Consti 1 (36-74)

36. Miranda vs. Aguirre, G.R.
133064 (September 16, 1999)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999]
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R.
CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON.
EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and
MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, respondents,
GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent
component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A.
No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it
changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city, viz:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words an independent
thereon so that said Section will read as follows:
SEC. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city to be
known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present
territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the
present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its
stead substitute the following:
SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any
Elective Provincial Position for the Province of Isabela.-The voters of the City of Santiago shall be
qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan
members and other elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such qualified voter
can be a candidate for such provincial positions and any elective provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.- All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.2 They alleged as ground the lack of provision in
R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper
plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at
bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige,
Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the
petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor
General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended
that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao,3 a member of the
provincial board of Isabela.4 He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991 do not require a plebiscite to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in
provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He
also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended
their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its
reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the
constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.5 Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in
his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the city
council of Santiago City. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago from
independent component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown
hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and
immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the
standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of
Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be
conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to
strike the law as unconstitutional.
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the
ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal
especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as
including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in
many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v. Cuenco,6 we held:
xxx
The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before
it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a
legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements
of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is
the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix
explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the
conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be
submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a
plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code
(R.A. No. 7160), thus:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government
units belongs to Congress.8 This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution
vested in Congress.9 The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the
Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an
independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago
City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within
the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional
provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units involve a common denominator - - - material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is
precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units
directly affected. It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The
1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of
our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article
X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created,
abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the
people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to
serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing,
merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in
their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as
opposed to democracy thru peoples representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with
the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the
independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council
of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela.Taxes that will be collected by the
city will now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes on
the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz:10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had merely re-
classified Santiago City from an independent component city into a component city, the effect when
challenged (sic) the Act were operational would be, actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there
would be substantial changes in the political culture and administrative responsibilities of Santiago City,
and the Province of Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to the
Province of Isabela, geographically, politically and administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of
Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to the
benefit or advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of
its share from the internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No.
7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area and population of local
government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government, and which taxes shall
accrue solely to the City Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared
with the province such as taxes on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160),
professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The
Provincial Government will allocate operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic)
diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because of reduced shares of the IRA
in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of the R.A. No. 7160. The City Governments
share in the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since certain
portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A. No.7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials (Section 451
and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial Governor who is
tasked by law to ensure that every component city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of
the province acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i),
R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former
(Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the local
governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city officials
will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will
be the great change in the state of the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue
of R.A. No. 7720, it is the Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an
independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to
the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468 (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4),
R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the decisions in administrative cases by the former could be appealed and
acted upon by the latter (Section 67, R.A. No. 7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an
independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the
purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the
will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there
is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6,
paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord
with the Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance
prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
x x x.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a
material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and
economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528
on the ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of
amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an
amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. He
also contends that the amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a
city. Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A.
No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of
the local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in
their rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a
mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its
physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the
classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there
a need for such changes to be approved by the people x x x."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two
conditions - - - first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a
local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income,
population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria
and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are
imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not
imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code
does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and
land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action,
unless said law or ordinance fixes another date."11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of
the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory. 12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different
purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are
designed to achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7,
Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be attested by the
Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to
achieve a political purpose --- to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political
practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed by the political
representatives of the people themselves than the exercise of direct people power. As well-observed by
one commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
are "xxx basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done not only by Congress but
also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. xxx By giving the inhabitants a hand in
their approval, the provision will also eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize
legislative action designed for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local
government units."13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its
people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago
City has been converted to an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and
the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the
sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its
socio-economic-political status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of
the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing
for it is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or be
voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they
gave up that privilege when they voted to be independentfrom the province of Isabela. There was an
attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City
to its people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess
was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee anounced the withdrawal of the
amendment "after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body." We quote the
debates, viz:14
"BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729 as reported out under
Committee Report No. 971.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the motion is approved.
"Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary
will read only the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
"The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE
SANTIAGO
_______________________________________________________
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
_______________________________________________________
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished Chairman of the
Committee on Local Government be recognized.
"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO
"Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House by Congressman Antonio M.
Abaya as its principal author, is a simple measure which merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago into
a component city of the Province of Isabela.
"The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral part of the Province of
Isabela. As an independent component city, however, it is completely detached and separate from the
said province as a local political unit. To use the language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill,
the City of Santiago is an island in the provincial milieu.
"The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified to run for any
elective positions in the Province of Isabela.
"The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and authority of general
supervision over the city and its officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office of
the President, which is very far away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is affected, one way or
the other, by the happenings in the said province, and is benefited by its progress and
development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
"Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august Body Committee
Report No. 971 of the Committee on Local Government , recommending approval, with our proposed
committee amendment, of House Bill No. 8729.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of interpellations is
closed.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President.
"The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?

"Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the ruling on the motion to close the
period of interpellations just to be able to ask a few questions?
"Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the closing of the period of
interpellations? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Roco is recognized.
"Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentleman yield for some questions?
"Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government, we
were with the sponsors when we approved this bill to make Santiago a City. That was about two and a
half years ago. At that time, I remember it was the cry of the city that it be independent. Now we are
deleting that word independent.
"Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want some
explanation on what happened between then and now that has made us decide that the City of
Santiago should cease to be independent and should now become a component city.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the public hearing that they are
no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city. The power and
authority is now being exercised by the Office of the President and it is quite far from the City of
Santiago.
"In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that they want to
participate in the provincial elections.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it on record, however. I think there
was a majority of 14,000 who approved the charter, and maybe we owe it to those who voted for that
charter some degree of respect. But if there has been a change of political will, there has been a change
of political will, then so be it.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a very important point raised by
Senator Roco, and I will have to place it on the Record of the Senate that the reason why we are
proposing a committee amendment is that, originally, there was an objection on the part of the local
officials and those who oppose it by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill. That was the solution. Because
there were some sectors in the City of Santiago who were opposing the reclassification or reconversion
of the city into a component city.
"Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President -- because the two of us had special pictures (sic) in
the city -- is that I thought it should be put on record that we have supported originally the proposal to
make it an independent city. But now if it is their request, then, on the manifestation of the Chairman,
let it be so.
"Thank you.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr. President?
"Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our good friend, the Senator from Bicol,
on the matter of the opinion of the citizens of Santiago City, there is a resolution passed by the
Sanggunian on January 30, 1997 opposing the conversion of Santiago from an independent city.
"This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the reason why, as
mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the
law takes effect.
"The question I would like to raise-- and I would like to recall the statement of our Minority Leader --
is that, at this time we should not be passing it for a particular politician.
"In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the additional territory
be added to the election of the provincial officials of the province of Isabela.
"Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the Floor, Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I share some information.
"Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will not be to the
benefit of the provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger
territory.
"As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago who will now be
enfranchised in the provincial electoral process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow
into provincial leadership. This is one of the prime reasons why this amendment is being put forward.
"While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who signed the
resolution were not the whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district
who represents a constituency, the voice of the district.
"I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must be heard, and if
we have to fathom the interest of the people, the law which has been crafted here in accordance with
the rules should be given account, as we do give account to many of the legislations coming from the
House on local issues.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this question is that, as Senator Roco said,
just two-and-a-half years ago we passed a bill which indeed disenfranchized--if we want to use that
phrase-- the citizens of the City of Santiago in the matter of the provincial election. Two-and-a-half
years after, we are changing the rule.
"In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in order to
approve the conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe that the only way to resolve this
issue raised by Senator Roco is again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision
of this proposed bill and as will be proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment.
"Thank you very much, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that the change from an independent
to a component city be subjected to a plebiscite.
Sections 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those enumerated. So the
proposal coming from the House is in adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a
plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is conversion. The word conversion appears in that
provision wherein we must call a plebiscite. During the public hearing, the representative of
Congressman Abaya was insisting that this is not a conversion; this is merely a reclassification. But it is
clear in the bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city. That is how the
members of the committee felt. That is why we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to
incorporate a plebiscite in as much as there is no provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we
would like not only to give the other people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the
leadership of the province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing
it. To them, this is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of
Isabela deciding for them.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to close the period of interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection? Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as follows:
"SEC. 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE ENTIRE
SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:
"SEC. 49. PLEBISCITE. - THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE
PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF
THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60)
DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND
SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE.
"The President. Is there any objection?
"Senator Enrile. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.
"Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.
"SUSPENSION OF SESSION
"Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.
"The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is no objection. [There was none]
"It was 7:54 p.m.
"RESUMPTION OF SESSION
"At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
"The President. The session is resumed.
"Senator Sotto is recognized.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body, I
withdraw my amendment.
"The President. The amendment is withdrawn.
"Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.
"Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of the amendment.
"Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela -- I am no great fan of the Senator from
Isabela -- but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not only his province but his own city
where he is a resident and registered voter.
"So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance, senatorial courtesy
demands that we, as much as possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we
have done on matters affecting the district of other senators. I need not remind them.
"Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.

"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest appreciation for the statement of the
gentleman from Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the feeling is not mutual. At least for
now, I have suddenly become his great fan for the evening.
"May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do
not want it to be a city but because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for
the leadership of the province. The town is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town
from the province?
"But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the Committee.
"Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that the period of committee
amendments be closed.
"The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the word independent preceding
component city?
"Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The main title of this House Bill No.
8729 is An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act 7720. The title is the title of Republic Act
7720. So, I do not think that we should amend that anymore.
"The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman kindly state the motion?
"Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments.
"Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move that we close the period of
individual amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of individual amendments
is closed.
"APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we shall now vote on Second
Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
"As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
"Several Members. Aye
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]
"House Bill No. 8729 is approved on Second Reading."

The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading of the
city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. vs. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros
Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law
as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its enactment, viz:
"The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was to have the creation of the new Province a fait
accompli by the time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so
that the new Governor and other officials shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function
for purposes of the election for President and Vice-President. Thus, the petitioners reported after the
event: With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed by
President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials headed by Governor Armando
Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political
machinery was in place to deliver the solid North to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What
happened in Negros del Norte during the elections - the unashamed use of naked power and resources -
contributed in no small way to arousing peoples power and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds
of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today.
"The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts
complained of, viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the
appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the
proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the
remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago
and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran,
Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and
Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing
1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered
without the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. It is plain
that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the
proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire
province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the
whole province is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit
the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as
absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded
against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent
component cities were downgraded into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the
City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental,16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan17 whose charters were
amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to
which their city belongs without submitting the amendment to a plebiscite.With due respect, the cities
of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then
were not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but
were not independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were
considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under
consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained:18
"x x x Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the voters of San
Carlos to vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade
the status of the City of San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this bill
will, in any way, diminish the powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In
fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore,
this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power to vote in provincial
elections, without in any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is for this reason
that I vote in favor of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill19 allowing qualified voters of the city of Oroquieta
to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he
explained that the right to vote being given to the people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its
status as a component city.20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out
the need to remedy the anomalous situation then obtaining xxx where voters of one component city
can vote in the provincial election while the voters of another component city cannot vote simply
because their charters so provide.21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of component cities
prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the
writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Panganiban, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., joins J. Mendoza in his dissenting opinion.
Buena, J., see dissenting opinion.
1
See Section 4 of R.A. No. 7720.
2
See Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
3
The intervention was granted on June 30, 1998.
4
After R.A. No. 8528 was enacted, COMELEC reallocated the seats for the provincial board in Isabela. It
added one (1) seat to the 4th district where Santiago City belongs. The intervenor won the additional
seat in the May 11, 1998 elections.
5
Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976).
6
100 Phil. 1101 (1957).
7
92 SCRA 642 (1979).
8
Mendenilla v. Onandia, 115 Phil. 534 (1962).
9
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
10
Reply of Petitioners, pp. 7-9.
11
See also Rule II, Article 6, par. F(1) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code.
12
Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991, The Key to National Development, p. 36.
13
Hector S. de Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, 1991 ed., p. 509.
14
Journal of the Senate, 10th Congress, 3rd Regular Session, Session No. 55, February 3, 1998, pp. 92-
100.
15
142 SCRA 727, 753-754 (1986).
16
See R.A. No. 6720 which amended R.A. No. 5518.
17
18
Record of the Senate, October 20, 1989, p. 795.
19
House Bill No. 1881; Committee Report Nos. 73 and 76 in the Senate.
20
Record of the Senate, November 25, 1988, p. 763.
21
Ibid., p. 764. See Record of the Senate, October 6, 1989, p. 506 where the cases of the cities of Naga
and Ormoc were cited as examples.
37. People vs. Gacott, G.R. No. 116049 (July 13, 1995)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999]
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R.
CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON.
EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and
MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, respondents,
GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent
component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A.
No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it
changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city, viz:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE
SANTIAGO.
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words an independent
thereon so that said Section will read as follows:
SEC. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city to be
known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present
territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the
present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its
stead substitute the following:
SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any
Elective Provincial Position for the Province of Isabela.-The voters of the City of Santiago shall be
qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan
members and other elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such qualified voter
can be a candidate for such provincial positions and any elective provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.- All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.2 They alleged as ground the lack of provision in
R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper
plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at
bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige,
Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the
petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor
General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended
that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao,3 a member of the
provincial board of Isabela.4 He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991 do not require a plebiscite to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in
provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He
also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended
their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its
reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the
constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.5 Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in
his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the city
council of Santiago City. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago from
independent component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown
hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and
immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the
standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of
Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be
conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to
strike the law as unconstitutional.
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the
ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal
especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as
including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in
many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v. Cuenco,6 we held:
xxx
The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before
it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a
legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements
of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is
the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix
explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the
conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be
submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a
plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its
This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code
(R.A. No. 7160), thus:
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government
units belongs to Congress.8 This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution
vested in Congress.9 The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the
Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an
independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago
City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within
the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional
provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units involve a common denominator - - - material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is
precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units
directly affected. It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The
1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of
our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article
X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created,
abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the
people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to
serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing,
merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in
their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as
opposed to democracy thru peoples representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with
the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the
independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council
of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela.Taxes that will be collected by the
city will now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes on
the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz:10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had merely re-
classified Santiago City from an independent component city into a component city, the effect when
challenged (sic) the Act were operational would be, actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there
would be substantial changes in the political culture and administrative responsibilities of Santiago City,
and the Province of Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to the
Province of Isabela, geographically, politically and administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of
Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to the
benefit or advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of
its share from the internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No.
7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area and population of local
government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government, and which taxes shall
accrue solely to the City Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared
with the province such as taxes on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160),
professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The
Provincial Government will allocate operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic)
diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because of reduced shares of the IRA
in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of the R.A. No. 7160. The City Governments
share in the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since certain
portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A. No.7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials (Section 451
and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial Governor who is
tasked by law to ensure that every component city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of
the province acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i),
R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former
(Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the local
governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city officials
will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will
be the great change in the state of the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue
of R.A. No. 7720, it is the Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an
independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to
the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468 (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4),
R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the decisions in administrative cases by the former could be appealed and
acted upon by the latter (Section 67, R.A. No. 7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an
independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the
purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the
will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there
is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6,
paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord
with the Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance
prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
x x x.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a
material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and
economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528
on the ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of
amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an
amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. He
also contends that the amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a
city. Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A.
No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of
the local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in
their rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a
mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its
physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the
classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there
a need for such changes to be approved by the people x x x."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two
conditions - - - first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a
local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income,
population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria
and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are
imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not
imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code
does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and
land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action,
unless said law or ordinance fixes another date."11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of
the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory. 12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different
purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are
designed to achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7,
Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be attested by the
Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to
achieve a political purpose --- to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political
practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed by the political
representatives of the people themselves than the exercise of direct people power. As well-observed by
one commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
are "xxx basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done not only by Congress but
also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. xxx By giving the inhabitants a hand in
their approval, the provision will also eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize
legislative action designed for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local
government units."13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its
people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago
City has been converted to an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and
the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the
sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its
socio-economic-political status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of
the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing
for it is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or be
voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they
gave up that privilege when they voted to be independentfrom the province of Isabela. There was an
attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City
to its people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess
was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee anounced the withdrawal of the
amendment "after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body." We quote the
debates, viz:14
"BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729 as reported out under
Committee Report No. 971.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the motion is approved.
"Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary
will read only the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
"The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE
SANTIAGO
_______________________________________________________
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
_______________________________________________________
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished Chairman of the
Committee on Local Government be recognized.
"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO

"Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House by Congressman Antonio M.
Abaya as its principal author, is a simple measure which merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago into
a component city of the Province of Isabela.
"The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral part of the Province of
Isabela. As an independent component city, however, it is completely detached and separate from the
said province as a local political unit. To use the language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill,
the City of Santiago is an island in the provincial milieu.
"The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified to run for any
elective positions in the Province of Isabela.
"The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and authority of general
supervision over the city and its officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office of
the President, which is very far away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is affected, one way or
the other, by the happenings in the said province, and is benefited by its progress and
development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
"Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august Body Committee
Report No. 971 of the Committee on Local Government , recommending approval, with our proposed
committee amendment, of House Bill No. 8729.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of interpellations is
closed.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President.
"The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the ruling on the motion to close the
period of interpellations just to be able to ask a few questions?
"Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the closing of the period of
interpellations? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Roco is recognized.
"Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentleman yield for some questions?
"Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.

"Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government, we
were with the sponsors when we approved this bill to make Santiago a City. That was about two and a
half years ago. At that time, I remember it was the cry of the city that it be independent. Now we are
deleting that word independent.
"Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want some
explanation on what happened between then and now that has made us decide that the City of
Santiago should cease to be independent and should now become a component city.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the public hearing that they are
no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city. The power and
authority is now being exercised by the Office of the President and it is quite far from the City of
Santiago.
"In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that they want to
participate in the provincial elections.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it on record, however. I think there
was a majority of 14,000 who approved the charter, and maybe we owe it to those who voted for that
charter some degree of respect. But if there has been a change of political will, there has been a change
of political will, then so be it.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a very important point raised by
Senator Roco, and I will have to place it on the Record of the Senate that the reason why we are
proposing a committee amendment is that, originally, there was an objection on the part of the local
officials and those who oppose it by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill. That was the solution. Because
there were some sectors in the City of Santiago who were opposing the reclassification or reconversion
of the city into a component city.
"Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President -- because the two of us had special pictures (sic) in
the city -- is that I thought it should be put on record that we have supported originally the proposal to
make it an independent city. But now if it is their request, then, on the manifestation of the Chairman,
let it be so.
"Thank you.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr. President?
"Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our good friend, the Senator from Bicol,
on the matter of the opinion of the citizens of Santiago City, there is a resolution passed by the
Sanggunian on January 30, 1997 opposing the conversion of Santiago from an independent city.
"This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the reason why, as
mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the
law takes effect.
"The question I would like to raise-- and I would like to recall the statement of our Minority Leader --
is that, at this time we should not be passing it for a particular politician.
"In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the additional territory
be added to the election of the provincial officials of the province of Isabela.
"Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.
"The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the Floor, Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I share some information.
"Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will not be to the
benefit of the provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger
territory.
"As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago who will now be
enfranchised in the provincial electoral process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow
into provincial leadership. This is one of the prime reasons why this amendment is being put forward.
"While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who signed the
resolution were not the whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district
who represents a constituency, the voice of the district.
"I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must be heard, and if
we have to fathom the interest of the people, the law which has been crafted here in accordance with
the rules should be given account, as we do give account to many of the legislations coming from the
House on local issues.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this question is that, as Senator Roco said,
just two-and-a-half years ago we passed a bill which indeed disenfranchized--if we want to use that
phrase-- the citizens of the City of Santiago in the matter of the provincial election. Two-and-a-half
years after, we are changing the rule.
"In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in order to
approve the conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe that the only way to resolve this
issue raised by Senator Roco is again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision
of this proposed bill and as will be proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment.
"Thank you very much, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that the change from an independent
to a component city be subjected to a plebiscite.
Sections 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those enumerated. So the
proposal coming from the House is in adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a
plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is conversion. The word conversion appears in that
provision wherein we must call a plebiscite. During the public hearing, the representative of
Congressman Abaya was insisting that this is not a conversion; this is merely a reclassification. But it is
clear in the bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city. That is how the
members of the committee felt. That is why we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to
incorporate a plebiscite in as much as there is no provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we
would like not only to give the other people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the
leadership of the province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing
it. To them, this is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of
Isabela deciding for them.
"Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to close the period of interpellations.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection? Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as follows:
"SEC. 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE ENTIRE
SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:
"SEC. 49. PLEBISCITE. - THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE
PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF
THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60)
DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND
SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE.
"The President. Is there any objection?
"Senator Enrile. Mr. President.

"The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.
"Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.
"SUSPENSION OF SESSION
"Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.
"The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is no objection. [There was none]
"It was 7:54 p.m.
"RESUMPTION OF SESSION
"At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
"The President. The session is resumed.
"Senator Sotto is recognized.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body, I
withdraw my amendment.
"The President. The amendment is withdrawn.
"Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.
"Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of the amendment.
"Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela -- I am no great fan of the Senator from
Isabela -- but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not only his province but his own city
where he is a resident and registered voter.
"So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance, senatorial courtesy
demands that we, as much as possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we
have done on matters affecting the district of other senators. I need not remind them.
"Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest appreciation for the statement of the
gentleman from Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the feeling is not mutual. At least for
now, I have suddenly become his great fan for the evening.
"May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do
not want it to be a city but because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for
the leadership of the province. The town is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town
from the province?
"But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the Committee.
"Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that the period of committee
amendments be closed.
"The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the word independent preceding
component city?
"Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The main title of this House Bill No.
8729 is An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act 7720. The title is the title of Republic Act
7720. So, I do not think that we should amend that anymore.
"The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman kindly state the motion?
"Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments.
"Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move that we close the period of
individual amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of individual amendments
is closed.
"APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we shall now vote on Second
Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
"As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
"Several Members. Aye
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]
"House Bill No. 8729 is approved on Second Reading."
The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading of the
city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. vs. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros
Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law
as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its enactment, viz:
"The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was to have the creation of the new Province a fait
accompli by the time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so
that the new Governor and other officials shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function
for purposes of the election for President and Vice-President. Thus, the petitioners reported after the
event: With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed by
President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials headed by Governor Armando
Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political
machinery was in place to deliver the solid North to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What
happened in Negros del Norte during the elections - the unashamed use of naked power and resources -
contributed in no small way to arousing peoples power and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds
of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today.
"The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts
complained of, viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the
appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the
proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the
remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago
and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran,
Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and
Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing
1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered
without the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. It is plain
that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the
proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire
province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the
whole province is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit
the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as
absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded
against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent
component cities were downgraded into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the
City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental,16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan17 whose charters were
amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to
which their city belongs without submitting the amendment to a plebiscite.With due respect, the cities
of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then
were not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but
were not independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were
considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under
consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained:18
"x x x Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the voters of San
Carlos to vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade
the status of the City of San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this bill
will, in any way, diminish the powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In
fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore,
this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power to vote in provincial
elections, without in any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is for this reason
that I vote in favor of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill19 allowing qualified voters of the city of Oroquieta
to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he
explained that the right to vote being given to the people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its
status as a component city.20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out
the need to remedy the anomalous situation then obtaining xxx where voters of one component city
can vote in the provincial election while the voters of another component city cannot vote simply
because their charters so provide.21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of component cities
prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the
writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Panganiban, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., joins J. Mendoza in his dissenting opinion.
Buena, J., see dissenting opinion.
1
See Section 4 of R.A. No. 7720.
2
See Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
3
The intervention was granted on June 30, 1998.
4
After R.A. No. 8528 was enacted, COMELEC reallocated the seats for the provincial board in Isabela. It
added one (1) seat to the 4th district where Santiago City belongs. The intervenor won the additional
seat in the May 11, 1998 elections.
5
Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976).
6
100 Phil. 1101 (1957).
7
92 SCRA 642 (1979).
8
Mendenilla v. Onandia, 115 Phil. 534 (1962).
9
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
10
Reply of Petitioners, pp. 7-9.
11
See also Rule II, Article 6, par. F(1) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code.
12
Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991, The Key to National Development, p. 36.
13
Hector S. de Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, 1991 ed., p. 509.
14
Journal of the Senate, 10th Congress, 3rd Regular Session, Session No. 55, February 3, 1998, pp. 92-
100.
15
142 SCRA 727, 753-754 (1986).
16
17
18
Record of the Senate, October 20, 1989, p. 795.
19
House Bill No. 1881; Committee Report Nos. 73 and 76 in the Senate.
20
Record of the Senate, November 25, 1988, p. 763.
21
Ibid., p. 764. See Record of the Senate, October 6, 1989, p. 506 where the cases of the cities of Naga
and Ormoc were cited as examples.
38. Sang. Bayan Ng Taguig vs. Judge Estrella, A.M. No. 01-1608-RJT (January 16,2001)
[A.M. No. 01-1608-RTJ. January 16, 2001]
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF TAGUIG, M. Mla., complainant, vs. Judge SANTIAGO G.

ESTRELLA, respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
MELO, J.:
At bar is a sworn letter-complaint dated October 20, 1997 filed by 10 members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Taguig, Metro Manila charging Judge Santiago G. Estrella of Branch 68 of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig City with serious misconduct relative to
Election Protest No. 144, entitled Ricardo D. Papa, Jr. vs. Isidro B. Garcia.
The present controversy stems from an election protest filed by then mayoral candidate Ricardo D.
Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8,
1995 elections. In his protest, Papa impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the municipality. This
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and eventually raffled to the sala of respondent wherein
it was docketed as Election Protest No. 144.
Garcia filed his answer with counter-protest and after the rejoinder of issues, Papa filed a Motion to
Withdraw First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action, thereby limiting his cause of action to only
one: the determination of the number of the plain Garcia votes which should be considered stray and
their number deducted from votes credited to protestee Garcia, there having been another candidate
surnamed Garcia.
The motion was granted and forthwith, the revision committee opened 712 questioned ballot boxes,
examined the contents, and revised the ballots.
On March 14, 1996, after the revision of ballots was completed, Papa filed a Motion for Technical
Examination, wherein he objected to more than 5,000 ballots, the same allegedly having been Written
By One (WBO) or Written By Two (WBT) persons. Respondent judge granted the motion. However, on
March 25, 1996, Papa withdrew this motion.
On April 10, 1996, a final revision report was submitted to respondent judge by Atty. Katherine A. Go,
the over-all chairperson of the Revision Committee. The report stated that Papa actually objected to a
total of 11,290 ballots for Garcia, over 5,000 of which were objected to by reason of the same having
been written by one person (WBO) or written by two (WBT). The said report also mentioned that Garcia
had 3,049 plain Garcia votes.
Thereafter, both parties offered their respective exhibits, which were all admitted by respondent judge.
On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to examine the contested ballots in the presence of a representative of both parties. The pertinent
portion of the order provided that so as to enable the court to get a complete overview of the matter, it
was better to have a handwriting expert examine the questioned ballots to settle once and for all the
questions and objections relative to the ballots.
After the NBI finished its examination of the contested ballots and upon the determination by
respondent that he had no further need of the ballot boxes, he issued an order dated May 19, 1997
directing the removal of the ballot boxes and election paraphernalia from his courtroom. On May 27,
1997, respondent ordered the immediate transfer of all the ballot boxes and election paraphernalia to
the sala of Judge Vivencio Baclig, Branch 157 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, so that Judge
Baclig may proceed with the trial of the vice-mayoralty election protest of the same municipality. On
June 5, 1997, all the ballot boxes which contained both contested and uncontested ballots were
removed from the custody of respondent and transferred to RTC, Branch 157. On June 26, 1997, the NBI
Report was submitted to respondent.
On July 22, 1997, Garcia filed a Manifestation and Formal Motion with Formal Query, praying that an
order be issued to the Branch Clerk of Court to be furnished a copy of the NBI Reports and/or allow him
to copy or review or at least to read said reports. Respondent judge denied the motion on the same day,
proclaiming that the examination of contested ballots by the NBI was ordered, upon the instance of the
court, and not by the parties, hence, only the court was given copies of the NBI Reports.
On the same day that Garcias motion was denied, respondent also set the date of promulgation of
judgment for July 31, 1997. This prompted Garcia to file a Manifestation and Most Urgent Motion to
Defer and/or Cancel Scheduled Promulgation of Judgment premised on respondents refusal to furnish
him a copy of the NBI Reports, and Garcias physical impossibility of examining the contested ballots
because (a) the report was submitted on June 26, 1997, and (b) the contested ballots and other election
paraphernalia had been transferred to the sala of Judge Vivencio Baclig in RTC, Branch 157. Respondent
judge denied Garcias motion on July 28, 1997, explaining that:
. . . To allow parties at this stage to secure copies of the NBI report and to comment on the same before
promulgating the decision would be opening the floodgates for undue delay.
Thereafter, Garcia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with a prayer for
restraining order and preliminary injunction with the COMELEC on July 29, 1997. The very next day or on
July 30, 1997, the COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge
from proceeding with the scheduled promulgation of judgment set on July 31, 1997.
On August 21, 1997, after the expiration of the TRO, Papa filed a Motion for Immediate Promulgation of
Judgment, requesting that the same be heard on August 25, 1997. This was, however, granted by
respondent judge the very next day, three days ahead of the date set for hearing of the motion, with
respondent setting August 27, 1997 as the promulgation date. Forthwith, Garcia filed with the COMELEC
an Urgent Manifestation and Motion Reiterating Prayer for Preliminary Injunction.
One day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment, or on August 26, 1997, the COMELEC issued
an order directing respondent to allow both parties or their counsel to have access to the NBI reports
and to give the parties copies thereof before the promulgation of the decision.
On the day of the promulgation of judgment (August 27, 1997), respondent gave Garcias counsel 5
minutes to go over Questioned Documents Report No. 152-297 which consisted of 53 pages, and
Questioned Document Report No. 152-297(A), which consisted of 17 pages.
Thereafter, judgment was promulgated, disposing:
WHEREFORE, and all the forgoing considered, the Court resolves to SUSTAIN as it hereby SUSTAINS the
Protest lodged by Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., and accordingly renders judgment DECLARING the aforenamed
Protestant the duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila.
The Counter-Protest filed by protestee Isidro B. Garcia is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to damages as no proof was presented by either party.
Complainants further claim that it was only after the promulgation of judgment that Garcia was able to
secure copies of the NBI Reports.
It must be noted that Papa filed an Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on August 26, 1997, a
day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment lending credibility to the claim of Garcia that Papa
had prior knowledge of respondents decision. Despite Garcias opposition, respondent granted said
motion on September 2, 1997. That same day, respondent also issued the Writ of Execution.
Complainants now allege that respondent judge, together with Papa and the NBI officials concerned,
violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides
that:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officers and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(e) Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. . . .
Complainants claim that: respondent gave unwarranted benefits to Papa and caused, on the other hand,
undue injury to Mayor Garcia as well as to the people of Taguig by depriving the latter of their duly
elected mayor, and giving Papa unwarranted benefits; the decision and reports were prepared, issued,
and executed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence; that
respondent conspired, confederated, and confabulated with the NBI officials concerned and Papa to
make the NBI Reports and the decision favorable to Papa; that respondent did not bother to check the
figures and to analyze the data contained in the reports, allegedly because a careful perusal of said
reports would have led to the discovery of flaws and mistakes; and that the hasty transfer of ballot
boxes from respondents sala to that of Judge Vivencio Baclig violated Section 255 of the Omnibus
Election Code which requires the examination and appreciation of the ballots to be done by the judge
himself rather than mere reliance on the work of the Revision Committee.
In his Comment dated December 10, 1997, respondent vehemently denied the allegations in the
complaint by addressing complainants two main issues: (1) whether it was proper for respondent to
have designated the NBI to conduct the necessary handwriting examination and to submit reports on
the results thereof to the court and not to the parties considering that said reports were the sole basis
of the decision rendered by the court, and (2) whether it was proper for respondent to have granted the
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the declared winner Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., allowing him to
take his oath notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal filed with the Commission on Elections
concerning the decision rendered by respondent.
In addressing the first issue, respondent claimed that the examination conducted by the NBI, which
included the segregation, photocopying, and photographing of the contested ballots was in fact done in
the presence of the court and the representatives of the parties. Respondent also alleged that the NBI
gave one copy each of the reports only to the court since the request therefor did not emanate from the
parties. He further claimed that the reports were made available to the parties as early as August 25,
1997, but that neither party took the time to reproduce the same.
Concerning the second issue, respondent asserted that he acted in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provide that upon motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the
court may, in its discretion and upon good reasons, order the execution of a judgment or final order
even before the expiration of the period to appeal. Respondent further contended that Papa, the
rightful winner of the May 1995 elections, had been deprived of his right to sit as the duly elected mayor
of the Municipality of Taguig and that his constituents had been equally deprived of his services as their
duly elected municipal head.
In the letter-reply dated August 12, 1998, complainants informed this Court that the COMELEC had
promulgated an En Banc resolution in SPR No. 42-97 entitled, Isidro B. Garcia vs. Hon. Santiago G.
Estrella, Judge, RTC, Branch 68, Pasig City and Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., nullifying the September 2, 1997
order of respondent directing execution pending appeal of his July 21, 1997 decision and the
corresponding Writ of Execution, and ordering (a) Papa to cease and desist from performing or
continuing to perform the duties and functions of Mayor of the Municipality of Taguig pending the final
resolution of the appeal, and (b) to immediately relinquish the position of Mayor of Taguig in favor
Garcia.
Both complainants and respondent were required by the Court on April 12, 2000 to manifest whether
they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the record. Respondent did manifest
that he was so willing, while complainants, despite proper service of the notice, failed to respond. They
are, therefore, deemed to be likewise willing to submit the case for resolution without further pleadings
and arguments.
In the previous report and recommendation dated February 29, 2000 submitted by Court Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo, it was pertinently observed that respondent gravely abused his discretion in
deciding the case and in issuing the questioned order since grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction occurs when a board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions exercises its
judgment in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, or fails to consider the evidence
adduced by the parties. The Office of the Court Administrator echoed the COMELECs finding that
respondents action showed utter disregard of the appropriate procedure required of him, resulting in
the disenfranchisement of thousands of voters.
No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1).Indeed, in every case, a judge shall
endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and applicable laws unswayed by partisan interests, public
opinion, or fear of criticism (Rule 3.02, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct). Thus, this Court has
continually reminded members of the bench that:
The Judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must view himself as a priest for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest in the
performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy, the judge must render service with
impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence reposed in him. (Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297
SCRA 679 [1998])
In the case at bar, respondents demeanor during the entirety of the trial is clearly wanting. From the
outset, it must be noted that Garcia obtained a total of 41,900 votes as compared to Papas
36,539. However, respondent based his decision to proclaim Papa the winner of the 1995 elections on
the basis of the NBI reports which recommended the deduction of 12,734 votes from Garcia's total
votes of 41,900 (per revision report), and 3,809 votes from Papas total votes of 36, 539 (per revision
report). Deducting 12,734 votes from Garcias votes would give him a total of 29,166; while deducting
3,809 votes from Papas votes would result in him getting a total of 32,730 votes. This will wipe out
Garcias edge of 5,361 and give Papa a judge-made plurality of 3,564 votes.
A more careful perusal of the data contained in the NBI reports would have shown a different
outcome. Upon analyzing the NBI report, it should have been apparent to respondent that the actual
count of the listed Garcia-manufactured ballots (GMB) to be deducted is 12,388 votes. This would have
resulted in a total of 29,512 votes for Garcia as compared to 32,730 for Papa. It must also be noted that
there were 3,049 votes for Garcia which were not counted because these were considered stray votes,
there having been another candidate surnamed Garcia. This other candidate was, however, declared a
nuisance candidate. Upon adding these 3,049 alleged stray Garcia votes to Garcias 29,512, we get a total
of 32,561 votes for Garcia as compared to 32,730 for Papa. This would have given Papa only a margin of
169 votes. This close margin between the two candidates should have given respondent reason enough
to subject the NBI Reports to closer scrutiny. It should be noted that respondent had already transferred
the questioned ballot boxes to another RTC sala on June 5, 1997, 21 days before he received the reports
and recommendation of the NBI. This fact made it impossible for him to form a proper basis for his
decision, as clearly, there was no way for him to ascertain the veracity of the NBI Reports. Section 255 of
the Omnibus Election Code requires that, where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant,
or whenever in the opinion of the court the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the
book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be brought
before it and that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted.
In this case, respondent was remiss in examining the questioned ballots despite the wrong figures,
computations, and typographical errors and mistakes present in the NBI Reports. Notwithstanding these
errors, respondent based his decision solely on the conclusions and findings of the NBI.
Respondents obvious partiality for Papa is further bolstered by his acts during the promulgation of
judgment on August 27, 1997. The facts show that respondent did not set the NBI Reports for hearing,
nor was Garcia allowed to confront the NBI officials concerned. He did not even allow Garcia to get
copies of the reports until after the promulgation of the decision on August 27, 1997, and this, only after
the COMELEC had ordered respondent to do so on August 26, 1997. In fact, the only time Garcias
counsel was able to study the two reports of the NBI consisting of 53 and 17 pages, respectively, was
five minutes before the promulgation of judgment. Respondents justification that he alone should have
copies of the reports since these were court-sponsored and the request did not emanate from either of
the parties, is an explanation which this Court finds hard to accept.
Judge Estrellas obvious bias became even more apparent when he granted the motion for execution
pending appeal filed by Papa on the day of promulgation of judgment, August 27, 1997. What is
disturbing is that said motion was dated August 26, 1997, a day before the scheduled promulgation,
indicating that Papa had prior knowledge of a decision favorable to him.
On this score, we find pertinent our ruling in the recent case of Evelyn Agpalasin vs. Judge Ernesto M.
Agcaoili, (A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April 12, 2000), that:
A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid such
action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in determining his judicial course. He must not only render a just, correct and
impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness,
impartiality and integrity. A decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless
be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less
than impartial and honest.
We also find credence in the COMELEC resolution promulgated on January 5, 1998 which observed that
it was physically impossible for the NBI document examiners to have examined over 16,000 ballots and
to have come out with an accurate finding. Declared thus the COMELEC:
In the case at bench, the NBI necessarily examined xerox copies of 14,664 ballots from 713 precincts and
without the guidance of objections from revisors, the NBI document examiner, on his own initiative and
determination, sorted out as written by one person 12,274 ballots in six (6) groups. This was done in a
record time of less than two (2) months, from March 31, 1997 to May 19, 1997.
As we know, standard document examination procedure requires the examination of original

documents (ballots, in this case) not photocopies. Other than this, invalidating ballots not objected to by
the revisors in the revision report, as pointed out, is not sanctioned by the rules on revision and
appreciation of ballots.
To conduct this kind of examination, involving enormous number of ballots, is almost impossible to
accomplish. One would have to spread the 14,664 ballots from 713 precincts beside each other, in a
floor or table space bigger than the size of a basketball court, and by going over those thousands of
ballots, pick at random groups of ballots six groups in all and, by examining them, reach a conclusion
that the ballots in each of these groups were written by one person. Common sense dictates that this is
simply an impossible procedure. And we are not convinced that through this method, the NBI could
correctly and with scientific precision invalidate 12,724 ballots of the protestee.
Indubitably, the foregoing have raised the suspicion of partiality on the part of respondent. Verily, a
judge must promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. These stringent
standards are intended to assure parties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary that is capable
of dispensing impartial justice in every issue in every trial (Abundo vs. Manio, Jr., 312 SCRA 1 [1999]).
WHEREFORE, Judge Santiago G. Estrella is hereby found guilty of serious misconduct, partiality, and
inexcusable negligence, and is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with the stern warning that any similar misconduct on his part in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
39. Meralco vs. Pasay Transportations Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1932)
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.

Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay Transportation Co.
P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez. A. M. Zarate for respondent Raymundo Transportation Co.
Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.
MALCOLM, J.:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company,
requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon
which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric
Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation
companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above referred
to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an
electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a
point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section
11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or
corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein,
the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation
to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom
shall be final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it was ordered that the
petitioner be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and the transportation companies
affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings,
and opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators. On the submission of
memoranda after an oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution.
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is attempted to be
granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators and to the Supreme
Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court is
made final. And it is finally observed that the franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by the
Government of the Philippine Islands, although only a contract between the parties to it, is now made to
effect the rights of persons not signatories to the covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to
arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction
of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and
1821 of the Civil Code. Citation of authority is hardly necessary, except that it should be recalled that in
the Philippines, and in the United States for that matter, it has been held that a clause in a contract,
providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them
alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction (Wahl and
Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301; Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69;
Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U. S.,
161.)
We would not be understood as extending the principles governing arbitration and award too far.
Unless the arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the
parties, the courts should look with favor upon such amicable arrangements. We can also perceive a
distinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling
within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the parties to a
particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true that the
decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced would leave a public utility,
not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for a judicial
determination of the question in dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner's
Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a state legislature authorizing the
commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners
of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is not the
question before us. Here the question is not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of
legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act
in that capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of
arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall
within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the
right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the
courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would
then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the
Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if
the functions performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be
considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties
which the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The
present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as
a court asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which
is not a court at all.lawphil.net
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as
the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its
members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by
law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it
could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could
hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members
of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and
possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the
Supreme Court.lawph!l.net
In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to
exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the
government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise
any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . . The award of execution is a part, and an
essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the
legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be inoperative and
nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would
remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should
at some future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such
is not the judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the
whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And while it executes
firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully abstain from exercising any power
that is not strictly judicial in its character, and which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution. . . .
(Gordon vs. United States [1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697 Appendix.)
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act
No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government
constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the
petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to
proceed further in the matter.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial and Butte, JJ.,
concur.
40. Garcia vs. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 (1971)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 198-J May 31, 1971

PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant,
vs.
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his
former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ... gross
incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly)
Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed (allegedly) as follows:
2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, as such incumbent Judge, respondent
herein, has not submitted his monthly reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided
and/or resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three
months, together with the title, number, number of hours of court session held a day, etc., as evidenced
by the certificate issued by Hon. Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "A", Item No. 1, in violation of Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of Justice
dated February 6, 1952, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B";
3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July
to December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971 inclusive as evidenced by the certificate issued
by Judge Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex "A", Item No. 2 thereof;
4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo and knowing
fully well that he has never performed his official duties or discharged the duties appertaining to his
office, he has collected and was paid his salaries from July to December, 1970 and from January to
February 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of
Justice hereto attached as Annex "C" and the certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex "A", last paragraph thereof,
aggravated by his repeated failure to submit the certificate of service in flagrant violation of action 5 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which provides as follows:
... District judges, judges of City Courts, and municipal Judges shall certify on their application for leave,
and upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the payrolls upon which their
salaries are paid, that all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal
cases which have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or
more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate and ... no
salary shall be paid without such certificate' (Emphasis supplied).
5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports from July to December, 1970 and from
January, 1971 to February, 1971 stating therein the number of hours of session that the Court holds
daily, the accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a District Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo, Branch VI he has manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness to
perform or discharge official duties in the administration of justice.
7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the Honorable Secretary of Justice informing him
that he was entering upon the performance of his duties, which letter of his reads in full:
'I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon the performance of the duties of the office of
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City (Branch VI) today, June 29, 1970.'
That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate falsehood aggravates his moral bankruptcy
incompatible to the requirements of the highest degree of honesty, integrity and good moral character
appertaining to holding the position of Judge in the administration of justice.
Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer alleging pertinently that:
THE FACTS
Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City with
station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to
be organized from scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna, the
municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice, respondent decided to accept the offer of the
Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the court; to utilize
the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the purchase of the
necessary supplies and materials; and to rely on the national government for the equipment needed by
the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all these items must be furnished by
the provincial government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that
the province was not in a position to do so).
As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured the respondent that
the court could be accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon as the
office of the municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location. When the
projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office was about to be effected, the treasurer and several
municipal councilors objected. The municipal mayor then requested the respondent to look over some
of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment that the municipal government will
shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first choice was the second floor of the Republic
Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner of the building refused to reduce
the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by respondent was the second floor of the
Laguna Development Bank. After a month's negotiations, the municipality finally signed a lease
agreement with the owner on October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal
government could release the amount necessary for the improvements to convert the space that was
rented, which was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices for the personnel of the
court and for the assistant provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon respondent's representations, the
provincial government appropriated the amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies and
materials needed by the court. Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for the
necessary equipment with the Property Officer of the Department of Justice but, unfortunately, the
appropriation for the equipment of courts of first instance was released only on December 23, 1970 and
the procurement of the equipment chargeable against this allotment is still under way (please see
enclosed certification of the Financial Officer of the Department of Justice marked Annex "A").
"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court,
he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice,
respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all
the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary
of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without
being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
"Charges Have No Basis -- .
"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, grave
incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act.
"It is respectfully submitted that -- .
"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does
not constitute incompetence. Respondent was like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the
bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a sala',
but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because aside from the
time, effort and money he spent in organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of
Justice (please see enclosed certification of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S. Santos marked Annex
'B'). Indeed, even if respondent did no more than exert efforts to organize his court, he could, as other
judges have done, have collected his salaries as judge without being guilty of dishonesty.
"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position then carried a salary of
P19,000 per annum, he automatically ceased to be Chief of the Technical Staff of the Department of
Justice and Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, positions from which he was receiving P16,200
and P8,000 per annum, respectively. Also, in anticipation of the judicial duties which he was about to
assume, respondent took a leave of absence from his professorial lecturer's duties in the U.P. College of
Law where he was receiving approximately P600 a month.
"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the
Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicial duties.
"The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not actually started, to perform their
judicial duties to comply with the abovementioned statutory-provisions and circular (please see
enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked Annex 'C').
"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the folly of requiring a judge who has
not entered into the Performance of his judicial duties to comply with them. Taking Section 5, how could
a judge who has not started to discharge his judicial duties certify that 'all special proceedings,
applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases, which have been under submission for
decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or
before the date of making the certificate.' And bow could such a judge hold court in his place of
permanent station as required by Section 55; observe the hours of daily sessions of the court as
prescribed by Section 58; and render the reports required by Circular No. 10 when his court is not yet in
physical existence Clearly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10
cannot apply to such a judge." .
In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in their respective complaint and
answer and considering, in the light thereof, that the material facts are more or less undisputed, the
Court feels that this case can be disposed of without any further proceeding.
After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must be dismissed. To
begin with, We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations for the respondent complained
of. As We see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant has attempted to portray it. Complainant's
theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such,
since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet
performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties
of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position
as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition
that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for
any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the
Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way
possible which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as
in this case, the government officials or officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and
facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without
any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the
part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the
Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein for
sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not
improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries,
while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on, his part. As to whether or
not in doing so he, placed in jeopardy the independence of the judiciary and failed to act according to
the correct norm of conduct which a judge should observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments of
the government will be discussed a non. At this juncture, the only point We settle is that complainant's
theory of dishonesty cannot hold water.
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments and
status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well as the
corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet started
performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him for all of them
contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. On
the other hand, respondent Could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid
confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made himself available for the purpose
for which he was appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was
appointed was not of his making. The other officials in charge of providing him therewith seem to have
been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to have it read. Conceivably, under the law,
with the permission of this Court, respondent could have been assigned to another court pending all
these preparations, but that is something within the initiative control of the Secretary of Justice and nor
of the respondent.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long
standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if
it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or
officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously
observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the
people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions
in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence
of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts a check
and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the
serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave
importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge or
even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters
submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still,
reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this
Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this
practice is discontinued.
WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be
furnished the Secretary of Justice.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro and Teekankee, JJ., took no part.
Fernando, J., concurs fully and in addition submits a brief separate opinion. Makasiar, J., concurs with
the opinion Mr. Justice Fernando.
FERNANDO, J., concurring: .
I join the rest of my brethren in yielding concurrence to the ably-written opinion of Justice Barredo.
Respondent Judge clearly should be exculpated of the charge filed against him. What is more the
opinion of the Court possesses the merit of setting forth in forthright and unequivocal language the
disapproval of the practice hitherto followed of having members of the judiciary perform non-judicial
functions. There is no doubt to my mind of its repugnancy to the fundamental concept of separation of
power. It is to that aspect of the question as well as what, to my mind, is the doubtful constitutionality
of allowing the Secretary of Justice to exercise supervisory authority over lower court judges that this
brief concurring opinion addresses itself.
1. The doctrine of separation of powers, a basic concept under our Constitution, 1 embodies the
principle of a tripartite division of governmental authority entrusted to Congress, the President, and the
Supreme Court as well as such inferior courts as may be created by law. Three departments of
government are thus provided for, the legislative vested with the lawmaking function, the executive
with the enforcement of what has been thus enacted, and the judiciary with the administration of
justice, deciding cases according to law. 2 The reason for such a doctrine is to assure liberty, no one
branch being enabled to arrogate unto itself the whole power to govern and thus in a position to impose
its unfettered will. If it were so, the rights of the individual could with impunity be disregarded; he could
be placed at its mercy. The three departments are coordinate and co-equal, each having exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and supreme in its own sphere. That is to guarantee
independence, no interference being allowed on matters left to the exclusive concern of each. Much
less is control by only one of the three departments of any or both of the others permissible. 3 .
It is to be admitted that the realities of government preclude the independence of each of the
departments from the other being absolute. This is so especially as between the legislative and
executive departments. What the former enacts, the latter implements. To paraphrase Roosevelt, the
letter of the Constitution requires a separation, but the impulse of a common purpose compels
cooperation. It could be carried to the extent of such powers being blended, without undue danger to
liberty as proved by countries having the parliamentary forms of government. This is especially so in
England and in Switzerland, where the tradition of freedom possesses strength and durability. It does
not admit of doubt, however, that of the three branches, the judiciary is entrusted with a function the
most sensitive and delicate. It passes upon controversies and disputes not only between citizens but
between citizens and government, the limits of whose authority must be respected. In a system like
ours, every exercise of governmental competence, whether coming from the President or from the
lowest official, may be challenged in court in an appropriate legal proceeding. This is an aspect of the
theory of cheeks and balance likewise provided for in the Constitution. 4 It is thus indispensable that
judicial independence should, by all means, be made secure. Not only that. The feeling that judges are
not in any way subject to the influence of the executive and legislative branches must be pervasive;
otherwise, there would be loss of confidence in the administration of justice. With that gone, the rule of
law is placed in dire peril.
Nor is the force, to my mind, of the preceeding observation blunted by the recognition that there could
be no precise delineation of the respective competence alloted the legislative, the executive and the
judicial departments under the Constitution. Necessarily, overlapping and interlacing of functions could
not entirely be avoided. For as observed by Justice Holmes in his famous dissent in a case of Philippine
origin, "The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.
Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one
extreme to the other... When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they
must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on." 6 Further on, he added: "It
does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not
and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires." 7 .
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor,
the practical demands of government precluding its doctrine application, it cannot justify a member of
the judiciary being requited to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is
implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his
actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is
indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be
confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of
respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
It is opposite to quote from an opinion of Justice Cardozo, as Chief Judge of "the New York Court of
Appeals," when that Court nullified a section of a New York statute that would vest in a justice of its
Supreme Court the power to investigate at the instance of its governor. His opinion explained why: "He
is made the delegate Of the Governor in aid of an executive act, the removal of a public officer... At the
word of command he is give over the work of judging, and set himself to other work, the work of
probing and advising. His findings when made will have none of the authority of a judgment. To borrow
Bacon's phrase, they will not 'give the rule or sentence.' They will not be preliminary or ancillary to any
rule or sentence to be pronounced by the judiciary in any of its branches. They will be mere advice to
the Governor, who may adopt them, or modify them, or reject them altogether. From the beginnings of
our history, the Principle has been enforced that there is no inherent power in Executive or Legislature
to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties... The exigencies of government have made it necessary to relax as merely
doctrinaire adherence to a principle so flexible and practical, so largely a matter of sensible
approximation, as that of the separation of powers. Elasticity has not meant that what is of the essence
of the judicial function may be destroyed by turning the power to decide into a pallid opportunity to
consult and recommend ..." 9.
Our holding today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee," 10 a 1968 decision, Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, who penned the opinion, first referred to the above Richardson decision as well as to Federal
Radio Commission v. General Electric Co.",. It went on to state: "In this spirit, it has been held that the
Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes
between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil.
600)." 12 It is clear from the above Noblejas decision that even prior to the motion there was a
commitment to the principle that a member of the judiciary cannot be asked non-judicial functions. For
in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 13 mentioned therein, Justice Malcolm , speaking for
this Court, was quite explicit. Thus Supreme Court and its members cannot be required to exercise any
power any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions." 14 .
3. Nonetheless, as now decided, respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any wise
accountable. No taint of bad faith can be attached to his conduct. What he was required to do was in
accordance with the practice herefore followed by the Department of Justice. He is, under the statute in
force, under the administrative supervision of its head. Nor can the good faith of Secretary of Justice
Abad Santos be impugned. What was done by him was likewise in accordance with what previous
secretaries of justice were accustomed to do. The root of the evil then is the statutory authority of the
Department of Justice over Court of first instance and other inferior courts.15 While a distinction could
be made between the performance of judicial functions which in no way could be interfered with by the
Department and the task of administration which is executive in character, still the conferment of such
competence to a department head, an alter ego of the President, is, to my mind, only unwise but of
doubtful constitutionality. For in issuing administrative rules and regulations over matters deemed non-
judicial, they may trench upon the discretion of judges which should be exercised according to their
conscience alone. What is more, the influence that the Secretary has over them, is magnified. It is
already unavoidable under our scheme of government that they court his goodwill; their promotion may
at times depend on it. With this grant of authority, the assertion of independence becomes even more
difficult. It is thus objectionable in principle and pernicious in operation. That certainly is not the way to
reduce to the minimum any participation of the executive in judicial affairs arising from the power to
appoint. As it is, even when the government as the adverse party in criminal cases, tax suits, and other
litigations is in the right, a favorable decision from the lower courts could be looked upon with suspicion.
The judiciary must not only be independent; it must appear to be so.
The presence in the statute books of such power of administrative oversight then, is, to my mind,
anomalous. More specifically, were it not for such power granted the department head, respondent
Judge in this case could not have been called upon to assist the Secretary of Justice. Considering that the
Constitutional Convention is about to meet, it is to be hoped that it be made clear that the judiciary is to
be totally freed from any supervisory authority of an executive department.
1 Cf. "The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government." Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936) per Laurel, J.
2 Law covers not only statutes but likewise, treaties, executive orders to implement statutes, and
ordinances, municipal corporations being delegated with the competence of legislating over local affairs.
3 Cf. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Social Security Commission, L-26175, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 178.
4 As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the previously cited Angara decision, the President may approve or
disapprove legislation, his veto however being subject to be overriden; he may convene the legislative
body in special sessions. Congress may confirm or reject Presidential appointments; it may apportion
the jurisdiction of the courts and determine what funds to appropriate for their support; it may impeach
certain officials; and lastly as far as the judiciary is concerned, it has the power of judicial review
enabling it to annul executive or legislative acts.
5 Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 US 189 (1928).
6 Ibid., pp. 209-210..
7 Ibid., p. 211.
8 In re Richardson, 160 NE 655 (1928).
9 Cf. Hayburns Case, 2 Dall 409 (1792); United States v. Ferreira 13 How. 40 (1851); Gordon v. United
States, 117 US 697 (1865); Matter of Sanborn 148 US 222b (1893); Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Brimson, 154 US 447 (1894); Muskrat v. United states, 219 US 346 (1911); Tutun v. United States, 270 US
738 (1926); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis 273 US 70 (1927).
10 L-28790, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 405.
11 281 US 469 (1930).
12 Noblejas v. Teehankee, L-28790, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 405, 409-410.
13 57 Phil. 600 (1932).
14 Ibid., p. 605.
15 Section 83, Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, reads as follows: Bureaus and offices under
the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Office of
the Solicitor General, the Courts of First Instance and the Inferior Courts, the Public Service Commission,
the Bureau of Prisons, the General Land Registration Office, the Court of Industrial Relations, the
National Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the
Deportation Board and the Code Commission. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel shall be
merged with the Office of the Solicitor General..."
41. Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively,
of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer
of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in
and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to
representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from
salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief
Justice's directive as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. — The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous
and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the
deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from
the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has deemed
it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter,
the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of
exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality
among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the
deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F.
Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members
of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as
approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by
the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or
employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has
authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of
the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby
makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David,
infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax
and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The
Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income
tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges
does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their
continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such compensation
as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis
supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of
inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office.
... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically
stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers,
shall be exempt from payment of income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973
Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original
concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such
contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges
of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise, the Chief
Justice shall receive an annual salary of _____________ and each Associate Justice ______________
pesos. 5(Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented their
objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this not violate
the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of the law? After all, tax
is levied not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when the judge receives a salary and
it is comingled with the other income, we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we have to give special
privileges to the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or decrease of their
salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary and affecting the
independence of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the special privilege
on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal
protection clause. 6
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto Concepcion,
for whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial system as a
whole with the whole armor of defense against the executive and legislative invasion of their
independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside, especially the humble government
employees, might say that in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the fortress of
privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number
of powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other
employees of the government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which is, of course,
denied to the entire executive department and the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A.
Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor
subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches in
the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the original
draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges
is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries." Commissioner
Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in
support of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a modification of the amendment,"
as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is not enough
to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman will
do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs. David [should be
Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which excludes them from income tax, but rather I would
propose that the statement will read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this position, I would say that
the argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax because
they already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet members and all other
employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many people who have accepted employment
in the government involving a reduction of income and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are
not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting service in government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico F.
de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas
announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent, Commissioner Rigos,
that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution
similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers,
shall be exempt from payment of income tax.
So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to
tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries
of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions. But at any rate,
when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs.
Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without
objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will be a provision
under the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that the
salaries of officials of the government including constitutional officers shall not be exempt from income
tax? The amendment proposed herein and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During
their continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to
income tax" is deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.11it may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.12 1avvphi1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again
reproduced hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
(Emphasis supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of
Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of
enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a
strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion
in the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income
tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs.
Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs. David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental
law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and
import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the
cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1
Section 9,Articie VIII.
2
Section 10, Article X.
3
Section 6, Article XV, General Provisions.
4
Section 10, Article VIII.
5
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 433.
6
Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 460.
7
Ibid., at page 467,
8
85 Phil. 552 (1950).
9
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 506.
10
Gold Creek Mining Co. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).
11
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
12
Tanada, Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 21.
13
85 Phil. 552 (1950).
14
93 Phil. 696 (1953).
42. In RE Gonzales, A.M. Nos. 88-4-5433 (April 15, 1988)
EN BANC
[A.M. Nos. 88-4-5433. April 15, 1988.]
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMENT FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988

REQUESTING HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-
COMPLAINT.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; IMPEACHMENT; PUBLIC OFFICERS REQUIRED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE

PHILIPPINE BAR CAN BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE BY IMPEACHMENT. — A public officer who under the
Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him
and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during
the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it
the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from
office.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE APPLIES TO MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT. — A Member of the Supreme
Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2
and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus
terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by
disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial
independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is
important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to
all manner of charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or
by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by
the Court.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
"Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint,
dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court," together
with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice
Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important
implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by "Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for
disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr.
Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel
Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed
on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the opinion of
Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless,
encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition
Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan’s intervention.
The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez a copy of the per curiam
Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel
Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges
made by complainant Cuenco against Mr. Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolution,
the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively
dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr.
Cuenco, the Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988 within which to file his Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court of 17 February 1988. On 28 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco
filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case No.
3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading as a Motion
for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr.
Cuenco’s Motion for Reconsideration.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
It is important to underscore the rule of constitutional law here involved. This principle may be
succinctly formulated in the following terms: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to
be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed
from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such
public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before
the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from
office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135 in
the following terms:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and
may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s incumbency, would in effect be to
circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of
the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies
(Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections
(Article XI [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id. and the members of the Commission on Audit who
are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally required
to be members of the Philippine Bar." (Italics supplied)
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,
1 the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over ‘public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations.’ There are
exceptions, however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by
impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Sec. 2. The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption.’
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers
by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment
to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from
office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution, states that
‘judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold
any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The
above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from
the explicit character of the above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of
position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally
manifest that the party thus convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in
accordance with law. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of
the impeachment process (The Constitution of the Philippines, pp. 465-466).’ The clear implication is,
the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction
and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action ‘in accordance with law’ may not
prosper." 2
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are
substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Sec. 3 . . .
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its Members or the other
constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal
acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehaviour. What the
Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such
liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from
office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he
may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any
wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers.
The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule,
Members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought
against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of
reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio
dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate
grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Resolution upon Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez
and Mr. Miguel Cuenco.chanrobles law library : red
Teehankee, (C.J.), Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernan, J., no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., was absent.
43. Tirol vs. COA, G.R. No. 133954 (August 3, 2000)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133954. August 3, 2000]
VICTORIANO B. TIROL, JR. petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Region VIII, represented by its
DIRECTOR, Leyte Government Center, Candahug, Palo, Leyte, respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, in relation to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner seeks the
reversal of the Resolution[1] of 20 March 1997 and the Order[2] of 5 March 1998 of the Office of the
Ombudsman which, respectively, found petitioner and his co-respondents in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836
criminally culpable for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019,[3] as amended, and denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution.
Petitioner is the incumbent Regional Director of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS), Region V. Prior to such assignment he was the DECS Regional Director of Region VIII. In the latter
capacity, he and some officials of the Lalawigan National High School, Lalawigan, Borongan, Eastern
Samar, were charged with the violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for
entering into a contract alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. The
charge originated from a complaint filed by the schools Teachers and Employees Union alleging
overpricing of various school equipment for the Lalawigan National High School. Specifically, petitioners
participation consisted in approving the Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV) and the check in connection
with the transaction.
On the strength of the complaint, Region VIII of respondent Commission on Audit (COA) audited the
operations and accounts of the Lalawigan National High School. The audit covered the period from 1
January 1990 to 30 April 1993.
Per the audit report,[4] COA found that there was malversation of public funds. It cited the purchase of
certain supplies and equipment which was done through a negotiated contract and not through a
competitive public bidding, contrary to COA Circular No. 85-55A. The circular requires public bidding in
the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment in excess of P50,000, unless the law or agency
charter provides otherwise. In the questioned purchase the agency failed to ascertain the
reasonableness of the contract prices, resulting in an overprice of P35,100 in comparison with COAs
actual canvass of prices, thus:
Per Voucher Per Canvass
Quantity Description Unit Price Total Unit Price Total Price Variance
Amount Amount
2 Singer Sewing
P7,850 P15,700 P4,450 P8,900 P6,800
machine
4 16" Hitachi /
3,800 15,200 1,200 4,800 10,400
Union Coiling Fan
3 Molodione 3,675 11,025 1,850 5,550 5,475
2 Xylophone 1,750 3,500 560 1,120 2,380
2 Makita Electric
Planer Model No.
8,837.50 17,675 8,500 17,200 475
19008 3 in. 82
mm
1 Makita Electric
Circular Saw
16,900 16,900 7,330 7,330 9,570
Model No. 5601
N 160 mm
TOTAL P80,000 P44,900 P35,100

In its letter[5] to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, the COA recommended the filing of both
criminal and administrative cases against the persons liable therefor, including petitioner for his
approval of the RIV for the assailed purchase and signing of the check in payment therefor. This
complaint was docketed as OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836.
In his counter-affidavit,[6] petitioner alleged that the aforesaid documents were previously reviewed by
his subordinates. He approved them only upon the certification and representation of the said
subordinates that everything was in order. Accordingly, his approval was purely a ministerial act.
In her Resolution of 20 March 1997,[7]Virginia Palanca Santiago, Graft Investigation Officer III of the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, rejected petitioners defense because had he carefully scrutinized the
documents he would have discovered that the purchases were made without competitive public bidding
and the magnitude of the amount involved would prevent a reasonable mind from accepting the claim
that petitioner was merely careless or negligent in the performance of his functions.
Santiago gave credence to COAs detailed report which clearly showed an overpriced value of the
supplies and materials purchased, to the great disadvantage of the government. Had the proper bidding
procedure been observed, no such damage would have occurred. Moreover, petitioners co-respondents
did not dispute the charge of overpricing. Their main defense was that the purchase was emergency in
nature. The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, however, ruled that emergency purchases could only
refer to those which were urgent such that failure to make them would endanger the lives of the
students. It held that the doubtful purchase did not qualify as an emergency purchase.
Accordingly, Santiago recommended that petitioner and his co-respondents be indicted for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, for entering into a contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the Government.
The Resolution was recommended for approval by Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Arturo C.
Mojica. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the Resolution on 21 June 1997.
In an Information[8] filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as SB Criminal Case No.
23785,[9] petitioner and two other co-respondents were charged with the aforementioned offense
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of October, 1992, at Tacloban City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, all public officers, having been appointed and qualified
as such public positions above-mentioned, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to
office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate
intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a transaction or contract for
and in behalf of Lalawigan National High School, Lalawigan, Borongan, Eastern Samar, for the purchase
of the following:
2 pcs. Singer Sewing Machine P 15,700.00
4 pcs. 16" Hitachi Union Ceiling Fan 15,200.00

3 pcs. Meodione 11,025.00
2 pcs. Xylophone 3,500.00
2 pcs. Makita Elect. Planor Model No. 19008 3 17,675.00

in. 82 mm
1 pc. Makita Elect. Circular Saw Model No. 5601 16,900.00

N 160 mm
TOTAL P 80,000.00
in the total amount of P80,000.00, Philippine Currency, with Fairchild Marketing and Construction,
based at Tacloban City, without following the procedures of competitive public bidding as required by
law, which transaction was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, particularly the
Lalawigan National High School, as the value of above-mentioned items were overpriced in the total
amount of P35,100.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government.[10]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas. He insisted that his act of approving the RIV arose from the need of the requesting school, and
matters pertaining to the price and mode of purchase were not yet considered at that stage. It was only
after the approval of the RIV that these matters were deliberated upon, not by him, but by the officials
of the requesting school. As to the check, he asserted that the supporting documents had been acted
upon and approved by his subordinates and the concerned school officials, and since there was no
indication of any patent irregularity, he signed the check. Finally, petitioner assailed the finding of
conspiracy since there was no direct proof therefor other than a mere allegation imputing the same.
In the Order of 5 March 1998,[12] the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended that petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration be dismissed for lack of merit. The Ombudsman approved the
recommendation on 22 May 1998.
Petitioner then filed the instant petition. In the meantime, the proceeding before the Sandiganbayan
continued. Upon arraignment on 24 August 1998, petitioners co-accused pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. On 2 September 1998, petitioner filed a motion to reset the scheduled hearing on 17
and 18 September citing the pendency of the instant petition. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
motion as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, he filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying his motions. That action, entitled Tirol v. Sandiganbayan and docketed as G.R. No.
135913, was decided on 4 November 1999 adversely against petitioner.
In the instant petition, petitioner seeks the reversal of the assailed Resolution and Order of the Office of
the Ombudsman, which, according to him, erred in concluding that he was culpably liable for alleged
overpricing of the questioned purchase of supplies and materials. He argues that the acts directly
resulting in the overprice were committed by the following officials: (1) co-respondent Conchita C.
Devora, Principal 1, who approved the transaction, countersigned the checks and requisitioned the
items; (2) co-respondent Maria A. Alvero, Bookkeeper, who affixed her signature in the voucher; and (3)
Salome G. Germana, Designated Storekeeper, who signed Box No. 4 of the voucher. His participation
was limited to signing the RIV and the check as a matter of routine. Moreover, the RIV did not involve
the determination of the price of the supplies and materials to be purchased, and his signing the check
was done in compliance with the DECS policy which limited the signing authority of the principal,
Conchita C. Devora, to checks not exceeding P50,000. In such case the signing authority was vested in
him as the DECS Regional Director.
In maintaining his innocence, petitioner asserts that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
public functions by public officers should apply in his favor. He had no ground to doubt the preparation,
processing and verification of his subordinates prior to his act of approving the RIV and signing the
check. His position required the signing of voluminous documents and it would be unreasonably
cumbersome if he were to scrutinize every document that required his signature.
In support of his arguments, petitioner cites the cases of Arias v. Sandiganbayan[13] and Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan,[14] where this Court held that heads of office may rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter into
negotiations. He likewise disputes the allegation of conspiracy for the acts imputed against him were
functions discharged in the performance of his official duty. He did not overstep or exceed said
functions. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an
offense.
In the Comment for the public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that conspiracy
need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be established by circumstantial evidence. It avers that
what prevails in the instant case is a conspiracy of silence and inaction. Petitioner should have been
vigilant in protecting the interest of the government. The magnitude of the amount involved should
have cautioned him to verify the truthfulness of the documents presented for his signature. Petitioner
ignored this telling warning and in so doing he was guilty of negligence. His reliance on his subordinates
is no excuse, otherwise his position would be a mere rubber stamp for the said subordinates.
As a final argument, the Office of the Solicitor General asseverates that it is beyond the ambit of this
Courts authority to review the power of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed
before it. The Ombudsman is constitutionally mandated to investigate and prosecute matters falling
within his jurisdiction.
In his Reply petitioner states that the nature of the petition does not involve a review of the factual
finding of the Office of the Ombudsman but rather its conclusion based on undisputed facts. The issue is
a question of law and may, therefore, be reviewed by this Court.
A meticulous review and re-evaluation of the pleadings in this case, as well as G.R. No. 135913 leads this
Court to a conclusion unfavorable to petitioner.
Petitioner is indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, which provides:
Section 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(g) Entering into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
There is no dispute that the Office of the Ombudsman included him as a respondent because of his
participation in signing the RIV and issuing a check pertaining to the questioned purchase. Whether, on
the one hand, the said acts were done in good faith as to exonerate him from any liability, and on the
other, whether there was conspiracy among petitioner and his co-respondents, involve questions of
fact. These are matters of evidence to be weighed and appreciated by the Sandiganbayan, which has
original exclusive jurisdiction over the case.[15]
Only questions of law may be appealed to us by way of certiorari. This Court is not ordinarily a trier of
facts, its jurisdiction being limited to errors of law. There is a question of law in any given case when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact arises when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.[16]
From the pleadings it is clear to this Court that, contrary to the representations of petitioner, what he
wants us to do is review the evidence and determine whether in fact he acted in good faith and that no
conspiracy existed among the accused.
The rulings in Arias v. Sandiganbayan[17] and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan[18] are inapplicable to petitioner.
It must be emphasized that the petitioners therein were indicted and submitted themselves to trial
before the Sandiganbayan, which convicted them of the offenses charged. In short the Sandiganbayan
had, in due course, received the evidence of the parties and weighed its probative value. Unsatisfied
with the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners therein appealed to
this Court.
In Arias this Court set aside the judgment against the petitioner because there was no evidence that the
Government suffered undue injury. As stated by the Solicitor General which recommended Arias
acquittal, (a) the "P80.00 per square meter acquisition cost is just, fair and reasonable," and (b) "the
prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and convincing evidence of conspiracy between the
petitioners and their co-accused."
In Magsuci, the reversal by this Court of the judgment of conviction was based on a finding that Magsuci
acted in good faith and that "there has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any
irregularity committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Acla."
In both Arias and Magsuci, there was paucity of evidence on conspiracy.
In this case, there is only the claim of petitioner that he had acted in good faith and that there was no
conspiracy. The Ombudsman believes otherwise. It is settled that this Court ordinarily does not interfere
with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file
the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.[19] This rule is based not only upon respect
for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by immeasurable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in as much the same way
that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information
in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[20]
Petitioner has not convinced this Court that his case falls within any of the exemptions, enumerated
in Brocka v. Enrile,[21] to the rule that criminal prosecution may not be restrained either through a
preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition.
There is yet another basic reason for dismissing the instant petition. This is an appeal under Section 27
of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 in relation to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. We have
declared Section 27 to be unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto[22] for increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent.
Moreover, even if said provision had not been declared unconstitutional, it still does not grant a right of
appeal to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases[23]as in fact said
Section mentions only appeals from "all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman."
Even if we were to brush aside technicality which action we would ordinarily reserve for cases having
transcendental importance to the public[24] and considered the instant petition one for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it would still suffer from a failure to denominate the proper party. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 has for its object the review of an action of a tribunal, board or
officer exercising quasi-judicial functions made without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant petition, the tribunal
whose action is sought to be reviewed is the Office of the Ombudsman yet, petitioner impleaded the
Commission on Audit as respondent, and not the Office of the Ombudsman.
Additionally, the totality of petitioners and his counsels acts, including that in the other case he filed
with us in G.R. No. 135913,[25] manifests a scheme to frustrate the ends of justice by using court
procedures to delay the resolution of a pending case. It is with much regret that we must reiterate to
petitioners counsel our command laid down some thirty years ago that a lawyer, as an officer of the
court, should never induce a court to act contrary to the dictates of justice and equity nor should he
befuddle the issues. These and similar maneuvers are not only unethical, they also almost always betray
the weakness of the clients cause.[26]
The actions filed by petitioner before this Court, specifically G.R. No. 135913 and the instant petition,
were in fact a modified form of forum shopping. Perhaps realizing that this instant petition could be
dismissed in light of Fabian, which was promulgated on 16 September 1998, petitioner instituted GR.
No. 135913 on 3 November 1998. The two petitions could have created havoc to the judicial system had
petitioner succeeded with his ploy. Petitioners counsel is hereby warned that a repetition of his dilatory
tactics or some other similar scheme to thwart justice will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby DENIED and the Resolution of 20 March
1997 and Order of 5 March 1998 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836 are
AFFIRMED.
Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on official leave.
[1]
Rollo, 52-59.
[2]
Id., 67-69.
[3]
Also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[4]
Rollo, 29-49.
[5]
Rollo, 27.
[6]
Id., 50-51.
[7]
Supra note 1.
[8]
Rollo, 60-61.
[9]
Entitled, People of the Philippines v. Victoriano B. Tirol, Jr., Director III of the Department of Culture,
Education and Sports, Region VIII now designated at DECS, Region V, Legaspi City), Conchita C. Devora,
Secondary School Principal I, Maria A. Alvero, Bookkeeper, all of Lalawigan National High School,
Lalawigan, Borongan, Eastern Samar.
[10]
Rollo, 60-61.
[11]
Id., 63-66.
[12]
Supra note 2.
[13]
180 SCRA 309 (1989)
[14]
240 SCRA 13 (1995)
[15]
Presidential Decree No. 1861, Section 4; Republic v. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211, 228 (1994); Subido, Jr.
v. Sandiganbayan, 266 SCRA 379, 387, 388 (1997)
[16]
Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P. I., 19 SCRA 289, 292 (1987); Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 83, 91 (1998); Dela Torre v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., 298
SCRA 363, 373 (1998)
[17]
Supra note 13.
[18]
Supra note 14.
[19]
Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman, 225 SCRA 725, 730 (1993); Cruz, Jr. v. People, 233 SCRA 439, 459 (1994);
Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 252 SCRA 641, 659-660 (1996); Alba v. Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 753, 765
(1996)
[20]
Ocampo v. Ombudsman, supra note 19.
[21]
192 SCRA 183, 188-189 (1990). See also Venus v. Desierto, 298 SCRA 196, 214-215 (1998)
[22]
295 SCRA 470 (1998)
[23]
Tirol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135913, 4 November 1999.
[24]
See for example Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106, 134-135 (1997)
[25]
Supra note 23.
[26]
Lim Tanhu v. Remolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975); Ledesma Overseas Shipping Corp. v. Avelino, 82 SCRA
396 (1978); Ruben Agpalo, Legal Ethics (Fourth ed., 1989), 124-125.
44. People vs. Ramos, 88 SCRA 466 (1979)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142577. December 27, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUPERTO RAMOS y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision dated November 19, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21 in Criminal Case No. 659-M-98 finding accused-appellant Ruperto Ramos y
dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and likewise imposing upon him the
supreme penalty of death. Accused-appellant was ordered to pay private complainant the amount of
P75,000.00 as moral damages.
Upon the complaint of the victim, Jocelyn Ramos, an Information charging accused-appellant of rape
was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information states:
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, on complaint of the offended party, accuses Ruperto
Ramos y dela Cruz of the crime of Rape, penalized under the provisions of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of December, 1997, in the municipality of Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Ruperto Ramos y dela
Cruz, being an uncle of complainant Jocelyn Ramos, a 16 year old mentally retarded minor, and knowing
of her mental condition, did then and there wilfilly, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of threats or
intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of said complainant against her will and
without her consent.
Contrary to law.[1]
During the arraignment, accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
At the trial, the prosecution adduced evidence that the spouses Efren Ramos and Fortunata Ramos have
two children, namely, Jocelyn, then fifteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime, and
Mary Grace, who was then six years old. Fortunata and her children resided in a compound in Partida
Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Accused-appellant, the older brother of Efren, resided in the same
compound. His house was about twenty meters away from the house of Efren and Fortunata. Efren
worked abroad. He had been away from home for several years already.
On December 14, 1997, at around noontime, Jocelyn was outside the house playing with her younger
sister Mary Grace and their seven-year old neighbor Joel Santiago. While the children were busy playing,
accused-appellant, then wearing an undershirt and shorts, waved his hand to Jocelyn and motioned for
her to come to his house. Jocelyn dutifully approached accused-appellant and entered his house
through the kitchen. Once Jocelyn was inside the house, accused-appellant locked the door to the
kitchen. He then led her to his bedroom. Once they were inside, accused-appellant locked the bedroom
door. He undressed Jocelyn and made her lie down on the bed. Accused-appellant placed himself on top
of her. He spread her legs apart while he mashed her breast and sucked her nipples. Thereafter,
accused-appellant inserted his penis into her sexual organ. Jocelyn felt pain as he made the pumping
motion while inserting his private part into hers. Jocelyn could not do anything but cry. Accused-
appellant threatened her by gnashing his teeth and ordered her not to tell anyone else. According to
Jocelyn, that was not the first that accused-appellant had sexually abused her.
Unknown to accused-appellant, Mary Grace and Joel saw Jocelyn enter the house of accused-appellant
that day. They went to the window of the house of accused-appellant and propped themselves up
alternately on each others shoulder to be able to peep through the window. Joel saw Jocelyn lying on
the bed totally naked, with accused-appellant on top of her. Joel saw accused-appellant inserting his
penis into her vagina. Mary Grace in turn saw accused-appellant fondle the breasts of Jocelyn while she
was lying down and thereafter insert his hand into Jocelyns underwear.
At about 4:00 p.m. that day, Mary Grace told her mother Fortunata about what transpired between
accused-appellant and Jocelyn. When Fortunata confronted Jocelyn about it, the latter confirmed what
Mary Grace had told their mother. Since her husband was abroad, Fortunata went to Rafael Ramos, the
older brother of Efren and accused-appellant, for guidance. Rafael advised her to file a criminal
complaint against accused-appellant for his dastardly acts.
Following her brother-in-laws advice, Fortunata, on behalf of Jocelyn, filed a criminal complaint against
accused-appellant for rape with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan on December 15,
1997. The complaint was signed by Fortunata. Jocelyn affixed her thumbmark thereto.[2] Jocelyn was 16
years old at the time. In her sworn statement, Fortunata claimed that accused-appellant raped
Jocelyn.[3]
Dr. Manuel Aves, medico-legal of the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory, conducted a genital
examination of Jocelyn on December 17, 1997.He found multiple healed lacerations at 9 and 11 oclock
positions on Jocelyns hymen. He opined that the lacerations could have been caused by sexual
intercourse. Dr. Aves likewise declared that Jocelyn was suffering from moderate mental retardation,
and placed her mental capacity equivalent to that of a six- or seven-year old child.[4]
After a series of psychiatric examinations conducted on her by Dr. Bernadette Arcena of the National
Center for Mental Health, the latter confirmed that Jocelyn was indeed a mental retardate whose
mental age was equivalent to that of a six-year old child.[5]
For his part, accused-appellant denied having any carnal knowledge of Jocelyn. He admitted that Jocelyn
is his niece, being the daughter of Efren, his younger brother. Accused-appellant claimed that he was in
his house on December 14, 1997 with his brother-in-law Victor Gamboa, his niece Mildred Ramos who
was the wife of his nephew Roland Ramos, his five-year old son Ryan, and Rolands and Mildreds
daughter, Ranyamae Ramos. Accused-appellant asserted that Jocelyn never went to his house on
December 14, 1997.
Mildred Ramos corroborated accused-appellants claim and testified that both of them were in their
house the whole day on December 14, 1997, and that she did not see Jocelyn inside the house or enter
accused-appellants bedroom on that day.
Victor Gamboa testified that his sister and accused-appellant were married. The couple had a son
named Ryan. They resided in Dagupan City until accused-appellants wife died in 1996. By then, Ryan was
already four years old. After his wifes death, accused-appellant left Dagupan City and resided in the
house of Roland Ramos and Mildred Ramos, leaving Ryan Ramos in the custody of Victor Gamboa. On
December 13, 1997, at about 3:00 p.m., Victor Gamboa and Ryan arrived in Sta. Maria, Bulacan to visit
accused-appellant. Victor Gamboa and Ryan stayed in the house of Roland Ramos and Mildred Ramos
the whole day on December 14, 1997. He and Ryan left at about 6:00 p.m. and returned to Dagupan
City. He never saw Jocelyn in said house the whole day on December 14, 1997.
Accused-appellant further testified that Fortunata was just envious of him because his (accused-
appellants) inheritance was still intact while that of Fortunatas family had already been depleted. He
further claimed that Fortunata bore a grudge against him because she borrowed P500.00 or P300.00
from him but he refused to lend her any amount; and that he caused the removal of the illegal
electricity connection in Fortunatas house.Accused-appellant claimed that while he was in prison,
Fortunatas driver Domingo came to him and demanded the payment of half a million pesos as
settlement of the case but accused-appellant refused to pay as he did not have such amount of
money. Accused-appellant also asserted that Jocelyn was always out of the house with her barkadas,
implying that she could have been sexually abused while with them.
The trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his niece
Jocelyn and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the trial
courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds and so holds accused RUPERTO RAMOS to be GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 8353 with the attendant aggravating circumstances that the victim is under eighteen
years of age and the offender is a x x x relative by consanguinity or affinity within the the (sic) third civil
degree. x x x.
Relative thereto, this Court cannot find a way to differ from the High Courts impression that of all the
so-called heinous crimes, none perhaps more clearly provokes feelings of outrage, detestation and
disgust than incestuous rape. (People vs. Baculi, 246 SCRA 756) Accordingly, absent any circumstances
that would mitigate the commission thereof, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH by lethal injection.
In line with established jurisprudence, the said accused is also ordered to indemnify the offended party
Jocelyn Ramos, in the sum of P75,000.00 for moral damages.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In his appeal brief, accused-appellant assails the decision of the trial court, alleging that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND IN TOTALLYIGNORING/DISREGARDING THE VERSION OF THE DEFENSE.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[7]
The issues raised by appellant shall be resolved jointly as they are interrelated.
We agree with accused-appellants pose that, in reviewing rape cases, the court has always been guided
by three (3) well-entrenched principles:(1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2)
considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.[8] The primordial consideration in a determination concerning
the crime of rape is the credibility and probative weight of complainants testimony.[9]
The legal aphorism is that the findings of the trial court, its conclusions culled from said findings, its
calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties and the probative weight thereof are accorded,
great respect, if not conclusive effect, by the appellate court because of the unique advantage of the
trial court of monitoring and observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of said
witnesses as they regale the trial court with their testimonies. In contrast, the appellate courts must
contend itself only with the mute pages of the original records and the evidence adduced by the parties
elevated by the trial court.[10]
In this case, the trial court found Jocelyn credible and gave full probative weight to her testimony thus:
More so, as herein observed, when Jocelyn has been able to communicate her experience in a manner
that was clear as well as consistent. Neither was her testimony attended by material flaws in the cross-
examination. On the contrary, more details were extracted of her regarding the incident in
question. Hence, we find no valid reason to disregard or discredit her testimony.[11]
Indeed, the findings of the trial court are buttressed by the testimony of Jocelyn as she vividly recalled
how accused-appellant defiled her, with tears welling from her eyes, her sex organ throbbing with pain
caused by penile penetration:
Atty. Bernabe:
Q Madam Witness do you know the accused in this case Ruperto Ramos?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is inside the court room will you please point him to us?
A (The witness is pointing to a man in handcuff.)
Court:
Q Why do you know the accused?
A He is the brother of my father, Your Honor.
Q Who is older Ruperto or your father?
A Ruperto, Your Honor.
Q What is the name of your father?
A Efren Ramos, Your Honor.
Atty. Bernabe:
Q Sometime in December 14, 1997, do you recall if you have met your uncle Ruperto Ramos?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you come to see and meet the accused Ruperto Ramos?
A He kept on looking at me, Sir.
Q And when he was looking at you on that date of December 14, 1997, what happened next?
A He was undressing me, Sir.
Q In what place that you were being undressed by the accused?
A Inside his bedroom, Sir.
Q How come that you were at the bedroom on your uncle on that day?
A He was calling me, Sir.
Court:
Q What time of the day is that?
A Noon time, Your Honor.

Atty. Bernabe:
Q Where were you when you were being called by your uncle?
A I was in the house of Ka Nene, Sir.
Q Why were you there in the house of Ka Nene?
A I was playing with Grace, Sir.
Q Who is this Grace?
A My sister, Sir.
Q Aside from Grace who else those you were playing with?
A Joel, Sir.
Q How far is this house of Ka Nene to the house of Ruperto Ramos?
A Further than this wall, Sir.
Court:
Q How about that door?
A That is, Your Honor, (about 6 meters.)
Atty. Bernabe:
Q As you were called by your uncle, was he shouting or how were you called?
A He was waving his hand at me, Sir.
Q After he waved his hand, what did you do?
A I approached him, Sir.
Q Did he say anything when you approached him?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was that?
A He asked me to enter the house, Sir.
Q After entering the house, what happened next?
A He went to the kitchen and locked the doorknob, Sir.
Q What happened after?
A He made me enter his bedroom and locked the doorknob, Sir.
Q And when the two of you were already inside his bedroom and locked the doorknob what happened?
A He undressed me and made me lie down on his bed, sir.

