2x8x16 on March 13, 1994. On the other hand, the lumber in the petitioner’s house, on March 15, 1994,
was 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber of three different sizes, to wit: 20 pieces 2x6x18; 3 pieces 2x8x18; and 1 piece
2x10x12.8
Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the lumber, asked for police
assistance, and told the petitioner that they were going to transport the confiscated lumber to the DENR office for
safekeeping. Seizure Receipt No. 004157 and a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being
Confiscated,9 which showed the value of the lumber to be 9,040.00, were issued to the petitioner. Forest Rangers Butal and
Ramos corroborated Abaniel’s testimony.10
SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for police assistance, he and PO3 Antonio Crescencio
went to the house of the petitioner where they saw some lumberwhich was later loaded on a cargo truck. Thereafter, they
escorted the transport of the lumber to the DENR office in San Roque, Talibon, Bohol.11
On the other hand, the lone witness of the defense, Lolita Crescencio, admitted that the seized lumber were owned by the
petitioner but claimed that the latter bought it from Pengavitor Enterprises of Trinidad, Bohol and from Java Marketing in
Ubay, Bohol.12 However, the defense had only the Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises which,
however, did not tally with the forest products confiscated.
On May 17, 1994, the petitioner was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, with violation of
SECTION 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. The Information13 alleged:
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1994, in the municipality of Talibon, Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to possess and to gain for her own benefit, without any legal
document as required under existing jurisprudence, laws and regulations, and without any lawful authority under existing
rules and regulation of DENR Forest Management Sector, willfully, unlawfully and illegally possess and have under her
custody and control forest products consisting of twenty-four (24) pieces of magsihagon lumber with a volume of 452 board
feet and a total value of Nine Thousand Forty (₱9,040.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency; to the damage and prejudice of the
Republic of the Philippines.14
During the arraignment on July 15,1997, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.Thereafter, trial ensued.15
On August 12, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment16 convicting the petitioner of the offense charged and sentenced her to
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years and six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras maximum. The RTC also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber owned by
the petitioner.17
As expected, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. However, in its Resolution18 dated April 15, 2011, the CA
dismissed the appeal outright because the petitioner failed to furnish the OSG a copy of the Appellant’s Brief in violation of
the Rules of Court. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA,in its Resolution 19 dated
November 19, 2012. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA’s dismissal of the appeal due to the petitioner’s failureto serve a copy
of the Appellant’s Brief to the OSG is proper, in view of the attendant factual circumstances and in the interest of substantial
justice.
Ruling of the Court
In this case, the petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure and submits that the CA erred in
dismissing her appeal purely on the basis of mere technicalities.
Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest opportunity for the
determination of their cases on the MERITs and of dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant
or when the purpose of justice requires it.20
The Court has constantly pronouncedthat "[t]he rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,technical sense, for
they have been adopted to help secure – not override – substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with
caution so asnot to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure thatall litigants are granted the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of technicalities."21
It is clear that without at all touching on the substantive aspects of the petitioner’s cause, the appellate court opted not to
decide the case on the MERITs. The subject of the appeal was the decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner of violation
of the FORESTRY Code and sentencing her to suffer an imprisonment of no less than six (6) years to eleven (11) years.
In this case, there is nothing in the record that shows any deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to subvert and delay
the final disposition of the case. In fact, when the petitioner learned that her appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to
serve a copy of her Appellant’s Brief to the OSG, she immediately confronted her previous counsel who denied having filed
such brief. Asthe petitioner was very much worried of being incarcerated, she asked her previous counsel to withdraw from
the case. Thus, the petitioner submits that the outright denial of her appeal is due to the incompetence and ignorance of her
former counsel who even lied about the fact thathe has indeed filed an Appellant’s Brief.
As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate
court’s indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;
(b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (C) where the interests
of justice so require.22
Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief tothe OSG is a
persuasive reason or a compelling justification to forego the Rules of Procedure as the wanton recklessness or gross
negligence of her counsel has deprived her of due process of law which will result in the outright deprivation of her liberty.
In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have taken a liberal view of the rules and ruled on the MERITsof the
appeal, especially when what is involved is no less than the petitioner’s liberty.
Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue, it will still find that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner’s culpability.
In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the supporting documents to show that she bought
the questioned lumber from legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the DENR
personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against her.
The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certainexceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain view.1âwphi1 Under the plain view
doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.24
There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant when they went to the house of the
petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the petitioner’s house, the lumbers were lying under the latter’s house and
at the shoreline about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It isclear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly
exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view
doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant. SECTION 8025 of the
FORESTRY Code authorizes the FORESTRY officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the Philippine National
Police to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses
defined by the FORESTRY Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense orthe
forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly, in the course ofsuch lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel had
inadvertently come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.
The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, as well as her subsequent failure to produce
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of the
FORESTRY Code. Under SECTION 68 of the FORESTRY Code, there are two distinctand separate offenses punished,
namely: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land withoutany authority; and (2) possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.26
In the second offense, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products are legal
or not. Mere possession of forest products withoutthe proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the
lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because the FORESTRY Code is a special law which considers mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper documentation as malum prohibitum.27
In the present case, the magsihagonlumber were admittedly owned by the petitioner but unfortunately no permit evidencing
authority to possess said lumber was duly presented. Thus, the Information correctly charged the petitioner with the second
offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the proper documents. The prosecution
adduced several documents to prove that the lumber was confiscated from the petitioner, namely: a Statement Showing the
Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated on March 15, 1994, seizure receipt, a photograph of the house of
the petitioner, and a photograph of the confiscated lumber. Moreso, the direct and affirmative testimony of the DENR
personnel as state witnesses on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes the petitioner’s liability.
As to the imposable penalty on the petitioner, the RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras maximum.
The Court does not agree. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as appearing in
the Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated is ₱9,040.00 which is alleged in the
Information. However, except for the testimonies of Abaniel and Butal that this amount is the estimate based on prevailing
local price as stated in the apprehension receipt they issued, the prosecution did not present any proof as tothe value of the
lumber.
Clearly, this evidence does not suffice. The Court had ruled that in order to prove the amount of the property taken for fixing
the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the prosecution must
present more than a mereuncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration
of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based
on the attendant circumstances of the case.28 Hence, the lower court erred in finding that the value of the confiscated
lumber is ₱9,040.00 for no evidence of such value was established during the trial.
Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)29 of the RPC, whichis arresto
mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, considering that violation of SECTION 68 of the FORESTRY Code is
punished as Qualified Theft under Article 31030 in relation to Article 309 of the RPC, the statutory penalty shall be increased
by two degrees, that is, to prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods or within the range ofthree (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days, considering that there are no
attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense.
In accordance with current jurisprudence31 and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court finds it
proper to impose on the petitioner, in view of the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of frmr (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as
maximum. WHEREFORE, the Decision on August 12, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in
Criminal Case No. 96-27, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Ma. Mimie Crescencio is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four ( 4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
v
PAGADIAN CITY TIMBER CO., INC.,
On October 14, 1994, petitioner, through the DENR, and respondent Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. executed Industrial
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. R-9-0404 whereby petitioner, represented by then Regional Executive Director
(RED) for Region IX, Leonito C. Umali, authorized respondent, represented by its President Filomena San Juan, to develop,
utilize, and manage a specified forest area covering 1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and
Datagan, Municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other forest products subject to a
production-sharing scheme.
Respondent later submitted the required Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) which the DENR
approved on August 17, 1995.
On October 8, 1998, in response to the numerous complaints filed by members of the Subanen tribe regarding respondent’s
alleged failure to implement the CDMP, disrespect of their rights as an indigenous people, and the constant threats and
harassment by armed men employed by respondent, RED Antonio Mendoza, DENR Region IX, issued Regional Special
Order No. 217 creating a regional team to evaluate and assess IFMA No. R-9-040.
Thus, the DENR sent a letter dated October 22, 1998 to respondent, giving notice of the evaluation and assessment to be
conducted on the area from October 22-30, 1998 covering the years 1997 and 1998. In the notice, the DENR requested any
representative of the company to appear at the CENRO Office, Pagadian City, and bring with him documents and maps
concerning its IFMA operations.
On October 23, 1998, a DENR Evaluation Team composed of Aniceto Wenceslao (Forester, DENR, Zamboanga del Sur),
Isabelo Mangaya-ay (Intern Chief, RCBF/MCO), Philidor Lluisma (Forester II, Regional Office), Chanito Paul Siton (C.
Forester, CENRO-Pagadian City), Adelberto Roullo (Forester, CENRO, Pagadian City), and Francisco Martin (Carto LEP,
CENRO, Pagadian City) went to the IFMA site. After a briefing conference between the Evaluation Team and respondent’s
Operations Manager, Inocencio Santiago, actual field evaluation and assessment followed.
On October 29, 1998, an exit conference and dialogue on post evaluation and assessment of IFMA R-9-04 was held
between DENR officials, namely, CENR Officer Maximo O. Dichoso, IFMA Regional Team Leader, Forester Isabelo C.
Mangaya-ay, and IFMA Regional Team Member, Forester Philidor O. Lluisma, and IFMA Representative and Operations
Manager Inocencio Santiago at the CENRO, Pagadian City.5 The exit conference was called to order at 1:30 p.m. and was
concluded at 3:00 p.m. Forester Mangaya-ay presented the representative results and findings of the Evaluation Team, to
wit:
The presiding officer started with the mango plantation in the Noran, Langapod side. That out of the estimated number of
seedlings planted of about 2,008 hills, within an equivalent area of 20 hectares, the result or finding of the inventory
conducted at 100% intensity is only 98 hills of seedlings survived including the doubtful and badly deformed. The species
planted along trails are Gmelina and Mahogany species. The said foot trail planted with the aforementioned species starts
from the entrance of the IFMA are where the notice billboard is posted up to the only existing look-out tower. The estimated
average of percent survival for Gmelina is more or less 30%. There are also portions where higher percentage of survival is
recorded at 56% and lower at 14%. There are areas planted declared by Kagawad Cerning Becagas of Barangay Cogonan
now covered by CSC. The areas covered by CSC, a waiver is needed to be issued by the IFMA holder.