Q Before you were made to lie down on the bed, what did you do?
A He placed himself on top of me, sir.
Q When you were already lying down what did Ruperto Ramos do to you?
A He placed on top of me. He was doing the pumping, "kumakantot sa akin" sir.
Q How did he do that?
A My legs were spread, sir.
Q What else?
A He was sucking my nipples, sir.
Q What else did he do?
A He was biting my breast, sir.
Q What else did he do aside from those you have already said?
A (The witness is hesitating.) No, sir.
Court:
Q What was the attire of the accused when he was calling you?
A Sando and shorts, Your Honor.
Q And what was his attire when he placed on top of you?
A He was wearing long maong and sando, Your Honor.
Q Was it short or long pants?
A Short, Your Honor.
Atty. Bernabe:
Q How about you when you were already lying down and your nipple being sucked by the accused?
A I was naked, Sir.
Q How about at the time when you said the accused was pumping on top of you, did you wear anything?
A I was cloth, Sir.
Q How about the accused was he wearing anything when he pumped on you?
Atty. Balagtas:
Already answered.
Court:
Q What about you when you were lying, what was your position was (sic) you pacing (sic) down or
pacing (sic) up?
A Pacing (sic) me, Your Honor.
Atty. Bernabe:
Q You made mention a while ago that your legs were spread.
Atty. Balagtas:
Already answered, Your Honor.
Court:
Q In this information it alleges here that the accused knowingly the mental condition of the complainant
did then and there willfully and feloniously by means of threats or intimidation and with lewd designs
have carnal knowledge with the said complainant against her will and without consent, what can you
say about it?
A Yes, Your Honor, he threatened me.
Atty. Bernabe:
Q How did he threaten you?
A He was (witness demonstrating clenching her teeth).
Court:
Q Did he say anything when he clenched his teeth?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What did he say?
A Not to tell anybody, Your Honor.
Atty. Bernabe:
Q What did you feel when the accused place on top of you?
A I was hurt, sir.
Q Why?
A It was painful, sir.
Court:
Q What part of your body?
A (Witness pointing to her private part.)
Atty. Bernabe:
Q Why did you feel pain?
A Because I was crying, sir. My tears rolled down my cheeks.
Q You said that your private part was painful, can you tell the Honorable Court.
Court:
Q Are you ashame[d] to tell everything? Because of the number of men inside the Courtroom?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Will you be able to tell us more details if we exclude the audience?
A Yes, Your Honor.
(Audience is ordered to move outside.)
Atty. Bernabe:
Q Your answer to the last question, what did Ruperto Ramos do to you?
A He inserted his penis to my private part, sir, ang titi niya ipinasok sa pepe ko.
Q Madam Witness how many times did your uncle, you said he inserted his penis inside your private
part?
A Often, sir.[12]
Jocelyns testimony, standing alone, is conclusive proof of the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime of
rape. Nonetheless, as found by the trial court, Joel and Mary Grace substantially corroborated Jocelyns
testimony on its material points. Mary Grace testified seeing accused-appellant mashing the breast of
Jocelyn and sucking her nipples:
Q As you and Joel were playing then, did you observe any unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please tell the Court what was that?
A We went inside the room of the house of Ruping, the room owned by Ruping and while we were
viewing TV, we saw Ruping inserting his hands to the private part of my sister. He is inserting his hands
inside the party (sic) of Josylyn (sic).
Q And after seeing that, what happened next?
A We went outside and we reported the incident to the mother of Joel.
Q Madam witness, your playmate Joel testified that you and him went by the window and by stepping
on your shoulder that he saw Ruping doing something to your sister, is it not a fact that Joel stepped on
your shoulder on that particular day?
A Yes, sir.
Q After Joel had stepped on your shoulder you also testified that you stepped on his shoulder and you
were the one saw something going on inside the room. What is that something that you have seen?
A There was sir, he mashed her brest (sic) and he sucked her nipples.
Q Aside from that, what else?
A While my sister is lying down, the accused is inserting his finger to the private part of my sister.
(referring to Josylyn)
Q And what else transpired aside from those?
A That is all, sir.[13]
Joel testified seeing accused-appellant and Jocelyn lying in bed naked, accused-appellant on top of her
and inserting his penis into her vagina:
Atty. Bernabe:
Mister witness, sometime in December, 1997, did you have occasion to see accused Ruperto Ramos?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did you see him?
A. In the room, sir.
Q. Who was with him in the room?
A. Jocelyn, sir.
Q. Who is Jocelyn?
A. Our neighbor, sir.
Q. And you made mention that you saw Jocelyn and Ruperto Ramos inside the room. Who is the owner
of that house if you know?
A. Rupin, sir.
Q. When you made mention of Ruping, you are referring to the accused Ruperto Ramos?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you said you saw them, what were they doing?
A. Ruperto was lying on top of Jocelyn, sir.
Q. How did you come to know about that matter?
A. We went to the back window and we used an object to step on to see them, sir.
Q. You made mention of Grace. Who is Grace?
A. My playmate, sir.
Q. How is she related to Jocelyn?
A. They are sisters, sir.
Q. Please tell the Honorable Court what exactly did you see when you said Ruperto Ramos was on top of
Jocelyn?
A. Binuburat ang titi.
Q. And were they wearing anything?
A. None, sir.
Court:
Who in particular had no clothing?
A. Both of them, sir.
Q. And for how long did you see Ruperto Ramos on top of Jocelyn?
A. It was long but I could not estimate, sir.
Atty. Bernabe:
Now, when Ruperto Ramos was on top of Jocelyn, what specifically was Ruperto Ramos doing?
Atty. Balagtas:
Already answered.
Atty. Bernabe:
How about Jocelyn, what was she doing at that time?
A. Jocelyn was lying front (nakadapa), sir.
Q. Aside from the fact that you claim that Ruperto . . . . (interrupted)
Court:
Just a minute. You just stated that Jocelyn was lying front and Ruperto Ramos was lying on top of
her. Was Ruperto Ramos lying front on top of Jocelyn?
A. He was lying on top of the back of Jocelyn, sir.
Atty. Bernabe:
Aside from that, you claim that Ruperto was binuburat ang titi. Are there other acts which you have
seen during that time?
A. The eggplant was inserted inside the private part of Jocelyn, sir.
Q. By whom?
A. Ruping, sir.[14]
Dr. Aves findings based on his medical examination of Jocelyn that her hymen had multiple healed
lacerations at 9 and 11 oclock positions further buttressed Jocelyns testimony that appellant had carnal
knowledge of her. Laceration of the hymen, whether fresh or healed, is the best physical evidence of
defloration.[15]
Appellants imputation of ill motive on Fortunata, Jocelyns mother, was an act of utter desperation. His
claims that Fortunata accused him of raping her daughter only out of envy because his inheritance was
still intact while Fortunatas had already been depleted, and that he rebuffed Fortunata when she
borrowed P500.00 or P300.00 from him and when he removed the illegal electrical connection installed
in the house of Fortunata, are preposterous and outrageous. In the first place, it is highly inconceivable
that Jocelyn, a nave girl, would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts
and undergo the expense, tribulation and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of a public trial,
unless she was in fact raped by accused-appellant.[16] Accused-appellant failed to prove his assertion and
relied only on his own self-serving testimony. Moreover, mothers are so protective of their children that
they would give up their lives and fortune to protect their children from any threat or peril to their lives
or limb and shield them from embarassment, ridicule and any taint on their reputation. It is unthinkable
that Fortunata will use Jocelyn as an instrument of malice, even for the purpose of avenging a personal
slight, especially if it will subject Jocelyn to the embarrassment, trauma and stigma attendant to a rape
trial unless accused-appellant indeed raped Jocelyn.[17] It must be pointed out that Fortunata first sought
the advice of Rafael Ramos, the older brother of Efren and accused-appellant, before she assisted the
private complainant in filing a complaint for rape against accused-appellant.
Ranged against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellants curt denial of the
charge against him must necessarily fail.Case law has it that denial of the crime charged is but self-
serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[18] It bears stressing that accused-appellants
denial of the charge is corroborated only by his close kins, his niece and brother-in-law.
In fine, we find that the trial court did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of raping Jocelyn.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court committed an error in imposing the penalty of death on
him on its finding that private complainant was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime and
that she was a relative of accused-appellant by consanguinity within the third civil degree.Accused-
appellant contends that the prosecution failed to adduce conclusive evidence independent of the
testimony of private complainant to prove the latters minority. Neither did the prosecution allegedly
prove that private complainant was a mental retardate. The Solicitor General on the other hand
contends that the testimonies of private complainant and her mother constitute proof of minority of
Jocelyn.
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provide in part that:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed:
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise consciousness;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. -
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxx
10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of
the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.[19]
In the appeal at bar, the information alleged two sets of special qualifying circumstances attendant to
the commission of the crime of rape, namely, (a) the minority of private complainant and her
relationship to accused-appellant; (b) her mental retardation and knowledge thereof by accused-
appellant. Proof of only one of these special qualifying circumstances is sufficient to justify the
imposition of the supreme penalty on death of accused-appellant.
In the prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing
but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an
accused is charged must be established. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances
must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself, otherwise, there can be no
conviction of the crime in its qualified form.[20]
As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victims minority and
her relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt. To prove
the minority of Jocelyn, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence her birth certificate as it is
the best evidence to prove her age at the time of the commission of the crime. Substitutionary
evidence, absent proof of loss or destruction of the original of her birth certificate or the unavailability
thereof without fault of the prosecution, including the testimony of Jocelyn and of her mother, will not
suffice. Neither can the relationship of the accused to the victim be established by mere testimony, not
even if the same was admitted by the accused. In People vs. Tabanggay,[21] we categorically declared:
x x x Jurisprudence dictates that when the law specifies certain circumstances that will qualify an offense
and thus attach to it a greater degree of penalty, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in
order to justify the imposition of the graver penalty. Recent rulings of the Court relative to the rape of
minors invariably state that in order to justify the imposition of death, there must be independent
evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the
absence of denial of the accused. A duly certified certificate live birth accurately showing the
complainants age, or some other official document or record such as a school record, has been
recognized as competent evidence.
In the instant case, we find insufficient the bare testimony of private complainants and their mother as
to their ages as well as their kinship to the appellant. x x x [We] cannot agree with the solicitor general
that appellants admission of his relationship with his victims would suffice. Elementary is the doctrine
that the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of a crime, including the qualifying
circumstances. In sum, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce in evidence the original of the certificate of birth of
Jocelyn. There is no evidence that said certificate of birth was lost or destroyed or was unavailable
without the fault of the prosecution. Hence, substitutionary evidence was inadmissible. The testimony
of Jocelyn as to her age, even if corroborated by her mother, is not sufficient proof of minority.
The prosecution adduced testimonial evidence inclusive of the admission of accused-appellant that he
was the uncle of Jocelyn. However, under the Information, accused-appellant was merely declared to be
the uncle of Jocelyn. We have held that if the offender is merely a relation not a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, or guardian or common-law spouse of the mother of the victim, the information must allege
that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil degree. It is not
enough for the information to merely allege that accused-appellant is the uncle of private
complainant. Even if the prosecution proved that accused-appellant was in fact the uncle of Jocelyn, the
death penalty cannot be meted on accused-appellant on account of said relationship. Consequently,
accused-appellant can only be held liable for simple rape even if it was proven during the trial that he
was the uncle of the victim and thus a relative by affinity of the victim within the third civil degree.[22]
On the second set of special qualifying circumstances, the prosecution was burdened to prove that (a)
Jocelyn was a mental retardate and that(b) accused-appellant knew her mental condition. Knowledge by
accused-appellant of the mental condition of Jocelyn may be proved by direct and/or circumstantial
evidence. In this case, the prosecution adduced sufficient proof that Jocelyn was a mental
retardate. However, the prosecution failed to adduce incontrovertible evidence to prove that accused-
appellant knew of the mental retardation of Jocelyn.
The barefaced facts that private complainant was the niece of accused-appellant and that they were
neighbors before and at the time of the commission of the crime do not constitute conclusive proof that
accused-appellant had knowledge of the mental retardation of private complainant absent evidence of
external manifestations of her mental condition. The penalty of death is so severe that nothing but
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before the said penalty can be imposed. In sum then,
accused-appellant is guilty of simple rape defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act 7659 and should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In light of the reduction of
the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant, the award of civil indemnity (erroneously designated as
moral damages by the trial court) must likewise be reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00. Civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is awarded only where the crime of rape was effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present
law.[23] In addition, accused-appellant is also liable for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. In
rape cases, the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of
moral damages even without proof thereof.[24]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGIONG, the Decision dated November 19, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21 of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 659-M-98
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of simple rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the victim, Jocelyn Ramos, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[1]
Records, p. 2.
[2]
Ibid., Exhibit A.
[3]
Ibid., Exhibit B, p. 115.
[4]
Ibid., Exhibit C, p. 116.
[5]
Ibid., Exhibit D, p. 117.
[6]
Ibid., p. 159.
[7]
Rollo, p. 48.
[8]
People of the Philippines vs. Norberto Del Mundo, Sr., 356 SCRA 45, 50 (2001).
[9]
People of the Philippines vs. Rodegelio Turco, Jr., 337 SCRA 714, 722 (2000).
[10]
People of the Philippines vs. Aurelio Delovino, 247 SCRA 637 (1995).
[11]
RTC Decision, November 19, 1999, p. 5; Rollo, p. 27.
[12]
TSN, November 6, 1998, pp. 3-9.
[13]
TSN, October 14, 1998, pp. 4-5.
[14]
TSN, September 9, 1998, pp. 3-5.
[15]
People of the Philippines vs. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 140642-46, August 7, 2002, p. 21.
[16]
People of the Philippines vs. Jaquilmac, G.R. No. 139787, September 17, 2002, p. 10.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
People of the Philippines vs. Castro Geraban, 358 SCRA 213 (2001).
[19]
Supra.
[20]
People of the Philippines vs. Sitao, G.R. No. 146790, August 22, 2002, p. 7.
[21]
334 SCRA 575 (2000).
[22]
People of the Philippines vs. Ben Libo-on, 358 SCRA 152, 176 (2001).
[23]
People of the Philippines vs. Sitao, supra., p. 9.
[24]
Ibid.
45. People vs. Mateo, G.R. No. 147678 (July 7, 2004)
477 Phil. 752
VITUG, J.:
On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly committed on ten
different dates - 07 October 1995, 14 December 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 29 February
1996, 08 May 1996, 02 July 1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996 - were filed against
appellant EFREN MATEO. Except for the variance in dates, the ten informations, later docketed Criminal
Cases No. 9351 to No. 9360, inclusive, in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, uniformly read -
"The undersigned OIC Provincial Prosecutor upon preliminary investigation conducted by the MTC,
Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1, accuses Efren Mateo of Brgy. Buenavista, Tarlac, Tarlac of the crime of Rape,
committed as follows:
"That on or about January 12, 1996, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Efren Mateo y Garcia, who is the
guardian of the complaining witness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by
means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house against
her consent."[1]
The trial ensued following a plea of "not guilty" entered by appellant to all the charges.
According to Imelda Mateo, she was born on 11 September 1980 to the spouses Dan Icban and
Rosemarie Capulong. Rosemarie Capulong and appellant started to live together without the benefit of
marriage when private complainant was only two years old. Imelda stayed with her mother and
appellant in a house in Buenavista, Tarlac, and adopted the surname of appellant when she started
schooling.
Imelda recalled that each time the ten rape incidents occurred her mother, Rosemarie, was not at
home. On 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie went to Bamban and returned home
only the next day. The second rape was said to have occurred on 14 December 1995, while her mother
was attending a seminar for day-care workers. Imelda recalled the third rape to have been committed
on 05 January 1996, the same day her mother resigned from her job and left for Manila. The fourth
rape, she said, happened a week later, on 12 January 1996, when Rosemarie Capulong was attending
yet another seminar for day-care workers. The fifth incident was on 29 February 1996, when Rosemarie
left for Manila to follow-up her application for an overseas job. The sixth rape took place on 08 May
1996 when Rosemarie was once again in Manila to attend to her application papers. On 01 July 1996,
Rosemarie and appellant left for Manila as Rosemarie was scheduled to depart for Jeddah. Appellant
returned home in the evening of the next day, 02 July 1996, the same day the job recruiter relayed the
news that Rosemarie Capulong could not yet leave for Jeddah. During the night, appellant again
molested Imelda. With Rosemarie finally away, appellant frequented his nocturnal visits. On the night
of 18 July 1996, appellant went into her room and abused her while her siblings were sleeping in
the sala. The same incident was repeated on the night of 16 August 1996 when appellant, already
naked, entered the room and sexually assaulted Imelda. The last rape was committed on 28 August
1996. According to private complainant, she never reported any of the ten incidents to anybody
because the accused had threatened to kill her and her mother if she were to disclose the matter to
anyone.
Imelda stated that each of the ten rape incidents were committed in invariably the same fashion. All
were perpetrated inside the house in Buenavista, Tarlac, during the night and, each time, she would try
to ward off his advances by kicking him but that he proved to be too strong for her. These incidents
occurred in the presence of her three sleeping siblings who failed to wake up despite the struggles she
exerted to fend off the advances. She recalled that in all ten instances, appellant had covered her
mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting. Subsequently, however, she changed her
statement to say that on two occasions, particularly the alleged sexual assaults on 02 July 1996 and 18
July 1996, appellant had only covered her mouth with his hands. Still much later, Imelda testified that
he had not covered her mouth at all.
The predictable pattern of the rape incidents testified to by Imelda prompted the defense to ask her
whether she had, at any one time, taken any protective measure in anticipation of the rape
incidents. She replied that once she had requested her brothers and sister to keep her company in the
bedroom at night but appellant had scolded them. On the night of the fourth rape, she narrated that
she armed herself with a knife but, when appellant entered her room that night, she was not able to
retrieve the bladed weapon from under the bed as appellant was sitting right on top of it.
Dr. Rosario Fider, the second witness for the prosecution, stated that she had physically examined
private complainant on 14 October 1996 and found superficially healed lacerations at 3:00, 6:00 and
9:00 positions on her private organ that could have been caused by an insertion of an instrument or by
sexual intercourse. According to Dr. Fider, the lacerations pointed to possibly one or two, and at most
three, incidents of rape, which had happened not earlier than two weeks before the date of the physical
examination.
Appellant denied each of the charges. On 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, he claimed that he
was in Barangay Talaga, Capas, to pick up newly hatched ducklings, numbering about a thousand, which
had to be properly fed, kept warm and constantly cared for that required him to be around the entire
day and night for two weeks. The fowls had then to be brought into an open field located one and a half
kilometers away which could be traversed by foot. He continued to tend to the animals from 20
October 1995 until sometime in February 1996. During the period, he was able to go home only once
a week or three times a month.
On 14 December 1995, the supposed date of the second rape, appellant admitted that he had
temporarily left the care of his ducks to go caroling with his wife, their daughter Imelda and some
friends. He immediately returned to care for his ducks, located some 500 meters from their residence,
that kept him busy and away from home when the third, fourth and fifth rape incidents were said to
have taken place on the 5th and 12th of January and 29th of February of 1996. While he admitted to
leaving occasionally the animals in order to go home, these visits, however, were said to be brief and
mainly for getting some food and fresh clothes. Appellant could not recall when exactly he sold the
ducks but it was definitely prior to 08 May 1996, the day he was accepted and reported for work at the
LA Construction of Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac, located some three kilometers away. On 08 May 1996, the
date of the sixth rape, he was at work from seven o'clock in the morning until the following day to finish
a rush job.
On 01 July 1996, he accompanied his wife, Rosemarie, to Manila who was scheduled to leave for Jeddah
the following day. Upon being advised that her flight was postponed, the couple stayed in the house of
one Luding Sevilla in Caloocan. On 03 July, he returned to Tarlac. From 15 July to September, 1996, he
was given the nightshift at the LA Construction. Appellant asserted that it was impossible for him to
have raped private complainant on 28 August 1996 because at six o'clock that evening, his friends Boy
Botio, Boy Pineda, Marvin Dalangin and Nelson Castro had picked him up at his house to attend
the fiesta at Barangay Murcia, Concepcion, Tarlac, where they spent the night.
Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being the malicious "retribution" of a vengeful
stepdaughter. Allegedly, on 11 October 1996, he took private complainant to task after his son, Marlon
Mateo, who had reported seeing her engaged in sexual intercourse with one Pikong Navarro inside the
room of their house. Earlier, on 05 August 1996, he also learned that Sharon Flores, a neighbor and a
friend of private complainant, had caught his stepdaughter and Navarro in a very compromising
position. In anger, he hit Imelda twice with a piece of bamboo. He then forbade her from going out at
night and leaving her siblings alone in the house.
Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of private complainant, rose to testify in defense of her common-law
husband. Capulong asserted that she had not at any time, prior to her departure for Jeddah, spent any
night outside their house. Rosemarie said that she was a day-care teacher from June 1990 until June
1996. On 07 October 1995, the date of the supposed first rape, she was at home and did not go to
Bamban as so claimed by private complainant. Capulong disputed the claim of private complainant that
she attended a seminar for day-care workers on 12 January 1996 since her job did not require her to
attend seminars except for regular meetings held on the last Friday of every month, with each meeting
lasting for only half a day. The last seminar she had attended was in June of 1990 in Tarlac. On 29
February 1996, Rosemarie was also certain that she spent the night at home as she had to report for
work the following day. She started obtaining documents for her planned employment abroad only on
12 February 1996, when she secured her birth certificate in Bamban as so attested by the date
appearing on the certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bamban. On 08 May 1996, she
admitted being away from home while attending a general assembly of day-care workers in
Zambales. On that day, appellant was likewise not at home due to his overtime work up until about
three or four o'clock in the early morning. Imelda herself, Capulong testified, had attended on that
day the San Miguel fiesta. Contrary to the allegation of private complainant, the witness was not in
Manila on the 5th and 12th of January 1996 because, at that time, she had yet no plans of working
overseas. She denied the assertions of private complainant that Capulong had resigned from her day-
care work on 05 January 1996, saying it was actually months later, or in June of 1996, when she quit her
job. It was on 13 February 1996 when she went to Manila for the first time to attend to her application
for a possible overseas work. She made subsequent trips to the city, that is, on the 3rd, 5th, 8th and
24th of the month of June, to follow-up her employment papers and to submit herself to a medical
check-up. All these visits only took a day, and she would always be home in Buenavista at nightfall. On
01 July 1996, appellant accompanied her to Manila but, upon learning that her flight was postponed,
they spent the night in Caloocan. The couple stayed together in Manila until 03 July 1996, when
appellant decided to return to Tarlac. Rosemarie worked in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, until 11 November
1996 when she decided to return home.
Rosemarie Capulong corroborated the testimony of appellant regarding his whereabouts from October
1995, when the ducks were first brought to the field, until 15 December 1995, when appellant had
joined her and their friends caroling. Capulong believed that the charges may have been fabricated by
her relatives who were "jealous" of appellant because it was he, not they, who had been receiving the
remittances of her earnings from Saudi Arabia.
Sharon Flores, a neighbor, testified that, about noontime on 05 August 1996, she repaired to the house
of private complainant to investigate rumors regarding a man seen entering the Capulong
residence. When she went in, she saw private complainant and Pikong Navarro lying on the bed,
embracing each other under a blanket.
Anselmo Botio, a friend of appellant, and Marlon Mateo, a brother of private complainant, corroborated
appellant's alibi. Botio said that on 28 August 1996, at six o'clock in the evening, he, together with
appellant and some friends, went to attend the fiesta in Barangay Murcia upon the invitation of one
Ruben Santos. The group arrived in Murcia at seven o'clock that evening and promptly had dinner and a
drinking spree which lasted until the morning of the next day.
Marlon Mateo testified that one day in October 1996, while his mother was working overseas, he
arrived home from school, and saw Pikong Navarro and private complainant, both naked, on the
bed. Navarro was on top of private complainant and was making thrusting motions. Marlon Mateo
hurriedly left to report the incident to his father.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, dated 23 January 2001, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape -
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to
indemnify the complainant the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages
for each count of rape."[2]
More often than not, the Court has deemed it sufficient to convict an accused for rape solely on the
basis of the testimony of the victim.[3] The heavy reliance normally given by the Court on the narration
of the victim finds justification on the fact that, generally, she would be the sole witness to the incident
and the shy and demure character of the typical Filipina would preclude her from fabricating that
crime. It is imperative, nonetheless, that the testimony must be convincing and straightforward in order
to avoid any serious doubt from being cast on the veracity of the account given.
Relative to the first supposed rape incident, private complainant categorically stated that she had slept
in the lone bedroom of the house while her siblings and her stepfather slept in the sala
"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?
"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Q. How did (sic) he able to take you out from the room? In what way?
"A. She (sic) lifted me and still my mouth was covered, my hands were stocked and I
cannot move, sir.
"Q. She (sic) lifted you by his two hands, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir."[4]
"Q. You testified on direct examination that there is only one room in your house, is that
right?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And you were then sleeping inside your house in that one room, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. While your brothers as well as your stepfather were then sleeping outside your
room, you [were] also sleeping, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir."[5]

In the next breath, however, she testified that all her three siblings were sleeping with her on the night
of 07 October 1995 -
"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?
"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.
"Q. Do you want to tell this Honorable Court that he brought you to the sala where your
brothers Ryan and Marlon and your sister Iris were then sleeping?
"A. My brothers and sister were sleeping in the room, sir.
"Q. Is it not a fact that there was only one room in your house?
"A. But they slept there on that night, sir.
"Q. In other words, Madam Witness, you were sleeping together with Ryan, Marlon,
and Iris by that time in one room together in one bed?
"A. Yes, sir."[6]
Still, later, Imelda changed her testimony and said that her brothers were in the sala and that it was only
her sister Iris who was with her in the bedroom when the rape incidents were committed -
"Q. How about your brother Ryan where did he sleep on October 7, 1995?
"A. At the sala, sir.
"Q. Who was with him in the sala?
"A. He [was] sleeping with my stepfather and my brother Marlon, sir.
"Q. How about Iris, where was she sleeping?
"A. She was with me, sir.
"Q. You mean to imply to the Court that according to you the accused abused you on
October 7, 1995, Iris [was] with you in the room?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Are you sure of that?

"A. Yes, sir.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Q. You stated in your direct testimony that on October 7, 1995 your father entered
your room where you were sleeping, covering your mouth and forced you to go to the sala, do you recall
that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember that you have testified that he was able to take you to the
sala?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And then when you reached the sala, you stated that the accused criminally abused
you?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember having been asked by the prosecutor examining you, and
now I cite to you your statement; `Q - Public Prosecutor Llobrera, `Now, let us make it clear. You said
you were brought to the sala and your answer, `Yes, sir.''' Do you not remember having made that
statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And another question, `When you reached the sala what were the first things he did
to you and your answer, `He kissed me, sir.'' Do you remember that?
"A. No, sir. The first time he abused me was in the room, sir."[7]
The Solicitor General would posit that the claim of private complainant that she had the sole privilege of
sleeping in the lone bedroom of their house while the rest of the family, namely both her parents and
her three siblings, had to squeeze themselves in the sala strained credulity, and that the testimony of
her mother, Rosemarie Capulong, to the effect that the couple were the occupants of the single
bedroom while their children stayed in the sala where the television was located, made more sense.
Imelda testified that her three siblings - Marlon, Ryan and Iris - were sleeping inside the house every
time the rape incidents were committed. The identical testimony of everyone else in the Mateo
household, including her mother Rosemarie Capulong and brother Marlon Mateo, exposed such
assertions to be a blatant lie and categorically stated that Ryan himself had never stayed in the Mateo
residence because he was living with his grandparents since childhood.
Private complainant testified that during the rape incidents she was gagged with a handkerchief which
rendered her unable to shout for help. Later on, however, she gave different versions on whether
appellant covered her mouth with his hand or with a handkerchief during the rape incidents occurring
on 07 October 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August
1996. Eventually, she repudiated her earlier testimony by stating that appellant had never covered her
mouth, either with a handkerchief or with his hand -
"Q. Both the incidents of July 2 and July 18, according to you, he only covered your
mouth on both occasions?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. He did not tie your mouth with anything?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Miss Witness, in your statement also on August 20, 1997, you stated that the
accused covered your mouth and tied your mouth with a handkerchief on both occasions. Do you
remember having given that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. So, you do not remember having made that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Recalling your testimony you gave on August 20, 1997, for the July 2 occasion and
the testimony that you gave as appearing on page 18 of the transcript of stenographic notes. These
questions and answers were given and answered by you. `Q. While he was doing all these things to
you, did you call for help? A. I cannot shout because my mouth was covered with a handkerchief,
sir. Q. Was he holding that handkerchief? A. It was tied, sir.' On July 17, 1997, you said that the
accused tied your mouth on July 2, 1996, and you said that you cannot shout because your mouth was
tied with a handkerchief. Do you remember having stated that?
"A. No, sir.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Q. On the July 18 occasion, you also stated in your direct testimony on August 29,
1997, when asked these following questions appearing on page 21 of the transcript of stenographic
notes. `Q. Tell the Court how did he rape you on that night? A. On that night while I was sleeping in my
room, he tied a handkerchief in my mouth so I could not shout, sir.' Do you remember having stated
that?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And also you were asked this question: `Q. After tying this handkerchief to your
mouth, what did he do to you?' You said that he raped you. Do you remember having given this
statement?
"A. No, sir."[8]
Also quite telling were some discrepancies in the testimony of private complainant regarding the
whereabouts of her mother Rosemarie Capulong on the dates of the incidents. According to private
complainant, it was when her mother Rosemarie was not at home when appellant would commit the
dastardly crimes. Not only did the account of Imelda contradict that of Rosemarie but that Imelda
herself would appear to have made irreconcilable statements. According to her, on 07 October 1995,
the date of the first rape, Rosemarie had gone to Bamban to visit her mother. Subsequently, however,
she said that Rosemarie went to Bamban because she worked there, only to later say that, at that time,
Rosemarie had already resigned from work. Imelda would further change her story by stating that
Rosemarie Capulong did not report for work that day; then, in a quick turnaround, she remarked that
her mother did go to Bamban not to work but to get her birth certificate. Interestingly, Imelda said that
07 October 1995 was a working day, and that she had gone to school the following day. Judicial notice
could be taken of the fact, however, that 07 October 1995 was a Saturday and that the following day, a
Sunday, could not have been a school day. With respect to the rape committed on 12 January 1996,
Imelda testified that Rosemarie was attending a seminar; yet, when cross-examined, she told the trial
court that on that day Rosemarie went to Manila to borrow money from her cousin.
The subsequent conduct of a victim could also either confirm or negate her claim of rape.[9] The human
nature, characterized by an instinct for self-preservation and an aversion to humiliation, would dictate
that a typical victim of rape could display changes in behavior, erratic mood swings and an alteration in
her daily routine. No such changes were observed in the case of private complainant. She testified that
on the day after the first incident on 07 October 1995, she woke up at six o'clock in the morning, washed
her face, and went to school. There was no apparent attempt on her part to run away from home
despite every chance to escape from her tormentor or to exercise every means available to ensure that
the incidents would not be repeated. At fifteen years old, already old enough to think of her safety and
well-being, Imelda Mateo went about her usual business as if nothing unusual had occurred. She
continued to sleep in the same bedroom with nary any precaution against the bestiality she was sure
would come everytime her mother was away.
While it may be argued that appellant's moral ascendancy over Imelda was enough to intimidate her to
suffer in silence; still, it could well be improbable for a victim who had been raped no less than ten times
not to make a simple outcry against her unarmed rapist when she had every opportunity to do so.
The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of
appellant.
The records would disclose that the first half of the trial, from 17 July 1997 until 15 October 1997, was
conducted by Judge Lino L. Diamsay. Judge Edgardo F. Sundiam conducted the trial from 14 January
1999 until 24 February 1999. From 11 May 1999 until the day of the last hearing, it was Judge Arsenio P.
Adriano who heard the case. While this change of the presiding judges would not invalidate the
proceedings, it did deny to the deciding magistrate the opportunity to observe in entirety the demeanor
of the witnesses which could well be vital to the decision-making process, particularly where credibility
would, by and large, constitute the singular issue.
The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving
offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher."
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659,[10] as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of
Rule 122,[11]Section 10 of Rule 122,[12] Section 13 of Rule 124[13] and Section 3 of Rule 125[14] of the Rules
of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character,
and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an
intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of
primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet,
it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed
an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in
these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where
life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded
an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by
the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances
so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme
Court for its final disposition.[15]
Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-year period since the re-imposition of the death penalty
law in 1993 until June 2004, the trial courts have imposed capital punishment in approximately
1,493,[16] out of which 907 cases[17] have been passed upon in review by the Court. In the Supreme
Court, where these staggering numbers find their way on automatic review, the penalty has been
affirmed in only 230 cases comprising but 25.36% of the total number. Significantly, in more than half or
64.61% of the cases, the judgment has been modified through an order of remand for further
proceedings, by the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or by a reduction of the
sentence. Indeed, the reduction by the Court of the death penalty to reclusion perpetua has been made
in no less than 483 cases or 53.25% of the total number. The Court has also rendered a judgment of
acquittal in sixty-five (65) cases. In sum, the cases where the judgment of death has either been
modified or vacated consist of an astounding 71.77% of the total of death penalty cases directly
elevated before the Court on automatic review that translates to a total of six hundred fifty-one (651)
out of nine hundred seven (907) appellants saved from lethal injection.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the
Supreme Court -
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts."
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing
an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section
10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide
for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme
Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly
involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with the
discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[1]
Records, p. 1.
[2]
Rollo, p. 53.
[3]
People v. Paranzo, G.R. No. 107800, 26 October 1999 (317 SCRA 367).
[4]
TSN, Imelda Mateo, Cross-examination, 16 September 1997, pp. 17-19.
[5]
[6]
[7]
TSN, Imelda Mateo, Cross-examination, 14 January 1999, pp. 5-12.
[8]
TSN, Imelda Mateo, Cross-examination, 11 May 1999, pp. 22-25.
[9]
People v. Bayron, G.R. No. 122732, 07 September 1999 (313 SCRA 727); People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No.
128075, 14 September 1999 (314 SCRA 334).
[10]
ART. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic Review of death penalty
cases. - x x x
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by the court en banc, within twenty (20) days but
not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion
for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the
filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
[11]
Sec. 3. How appeal taken.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court
is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses
committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed,
shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial
Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this
Rule.
[12]
Sec. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. - In all cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review
and judgment within five (5) days after the fifteenth (15th) day following the promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be
forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
[13]
Sec. 13. Quorum of the court; certification or appeal of cases to Supreme Court. - Three (3) Justices
of the Court of Appeals shall constitute a quorum for the sessions of a division. The unanimous vote of
the three (3) Justices of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment or final
resolution, which shall be reached in consultation before the writing of the opinion by a member of the
division. In the event that the three (3) Justices can not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice
shall direct the raffle committee of the Court to designate two (2) additional Justices to sit temporarily
with them, forming a special division of five (5) members and the concurrence of a majority of such
division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment or final resolution. The designation of
such additional Justices shall be made strictly by raffle and rotation among all other Justices of the Court
of Appeals.
Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall
render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment as the
circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and forthwith certify the
case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review..
[14]
Sec. 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. - When the Supreme Court en banc is equally divided in
opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had on whether to acquit the appellant, the case shall again
be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after re-deliberation, the judgment of conviction of
the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted.
[15]
In this instance, then, the Supreme Court may exercise its "exclusive appellate jurisdiction" over all
cases where the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed by lower courts,
under applicable laws like Republic Act No. 296 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
[16]
As of 06 July 2004, the total number of cases pending in the Supreme Court are as follows:
Death Penalty ------------------------------------------------------------------- 586
Life Imprisonment ------------------------------------------------------------------- 375

[1320]
Reclusion Perpetua -------------------------------------------------------------------
2281
The total number of cases certified by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court for review are as
follows:
Death Penalty ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Life Imprisonment ------------------------------------------------------------------- 3

[28]
Reclusion Perpetua -------------------------------------------------------------------
32
[17]
As per report from the Judicial Records Office of the Supreme Court, the following are the data as of
08 June 2004:
DISMISSED due to death of the Accused-Appellants ----------------- 26
AFFIRMED --------------------------------------------------------- 230
MODIFIED:
a. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ------------------------------ 31
b. RECLUSION PERPETUA ------------------------------- 483
c. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE ------------------------- 72
ACQUITTED -------------------------------------------------------- 65
907
46. Santiago vs. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 (1970)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970
TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO
AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR
MARCELO, respondents-appellees.
Teodoro M. Santiago for petitioner-appellant.
Ramon C. Carag for respondent-apellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its
Civil Case No. 2012 — for certiorari, injunction and damages — on the ground that the complaint therein
states no cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the said order of dismissal.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was commenced in the court below, appellant
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School in
Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The Rating Of
Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of
selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as
chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida
Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged
Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,
respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days
before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father
as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the
above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named
committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a
sixth grader at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May 21st,
1965 with the honor rank of third place, which is disputed; that the teachers of the school had been
made respondents as they compose the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whose grave
abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the other defendants were included as Principal,
District Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a
consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia Liñgat
(second placer in the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner before,
except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced, while his closest
rival had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina, was coached
and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils
in English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the committee
referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was composed of all the Grade VI
teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which
provides that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades
V and VI; that there are direct and circumstantial matters, which shall be proven during the trial,
wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as the changing of
the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85%, and some
teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there has already an
intention to pull him to a much lower rank at the end of the school year; that several district
examinations outside of teachers' daily units and other than periodical tests were given, ratings in which
were heavily considered in the determination of periodical ratings, whereas according to the Academic
Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of schools of the place such district examinations were
not advisable; that there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the respondent
teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect
score, which is very unnatural; that the words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was
erased and replaced with the words "second place", which is an instance of the unjust and
discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor pupils
they made; that petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District
Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay
his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and
adequate remedy under the circumstances; and, that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and
moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final
list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and,
during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally
publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was
scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the
lower court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were
then already set on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would be shocking
to the school authorities, parents, and the community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of
that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the
school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested list of honor students.
Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the petition within ten (10) days,
respondents moved for the dismissal of the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a
motion to dismiss, on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even
assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had already become
academic. This was opposed by petitioner.
In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents was granted, the court reasoning
thus:
The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper and for being academic. In order
to resolve the motion to dismiss, the Court has carefully examined the petition to determine the
sufficiency of the alleged cause of action constituting the special civil action of certiorari.
The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave abuse of discretion' are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These allegations may be substantially summarized as follows: Paragraph 3 alleges that
since grades one to six, the students closely contending for class honors were Socorro Medina, Teodoro
Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican and Patricia Liñgat.
Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once second honor (grade IV), and twice
third place (grades II and III).
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV); four times second place (grades I, II, III, and V)
and once third place (grade VI).
Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once third place (grade I).
Patricia Liñgat once third place (grade V); and once second place (grade VI).
That as now ranked in the graduation Liñgat is given second place while Teodoro Santiago, Jr., is given
the third place only. This is the ranking now disputed by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of 1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas
who became her English teacher in the sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored Socorro
against her rivals.
Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the committee on honor students are all grade six
teachers while the Service Manual For Teachers provides that the committee shall be composed of the
teachers from the fifth and sixth grades.
Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial evidence showing the change of ratings of
Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower
rank.
Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations upon which ratings were partly based were
not advisable.
Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect pupil which is unnatural.
Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner the word "First Place" was erased
and changed to "Second Place".
Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities but they only 'passed
the buck to each other.'
SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal,
board or officer.'
'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof,
together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'
It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order complained of, together with all pleadings and documents which are relevant
thereto, as required by the second, paragraph of the aforequoted rule. This violation renders the
petition extremely indefinite and uncertain. There is no written formal judgment or order of
respondents that is submitted for revision or correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the
petition.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED
All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities who only
'passed the buck to each other.' This allegation does not show that petitioner formally availed of and
exhausted the administrative remedies of the Department of Education. The petition implies that this is
the first formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers. The administrative agencies of the
Department of Education could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner with dispatch and give
effective remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he
lacked any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachers refer to errors,
mistakes, or irregularities rather than to real grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by means
of certiorari.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the petition states no cause of
action and should be, as it is hereby dismissed.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration
thereof, but the same proved to be futile, hence, this appeal.
Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition states no cause of action on the
grounds — discussed by the court a quo in the appealed order above-quoted — (1) that the petition
does not comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not been accompanied
by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative remedies were not first
exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the teachers who
constituted the committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees maintain that the court below did
not err in dismissing the case on said grounds. Further, they argue in favor of the questioned order of
dismissal upon the additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of students for honor" whose
actions are here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions" against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.
The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really the said committee of
teachers does not fall within the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no longer be
necessary. To resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:
In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of
judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of
the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction
the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of
persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and
determination of their respective rights and obligations.
'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general appear or are brought before
the tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered. It
implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims, and is inconsistent with discretion
on the one hand — for the tribunal must decide according to law and the rights of the parties — or with
dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must exercise its own judgment under the law, and not
act under a mandate from another power. ... The character of its action in a given case must decide
whether that action is judicial, ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public agent of
the country or State, as in its varied jurisdictions it may by turns be each.' (In Re Saline County
Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)
'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what
the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is
clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.' (State ex
rel. Board of Commissioners of St. Louis County, et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and
authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the
laws to that end.
'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which would be applicable to all cases.
The term has been variously defined as the authority to determine the rights of persons or property by
arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party thereto; the authority
exercised by that department of government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is
and its construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power vested in the judges or in the
courts; the authority vested in some court, officer, or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication; the power
belonging to or emanating from a judge as such; the power conferred upon a public officer, involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting
the interest of persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out the
mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases
before them, or some matter incidental thereto, and of which they have jurisdiction; the power of a
court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which adjudicates upon and protects the rights
and interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law. "Judicial power"
implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and
determine but not everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power"
does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit
or action between the parties.' (34 C.J. 1183-1184.) .
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to
the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department.
... the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial functions is difficult to point
out. What is a judicial function does not depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is
performed or the importance of the act. In solving this question, due regard must be had to the organic
law of the state and the division of power of government. In the discharge of executive and legislative
duties, the exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary, and matters of the
greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is not enough to make a function judicial that it
requires discretion, deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and
judgment within that subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least,
which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the matter, in respect to which it is
exercised, belongs to either of the two last-named departments of government, it is not judicial. As to
what is judicial and what is not seems to be better indicated by the nature of a thing, than its definition.'
(Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co. Appt. v. Town of Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) pp. 321, 328-
329.) [Emphasis supplied]1
'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what
are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in
connection with the law as to the right to the writ of certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature
of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines
whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the
proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when
applied to the courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act
judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character. ...' "In State ex rel. Board of
Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the following statements were made:
'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial
functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance
of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may,
in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of
judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to
a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to
determine those questions, he acts judicially.'2
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for
honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in
the performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decision cited, it will be
gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary
that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the
tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees,3 however, there
is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi
judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent
provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated in the
composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that
committee's duties.
At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly one of first impression, is not
without substantial parallel. In the case of Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al.,4 the issue presented for
determination was whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of
judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared that the judiciary has no power to reverse the
award of the board of judges of that contest and, for that matter, it would not interfere in literary
contests, beauty contests and similar competitions. It was reasoned out thus:
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in this
islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have
taken part in them either as contestants in their school days (In the College of Law, U.P. annual
oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice Labrador in
1916), or as members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some few verdicts did not reflect
the audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet
no party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the
board's decision is final and unappealable.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest tenets of
sportsmanship: finality of referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are
supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes are
secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs was merely the privilege to
compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they
were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in American
jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords some reason for
doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion
must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal
principle not in harmony with the generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012.)
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that
where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general
jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the
board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean
the same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the aforesaid principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As
stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the
board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of 'damnum absque
injuria'. This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But
then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously
injured her. Not against the other judges.
But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court below apparently did, that judicial
intervention might be sought in cases of this nature, still, We are inclined to sustain the order of
dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of appellant to comply with the requirements of Section
1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with
a copy of the judgment or order subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule
but by precedents as well. In the case of Alajar, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,5where it was
claimed by therein petitioners that the respondent court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
estimating certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans instead of cans, allegedly in
complete disregard of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation
Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No.
L-6191,6 and in ordering thereafter the division of the said rice harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of
the tenants, this Court denied the petition for certiorari on the ground, among others, of failure on the
part of said petitioners to attach to their petition copies of the decisions allegedly violated. Speaking
thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this Court held:
The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not even sufficient in form and substance to
justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for. It charges that the Court of Industrial Relations
abused its discretion in disregarding the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No. L-6191; yet it does not attach to the
petition the decisions allegedly violated by the Court below and point out which particular portion or
portions thereof have been disregarded by the respondent Court.
The same principle was applied in the more recent case of NAWASA vs. Municipality of Libmanan, et
al.,7 wherein this Court dismissed (by Resolution) the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and
the municipality of Libmanan. In the following language, this Court emphasized the importance of
complying with the said requirement of Rule 65:
While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint filed by the respondent municipality with the
respondent court for recovery of property with damages (Civil Case No. L-161) no copy thereof is
attached to the petition.
Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision rendered by the respondent court on
December 10, 1965, but no copy thereof is attached to the petition.
Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of default entered by the respondent court and of
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the case above-mentioned, but no copy of the order
of default is attached to its petition.
Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was filed for the purpose of enjoining the
respondent court from executing the decision rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the importance of the
missing pleadings is obvious.
Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an order commanding the respondent court to
approve either the original or the amended record on appeal filed petition, but no copy of either is
attached to its petition.
In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is dismissed.
It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the programme of the
graduation exercises held by the Sero Elementary School in the morning of the very day of that
graduation exercises, implying that he could not have attached then a copy thereof (to show the
decision of the committee of teachers in the ranking of students complained of) to his petition. The
stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such decision of the said committee of
teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him, even before the filing of his
petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally appealed the said
committee's decision with various higher authorities of the above-named school, who merely passed
the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition various other documents or papers
— as the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of their
committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I certificate — which appellant never
bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he miserably failed to comply with
the requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned. With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to pass
upon the other two errors assigned by appellant.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1 Ruperto vs. Torres, et al., L-8785, February 25, 1957, (Unreported).
2 Municipal Council of Lemery vs. Provincial Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 268.
3 See pp. 5-6, Brief for Appellees.
4 91 Phil. 482 (May 30, 1952).
5 G.R. Nos. L-8174 and L-8280-86, October 8, 1955, 97 Phil. 675.
6 Republic of the Philippines vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461.
7 L-27197, May 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 337.
47. Felipe vs. Leuterio, 91 Phil. 482 (1952)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4606 May 30, 1952
RAMON B. FELIPE, SR., as Chairman, Board of Judges, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, EMMA IMPERIAL,
represented by her guardian-ad-litem JUSTO V. IMPERIAL, and SOUTHERN LUZON
COLLEGE, respondents.
Ramon Felipe, Jr., and L. B. Karingal for petitioner.