CENR Officer Maximo O. Dichoso commented that during a meeting held before, the IFMA holder was willing to give up the
said areas.
The presiding officer continued that on the courtesy call made to the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Cogonan, Mr.
Roberto Palaran recounted the assistance extended by the IFMA holder to his barangay as Community Assistance/service
which includes electric generator, handheld radio and laborers for the repair of Noburan – Cogonan road and the repair of
the hanging bridge at Sitio Tialaic to which the said Barangay Chairman issued a duly signed certification to this effect.
With regards, the seedling stock within the nursery, there are approximately a total number of about 44,460 seedlings of
Gmelina species. That the infrastructure implemented or constructed, there exist only one look-out tower of the reported 4
look-out towers constructed. Moreover, the team had also noted only 1 bunkhouse and 1 stockroom or shedhouse. There is
also 1 Multi-purpose shed and 1 dilapidated or neglected notice billboard poster at the entrance trail leading to the IFMA
area. That with regards the concrete monument, there are only 2 recorded. The other corners visible are those located at
junctions of creeks and rivers. But the others cannot be visibly or never planted for the same cannot be pinpointed or shown
to the team allegedly for lack of knowledge by the representative of the IFMA holder. Finally, the presiding officer reminded
the herein IFMA representative Mr. Inocencio Santiago that per actual survey, inspection and ground verification, the team
believes that the other reported areas planted are located outside the designated IFMA area particularly the Noburan and
Langapod sides.6
After the presentation, Mangaya-ay asked Santiago if he had comments, suggestions, or questions regarding the matter
and the manner of the conduct of the evaluation and assessment by the Evaluation Team. Santiago said he had none, but
requested a copy of the report of the Evaluation Team. Mangaya-ay informed him that it was only RED Mendoza who may
furnish him a copy of the report.
Later, the Evaluation Team submitted a report through a Memorandum7 dated November 6, 1998 to the DENR-RED of
Region 9, Zamboanga City, on the evaluation and assessment of respondent under IFMA No. R-9-040. The said
Memorandum stated –
In compliance with Regional Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998, please be informed that the herein information is the
result or findings of the team for the conduct of evaluation and assessment following the guidelines setforth under
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 11, Series of 1995 of Pagadian Timber Co., Inc. under IFMA No. R9-040
against their actual accomplishment as mandated under the terms and conditions of the IFMA including other applicable
laws, rules and regulations of the department on the matter.
At the onset, the team conducted a briefing conference and dialogue with the IFMA holder, the CENR Officer of Pagadian
City and personnel concerned for the proper and orderly implementation and conduct of the evaluation and assessment
(please see attached).
The team was composed of the Regional Evaluating Team, the CENRO and PENRO representatives and the
representatives of the IFMA holder. The team proceeded to the western portion of the area of the herein IFMA particularly
Barangay Cogonan, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur. The evaluation and assessment was then conducted on the main
nursery, the established plantation, the look-out towers, the boundary of ISF and claimed or occupied areas, natural or
residual forest, the IFMA boundary, monuments planted, foot trails, other improvements introduced and the billboard and
signboard posted. The inspection, evaluation and assessment conducted were all undertaken in the presence of the IFMA
holder, representatives, laborers and other personnel on the area. (please see attached report, tall sheets, pictorials and
map).
In the conduct of the same, the IFMA representatives or laborers that assisted the team could only show the subject area
under evaluation but the other areas alluded to as accomplished or undertaken by the company appeared upon actual
verification and inspection to be negative and non-existent thus dispelling their allegation.
With regard the information and dissemination conducted by the IFMA holder including other services extended to the
communities within the IFMA area and vicinities, it is noteworthy for recognition the donations made by the company.
(Please see attached minutes of the dialogue with the barangay officials of Barangay Cogonan and pictorials).
The evaluation conducted on the nursery operations show that the facilities and other necessary implements were generally
below par. An inventory of the seedlings stock of pure Gmelina species have already lapsed its plantability or have
overgrown in the seedbed with an average grand total of about 44,460 within the established 2-hectare main nursery area.
There was no other subsidiary nursery established in the area. Also noted is the enrichment planting conducted along both
sides of the foot-trail which extends approximately 18 kms. From the entrance of the IFMA area going to the lookout tower
of the four (4) lookout towers reported, only one (1) has been noted remaining in the area and the rest were destroyed or
burned (pls. see attached pictorials). The signboard posted was unattended and in the state of disrepair. There were no
monument planted or any marking along the IFMA boundary and in residual forest except the monuments found in the ISF
boundaries within the IFMA area (please see attached pictorials). The plantation established is composed of Gmelina
species with 4 x 4 spacing over a total of about 10.18 hectares. Basing on 5% estimate inventory, the result is 43% seedling
survival.
Thereafter, the team also conducted evaluation and assessment at the eastern portion particularly at Langapod, Labangan,
Zamboanga del Sur. The team inspected and verified on the ground the reported 20 hectares mango plantation with a
spacing of 10 x 10 meters at 100% intensity inventory. The accounted number of mango seedlings planted of about 2,008
hills, only 98 seedlings survived. Wherefore, it generally represents 5% seedling survival. (Please see attached)
Finally, the team conducted an exit conference with the CENR Officer, and the IFMA holder where the tentative and general
findings of the evaluation and assessment was laid-out and presented to the body. (Please see attached)8
On the basis of such findings, the Evaluation Team made the following recommendations –
1. The lessee should be required to explain why they failed to develop their IFMA area (Plantation Development) in
accordance with the approved Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP);
2. The boundary and area coverage of IFMA No. R9-040 should be amended to exclude areas covered by Certificates of
Stewardship Contracts (CSC) under the ISF Program with an area of 226.17 hectares, other areas previously identified as
"occupied/claimed" and other conflict areas;
3. The amended boundary should be delineated/surveyed on the ground with a precise instrument and all corners
appropriately marked/monumented;
4. The company should hire a full time forester.9
Acting on the Memorandum dated November 6, 1998, RED Antonio M. Mendoza, DENR-IX, Zamboanga City, submitted to
the DENR Secretary a Memorandum10 dated April 7, 1999 regarding the performance evaluation of IFMA No. R-9-040. The
RED Memorandum reads –
This has reference with the instruction to validate the performance/accomplishment of IFMAs of Region IX, Western
Mindanao. Validation of IFMAs is in accordance with the existing policy of the DENR, to determine the capabilities of the
holders to develop their Lease areas in consonance with their submitted and approved Comprehensive Development
Management Plan.
xxxx
On 6 November 1998, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and Philidor Lluisma, pursuant to Regional Special Order No. 217,
Series of 1998, conducted the evaluation of the performance of IFMA No. R9-040 of Pagadian City Timber Company, Inc.
located at Langapod and Cogonan, Municipality of Labangan and Datagan, Municipality of Sominot, all of Zamboanga del
Sur. Result of the evaluation reveals that the holder violated the following DENR existing Rules and Regulations particularly
SECTION 26 of DAO 97-04 GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION of IFMA which provides that, "any of the following violations
shall be sufficient grounds for the cancellation of IFMA."
1. Paragraph 26.5, SECTION 26, DAO 97-04, Series of 1997, provides that failure to implement the approved
Comprehensive Development and Management Plan.
As of 1998, the 4th year of existence of IFMA No. R9-040, the holder must have developed a total of 1,597.0 hectares as
per approved CDMP. However, based on the report submitted by the Evaluation Team only 365.2 hectares was planted
which are about 22.8%. During the evaluation, however, the IFMA representative could not even pinpoint the planted areas.
Per report of the Pagadian CENRO Composite Monitoring Team conducted on 21 August 1998 the plantation area was
burned resulting to the damage of about 300 hectares leaving only about 20.0 hectares undamaged. No report had been
submitted/received since then.
In infrastructure, the holder managed to put up one (1) out of four (4) programmed look-out towers; developed one (1) out of
two (2) forest nurseries and constructed only 6 km. foot trail which is only about 27% accomplishment of the whole
infrastructure.
2. Paragraph 26.8 of SECTION 26, DAO 97-04, specifically provides that failure to implement or adopt agreements made
with communities and other relevant sectors.
Attached herewith, please find several petitions, sworn statements, affidavits and resolutions from various sectors
particularly the Subanen Communities (IP’s) within the area. The existence and approval of IFMA No. R9-040 contract is
being protested and is demanding for its cancellation.
The primary complaint was a blatant disrespect to their rights as an Indigenous People and the non-peaceful co-existence
between them and the holder of the IFMA R9-040. Accordingly, they were constantly threatened/harassed by armed men
employed by the holder.
In the same Memorandum, RED Mendoza recommended to the DENR Secretary the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040. 11
It appears that RED Mendoza issued a subsequent but similar Memorandum12 dated April 21, 1999 to the DENR Secretary
relative to IFMA No. R-9-040. It stated –
This has reference with the instruction to validate the performance/accomplishment of IFMAs of Region IX, Western
Mindanao. Validation of IFMAs is in accordance with the existing policy of the DENR to determine the capabilities of the
holders to develop their Lease areas in consonance with their approved Comprehensive Development and Management
Plan.
In furtherance thereto, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and Philidor Lluisma, pursuant to Regional Special Order No. 217,
Series of 1998, conducted the evaluation of the performance of IFMA No. R9-040 of Pagadian City Timber Company, Inc.
located at the Municipalities of Labangan, Datagan and Sominot, all of Zamboanga del Sur, on November 6, 1998. Result of
the evaluation revealed that the holder violated Rules and Regulations which are sufficient ground for cancellation as
stipulated under SECTION 26 of DAO 97-04, they are as follows
1. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE APPROVED COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT PLAN.
Under the approved comprehensive and development plan, 1,597.0 ha of plantation should have been established from the
Approval of the CDMP. However, only 365.2 ha were reportedly planted from CY 1995 to 1997. This represents only 28% of
the targeted goal on plantation establishment.
Field validation of the reported established plantation revealed otherwise. The findings of the team are:
A. Portion of the area reported as established plantation by the IFMA holder is an ISF project with an area of 226.17 ha.