Ezequiel S. Grageda and Victoriano Yamson for respondents Judge Leuterio and Emma Imperial.
Padilla and San Juan for respondent Southern Luzon College.
BENGZON, J.:
Statement of the case. The issue in the litigation is whether the courts have the authority to reverse the
award of the board of judges of an oratorical competition.
In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor was given by the board of five judges to
Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the court of the first
instance of that province to reversed that award, alleging that one of the judges had fallen to error in
grading her performance. After a hearing, and over the objection of the other four judges of the contest,
the court declared Emma Imperial winner of the first place. Hence this special civil action challenging the
court's power to modify the board's verdict.
The facts. There is no dispute about the facts:
1. On March 12, 1950 a benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga City. The contestants
were eight, among them Nestor Nosce, Emma Imperial, and Luis General, Jr.
2. There were five judges of the competition, the petitioner Ramon B. Felipe, Sr. being the Chairman.
3. After the orators had delivered their respective pieces, and after the judges had expressed their
votes, the Chairman publicly announced their decision awarding first price to Nestor Nosce, second price
to Emma Imperial, third price to Menandro Benavides and fourth place to Luis General, Jr.
4. Four days afterwards, Emma Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting the verdict,
and alleging that one of the Judges had committed a mathematical mistake, resulting in her second
place only, instead of the first, which she therefore claimed.
5. Upon refusal of the Board to amend their award, she filed a complaint in the court of first instance.
6. At the contest the five judges were each furnished a blank form wherein he give the participants
grades according to his estimate of their abilities, giving number 1 to the best, number 2 to the second
best etc., down to number 8. Then the grades were added, and the contestant receiving the lowest
number got first prize, the next second prize, etc.
7. The sums for the first four winners were: Nosce 10; Imperial 10; Benevides 17, General 17, the Board
of judges having voted as follows:
Judge Nosce Imperial Buenavides General
Felipe Sr. ......... 3 1 2 4
Obias .............. 1 2 4 3
Rodriguez .......... 1 4 5 3
Prado .............. 3 2 1 3
Moll ............... 2 1 5 4
10 10 17 17
8. It appearing that Nestor Nosce and Emma Imperial had tied for the first place, the Chairman,
apparently with the consent of the board, broke the tie awarding first honors to Nosce and second
honors to Imperial.
9. For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms contained blank spaces in which, after the
names of the rival orators and their respective orations, the judge could not jot down the grades he
thought the contestants deserved according to "Originality", "Timeliness", "English", "Stage Personality",
"Pronunciation and Enunciation" and "Voice". From such data he made up his vote.
10. It was discovered later that the form filed by Delfin Rodriguez, one of the Judges, gave Imperial and
General the following ratings under the above headings; Imperial 19-15-15-18-14-14 Total 94-Place 4th
General 19-15-15 or 14-19-14-14 Total 95-Place 3rd.
11. Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of 94 and therefore should rank 3rd place in
Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3 from Rodriguez, her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten, with
the result that she copped first place in the speaking joust.
12. Rodriguez testified that he made a mistake in adding up Imperial's ratings; that she should have
been given a total of 95, or placed No. 3, the same as General; that he was not disposed to break the tie
between her and General and insisted that he wanted to give rank 3 to Imperial and rank 3 also to
General.
Discussion. Although it would seem anomalous for one judge to give the same rank to two contestants,
we will concede for the moment that Delfin Rodriguez could have given 3 to Imperial to General.
However if deductions are to be made from his recorded vote (Exhibit 3) one may infer that after the
contest and before submitting his vote he decided to give General an edge over Imperial. How? Under
the caption "English" General was given by himself at first "14", later increased to "15". Evidently
because after he had added the ratings of Imperial and (erroneously) reached the sum of 94, he added
the ratings of General (which were the same as Imperial with 14 under "English") and (mistakenly)
reached 94 also. So what did he also? He raised the 14 to 15 and thus gave general 95 to place him over
Imperial's 94. (Mistakingly again, because with 15 General got 96 instead of 95).
But to us the important thing is Rodriguez' vote during and immediately after the affair. His vote in
Exhibit 3 definitely gave General place No. 3 and Imperial place No. 4. His calculations recorded on
Exhibit 3 were not material. In fact the Chairman did not bother to fill out the blank spaces in his own
form, and merely set down his conclusions giving one to Imperial, 2 to Benavides etc. without specifying
the ratings for "Voice", "English", "Stage Personality" etc. In other words what counted was the vote.
Probably for the above reasons the board refused to "correct" the alleged error.
The situation then is this: Days after a contest has been conducted and the winners announced, one of
the judges confesses he made a mistake, that the ratings he gave the second place winner should have
been such as would entitle her to first place. The other judges refuse to alter their verdict. May the
matter be brought to the court to obtain a new award, reversing the decision of the board of judges?
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in these
islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have
taken part in them either as contestants in their school days1, or as members of the board of judges
afterwards. They know some (few) verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and that errors
have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial
intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest tenets of
sportmanship: finally of the referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are
supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes are
secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because their's was merely the privilege to
compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they
were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in American
jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords some reason for
doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion
must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal
principle not in harmony with the generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012).
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that
where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general
jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the
board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean
the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right.
As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by
the board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque
injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But
then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously
injured her. Not against the other judges.
By the way what is here in stated must not be understood as applying to those activities which the
government has chosen to regulate with the creation of the Games and Amusements Board in Executive
Order No. 392, Series 1950.
Judgment. In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so declare, that the judiciary has no
power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it would not
interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions.
Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo and Ladrador, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1
In the College of Law U.P. annual oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor in
1914 and to Justice Labradorin 1916.
48. Prudential Bank vs. Castro, 158 SCRA 646 (1988)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 2756 March 15, 1988
PRUDENTIAL BANK complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Acting on the "Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition" filed by respondent
Benjamin M. Grecia himself, dated February 8, 1988, praying that the decision of November 12,1987,
and the resolution of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said decision be set aside and a
new one entered by this Court dismissing the administrative complaint and exonerating the respondent,
the Court RESOLVED (1) the EXPUNGE said Petition, it being in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration filed without leave of Court, besides the fact that the first motion for reconsideration
filed by the same respondent had already been denied with finality on January 12, 1988; (2) to STRIKE
OUT Annex "1" of the Petition and its exclosures, Annex "1" being a xerox copy of a letter dated 04
August 1986 written by Judge Dionisio N. Capistrano to an unknown addressee, for being immaterial and
impertinent to this case for disbarment (Sec. 5, Rule 9, Rules of Court). The Court will not allow the filing
of such kinds of Petitions/Annexes that are not only irrelevant to the issue and presented out of time as
hereinafter explained, but are also scurrilous and defamatory.
Certain points raised in the Petition, however, call for separate treatment and determination.
1) The "Petition for Voluntary Inhibition" of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and Justice Teodoro R.
Padilla is DENIED there being no legal nor factual basis therefor. It is settled jurisprudence that after a
member has given an opinion on the merits of the case, a motion to disqualify a member of the
Supreme Court cannot be considered because litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action
of the Court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been rendered (Araneta vs. Dinglasan,
84 Phil. 368, citing Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of Abelia, 49 Phil. 374).
The decision to disbar respondent lawyer was the collective judgment of the Court, with the exception
of Justice Sarmiento who had inhibited himself, with no member in the least bit attempting to influence
one or the other. In fairness to the Chief Justice, and to disabuse the fears and suspicions of respondent
Grecia, it should be made of record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did the Chief
Justice show any ill will nor any signs of "vindictiveness" much less any attempt to "exact vengeance for
past affront" against respondent lawyer. All discussions were characterized by judicial objectivity
dictated only by the highest interests of the profession and public welfare.
Similarly, the plea for the inhibition of Justice Padilla has to be DENIED for being devoid of any valid
reason. Justice Padilla was counsel for Cityland Development Corporation in the case of Manchester
Development Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, Cityland Development Corporation, et al. (G.R. No.
75919, May 7,1987,149 SCRA 562), for which reason he took no part in the said suit. Cityland, however,
is not a party in this administrative case.
2) The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of
certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The
certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very
beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by.
any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which
by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court.
The certification in AM No. R-510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in
the Petition, is but an oversight.
But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its
decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or
an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be
assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.
3) No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in the Court's Minute Resolution, dated
January 12,1988, denying the motion for reconsideration "for lack of merit, the issues raised therein
having been previously duly considered and passed upon." It bears repeating that this is an
administrative case so that the Constitutional mandate that "no ... motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be ... denied without stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable. And even
if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the
Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis (see
Sec. 3, Rule 45).
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes
and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
As the Court's unanimous Resolution states, respondents' so-called petition for redress dated February
8, 1988 (in effect a second motion, filed without leave of Court, for reconsideration of the disbarment
decision of November 12,1987 and the Resolution of January 12, 1988 denying reconsideration) has
been filed out of time and has been expunged. Aside from the fact that the petition for my voluntary
inhibition is devoid of factual and legal basis, there is nothing left before the Court for determination on
the merits. Be that as it may, I had refrained from taking part in the deliberation on this incident and had
wanted to abstain even as a beau geste but submitted the question to the judgment of my peers.
Bowing to their collective judgment against my inhibition, I herewith express my fun concurrence with
the Court's action.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur. In addition, I wish to make this brief statement. I do not personally know respondent Benjamin
M. Grecia. As far as my memory can recall, I have not dealt with said respondent, personally or
professionally at any time. There is therefore absolutely no basis for respondent's claim that I have
acted with bias or prejudice against his cause.
In Manchester Development Corporation, et al., petitioners, vs.Court of Appeals, City Land Development
Corporation, et al., respondents, G.R. No. 75919, I took no part simply because I was a retained counsel
of the respondent City Land Development Corporation before my appointment to the Court. In this
administrative case, I have not been related, personally or professionally, with any party or counsel.
There is thus absolutely no reason for me not to take part in this case. In fact, I consider it a part of my
sworn duty to take part therein since there is absolutely no legal, moral or ethical ground which would
justify my inhibition.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
As the Court's unanimous Resolution states, respondents' so-called petition for redress dated February
8, 1988 (in effect a second motion, filed without leave of Court, for reconsideration of the disbarment
decision of November 12,1987 and the Resolution of January 12, 1988 denying reconsideration) has
been filed out of time and has been expunged. Aside from the fact that the petition for my voluntary
inhibition is devoid of factual and legal basis, there is nothing left before the Court for determination on
the merits. Be that as it may, I had refrained from taking part in the deliberation on this incident and had
wanted to abstain even as a beau geste but submitted the question to the judgment of my peers.
Bowing to their collective judgment against my inhibition, I herewith express my fun concurrence with
the Court's action.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur. In addition, I wish to make this brief statement. I do not personally know respondent Benjamin
M. Grecia. As far as my memory can recall, I have not dealt with said respondent, personally or
professionally at any time. There is therefore absolutely no basis for respondent's claim that I have
acted with bias or prejudice against his cause.
In Manchester Development Corporation, et al., petitioners, vs.Court of Appeals, City Land Development
Corporation, et al., respondents, G.R. No. 75919, I took no part simply because I was a retained counsel
of the respondent City Land Development Corporation before my appointment to the Court. In this
administrative case, I have not been related, personally or professionally, with any party or counsel.
There is thus absolutely no reason for me not to take part in this case. In fact, I consider it a part of my
sworn duty to take part therein since there is absolutely no legal, moral or ethical ground which would
justify my inhibition.
49. Consing vs. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 14 (1989)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 78272 August 29, 1989
DR. and MRS. MERLIN CONSING, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARIDAD SANTOS, respondents.
Sumulong Law Offices for petitioners.
Edgardo B. Arellano for private respondent,
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner Merlin Consing is the registered owner of a 9,643 sq. m. parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 312970 located in barrio Bayanbayanan, Marikina, Rizal. Sometime in 1971,
Consing caused the subdivision of said parcel of land into thirty-eight (38) lots and submitted a
subdivision plan to the Land Registration Commission (LRC) which was approved on January 25, 1971 as
a simple subdivision plan. Subsequently, Consing filed a petition for segregation of title and the issuance
of separate certificates of title for the 38 lots. In the same petition, Consing likewise informed the
Register of Deeds that he voluntarily grants the right of way in lots 2, 7, 8, 13, 14, 19, 20, 25, 26, 31, 32,
35, 36, and 37 [Exh. "3"]. The petition for segregation was granted and thereafter, doing business under
the name Mearle Homes, the spouses Consing engaged in the sale of these 38 lots.
On October 4, 1971 private respondent Caridad Santos and the Consings entered into an agreement
denominated as a "Contract of Sale" whereby the latter agreed to sell, transfer and convey to the
former a house and lot more particularly described as follows:
A newly constructed 4 bedrooms, two bathrooms, complete with light and water connections bungalow,
fenced on two parcels of land (Lot No. 26 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd 134075 and Lot No. 25 of
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd 134075, all being a portion of Lot B (LRC) Psd 133634, LRC Rec No. 7672
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED NINETY FOUR (294) SQUARE METERS & TWO HUNDRED NINETY
FIVE (295) SQUARE METERS, respectively more or less including the voluntary right of way, covered by
TCT No. 313386 and TCT 313385, respectively; located at Barrio Bayanbayanan, Municipality of
Marikina, Rizal [Exh."11"].
It is stipulated in said "Contract of Sale" that in consideration of the agreement to sell the buyer will pay
the seller P 110,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum, payable as follows: P25,000.00 upon the signing
of the contract and a monthly installment of P 1,020.14 payable on or before the fifth day of each
month beginning December 1971 without necessity of demand until the amount of the purchase price
and interest shall have been fully paid after which ownership would be transferred to the buyer.
Santos paid her monthly installments to the Consings. Starting May 1972, however, she defaulted in her
payments. Consing sent her several letters of demand to which she did not reply. On June 28, 1974,
counsel for the Consings sent a final demand letter to Santos asking her to settle her obligations which
by then have accrued to Pl 2,818.61, otherwise, they shall be constrained to resort to court litigation.
[Record, p. 12].
Santos, represented by a lawyer, manifested her willingness to settle her obligations on the condition
that the Consings comply with all the laws and regulations on subdivisions and after payment to her of
damages as a consequence of the use of a portion of her lot, more or less 168 sq.m., as a subdivision
road [Record, p. 13].
Subsequently, on July 26, 1974, the Consings filed an ejectment case against Santos. After trial, on
November 4, 1974, judgment was rendered by Judge Gregorio de la Paz of the Municipal Court of
Marikina in favor of the Consings.
It appears, however, that on August 22, 1974, with the ejectment case still pending, Santos filed with
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for specific performance with damages against the
Consings. On March 17, 1975, the CFI issued a restraining order enjoining the Municipal Court of
Marikina from resolving the motion for execution filed by the Consings in the ejectment case and from
taking further action in said case until further orders from the CFI [Record, p. 69].
Also borne out by the record is the criminal complaint filed by Santos against Merlin Consing charging
him with the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1964 of Marikina for contracting
to sell to her the two lots in question without first securing the approval of the Municipal Council of
Marikina for his subdivision plan [Exh. "1"]. On May 21, 1975 this complaint was dismissed by the fiscal
on the grounds of lack of a prima facie case and prescription [Exh. "1-b"].
At about the same time, Consing submitted his subdivision plan to the Municipal Council of Marikina for
approval. The council, in turn, referred the same to the Department of Local Government and
Community Development (DLGCD) in compliance with its Memorandum Circular No. 73-41 of
September 7, 1973. The DLGCD in its second endorsement dated March 13, 1975, noted that the
"subdivision plan meets in general the requirements in the subdivision regulations of this Office with
respect to lot areas and lot frontages except the street widths which are not indicated as road lots and
which are below the 10 m. minimum requirement. It is therefore recommended that the existing roads
should be indicated on the plan as road lots and the corresponding areas along the sides of the said
roads as corrected, be reserved for future road widening and annotated in the title as such and should
be excluded from the sale of the corresponding affected lots. . . ." [Exh. "D"]
On August 28, 1981, the CFI rendered judgment finding that although the Consings may have "corrected
the irregularities and/or [have] complied with the legal requirements for the operation of their
subdivision, they cannot escape their liability to [Santos] for having sold to her portions of the roads or
streets denominated as right-of-way. On this ground alone, this Court believes that [Santos] was fully
justified in refusing to pay further her monthly amortizations. In the interest of justice, fair play and
equity, this Court believes that there shall be a proportionate reduction of the purchase price of the two
lots corresponding to the area of 168 square meters, more or less, used as a [right] of way." [Record, p.
485]. The dispositive portion of the CFI decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff (Santos), ordering the defendants
Consings to allow the plaintiff to continue paying her monthly amortizations of the two lots in question
of the reduced purchase price of P 78,375.68, after deducting whatever amounts were already paid by
her.
Defendants are further ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P 10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
The restraining order issued against Municipal Judge Gregorio C. de la Paz is made permanent.
Plaintiffs other prayers for relief, as well as defendants' counterclaim, are dismissed, for lack of merit.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED [Record, p. 486].
The Consings interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the CFI with
modification as to the computation of the amount to be deducted from the purchase price. The decretal
portion of the CA decision 1 is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with the modification that the reduced purchase
price of the property in question should be, as it is hereby fixed, at P 94,312.16 instead of P 78,375.68.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED [CA Decision, pp. 12-13].
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner-spouses filed this petition for review citing the
following reasons why the decision of respondent court should be reviewed and their petition allowed:
1. The decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals in this case does not comply with the
requirements of Article VIII, section 13, of the New Constitution;
2. It is arbitrary and there is no law to support Judge Pineda and the respondent Court of Appeals in
holding that when the Consings constituted a voluntary right of way on Lots 25 and 26, the portions
subject to the right of way ceased to be owned by the Consings and became streets or road lots which
the Consings have no right to sell;
3. It is arbitrary and contrary to the documented facts for the respondent Court of Appeals to say that
the portions of Lots 25 and 26 subject to a voluntary right of way are actually used as streets or roads
even though it is clearly stated in the lot titles, in the location plans, and in the contract of sale, that said
portions are not streets or roads, but are portions subject to voluntary right of way, and in spite of the
fact that the subdivision was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner as a simple subdivision
plan which clearly shows that there are no streets or road lots in the subdivision.
4. It is arbitrary for Judge Pineda and the respondent Court of Appeals to suppose that the portions of
Lots 25 and 26 subject to right of way are streets or road lots and then compute the value of the said
portions in a careless and erroneous manner, deducting afterwards the value so computed from the P
110,000 purchase price; and
5. There is no legal or factual basis in ordering the Consings to pay P 10,000 attorney's fee to Caridad
[Rollo, pp. 24-25].
Thereafter, private respondent, as required by the Court, filed her Answer/Comment to which
petitioners filed their Reply. On May 2, 1988 the Court, after considering the allegations contained, the
issues raised and the arguments adduced in the pleadings submitted by the parties, gave due course to
the petition [Rollo, p. 84].
Petitioners first raise the issue of the Court of Appeals' non-compliance with the certification
requirement under Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Sec. 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in
division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the
opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part,
or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same
requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. [Emphasis supplied].
The first sentence of this provision outlining the decision-making process of the Supreme Court is
adopted from both the 1935 2 and 1973 3 Constitutions. The latter Constitution further broadened the
application of the requirement on the decision-making process by mandating that this "shall be
observed by all inferior collegiate courts."
The certification 4 requirement, however, is a new provision introduced by the framers of the 1987
Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the implementation of the constitutional requirement that
decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts, such as the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, are reached after consultation with the members of the court
sitting en banc or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision-writing. The
decision is thus rendered by the court as a body and not merely by a member thereof [I Record of the
Constitutional Commission 498-500], This is in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which
arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of
the required majority vote.
The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for
decision had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule
131, Rules of Court]. The lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of
failure to observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for
the omission to account therefor [See I Record of the Constitutional Commission 460]. Such absence of
certification would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
The second and third assigned errors of petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals finding
that a portion of Lots 25 and 26, although called a voluntary right of way, is a subdivision road which
they have no right to sell. The Consings argue that it is a voluntary easement which they have a right to
constitute by virtue of Art. 619 of the New Civil Code and "[b]y constituting and establishing a voluntary
right of way in said two lots, the portions subject to the voluntary right of way did not become streets or
roads as held by Judge Pineda and the respondent Court of Appeals; they continue to be the property of
the Consings but subject to an encumbrance, i.e. subject to an easement of right of way." [Petition, p.
22; Rollo, p. 27]. Further, the Consings contend that "the portions of Lots 25 and 26 subject to voluntary
right of way can never be used as streets or road lots because [their] subdivision plan was approved by
the Land Registration Commissioner as a simple subdivision plan which means that there are no streets
or road lots in the subdivision, otherwise it would not have been approved as [such]." [Petition, p. 24;
Rollo, p. 29]. In fine, the Consings are alleging that there is no basis for the reduction in the purchase
price of the two lots.
Private respondent Santos on the other hand, avers that the alleged right of way is actually a subdivision
road. This road is included in the two lots sold to her and she is deprived of the use and enjoyment
thereof, hence, a reduction in the purchase price of said lots is in order.
Petitioners' contentions are devoid of merit. The evidence on record negates the Consings' assertion
that the portions subject to the voluntary easement of right of way are not roads. It is undisputed that
the Consings' subdivision plan was approved by the LRC as a simple subdivision which indicated no
streets or roads. However, this does not preclude the need for them within the subdivision. An
examination of the Consings' subdivision plan reveals that the land is subdivided into 38 lots with the so-
called voluntary right of way cutting across lots 2 and 3, 7 and 6, 8 and 9,13 and 12,14 and 15, 19 and 18,
20 and 21, 25 and 24, 26 and 27, 31 and 30, 32 and 33. The relative position of this "right of way" vis-a-
vis the lots shows that it is in fact a road without which the subdivision lot buyers would have no means
of access to and from the subdivision.
Moreover, as heretofore stated, when the Municipal Council referred the Consings subdivision plan to
the DLGCD the latter recommended that the existing roads within the subdivision should be indicated
on the plan as road lots. In turn, the Municipal Council of Marikina passed Resolution No. 70 approving
the subdivision plan of Mearle Homes, Inc. subject, however, to several conditions one of which is the
subdivision owner's compliance with the recommendation of the DLGCD. On May 19, 1975, Merlin
Consing wrote a letter addressed to the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Council of Marikina wherein he
admitted that "the road lots as shown in the plan originally approved by the Land Registration
Commission are the Right-of-way which are annotated in the corresponding transfer Certificate of Titles,
copies of which were supplied or forwarded to your office. These are the road lots mentioned.
..."[Exh."24"].
In this same letter, Merlin Consing stated that "the road lots annotated in their corresponding titles ARE
NOT INCLUDED in the sale of the property." However, the transfer certificates of title covering lot 25 and
lot 26 clearly state the boundaries thereof and when compared to the Consings' subdivision plan would
reveal that the seller sold that portion covered by the right of way to the buyer. Further, the "Contract
of Sale" between the parties is specific that the property sold to Santos includes the voluntary right of
way [See Exh. "11" pertinent portion quoted in p. 2 of this decision].
In Lim v. De los Santos [G.R. No. L-18137, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 798] the Court had occasion to state
one duty of a subdivision lot seller. In said case the subdivision lot buyers instituted an action for specific
performance with damages to compel the sellers to construct the necessary roads in the subdivision
that would serve as outlets. The sellers' motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action was
sustained by the trial court because the contract to sell between the parties mentioned no obligation on
the part of the defendants to construct roads. The case reached this Tribunal and in resolving the issue
of whether or not the complaint stated a cause of action, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice JBL
Reyes, declared that "[t]he allegations in the complaint that defendant-vendor made representations
that 'she would have constructed (i.e., would cause to be built) adequate outlets' for the lots sold do not
strike us to be so improbable as to justify their being disbelieved de plano. After all, a seller's duty is to
deliver the thing sold in a condition suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer for the purposes
contemplated (Sent. Trib. Supreme of Spain, 17 Nov. 1930), and proper access to a residence is essential
to its enjoyment. . . ." [at 802; Emphasis supplied].
In the case at bar, in including as part of Santos' purchase price the value of the subdivision road,
petitioners have shifted to her the burden of providing for an access to and from the subdivision. The
Consings have thus failed in their duty as subdivision lot sellers and for such failure and consequent
unfairness and injustice to Santos, the latter should be entitled to a proportionate reduction in her
purchase price of the two lots.
Petitioner-spouses also allege that the CA erred in its computation of the amount to be deducted from
the purchase price of the lots. They contend that respondent court had no basis when it made its
computation and it merely assumed the price to be deducted.
The CFI's computation deducted from the total purchase price of P 110,000.00 the price per square
meter of the lots multiplied by the total area covered by the right of way which is 168 sq.m. In arriving at
the price per square meter of the two lots, the trial court divided the total purchase price by the total
area of the two lots, which is 589 sq.m.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Consings took exception to this method of computation alleging
that the trial court failed to take into account the value of the bungalow constructed on the lots and
which is part of the contract. The Court of Appeals found merit in this allegation and re-computed the
price per square meter of the two lots in the following manner:
... There is, however, no evidence showing the price of the land sold, separately from that of the house
erected thereon. Be that as it may, it may be reasonably assumed under the circumstances of the case,
that one-half (1/2) of the price of the property corresponds to the house and the other half to the lot.
Upon this assumption, the price per square meter of the land (with a total area of 589 square meters)
may be placed at P 93.38, and the price of 168 square meters of right of way at P 15,687.84 (instead of
P31,375.68 stated in the appealed decision) which is logically and reasonably deductible from the total
purchase price due from the appellee. In consequence, the total reduced purchase price of the subject
property may be fixed at P 94,312.16 (or P l10,000.00 minus P l5,687.84). [CA Decision, p. 11].
Indeed, the record is bereft of any evidence as regards the price of the two lots sold to Santos separately
from the price of the bungalow constructed thereon. The exhibits presented by the parties and their
testimonies do not reveal separate valuations of the bungalow and the two lots. Evident therefore is the
fact that the purchase price of P110,000.00 is for both the bungalow and the two lots sold
as one property. Further, to require the parties to adduce their respective evidence as to the separate
valuations of the properties in question would only serve to unduly delay the disposition of the case.
Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals' computation that one-half of the purchase price of P
110,000.00 corresponds to the value of the bungalow and the other half to the two lots is both just and
fair. Accordingly, the Court will not disturb the same.
Finally, petitioners allege that "there is no basis for awarding attorney's fees to (private respondent] in
this case because the Consings have not 'acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy
[Santos'] plainly valid, just and demandable claim' (Art. 2208, para. 5 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines)" [Petition, p. 26; Rollo, p. 31]. The evidence on record, however, proves otherwise. While
the Consings have secured the necessary licenses to operate a subdivision from the Municipal Council of
Marikina and the National Housing Authority they, however, exerted the effort to obtain them only after
private respondent filed a complaint for specific performance against them. Moreover, as heretofore
mentioned, petitioner-spouses constituted an alleged "right of way" over the two lots sold to private
respondent which as the evidence on record reveals was intended to be a subdivision road occupying
168 sq. m. of the total 589 sq. m. of the lots sold. This conduct on the part of the petitioners clearly
shows gross and evident bad faith, not to mention lack of fairness, for which reason affirmance of the
award of P 10,000.00 attorney's fees in favor of private respondent is in order.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Cecilio L. Pe with Justices Desiderio P. Jurado and Antonio M. Martinez concurring.
2 Article VIII Sec. 11. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision shall
be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Justice for the writing of the opinion of the
Court. Any Justice dissenting from a decision shall state the reasons for his dissent.
3 Article X Sec. 8. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc
or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court. Any Member dissenting from a decision shall state the reasons for his dissent.
The same requirements shall be observed by all inferior collegiate courts.
4 In a letter-query dated June 22, 1987 addressed to the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Claudio
Teehankee, the then Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Carolina Grino-Aquino manifested that
"[i]n a meeting last week of the chairmen of the present 16 divisions of the Court of Appeals . . . the
majority were for adopting, with slight modification, the forms now used by the Supreme Court for the
"attestation" of the division chairmen, and for the "certification" of the Chief Justice on the decisions of
that Court." The Minutes of the CA en banc session on June 26, 1987reveals that it was only during this
time that the members of the CA agreed that each division can adopt its own certification as long as the
Constitutional requirement is satisfied. In the same meeting the Presiding Justice made known her
intention to comply with the requirement immediately after her letter-query is acted upon by the SC. In
an en banc resolution dated June 23, 1987 (promulgated onJune 29, 1987) the SC approved the CA's
proposed certification. It is evident therefore that not until after June 1987 did the Court of Appeals
begin to make the certification required under the 1987 Constitution. The CA decision in this case was
rendered on April 30, 1987.
50. Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385 (December 6, 2000)
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO,
BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU
MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON
BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY
DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW
ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT
P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY,
CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G.
DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H.
ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H.
MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S.
LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL,
FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M.
MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M.
LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M.
EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-
PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),
the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998
their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples
and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the
petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or
to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae
and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene
with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in
turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private
but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable
for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral
domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner
of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall
be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease
and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371;
and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of
R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with
the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza
voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the
law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7,
and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join
in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant
to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 114.
2
Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.
3
Id. at 23-25.
4
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
5
Rollo, pp. 25-27.
6
Id. at 27-28.
7
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses
and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner1 wrote:2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-
dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient
practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and
interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation,
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are
obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same
token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into
the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on
state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be
appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion
attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA
was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous
cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical
injustice to our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not
constitute part of the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains does not
deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision in their development
and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of
the law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed under
Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be harmonized with
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian
Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the
country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of
the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal
crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant
be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition,
but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may
wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at such
time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts,
farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this
purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and
receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us
to be disposed of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became
the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of
distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and
civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the
various modes of land grant from the Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory
claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree
of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the
Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees.8 This was the last Spanish land law
promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands,
otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of the
United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903,
the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first
Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation
or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's
predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in
1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land
by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year
adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had
given them title to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the
land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws which
from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies."10 The question
posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State
as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in the
Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific
colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was
decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands
should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal
Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court
interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the
Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This
statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king.
It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private
person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants
of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed
by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected
in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length
of time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on
the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the
kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands granted by the king, the decree
provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land
should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown.14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's principal
subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x
cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue
of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties
interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a
just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be
granted to others."15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied" by
private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with
contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs'
case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the
earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for
a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the
absolute owner."16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these
Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any
action by the State."17 Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere possession.
Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the
provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government from
earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has
been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the Philippine Bill
of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine
Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands
in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,"
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and
for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained
in the government;19 and that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and
other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States.20 The term "public land" referred to all
lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands.22
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law was passed
under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936
by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it
is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory
provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par
with Filipino citizens and corporations.24
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or the
Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and
private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy
of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the principles and
procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after
the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue
an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property
described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or
reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land
are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and
negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating
objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the
natural resources of the country.28There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of
the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization.30 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not
certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention
approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National
Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National Economy
and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or
it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein,
whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that
petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples,
Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is
simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which
traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary
laws and traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is to
a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an
unconscionable consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance
and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and protect their culture,
traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences
and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven
(7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the
Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and
the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central
Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the
Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were
merged under a revitalized structure.38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still
unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's
decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized
and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with
customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to
₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)
or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is
the contemporary international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention
16941 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously
lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under
claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing
common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include
peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which
inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-
indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced
from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous

societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories
under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs,
traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural
inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from
the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the
time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have
resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao,
Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of 110
tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga,
Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan;
Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of
Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan,
Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of
Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of
Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the
Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros Occidental;
the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of
Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog,
Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan
del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and
Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and
Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of
Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of
Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato;
the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo,
Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000 to 30,000
B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos,
Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural
features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences
from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic
strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and
traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became supplementary
activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the soil.46 From the
hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous
culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout
the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical
climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences.47 Life was
essentially subsistence but not harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had languages
that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media of daily
communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts
and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their
lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and
life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang
Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos
adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as
something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life, indicating
the importance of the relationship between man and the object of nature.51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word
"balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores.52 The barangay was basically a
family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different
and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and
promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of
government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of
war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from generation to
generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs and
chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community.54 The written laws were those that
the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose.55 The oldest known
written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are
the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the laws
dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and
punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were
decided peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as
"jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a
board composed of elders from neutral barangays acted as arbiters.57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The chiefs
merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the
family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore, participated
in the community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a member of the
barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing
of resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of land was
non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of
lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended
for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land
communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of
importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and
sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to provide them
with the leadership and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The
Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by
Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction:
Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon.62The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward
Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but
was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a
provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer,
cession or sale of land.64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where most
production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They
were not economies geared to exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay
membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands
into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos living in
barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on
the missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in
a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude
towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize
these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and
material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same
laws."69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would be
constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their houses around the church
and the unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to
"tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa
real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the
Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt
Hispanic culture and civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not
assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to
the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public
domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law.73 The
concept that the Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was
imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the
Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First were
the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were
the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities.75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards and
was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the
lowest classes.76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila and
the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into
the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish
interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing
the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial
administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization
process, separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian community.78 Their own political,
economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of
suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the
other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related populace
through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed the
existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization, the
American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and
with the national conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian Filipinos.
The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly,
"to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart
from settled communities."82
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act No. 253
creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's
primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in
Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about
their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with
American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and
produced a wealth of valuable materials about them.83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue then
was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and
complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos
or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said
national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National
Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous
peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National
Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American
regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of assimilation
understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and
Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal
wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide
open spaces in Mindanao.86Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system
resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With government initiative and
participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples
were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national government in the name of national
development.87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities
in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities" were
addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural
communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and
their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the formulation
and implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions
to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate
the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time "protect
the rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community."89 In short,
while still adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to
preserve their way of life.90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands
Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the national
cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the
expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and
Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power
Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries
Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized by law in
1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in
Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives.93 Timber concessions, water
projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the national government led not
only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction
of their natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office
of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities all under the Office of the President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to
preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly
guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By
recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right
to live in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are
non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-
government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the
Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest
of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat
worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their
customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration,
represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems
were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The
economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The
social structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was
maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social courtesies and
ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional concept of
permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies
to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or
stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership,
and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the
concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation
but the future ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and
spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.100 Customary law has a strong
preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or
families who are related by blood or by marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same locality who
may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws
draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production. The
Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products,
and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial
grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common
economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual
ownership.The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual
ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the
property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil
Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged
except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in
the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member
before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of
the ili.105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of
individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our
national land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands.
Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and
House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four
proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural
Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of
Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth
Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous
peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the
dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their Christian
brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the
hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive
exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became
marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against
the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to
their ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine
Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal
Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to legitimize the wholesale
landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant homesteaders within the
traditional areas of the ICCs."109
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land long
before any central government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they ruled
themselves and related with other tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the
mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality.
Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio-
cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending on
it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based
on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine reinstated
in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the
State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was first laid down in the case of Cariño v.
Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural
communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling
has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases."111
Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529,
R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or
implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence of
ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented the
policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown
during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic when
government organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral land.
The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power of the
State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering
from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in their
relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor and
none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural
Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor by Rep.
Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would
promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and ascertain that
these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that
remained long before this Republic was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need,
Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into
reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be
considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the
Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular
Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the
Spanish and American regimes.115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was
approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not
Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral
lands.Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b]
of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare.
It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually
owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,
continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into
by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains
comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable
or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the
home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except
that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also
utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include
but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the
delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of
Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the IPRA
on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in identification and
delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the
boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51 and
52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said
law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding by
the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT) in the name of the community concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral
domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs
concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions.123 With respect to ancestral lands
outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).124
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds in
the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two
modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory
reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands
and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and
are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be
recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be
embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however,
is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The
IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public
land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never
been public lands and are private.
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular
Government.130 Cariñofirmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any
royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares of
land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and
occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the property
for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land
in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but
no document issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land
under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The North American colonial government, however, ignored his
possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property
in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation133 was
proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the property
with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cariño, off the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to the land. Both
the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet
which reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cariño's application. The Philippine Supreme
Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that
Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required
registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the
absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held
from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized
as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is
true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United
States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the
inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left
on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall
insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize
actual facts, are matters for it to decide."137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the new
colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due process" as
well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It was based on the strong mandate
extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States.
Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of
the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking
over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with
paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the
natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369,
section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are
to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the
attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its
attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the
safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides
that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the light
of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was
ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or
that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a
large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by
native custom and by long association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their
own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been
held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly
in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the
benefit of the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or memory
went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have
been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904
decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees
did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize
that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the
preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were
admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it
was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees
and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives
were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not
assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at
will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a
contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others,
when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by
good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal
overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse.
The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this
recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over unconquered
territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives
that failure to register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of such land. The
registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he
had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank
enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under
Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various
interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong
"due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.142 This title was
sufficient, even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens
certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not
without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice
the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental
principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law
and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of
what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio
Municipality in his name.144
Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as
"native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the
Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to
anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish
Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the
technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights
and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect
seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island of Luzon, at least,
for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to
enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of
the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to
Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law
from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law
Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made after Professor
Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and
development of Philippine land laws.147 He discussed Cariño extensively and used the term "native title"
to refer to Cariño's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined by
Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians.148 This is
not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American regime, government
policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native Americans.149 This was clearly
demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to
remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao,
Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans,
including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus
claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground
of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the
only successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their
health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they roamed.151 Speaking through Justice
Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands
in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical
with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable
lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state
of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians
may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical.
But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United
States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located,
they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the
country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that
when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental
system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro
as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States."153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian reservation is
a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes
of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be
established by custom and prescription.155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the
"aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on the
actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense
that such lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation.157 It
is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in
numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal
possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have held and
occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement
by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's
Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of two (2)
Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private
persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of
the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates
of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world
by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they found it
necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle
that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery
was made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole
right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives,
the court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by
themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,
entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to
be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to
use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title
to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted
the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this
ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have
been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire Indian
land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or Holland-
did this right belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right
nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or
conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her
subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them,
it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title
paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has
never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with
this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the universal
recognition of this principle.163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without having
to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens.164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of Georgia enacted
a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from
the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs,
who were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a violation of the
Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties established
between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating
intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States government and the
Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for the
supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their
country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection
of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the
establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the
Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power. They
assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that
of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a
master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial
boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm
purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802,
which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the
lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as
well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct
from others." x x x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia
have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties
and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by
our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all
other European governments. Designated as the naked fee,169 this title was to be consummated by
possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians'
legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the
land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land- either by
purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the
discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while
the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the
ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves.170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands occupied
by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the discovering
European nation and later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of occupancy in the
Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting
the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of
complete ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the
whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by
Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property
right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government who, as sovereign, possessed
exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as
legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long
time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and
customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians
have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of individual
Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe
generally being held in communal ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to designate
such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws.178 Indian land which has been
abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part
of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians.180 Once set apart by
proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is extinguished, no
one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of,
them.181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of indigenous
Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property
systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a
comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and
aboriginal title, however, there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American
Indians may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the
Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of
the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by action
authorized by Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by
persons other than the Federal Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to
recognize the native Americans' ownership of these lands,186 the power of the State to extinguish these
titles has remained firmly entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral domains
and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between its
application in the Philippines vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the
peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA grants
ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is
private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes
native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the private character
of ancestral domains and lands. Cariñowas cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of
acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the
Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions
specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed
to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land.189 The land ceases to be part of the
public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
the prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule that all
lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public
domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession of
an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had
been private property even before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under the
provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariño was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive
prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and
adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open
and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens194 and
members of the national cultural minorities195 that converts the land from public into private and
entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by
the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of
registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts
ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary
implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural
land simply for registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-
owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial or
for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral
lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually
used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of
eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval of
this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be
individually, not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept
of owner since time immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the
individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands
regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements of
the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with
lands of the public domain.198 Its provisions apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or
concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated
by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of
private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP
wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land,
regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public
agricultural land for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a
limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date
of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the
1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or
timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral
lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To
classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a
nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The
IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital
concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs.201
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs
distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this
constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form
of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership
under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to
Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete
titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four
hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands
subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been
occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent
issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not
since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this
section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real
property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law.203
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural
land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial
confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is
sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be
confirmed judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights of
ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428
and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through
the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily
includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and
dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces,205 the right to
consume the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing
owned,207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other person to
whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of
ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs
private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the
indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public
domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the
ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral
domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held.209 These communal rights,
however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code.210 Co-ownership gives
any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly
provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned.211 To allow
such a right over ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but
of the very community itself.212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less
corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to
an extension of another fifty years in any single instance.213 Every stockholder has the right to
disassociate himself from the corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved
voluntarily or involuntarily.215
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to all
generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the
ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold
or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are communal.
These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members
of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of
redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces
a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under customary law. 217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of
law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where
no codal provision is applicable.219 In other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil
Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to
ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and
coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT is merely
a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by
virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of
the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land, being
people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the
faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the
land- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings
between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.222
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2,
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Section 7
provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right to develop,
control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve
natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to
benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein;
the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas
for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon
the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may
sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom. No
ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other
than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the
State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary
life support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated
systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have
been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare
and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the
area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to
amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights
to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of
any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent
of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall
have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of
transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers (a)
lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d)
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural
resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d)
the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to
claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance
with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section 8
gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs
or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title
over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not
Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their
Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared
in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration,
development and utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control and supervision,
and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or
financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the
exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake
the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through
co-production,224joint venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements may be for a
period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the small-
scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these
resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the President, may
enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
(R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-sharing, may
apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities
which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or
heavy mining equipment."229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains
includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and
improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration
does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional
fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources found within
the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover
"waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, floraand fauna and all other natural resources"
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with
the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of
the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural
resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These
rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use,
right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land
and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or
any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and
natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7
(a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over
land does not necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found on or
under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a)
speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b)
and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later, do
not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and
categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the
Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the law,
it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the
Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2,
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants the
ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and
conserve natural resourceswithin the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources
found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in
the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will
affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the
government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the
following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just
and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit
and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions
for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and
conservation measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and
environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to
the exploitation and development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or
stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or
negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the
natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the
"utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and
customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale
utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural
resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in
recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly
situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival."235 Section 7 (b) also
expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental
and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject
utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and
utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for
not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into
with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has
agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take
appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural resources

within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources within the ancestral domains
obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial
or other extensive use that require technology other than manual labor.236 The law recognizes the
probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization
of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be
entered into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural
resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation
thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not
necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that
owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to
whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine
that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by
implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in
relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake
the development and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may
recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are
found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them.
The State may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether
natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its
agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP
member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the
ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the State, as
owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the
development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the
ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may
enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or
foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-
scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give
priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose which
option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely
undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must
undertake such endeavour always under State supervision or control. This indicates that the State does
not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the
law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural
resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following
provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or
entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that the area
affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-
based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That
no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of
the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-
owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing
agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have
the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the
requirement of this consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural resources
shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral
domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been
conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance
with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project granted by
any department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession,
license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area
subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP
with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any
concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs
have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the
certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral
domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL

MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to
prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources. First,
the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling
their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on
Human Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North
American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for
fundamental rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,239 and during the 1980's,
indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the
first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance
that carried out successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they
have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a
result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and
the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the national governments'
inability to deal with the situation.241Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda.242
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and
specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs
as a result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin America.243 The World Bank now seeks to apply
its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for
the projects of the Asian Development Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a State
policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and development.245 The
IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international category of IPs,246 and is heavily
influenced by both the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations
(UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the prevention of
discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO
No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new
international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist orientation
of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their
own institutions, ways of life and economic development."250
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious
differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through
the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation.251 Largely
unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society,
specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the
evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems.252 It is
through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in
terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines
became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of
the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a
whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization,253 it is this Court's duty to
acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-
existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997.
Footnotes
1
Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law
School.
2
The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 67, Summer 2000, No. 3, p. 573.
3
Dominium is distinguished from imperium which is the government authority possessed by the state
expressed in the concept of sovereignty- Lee Hong Hok v. David, 48 SCRA 372, 377 [1972].
4
Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 543 [1904]; See also Florencio D.R. Ponce, The Philippine Torrens
System, p. 13 [1964].
5
Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 5 [1986]; these grants were better known as
repartimientos and encomiendas. Repartimientos were handouts to the military as fitting reward for
their services to the Spanish crown. The encomiendas were given to Spaniards to administer and
develop with the right to receive and enjoy for themselves the tributes of the natives assigned to them.-
Ponce, supra, p. 12, citing Benitez, History of the Philippines, pp. 125-126.
6
Narciso Pena, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 2 [1994].
7
The Mortgage Law is a misnomer because it is primarily a law on registration of property and
secondarily a mortgage law- Ponce, supra, at 16.
8
Ponce, supra, at 15.
9
3 Phil. 537 [1904].
10
Id. at 540.
11
Id. at 548.
12
Id. at 543-544.
13
Id. at 543.
14
Id. at 542-543. These comments by the court are clear expressions of the concept that Crown holdings
embraced both imperium and dominium—Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface
Between National Land Law and Kalinga Land Law, 58 P.L.J. 420, 423 [1983].
15
Id. at 545-546.
16
Id. at 543.
17
Id. at 557.
18
Id. at 553-554; Valenton was applied in Cansino v. Valdez, 6 Phil. 320 [1906]; Tiglao v. Insular
Government, 7 Phil. 80 [1906]; and Cariño v. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 [1906]; all decided by the
Philippine Supreme Court.
19
Please see Section 70, Act 926.
20
21
Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572 [1909]; also cited in Ponce, supra, at 32.
22
Archbishop of Manila v. Director of Lands, 27 Phil. 245 [1914]; also cited in Ponce, supra, at 32.
23
Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 250 [1961].
24
25
Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 26 [1982]; Noblejas, supra, at 32.
26
Noblejas, supra, at 32.
27
Ponce, supra, at 123-124; Noblejas, supra, at 33.
28
2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592 [1937].
29
Id. at 600.
30
Id. at 600-601.
31
Ibid.
32
Section 7.
33
Section 8.
34
Sections 13 to 20.
35
Sections 21 to 28.
36
Sections 29 to 37.
37
Sections 38 and 40.
38
Sections 74 to 77.
39
Section 69.
40
Section 73.
41
Convention Conerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989.
42
Guide to R.A. 8371, published by the Coalition for Ips Rights and ancestral Domains in cooperation
with the ILO and Bilance-Asia Department, p. 4 [1999]—hereinafter referred to as Guide to R.A. 8371.
43
Taken from the list of IPs sbmitted by Rep. Andolana to the house of Representatives during the
deliberations on H.B. No. 9125—Interpellations of Aug. 20, 1997, pp. 00086-00095. "lost tribes" such as
the Lutangan and Tatang have not been included.
44
How these people came to the Philippines may be explained by two theories. One view, generally
linked to Professor Otley H. Beyer, suggests the "wave theory"—a series of arrivals in the archipelago
bringing in different types and levels of culture. The Negritos, dark-skinned pygmies, came between
25,000 to 30,000 B.C. Their cultural remains are preserved by the Negrito-type Filipinos found in Luzon,
Visayas and Mindanao. Their relatively inferior culture did not enable them to overcome the pressures
from the second wave of people, the Indonesians A and B who came in 5,000 and 3,500 B.C. They are
represented today by the Kalinga, Gaddang, Isneg, Mangyan, Tagbanua, Manobo, Mandaya, Subanon,
and Sama. The first group was pushed inland as the second occupied the coastal and downriver
settlements. The last wave involved Malay migrations between 500 B.C. and 1,500 A.D. they had a more
advanced culture based on metal age technology. They are represented by the Christianized and
Islamized Filipinos who pushed the Indonesian groups inland and occupied much of the coastal, lowland
and downstream areas.
A second view is postulated by Robert Fox, F. Landa Jocana, Alfredo Evangelista, and Jesus Peralta.
Jocano maintains that the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays stand co-equal as ethnic groups without
any one being dominant, racially or culturally. The geographic distribution of the ethno-linguistic groups,
which shows overlapping of otherwise similar racial strains in both upland and lowland cultures or
coastal and inland communities, suggests a random and unstructured advent of different kinds of
groups in the archipelago—Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, published by the Manila Studies
Association, Inc. and the Philippine National Historical society, Inc., pp. 33-34 [1997]; Teodoro A.
Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, p. 21 [1990].
45
Tan, supra, at 35-36.
46
Onofre D. Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Edition, vol. 1, p.
13, Aklahi foundation, Inc. [1989]. It was in 800-1,000 A.D. that the Ifugaos of Northern Luzon built the
rice terraces—Id. at 37.
47
Id. at 5-6.
48
Id. at 13.
49
Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, p. 54 [1990].
50
Corpuz, supra, at 5.
51
Id. at 44-45.
52
Agoncillo, supra, at 40.
53
Id. at 40-41.
54
Rafael Iriarte, History of the Judicial System, the Philippine Indigenous Era Prior to 1565, unpublished
work submitted as entry to the Centennial Essay-Writing Contest sponsored by the National Centennial
Commission and the Supreme Court in 1997, p. 103, citing Perfecto V. Fernandez, Customs Laws in Pre-
Conquest Philippines, UP Law Center, p. 10 [1976].
55
56
Amelia Alonzo, The History of the Judicial System in the Philippines, Indigenous Era Prior to
1565,unpublished work submitted as entry to the Centennial Essay-Writing Contest sponsored by the
National Centennial Commission and the Supreme Court in 1997.
57
58
Renato Constantino, A Past Revisited , p. 38 [1975].
59
Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, published by the Manila Studies Ass’n., Inc. and the Phil.
National Historical Society, Inc., p. 43 [1997].
60
Id.
61
Id. at 43-44.
62
63
Id. at 48-49.
64
Cacho v. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil. 616, 625-627 [1914]; see also Ponce, The Philippine Torrens
System, pp. 11-12 [1964]. In Philippine pre-colonial history, there was only one recorded transaction on
the purchase of land. The Maragtas Code tells us of the purchase of Panay Island by ten Bornean datus
led by Datu Puti from the Atis under Marikudo in the 13th century. The purchase price for the island was
a gold salakot and a long gold necklace – Agoncillo, supra, at 25.
65
Constantino, supra, at 38.
66
Corpuz, supra, at 39.
67
Resettlement- "bajo el son de la campana" (under the sound of the bell) or "bajo el toque de la
campana"(Under the peal of the bell).
68
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].
69
Id. at 17, citing the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.
70
71
Id. at 80.
72
Corpuz, supra, at 277-278.
73
Id. at 277.
74
Id., N.B. But see discussion in Cariño v. Insular Government, infra, where the United States Supreme
Court found that the Spanish decrees in the Philippines appeared to recognize that the natives owned
some land. Whether in the implementation of these decrees the natives’ ancestral rights to land
were actually respected was not discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court; see also Note 131, infra.
75
76
Id. at 67.
77
Id. at 52-53.
78
Id. at 53.
79
Id. at 55.
80
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].
81
Memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.
660, 714 [1919]; also cited in People v. Cayat, supra, at 17-18.
82
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra, at 693.
83
Charles Macdonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and Integration,
Indigenous Peoples of Asia, p. 348, ed. by R.H. Barnes, A. Gray and B. Kingsburry, pub. by Association for
Asian Studies [1995]. The BNCT made a Bontok and subanon ethnography, a history of Sulu genealogy,
and a compilation on unhispanized peoples in northern Luzon.—Owen J. Lynch, Jr., The Philippine
Colonial Dichotomy: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 P. L. J. 139-140 [1988].
84
R.A. No. 1888 of 1957.
85
See People v. Cayat, supra, at 21; See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 694 [1919]
86
MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 351.
87
The construction of the Ambuklao and Binga dams in the 1950’s resulted in the eviction of hundreds
of Ibaloi families – Cerilo Rico S. Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights: Issues, Responses, and
Recommendations, Ateneo Law Journal, vol. 38, No. 1, p. 92 [1993].
88
Section 11, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution.
89
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1017 and 1414.
90
The PANAMIN, however, concentrated funds and resources on image-building, publicity, and impact
projects. In Mindanao, the agency resorted to a policy of forced resettlement on reservations,
militarization and intimidation- MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 349-350.
91
No occupancy certificates were issued, however, because the government failed to release the
decree’s implementing rules and regulations- Abelardo, supra, at 120-121.
92
Id., Note 177.
93
Id., at 93-94.
94
MacDonald, Indigenous People of the Philippines, supra, at 351.
95
E.O. Nos. 122-A, 122-B and 122-C. The preamble of E.O. No. 122-B states:
"Believing that the new government is committed to formulate more vigorous policies, plans, programs,
and projects for tribal Filipinos, otherwise known as Indigenous Cultural Communities, taking into
consideration their communal aspirations, customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests, in order to
promote and preserve their rich cultural heritage and insure their participation in the country’s
development for national unity; xxx"
96
Article II, sec. 22; Article VI, sec. 5, par. 2; Article XII, sec. 5; Article XIII, sec. 6; Article XIV, sec. 17; and
Article XVI, sec. 12.
97
MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 345.
98
Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, p. 54 [1997].
99
Cordillera Studies Program, Land Use and Ownership and Public Policy in the Cordillera, 29-30 [n.d.];
also cited in Dante B. Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in
Jurisprudence and Legislation, 5 Phil. Nat. Res. L.J. No. 1, pp. 47-48 [1992].
100
Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights, supra, at 98-99, citing Ponciano L. Bennagen, Indigenous
Attitudes Toward Land and Natural Resources of Tribal Filipinos, 31 National Council of Churches in the
Philippines Newsletter, Oct.-Dec. 1991, at 4-9.
101
Id. at 99, citing June Prill-Brett, Bontok Land Tenure (UP Law library, mimeographed).
102
Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface of National Land Law and Kalinga Law,
58 P.L.J. 420, 440-441 [1983].
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid.
106
Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface, supra, at 420.
107
Senate Bill No. 1728 was co-sponsored by Senator Macapagal-Arroyo and co-authored by Senators
Alvarez, Magsaysay, Revilla, Mercado, Enrile, Honasan, Tatad, Maceda, Shahani, Osmena and Romulo.
The Eighth Congress, through Senators Rasul, Estrada and Romulo filed a bill to operationalize the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution on indigenous peoples. The bill was reported out, sponsored an
interpellated but never enacted into law. In the Ninth Congress, the bill filed by Senators Rasul and
Macapagal-Arroyo was never sponsored and deliberated upon in the floor.
108
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Flavier, Legislative History of SBN 1728, Tenth Congress, Second
Regular Session, Senate, Oct. 16, 1996, pp. 15-16.
109
Id. at 12.
110
Id. at 17-18.
111
Id. at 13.
112
Journal of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, Senate, Session No. 5, Aug. 5-6, 1997, pp. 86-87.
113
Co-authors of the bill were Reps. Ermita, Teves, Plaza, Calalay, Recto, Fua, Luciano, Abad, Cosalan,
Aumentado, de la Cruz, Bautista, Singson, Damasing, Romualdo, Montilla, Germino, Verceles—
Proceedings of Sept. 4, 1997, pp. 00107-00108.
114
Sponsorship speech of Rep. Andolana of House Bill No. 9125, March 20, 1997.
115
Interpellation of Aug. 20, 1997, 6:16 p.m., p. 00061.
116
Section 3 [a], IPRA.
117
Section 3 [b], IPRA.
118
Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 14.
119
Section 44 [e], IPRA.
120
Section 51, IPRA.
121
Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 15.
122
A CADT refers to a title formally recognizing the right of possession and ownership of ICCs/IPs over
their ancestral domains identified and delineated in acordance with the IPRA—Rule II [c], Rules &
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, NCIP Admin. Order No. 1.
123
Section 53 [a], IPRA.
124
A CALT refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands- Rule
II [d], Implementing Rules, NCIP A.O. No. 1.
125
Section 52 [k], IPRA.
126
Section 3 [1], IPRA.
127
Section 11, IPRA.
128
Ibid.
129
41 Phil. 935 (1909), 212 U.S. 449, 53 L.Ed. 594.
130
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Juan Flavier, Leg. History of SBN 1728, Tenth Congress, Second
Regular Session, Oct. 16, 1996, p. 13.
131
It was the practice of the Spanish colonial government not to issue titles to Igorots—Owen J. Lynch,
Jr., Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws (1900-
1913), 63 P.L.J. 249, 288 [1988], citing the testimony of Benguet Provincial Governnor William F. Pack,
Records at 47, Cariño.
132
Maura Law or the Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1894.
133
Later named Camp John Hay.
134
Lynch, Invisible Peoples, supra, at 288-289.
135
7 Phil. 132 [1906].
136
In 1901, Cariño had entered into a promissory agreement with a U.S. merchant in Manila. The note
obliged Cariño to sell the land at issue "as soon as he obtains from the Government of the United States,
or its representatives in the Philippines, real and definitive title." See Lynch, Invisible Peoples, supra, at
290, citing Government’s Exhibit G, Records, at 137-138, Cariño.
137
Cariño v. Insular Government, supra, at 939.
138
Ibid.
139
Id. at 940.
140
Id. at 941.
141
Id. at 941-942.
142
Aranal-Sereno and Libarios, The Interface Between Kalinga Land Law, supra at 428-This artcile was
one of those circulated among the Constitutional Commissioners in the formulation of Sec. 5, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution (4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 33).
143
Id. at 944.
144
Certificate of Title No. 2 covering the 148 hectares of Baguio Municipality was issued not in the name
of Cariño who died on June 6, 1908, but to his lawyers John Hausserman and Charles Cohn and his
attorney-in-fact Metcalf Clarke. Hausserman, Cohn and Clarke sold the land to the U.S. Government in a
Deed of Quitclaim-Richel B. Langit, Igorot Descendants Claim Rights to Camp John Hay, Manila Times, p.
1, Jan. 12, 1998.
145
Id. at 939.
146
57 P.L.J. 268, 293-296 [1982].
147
From 1987 to 1988, Prof. Lynch allowed the P.L.J. to publish parts of his doctoral dissertation at the
Yale Law School entitled "Invisible Peoples: A History of Philippine Land Law." Please see the Legal Bases
of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty: An Inquiry, 62 P.L.J. 279 [1987]; Land Rights, Land Laws and Land
Usurpation: The Spanish Era (1568-1898), 63 P.L.J. 82 [1988]; The Colonial Dichotomy: Attraction and
Disenfranchisement, 63 P.L.J. 112; Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary
Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63 P.L.J. 249.
148
"Native title" is a common law recognition of pre-existing aboriginal land interests in Autsralia-
Maureen Tehan, Customary Title, Heritage Protection, and Property Rights in Australia: Emerging
Patterns of Land Use in the Post-Mabo Era, 7 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, No. 3, p. 765 [June 1998].
149
Lynch, Native Titles, supra, Note 164, p. 293.
150
39 Phil. 660 [1919].
151
Id. at 712-713.
152
Id. at 694.
153
Id. at 700.
154
42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 29 [1944 ed.].
155
There are 3 kinds of Indian reservations: (a) those created by treaties prior to 1871; (b) those created
by acts of Congress since 1871; and (c) those made by Executive Orders where the President has set
apart public lands for the use of the Indians in order to keep them within a certain territory- 42 C.J.S.,
Indians, Sec. 29 citing Sioux Tribe of Indians v. U.S. 94 Ct. Cl. 150, 170, certiorari granted 62 S. Ct. 631,
315 U.S. 790, 86 L. Ed. 1194, affirmed 62 S. Ct. 1095, 316 U.S. 317, 86 L. Ed. 1501. It is observed that the
first two kinds may include lands possessed by aboriginal title. The last kind covers Indian reservations
proper.
Until 1871, Indian tribes were recognized by the United States as possessing the attributes of nations to
the extent that treaties were made with them. In that year, however, Congress, by statute, declared its
intention thereafter to make the Indian tribes amenable directly to the power and authority of the
United States by the immediate exercise of its legislative power over them, instead of by treaty. Since
then, Indian affairs have been regulated by acts if Congress and by contracts with the Indian tribes
practically amounting to treaties- 41 Am Jur 2d, Indians, Sec. 55 [1995 ed].
156
42 C.J.S. Indians, Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].
157
Ibid.; see also U.S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., Ariz., 62 S. Ct. 248, 314 U.S. 339, 86 L. Ed. 260 [1941].
158
Ibid.
159
8 Wheat 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 [1823].
160
Id. at 680.
161
Id. at 689.
162
Id. at 696; see also 41 ALR Fed 425, Annotation: Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian
Lands, Sec. 2[a] [1979].
163
Buttz v. Northern Pac.R. Co., Dak., 7 S. Ct. 100, 119 U.S. 55, 30 L. Ed. 330, 335 [1886].
164
Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293-294; Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L.R. 48-49 [1947].
165
6 Pet 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 [1832].
166
Id. at 499.
167
Id. at 500.
168
Id. at 501.
169
The title of the government to Indian lands, the naked fee, is a sovereign title, the government having
no landlord from whom it holds the fee- Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation in
Wyoming v. U.S., 85 Ct. Cl. 331, certiorari granted U.S. v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 58 S. Ct. 609, 303
U.S. 629, 82 L. Ed. 1090, affirmed 58 S. Ct. 794, 304 U.S. 111, 82 L. Ed. 1213, 1218-1219 [1938].
170
Buttz v. Northern Pac. R. Co., Dak., at 30 L. Ed. 330, 335; Beecher v. Wetherby, Wis., 95 U.S. 517, 24 L.
Ed. 440, 441 [1877]; see also 42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].
171
Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal title to Indian Lands, 41 ALR Fed 425, Sec. 2 [b]
[1979]- hereinafter cited as Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands.
172
Ibid.; see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272, 99 L. Ed. 314, 320, 75 S. Ct. 313 [1955], reh den
348 U.S. 965, 99 L. Ed. 753, 75 S. Ct. 521.
173
Ibid.; Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., at 99 L. Ed. 320.
174
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 39 L. Ed. 2d 73, 94 S Ct. 772 [1974]; U.S. v.
Alcea Bank of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 91 L. Ed. 29. 67 S. Ct. 167 [1946].
175
For compensation under the Indian Claims Commission Act, the proof of aboriginal title rests on
actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time prior to the loss of the property.
(The Indian Claims Commission Act awards compensation to Indians whose aboriginal titles were
extinguished by the government through military conquest, creation of a reservation, forced
confinement of Indians and removal of Indians from certain portions of the land an the designation of
Indian land into forest preserve, grazing district, etc.) - Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Secs.
2[a], 3[a], pp. 431, 433, 437.
176
Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[b], p. 435.
177
41 Am Jr 2d, Indians, Sec. 59 [1995 ed.].
178
An allotment of Indian land contains restrictions on alienation of the land. These restrictions extend to
a devise of the land by will- Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. U.S., 235 U.S. 37, 59 L. Ed. 116,. 35 S. Ct. 6 [1914]; A
railroad land grant that falls within Indian land is null and void- Northern P. R. Co. v. U.S., 227 U.S. 355,
57 L.Ed. 544,33 S. Ct. 368 [1913]; Portions of Indian land necessary for a railroad right of way were, by
the terms of the treaty, declared "public land," implying that land beyond the right of way was private-
Kindred v. Union P.R. Co., 225 U.S. 582, 56 L. Ed. 1216, 32 S. Ct. 780 [1912]; see also 41 Am Jur 2d,
Indians, Sec. 58 [1995 ed].
179
Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[a], p. 433.
180
42 C.J.S. Indians, Sec. 29 [1944 ed.]
181
Ibid.
182
North American Indians have made much progress in establishing a relationship with the national
government and developing their own laws. Some have their own government-recognized constitutions.
Usually the recognition of Indian tribes depends on whether the tribe has a reservation. North American
tribes have reached such an advanced stage that the main issues today evolve around complex
jurisdictional and litigation matters. Tribes have acquired the status of sovereign nations within another
nation, possessing the right to change and grow- Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of
Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, Texas International Law
Journal, vol. 32: 97, 104 [1997].
183
Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293.
184
Dante Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in Jurisprudence and
Legislation, 5 Phil. Nat. Res. L.J. No. 1, pp. 43, 40 [Aug. 1992]; see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., supra,
at 320.
185
Ibid.
186
D. Gatmaytan, supra, citing Churchill, The Earth is Our Mother: Struggles for American Indian Land
and Liberation in the Contemporary United States, The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization
and Resistance 139 (M. Jaimes 1992); and Indian Law Resource Center, United States Denial of Indian
Property Rights: A Study in Lawless Power and Racial Discrimination, Rethinking Indian Law 15 (National
Lawyers Guild, Committee on Native American Struggles 1982).
187
Id., Note 28, stating that some earlier decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have held that Congress is
subject to the strictures of the Constitution in dealing with Indians. When an Indian property is taken for
non-Indian use, the U.S. government is liable for payment of compensation, and an uncompensated
taking may be enjoined. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 217 [1982], citing Shoshone Tribe v.
U.S. 299 U.S. 476 [1937]; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 [1912]; and Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249
U.S. 110 [1919].
188
See Discussion, infra, Part IV (c) (2).
189
Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 [1925]; Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437 [1980].
190
Ibid.
191
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509 [1986]; Director of Lands v. Buyco,
216 SCRA 78 [1992]; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapina, 235 SCRA 567 [1994].
192
75 Phil. 890 [1946].
193
Id. at 892.
194
Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141.
195
Sec. 48 [c], C.A. 141, as amended. This provision was added in 1964 by R.A. 3872.
196
Section 12, IPRA.
197
"Time immemorial" refers "to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/Ips
are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory
devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with
their customs and traditions." (Sec. 3 [p], IPRA).
198
Section 2, C.A. 141.
199
Section 8, C.A. 141.
200
The classification of ancestral lands 18% in slope or over as alienable in the IPRA is an exception to
Section 15, P.D. 705, the Revised Forestry Code.
201
Charles MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and Integration,
Indigenous Peoples of Asia, supra, at pp. 345, 350.
202
Section 5, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.
203
Words in bold were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 in 1964.
204
Words in bold were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 on June 18, 1964. On January 25, 1977,
however, Sec. 48 [b] and 48 [c] were further amended by P.D. 1073 stating that these provisions on
cultural minorities apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain- Please see
Republic v. CA and Paran, 201 SCRA 1, 10-11 [1991].
205
Jus utendi, jus fruendi.
206
Jus abutendi.
207
Jus disponendi.
208
Jus vindicandi. Please see Tolentino, Civil Code, vol. II, pp. 45-46 [1992]; see also Tolentino, vol. I, pp.
12-14.
209
Sec. 55, IPRA provides:
"Sec. 55. Communal rights.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the ancestral domains, whether
delineated or not, shall be presumed to be communally held: provided, That communal rights under this
Act shall not be construed as co-ownership as provided in Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the
New Civil Code."
210
Ibid.
211
Article 494, Civil Code.
212
Antonio M. La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title, Part II, 2 Phil. Nat. Res. L. J. 23 [Dec. 1989].
213
Section 11, Corporation Code.
214
Sections 60-72, Corporation Code.
215
Section 117, Corporation Code. Please see also La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title, Part II, supra,
at 23.
216
Section 5, par. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.
217
Customary law is recognized by the Local Government Code of 1991 in solving disputes among
members of the indigenous communities, viz:
"Sec. 412 (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities.- The customs and
traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of
the cultural communities."
218
Law writes custom into contract-Hongkong & Shanghai Bank v. Peters, 16 Phil. 284 [1910].
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced."
"Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence."
219
Article 78 on marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces-
this is now Art. 33 of the Family Code; Art. 118, now Art. 74 of the Family Code on property relations
between spouses; Art. 577 on the usufructuary of woodland; Art. 657 on easement of right of way for
passage of livestock; Arts. 678, 1315, 1376, 1522, 1564 and 1577. Please see Aquino, Civil Code, vol. 1, p.
25.
220
Castle Bros. v. Gutierrez Hermanos, 11 Phil. 629 [1908]; In Re: Firm Name of Ozaeta Romulo, 92 SCRA
1 [1979]; Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 [1988]; Please see Aquino, Civil Code, vol. 1, p. 26 for a
list of other cases.
221
This situation is analogous to the Muslim code or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (P.D. 1083)
which took effect on February 4, 1977 despite the effectivity of the Civil Code and the Family Code. P.D.
1083 governs persons, family relations and succession among Muslims, the adjudication and settlement
of disputes, the organization of the Shari’a courts, etc.
222
Mariflor P. Pagusara, The Kalinga Ili: Cultural-Ecological Reflections on Indigenous Theora and Praxis
of Man-Nature Relationship, Dakami Ya Nan Dagami, p. 36, Papers and Proceedings of the 1st Cordillera
Muti-Sectoral Land Congress, 11-14 March 1983, Cordillera Consultative Committee [1984].
223
Section 2, Article XII.
224
A "co-production agreement" is defined as one wherein the government provides input to the mining
operation other than the mineral resource- Section 26 (b), R.A. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
225
A "joint venture agreement" is one where a joint-venture company is organized by the government
and the contractor with both parties having equity shares, and the government entitled to a share in the
gross output- Section 26 (c), R.A. 7942.
226
A mineral "production-sharing agreement" is one where the government grants to the contractor the
exclusive right to conduct mining operations within a contract area and shares in the gross output. The
contractor provides the financing, technology, management and personnel necessary for the
implementation of the agreement- Section 26 (a), R.A. 7942.
227
Section 26, R.A. 7942.
228
Section 3 [d], People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) provides:
"Sec. 3 [d] 'Small-scale mining contract' refers to co-production, joint venture or mineral production
sharing agreement between the State and a small-scale mining contractor for the small-scale utilization
of a plot of mineral land."
229
Section 3 [b], R.A. 7076.
230
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998.
231
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228, 239 [1988], Cruz, J., ponente, it was declared that if a
person is the owner of a piece of agricultural land on which minerals are discovered, his ownership of
such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the
State to which such minerals belong- also cited in H. de Leon, Phil. Constitutional Law, Principles and
Cases, vol. 2, pp. 800-801 [1999].
232
See Ground I, Grounds to Issue Writ of Prohibition, Petition, p. 14.
233
Section 7 (b) is subject to Section 56 of the same law which provides:
"Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes.- Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing
and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected."
The law took effect 15 days upon publication in the O.G. or in any 2 newspapers of general circulation
(Sec. 84, IPRA). The IPRA was published in the Chronicle and Malaya on Nov. 7, 1997.
234
Section 9 of the IPRA also gives the ICCs/IPs the ff. responsibilities over their ancestral domains:
(a) Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced ecology in the ancestral
domain by protecting the flora and fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;
(b) Restore Denuded Areas.- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the reforestation of
denuded areas and other development programs and projects subject to just and reasonable
renumeration;
(c) Observe Laws.- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations
for its effective implementation."
Section 58 of the same law also mandates that ancestral domains or portions thereof, which are found
to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas,
forest cover, or reforestation as determined by appropriate agencies with the full participation of the
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for such purposes. The ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with
the full and effective assistance of government agencies.
235
Hector S. de Leon, Textbook on the New Philippine Constitution pp. 473-474 [1987] citing the 1986
UP Law Constitution Project, The National Economy and Patrimony, p. 11.
236
Under the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, "small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely
heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy
mining equipment"- Section 3 [b], R.A. 7076.
237
See infra., pp. 77-79?.
238
Andrew Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, ed. By Barnes, Gray and
Kingsbury, pub. By Ass'n. for Asian Studies, at 35, 42 [1995].
239
E.g. International Indian Treaty Council, World Council of IPs.
240
Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, supra, at 44, citing the International Work Group for
Indigenous Affairs, 1988.
241
Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human
Rights Perspective, 32 Texas International Law Journal 97, 102 [1997].
242
Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the
Asian Controversy, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 92: 414, 429 [1998].
243
The World Bank supported the Chico Dam project. Due to the Kalingas' opposition, the WB pulled out
of the project but the conflict between the Philippine government and the natives endured long after-
Marcus Colchester, Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Sustainable Resource Use in South and Southeast
Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, supra, pp. 59, 71-72.
244
Kingsbury, supra, at 417.
245
Section 22, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
246
Interpellation of Senator Flavier on S.B. No. 1728, Deliberation on Second Reading, November 20,
1996, p. 20.
247
Guide to R.A. 8371, Coalition for IPs Rights and Ancestral Domains, the International Labor
Organization, and the ILO-Bilance- Asia Dep't, p. 3 [1999].
248
Also referred to as the "Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989."
249
See Introduction to ILO Convention No. 169, par. 4.
250
Id., pars. 5 and 6.
251
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Towards a Definition of National Policy on Recognition of Ethnic Law within
the Philippine Legal Order, 55 P.L.J. 383, 385 [1980].
252
Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, Manila Studies Association, Inc. and the Phil. National
Historical Society, Inc., p. 6 [1997].
253
Fernandez, supra, at 385, 391.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in any forum and, when it shows
itself in a given judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus standi, the propriety of the
specific remedy invoked, or the principle of hierarchy of courts, that may ordinarily be raised by party-
litigants, should not be so perceived as good and inevitable justifications for advocating timidity, let
alone isolationism, by the Court.
A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes the Court’s adjudication must have a
personal and substantial interest in the dispute;1 indeed, the developing trend would require a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in order to ensure that one is
the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power.2 The rule requires a party to aptly show a
personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable
decision so as to warrant his invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction and to render legally feasible the
exercise of the Court’s remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power can
easily become too unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may, in no small measure,
adversely affect its intended essentiality, stability and consequentiality.
Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exits, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance and paramount interest to the nation,3 the Court must take the liberal approach that
recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise
constitutional issues that affect them.4 This Court thus did so in a case5 that involves the conservation of
our forests for ecological needs. Until and exact balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic
notion that can free itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities
subordinate to what may be considered to be of overriding concern.
The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, a law that obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its significance to the nation and its
people now and in the generations yet to come. Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise also known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 ("IPRA"), enacted into law in 1997 and made effective on 22
November 1997, is apparently intended to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution which
recognizes the rights of indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of national unity and
development"6 and commands the State, "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs," to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands in order to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.7
Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines "ancestral domains" to embrace
"all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources" including "ancestral lands, forest, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise," over which indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples ("ICCs/IPs") could exercise virtual ownership and control.
IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains covering literally
millions of hectares. The notion of community property would comprehend not only matters of
proprietary interest but also some forms of self-governance over the curved-out territory. This
concept is elaborated in Section 7 of the law which states that the "rights of ownership and possession
of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected," subsumed under which would
encompass the right of ownership(paragraph a); the right to develop, control and use lands and
natural resources, including "the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;" (par. b); the right to stay in the
territories (par. c); the right to return to their abandoned lands in case of displacement (par. d); the
right to regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of ancestral domains previously
reserved (par. g); and the right to resolve land conflicts in accordance primarily with customary law
(par. h). Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given "priority rights in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains." These
provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the context of the fundamental law and
virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a
significant area of the country and its patrimony.
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State," and, with the exception
of agricultural lands, "shall not be alienated." It ordains that the "exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."8
These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other specific mandates in
the 1935 Constitution, forming Article XII under the title "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources", were derived largely from the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation
of Lands and other Natural Resources.9 According to the Committee report, among the principles upon
which these provisions were based, was "that the land, minerals, forest and other natural resources
constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation," and should thereby "be preserved for those
under the sovereign authority of the Nation and for their posterity."10 The delegates to the 1934
Constitutional Convention were of the unanimous view that the "policy on natural resources, being
fundamental to the nation’s survival should not be left to the changing mood of the lawmaking body."11
The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, thus expresses
this regalian doctrine of the old, and the domainial doctrine of the new, that all lands and natural
resources belong to the state other than those which it recognizes to be of private ownership. Except
for agricultural lands of the public domain which alone may be alienated, forest or timber, and
mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources, of the country must remain with the state, the
exploration, development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full control and
supervision albeit allowing it to enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.12
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño vs. Insular Government,13 holding that a
parcel of land held since time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private ownership is presumed
never to have been public land and cited to downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine, cannot
override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in them that sovereignty
resides and from them that all government authority emanates.14 It is not then for a court ruling or any
piece of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to the
latter, and it is the sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate.
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that
would simply express that "customary laws shall govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the
Constitution could have itself easily provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr.
Chief Justice Davide has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Convention, thus:
"Mr. Davide. x x x Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property rights or relations
in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is concerned, it is respectfully
submitted that the particular matter must be submitted to Congress. I understand that the idea of
Comm. Bennagen is for the possibility of the codification of these customary laws. So before these are
codified, we cannot now mandate that the same must immediately be applicable. We leave it to
Congress to determine the extent of the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in relation to
whatever may have been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead of the horse."15
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and,
with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of, the stream of laws.
The "due process clause," as I so understand it in Tanada vs. Tuvera16 would require an apt publication
of a legislative enactment before it is permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when
specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication to render them
correspondingly binding and effective as such.
Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-examine the
law. Indeed, the State is exhorted to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands, a task that would entail a balancing of interest between their specific needs and the
imperatives of national interest.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.
Footnotes
1
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89; Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 244.
2
Am Jur § 189, p. 591, S. vD., 410 US 641, 35 L Ed 2d 536, 93 S Ct 1146.
3
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 540; Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, 36, 37.
4
Defensor Santiago, Miriam, Constitutional Law, First Edition, 1994, p. 11; see also Rev. Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., on the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 Ed., pp. 336-337.
5
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792.
6
Art. 11, Sec. 22.
7
Art. XII, Sec. 5.
8
Sec. 2.
9
II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 594.
10
Ibid., p. 595.
11
Ibid., p. 600.
12
CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 2; Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., vs. Factoran, Jr., 240 SCRA 100.
13
41 Phil. 935.
14
CONST., Art. II, Sec. 1.
15
4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 32.
16
146 SCRA 446.

SEPARATE OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
You ask if we own the land. . . How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race own the land
because only the race lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a birthright of every man. The lowly
animals claim their place; how much more man? Man is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave
us life and placed us in the world to live human lives. And where shall we obtain life? From the land. To
work (the land) is an obligation, not merely a right. In tilling the land, you possess it. And so land is a
grace that must be nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of Apu Kabunian
to all his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs …life.
- Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen, "Tribal Filipinos" in
Indigenous View of Land and the Environment, ed. Shelton H. Davis, the World Bank Discussion Papers,
No. 188, pp. 71-72.)
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather
than in violation of, the Constitution.1 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.2
The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be construed in view of such
presumption of constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of these provisions should take into
account the purpose of the law, which is to give life to the constitutional mandate that the rights of the
indigenous peoples be recognized and protected.
The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and therefore, their
heritage, is not unique. It is one that they share with the red-skinned "Indians" of the United States, with
the aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name a few. Happily,
the nations in which these indigenous peoples live all have enacted measures in an attempt to heal an
oppressive past by the promise of a progressive future. Thus has the international community realized
the injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This sentiment among the
family of nations is expressed in a number of documents, the most recent and most comprehensive of
which is the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by
the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution
on August 26, 1994. Among the rights recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of lands, territories
and even the resources which the indigenous peoples have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied
or used, and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without the free and informed
consent of the indigenous peoples.
A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples
The term "indigenous" traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning "within." In the sense the
term has come to be used, it is nearer in meaning to the Latin word indigenus, which means
"native."3 "Indigenous" refers to that which originated or has been produced naturally in a particular
land, and has not been introduced from the outside.4In international law, the definition of what
constitutes "indigenous peoples" attains some degree of controversy. No definition of the term
"indigenous peoples" has been adopted by the United Nations (UN), although UN practice has been
guided by a working definition in the 1986 Report of UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo:5
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from
other sections of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present
non-dominant sections of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence
as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the
present, of one or more of the following factors:
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal system,
membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style, etc.);
(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means of
communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal
language);
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;
(f) Other relevant facts.6
In Philippine constitutional law, the term "indigenous peoples" pertains to those groups of Filipinos who
have retained a high degree of continuity from pre-Conquest culture.7 Philippine legal history, however,
has not been kind to the indigenous peoples, characterized them as "uncivilized,"8 "backward
people,"9 with "barbarous practices"10and "a low order of intelligence."11
Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now employs the
politically-correct conjunctive term "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities" as follows:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.- For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx
(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. - refer to a group of people or homogenous

societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized
community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership
since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of
language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall likewise include
peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which
inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-
indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present State boundaries, who retain some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced
from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains x x x.
Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already plowing our
soil and hunting in our forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who were the original inhabitants
of our archipelago, were, at that time, practicing a native culture. From the time the Spaniards arrived
up to the early part of the American regime,12 these native inhabitants resisted foreign invasion,
relentlessly fighting for their lands. Today, from the remote uplands of Northern Luzon, to Palawan,
Mindoro and Mindanao, the indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate their ancestral lands,
the lands of their forefathers.
Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our national culture
exhibits only the last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial rule and neocolonial
domination have created a discernible distinction between the cultural majority and the group of
cultural minorities.13 The extant Philippine national culture is the culture of the majority; its indigenous
roots were replaced by foreign cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not
dominant.14 While the culture of the majority reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of the
minorities has retained its essentially native character.
One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural community. Around twelve million
Filipinos are members of the one hundred and ten or so indigenous cultural communities, 15 accounting
for more than seventeen per centum of the estimated seventy million Filipinos16 in our country. Sadly,
the indigenous peoples are one of the poorest sectors of Philippine society. The incidence of poverty
and malnutrition among them is significantly higher than the national average. The indigenous peoples
are also among the most powerless. Perhaps because of their inability to speak the language of law and
power, they have been relegated to the fringes of society. They have little, if any, voice in national
politics and enjoy the least protection from economic exploitation.
The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples
The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less fortunate brothers,
fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people empowerment and social justice,
and to reach out particularly to the marginalized sectors of society, including the indigenous peoples.
They incorporated in the fundamental law several provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and
interests of the indigenous peoples, to wit:
Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of
national unity and development.17
Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure
their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains.18
Sec. 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities,
and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its
increments.19
Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in
accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the
public domain under lease or concession, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and
the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.20
Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the
formulation of national plans and policies.21
Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such
communities.22
IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It provides, among
others, that the State shall recognize and promote the rights of indigenous peoples within the
framework of national unity and development, protect their rights over the ancestral lands and
ancestral domains and recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains.23 Moreover, IPRA
enumerates the civil and political rights of the indigenous peoples;24 spells out their social and cultural
rights;25 acknowledges a general concept of indigenous property right and recognizes title thereto;26 and
creates the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President.27
Preliminary Issues
A. The petition presents an actual controversy.
The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an appropriate
case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.28
Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.29 The threshold issue,
therefore, is whether an "appropriate case" exists for the exercise of judicial review in the present case.
An "actual case or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution
and susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory,30 or that
which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems.31 A petition raising a
constitutional question does not present an "actual controversy," unless it alleges a legal right or power.
Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term "controversy" is the
presence of opposing views or contentions.32 Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues which
remain unfocused because they lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely
framed from a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation
embracing conflicting and demanding interests.33 The controversy must also be justiciable; that is, it
must be susceptible of judicial determination.34
In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted,
and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the
government agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be successfully
maintained that we should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the
controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that
the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the
public domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to
implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and
prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process.
B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the constitutional questions
herein.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will
sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.35 Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as
citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the citizens, the violation of which may result only in a
"generalized grievance".36 Yet, in a sense, all citizen’s and taxpayer’s suits are efforts to air generalized
grievances about the conduct of government and the allocation of power.37
In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to standing.38 The proper party
requirement is considered as merely procedural,39 and the Court has ample discretion with regard
thereto.40 As early as 1910, the Court in the case of Severino vs. Governor General 41 held:
x x x When the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must show some
personal or special interest in the subject matter, since he is regarded as the real party in interest and
his right must clearly appear. Upon the other hand, when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.42
This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at large, may also be
the subject of an actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that a private citizen may enforce a
"public right" in behalf of other citizens. We opined therein that:
… The right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of any other
qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he would suffer in case
he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be greater or different from that of the other electors;
but he is seeking to enforce a public right as distinguished from a private right. The real party in
interest is the public, or the qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the same right and
would suffer the same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to maintaining a
petition whether or not the relief sought by the relator should be granted.43
In Tañada v. Tuvera,44 the Court enforced the "public right" to due process and to be informed of
matters of public concern.
In Garcia vs. Board of Investments,45 the Court upheld the "public right" to be heard or consulted on
matters of national concern.
In Oposa v. Factoran,46 the Court recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law."47 Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., delivering the opinion of the
Court, stated that:
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation-aptly and fittingly stressed by petitioners-the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.48
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated
and diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of the national
patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a
citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any grant of concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the
preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizen’s
suit.
In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that a taxpayer has the right to
enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through the implementation of an unconstitutional
statute,49 and by necessity, he may assail the validity of a statute appropriating public funds.50 The
taxpayer has paid his taxes and contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner
by which the proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for the purpose
of administering an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds.51
The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the
Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." In the same manner, Section 79 authorizes for the expenditure of public funds by
providing that "the amount necessary to finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged against the
current year's appropriation for the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (the "ONCC") and the
Office for Southern Cultural Communities (the "OSCC"),"52which were merged as organic offices of the
NCIP.53 Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of a taxpayer’s suit.
C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist
from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s
jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.54 Mandamus, on the other hand, is an
extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when said entity or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station, or when said entity or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.55
In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing the challenged
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998,
and that the same officials be enjoined from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the said
law and rules. They further ask that the Secretary of the DENR be compelled to perform his duty to
control and supervise the activities pertaining to natural resources.
Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the questioned
provisions of the IPRA and from disbursing funds in connection therewith if the law is found to be
unconstitutional. Likewise, mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country’s
natural resources. Consequently, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy
for the relief sought.
D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the Court assumes
jurisdiction over the petition in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.
Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass
upon the issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn
of all but the important legal issues or those of first impression, which are the proper subject of
attention of the appellate court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to improve
the administration of justice.
This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,56 such concurrence
does not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this Court’s primary
jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such invocation.57 We
held in People v. Cuaresma58 that:
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket x x
x.59 (Emphasis supplied.)
IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its impact upon the lives
not only of the indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of all Filipinos cannot be denied. The
resolution of this case by the Court at the earliest opportunity is necessary if the aims of the law are to
be achieved. This reason is compelling enough to allow petitioners’ invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction
in the first instance.
Substantive Issues
Primary Issue
The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves around the
constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59.
These provisions allegedly violate Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays
and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.
Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of ownership60 over ancestral
lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title.61 The term "ancestral lands" under the statute
refers to lands occupied by individuals, families and clans who are members of indigenous cultural
communities, including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
lots. These lands are required to have been "occupied, possessed and utilized" by them or through their
ancestors "since time immemorial, continuously to the present".62 On the other hand, "ancestral
domains" is defined as areas generally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, including
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds, worship areas, and
lands no longer occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural communities but to which they had
traditional access, particularly the home ranges of indigenous cultural communities who are still
nomadic or shifting cultivators. Ancestral domains also include inland waters, coastal areas and natural
resources therein.63 Again, the same are required to have been "held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously to the present".64 Under Section 56, property rights within the
ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of said law "shall be recognized and
respected."
Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to ancestral lands,
ancestral domains, and natural resources are unconstitutional. The fundamental question is, who,
between the State and the indigenous peoples, are the rightful owners of these properties?
It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation, of the
fundamental law.65The reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted
within its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations. Accordingly, courts should presume
that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates
no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.66
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.
In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public domain and,
thus, owned by the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners and the
Solicitor General advance the following arguments:
First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive dominion
over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the Spanish King under the
theory of jura regalia, which was introduced into Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521,
acquired title to all the lands in the archipelago.
Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
owned by the State. They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to the State the ownership of
all lands and makes the State the original source of all private titles. They argue that the Philippine State,
as successor to Spain and the United States, is the source of any asserted right of ownership in land.
Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cariño doctrine exists. However, petitioners
maintain that the doctrine merely states that title to lands of the public domain may be acquired by
prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands
of the public domain and, thus, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral lands and
ancestral domains existed by virtue of the Cariño doctrine, such native title was extinguished upon the
ratification of the 1935 Constitution.
Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to
protect that rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. However, they
contend that the mandate is subject to Section 2, Article XII and the theory of jura regalia embodied
therein. According to petitioners, the recognition and protection under R.A. 8371 of the right of
ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains is far in excess of the legislative power and
constitutional mandate of Congress.
Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State, petitioners
posit that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
non-agricultural lands of the public domain and other natural resources.
I am not persuaded by these contentions.
Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is understandable.
Not only is the theory well recognized in our legal system; it has been regarded, almost with reverence,
as the immutable postulate of Philippine land law. It has been incorporated into our fundamental law
and has been recognized by the Court.67
Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express
or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter,
the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines
has persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from
nowhere.68
In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights,69 or those rights which the King has by
virtue of his prerogatives.70 In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in
which a subject has a right of property or propriedad.71 These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by
the king as the sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the
use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the
King theoretically retained the title.72 By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor
of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held.73 The theory of jura
regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest.74
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time
immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular Government75 the United States Supreme Court,
reversing the decision76of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:
x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. x x
x.77 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of
land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
In Cariño, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cariño applied for registration in his name of an ancestral
land located in Benguet. The applicant established that he and his ancestors had lived on the land, had
cultivated it, and had used it as far they could remember. He also proved that they had all been
recognized as owners, the land having been passed on by inheritance according to native custom.
However, neither he nor his ancestors had any document of title from the Spanish Crown. The
government opposed the application for registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court held that the applicant was entitled to the registration of his native title to
their ancestral land.
Cariño was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court were
binding as precedent in our jurisdiction.78 We applied the Cariño doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs.
Director of Lands,79where we stated that "[a]ll lands that were not acquired from the Government either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest."80
Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Cariño was premised on the fact that
the applicant had complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription, having established that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property since time immemorial. In effect,
petitioners suggest that title to the ancestral land applied for by Cariño was transferred from the State,
as original owner, to Cariño by virtue of prescription. They conclude that the doctrine cannot be the
basis for decreeing "by mere legislative fiat…that ownership of vast tracts of land belongs to [indigenous
peoples] without judicial confirmation."81
The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cariño doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the
public domain and, as such, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
There is no merit in these contentions.
A proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to lands which
have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or
otherwise. A distinction must be made between ownership of land under native title and ownership by
acquisitive prescription against the State. Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land
has been held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-interest, the
United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of title from the State as the
land has been regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. In contrast, ownership of
land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a conversion of the character of the property
from alienable public land to private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a
private person. Since native title assumes that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed
never to have been part of the public domain, the Solicitor General’s thesis that native title
under Cariño applies only to lands of the public domain is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks under
the Constitution82 is irrelevant to the application of the Cariño doctrine because the Regalian doctrine
which vests in the State ownership of lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and
ancestral domains.
Legal history supports the Cariño doctrine.
When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and occupation thereof
in the 16th century and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it entered into with Portugal,83 the
continents of Asia, the Americas and Africa were considered as terra nullius although already populated
by other peoples.84 The discovery and occupation by the European States, who were then considered as
the only members of the international community of civilized nations, of lands in the said continents
were deemed sufficient to create title under international law.85
Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did not mean that it
acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws of Spain, the Spanish Crown
was considered to have acquired dominion only over the unoccupied and unclaimed portions of our
islands.86
In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the natives of their
property. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish King to do no harm to the
natives and to their property. In this regard, an authority on the early Spanish colonial period in the
Philippines wrote:
The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging opportunity to
avoid a repetition of the sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his written instructions for
the Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded the expedition, Philip II envisaged a bloodless pacification of
the archipelago. This extraordinary document could have been lifted almost verbatim from the lectures
of the Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, delivered in the University of Salamanca. The King
instructed Legazpi to inform the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their persons or
to their property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in friendship and "to explain
to them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved." Although the Spanish expedition could
defend themselves if attacked, the royal instructions admonished the commander to commit no
aggressive act which might arouse native hostility.87
Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including native land
occupancy.88 Thus, the Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred ownership of lands
already held by the natives.89 The royal decrees of 1880 and 1894 did not extinguish native title to land
in the Philippines. The earlier royal decree, dated June 25, 1880, provided that all those in "unlawful
possession of royal lands" must legalize their possession by means of adjustment proceedings,90 and
within the period specified. The later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894, otherwise known as the
Maura Law, declared that titles that were capable of adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but for
which adjustment was not sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the Maura Law, it was
held in the case of Cariño that the royal decree of 1894 should not be construed as confiscation of title,
but merely as the withdrawal of the privilege of registering such title.91
Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United States,
contrary to petitioners’ assertion that the US merely succeeded to the rights of Spain, including the
latter’s rights over lands of the public domain.92 Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the
cession of the Philippines did not impair any right to property existing at the time.93 During the American
colonial regime, native title to land was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided
that property and rights acquired by the US through cession from Spain were to be administered for the
benefit of the Filipinos.94 In obvious adherence to libertarian principles, McKinley’s Instructions, as well
as the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the US Constitution.
One of these rights, which served as an inviolable rule upon every division and branch of the American
colonial government in the Philippines,95 was that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."96 These vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902
were in turn expressly protected by the due process clause of the 1935 Constitution. Resultantly,
property rights of the indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and ancestral domains were firmly
established in law.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands and domains were "abated by the direct act by the sovereign Filipino people of ratifying
the 1935 Constitution."97 He advances the following arguments:
The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power to restructure the
consolidation of rights inherent in ownership in the State. Through the mandate of the Constitutions
that have been adopted, the State has wrested control of those portions of the natural resources it
deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence. It has been held that the State may impair
vested rights through a legitimate exercise of police power.
Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential to but determinative
of social welfare and existence. To allow otherwise is to invite havoc in the established social system. x x
x
Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural resources that have
been found from generation to generation to be critical to the survival of the Sovereign and its agent,
the State.98
Stated simply, the Solicitor General’s argument is that the State, as the source of all titles to land, had
the power to re-vest in itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title to all lands, including ancestral lands
and ancestral domains. While the Solicitor General admits that such a theory would necessarily impair
vested rights, he reasons out that even vested rights of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are not absolute and may be impaired by the legitimate exercise of police power.
I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor General, while
embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding. It simply declares that "all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State."99 Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social welfare
and existence," including those which are not part of the public domain, shall thereafter be owned by
the State. If there is any room for constitutional construction, the provision should be interpreted in
favor of the preservation, rather than impairment or extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise,
Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution cannot be construed to mean that vested right which had
existed then were extinguished and that the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the guise of
"wrest[ing] control of those portions of the natural resources [which the State] deems absolutely
necessary for social welfare and existence." On the contrary, said Section restated the fundamental rule
against the diminution of existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of lands of the public
domain and other natural resources by the State is "subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concessions." The "existing rights" that were intended to be protected must, perforce, include the right
of ownership by indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains. The words of the law
should be given their ordinary or usual meaning,100 and the term "existing rights" cannot be assigned an
unduly restrictive definition.
Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution101to
protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Nonetheless,
they contend that the recognition and protection under IPRA of the right of ownership of indigenous
peoples over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are far in excess of the legislative power and
constitutional mandate of the Congress,102 since such recognition and protection amount to the
alienation of lands of the public domain, which is proscribed under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect the rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary sense, the term "right" refers to
any legally enforceable claim.103It is a power, privilege, faculty or demand inherent in one person and
incident upon another.104 When used in relation to property, "right" includes any interest in or title to an
object, or any just and legal claim to hold, use and enjoy it.105 Said provision in the Constitution cannot,
by any reasonable construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right of ownership over
such ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have exceeded its constitutional
mandate and power in enacting the provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 7(a) and 8, which recognize
the right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over ancestral lands.
The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to "provide for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains." In light of this provision, does Congress have the power to decide whether
ancestral domains shall be private property or part of the public domain? Also, does Congress have the
power to determine whether the "extent" of ancestral domains shall include the natural resources
found therein?
It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution did not intend
Congress to decide whether ancestral domains shall be public or private property. Rather, they
acknowledged that ancestral domains shall be treated as private property, and that customary laws shall
merely determine whether such private ownership is by the entire indigenous cultural community, or by
individuals, families, or clans within the community. The discussion below between Messrs. Regalado
and Bennagen and Mr. Chief Justice Davide, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is
instructive:
MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from either
Commissioner Bennagen or Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase "CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE
FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain," because ordinarily it is the law on
ownership and the extent thereof which determine the property rights or relations arising therefrom.
On the other hand, in this proposed amendment the phraseology is that it is the property rights or
relations which shall be used as the basis in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domain. I assume there must be a certain difference in the customary laws and our regular civil laws on
property.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to Congress to make the
necessary exception to the general law on property relations.
MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example of such a customary
law wherein it is the property rights and relations that determine the ownership and the extent of that
ownership, unlike the basic fundamental rule that it is the ownership and the extent of ownership which
determine the property rights and relations arising therefrom and consequent thereto. Perhaps, these
customary laws may have a different provision or thrust so that we could make the corresponding
suggestions also by way of an amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.
MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.
There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There would be ownership
based on individuals, on clan or lineage, or on community. And the thinking expressed in the
consultation is that this should be codified and should be recognized in relation to existing national laws.
That is essentially the concept. 106(Emphasis supplied.)
The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from the following
exchange between Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen:
MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain, are we thinking in terms of the tribal ownership or
community ownership or of private ownership within the ancestral lands or ancestral domain?
MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as ownership by private
individuals, clans and even communities.
MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the State will set aside the
ancestral domain and there is a separate law for that. Within the ancestral domain it could accept more
specific ownership in terms of individuals within the ancestral lands.
MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. 107 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never expressly
mentioned Cariño in their deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the concept of native title to land,
or that they were unaware of native title as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.108 The framers of
the Constitution, as well as the people adopting it, were presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial
doctrines concerning the subject of constitutional provisions, and courts should take these doctrines
into consideration in construing the Constitution.109
Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are considered as private
property of indigenous peoples, the IPRA, by affirming or acknowledging such ownership through its
various provisions, merely abides by the constitutional mandate and does not suffer any vice of
unconstitutionality.
Petitioners interpret the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs" in Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to mean "as subject to the provision of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution," which vests in the State ownership of all lands of the public
domain, mineral lands and other natural resources. Following this interpretation, petitioners maintain
that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are the property of the State.
This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the declarations made in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions on the state policy of conservation and nationalization of lands of the public
domain and natural resources, and is of paramount importance to our national economy and patrimony.
A close perusal of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveals that the framers of the
Constitution inserted the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" mainly to prevent the
impairment of Torrens titles and other prior rights in the determination of what constitutes ancestral
lands and ancestral domains, to wit:
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral lands. How does this
affect the Torrens title and other prior rights?
MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we did say that in cases
where due process is clearly established in terms of prior rights, these two have to be respected.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that parts of Baguio City are
considered as ancestral lands?
MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in one of the
publications that I provided the Commissioners, the parts could be considered as ancestral domain in
relation to the whole population of Cordillera but not in relation to certain individuals or certain groups.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered as ancestral land?
MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner that Filipinos can
speak of the Philippine archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms of the right of a particular person
or particular group to exploit, utilize, or sell it.
MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.
MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. 110
Thus, the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" was intended by the framers of the
Constitution as a reiteration of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law.
There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of the indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to Section 2 of the same Article ascribing
ownership of all public lands to the State. The Constitution must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that
when construction is proper, the whole Constitution is examined in order to determine the meaning of
any provision. That construction should be used which would give effect to the entire instrument.111
Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands and other
natural resources should be read together with the other provisions thereof which firmly recognize the
rights of the indigenous peoples. These, as set forth hereinbefore,112 include: Section 22, Article II,
providing that the State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework
of national unity and development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being, and for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains; Section 1, Article XIII, directing the
removal or reduction of social, economic, political and cultural inequities and inequalities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good; Section 6, Article XIII, directing the
application of the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship in the disposition and utilization of other
natural resources, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands; Section 17, Article XIV, decreeing that the State shall recognize,
respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their
cultures, traditions, and institutions; and Section 12, Article XVI, authorizing the Congress to create a
consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities.
Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national economy is the more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth.113 Equity is given prominence as the first objective of
national economic development.114 The framers of the Constitution did not, by the phrase "subject to
the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs," intend to establish
a hierarchy of constitutional norms. As explained by then Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or paramount, or to create
absolute limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the balancing of interests:
BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davide’s formulation of the first sentence, he says: "The State,
SUBJECT TO THE provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS shall guarantee the rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands to insure
their economic, social and cultural well-being." There are at least two concepts here which receive
different weights very often. They are the concepts of national development policies and programs, and
the rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would like to ask: When
the Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling concept? I ask this because
sometimes the rights of cultural minorities are precisely transgressed in the interest of national
development policies and programs. Hence, I would like to know which is the controlling concept here.
Is it the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands or is it national development policies and
programs.
MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is more paramount. The concept
introduced here is really the balancing of interests. That is what we seek to attain. We have to balance
the interests taking into account the specific needs and the specific interests also of these cultural
communities in like manner that we did so in the autonomous regions.115 (Emphasis supplied.)
B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the State’s ownership over the natural resources
within the ancestral domains.
Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain
and other natural resources,116 as well as the State’s full control and supervision over the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources.117 Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General
assail Sections 3 (a),118 5,119and 7120 of IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which
states, in part, that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State."121 They would have the Court declare as
unconstitutional Section 3(a) of IPRA because the inclusion of natural resources in the definition of
ancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication of State ownership over these resources.
I am not convinced.
Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and
composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether
a particular area is to be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section
3(a) serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It
does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous
peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important to ensure
that no unnecessary encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result
during the delineation process. The mere fact that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include the
natural resources found therein does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as
private property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section 3(a) cannot be
construed as a source of ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply
because it recognizes ancestral domains as their "private but community property."
The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples’ concept
of ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In Civil Law, "ownership" is the
"independent and general power of a person over a thing for purposes recognized by law and within the
limits established thereby."122 The civil law concept of ownership has the following attributes: jus
utendi or the right to receive from the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to consume
the thing by its use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy that
which is owned and jus vidicandi or the right to exclude other persons from the possession the thing
owned.123 In contrast, the indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership emphasizes the importance of
communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal character of ownership, the property held in
common "cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed"124 because it was meant to benefit the whole
indigenous community and not merely the individual member.125
That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous peoples is also
clear from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on Section 7 which recites the
rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains, to wit:
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8126 rights to ancestral domain, this is where we transferred the
other provision but here itself -
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr.
Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all agree that
that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of those indigenous communities living in forest
and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give
little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should be done in
their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this has been disturbing
our people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or the secretariat could just
propose a provision for incorporation here so that maybe the right to consultation and the right to be
compensated when there are damages within their ancestral lands.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are already considered
in subsequent sections which we are now looking for.
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the indigenous people where
they are. Number two, in terms of the mines there is a need for prior consultation of source which is
here already. So, anyway it is on the record that you want to make sure that the secretariat takes note
of those two issues and my assurance is that it is already there and I will make sure that they cross
check.
HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a Senate version you do
not have and if you agree we will adopt that.127 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the
natural resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim ownership over lands,
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains."
Neither does Section 7(b), which enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural
resources found within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the
natural resources.
What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples’ rights and welfare in relation to the
natural resources found within their ancestral domains,128 including the preservation of the ecological
balance therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will not be unduly displaced when
State-approved activities involving the natural resources located therein are undertaken.
Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not been
recognized in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza129 in support of
their thesis that native title to natural resources has been upheld in this jurisdiction.130 They insist that
"it is possible for rights over natural resources to vest on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if
these were held prior to the 1935 Constitution."131However, a judicious examination of Reavies reveals
that, contrary to the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did not recognize native title to
natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership of
minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land by virtue of
time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was acknowledged and recognized as far back
during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards
natural resources. The unique value of natural resources has been acknowledged by the State and is the
underlying reason for its consistent assertion of ownership and control over said natural resources from
the Spanish regime up to the present.132 Natural resources, especially minerals, were considered by
Spain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its battles in wars against other nations. Hence,
Spain, by asserting its ownership over minerals wherever these may be found, whether in public or
private lands, recognized the separability of title over lands and that over minerals which may be found
therein. 133
On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals. As
the owner of natural resources over the Philippines after the latter’s cession from Spain, the United
States saw it fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public
lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands. A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of
private mineral land pursuant to the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State,
from exploiting minerals within his property.134 Although the United States made a distinction between
minerals found in public lands and those found in private lands, title in these minerals was in all cases
sourced from the State. The framers of the 1935 Constitution found it necessary to maintain the State’s
ownership over natural resources to insure their conservation for future generations of Filipinos, to
prevent foreign control of the country through economic domination; and to avoid situations whereby
the Philippines would become a source of international conflicts, thereby posing danger to its internal
security and independence.135
The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other natural resources in the 1935
Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973136 and 1987 Constitutions.137
Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains belong to the
State, the Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the NCIP with respect to ancestral
domains under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to the lands and not to the natural resources therein.
Section 52[i] provides:
Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies. - The
Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The secretaries of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of
Interior and Local Government, and Department of Justice, the Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, and any other government agency claiming jurisdiction over the area shall be
notified thereof. Such notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed.
Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the administration
of other agencies of the Government, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform, with respect to
agricultural lands, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources with respect to timber,
forest and mineral lands. Upon the certification of these areas as ancestral domain following the
procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies
concerned over lands forming part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of government
agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral domains does not terminate by such
certification because said agencies are mandated under existing laws to administer the natural
resources for the State, which is the owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i] as divesting the State,
through the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the natural resources within the
ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the established doctrine that all natural resources are
owned by the State.
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional.
The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve the natural
resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation
and utilization of these resources, and to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of such
natural resources.138 The statute also grants them priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains.139 Before the NCIP
can issue a certification for the renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or for the
perfection of any production-sharing agreement the prior informed written consent of the indigenous
peoples concerned must be obtained.140 In return, the indigenous peoples are given the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains or portions thereof which are found to
be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover, or reforestation.141
The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and dominant role in the
utilization of our country’s natural resources. Petitioners, on the other hand, allege that under the
Constitution the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may only be undertaken
by the State, either directly or indirectly through co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements.142 To petitioners, no other method is allowed by the Constitution. They likewise submit
that by vesting ownership of ancestral lands and ancestral domains in the indigenous peoples, IPRA
necessarily gives them control over the use and enjoyment of such natural resources, to the prejudice of
the State.143
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources must be under the full control and supervision of the
State, which may directly undertake such activities or enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements. This provision, however, should not be read in isolation to avoid a
mistaken interpretation that any and all forms of utilization of natural resources other than the
foregoing are prohibited. The Constitution must be regarded as consistent with itself throughout.144 No
constitutional provision is to be separated from all the others, or to be considered alone, all provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the fundamental law.145
In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources
stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the third paragraph of the
same section that Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by its
citizens.146 Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs the State, in the disposition and utilization of natural
resources, to apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship.147 Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII
mandates the State to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of marine and
fishing resources.148 Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor
philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony with the other provisions of the Constitution rather
as a sequestered pronouncement,149 cannot be construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of
utilization of natural resources without the State’s direct participation.
Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the exploration, development and
utilization of the natural resources under existing laws,150 the State retains full control over such
activities, whether done on small-scale basis151 or otherwise.
The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources under
Sections 7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under existing laws, such as the
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A. 7076
expressly provides that should an ancestral land be declared as a people’s small-scale mining area, the
members of the indigenous peoples living within said area shall be given priority in the awarding of
small-scale mining contracts.152 R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be opened for mining
operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community concerned153 and in the
event that the members of such indigenous cultural community give their consent to mining operations
within their ancestral land, royalties shall be paid to them by the parties to the mining to the
contract.154
In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the indigenous
peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following: "to manage and
conserve natural resources within territories and uphold it for future generations; to benefit and share
the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; to negotiate the terms
and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of
any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive
just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project, and the
right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment of these rights."
It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b) pertains
only to the exploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers only to the search or
prospecting of mineral resources, or any other means for the purpose of determining the existence and
the feasibility of mining them for profit.155 The exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot
be equated with the entire process of "exploration, development and utilization" of natural resources
which under the Constitution belong to the State.
Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the utilization of natural
resources and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does not mean exclusive rights. What is
granted is merely the right of preference or first consideration in the award of privileges provided by
existing laws and regulations, with due regard to the needs and welfare of indigenous peoples living in
the area.
There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character in the grant of
concessions. Nor does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by government entities. Several
factors still have to be considered. For example, the extent and nature of utilization and the consequent
impact on the environment and on the indigenous peoples’ way of life are important considerations.
Moreover, the indigenous peoples must show that they live in the area and that they are in the best
position to undertake the required utilization.
It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a blanket
authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said natural resources is always
subject to compliance by the indigenous peoples with existing laws, such as R.A. 7076 and R.A. 7942
since it is not they but the State, which owns these resources.
It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from undertaking
activities, or entering into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with private
entities, to utilize the natural resources which may be located within the ancestral domains. There is no
intention, as between the State and the indigenous peoples, to create a hierarchy of values; rather, the
object is to balance the interests of the State for national development and those of the indigenous
peoples.
Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-indigenous peoples from
undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon authority granted by the proper
governmental agency. To do so would unduly limit the ownership rights of the State over the natural
resources.
To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the utilization of
natural resources is nothing new. As previously mentioned, Section 7, Article XIII of the Constitution
mandates the protection by the State of "the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and
offshore."
Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources
within the ancestral domains may disrupt the natural environment as well as the traditional activities of
the indigenous peoples therein. Hence, the need for the prior informed consent of the indigenous
peoples before any search for or utilization of the natural resources within their ancestral domains is
undertaken.
In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such activities, IPRA requires
that the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples be obtained. The State must, as a matter of
policy and law, consult the indigenous peoples in accordance with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution that national development policies and programs should involve a systematic consultation
to balance local needs as well as national plans. As may be gathered from the discussion of the framers
of the Constitution on this point, the national plan presumably takes into account the requirements of
the region after thorough consultation.156 To this end, IPRA grants to the indigenous peoples the right to
an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, and the right not to be removed therefrom without their free and prior informed
consent.157 As to non-members, the prior informed consent takes the form of a formal and written
agreement between the indigenous peoples and non-members under the proviso in Section 57 in case
the State enters into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with Filipino
citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not peculiar to IPRA. Existing laws and regulations such as
the Philippine Environmental Policy,158the Environmental Impact System,159 the Local Government
Code160 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995161already require increased consultation and participation
of stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples, in the planning of activities with significant environment
impact.
The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous peoples must be
procured before the NCIP can issue a certification for the "issuance, renewal, or grant of any concession,
license or lease, or to the perfection of any production-sharing agreement," must be interpreted, not as
a grant of the power to control the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, but
merely the imposition of an additional requirement for such concession or agreement. The clear intent
of the law is to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples which may be adversely
affected by the operation of such entities or licensees.
Corollary Issues
A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.
The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal protection of the laws."
Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains under Section
3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that the inclusion of private lands in the
ancestral lands and ancestral domains violates the due process clause.162 Petitioners’ contention is
erroneous.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
"subject to Section 56," which reads:
Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. – Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing
and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and protected.
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of indigenous
peoples, but not those who are not members of such communities. Following their interpretation, IPRA,
under Section 56, recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral
domains, subject to the vested rights of the same communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral
domains. Such interpretation is obviously incorrect.
The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether
indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of the
ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless
of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish.163 What IPRA only requires is that these "property rights" already exist
and/or vested upon its effectivity.
Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens titles within
areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes strict procedural
requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards against
the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member of an indigenous
cultural community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the
Director of Lands shall appear to represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines.164 With regard
to ancestral domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural
community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the Ancestral domains
Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO; fourth, posting and publication;
and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of the final report of the ADO.165 With regard
to ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral domain, the statute imposes the following
procedural requirements: first, application; second, posting and publication; third, investigation and
inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a report
by the ADO.166 Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the petitioners that the law affords no
protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.
Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP167 and the application of customary law,168 violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of
indigenous peoples,169 and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
indigenous peoples,170including even disputes between a member of such communities and one who is
not a member, as well as over disputes in the delineation of ancestral domains.171 Petitioners clarify that
they do not claim that the members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial judges. They
merely contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not a member of
an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one who is] before judges who
are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a suspicion that they do not have the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge."172
In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied first in disputes
involving property, succession and land,173 and that such laws shall likewise be used in disputes involving
indigenous peoples.174 They assert that "[w]hen the dispute involves a member of an [indigenous
cultural community and another who is not], a resolution of such a dispute based on customary laws. . .
would clearly be a denial of due process. . . [because those who are not indigenous peoples] do not
know what these customary laws are."175
Petitioners’ concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous
peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering
justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A person’s possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a
judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable
of rendering justice as the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the
concept of justice.
In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its quasi-judicial
powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by
petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of procedure are likewise available to any
party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP.
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice
it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said
provision states, "The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the
use of customary laws under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use.176 The
IPRA prescribes the application of such customary laws where these present a workable solution
acceptable to the parties, who are members of the same indigenous group. This interpretation is
supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules which states:
RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands, involving
ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the
concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral
domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or
where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in
accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted
hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains,177 where all the parties involved are
members of indigenous peoples,178 specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that
when one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous
peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not required.
Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes
concerning ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The
utilization of customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recognizing the application
thereof through legislation passed by Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under the
Civil Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the rules of
evidence,179 and it is not contrary to law, public order or public policy.180 Moreover, the Local
Government Code of 1991 calls for the recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution
of issues involving members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary laws in
the settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are
members of indigenous peoples.181
B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President’s
power of control over the Executive Department.
The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, which provides that:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.
The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides:
Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
xxx
Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President
Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to recognize, promote and protect the rights and well-being of indigenous
peoples. It shall be an independent agency under the Office of the President. As such, the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. This relationship shall be
carried out through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day administration or all those
pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of the Commission, as
the Chief Executive Officer.
Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the President over
the NCIP by characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President as "lateral but
autonomous...for purposes of policy and program coordination."
Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules
characterize the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President, such characterization
does not remove said body from the President’s control and supervision.
The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and
well being of the indigenous peoples and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights
thereto.182 It has been granted administrative,183 quasi-legislative184 and quasi-judicial powers185 to carry
out its mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIP’s functions renders it impossible to place said agency
entirely under the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the reason for its
characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An "independent agency" is defined as an
administrative body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of
department, as distinguished from a "subordinate agency" or an administrative body whose action is
subject to administrative review or revision.186
That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all instances is
evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals,187 like those of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the
NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress "under the office of the
President" and, as such, is still subject to the President’s power of control and supervision granted under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution188 with respect to its performance of administrative functions,
such as the following: (1) the NCIP must secure the President’s approval in obtaining loans to finance its
projects;189 (2) it must obtain the President’s approval for any negotiation for funds and for the
acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever from and from whatever source;190 (3) the NCIP shall
submit annual reports of its operations and achievements to the President, and advise the latter on all
matters relating to the indigenous peoples;191 and (4) it shall exercise such other powers as may be
directed by the President.192 The President is also given the power to appoint the Commissioners of the
NCIP193 as well as to remove them from office for cause motu proprio or upon the recommendation of
any indigenous community.194
To recapitulate:
(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, and 8) affirming the
ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title do not
diminish the State’s ownership of lands of the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains
are considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public domain, following the doctrine
laid down in Cariño vs. Insular Government;195
(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands and other natural
resources in the State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant
certain rights to the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within the ancestral domains,
e.g., to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of the same, as well as
priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation thereof. The State retains full
control over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources even with the grant of
said rights to the indigenous peoples, through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the
utilization of natural resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991196and the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995.197 Moreover, the rights granted to indigenous peoples for the utilization
of natural resources within their ancestral domains merely amplify what has been earlier granted to
them under the aforesaid laws;
(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their ancestral lands and
domains, it also protects the vested rights of persons, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples,
who may have acquired rights of ownership lands or rights to explore and exploit natural resources
within the ancestral lands and domains;198
(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions (Sections 40, 51-54, 62,
63, 65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among others, establish the composition of the NCIP, and prescribe
the application of customary law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact the NCIP is
composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover,
the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution; and
(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an independent agency under
the Office of the President does not infringe upon the President’s power of control under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the
NCIP under the Office of the President, and therefore under the President’s control and supervision with
respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of
the NLRC and the SEC.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Footnotes
1
Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69 (1979); Phil.
Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil 674 (1952).
2
In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).
3
In Philippine Colonial history, the term indio applied to indigenous throughout the vast Spanish empire.
India was a synonym for all of Asia east of the Indus River. Even after it became apparent that the
explorer Christopher Columbus was not able to reach territories lying off the east coast of Asia, the
Spanish persisted in referring to all natives within their empire as los Indios. (Owen J. Lynch, Jr., THE
PHILIPPINE COLONIAL DICHOTOMY: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 PL J 112 [1988] citing R.
BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN’S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE
PRESIDENT 5 [1979].
4
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976), p. 1151.
5
Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian
Controversy, 92 The American Journal of International Law 414, 419 (1998) citing Jose Martinez Cobo,
Study of the Problem of Discrimination against indigenous population, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1986/ 7/
Add. 4, paras. 379-80.
6
Ibid. This definition is criticized for taking the potentially limited, and controversial view of indigenous
peoples by requiring "historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed
on their territories."
7
8
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 680 (1919).
9
Hearing before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-Third Congress, Third
Session on HR 18459, pp. 346, 351. Quoted in Rubi at 686.
10
United States President McKinleys’ Instruction to the Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900, quoted in
Rubi at 680.
11
US v. Tubban, 29 Phil. 434, 436 (1915).
12
See Owen J. Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples And A Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary
Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63 PLJ 249 (1988).
13
For an introduction to the chasm that exists between Philippine Law and Indigenous Custom Law, see
Owen J. Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey 52 PLJ 268
(1982); and the Philippine Indigenous Law Collection: An Introduction and Preliminary Bibliography, 58
PLJ 457 (1983), by the same author.
14
See Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (1975), pp. 26-41; Teodoro Agoncillo, A
History of the Filipino People, 8th ed., pp. 5, 74-75.
15
Response of Rep. Gregorio A. Andolana to the interpellation of Rep. John Henry R. Osmeña on ouse
Bill No. 9125, Journal of August 20 and 21, 1997 of the House of Representatives, p.20.
16
Philippines Yearbook (1998 ed.), p. 366.
17
Article II of the Constitution, entitled State Principles and Policies.
18
Article XII of the Constitution, entitled National Economy and Patrimony.
19
Article XIII of the Constitution, entitled Social Justice and Human Rights.
20
Ibid.
21
Article XIV of the Constitution, entitled Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports.
22
Article XVI of the Constitution, entitled General Provisions.
23
SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policies . - The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the
framework of the Constitution:
a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity
and development;
b) The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic,
social and cultural well being and shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain;
c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their
cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and
policies;
d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full
measure of human rights and freedoms without distinction or discrimination;
e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights
and guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on
an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other
members of the population; and
f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural
integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other
services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of these
communities.
Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and
guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values,
beliefs, interests and institutions, and to adopt and implement measures to protect their rights to their
ancestral domains.
24
See Sections 13-20, R.A. 8371.
25
26
27
28
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392, 400 (1980), citing People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
29
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492, 513 (1996).
30
Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 104 (1996).
31
Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346, 362 (1913).
32
WEBSTERS’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1976, p. 497.
33
United States v. Freuhauf, 365 US 146 (1961).
34
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 364 (1989); Joya v.
PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993).
35
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937).
36
Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337, 342 (1983).
37
US v. Richardson, 418 US 166, 194 S Ct 2940, 41 L Ed 2d 678 (1974).
38
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, 135 (1994), citing, among others, Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15
SCRA 479 (1965); CLU V. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221
(1991); Osmena v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Carpio v.
Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992).
In Kilosbayan v. Morato (250 SCRA 130 [1995]) the Court discoursed on the rule on standing as follows:
taxpayers may sue on the claim of illegal disbursement of funds, or to assail the constitutionality of a tax
measure; voters may question the validity of election laws; citizens may raise constitutional questions of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and, legislators may question the validity of
official acts which infringe their prerogatives.
39
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).
40
Assn. of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 364-365
(1989).
41
16 Phil. 366 (1910), citing HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES.
42
Id., at 371.
43
Id., at 374-375.
44
136 SCRA 27, 37 (1985).
45
177 SCRA 374, 383 (1989).
46
224 SCRA 792 (1993).
47
Id., at 805.
48
Ibid.
49
Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300, 306 (1966).
50
Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479, 487 (1965), citing 11 Am Jur 761.
51
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333, 358-359 (1976); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331
(1960); Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 (1972).
52
Section 79. Appropriations.- The amount necessary to finance the initial implementation of this Act
shall be charged against the current year's appropriation of the ONCC and the OSCC. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.
53
Section 74. Merger of ONCC/OSCC.—The Office for Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) and the
Office for Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), created under Executive Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C
respectively, are hereby merged as organic offices of the NCIP and shall continue to function under a
revitalized and strengthened structure to achieve the objectives of the NCIP x x x.
54
Section 2, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
55
Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
56
Article VIII of the Constitution states:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
xxx
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended, provides:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.-The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
x x x.
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases.- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.
57
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154, 173-174 (1997).
58
172 SCRA 415 (1989).
59
Id., at 424.
60
Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:
(a) Right of Ownership. – The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
(b) hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
xxx
61
Section 3(l) Native Title – refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as
memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public
lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish
Conquest; x x x
Section 3(p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain
ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owners, and utilized a defined
territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in
accordance with their customs and traditions.
62
Section 3(b) Ancestral Lands – Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and
utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement
by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings
entered into by the government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to,
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots;
63
Section 3(a) Ancestral Domains – Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein, held under a claim
of ownership, occupied or possessed by Indigenous peoples, by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by the government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare.
It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually
owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively be occupied
by Indigenous peoples but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators.
64
Ibid.
65
Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958); San Miguel Corporation v. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69 (1979).
66
In re Guarina, 24 Phil 37 (1913).
67
See Lee Hong Hok vs. David, 48 SCRA 372 (1972).
68
Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1994 rev. ed., p. 15.
69
1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd revision, p. 1759.
70
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 1282.
71
76 Corpus Juris Secundum, citing Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 566.
72
Washburn, p. 44; see also Williams, Principles Of The Law On Real Property, 6th ed. (1886), p.2;
Bigelow, p. 2.
73
Warvelle, Abstracts and Examination of Title to Real Property (1907), p.18.
74
1 Dictionary of English Law (Jowitt, ed.), p. 797.
75
41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L Ed. 594 (1909).
76
Cariño vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 (1906). The Philippine Supreme Court in this case held that
in the Philippines, there is no conclusive presumption of a grant of title to land from the Government
founded merely upon long possession of the same by the applicant.
77
Cariño vs. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 941.
78
Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902.
79
75 Phil 890 (1946).
80
Id., at 892.
81
Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, p. 861.
82
Section 3, Article XII, Constitution.
83
Under the Treaty of Tordesillas, the world was divided between Spain and Portugal, with the former
having exclusive power to claim all lands and territories west of the Atlantic Ocean demarcation line
(Lynch, The Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty, 62 Phil L J 279, 283 [1987]).
84
See AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ed., 142-143.
85
See Cruz, International Law, 1996 ed., pp. 106-107.
86
Cariño v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 939.
This point finds significance in light of the distinction between sovereignty and dominion. Sovereignty is
the right to exercise the functions of a State to the exclusion of any other State (Case Concerning the
Island of Las Palmas [1928], UNRIAA II 829, 838). It is often referred to as the power of imperium, which
is defined as the government authority possessed by the State (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines: A Commentary Vol. 2, p. 419). On the other hand, dominion, or dominium, is the
capacity of the State to own or acquire property such as lands and natural resources.
Dominium was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of jura regalia. The
declaration in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that all lands of the public domain are
owned by the State is likewise founded on dominium (Ibid.). If dominium, not imperium, is the basis of
the theory of jura regalia, then the lands which Spain acquired in the 16th century were limited to non-
private lands, because it could only acquire lands which were not yet privately-owned or occupied by
the Filipinos. Hence, Spain acquired title only over lands which were unoccupied and unclaimed, i.e.,
public lands.
87
Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipinos Responses, 1565-1700 (1959),
pp. 8-9.
88
Cariño vs. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 943.
89
Book 4, Title 12, Law 9, decreed by Philip II, 1 June 1594. We order that grants of farms and lands to
Spaniards be without injury to the Indians and that those which have been granted to their loss and
injury, be returned to the lawful owners.
Book 4, Title 12, Law 14. We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories,
and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still
pertaining the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and
true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that x x x after distributing
to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasteurage, confirming them in what they now
have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered
for us to dispose of as we wish. [Quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 542-543 (1904).] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Book 6, Title 1, Law 15, decreed by King Philip II, at Madrid, 7 November 1574. We command that in the
Philippine Islands the Indians not be removed from one to another settlement by force and against their
will.
Book 6, Title 1, Law 23, otherwise known as Ordinance 10 of 1609 decreed by Philip III. It is right that
time should be allowed the Indians to work their own individual lands and those of the community.
Book 6, Title 1, Law 32, decreed by Philip II, 16 April 1580. We command the Viceroys, Presidents, and
Audiencias that they see to it that the Indians have complete liberty in their dispositions.
Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754. Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it shall
be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription; x x x. [Quoted in
Valenton v. Murciano, supra, at 546.] (Emphasis supplied.)
90
Article 6 of the royal decree of June 25, 1880, quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, supra note 89 at 549.
91
Cariño v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 944.
92
Memorandum of Petitioners, par. 3.4, Rollo, pp. 845-846.
93
The Treaty of Paris reads in part:
Article III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, x x x.
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars, within three months after the
exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.
xxx
Article VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles One, Two, and Three of this treaty, Spain
relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands of the West Indies, in the Island of Guam,
and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways,
and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain and as such
belong to the Crown of Spain.
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding
paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the
peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private
establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire
and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of
whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.
94
The statute reads in part:
Section 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands
under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,
except such land or other property as shall be designated by the President of the United States for
military and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are hereby placed under the
control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof,
except as provided by this Act.
95
McKinley’s Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, in Mendoza, From McKinley’s
Instructions to the New Constitution: Documents on the Philippine Constitutional System (1978) p. 71.
96
Id., at 65-75; Section 5, Philippine Bill of 1902.
97
Solicitor General’s Memorandum, Rollo, p. 668-669.
98
Id, at 668.
99
Section 1, Article XII, 1935 Constitution reads:
All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
100
Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil 598 (1954).
101
Sec. 5, Article XII. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains.
102
See Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 863-864.
103
Sibal, Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, p. 893.
104
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 1189.
105
Ibid.
106
107
Id., at 37.
108
Solicitor General’s Memorandum, Rollo, p. 665.
109
Torres v. Tan Chim, 69 Phil 518 (1940); CIR v.Guerrero, 21 SCRA 180 (1967).
110
111
See 1 COOLEY, CONST., LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., pp. 127-129.
112
See pp. 8-9 of this Opinion for the full text of the constitutional provisions mentioned.
113
Section 1, Article XII provides:
The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit
of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources,
and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect
Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives and similar
collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership. (Emphasis
supplied.)
114
Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, p. 800, citing the sponsorship speech of Dr.
Bernardo Villegas, Chairman of the Committee on National Economy and Patrimony.
115
116
Petition, Rollo, pp.18-19.
117
Id., at 20.
118
Section 3. Definition of Terms. -For Purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
a) Ancestral Domains. -Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any
other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which
are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands,
forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands, individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the
home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
119
Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs
private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.
120
(a) Right of Ownership. – The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
(b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. – Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop,
control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve
natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit
and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose
of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result
of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights; x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
121
Section 2, Article XII, Constitution.
122
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 42 (1983);
see also Articles 427 and 428, Civil Code.
123
Id., at 43.
124
125
Ibid.
126
Should be Section 7. The Transcript of Session Proceedings of the deliberations of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on National Cultural Communities regarding House Bill No. 9125 refers to
Section 8 but the Committee was actually discussing Section 7 on Rights to Ancestral Domains.
127
Transcript of Session Proceedings, Bicameral Conference Committee on National Cultural
Communities, October 9, 1997, XIV-2.
128
Sections 7 (b) and Section 57, R.A. 8371.
129
40 Phil. 1017 (1909), 215 US 16, 54 L Ed 72.
130
Ibid. The facts of the case were discussed in Fianza vs. Reavies, (7 Phil. 610 [1909]) thus: Jose Fianza,
et al., members of the Igorot tribe, claimed that he and his predecessors had, for more than fifty years
prior to 1901, possessed a certain parcel of mineral land on which were found two gold mines. The same
parcel of land was also claimed by an American, J.F. Reavies, who entered the land in 1901 and
proceeded to locate mining claims according to the mining laws of the United States. The Philippine
Supreme Court held that Fianza, et al. were the rightful owners of the mineral lands pursuant to Section
45 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which in sum states that where a person have held or worked on their
mining claims for a period equivalent to ten years, evidence of such possession and working of the
claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto. On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court and held that the
indigenous peoples were the rightful owners of the contested parcel of land, stating that the possession
and working by Fianza, et al. of the mining claim in the Philippine Islands for the time required under the
Section 45 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to establish the right to a patent, need not have been under a
claim of title.
131
Memorandum of Intervenors Flavier, et al., Rollo, p. 918.
132
Article I of the Decree of Superior Civil Government of January 29, 1864 provided that "The supreme
ownership of mines throughout the kingdom belong to the crown and the king. They shall not be
exploited except by persons who obtained special grant from this superior government and by those
who may secure it thereafter, subject to this regulation." (FRANCISCO, PHILIPPINE LAWS ON NATURAL
RESOURCES, 2nd ed. [1956], p. 14, citing the unpublished case of Lawrence v. Garduno, G.R. No. 19042.)
Article 2 of the Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 (the Spanish Mining Law), the law in force at the time of
the cession of the Philippines to the United States contained a similar declaration, thus:
The ownership of the substances enumerated in the preceding article (among them those of
inflammable nature) belongs to the state, and they cannot be disposed of without an authorization
issued by the Superior Civil Governor.
The Spanish Civil Code contained the following analogous provisions affirming the State’s ownership
over minerals:
Art. 339. Property of public dominium is-
xxx
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in
some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other
works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Art. 350. The proprietor of land is the owner of the surface and of everything under it and may build,
plant or excavate thereon, as he may see fit, subject to any existing easements and to the provisions of
the Laws on Mines and Waters and to police regulations.
After the Philippines was ceded to Spain, the Americans continued to adhere to the concept of State-
ownership of natural resources. However, the open and free exploration, occupation and purchase of
mineral deposits and the land where they may be found were allowed under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Section 21 thereof stated:
Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and
unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase, and the
land in which they are found, to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said
Islands: Provided, That when on any lands in said Islands entered and occupied as agricultural lands
under the provisions of this Act, but not patented, mineral deposits have been found, the working of
such mineral deposits is hereby forbidden until the person, association, or corporation who or which has
entered and is occupying such lands shall have paid to the Government of said Islands such additional
sum or sums as will make the total amount paid for the mineral claim or claims in which said deposits
are located equal to the amount charged by the Government for the same as mineral claims.
Other natural resources such as water and forests were similarly regarded as belonging to the State
during both the Spanish and American rule in the Philippines, viz:
Article 33 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 defined waters of public ownership as (1) the waters
springing continuously or intermittently from lands of the public domain; (2) the waters of rivers; and (3)
the continuous or intermittent waters of springs and creeks running through their natural channels.
Article 1 of the same law states:
The following are also part of the national domain open to public use:
1. The coasts or maritime frontiers of the Philippine territory with their coves, inlets, creeks, roadsteads,
bays and ports
2. The coast of the sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coasts, to the full width recognized by
international law. The state provides for and regulates the police supervision and the uses of this zone
as well as the right of refuge and immunity therein, in accordance with law and international treaties.
With respect to forests, there are references made regarding State-ownership of forest lands in
Supreme Court decisions (See Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198-1199 [1968]; Director
of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5, 11 [1975]; Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175, 184 [1908];
Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil 572, 584 [1909]).
The State’s ownership over natural resources was embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution declared:
All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty -five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provided:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State.
With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the
public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for
a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
133
Noblejas, Philippine Law on Natural Resources 1961 Revised Ed., p. 6
134
See Laurel (ed.), Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. VI, pp. 494-495.
135
Explanatory Note of the Committee on Nationalization of Lands and Natural Resources, September
14, 1934, reproduced in Laurel (ed.), Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. VII,
pp. 464-468; see also De Leon and De Leon, Jr., Philippine Constitutional Law: Principles and Cases, Vol.
2, pp. 801-802.
136
Section 8, Article XIV, see note 139 for the full text of the provision.
137
Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations and associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
five years, and under such rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
138
xxx
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control
and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and
share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation
and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result
of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights;
139
Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.-The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and
utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for
not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into
with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has
agreed to allow such operation: Provided, finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take
appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract.
140
Section 59. Certification Precondition - All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or
entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the area
affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-
based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That
no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of
Indigenous peoples concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or
government-owned or controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production
sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs
shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the
requirement of this consultation process.
141
Section 58. Environmental Considerations.- Ancestral domains or portions thereof, which are found to
be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover, or reforestation as determined by appropriate agencies with the full participation of the
Indigenous peoples concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for such purposes. The
Indigenous peoples concerned shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve such areas with the full and effective assistance of government agencies. Should the
Indigenous peoples decide to transfer the responsibility over the areas, said decision must be made in
writing. The consent of the Indigenous peoples should be arrived at in accordance with its customary
laws without prejudice to the basic requirements of existing laws on free and prior informed consent:
Provided, That the transfer shall be temporary and will ultimately revert to the Indigenous peoples in
accordance with the program for technology transfer; Provided, further, That no Indigenous peoples
shall be displaced or relocated for the purpose enumerated under this section without the written
consent of the specific persons authorized to give consent.
142
Citing Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
143
Memorandum of Petitioners, Id., at 840-841.
144
State v. Lathrop, 93 Ohio St 79, 112 NE 209, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, § 100.
145
Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 US 8, 51 L Ed 345, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d
Constitutional Law, § 100.
146
Third paragraph, Section 2, Article XII, Constitution –
The Congress may, by law, allow small scale-utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.
147
Section 6, Article XIII, Constitution –
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in
accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the
public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights
of small settlers, and the rights of the indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be
distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
148
Section 7, Article XIII, Constitution –
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall
provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and
conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the
utilization of marine and fishing resources.
149
Bower v. Big Horn Canal Assn. (Wyo) 307 P2d 593, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law, § 100.
150
Republic Act No. 7076 (the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991), Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995).
151
Section 3(b) of R.A. 7076 defines "small-scale mining" as referring to mining activities which rely
heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy
mining equipment.
152
Section 7, R.A. 7076 provides:
Ancestral lands. - No ancestral land may be declared as a people’s small-scale mining area without the
prior consent of the cultural communities concerned: Provided, That, if ancestral lands are declared as
peole’s small-scale mining areas, the members of the cultural communities therein shall be given
priority for the awarding of a people’s small-scale mining contract.
153
154
155
Sec. 3(q), Chapter 1, Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995).
156
157
Sections 7(a) and (b), R.A. 8371.
158
Presidential Decree No. 1151 (1971).
159
Presidential Decree No. 1586 (1978) and DENR Administrative Order No. 37 (1996).
160
Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).
161
Republic Act No. 7942.
162
Petition, Rollo, pp. 23-25.
163
Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, 596 (1995).
164
Section 53 (f), R.A. 8371.
165
166
167
Sections 40, 51, 52, 53, 54, 62 and 66, R.A. No. 8371.
168
Sections 63 and 65, R.A. No. 8371.
169
Section 40. Composition.- The NCIP shall be an independent agency under the Office of the President
and shall be composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to the ICCs/IPs, one (1) of whom shall be
the Chairperson. The Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines from a list of
recommendees submitted by authentic ICCs/IPs: Provided, That the seven (7) Commissioners shall be
appointed specifically from each of the following ethnographic areas, Region I and the Cordilleras;
Region II, the rest of Luzon; Island Groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of
the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao:
Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7) Commissioners shall be women.
170
Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.- The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be
brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary
laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in
the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
171
Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts.- In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims
within the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which can not be resolved, the NCIP
shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of
such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the
traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The
NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions:
Provided, further, That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute
or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this
Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of a copy thereof.
172
Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo ,pp. 873-874.
173
Section 3 (f). Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs
and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs;
xxx
Sec. 63. Applicable Laws. - Customary laws, traditions and practices of the ICCs/IPs of the land where the
conflict arises shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims and ownerships, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes. Any doubt or ambiguity in the application and interpretation
of laws shall be resolved in favor of the ICCs/IPs.
174
Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws
and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
175
Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp.875-876.
176
R.A. 8371 states:
Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
177
See Secs. 62 and 63, R.A. 8371.
178
Sec. 65, R.A. 8371.
179
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.
180
Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced.180
181
R.A. No. 7160 reads:
Sec. 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. –
xxx
(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples, local systems of
settling disputes of indigenous peoples, local systems of settling disputes through their councils of datus
or elders shall be recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions of this Code.
182
Sec. 38, R.A. 8371.
183
Secs. 44 (a), (b), (c),(d), (f), (g), (h), (I), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (p), (q), R.A. 8371.
184
Sec. 44 (o), R.A. 8371.
185
Secs. 44 (e), 51-54, 62, R.A. 8371.
186
1 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law, § 55.
187
Sec. 62, R.A. 8371.
188
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
189
Sec. 44 (f), R.A. 8371.
190
Sec. 44 (g), R.A, 8371.
191
Sec. 44 (j), R.A. 8371.
192
Sec. 44 (p), R.A. 8371.
193
Sec. 40, R.A. 8371.
194
Sec. 42, R.A. 8371.
195
Supra note 75.
196
R.A. 7076.
197
R.A. 7942.
198
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA, J.:
This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not complain of any injury as a
result of the application of the statute to them. They assert a right to seek an adjudication of
constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea that the questions raised are of
"transcendental importance."
The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, §1 extends only to cases and controversies for the
determination of such proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of rights,
or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs.1 In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to
enforce a property right of petitioners against the government and other respondents or to demand
compensation for injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle
what they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment that we render in
this case will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation will bring to the
Court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. Such judgment cannot be executed as it
amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the provisions of the law in
question.2
I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, §1 of the Constitution to determine in
the abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive departments in enacting the IPRA. Our
jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to note that, in
enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins with the phrase "all
cases. . . ."
The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has been a grave
abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give the judiciary a roving commission to
right any wrong it perceives but to preclude courts from invoking the political question doctrine in order
to evade the decision of certain cases even where violations of civil liberties are alleged.
The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia,3 in which this Court, adopting the
submission of the Solicitor General, formulated the following test of its jurisdiction in such cases:
[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the President’s decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion
and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not
act arbitrarily.
That is why Art. VII, §18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission,
was the author of the opinions of the Court in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.
Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or
controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government and
erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with
power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be
permitting in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of
the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as
applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.
The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of
freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the
validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to
others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute
"on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on
freedom of expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is
unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable
from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not possible.
For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not only to act
without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or hypothetical questions, its
decision will be based on speculation rather than experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe
the impact of the law, the Court is likely to equate questions of constitutionality with questions of
wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into the domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it cannot
be too often repeated, cannot take place in a vacuum.
Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by petitioners will be a
"galling cop out"4 or an "advocacy of timidity, let alone isolationism."5 To decline the exercise of
jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out" or a sign of "timidity" than it was for Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison6 to hold that petitioner had the right to the issuance of his commission
as justice of the peace of the District of Columbia only to declare in the end that after all mandamus did
not lie, because §13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred original jurisdiction on the United
States Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as the court’s jurisdiction is
mainly appellate.
Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial review, and so that
there can be no doubt of this power of our Court, we in this country have enshrined its principle in Art.
VIII, §1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can result either in the invalidation of an act of Congress or
in upholding it. Hence, the checking and legitimating functions of judicial review so well mentioned in
the decisions7 of this Court.
To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is not to show
timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government whose acts, unless shown
to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are presumed to be valid. The polestar of constitutional
adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in the Angara case when he said that "this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota,
presented."8 For the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.9 Until, therefore, an actual
case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of constitutionality, which
inheres in every statute, must be accorded to it.
Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor General,10 reiterated
in Tanada v. Tuvera,11 that "when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is interested in the
execution of the laws." On the basis of this statement, he argues that petitioners have standing to bring
these proceedings.12
In Severino v. Governor General,13 the question was whether mandamus lay to compel the Governor
General to call a special election on the ground that it was his duty to do so. The ruling was that he did
not have such a duty. On the other hand, although mandamus was issued in Tanada v. Tuvera, it was
clear that petitioners had standing to bring the suit, because the public has a right to know and the
failure of respondents to publish all decrees and other presidential issuances in the Official Gazette
placed petitioners in danger of violating those decrees and issuances. But, in this case, what public right
is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in
common with other citizens.
For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.
Footnotes
1
Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966).
2
Muskrat v. United States, 279 U.S. 346, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911).
3
42 SCRA 448, 481 (1971) (emphasis on the original).
4
Panganiban, J., Separate Opinion, p. 2.
5
Vitug, J., Separate Opinion, p. 1.
6
1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
7
Occeña v. Commission on Elections; Gonzales v. The National Treasurer, 104 SCRA 1 (1981); Mitra v.
Commission on Elections, 104 SCRA 59 (1981).
8
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
9
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806 (1955).
10
16 Phil. 366 (1913).
11
136 SCRA 27 (1985).
12
Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion, pp. 21-23.
13
Supra note 10.
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring and Dissenting)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted handling of the
procedural or preliminary issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners have shown an actual case or
controversy involving at least two constitutional questions of transcendental importance,1 which
deserve judicious disposition on the merits directly by the highest court of the land.2 Further, I am
satisfied that the various aspects of this controversy have been fully presented and impressively argued
by the parties. Moreover, prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies3 to address the
problems raised by petitioners. In any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition, heard oral
arguments and required the submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a galling copout for us
to dismiss it on mere technical or procedural grounds.
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework

With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencia’s resolution of the two main substantive issues,
which constitute the core of this case. Specifically, I submit that Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution
of the Philippines insofar as -
1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain, waters, x x x and
other natural resources" which, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, "are owned by the State"
and "shall not be alienated." I respectfully reject the contention that "ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are not public lands and have never been owned by the State." Such sweeping statement
places substantial portions of Philippine territory outside the scope of the Philippine Constitution and
beyond the collective reach of the Filipino people. As will be discussed later, these real properties
constitute a third of the entire Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the nation's natural
wealth.
2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources," which the Constitution expressly requires to "be under the full control
and supervision of the State."
True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural communities’ right to
their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution."4 I concede that
indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights
to the beneficial use of public domains, as well as priority in the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.
Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in life, Congress
in its wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and sisters, subject
to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be respected. I personally believe in according every
benefit to the poor, the oppressed and the disadvantaged, in order to empower them to equally enjoy
the blessings of nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to the
nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades the repository of
the very authority of this Court - the Constitution of the Philippines.
The Constitution Is a Compact
My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all other laws
must conform.5 It is the people's quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying the principles upon which
the State and the government are founded.6 Having the status of a supreme and all-encompassing law,
it speaks for all the people all the time, not just for the majority or for the minority at intermittent times.
Every constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a
certain manner.7 Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos to
govern themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is exempt from its
compass.
RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples,
admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy enshrined
in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development."8Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute,
however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and
authority. More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions
contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic foundation of the State's property regime.
Public Domains and Natural Resources Are Owned by the State and Cannot Be Alienated or Ceded
Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the "conquest" of our
country in the sixteenth century. Under this concept, the entire earthly territory known as the Philippine
Islands was acquired and held by the Crown of Spain. The King, as then head of State, had the supreme
power or exclusive dominion over all our lands, waters, minerals and other natural resources. By royal
decrees, though, private ownership of real property was recognized upon the showing of (1) a title deed;
or (2) ancient possession in the concept of owner, according to which a title could be obtained by
prescription.9 Refusal to abide by the system and its implementing laws meant the abandonment or
waiver of ownership claims.
By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United States. The
latter assumed administration of the Philippines and succeeded to the property rights of the Spanish
Crown. But under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the US Government allowed and granted patents to Filipino
and US citizens for the "free and open x x x exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines] and the
land in which they are found."10 To a certain extent, private individuals were entitled to own, exploit and
dispose of mineral resources and other rights arising from mining patents.
This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it crafted and
ratified our first Constitution. Instead, the said Constitution embodied the Regalian Doctrine, which
more definitively declared as belonging to the State all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals and
other natural resources.11 Although respecting mining patentees under the Philippine Bill of 1902, it
restricted the further exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, both as to who
might be entitled to undertake such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads:
"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8 and 9, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution, state:
"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease
for the exploration, development, exploitation, utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The National
Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into
service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign
person or entity for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such."
Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizen, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays
and lagoons.
"The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution."
The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially impelled by the
desire to preserve the nation's wealth in the hands of the Filipinos themselves. Nationalism was fervent
at the time, and our constitutional framers decided to embody the doctrine in our fundamental law.
Charging the State with the conservation of the national patrimony was deemed necessary for Filipino
posterity. The arguments in support of the provision are encapsulated by Aruego as follows: "[T]he
natural resources, particularly the mineral resources which constituted a great source of wealth,
belonged not only to the generation then but also to the succeeding generation and consequently
should be conserved for them."12
Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all forces of energy
and other natural resources belonged to the Philippine State, the Commonwealth absolutely prohibited
the alienation of these natural resources. Their disposition, exploitation, development and utilization
were further restricted only to Filipino citizens and entities that were 60 percent Filipino-owned. The
present Constitution even goes further by declaring that such activities "shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State." Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and expressly states that
only agricultural lands of the public domain shall be alienable. We quote below the relevant provision:13
"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the
uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. x x x."
Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all ancestral
domains and lands are outside the coverage of public domain; and that these properties - including
forests, bodies of water, minerals and parks found therein - are private and have never been part of the
public domain, because they have belonged to the indigenous people’s ancestors since time
immemorial.
I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Indeed,
no one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was subject to
"any existing right, grant, lease or concession," the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute
terms. Because of the State’s implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all
those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court said that once minerals are found even in private land, the
State may intervene to enable it to extract the minerals in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The
land is converted into mineral land and may not be used by any private person, including the registered
owner, for any other purpose that would impede the mining operations. Such owner would be entitled
to just compensation for the loss sustained.
In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC,15 the Court clarified that while mining claim holders and
patentees have the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim, their rights are
not absolute or strictly one of ownership. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of pertinent
mining laws was deemed an abandonment or a waiver of the claim.
Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political history cannot be
set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The perceived lack of understanding
of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by conceding the nation’s resources to their exclusive
advantage. They cannot be more privileged simply because they have chosen to ignore state laws. For
having chosen not to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain
their ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their concept of "native title" thereto. It would be
plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law and, consequently, deserve equal
opportunity to enjoy the country’s resources.
Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does not grant
ownership of public domains and natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it recognizes and mandates
respect for the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains that had never been
lands of the public domain."16 I say, however, that such claim finds no legal support. Nowhere in the
Constitution is there a provision that exempts such lands and domains from its coverage. Quite the
contrary, it declares that all lands of the public domain and natural resources "are owned by the State";
and "with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."
As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,17 the Court declared as belonging to the public domain all lands
not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant under laws, orders or decrees
promulgated by the Spanish government; or by possessory information under Act 496 (Mortgage Law).
On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier et al.18 differentiate the concept of ownership of ICCs/IPs from
that which is defined in Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They maintain that "[t]here are variations
among ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera, but a fair synthesis of these refers to ‘x x x the tribal right
to use the land or to territorial control x x x, a collective right to freely use the particular territory x x x
[in] the concept of trusteeship.'"
In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that preserves the
property for the common but nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit of its members, without the
attributes of alienation or disposition. This concept, however, still perpetually withdraws such property
from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. The perpetual and
exclusive character of private respondents’ claims simply makes them repugnant to basic fairness and
equality.
Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and lands to the pre-
Spanish conquest. I should say that, at the time, their claims to such lands and domains was limited to
the surfaces thereof since their ancestors were agriculture-based. This must be the continuing scope of
the indigenous groups’ ownership claims: limited to land, excluding the natural resources found within.
In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use - not ownership - of ancestral domains,
then I have no disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution is IPRA’s Section 5719- without the
too-broad definitions under Section 3 (a) and (b) - insofar as it grants them priority rights in harvesting,
extracting, developing or exploiting natural resources within ancestral domains.
The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail. Our
Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino
people. As the protector of the Constitution, this Court has the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of that
Constitution - not to dilute, circumvent or create exceptions to them.
Cariño v. Insular Government Was Modified by the Constitution