These are covered with Certificate of Stewardship;
B. Locations and boundaries of reported plantations established from 1995 to 1997 cannot be located on the ground by the
team neither by the representative of the IFMA holder who accompanied the validating team; and
C. No plantation was established during CY 1998.
On Infrastructure, the holder constructed only one (1) lookout tower as against the goal of 4 towers; established one (1)
nursery as against the goal of two (2); and constructed only 6km foot trail. These represent only 27% of the total
infrastructure to be undertaken by the holder over the area.
2. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT OR ADOPT AGREEMENT WITH COMMUNITIES AND OTHER RELEVANT SECTORS.
Attached herewith are copies of petitions, sworn statements, affidavit and resolutions from Subanen Communities (IP’s) and
other sectors in the area demanding the cancellation of IFMA R9-040.
The complaints and demand for cancellation by the people where the IFMA is located is a manifestation and proof of non-
social acceptance of the project by the residents in the locality.
In view of the above findings, IFMA No. R9-040 is hereby recommended for cancellation.13
Acting on the latter Memorandum from RED Mendoza, then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, on June 7, 1999, issued
an Order14 canceling IFMA No. R-9-040 for failure to implement the approved CDMP and for failure of the lessee to protect
the area from forest fires. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, IFMA No. R9-040 issued to Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. is hereby ordered
cancelled. The IFMA holder is hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area and to surrender/return copy of the
Agreement to the Regional Executive Director, DENR Region 9, Zamboanga City.
The RED concerned or his duly authorized representative is hereby directed to serve this Order; determine best end use of
the land; take appropriate measures to protect the same and inform this Office immediately of his compliance.
SO ORDERED.15
On July 2, 1999, respondent’s President, Filomena S. San Juan, wrote DENR Secretary Cerilles that the company was
surprised to receive the Order of the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040 on June 22, 1999. She claimed that –
The DENR regional office is fully aware that the company is doing its best to manage and develop the area by continually
planting trees and protecting the area from forest fires and illegalities. No company would ever set fire on its own plantation
for obvious reasons. The company observed precautionary measures especially during the time of the El Niño
phenomenon. If there have been mistakes and miscommunications in the reports of the DENR field officers, these could
have been threshed out by a conference between DENR and the Pagadian Timber Company Inc.
The company was not accorded due process before the order of cancellation was issued. The company was not furnished
copy of the evaluation and recommendation of the DENR Regional Executive Director of Region IX. Had the company been
given the opportunity to contest the findings, evaluation and recommendation of the said office, the result would be
otherwise.16
She appealed for the reconsideration of the Order asking that a re-investigation be conducted to comply with due process.
Even as the said letter for reconsideration was not yet acted upon, respondent appealed to the Office of the President (OP).
In the Resolution17 dated January 12, 2000, the OP affirmed the cancellation order based on the results of the actual
evaluation and assessment of the DENR team. It ruled that the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040 was primarily and
specifically governed by SECTION 26 of Department Administrative Order (DAO) 97-04. Relative to respondent’s invocation
of due process, the OP held that respondent was afforded the right to be heard when it filed its motion for reconsideration
and its subsequent appeal to the OP.
The motion for reconsideration filed by respondent of the January 12, 2000 Resolution was denied by the OP in the
Resolution18 dated May 8, 2000.
Respondent went up to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against the implementation of the assailed Order dated June 7, 1999.
In its Resolution dated January 17, 2001, the CA issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, "directing and ordering
respondents (petitioner) and/or any other person acting under their command, authority and/or for and in their behalf, to
DESIST from implementing the assailed Order of cancellation dated June 7, 1999, and/or taking over the IFMA premises of
[respondent], pending the termination of this proceeding."
In its Decision19 dated October 18, 2001, the CA ruled in favor of respondents. In striking down the rulings of the OP and
the Order dated June 7, 1999, the CA declared that IFMA No. R-9-040 was a contract that could not be unilaterally
cancelled without infringing on the rights of respondent to due process and against impairment of contracts. The appellate
court agreed with respondent when the latter argued that it was entitled to the benefits of SECTIONs 3520 and 3621 of
IFMA No. R-9-040 such that respondent should have been given 30 days, after due notice, to remedy any breach or default
of the provisions of the IFMA and/or that the dispute regarding the bases for the cancellation of the IFMA should have first
been submitted to arbitration.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the CA Decision. In the Resolution22 dated July 24, 2003, the motion was denied for lack of
MERIT. Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that IFMA No. R9-040 is a contract and not a mere privilege granted by the
State to respondent.
II. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ordaining that respondent can rightfully invoke prior resort to arbitration or the
option to mend its violations under IFMA No. R9-040.23
In essence, petitioner argues that an IFMA is not an ordinary contract which is protected by the Constitution against
impairment24 but a mere privilege granted by the State to qualified persons by means of a permit, license, franchise,
agreement, or other similar concessions, which in this case is the exploration, development and utilization of the forest
lands belonging to the State under its full control and supervision. Thus, the cancellation of the IFMA does not amount to a
rescission of a contract but a mere withdrawal of this privilege. As such, the due process clause under the Constitution25
does not likewise apply since the IFMA area cannot be considered as property of respondent. According to petitioner, IFMA
No. R-9-040, with the forest lands covered by it, is imbued with paramount considerations of public interest and public
welfare such that whatever rights respondent may have under it must yield to the police power of the State. In this sense,
respondent cannot take refuge in SECTIONs 35 and 36 of IFMA No. R-9-040 to prevent the IFMA’s cancellation.
Inasmuch as the grounds cited by petitioner are interrelated, they shall be jointly discussed hereunder.
The petition is impressed with MERIT.
IFMA No. R-9-040 is a license agreement under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 (Revised FORESTRY Code), the law
which is the very basis for its existence.26 Under SECTION 3, paragraph (DD) thereof, a license agreement is defined as "a
privilege27 granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources within any forest land with the right of possession and
occupation thereof to the exclusion of others, except the government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop,
protect and rehabilitate the same in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement." This is evident in
the following features, among others, of IFMA No. R-9-040, to wit:
1. The State agreed to devolve to the holder of IFMA No. R-9-040 the responsibility to manage the specified IFMA area for a
period of 25 years, specifically until October 14, 2019, which period is automatically renewable for another 25 years
thereafter;
2. The State imposed upon respondent, as holder of IFMA No. R-9-040, the conditions, the means, and the manner by
which the IFMA area shall be managed, developed, and protected;
3. The State, through the DENR Secretary, shall not collect any rental within the first five (5) years of the IFMA, after which it
shall be entitled to annual rental of fifty centavos (P0.50) per hectare from the sixth to the tenth year thereof, and one peso
(P1.00) per hectare thereafter;
4. The IFMA area, except only the trees and other crops planted and the permanent improvements constructed by the IFMA
holder, remains the property of the State; and
5. Upon cancellation of the IFMA through the fault of the holder, all improvements including forest plantations existing within
the IFMA area shall revert to and become the property of the State.
An IFMA has for its precursor the Timber License Agreement (TLA), one of the tenurial instruments issued by the State to its
grantees for the efficient management of the country’s dwindling forest resources. Jurisprudence has been consistent in
holding that license agreements are not contracts within the purview of the due process and the non-impairment of
contracts clauses enshrined in the Constitution. Our pronouncement in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.28 is enlightening
–
In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s
forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. (citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 811) Such
unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., (id., at pp. 811, 812) where we held:
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government
to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands
of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by petitioners, into every timber license must be
read SECTION 20 of the FORESTRY Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
"x x x Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein x x x."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause of the constitution. In Tan vs. Director of FORESTRY, [125 SCRA 302,
325 (1983)] this Court held:
"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only
a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x"
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary [190 SCRA 673, 684
(1990):
"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause. [See SECTIONs 3(EE) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,
Tan v. Director of FORESTRY, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
cannot be invoked.
Even assuming arguendo that an IFMA can be considered a contract or an agreement, we agree with the Office of the
Solicitor General that the alleged property rights that may have arisen from it are not absolute.
All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as declared under SECTION 16,29 Article II of
the Constitution. This right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment,30 particularly our
diminishing forest resources. To uphold and protect this right is an express policy of the State.31 The DENR is the
instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this policy. It is "the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for
the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos."32
Thus, private rights must yield when they come in conflict with this public policy and common interest. They must give way
to the police or regulatory power of the State, in this case through the DENR, to ensure that the terms and conditions of
existing laws, rules and regulations, and the IFMA itself are strictly and faithfully complied with.
Respondent was not able to overturn by sufficient evidence the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions of the Evaluation Team when the latter inspected, assessed, and reported the violations respondent committed
under DAO No. 97-04 which eventually led to the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040.
It is worthy to note that petitioner followed regular procedure regarding the assessment of IFMA No. R-9-040. It gave notice
of the evaluation on October 22, 1998 to be held within the period October 22-30, 1998. Respondent admitted through the
affidavits of its President,33 Operations Manager,34 and workers35 that an Evaluation Team arrived at the IFMA area on
October 23, 1998. On October 23, 1998, prior to the actual assessment, a briefing was held on the conduct thereof in the
presence of the IFMA representatives. On October 29, 1998, an exit conference with IFMA Operations Manager Inocencio
Santiago was held at the CENRO Office, Pagadian City, where the results of the assessment were presented. That day, the
DENR officials asked Santiago if he had any questions or comments on the assessment results and on the manner the
evaluation was conducted, but the latter replied that he had none.
We do not understand why Santiago did not lift a finger or raise an objection to the assessment results, and only much later
in his Affidavit executed almost ten months thereafter, or on August 12, 1999, to claim so belatedly that there was no notice
given on October 22, 1998, that the Evaluation Team did not actually extensively inspect the IFMA area on October 23,
1998, and that there was no proper exit conference held on October 29, 1998. The same observation applies to
respondent’s President herself, who instead claimed that she vehemently opposed the appointment of then DENR
Secretary Cerilles because he was bent on canceling the IFMA at all costs, prior to the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040.
Besides, the detailed findings on the failure of respondent to implement its CDMP under its IFMA, as shown by the
November 6, 1998 Report of the Evaluation Team and the Memoranda dated April 7, 1999 and April 21, 1999, together with
all its attachments, belie respondent’s claim that there was no actual evaluation and assessment that took place on October
23, 1998. That the Evaluation Report was dated November 6, 1998 does not conclusively show that the evaluation was
actually held on that date. Neither was this properly proven by the Memoranda of RED Mendoza which stated that the
evaluation was conducted on November 6, 1998, since RED Mendoza could have been merely misled into such an
assumption because of the date of the Evaluation Report. The sweeping denials made by the IFMA representatives and
their self-serving accomplishment reports cannot prevail over the actual inspection conducted, the results of which are
shown by documentary proof.
Respondent, likewise, cannot insist that, pursuant to SECTION 35 of IFMA No. R-9-040, it should have been given notice of
its breach of the IFMA and should have been given 30 days therefrom to remedy the breach. It is worthy to note that
SECTION 35 uses the word "may" which must be interpreted as granting petitioner the discretion whether or not to give
such notice and allow the option to remedy the breach. In this case, despite the lack of any specific recommendation from
the Evaluation Team for the cancellation of the IFMA, DENR Secretary Cerilles deemed it proper to cancel the IFMA due to
the extent and the gravity of respondent’s violations.
It is also futile for respondent to claim that it is entitled to an arbitration under SECTION 36 of IFMA No. R-9-040 before the
license agreement may be canceled. A reading of the said SECTION shows that the dispute should be based on the
provisions of the IFMA to warrant a referral to arbitration of an irreconcilable conflict between the IFMA holder and the
DENR Secretary. In this case, the cancellation was grounded on SECTION 26 of DAO No. 97-04, particularly respondent’s
failure to implement the approved CDMP and its failure to implement or adopt agreements made with communities and
other relevant sectors. The contrary notwithstanding, what remains is that respondent never refuted the findings of the
Evaluation Team when given the opportunity to do so but waited until IFMA No. R-9-040 was already cancelled before it
made its vigorous objections as to the conduct of the evaluation, harping only on its alleged right to due process.
Indeed, respondent was given the opportunity to contest the findings that caused the cancellation of its IFMA when it moved
to reconsider the Order of cancellation and when it filed its appeal and motion for reconsideration before the OP.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the
law prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process
where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.36
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 18, 2001 and the Resolution dated July 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 59194 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Order dated June 7, 1999 of then DENR Secretary Antonio
Cerilles, and the Resolutions of the Office of the President dated January 12, 2000 and May 8, 2000 affirming the said
Order, are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
OLYMPIO REVALDO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in violation of SECTION 68 of
the FORESTRY Code, in an Information5 which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of June 1992, in the (M)unicipality of Maasin, (P)rovince of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of the following species of flat lumber:
1. Six (6) pcs. 1x10x7 Molave;
2. One (1) pc. 2x6x6 Molave;
3. Two (2) pcs. 2x4x6 Molave;
4. Two (2) pcs. 1x10x6 Narra;
5. Two (2) pcs. 2x8x7 Bajong;
6. One (1) pc. 1x6x6 Bajong;
7. Four (4) pcs. 1x6x6 Magkalipay; and
8. Three (3) pcs. 1x6x5 Magkalipay;
with a total value of ₱1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under existing forest laws and
regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented SPO4 Constantino Maceda (Maceda), Sulpicio Saguing (Saguing), and SPO4 Daniel Paloma
Lasala (Lasala) as witnesses.
Maceda, the person in charge of the operations SECTION of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Maasin, Southern
Leyte, testified that on 18 June 1992, at around 11:00 in the morning, he went with Chief Alejandro Rojas (Rojas), SPO3
Melquiades Talisic (Talisic) and SPO3 Nicasio Sunit (Sunit) to the house of petitioner to verify the report of Sunit that
petitioner had in his possession lumber without the necessary documents. They were not armed with a search warrant on
that day. They confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of different varieties lying around the vicinity of the house of petitioner.
Maceda asked petitioner who the owner of the lumber was and petitioner replied that he owned the lumber. Petitioner stated
that he would use the lumber to repair his house and to make furniture for sale. Maceda also testified that the lumber were
freshly cut. Maceda loaded the lumber on the patrol jeep and brought them to the police station. For coordination purposes,
Maceda informed the office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) of the confiscated lumber.
The DENR entrusted to the police custody of the lumber.6
Saguing, Forester II, CENRO-DENR, Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified that he went to the office of the PNP in Maasin,
Leyte to scale the confiscated lumber which were of different varieties. The total volume was 96.14 board feet belonging to
the first group of hardwood lumber.7
Lasala, Responsible Supply Sergeant, Finance Sergeant and Evidence Custodian, PNP, Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified
that he received the 20 pieces of assorted sizes and varieties of lumber from the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court,
but only ten pieces remained because some were damaged due to lack of storage space.8
For the defense, petitioner presented Dionisio Candole (Candole), Apolonio Caalim (Caalim), and himself as witnesses.
Petitioner testified that he is a carpenter specializing in furniture making. He was in his house working on an ordered divider
for a customer in the morning of 18 June 1992 when policemen arrived and inspected his lumber. Maceda, Sunit and Rojas
entered his house while Talisic stayed outside. Petitioner admitted to the policemen that he had no permit to possess the
lumber because those were only given to him by his uncle Felixberto Bug-os (Bug-os), his aunt Gliceria Bolo (Bolo), his
mother-in-law Cecilia Tenio (Tenio). The seven pieces of "magkalipay" lumber were left over from a divider he made for his
cousin Jose Epiz. He explained further that the lumber were intended for the repair of his dilapidated house. 9 The defense
presented Caalim to corroborate the testimony of petitioner.10
Defense witness Candole testified that it was Bug-os who hired him to cut a "tugas" tree on his land, sawed it into lumber
and delivered the same to petitioner who paid for the labor transporting the sawn lumber. Candole further testified that while
they were on their way to Barangay Combado, Sunit stopped them but allowed the lumber to be brought to the house of
petitioner.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court stated that petitioner failed to present Bug-os, Bolo, and Tenio to attest to the fact that they sought prior
DENR permission before cutting the trees and sawing them into lumber. The trial court further stated that the FORESTRY
Code is a special law where criminal intent is not necessary. The Secretary of the DENR may issue a Special Private Land
Timber Permit to landowners to cut, gather, collect or remove narra or other premium hardwood species found in private
lands. Transportation of timber or other forest products without authority or without the legal documents required under
forest rules and regulations is punishable under SECTION 68 of the FORESTRY Code. Petitioner did not present any
document as required by law.
The RTC-Branch 25 rendered judgment on 5 September 1997 convicting petitioner of the offense charged and sentencing
him as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused OLYMPIO REVALDO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged and, crediting him with one mitigating circumstance before applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
hereby SENTENCES him to an indeterminate imprisonment term of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as maximum, and to pay the
costs.
The 21 pieces of flat lumber of different varieties, scaled at 96.14 board feet and valued at ₱1,730.52 are hereby ordered
CONFISCATED and FORFEITED in favor of the government particularly the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte which shall
sell the same at public auction and the proceeds turned over to the National Treasury.12
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that motive or
intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal
liability.
Hence, the present petition.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers was illegal and thus the items
seized should not have been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the police officers were not armed
with a search warrant when they went to his house to verify the report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber
without the corresponding license. The police officers who conducted the search in the premises of petitioner acted on the
basis only on the verbal order of the Chief of Police. Sunit had already informed the team of the name of petitioner and the
location the day before they conducted the search. Petitioner argues that, with that information on hand, the police officers
could have easily convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant, but they did
not. Because the search was illegal, all items recovered from petitioner during the illegal search were prohibited from being
used as evidence against him. Petitioner therefore prays for his acquittal.1avvphi1.zw+
In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines (respondent) contends that even without a search warrant, the
personnel of the PNP can seize the forest products cut, gathered or taken by an offender pursuant to SECTION 8013 of the
FORESTRY Code.
There is no question that the police officers went to the house of petitioner because of the information relayed by Sunit that
petitioner had in his possession illegally cut lumber. When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber
were lying around the vicinity of petitioner’s house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects
falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. This Court had the opportunity to summarize the rules governing plain view searches in the case of
People v. Doria,14 to wit:
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (C) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and
hand and its discovery inadvertent.15
When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely
replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and for his furniture shop. There was thus
probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant.
The seizure of the lumber from petitioner who did not have the required permit to possess the forest products cut is
sanctioned by SECTION 68 of the FORESTRY Code which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. – Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations,
the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under SECTION 68 of the FORESTRY Code, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws
and regulations.16
As the Court held in People v. Que,17 in the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting, or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the
second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products are
legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the
lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because the FORESTRY Code is a special law which considers mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper documentation as malum prohibitum.
On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest petitioner, even without a warrant, SECTION 80 of the FORESTRY
Code authorizes the FORESTRY officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a
warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the FORESTRY
Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or
taken by the offender. SECTION 80 reads:
Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. - A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed
or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of
the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by
the offender in the process of committing the offense. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In open
court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he
did not have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated
house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The
law may be harsh but that is the law.
On the penalty imposed by the lower courts, we deem it necessary to discuss the matter. Violation of SECTION 68 of the
FORESTRY Code is punished as Qualified Theft with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code,18 thus:
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more
than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen
is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value
exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not
over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, x x x.
The trial court applied Article 309(3), in relation to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that the amount
involved was ₱1,730.52. However, except for the amount stated in the Information, the prosecution did not present any
proof as to the value of the lumber. What the prosecution presented were the Seizure Receipt19 and Confiscation
Receipt20 stating the number of pieces of lumber, their species, dimensions and volumes, with "no pertinent supporting
document." These do not suffice.
As we have held in Merida v. People,21 to prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against
the accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated
"estimate" of such fact. In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either
apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of
the case.
Accordingly, the prescribed penalty under Article 309(6) of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. However, considering that violation of SECTION 68 of the FORESTRY Code is punished as qualified theft
under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant to the FORESTRY Code, the prescribed penalty shall be increased
by two degrees,22 that is, to prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years. Taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be taken from
anywhere within the range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of arresto mayor, which
is the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. We find it proper to impose upon petitioner, under the circumstances
obtaining here, the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed Decision convicting petitioner for violation of SECTION 68 (now SECTION 77) of
the FORESTRY Code, as amended, with MODIFICATION as regards the penalty in that petitioner Olympio Revaldo is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.