In this connection, I submit that Cariño v. Insular Government20 has been modified or superseded by our
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as referring only to a means by which
public agricultural land may be acquired by citizens. I must also stress that the claim of Petitioner Cariño
refers to land ownership only, not to the natural resources underneath or to the aerial and cosmic space
above.
Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals,21 a Decision handed down after our
three Constitutions had taken effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority member's registration of
land under CA 141, Section 48 (c).22 The reason was that the property fell within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve. This Court quoted with favor the solicitor general’s following statements:
"3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law involved, as
to include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally apply
such provision. For, both the 1973 and present Constitutions do not include timber or forest lands as
alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution states that ‘with the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources
shall not be alienated.’ The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that ‘with
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated’."
Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court also stated that "forest land is incapable of
registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the defense of indefeasiblity of a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an action for
reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation, the patent covering forest land being void ab initio."
RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains
The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the natural resources
found within ancestral domains. However, a simple reading of the very wordings of the law belies this
statement.
Section 3 (a)24 defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement x x x. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural,
and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds x x
x bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources x x x." (Emphasis ours.)
Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs encompass the natural
resources found therein. And Section 7 guarantees recognition and protection of
their rights of ownership and possession over such domains.
The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds that ancestral
domains are the ICC’s/IP’s private but community property which belongs to all generations and
therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed." Simply put, the law declares that ancestral domains,
including the natural resources found therein, are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed. Not only does it vest ownership, as understood under the Civil Code; it adds perpetual
exclusivity. This means that while ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the majority of Filipinos
who are not indigenous can never own any part thereof.
On the other hand, Section 3 (b)25 of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to "lands occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial x x x,
under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, x x x including, but not limited to, residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots." Section 8 recognizes and
protects "the right of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands." Such ownership
need not be by virtue of a certificate of title, but simply by possession since time immemorial.
I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, more
specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals and natural
resources – none of which, except agricultural lands, can be alienated. In several cases, this Court has
consistently held that non-agricultural land must first be reclassified and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural purposes by a positive act of the government.26 Mere possession or
utilization thereof, however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties.27 The
presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Hence, x x x all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved
was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present competent and persuasive
proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other
than factual evidence of possession and title."28
Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 are merely
definitions and should not be construed independently of the other provisions of the law. But, precisely,
a definition is "a statement of the meaning of a word or word group."29 It determines or settles the
nature of the thing or person defined.30Thus, after defining a term as encompassing several items, one
cannot thereafter say that the same term should be interpreted as excluding one or more of the
enumerated items in its definition. For that would be misleading the people who would be bound by the
law. In other words, since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including the natural resources found
therein and further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs can
own natural resources.
In fact, Intervenors Flavier et al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral domains, with
no specific limits, likewise belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory directly contravenes the
Constitution. Such outlandish contention further disregards international law which, by constitutional
fiat, has been adopted as part of the law of the land.31
No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371
Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of
alienable public land, whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not exceeding 500
hectares, they may hold by lease only.
RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their mere
definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The properties under the assailed law
cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators."
Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as they have
used up the resources of a certain area, they move to another place or go back to one they used to
occupy. From year to year, a growing tribe could occupy and use enormous areas, to which they could
claim to have had "traditional access." If nomadic ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their enlarging
ancestral domain or land, several thousands of hectares of land may yet be additionally delineated as
their private property.
Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people's claim to their ancestral land is not based on compounded or
consolidated title, but "on a collective stake to the right to claim what their forefathers secured for them
when they first set foot on our country."32 They trace their right to occupy what they deem to be their
ancestral land way back to their ancient sultans and datus, who had settled in many islands that have
become part of Mindanao. This long history of occupation is the basis of their claim to their ancestral
lands.33
Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs as ancestral
domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands.34 Based on ethnographic surveys, the
solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains cover 80 percent of our mineral resources and
between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million hectares of land in the country.35 This means that four fifths
of its natural resources and one third of the country's land will be concentrated among 12 million
Filipinos constituting 110 ICCs,36 while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the overwhelming
majority will have to share the remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the constitutional
principle of a "more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth" among Filipinos.
RA 8371 Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural Resources
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that "[t]he exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." The State
may (1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) enter into co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by
Filipinos.37 Such agreements, however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and
under terms and conditions as may be provided by law.
But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as
natural resources found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and
possession, they may develop and manage the natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits
from the allocation and the utilization thereof.38 And they may exercise such right without any time
limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like
period.39 Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural
resources must also be limited to such period.
In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration
of natural resources,40 a right vested by the Constitution only in the State. Congress, through IPRA, has
in effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the State's power of ownership and full control over a
substantial part of the national patrimony, in contravention of our most fundamental law.
I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale utilization of natural
resources and cooperative fish farming, I absolutely have no objection. These undertakings are certainly
allowed under the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371 – (1) ownership
of ancestral lands and domains and the natural resources therein; and (2) the ICCs/IPs' control of the
exploration, development and utilization of such resources – I believe I should no longer tackle the
following collateral issues petitioners have brought up:
1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains amounts to undue
deprivation of private property
2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants
3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies and other forms of
exaction
4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in the settlements of
disputes over their rights and claims
5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) violate the due process and equal protection clauses
6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces against their will
I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic or, at least, no
longer of "transcendental importance," in view of my contention that the two major IPRA propositions
are based on unconstitutional premises. On the other hand, I think that in the case of the last three, it is
best to await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have been injured by specific provisions of
RA 8371.
Epilogue
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:
"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure
their economic, social, and cultural well being.
"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."
Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of ICCs/IPs: (1)
the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and (2) national development policies and programs.
Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This does not,
however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the Constitution withholds from the rest
of the Filipino people. I would concede giving them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the
preservation of their ancestral lands and domains.41 But to grant perpetual ownership and control of the
nation's substantial wealth to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to live
and abide by our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also subversive of the
rule of law.
In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating
"reverse discrimination." In seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the expense of the
majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced generosity will spread the roots of
discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration of national proportions.
Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the few,
however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just society be approximated by maiming
the healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can the nation survive by enclaving its wealth for
the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.
Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of opportunities and
privileges that are open to all and by preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them. This
is the essence of social justice – empowering and enabling the poor to be able to compete with the rich
and, thus, equally enjoy the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.
WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections
3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and related provisions of RA 8371.
Footnotes
1
Kilosbayan v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130, 140, November 16, 1995; Association of Small Landowners v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 365, July 14, 1989; Antonio v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368
(1949).
2
Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 46, May 2, 1997; Santiago v. Comelec, 270 SCRA 106, 123-24, March
19, 1997; Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, 60, May 14, 1991.
3
Tanada v. Angara, ibid.
4
§5, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
5
16 CJS §3.
6
16 Am Jur 2d §2.
7
Ibid.
8
§22, Art. II of the Constitution.
9
Abaoag v. Director of Lands, 45 Phil 518 (1923), cited in petitioners' Memorandum.
10
Soledad M. Cagampang-de Castro, "The Economic Policies on Natural Resources Under the 1987
Constitution Revisited," Journal of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Vol. XXV, Nos. 3 & 4 (1999), p.
51.
11
In a republican system of government, the concept of jura regalia is stripped of royal overtones;
ownership is vested in the State, instead. (Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 1009-1010.)
12
II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 603, quoted in Bernas, supra, p. 1010.
13
§3, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
14
160 SCRA 228, 239, April 15, 1988.
15
261 SCRA 528, September 9, 1996.
16
NCIP’s Memorandum, p. 24.
17
75 Phil 890, 892, August 31, 1946.
18
Intervenors’ Memorandum, pp. 33 et seq.
19
"SEC. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. – The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains. x x x."
20
41 Phil 935, February 23, 1909.
21
172 SCRA 455, 463, April 18, 1989, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
22
"(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (As
amended by R.A. No. 3872, section 1, approved June 18, 1964)."
23
284 SCRA 617, 633, January 22, 1998, per Puno, J.
24
"a) Ancestral Domains - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by
war, force majeureor displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects
or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and
which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence
and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators."
25
"b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to lands occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,
continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into
by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
26
Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development v. Intermediate Appellate Court, March 2,
1993;Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296, December 17, 1990; Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, January 29, 1990.
27
Ibid., Margolles v. Court of Appeals, February 14, 1994; Gordula v. Court of Appeals, supra.
28
Republic v. Sayo, October 31, 1990, per Narvasa, J. (later CJ). See also Republic v. Court of
Appeals,supra.
29
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 41.
30
Ibid.
31
§2, Art. II of the Constitution.
32
Cecilio R. Laurente, "The King's Hand: The Regalian Doctrine as a Contributing Factor in the Mindanao
Conflict," Human Rights Agenda, Vol. 5, Issue No. 7, July & August 2000, pp. 6-7.
33
Ibid.
34
Solicitor General's Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 651.
35
Ibid., pp. 4-5.
36
Ibid. See also Datu Vic Saway, "Indigenous Peoples and the Uplands: A Situationer," Proceedings of the
6th Upland NGO Consultative Conference, 23-27 August 1998, p. 30.
37
Or (3) in case of large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, enter – through the
President – into "agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance." (Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr., 240 SCRA 100, January 16, 1995.)
38
§7(b), RA 7381.
39
§57, ibid.
40
§7(b), ibid.
41
As stated earlier, Sec. 57 of IPRA, insofar as it grants them such priority, is constitutional.
51. People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 (1997)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 110817-22 June 13, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARCELINO A. BUGARIN, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated February 11, 1993, which the Regional Trial Court, Branch 97
of Quezon City rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28785 to 86 and Q-92-31157 to 31160, finding
accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin guilty of four counts of consummated rape and one count of
attempted rape and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of multiple (3
Counts) rape and one count of attempted rape, and in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code sentences him to prison terms as follows:
1) For each of the four counts of the above rape, reclusion perpetua.
2) For the attempted rape, two (2) years and four (4) months in the minimum penalty to four (4) years in
the maximum period and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 to deter sexual crimes of the sort committed by
accused.
SO ORDERED.
The complainant, Maryjane Bugarin, is the daughter of accused- appellant. On February 22, 1992,
accompanied by her mother, Regina Bugarin, and her maternal aunt, Nena Padecio, she complained to
the Central Police District Command that she had been repeatedly raped by accused-appellant. In her
sworn statement she related how, on nine different occasions between November 1989 and January 17,
1992, her father entered the common sleeping area of their house in Payatas, Quezon City and, after
holding her knees and spreading her legs, succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina and kissed her
breasts. She claimed that, on January 17, 1992, her father molested her by "kissing her vagina" and that
only by repeatedly kicking him did he desist from molesting her any further.
Complainant was examined on the same date by Emmanuel I. Aranas, PNP Medico-Legal Officer, who
found that she was "in non-virgin state physically." 2 On February 25, 1992, she returned to the police
station to file formal charges against her father. The case was referred to the Office of the Quezon City
Prosecutor which found probable cause and accordingly filed charges for consummated rape and
attempted rape by means of force and intimidation committed on December 23, 1991 and January 17,
1992 against accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin. No bail was recommended "considering that the
evidence of guilt of the respondent is strong." The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-
28785 and Q-92-28786 and raffled to Branch 88 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.
On May 7, 1992, four more charges for rape by means of force and intimidation committed on
November 1989, May 1990, June 1990 and March 14, 1991 were filed against accused-appellant.
Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, the additional cases were raffled to Branch 97 of
the same court. These cases were eventually consolidated and assigned to Branch 88.
The informations in the six cases alleged as follows:
Crim Case No. 92-31157
That on or about the month of June 1990 In Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her consent and against her will, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31158
That on or about the month of November, 1989 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION without her consent and against her will, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter.
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her consent and
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
That on or about the month of May 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there wilfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her consent and against her will, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter.
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1992, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the
vagina of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y ASUNCION, a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all
against her will, however, the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that
is, undersigned complainant push him away, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned in such
amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1991, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y ASUNCION, a minor, without her consent and against her
will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the
New Civil Code.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty in each case, after which trial ensued. Under
questioning by the prosecutor, Maryjane Bugarin narrated how her father sexually assaulted her in their
family's common sleeping area while no one was at home and threatened her if she told anyone about
what happened.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed to be God fearing and morally upright
and that his wife, Regina Bugarin, must have induced their daughter to file the complaints against him
because his wife blamed him for financially neglecting their family since 1989.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Regina Bugarin who testified that a good mother would not
expose her child to humiliation just to get back at her husband. She further claimed that her daughter,
who had been raised properly and taught to be honest, could not have fabricated the charges against
the accused-appellant.
In a two-page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993, the trial court, after giving a summary of the
testimonies of the complainant and accused-appellant, laconically ruled:
The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible in her story of how she was raped? The answer of
this Court is an undoubtful and a definite yes.
Accused-appellant questions the trial court's decision on the ground that: (1) the testimony of Maryjane
Bugarin is not credible; (2) the elements of force and intimidation had not been proved; and (3) the
decision of the trial court does not state the facts and law upon which it was based.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, representing the prosecution, contends that complainant, who
was only 15 years old when she reported the crime, was not likely to concoct charges against her father
and that the moral ascendancy of the father over her took the place of force and intimidation in rape.
We take up first accused-appellant's charge that the decision of the trial court does not state the
grounds therefor. Indeed, the Constitution provides in part in Art. VIII, §14 that "No decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based." This requirement is reiterated and implemented by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides in Rule 120, §2:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment. — The judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is
based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the
acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the
commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
action has been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the
offended party.
The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in at least three respects. First, it does not
contain an evaluation of the evidence of the parties and a discussion of the legal questions involved. It
does not explain why the trial court considered the complainant's testimony credible despite the fact
that, as accused-appellant points out, complainant could not remember the time of the day when she
was allegedly raped. It does not explain why accused-appellant's licking of complainant's genital
constituted attempted rape and not another crime. Second, the complainant testified that she had been
raped five times, to wit, in November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14, 1991,
and on December 23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she was molested by her father who
licked her private part, for which reason six informations were filed against him, but the decision found
the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape (which the trial court erroneously said three
counts) and one count of attempted rape, without explaining whether accused-appellant was being
acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the decision is so carelessly prepared that it finds the accused-
appellant guilty of three counts of consummated rape but sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua "for each of the four counts of . . . rape."
Maryjane claimed she had been raped on December 24, 1989, but the information in Criminal Case No.
Q-92-31160 is far rape allegedly committed in May 1990. It must be for this reason that the trial court
convicted accused-appellant of only four counts of rape, instead of five. But the trial court should have
explained so, if this was really the reason, and expressly acquitted the accused-appellant of the charge
under this information.
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among
other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them
appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings on points of law with
which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching
judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dexit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor
the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing
judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the
power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial
court in this case disrespects the judicial function.
We would normally remand this case to the trial court for compliance with the constitutional
requirement for decisions. But this case has been pending for sometime and further delay can be
avoided if the Court simply reviews the whole evidence. After all, the records of the trial court contain
the transcript of stenographic notes, the complainant's sworn statement dated February 22, 1992, the
resolution of the prosecutor, and the statement of the arresting officer, on the basis of which the Court
may properly decide the case. 3 For this reason the Court has decided to review this case despite the
failure of the trial court to make detailed findings of facts and a statement of the reasons underlying its
decision.
Now it is settled that when the complainant in a rape case, more so if she is a minor, 4 testifies that she
has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove the commission of the crime. 5 Care
must be taken, however, that her testimony is credible for a conviction to be justified based on her
testimony alone. 6 In this case, Maryjane Bugarin testified on November 25, 1992 7 as follows:
Q — On November 1989, was your father residing with you or was he living with you?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Now, on November, 1989 do you remember any unusual incident that happened, if any?
A — Yes, sir, when he entered the room.
Q — When you say "he," are you referring to Marcelino Bugarin?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — If Marcelino Bugarin is present today, would you be able to identify him?
A — Yes, sir. (witness is pointing to a man wearing a green t-shirt who answers by the name Marcelino
Bugarin when asked by the Court).
Q — On November 1989, you were mentioning that "he", referring to the accused, entered your room,
what happened?
A — (witness crying) When he entered the room, he embraced me and touched the different parts of
my body and he informed me that when I grow up, I would not become innocent.
Q — What do you mean by those words that he told you that when you grow up you would not be
innocent?
A — So that when I grow up I will know what he will be doing.
Q — What did he do?

A — He touched my knees and spread them out and then holding my breast and he put his sex organ
inside me.
Q — When you say inside me, what do you mean?
A — His sex organ entered my what, I am fertile.
Q — What do you mean by what?
A — My sex organ, sir.
Q — What did you do when your father tried to put his sex organ to your sex organ?
A — I was trying to push his body away from me, and I said to him, father, I don't like it, ayoko po.
Q — Despite your pleas, what happened next?
A — He still continued what he is doing, and when I fainted, he suddenly moved back.
Q — After he moved back, what transpired afterwards?
A — He went out and I was left crying.
Q — After this first incident, were there any other similar incident which happened, if any?
A — There are, sir, but I can't recall when.
Q — How many times more or less?
A — Around four (4) times.
Q — After November 1989?
A — Including November 1989.
Q — How about on December 24, 1989, do you remember where you were?
A — Yes, sir. I was in our house.
Q — Do you remember any unusual or extraordinary incident that happened on December 24, 1989?
A — Yes, sir. It is the same thing that he did to me.
Q — Please explain what the same thing he do to you?
A — He embraced and kissed me on my cheek, my neck and also my breast.
Q — What happened next?
A — He was spreading my legs.
Q — Then, after spreading your legs, what did the accused do?
A — He let his sex organ touched my sex organ.
Q — After that, what happened next?

A — I cried again.
Q — When you cried again, what did your father do, if any?
A — His face became scaring.
Q — Now, after December 24, 1989 incident, do you remember where you were sometime in June
1990?
A — I was in our house.
Q — Specifically, in June of 1990, do you remember any unusual incident that happened?
A — The same thing happened, over and over.
Q — What do you mean by the same thing happened, over and over?
A — He would embraced me and then kissed me and touched my breast and kissed my nipples.
Q — And, besides in embracing, kissing and kissing your nipples, what else did your father do on June
1990?
A — He kissed also my sex organ.
Q — Beside kissing your sex organ, what else did he do, if any?
A — He placed inside my sex organ his sex organ.
Q — In March 14, 1991, where were you?
A — I was also in our house.
Q — Do you remember what happened, if any, On March 14, 1991?
A — That's it again, I was in the room and again he embraced me made me lie down then kiss my sex
organ and then, he placed again his sex organ inside my sex organ.
Q — How about December 23, 1991, do you remember where you were?
A — I was also in the house.
Q — What happened?
A — I was lying down and he lied there beside me and told me to accede to his desire.
Q — What do you mean to accede to his desire?
A — He wanted to use me again.
Q — Then, he actually used you?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you were?

Q — Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this day?
A — He licked my sex organ.
Q — After that, what did he do next?
A — He was threatening me.
Q — What did you do when he threatened you?
A — I was so afraid. (witness is crying)
Q — What did the accused to after threatening you?
A — He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.
Q — What happened after you saw him walking just beside you on that date?
A — None, sir. I was just crying.
The accused-appellant claims that Maryjane's testimony contains inconsistencies which indicate that the
charges against him were fabricated. He points to the failure of complainant on cross-examination to
state in some instances the exact date and time she was allegedly raped, and to the fact that it took
complainant two years before reporting the incidents and that the prosecution did not present the
medico-legal officer who examined the complainant. Accused-appellant also claims that no evidence
was adduced to prove that the rape was committed by force and intimidation.
The failure of the complainant to state in some cases the exact date and time of the commission of rape
is a minor matter and can be expected when a witness is recounting the details of a humiliating
experience which are painful and difficult to recall in open court and in the presence of other
people. 8 Indeed, this Court has ruled that complainant's failure to recall some details of the crime,
instead of suggesting prevarication, precisely indicates spontaneity and is to be expected from a witness
who is of tender age and unaccustomed to court proceedings.
Besides, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. 9 The precise
time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission, 10 especially since in this case the date
and time of the commission of the crime is not material to the accused-appellant's defense. Indeed,
accused-appellant's contention is only that he could not have raped his daughter in the common
bedroom at nighttime because the place where they sleep is shut off from the rest of their house by a
curtain.
Suffice it to state that lust is no respecter of time and place. 11 Our cases record instances of rape
committed inside family dwellings when other occupants are asleep. 12 In the case at bar, Maryjane
testified that the accused-appellant was able to rape her by sending out her siblings to play with their
neighbors' children, and while her mother was at work from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. Complainant explained
her apparent inability to recall the exact dates of the assaults upon her, thus:
Q — Madam witness, you mentioned that you were raped sometime November 1989, June 1990,
December 24, 1989, March 14, 1991, December 23, 1991, how come that you knew very well the date
as December 24, March 14, December 23; or rather, how come that your complaint is only sometime in
the early part of 1991?
A — I remember because that was closed to the birthday of my brother.
Q — How about March 14, how come you knew very well that you were molested by your father?
A — Because at that time, our class will almost end and we were given clearances.
Q — What day is your last school day?
A — I cannot remember, sir.
Q — Is it usual that you knew very well March 14, and you do not know very well your last day of your
school day?
A — Because March 14 is our clearance.
Neither does the delay in making a criminal accusation impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is
satisfactorily explained. 13 In People v. Coloma, 14 where the complainant was also only 13 years old
when first molested by her father, the Court adverted to the father's moral and physical control over the
young complainant in explaining the delay of eight years before the complaint against her father was
made. In this case, Maryjane must have been overwhelmed by fear and confusion, and shocked that her
own father had defiled her. After all, she had been very close to him. She also testified that she was
afraid to tell her mother because the latter might be angered, so that she finally confided to her aunt.
Indeed, a survey conducted by the University of the Philippines Center for Women's Studies showed
that victims of rape committed by their fathers took much longer in reporting the incidents to the
authorities than did other victims. Many factors account for this difference: the fact that the father lives
with the victim and constantly exerts moral authority over her, the threat he might make against her,
the victim's fear of her mother and other relatives.
Nor is it entirely true that no evidence of force and intimidation had been adduced during the trial.
Maryjane testified that she tried to resist her father's advances but, on several occasions, she was
overpowered by him. She was embraced and thus prevented from escaping. 15 At other times she was
intimidated by menacing looks cast on her 16and by threats of harm. 17 Indeed, even if there was no
violence or force employed against her, the moral influence of accused-appellant over the complainant
sufficed to make the crime rape. 18
Nor is a medical examination an indispensable element in prosecutions for rape. 19 That the prosecution
did not present the medico-legal officer is, therefore, not an obstacle to a finding of guilt in this case.
We think the evidence in this case proves beyond all reasonable doubt that Maryjane had been raped
on four occasions by accused-appellant: November 1989, June 1990, March 14, 1991, and December 23,
1991. Complainant has no motive to incriminate her father. To the contrary, she testified that she was
close to him. The absence of a motive lends greater credence to her testimony. 20 Neither does her
mother have any reason to falsely accuse Marcelino Bugarin. Regina Bugarin suspected her husband of
having an affair with her sister in 1980 and confronted him, but she continued to live with him. This fact
makes it unlikely that she would use her daughter to destroy her husband more than ten years later. A
mother would not expose her child to public trial, if the charges she makes are not true. 21
We find no evidence, however, to find accused-appellant guilty of the charge in Criminal Case No. Q-92-
31160 for alleged rape committed in May 1990. There is no evidence to prove that accused-appellant
raped complainant on that date. Her testimony is to the effect that she was raped on another date,
December 24, 1989. But accused-appellant cannot be convicted for this as no complaint was formally
filed regarding it. Accused-appellant must accordingly be acquitted of the charge in Criminal Case No. Q-
92-31160.
Nor do we think that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape committed on January 17, 1992 as
the trial court held. Maryjane testified:
Q — Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you were?
Q — Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this day?
A — He licked my sex organ.
Q — After that, what did he do next?
A — He was threatening me.
Q — What did you do when he threatened you?
A — I was so afraid. (witness is crying)
Q — What did the accused to after threatening you?
A — He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.
Q — What happened after you saw him walking just beside you on that date?
A — None, sir. I was just crying.
The intent to commit rape is not apparent from the act described. It cannot be inferred from this act
(licking complainant's genital) alone that his intention was to have sexual intercourse with her because it
has not been shown that he had at least placed himself on top of the complainant. 22 The act imputed to
him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse. 23 Accused-appellant is instead guilty
of acts of lasciviousness. It can at least be inferred from his act of kissing the genital of the complainant
that he was moved by lewd designs. 24
Although relationship, as an aggravating circumstance, is alleged only in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157
to 31160, this circumstance was nonetheless proved during the trial in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785
and, therefore, should also be appreciated in that case to justify the imposition of the penalty in its
maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 11, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is SET
ASIDE and another one is RENDERED finding accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin GUILTY of four counts
of consummated rape in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28786, Q-92-31157, Q-92-31158, and Q-92-31159
and SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua and ORDERED to INDEMNIFY the complainant Maryjane Bugarin
in the amount of P30,000.00 in damages for each count of rape committed; and of acts of lasciviousness
in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785, for which he is SENTENCED to suffer imprisonment from 6 months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six 6 years ofprision correccional, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160, accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Per Judge Oscar L. Leviste.
2 Records, Vol. II, p. 14.
3 See People v. Escober, 157 SCRA at 541 (1988).
4 People v. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392 (1995).
5 See People v. Tabao, 240 SCRA 757 (1995); U.S. v. Ramos, 1 Phil. 181 (1906).
6 People v. Ching, 240 SCRA 267 (1995); People v. Biendo, 216 SCRA 626 (1992).
7 TSN, pp. 3-4, Nov. 25, 1992.
8 People v. Cruz, 240 SCRA 234 (1995); People v. Pascual, 220 SCRA 440 (1993).
9 People v. Quinones, 222 SCRA 249 (1993).
10 People v. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454 (1993).
11 E.g., People v. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104 (1993); People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 (1993).
12 People v. Codilla, supra.
13 People v. Abandaño, 242 SCRA 531 (1995); People v. Juinio, 233 SCRA 826 (1994); People v. Rostata,
Jr., 218 SCRA 657 (1993).
14 222 SCRA 255 (1993).
15 Testimony of Maryjane Bugarin, November 25, 1992, TSN, p. 3; Sworn Statement, Records, Vol. I, p.
11.
16 Id., p. 4.
17 Ibid.
18 People v. Mabunga, 215 SCRA 694 (1992).
19 People v. Saldivia, 203 SCRA 461 (1991).
20 People v. Matamorosa, 231 SCRA 509 (1994).
21 People v. Padre-e, 249 SCRA 422 (1995).
22 See People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 (1935).
23 People v. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 (1995).

24 Ibid.
52. Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 429 (1993)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C.

HERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30,
1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993,
which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the
Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).[2] Three children were born to
them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),[3] Lyra, born on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C),[4] and
Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).[5]
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition
seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity
of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit,
private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his
friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that,
because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually
transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and
unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family,
private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00
every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole
owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite,
purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left
the conjugal home on June 12, 1992.[6]
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an
order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was
collusion between the parties.[7] Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5,
1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be
set for trial.[8]
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:[9]
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias,
Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching
zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive
semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private respondents
teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while
petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from petitioners
salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by
selling Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would
help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was
a spendthrift and had other women, petitioners business suffered. Private respondent often had
smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of
their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private
respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia. When
petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with
Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his
part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left
the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back,
however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondents infidelity in the hope of saving their
marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds
Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986.However, private respondent was employed
only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the
company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs
of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire amount within
four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and
womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with
different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an
operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Drivers
School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom
he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E).[10] When petitioner
confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she
was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because
of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).[11]
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter
part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both
received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22,
1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).[12]
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child
who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never
affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)[13] with F & C Realty Corporation
whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in
Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full
payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of
absolute sale (Exh. K)[14] was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)[15] was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten letter[16] to private respondent
expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter,
petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney[17] and to divide the
proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention
to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners letter. By this time, he had already
abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent
left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondents whereabouts had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University, testified
during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner
introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not
impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed private
respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when
petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted
to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought private respondent
was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared
happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started
drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that private
respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and continued
hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was
beaten up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to
private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private
respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner.[18]
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision[19] dismissing the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:[20]
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of her
claim that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited by
the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) - not as grounds
for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as
follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological incapacity as a
ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated
circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as
grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article 46,
paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea
transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after
petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3)
of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a
careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this ground (fraud) at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioners marriage with the
respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the
Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming
the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court of Appeals
held:[22]
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground
for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so,
chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of
psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-
husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly,
petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husbands character
was on the borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the
psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant
herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husbands youth and very good looks, who was
admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the college
professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondent-husband not
as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there is
no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute
the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH
HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY
WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY
OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN
ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT
OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be
annulled on the ground of private respondents psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private
respondents psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues
that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the
celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[23]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[24] we held:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at
the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private
respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature,
and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private respondent showed
lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondents parents and petitioner supported him through
college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early
retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a
greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look
for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner
concludes that private respondents condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and
defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondents youth
and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:[25]
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[26] Thus, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[27]
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions,
affirming the trial courts finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondents psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality.[28] Only where it is
shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioners contentions on
the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration
of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more appropriately be
litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of
children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Per Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by Justices Jorge S. Imperial (Chairman) and
B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz.
[2]
RTC Records, p. 7.
[3]
Id., p. 8.
[4]
Id., p. 9.
[5]
Id., p. 10.
[6]
Petition, RTC Records, pp. 1-4.
[7]
RTC Records, p. 24.
[8]
Id., p. 25.
[9]
TSN, pp. 6-56, Nov. 13, 1992; pp. 3-31, Dec. 8, 1992.
[10]
RTC Records, p. 37.
[11]
Id., p. 38.
[12]
Id., pp. 39-40a.
[13]
Id., pp. 41-43.
[14]
Id., pp. 44-45.
[15]
Id., p. 47.
[16]
Id., pp. 49-51.
[17]
17 Id., p. 48.
[18]
TSN, pp. 32-68, Dec. 8, 1992.
[19]
Per Acting Presiding Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero.
[20]
RTC Records, pp. 58-59.
[21]
310 Phil. 22 (1995).
[22]
Rollo, pp. 44-46.
[23]
As amended by E.O. No. 227 dated July 17, 1987.
[24]
Supra, at 40-41.
[25]
335 Phil. 664, 676-680 (1997).
[26]
See Art. II, 12; Art. XV, 1-2.
[27]
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[28]
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169 (1996).
53. Nunal vs. Commission on Audit 169 SCRA 356 (1989)
251 Phil. 339
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute Resolution of this Court of 11
May 1988 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the
public respondent had committed grave abuse of discretion in holding, among others, that the
compromise agreement of the parties is not enforceable against the Municipality of Isabela, the latter
not having been impleaded as an indispensable party in the case."
In the present Motion, petitioner contends:

"1. The decision does not clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which it is based;
"2. The Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, is bound by the compromise agreement; and
"3. Public respondent Commission on Audit (COA, for short) gravely abused its discretion in denying the
lawful claim for separation pay by your petitioner." (Motion for Reconsideration, p.1; Rollo, p. 67)
The facts disclose that on 24 February 1976 petitioner was appointed as Municipal Administrator of
Isabela, Basilan. On 1 February 1980 he was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for
dishonesty, misconduct and for lack of confidence. On appeal, the Merit Systems Board exonerated
petitioner and reinstated him to his position as Municipal Administrator on 8 May 1980.
On 29 January 1981 petitioner was again dismissed for lack of confidence by then Municipal Mayor Alvin
Dans under Administrative Order No. 54, Series of 1981. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner filed Case No. 43, a suit for Mandamus and Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the
Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, and the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, before the
then Court of First Instance in Basilan Province, Branch I, praying for reinstatement "with full backwages
and other rights inherent in the position." He also filed Case No. 45 with the same Court seeking that he
and his wife be paid their back salaries from 1 February 1980 to 31 May 1980 pursuant to the Decision
of the Merit Systems Board on 16 February 1981.
On 20 February 1984, during the pendency of the said case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan,
abolished the subject position in its Resolution No. 902, Series of 1984, and Ordinance No. 336, pursuant
to the provisions of the Local Government code.
On 5 December 1984, petitioner and his wife, on the one hand, and on the other, Mayor Dans in his
capacity both as Municipal Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan,
the Municipal Treasurer and the Provincial Fiscal (p. 4, Reply to Comment of COA), entered into a
Compromise Agreement stipulating, among others, that:
"1. The respondents shall pay petitioner Rafael Nunal all back salaries and other emoluments due him
by reason of his employment as Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan, covering the period from
January 1, 1980 to August 15, 1984, together with accumulated vacation/sick leaves, midyear and
Christmas bonuses in 1982 and 1983, and separation pay under the Local Government Code, which are
reflected in the computation hereto attached and made an integral part hereof x x x " (p. 13, Rollo)
Under the same Compromise Agreement, petitioner was also considered as "retired" upon receipt of
the monetary considerations mentioned therein.
On 12 December 1984, the Court approved the Compromise Agreement.
On 1 April 1985, petitioner collected his retirement benefits although, concededly, no provision for the
same had been included in the Compromise Agreement (Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 9).
On 17 September 1985, petitioner filed his claim for separation pay in the amount of P54,092.50 to
which he is allegedly entitled due to the abolition of the position of Municipal Administrator, which
separation pay is provided for by the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337, Section 76).
On 6 January 1986 the Municipal Treasurer forwarded petitioner's claim to the Provincial Auditor of
Basilan. On 11 January 1986, in a First Indorsement, the Provincial Auditor opined that the claim was
legal and proper but payment thereof was made subject to availability of funds and the ruling of the
Regional Office of the Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City.
On 12 February 1986, in a 2nd Indorsement, the Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, Region
IX, Zamboanga City, reversed the Provincial Auditor of Basilan and denied petitioner's claim for
separation pay. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was forwarded to the Commission on Audit
(COA), Central Office, Quezon City.
On 13 October 1986 the COA Central Office, in its Decision No. 388, not only denied petitioner's claim
for separation pay but also disallowed the other payments made to petitioner. It held:
"Premises considered, and it appearing that Mr. Nunal has been paid back salaries and other
emoluments in the total amount of P90,362.96 pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, supra, this
Commission hereby directs that any and all payments made to Mr. Nunal corresponding to the period
when he was no longer in the government service should be disallowed in audit without prejudice to his
right of recourse against the officials personally liable for his unlawful dismissal." (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
Thus, this recourse by petitioner alleging grave abuse of discretion by COA, which Petition we had
previously dismissed in our Resolution of 11 May 1988 as heretofore adverted to.
It appearing, however, that the Compromise Agreement was duly signed by Mayor Alvin Dans as Mayor
and as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, by the Municipal Treasurer, and by the Provincial
Fiscal as their lawyer (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3); that the case was one for reinstatement and
backwages; and following the ruling of this Court in Gementiza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-41717-
33, 113 SCRA 477, April 12, 1982), the Municipality of Isabela should be deemed as impleaded in this
case, it being apparent that the officials concerned had been sued in their official capacity.
"It should be noted that before the Court below, respondents sued petitioner Mayor alone. However,
respondents, too, prayed for a Writ of Mandamus to compel petitioner Mayor to reinstate them with
back salaries and damages. Respondents, therefore, actually intended to sue petitioner in his official
capacity. Failure to implead the Municipality and other municipal authorities should not deter this
Court, in the interests of justice and equity, from including them herein as respondents." (at p. 488)
The Compromise Agreement, therefore, must be held binding on the Municipality of Isabela, which was
not, in any way, deprived of its day in Court (Gabutas vs. Castellanes, L-17323, 14 SCRA 376, June 23,
1965). Thus, the payments to petitioner of the sums of P68,389.25 as back salaries, P21,387.71 as total
accumulated vacation/sick leaves, P772.75 as Christmas bonus, and the back salaries of Mrs. Nanie B.
Nunal in the sum of P3,096.00, have to be upheld. It likewise appears that retirement benefits had also
been collected by petitioner on 1 April 1985.
In respect, however, of the separation pay claimed by petitioner, we uphold the ruling of the COA
reading in part:
"Anent the second issue, this Commission believes and so holds that the instant claim for separation pay
in addition to the retirement benefits earlier received by claimant is bereft of any legal basis. Culled
from the records is the fact that Mr. Nunal was dismissed from the service on January 29, 1981 and has
not been reinstated to the service until his position of Municipal Administrator of Isabela was
abolished. In other words, he was no longer in, or had already been separated from, the service when
the said position was abolished. Evidently then, his separation from the service was not attributable to
the abolition of the position but was due to his dismissal and, therefore, Section 76 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337 which provides -
'Section 76. - Abolition of Position. When the position of an official or employee under the civil service
is abolished by law or ordinance, the official or employee so affected shall be reinstated in another
vacant position without diminution of salary. Should such position not be available, the official or
employee affected shall be granted a separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service over and above the monetary privileges granted to officials and employees under existing law',
cannot be validly invoked as legal basis for the claim for separation pay. Moreover, the fact remains
that as earlier seen, Mr. Nunal has already been paid his retirement benefits under the existing
retirement law. His entitlement, therefore, to separation pay under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 is
offensive to the general policy of the government prohibiting payment of double retirement benefits to
an employee." (p. 4, COA Decision No. 388; p. 15, Rollo)
To grant double gratuity is unwarranted (See Cajiuat, et al. vs. Mathay, Sr., G.R. No. L-39743, 124 SCRA
710, September 24, 1983).
It may be that the matter of separation pay was included in the Compromise Agreement. Nonetheless,
it could not be granted outright but still had to be claimed and passed in audit, and has been aptly
denied by COA. And although petitioner did file suit against the Municipality for reinstatement, it does
not follow that he was not effectively dismissed such that he could still be considered an incumbent
whose position had been abolished. A dismissed employee can be considered as not having left his
office only upon reinstatement and should be given a comparable position and compensation at the
time of reinstatement (Cristobal vs. Melchor, No. L-43203, 101 SCRA 857, December 29,1980).
Finally, a word on petitioner's contention that the Resolution of this Court under date of 11 May 1988 is
not in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.
"No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor."
In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision" within the meaning of the
Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given
due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is
not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second
place, the assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus
complies with the Constitutional provision. (Tayamura, et al., vs. IAC, et al., G. R. No. 76355, May 21,
1987 [en banc]; see also Que vs. People, G. R. Nos. L-75217-18, 154 SCRA 160, September 21, 1987).
It may be added that the Writ of Certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative
Writ, never demandable as a matter of right, "never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion."
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3d Rev. [8th ed.]; Francisco, The Revised Rules, 1972 ed., Vol IV-B, pp. 45-46,
citing 14 C.J.S., 121-122).
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 is hereby PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED in that
the disallowance by respondent Commission on Audit of the amounts ordered paid by the Court of First
Instance of Basilan, Branch I, in its Decision dated 12 December 1984, is hereby SET ASIDE, but its
disallowance of petitioner's claim for separation pay of P54,092.50, is hereby SUSTAINED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
54. Yao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428 (October 24, 2000)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132428. October 24, 2000]
GEORGE YAO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, George Yao (hereafter YAO) assails the 25 April 1995 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 which dismissed his appeal and ordered the remand of the
records of the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan* City (hereafter MeTC) for
execution. YAO was convicted by said MeTC for unfair competition.
YAOs legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company
(hereafter PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only
local subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO knew that it was a highly unlikely market situation considering that
no GE starter was locally manufactured or imported since 1983. PEMCO commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc.
to conduct a market survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its trademark specialist, Martin Remandaman,
discovered that thirty (30) commercial establishments sold GE starters. All these establishments pointed
to Tradeway Commercial Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their source. Remandaman was able to
purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing
that these products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was
issued by the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630 starters, were
thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.
Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair competition under Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code were YAO, who was TCCs President and General Manager, and Alfredo Roxas, a
member of TCCs Board of Directors. The indictment[1] charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually and in
conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the General Electric (GE) logo, design and
containers, making them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing the public to
believe them as such, when they were in fact counterfeit. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-
155713.
Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to establish
the foregoing narration of facts. Further, the State presented witnesses Atty. Hofilena of the Castillo
Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices who underwent a familiarization seminar from PEMCO in 1990 on
how to distinguish a genuine GE starter from a counterfeit, and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCOs marketing
manager. Both described a genuine GE starter as having a stenciled silk-screen printing which includes
the GE logo... back to back around the starter, a drumlike glowbulb and a condenser/capacitor shaped
like an M&M candy with the numbers .006." They then compared and examined random samples of the
seized starters with the genuine GE products. They concluded that the seized starters did not possess
the full design complement of a GE original. They also observed that some of the seized starters did not
have capacitors or if they possessed capacitors, these were not shaped like M&M. Still others merely
had sticker jackets with prints of the GE logo. Mr. de la Cruz added that only Hankuk Stars of Korea
manufactured GE starters and if these were imported by PEMCO, they would cost P7.00 each locally. As
TCCs starters cost P1.60 each, the witnesses agreed that the glaring differences in the packaging, design
and costs indisputably proved that TCCs GE starters were counterfeit.
The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted that as general manager, he has overall
supervision of the daily operation of the company. As such, he has the final word on the particular
brands of products that TCC would purchase and in turn sold. He also admitted that TCC is not an
accredited distributor of GE starters. However, he disclaimed liability for the crime charged since (1) he
had no knowledge or information that the GE starters supplied to TCC were fake; (2) he had not
attended any seminar that helped him determine which TCC products were counterfeit; (3) he had no
participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling of the GE names or logo in the starters; (4) TCCs
suppliers of the starters delivered the same already branded and boxed; and (5) he only discussed with
the suppliers matters regarding pricing and peak-volume items.
In its 13-page 20 October 1993 decision,[2] the MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting
Roxas, the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to prove that he was still one of the Board of
Directors at the time the goods were seized. It anchored its conviction of YAO on the following: (1) YAOs
admission that he knew that the starters were not part of GEs line products when he applied with
PEMCO for TCCs accreditation as distributor; (2) the prosecutions evidence (Exhibit G-7), a delivery
receipt dated 25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier Center, on which a TCC personnel noted that the
2000 starters delivered were GE starters despite the statement therein that they were China starters;
this fact gave rise to a presumption that the TCC personnel knew of the anomaly and that YAO as
general manager and overall supervisor knew and perpetrated the deception of the public; (3) the fact
that no genuine GE starter could be sold from 1986 whether locally manufactured or imported or at the
very least in such large commercial quantity as those seized from TCC; and (4) presence of the
elements of unfair competition.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
For the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, Alfredo Roxas, of Unfair Competition
under Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code ... i.e., to prove that he was Chairman of the Board of the
Tradeway Commercial Corporation on October 10, 1990, as well as to have him identified in open court
during the trial, he is acquitted of the same.
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable
doubt as principal under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision
correccional.
This case was prosecuted by the law offices of Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon for ... PEMCO ...
Considering that no document was submitted by the private complainant to show how the claim
of P300,000 for consequential damages was reached and/or computed, the court is not in a position to
make a pronouncement on the whole amount. However, the offender, George Yao, is directed to pay
PEMCO the amount of P20,000 by way of consequential damages under Article 2202 of the New Civil
Code, and to pay the law offices of Castillo, Laman Tan and Pantaleon the amount of
another P20,000.00 as PEMCOs attorneys fees under Article 2208 (11) of the same.
This decision should have been promulgated in open court on July 28, 1993 but the promulgation was
reset for August 31, 1993 in view of the absence of parties; it was again re-set for today.
Promulgated this 20th day of October, 1993 in Kalookan City, Philippines.[3]
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied in its order[4] of 7 March 1994.
YAO appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). The appeal was docketed as Criminal
Case No. C-47255(94) and was assigned to Branch 121 of the court.
On 24 May 1994, Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of Branch 121 issued an order[5] directing the
parties to file their respective memoranda.
On 4 July 1994 YAO filed his Appeal Memorandum.[6]
Without waiting for the Memorandum on Appeal of the prosecution, which was filed only on 20 August
1994,[7] Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered on 27 July 1994 a one-page Decision[8] which affirmed in
toto the MeTC decision. In so doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of the MeTC and stated
that [a]after going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings
of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration[9] and assailed the decision as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of
the Rules of Court.[10] In its order[11] of 28 September 1994, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration as devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons.
On 4 October 1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal.[12]
The appealed case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16893. In its Resolution[13] of 28 February 1995, the
Court of Appeals granted YAO an extension of twenty (20) days from 10 February or until 12 March 1995
within which to file the Appellants Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the Court of Appeals promulgated a
Resolution[14] declaring that [t]he decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
121, has long become final and executory and ordering the records of the case remanded to said court
for the proper execution of judgment. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
In Our resolution, dated February 28, 1995, accused-appellant was granted an extension of twenty (20)
days from February 10, 1995, or until March 12, 1995 within which to file appellants brief.
To date, no appellants brief has been filed.
From the Manifestation, filed on March 24, 1995, by City Prosecutor Gabriel N. dela Cruz, Kalookan City,
it would appear that:
xxx
2. George Yao received a copy of the RTCs decision on August 16, 1994, and filed a motion for
reconsideration on August 30, 1994. On October 3, 1994, George Yao received a copy of the RTCs order,
dated September 28, 1994, denying his motion for reconsideration.
3. On October 4, 1994, George Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail.
We will assume from the said Manifestation that the decision of the RTC and the order denying YAOs
motion for reconsideration were sent to and received by YAOs counsel.
Proceeding from said assumption, Yao had fifteen (15) days from August 16, 1994 to elevate his case to
this Court. On August 30, 1994, or fourteen (14) days thereafter, Yao filed a motion for
reconsideration. When he received the Order denying his aforesaid motion on October 3, 1994, he had
one more day left to elevate his case to this Court by the proper mode of appeal, which is by petition for
review. Yao, however, on October 4, 1994, filed a notice of appeal by registered mail informing the RTC
that he is appealing his conviction to the Court of Appeals. By then, the fifteen (15) day period had
already elapsed.
That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 121, transmitted to this Court the entire
records of the case, thru a transmittal letter, dated October 13, 1994, and received by the Criminal
Section of this Court on October 28, 1994. YAOs counsel, on February 20, 1995, filed with this Court, a
motion for extension of period to file brief for accused-appellant which was granted in Our resolution
mentioned in the opening paragraph of this resolution.
Petitions for review shall be filed within the period to appeal. This period has already elapsed even when
Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail, with the RTC of Kalookan City. Worse, the notice of
appeal is procedurally infirm.
YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution
did not specifically dismiss the appeal, for which reason, there was no judgment on which an entry of
judgment could be issued. He also argued that the attendant procedural infirmities in the appeal, if any,
were cured with the issuance of the 28 February 1995 resolution granting him twenty (20) days from 10
February 1995 or until 12 March 1995 within which to file an appellants brief and in compliance thereto,
consequently filed his appellants brief on 2 March 1995.[15]
In its Resolution[16] of 26 January 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the
Entry of Judgment for lack of merit. Itconsidered the 25 April 1995 resolution as having in effect
dismissed the appeal, [hence] the Entry of Judgment issued on May 26, 1995... was proper.
In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the arguments he raised in his Urgent Motion to
Set Aside the Entry of Judgment of the Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the entry of judgment was
improvidently issued in the absence of a final resolution specifically dismissing the appeal; (2) the
procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and (3) the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due process of law.
In support of his first argument, YAO cites Section 1, Rule 11 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals, thus:
SEC. 1. Entry of Judgment. -- Unless a motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the
Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the
expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to parties.
YAO claims that the 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals was not a judgment on his appeal
nor was it a final resolution contemplated in the Internal Rules since it did not specifically dismiss his
appeal. A fortiori, the entry of judgment was improvidently issued for lack of legal basis.
YAO also repeats his argument that any procedural infirmity in the appeal was cured when the RTC gave
due course to the appeal, elevated the records to the Court of Appeals which in turn issued on 13
December 1994 a notice to file his Appellants Brief and granted him until 12 March 1995 within which to
file the appellants brief.
Finally, YAO asserts that he was denied due process considering that (1) none of the elements of unfair
competition are present in this case; (2) he filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals within the
reglementary period; and (3) notwithstanding his filing of a notice of appeal (instead of a petition for
review), it was a mere procedural lapse, a technicality which should not bar the determination of the
case based on intrinsic merits. YAO then invokes the plethora of jurisprudence wherein the Supreme
Court in the exercise of equity jurisdiction decided to disregard technicalities; decided [the case] on
merits and not on technicalities; found manifest in the petition strong considerations of substantial
justice necessitating the relaxing of the stringent application of technical rules, or heeded petitioners cry
for justice because the basic merits of the case warrant so, as where the petition embodies justifying
circumstances; discerned not to sacrifice justice to technicality; discovered that the application of res
judicata and estoppel by judgment amount to a denial of justice and or a bar to a vindication of a
legitimate grievance.[17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that the petition should be dismissed for lack of
merit. It maintains that although the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically state that the appeal
was being dismissed, the intent and import are clear and unequivocable. It asserts that the appeal was
obviously dismissed because the RTC decision has long become final and executory. YAO failed to
challenge the RTC decision, within the reglementary period, by filing a petition for review of the same
with the Court of appeals pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Instead, he filed an
ordinary appeal by way of a notice of appeal. Hence, the period to file the correct procedural remedy
had lapsed.
There is no dispute that YAO availed of the wrong procedural remedy in assailing the RTC decision. It is
clear from the records that YAO received a copy of the adverse RTC judgment on 16 August 1994. He has
fifteen (15) days or until 31 August 1994 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration or a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Fourteen (14) days thereafter or on 30 August 1994, YAO
opted to file a motion for reconsideration the pendency of which tolled the running of the period. He
received a copy of the RTCs order denying the motion for reconsideration on 3 October 1994. He had
therefore, only one day left, 4 October 1994 as the last day, within which to file with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review.[18] However, on said date, YAO filed a notice of appeal. He palpably availed
of the wrong mode of appeal. And since he never instituted the correct one, he lost it.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory
origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute.[19] Since the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law.[20] Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with.
That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the period fixed by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional.[21] Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal,[22] for it renders
the decision sought to be appealed final and executory,[23] with the end result that no court can exercise
appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.[24]
In the light of these procedural precepts, YAOs petition appears to be patently without merit and does
not deserve a second look. Hence, the reasons he enumerated to persuade this Court to grant his
petition and reinstate his appeal are obviously frivolous if not downright trivial. They need not even be
discussed here.
In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss the petition outright, if not for an
important detail which augurs well for YAO and would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle. The
decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which states:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
xxx
Let us quote in full the RTC judgment:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Kalookan City, in Crim.
Case No. C-155713, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
xxx
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao; beyond reasonable
doubt as principal under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision
correccional.
xxx
After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 20,
1993.
SO ORDERED.
That is all there is to it.
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the
constitutional injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written and
even if there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility
provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based,[25] as when they
stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying
circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability;[26] or
discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and
accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty;[27] or quoted the facts narrated
in the prosecutions memorandum but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before
finally agreeing with the prosecutions evaluation of the case.[28]
We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions,[29] a specie of succinctly written decisions
by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129[30] on the grounds of
expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. We have also declared that
memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate.[31]
In Francisco v. Permskul,[32] however, we laid down the conditions for the of validity of memorandum
decisions, thus:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not
easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the
incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being
adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings
of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable
part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the
lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the
law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an
examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted
should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will
rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it
become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of
decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and
easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an
extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple
litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves
no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
xxx
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to
the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the
strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as
a lawless disobedience.
Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and,
therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly
hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted
at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks
for itself.
We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to
comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco v. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the
MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should
directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.[33]
We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[34] in that
while we conceded that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot
be substituted for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul,[35] where we cautioned that expediency
alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the constitutional requirements.
This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the
expense of scholarly analysis, and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by
Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of Appeals[36] come true, i.e., if an appellate court failed
to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due
process since he was not accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible
magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only
property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a
paramount component of due process and fair play.[37] It is likewise demanded by the due process
clause of the Constitution.[38] The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal
to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that
does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint
the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.[39] More than that, the requirement is an
assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from
deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless
vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his
fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in
the justness of his decision.[40]
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals
whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not
only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a
decision, resolution or order which:contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to
any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of
the witnesses of both parties;[41] convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or
principle to support conclusions that the letter in question was libelous;[42] consisted merely of one (1)
paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of
parricide;[43] consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiters
decision including the dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2]
sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings[44]; was merely based on the findings of another
court sans transcript of stenographic notes;[45] or failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the
award of moral damages.[46]
In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in question.
In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not on the grounds he ardently invoked
but on the reasons already extensively discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of
appeal and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial system that courts
should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead afford every
party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the
constraints of technicalities.[47]
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of
compliance, may be relaxed.[48] In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in
absurdity and manifest injustice[49] or where the merit of a partys cause is apparent and outweighs
consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements,[50] procedural rules should definitely
be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere
technicalities.[51] We therefore withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable
failure to comply with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in
court. We also remind all magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to uphold the Constitution and the principles
enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this case is GRANTED. The questioned 25 April
1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 is hereby SET ASIDE and the 27 July 1994
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan City rendered in its appellate jurisdiction is
NULLIFIED. The records are hereby remanded to said Regional Trial Court for further proceedings and
for the rendition of judgment in accordance with the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on leave.
*
Spelled Kalookan in the record of Crim. Case No. C-155713 of MeTC, Branch 52 and in Crim. Case No. C-
47255 (94) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City.*
[1]
Original Record (OR), 26.
[2]
OR, 257-269; Rollo, 25-37. Per Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago.
[3]
OR, 268-269; Rollo, 36-37.
[4]
OR, 317-318.
[5]
OR, 307.
[6]
Id., 308 et seq.
[7]
Id., 323-366.
[8]
Id., 322; Rollo, 38.
[9]
OR, 368-370.
[10]
Section 2 Rule 20 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is
based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the
acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the
commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
action has been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the
offended party.
[11]
OR, 379.
[12]
Id., 380.
[13]
Rollo, 47.
[14]
Id. 40-42. Per Solano, A., J., with Benipayo, A., and Galvez, R., JJ., concurring.
[15]
Rollo, 49-51.
[16]
Per Galvez, R., J. , ponente, with Brawner, R., and Buzon, M., JJ., concurring.
[17]
Rollo, 117-122.
[18]
See Soco v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 449 [1996]; Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Corp.
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 602, 615 [1998].
[19]
Aris, Phil. Inc. v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 246, 253 [1991].
[20]
See Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, 378 [1996], citing Bello v. Fernandez, 4 SCRA 138; Ortiz v. Court of
Appeals, 299 SCRA 708 [1998].
[21]
See Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 587 [1998]. See also Asuncion v. NLRC 273 SCRA 498
[1997]; Mabuhay Development Industries v. NLRC, 288 SCRA 1 [1998]; Rosewood Processing, Inc. v.
NLRC, 290 SCRA 408 [1998].
[22]
Laza v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 654 [1997]; Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC, id.
[23]
Uy v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 343 [1998]; Mabuhay Development Industries v. NLRC, supra note
16; Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC, id.; Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 214 [1998].
[24]
Id., id.
[25]
See People v. Bongahoy, G.R. No. 124097, 17 June 1999.
[26]
People v. Landicho, 258 SCRA 1, 26 [1996].
[27]
People v. Sandiosa, 290 SCRA 92, 107 [1998].
[28]
People v. Gastador, 305 SCRA 659, 670 [1999].
[29]
In Francisco v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324, 333 [1989], the Court described [t]he distinctive features of a
memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, second, it incorporates by
reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order, or ruling under
review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval
of the findings of facts by the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher
court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the
cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the
higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or
conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway.
[30]
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. - Every decision or final resolution of a court in appealed
cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based
which may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set
forth in the decision, order or resolution appealed from.
[31]
See Romero v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 183; Francisco v. Permskul, supra note 29; Natural Gas
Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114323, 28 September 1999.
[32]
Francisco v. Permskul , supra note 29, at 335-337.
[33]
See ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation v. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454, 464 [1998].
[34]
206 SCRA 127, 134 [1992].
[35]
Supra note 29, at 331.
[36]
Supra note 30.
[37]
See Anino v. NLRC 290 SCRA 489, 500 [1998]. See also Saballa v. NLRC, 260 SCRA 697, 706 [1960].
[38]
See Spouses Yu Eng Cho & Francisco Tao Yu v. Pan American Airways, et al., G.R. No. 123560, 27
March 2000.
[39]
Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, 132; Saballa v. NLRC, supra note
32; ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. v. NLRC, supra note 28, 462; See also People v. Viernes, 262 SCRA
641, 659 [1996]; Caltex Refinery Employees Association v. Brilliantes, 279 SCRA 218, 243
[1997] citing Saballa v. NLRC; People v. Cayago, G.R. No. 128827, 18 August 1999; Madrid v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 130683, 31 May 2000.
[40]
People v. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384, 393 [1997].
[41]
See People v. Landicho, supra note 26.
[42]
De Vera v. Sancho, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1455, 13 July 1999.
[43]
People v. Cayago, supra note 39.
[44]
People v. Sandiosa, supra note 27.
[45]
People v. Ortiz-Miyake, 279 SCRA 180 [1997].
[46]
Spouses Yu Eng Cho & Francisco Tao Yu v. Pan American Airways supra note 33.
[47]
See Moslares v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 440, 448 [1998], citing Santos v. Court of Appeals, 253
SCRA 632 [1996]; See also Santos v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 632 [1996]; Magsaysay Lines Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 513 [1996].
[48]
See Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 418 [1998].
[49]
See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 344 [1996]; Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 611
[1998].
[50]
See Banez v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 19 [1997].
[51]
Ginete v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48.
55. Dizon vs. Judge Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338 (September 5, 1997)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338. September 5, 1997]
ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, complainant, vs. JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch
109, Pasay City, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, with
violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification in connection with her
decision in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled People of the Philippines v. Engineer Fernando S. Dizon.
It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting complainant of falsification of
private document. The promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the
decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on him.The accused
and his counsel were told to return in a few days for their copy of the decision, but although petitioner
and his father by turns went to the court to obtain a copy of the decision they were not able to do so. To
protect his right, complainant filed a partial motion for reconsideration on May 5, 1993, expressly
reserving his right to submit a more elaborate one upon receipt of the decision. The hearing of the
motion for reconsideration was scheduled on May 12, 1993, but the case was not called as complainants
counsel was told that the decision had not yet been finished. On November 29, 1994, complainant filed
an Omnibus Motion to Annul Promulgation of Sentence and to Dismiss the case. On December 16, 1994,
the date set for hearing the motion, complainant was served a copy of the decision, dated April 22,
1993, the dispositive portion of which states:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Fernando Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in
relation to Art. 171 par. 2 and 4 thereof and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Two (2) Years,
Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a fine of P5,000.00.
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the decision until
almost one year and eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion on April 22, 1993
constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, 14 of the Constitution which prohibits courts from rendering decisions
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based and 15 of the
same Art. VIII, which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions within three
months from the date of their submission. He alleges further that he was denied the right to a speedy
trial in violation of Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution and that Judge Lopez falsified her decision by
antedating it and including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of P5,000.00.
On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion for reconsideration after receiving a copy of
the full decision of the court. On January 3, 1995, he moved to disqualify respondent from hearing the
motions for reconsideration which he had filed. Respondent judge responded by voluntarily inhibiting
herself from further consideration of the case and ordered it forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of
Court for re-raffle. The case was eventually assigned to Judge Manuel F. Dumatol of Branch 113 of the
Pasay City RTC.
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was promulgated with the reading of the
dispositive portion, her decision was already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the process of
preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its promulgation.Respondent judge
states that after the dispositive portion had been read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma.
Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II, presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text
of the decision. The court found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of private
document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in
furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision was unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing her decision and to a series of personal
problems which contributed to this delay in the release of her decision, to wit: she has only two (2)
stenographers to attend to daily trials in her court, making it necessary for her to make use of the Social
Worker assigned to her to type her decisions. During the period January to December 1993 she had to
dispose of 285 cases, apart from the fact that there was an unusually big number of criminal, civil, and
land registration cases as well as special proceedings filed in her court which required the holding of
hearings in the mornings and in the afternoons. During the same period, she went through some
personal tragedies. She lost her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she had raised from childhood, due to
a hospital accident. This was followed by the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother, Margarita Lopez,
who had been under respondents care for the past eight years after suffering a stroke. On September
17, 1993, respondents father died of diabetes, renal failure, pneumonia, and cardiac arrest. Respondent
was the one who single-handedly brought them in and out of the hospital because all her able-bodied
relatives are abroad. Respondent herself was found to be suffering from diabetes and hypertension,
necessitating her treatment and leave of absence from September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994, in
addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from these, respondents family suffered financial reverses
because of estafa committed against them.
On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis submitted a memorandum,
finding the charge of violation of the Constitution to be without merit. He called attention to the written
decision of respondent judge, which, albeit delivered to complainant late, nonetheless states the facts
and law on which it is based. He likewise finds the charge of serious misconduct and falsification to be
without basis in view of the absence of malice. However, he finds the charge of inefficiency to be well
founded on the basis of respondents failure to furnish complainant or his counsel a copy of the decision
within a reasonable time after its promulgation. Hence, the Deputy Court Administrator believes that
Judge Lopez should be given admonition for her negligence, but recommends that the other charges
against her for violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed for lack of
merit.
The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution which provides:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower
courts.
Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of the submission of the case
for decision, the fact is that only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation. She claims that
on April 22, 1993 the text of her decision, containing her findings and discussion of complainants
liability, had already been prepared although it had to be put in final form by incorporating the
dispositive portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight months more before this was done
and a copy of the complete decision furnished the complainant on December 16, 1994. Rule 120 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
1. Judgment defined. - The term judgment as used in this Rule means the adjudication by the court that
the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and
civil liability provided for by law on the accused.
2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the official language, personally
and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement
of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.However, if the conviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the
judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of
court.
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is
the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is
based. Since this was done only on December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision was
served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision within three
months as required by Art. VIII, 15 of the Constitution.
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been read in open court on April 22,
1993 was to incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see
why it took respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was able to do
so. Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out her decision by a series of personal and
other problems which leads the Court to believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had not
finished the preparation of the entire decision. At all events, she could have applied for extension of
time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of judgment until she had finished it.
What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a sin perjuicio judgment, which is a
judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the
final judgment.[1] That is why, in answer to complainants charge that the dispositive portion of the
judgment read to him did not impose a fine, respondent contends that the addition of the fine
of P5,000.00 was within her power to do even if no such fine had been included in the oral sentence
given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge states, because the decision was not complete it could be
modified and cites in support of her contention the case of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia.[2] Respondent only
succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated on April 22, 1993 was a sin perjuicio judgment
which was incomplete and needed a statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment was
based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of rendering sin
perjuicio judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed because of the implied reservation that it is
subject to modification when the decision is finally rendered.[3] This Court has expressed approval of the
practice of some judges of withholding the dispositive portion from their opinions until the very last
moment of promulgation of their judgment in order to prevent leakage,[4] but that refers to
the preparation of their decision, not its promulgation. What must be promulgated must be the
complete decision. There would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage
of promulgation of judgment.
However, the Court finds the other charges against respondent to be without merit.
First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial by reason of respondents
failure to furnish him with a copy of the decision until after one year and eight months is without
basis. It appears that despite the destruction of records by fire in the Pasay City Hall on January 18, 1992
the parties were required to submit simultaneously their memoranda on August 18, 1992. The delay, if
any, was not such vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay[5] as to justify finding a denial of the right
to a speedy trial. The fact is that the reading of the sentence on April 22, 1993, albeit not in compliance
with the requirement for promulgation of judgments, nonetheless put an end to trial.
Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the complete decision did not prejudice his right
to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be given a copy of the
decision in order to apprise him of the basis of such decision so that he can intelligently prepare his
appeal or motion for reconsideration. However, in accordance with the ruling in Director of Lands v.
Sanz,[6] complainants period to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration did not begin to run until after
he actually received a copy of the judgment on December 16, 1994.He therefore suffered no
prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered from the anxiety to refute a conviction which he could not do
for lack of a statement of the basis of the conviction.
Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judges culpability. Except for this incident,
respondents record of public service as legal officer and agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, as
State Prosecutor, and later Senior State Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice for 17 years and as
Regional Trial Judge for more than 13 years now is unmarred by malfeasance, misfeasance or
wrongdoing. This is the first time she is required to answer an administrative complaint against her. Her
failure to decide the case of complainant was brought about by factors not within her control, to wit,
lack of stenographers and unusually big number of cases; and her personal loss as a result of the death
of her niece and both her parents, financial reverses of the family, and poor health as a result of
diabetes and hypertension.
In Mangulabnan v. Tecson,[7] a joint decision in two criminal cases was rendered by respondent judge on
February 24, 1978, six months and eight days from submission of the case, and a copy was delivered to
complainant on September 28, 1979, over 19 months after rendition of the decision.Two complaints
were filed for violation of the constitutional provision requiring submitted cases to be decided by lower
courts within three months and for violation of complainants right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge
blamed the delay in deciding the cases on the fact that his clerks had misfiled the records. As to the
delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision, the judge attributed this to the mistake of
his clerk who did not think complainant was entitled to receive the same. The judge was
reprimanded. The reason for the delay in that case was even less excusable than the difficulties
experienced by respondent Judge Lopez, i.e., deaths in respondents family, her own poor state of
health, financial reverses suffered by her family, and the volume of work done within the period in
question, which somewhat mitigate her liability. The Court believes that a similar penalty would be
appropriate.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of the
same acts complained of will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr. JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., (Chairman), on leave.
[1]
2 Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court 440 (1966).
[2]
162 SCRA 665 (1988).
[3]
Director of Lands v. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117 (1923).
[4]
See Castaos v. Escao, 251 SCRA 174 (1995).
[5]
Que v. Cosico, 177 SCRA 410 (1989).
[6]
45 Phil. 117 (1923).
[7]
101 SCRA 810 (1980).
56. Asiavest vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110263 (July 20, 2001)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110263. July 20, 2001]

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 19,
1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 35871 affirming the Decision[2] dated October 14, 1991 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168 in Civil Case No. 56368 which dismissed the complaint of
petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad for the enforcement of the money judgment of the
High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur against private respondent Philippine National Construction
Corporation.
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of
Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly
incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
It appears that sometime in 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent,
then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of
Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.[3]
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private
respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it
extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project.
On September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioner and against the private respondent which is also designated therein as the
2nd Defendant. The judgment reads in full:
SUIT NO. C638 of 1983
Between
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad Plaintiffs
And
1. Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd.
2. Construction & Development
Corporation of the Philippines Defendant
JUDGMENT
The 2nd Defendant having entered appearance herein and the Court having under Order 14, rule 3
ordered that judgment as hereinafter provided be entered for the Plaintiffs against the 2nd Defendant.
IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the 2nd defendant do pay the Plaintiffs the sum of $5,108,290.23 (Ringgit
Five million one hundred and eight thousand two hundred and ninety and Sen twenty-three) together
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on: -
(i) the sum of $2,586,866.91 from the 2nd day of March 1983 to the date of payment; and
(ii) the sum of $2,521,423.32 from the 11th day of March 1983 to the date of payment; and $350.00
(Ringgit Three Hundred and Fifty) costs.
Dated the 13th day of September, 1985.
Senior Assistant Registrar,
High Court, Kuala Lumpur
This Judgment is filed by Messrs. Skrine & Co., 3rd Floor, Straits Trading Building, No. 4, Leboh Pasar,
Besar, Kuala Lumpur, Solicitors for the Plaintiffs abovenamed. (VP/Ong/81194.7/83)[4]
On the same day, September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya issued an Order directing the private
respondent (also designated therein as the 2nd Defendant) to pay petitioner interest on the sums
covered by the said Judgment, thus:
SUIT NO. C638 OF 1983
Between
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad Plaintiffs
And
1. Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd.
2. Construction & Development
Corporation of the Philippines Defendants
BEFORE THE SENIOR ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
CIK SUSILA S. PARAM
THIS 13th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1985 IN CHAMBERS
ORDER
Upon the application of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, the Plaintiffs in this action AND UPON
READING the Summons in Chambers dated the 16th day of August, 1984 and the Affidavit of Lee Foong
Mee affirmed on the 14th day of August 1984 both filed herein AND UPON HEARING Mr. T. Thomas of
Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Mr. Khaw Chay Tee of Counsel for the 2nd Defendant abovenamed on the
26th day of December 1984 IT WAS ORDERED that the Plaintiffs be at liberty to sign final judgment
against the 2nd Defendant for the sum of $5,108.290.23 AND IT WAS ORDERED that the 2nd Defendant
do pay the Plaintiffs the costs of suit at $350.00 AND IT WAS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs be at
liberty to apply for payment of interest AND upon the application of the Plaintiffs for payment of
interest coming on for hearing on the 1st day of August in the presence of Mr. Palpanaban Devarajoo of
Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Mr. Khaw Chay Tee of Counsel for the 2nd Defendant above-named AND
UPON HEARING Counsel as aforesaid BY CONSENT IT WAS ORDERED that the 2ndDefendant do pay the
Plaintiffs interest at a rate to be assessed AND the same coming on for assessment this day in the
presence of Mr. Palpanaban Devarajoo of Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Mr. Khaw Chay Tee of Counsel
for the 2nd Defendant AND UPON HEARING Counsel as aforesaid BY CONSENT IT IS ORDEREDthat the
2nd Defendant do pay the Plaintiffs interest at the rate of 12% per annum on:
(i) the sum of $2,586,866.91 from the 2nd day of March 1983 to the date of payment; and
(ii) the sum of $2,521,423.32 from the 11th day of March 1983 to the date of Payment.
Dated the 13th day of September, 1985.
Senior Assistant Registrar,
High Court, Kuala Lumpur.[5]
Following unsuccessful attempts[6] to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment,
petitioner initiated on September 5, 1988 the complaint before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.[7]
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss filed on October 5, 1988,
contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or
enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private
respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact.[8] Dismissal was, however,
denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.[9]
On May 22, 1989, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim[10] and therein
raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply[11] filed on June 8, 1989, the
petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private
respondent by its voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr.
Khay Chay Tee. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all objections to the High
Courts jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.
In due time, the trial court rendered its Decision dated October 14, 1991 dismissing petitioners
complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed
the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court in a Decision dated May 19, 1993.
Hence, the instant petition which is anchored on two (2) assigned errors,[12] to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MALAYSIAN COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER PNCC, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT (a) THE FOREIGN COURT HAD
SERVED SUMMONS ON PNCC AT ITS MALAYSIA OFFICE, AND (b) PNCC ITSELF APPEARED BY COUNSEL
IN THE CASE BEFORE THAT COURT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT TO (SIC) THE
MALAYSIAN COURT JUDGMENT.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion
to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;[13] however, the rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.[14]
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the
immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown
that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction;
that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the
system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.[15]
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due
notice in the foreign forum. Under Section 50(b),[16] Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the
governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate
court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce
the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule
131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction.Hence, once the authenticity of
the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of
overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High
Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Vinayak Prabhakar Pradhan, presented as petitioners sole
witness, testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia;[17] that he
was connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981;[18] that private respondent, then
known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest
Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur;[19] that the writ of summons were served on March 17,
1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial
planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia operations;[20]that upon the filing of the case,
Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan
Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the
regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized
that the writ was properly served;[21] that because private respondent failed to file a statement of
defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted
affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim;[22] that the matter was then heard before
the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was represented by
counsel;[23] and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner offered the following documentary evidence:
(a) A certified and authenticated copy of the Judgment promulgated by the Malaysian High Court dated
September 13, 1985 directing private respondent to pay petitioner the sum of $5,108,290.23 Malaysian
Ringgit plus interests from March 1983 until fully paid;[24]
(b) A certified and authenticated copy of the Order dated September 13, 1985 issued by the Malaysian
High Court in Civil Suit No. C638 of 1983;[25]
(c) Computation of principal and interest due as of January 31, 1990 on the amount adjudged payable to
petitioner by private respondent;[26]
(d) Letter and Statement of Account of petitioners counsel in Malaysia indicating the costs for
prosecuting and implementing the Malaysian High Courts Judgment;[27]
(e) Letters between petitioners Malaysian counsel, Skrine and Co., and its local counsel, Sycip Salazar
Law Offices, relative to institution of the action in the Philippines;[28]
(f) Billing Memorandum of Sycip Salazar Law Offices dated January 2, 1990 showing attorneys fees paid
by and due from petitioner;[29]
(g) Statement of Claim, Writ of Summons and Affidavit of Service of such writ in petitioners suit against
private respondent before the Malaysian High Court;[30]
(h) Memorandum of Conditional Appearance dated March 28, 1983 filed by counsel for private
respondent with the Malaysian High Court;[31]
(i) Summons in Chambers and Affidavit of Khaw Chay Tee, counsel for private respondent, submitted
during the proceedings before the Malaysian High Court;[32]
(j) Record of the Courts Proceedings in Civil Case No. C638 of 1983;[33]
(k) Petitioners verified Application for Summary Judgment dated August 14, 1984;[34] and
(l) Letter dated November 6, 1985 from petitioners Malaysian counsel to private respondents counsel in
Malaysia.[35]
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign
judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party
who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise.
Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High
Court judgment, namely, (a) that jurisdiction was not acquired by the Malaysian Court over the person
of private respondent due to alleged improper service of summons upon private respondent and the
alleged lack of authority of its counsel to appear and represent private respondent in the suit; (b) the
foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by evident collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact or law; and (c)
not only were the requisites for enforcement or recognition allegedly not complied with but also that
the Malaysian judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional prescription that the every decision
must state the facts and law on which it is based.[36]
Private respondent relied solely on the testimony of its two (2) witnesses, namely, Mr. Alfredo N.
Calupitan, an accountant of private respondent, and Virginia Abelardo, Executive Secretary and a
member of the staff of the Corporate Secretariat Section of the Corporate Legal Division, of private
respondent, both of whom failed to shed light and amplify its defense or claim for non-enforcement of
the foreign judgment against it.
Mr. Calupitans testimony centered on the following: that from January to December 1982 he was
assigned in Malaysia as Project Comptroller of the Pahang Project Package A and B for road construction
under the joint venture of private respondent and Asiavest Holdings;[37] that under the joint venture,
Asiavest Holdings would handle the financial aspect of the project, which is fifty-one percent (51%)
while private respondent would handle the technical aspect of the project, or forty-nine percent
(49%);[38] and, that Cora Deala was not authorized to receive summons for and in behalf of the private
respondent.[39] Ms. Abelardos testimony, on the other hand, focused on the following: that there was no
board resolution authorizing Allen and Gledhill to admit all the claims of petitioner in the suit brought
before the High Court of Malaya,[40] though on cross-examination she admitted that Allen and Gledhill
were the retained lawyers of private respondent in Malaysia.[41]
The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing enforcement and
recognition of the Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and procedure taken by the
Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress, the
recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure
in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the
country in which the judgment is relied on.[42] Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as
those relating to the service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel
to appear and represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex
fori or the internal law of the forum,[43] i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the
validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to
what the Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial
notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested
or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as
to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons
upon a financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not.Accordingly, the
presumption of validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by
the High Court of Malaya must stand.[44]
On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of Allen and Gledhill to represent private
respondent, not only did the private respondents witnesses admit that the said law firm of Allen and
Gledhill were its counsels in its transactions in Malaysia,[45] but of greater significance is the fact that
petitioner offered in evidence relevant Malaysian jurisprudence[46] to the effect that (a) it is not
necessary under Malaysian law for counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court to submit a
special power of attorney authorizing him to represent a client before said court, (b) that counsel
appearing before the Malaysian High Court has full authority to compromise the suit, and (c) that
counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court need not comply with certain pre-requisites as
required under Philippine law to appear and compromise judgments on behalf of their clients before
said court.[47]
Furthermore, there is no basis for or truth to the appellate courts conclusion that the conditional
appearance of private respondents counsel who was allegedly not authorized to appear and represent,
cannot be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Malaya, inasmuch
as said conditional appearance was not premised on the alleged lack of authority of said counsel but the
conditional appearance was entered to question the regularity of the service of the writ of
summons. Such conditional appearance was in fact subsequently withdrawn when counsel realized that
the writ was properly served.[48]
On the ground that collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact and law tainted the judgment of the High
Court of Malaya, no clear evidence of the same was adduced or shown. The facts which the trial court
found intriguing amounted to mere conjectures and specious observations. The trial courts finding on
the absence of judgment against Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. is contradicted by evidence on record that
recovery was also sought against Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. but the same was found
insolvent.[49] Furthermore, even when the foreign judgment is based on the drafts prepared by counsel
for the successful party, such is not per seindicative of collusion or fraud. Fraud to hinder the
enforcement within the jurisdiction of a foreign judgment must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts
not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered,[50] or that which would go to the
jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to
defend the action to which he has a meritorious defense.[51] Intrinsic fraud is one which goes to the very
existence of the cause of action is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against
the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.[52] Evidence is wanting on the alleged extrinsic
fraud. Hence, such unsubstantiated allegation cannot give rise to liability therein.
Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not enforceable in view of the
absence of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was
based. As aforestated, the lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and
procedure.[53] Considering that under the procedural rules of the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment
may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every fact and law upon which the judgment is
based, then the same must be accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the
judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to demonstrate the alleged invalidity of such foreign
judgment, being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the High Court of Malaya. But instead
of doing so, private respondent merely argued, to which the trial court agreed, that the burden lay upon
petitioner to prove the validity of the money judgment. Such is clearly erroneous and would render
meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a foreign judgment were the party seeking to enforce
it be required to first establish its validity.[54]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1993
in CA-G.R. CV No. 35871 sustaining the Decision dated October 14, 1991 in Civil Case No. 56368 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 168 denying the enforcement of the Judgment dated September
13, 1985 of the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another in its
stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation to
pay petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad the amounts adjudged in the said foreign
Judgment, subject of the said case.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on official business.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Segundino G. Chua and concurred in by Associate Justices Serafin V.C.
Guingona and Ramon Mabutas, Jr., Sixteenth Division, in C-A G.R. CV No. 35871, Rollo, pp. 31-37.
[2]
Penned by Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo, Records, pp. 444-454.
[3]
Docketed as Suit No. C638 of 1983.
[4]
Records, pp. 126-127.
[5]
Records, pp. 129-130.
[6]
TSN, March 5, 1990, p. 31.
[7]
Records, pp. 1-4.
[8]
Records, pp. 17-25.
[9]
Order dated February 8, 1989, Records, p. 49.
[10]
Records, pp. 69-72.
[11]
Records, pp. 73-74.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[13]
Cucullu v. Louisiana Insurance Co. (La) 5 Mart NS 464, 16 Am Dec 199.
[14]
30 Am Jur 2d Enforcement and Execution of Judgments 779; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 US 113, 40 L Ed 95,
16 S Ct 139.
[15]
Private International Law, Jovito R. Salonga, 1995 Edition, p. 543; 30 Am Jur 2d Executions and
Enforcement of Judgments 780; Southern v. Southern, 43 NC App 159, 258 SE2d 422.
[16]
Now Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
[17]
TSN, March 5, 1990, p. 3.
[18]
TSN, March 5, 1990, p. 4.
[19]
TSN, March 5, 1990, p. 4.
[20]
TSNs, March 5, 1990, pp. 21-22; September 4, 1990, pp. 6-7.
[21]
TSN, March 5, 1990, pp. 10, 23-26.
[22]
TSN, March 5, 1990, pp. 10-11, 26-28.
[23]
TSN, March 5, 1990, pp. 19-20, 28-30, 37.
[24]
Exhibits A, A-1 and A-2, Records, pp. 125-127.
[25]
Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2, Records, pp. 128-130.
[26]
Exhibits C, C-1 and C-2, Records, pp. 131-133.
[27]
Exhibits D, D-1 and D-2, Records, pp. 134-136.
[28]
Exhibits E, E-1, E-2, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-7 and E-8, Records, pp. 137-144.
[29]
Exhibits F and F-1, Records, pp. 147-148.
[30]
Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2, Records, pp. 149-159.
[31]
Exhibits H and H-1, Records, pp. 160-161.
[32]
Exhibits I, I-1 and I-2, Records, pp. 162-167.
[33]
Exhibits J, J-1 to J-4, Records, pp. 168-173.
[34]
Exhibits K and K-1, Records, pp. 174-179.
[35]
Exhibit L, Records, p. 217.
[36]
Citing Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.
[37]
TSNs, July 30, 1990, pp. 4-5; September 4, 1990, p. 3.
[38]
TSN, July 30, 1990, pp. 5-6, 8.
[39]
TSN, July 30, 1990, p. 15.
[40]
TSN, October 5, 1990, pp. 6-10.
[41]
TSN, October 5, 1990, p. 11.
[42]
30 Am Jur Executions and Enforcement of Judgments 843; In re Osborne, 205 NC 716, 172 SE 491.
[43]
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 26, 45 [1998].
[44]
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 192, 199 [1995].
[45]
TSNs, September 4, 1990, p. 11; October 5, 1990, pp. 11-12.
[46]
Matthews v. Munster XX QBD 141, 1887, Great Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance Co. and
others, 2 ALR 485 [1981]; Waugh and others v. H.B. Clifford and Sons Ltd. and others, 1 ALR 1095 [1982];
Exhibits M, M-1 and M-2, Records, pp. 355-385.
[47]
Also Sovereign General Insurance Sdn. Bhd. v. Koh Tian Bee, 1 MLJ 304 (1988), Exhibit M-3, Records,
pp. 386-389.
[48]
TSN, March 5, 1990, pp. 10, 23-26.
[49]
TSN, March 5, 1990, pp. 22-25; Exhibits G, and G-2, Records, pp. 149-159.
[50]
Labayen v. Talisay-Silay Mining Co., 40 O.G. 2nd Supp. No. 3, p. 109 .
[51]
30 Am Jur 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments 840; Pentz v. Kuppinger (2nd Dist) 31 Cal App
3d 590, 107 Cal Rptr 540.
[52]
Private International Law, Jovito R. Salonga, 1995 Edition, p. 558; Beale, Conflict of Law, Vol. II, p.
1402; Abouloff v. Oppenwhimer and Another [1852], 58 L.J. Q.B. 1.
[53]
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[54]
Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 549 [1998].
57. Fr. Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123547 (May 21, 2001)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123547. May 21, 2001]
REV. FR. DANTE MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE
JOHNSON BALLUTAY, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 25, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY,
HONORABLE JUDGE ADRIANO TUAZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 28, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF CABANATUAN CITY, SPOUSES REYNALDO VENERACION and SUSAN VENERACION, SPOUSES
MAXIMO HIPOLITO and MANUELA DE LA PAZ and GODOFREDO DE LA PAZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated September 7, 1995, and resolution, dated
January 31, 1996, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court,
Branches 25[1] and 28,[2] Cabanatuan City, finding private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan
Veneracion owners of the land in dispute, subject to petitioners rights as a builder in good faith.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in February 1981, private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister Manuela De la Paz,
married to Maximo Hipolito, entered into an oral contract with petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then
Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City, for the sale of Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in
Cabanatuan City for the sum of P15,000.00. The lot is located along Maharlika Road near the Municipal
Hall of Cabanatuan City. At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia De la
Paz, mother of private respondents, although the latter had already sold it to private respondent
Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 26, 1976 (Exh. N/Exh. 2-
Veneracion).[3] Private respondent Manuela subsequently registered the sale in her name on October
22, 1981 and was issued TCT No. T-40496 (Exh. 9).[4] When the land was offered for sale to petitioner,
private respondents De la Paz were accompanied by their mother, since petitioner dealt with the De la
Pazes as a family and not individually. He was assured by them that the lot belonged to Manuela De la
Paz. It was agreed that petitioner would give a downpayment of P3,000.00 to private respondents De la
Paz and that the balance would be payable by installment. After giving the P3,000.00 downpayment,
petitioner started the construction of a house on the lot after securing a building permit from the City
Engineers Office on April 23, 1981, with the written consent of the then registered owner, Claudia de la
Paz (Exh. B/Exh, 1).[5] Petitioner likewise began paying the real estate taxes on said property (Exh. D, D-1,
D-2).[6] Construction on the house was completed on October 6, 1981 (Exh. V).[7] Since then, petitioner
and his family have maintained their residence there.[8]
On January 31, 1983, petitioner completed payment of the lot for which private respondents De la Paz
executed two documents. The first document (Exh. A) read:
1-31-83
Ang halaga ng Lupa sa Villa Fe Subdivision na ipinagbili kay Fr. Dante Martinez ay P15,000.00 na
pinangangako namin na ibibigay ang Deed of Sale sa ika-25 ng Febrero 1983.
[SGD.] METRING HIPOLITO
[SGD.] JOSE GODOFREDO DE LA PAZ[9]
The second writing (Exh. O) read:
Cabanatuan City
March 19, 1986
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that Freddie dela Paz has agreed to sign tomorrow (March 20) the affidavit of sale of lot
located at Villa Fe Subdivision sold to Fr. Dante Martinez.
[Sgd.] Freddie dela Paz
FREDDIE DELA PAZ[10]
However, private respondents De la Paz never delivered the Deed of Sale they promised to petitioner.
In the meantime, in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Right to Repurchase dated October 28, 1981 (Exh.
10),[11] private respondents De la Paz sold three lots with right to repurchase the same within one year
to private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion for the sum of P150,000.00. One of the
lots sold was the lot previously sold to petitioner.[12]
Reynaldo Veneracion had been a resident of Cabanatuan City since birth. He used to pass along
Maharlika Highway in going to the Municipal Hall or in going to and from Manila. Two of the lots subject
of the sale were located along Maharlika Highway, one of which was the lot sold earlier by the De la
Pazes to petitioner. The third lot (hereinafter referred to as the Melencio lot) was occupied by private
respondents De la Paz. Private respondents Veneracion never took actual possession of any of these lots
during the period of redemption, but all titles to the lots were given to him.[13]
Before the expiration of the one year period, private respondent Godofredo De la Paz informed private
respondent Reynaldo Veneracion that he was selling the three lots to another person
for P200,000.00. Indeed, private respondent Veneracion received a call from a Mr. Tecson verifying if he
had the titles to the properties, as private respondents De la Paz were offering to sell the two lots along
Maharlika Highway to him (Mr. Tecson) for P180,000.00 The offer included the lot purchased by
petitioner in February, 1981. Private respondent Veneracion offered to purchase the same two lots from
the De la Pazes for the same amount. The offer was accepted by private respondents De la
Paz. Accordingly, on June 2, 1983, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed over the two lots (Exh. I/Exh. 5-
Veneracion).[14] Sometime in January, 1984, private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion asked a certain
Renato Reyes, petitioners neighbor, who the owner of the building erected on the subject lot was. Reyes
told him that it was Feliza Martinez, petitioners mother, who was in possession of the
property. Reynaldo Veneracion told private respondent Godofredo about the matter and was assured
that Godofredo would talk to Feliza. Based on that assurance, private respondents Veneracion
registered the lots with the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan on March 5, 1984. The lot in dispute was
registered under TCT No. T-44612 (Exh. L/Exh. 4-Veneracion).[15]
Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had been sold to the spouses
Veneracion after receiving a letter (Exh. P/Exh. 6-Veneracion) from private respondent Reynaldo
Veneracion on March 19, 1986, claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the
property and remove their improvements thereon.[16] Petitioner, in turn, demanded through counsel the
execution of the deed of sale from private respondents De la Paz and informed Reynaldo Veneracion
that he was the owner of the property as he had previously purchased the same from private
respondents De la Paz.[17]
The matter was then referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay of San Juan, Cabanatuan City for
conciliation, but the parties failed to reach an agreement (Exh. M/Exh. 13).[18] As a consequence, on May
12, 1986, private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion brought an action for ejectment in the Municipal
Trial Court, Branch III, Cabanatuan City against petitioner and his mother (Exh. 14).[19]
On the other hand, on June 10, 1986, petitioner caused a notice of lis pendens to be recorded on TCT
No. T-44612 with the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City (Exh. U).[20]
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to have the case decided under the Rules on
Summary Procedure and defined the issues as follows:
1. Whether or not defendant (now petitioner) may be judicially ejected.
2. Whether or not the main issue in this case is ownership.
3. Whether or not damages may be awarded.[21]
On January 29, 1987, the trial court rendered its decision, pertinent portions of which are quoted as
follows:
With the foregoing findings of the Court, defendants [petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez and his mother]
are the rightful possessors and in good faith and in concept of owner, thus cannot be ejected from the
land in question. Since the main issue is ownership, the better remedy of the plaintiff [herein private
respondents Veneracion] is Accion Publiciana in the Regional Trial Court, having jurisdiction to
adjudicate on ownership.
Defendants counterclaim will not be acted upon it being more than P20,000.00 is beyond this Courts
power to adjudge.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing plaintiffs complaint and ordering plaintiff to pay
Attorneys fee of P5,000.00 and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[22]
On March 3, 1987, private respondents Veneracion filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court,
but failed to pay the docket fee. On June 6, 1989, or over two years after the filing of the notice of
appeal, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of the Judgment, alleging finality of judgment for failure
of private respondents Veneracion to perfect their appeal and failure to prosecute the appeal for an
unreasonable length of time.
Upon objection of private respondents Veneracion, the trial court denied on June 28, 1989 the motion
for execution and ordered the records of the case to be forwarded to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court. On July 11, 1989, petitioner appealed from this order. The appeal of private respondents
Veneracion from the decision of the MTC and the appeal of petitioner from the order denying
petitioners motion for execution were forwarded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Cabanatuan
City. The cases were thereafter consolidated under Civil Case No. 670-AF.
On February 20, 1991, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding private respondents
Veneracion as the true owners of the lot in dispute by virtue of their prior registration with the Register
of Deeds, subject to petitioners rights as builder in good faith, and ordering petitioner and his privies to
vacate the lot after receipt of the cost of the construction of the house, as well as to pay the sum
of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suit. It, however, failed to rule on petitioners appeal
of the Municipal Trial Courts order denying their Motion for Execution of Judgment.
Meanwhile, on May 30, 1986, while the ejectment case was pending before the Municipal Trial Court,
petitioner Martinez filed a complaint for annulment of sale with damages against the Veneracions and
De la Pazes with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cabanatuan City. On March 5, 1990, the trial court
rendered its decision finding private respondents Veneracion owners of the land in dispute, subject to
the rights of petitioner as a builder in good faith, and ordering private respondents De la Paz to pay
petitioner the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, and for private
respondents to pay the costs of the suit.
On March 20, 1991, petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals of the RTCs
decision in Civil Case No. 670-AF (for ejectment).Likewise, on April 2, 1991, petitioner appealed the trial
courts decision in Civil Case No. 44-[AF]-8642-R (for annulment of sale and damages) to the Court of
Appeals. The cases were designated as CA G.R. SP. No. 24477 and CA G.R. CV No. 27791, respectively,
and were subsequently consolidated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decisions, without
ruling on petitioners appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts order denying his Motion for Execution of
Judgment. It declared the Veneracions to be owners of the lot in dispute as they were the first
registrants in good faith, in accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code. Petitioner Martinez failed to
overcome the presumption of good faith for the following reasons:
1. when private respondent Veneracion discovered the construction on the lot, he immediately
informed private respondent Godofredo about it and relied on the latters assurance that he will take
care of the matter.
2. the sale between petitioner Martinez and private respondents De la Paz was not notarized, as
required by Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code, thus it cannot be said that the private respondents
Veneracion had knowledge of the first sale.[23]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution dated January 31,
1996.[24] Hence this petition for review. Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
I THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGES
JOHNSON BALLUTAY AND ADRIANO TUAZON ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
REYNALDO VENERACION AND WIFE ARE BUYERS AND REGISTRANTS IN GOOD FAITH IN RESOLVING THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN DISPUTE.
II THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING AND DECIDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASES OF SALVORO VS. TANEGA, ET AL., G.R. NO. L 32988
AND IN ARCENAS VS. DEL ROSARIO, 67 PHIL 238, BY TOTALLY IGNORING THE SAID DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE ASSAILED DECISIONS OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS.
III THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW IN CA G.R. SP. NO. 24477.
IV THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN DENYING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR REVIEW
AFORECITED INEVITABLY SANCTIONED AND/OR WOULD ALLOW A VIOLATION OF LAW AND DEPARTURE
FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE
ADRIANO TUAZON WHEN THE LATTER RENDERED A DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 670-AF [ANNEX D]
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE SENDON DELIZO IN CIVIL CASE NO.
9523 [ANNEX C] AND IN NOT RESOLVING IN THE SAME CASE THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY DEFENDANTS
ON THE ORDER OF THE SAME COURT DENYING THE MOTION FOR EXECUTION.
V THAT THE RESOLUTION [ANNEX B] (OF THE COURT OF APPEALS) DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [ANNEX I] WITHOUT STATING CLEARLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH SAID
RESOLUTION WAS BASED, (IS ERRONEOUS).
These assignment of errors raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in good faith of the lot in dispute as to
make them the absolute owners thereof in accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code on double sale of
immovable property.
2. Whether or not payment of the appellate docket fee within the period to appeal is not necessary for
the perfection of the appeal after a notice of appeal has been filed within such period.
3. Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion for reconsideration
is contrary to the constitutional requirement that a denial of a motion for reconsideration must state
the legal reasons on which it is based.
First. It is apparent from the first and second assignment of errors that petitioner is assailing the findings
of fact and the appreciation of the evidence made by the trial courts and later affirmed by the
respondent court. While, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, review may nevertheless be granted under certain exceptions,
namely: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issue of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; (j) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.[25]
In this case, the Court of Appeals based its ruling that private respondents Veneracion are the owners of
the disputed lot on their reliance on private respondent Godofredo De la Pazs assurance that he would
take care of the matter concerning petitioners occupancy of the disputed lot as constituting good
faith. This case, however, involves double sale and, on this matter, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code provides
that where immovable property is the subject of a double sale, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it to the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof,
to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title.[26] The requirement of the law, where title to the property is recorded in the
Register of Deeds, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and recording in good faith. To be entitled to
priority, the second purchaser must not only prove prior recording of his title but that he acted in good
faith, i.e., without knowledge or notice of a prior sale to another. The presence of good faith should be
ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the land.[27]
1. With regard to the first sale to private respondents Veneracion, private respondent Reynaldo
Veneracion testified that on October 10, 1981, 18 days before the execution of the first Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase, he inspected the premises and found it vacant.[28] However, this is belied by
the testimony of Engr. Felix D. Minor, then building inspector of the Department of Public Works and
Highways, that he conducted on October 6, 1981 an ocular inspection of the lot in dispute in the
performance of his duties as a building inspector to monitor the progress of the construction of the
building subject of the building permit issued in favor of petitioner on April 23, 1981, and that he found
it 100 % completed (Exh. V).[29] In the absence of contrary evidence, he is to be presumed to have
regularly performed his official duty.[30] Thus, as early as October, 1981, private respondents Veneracion
already knew that there was construction being made on the property they purchased.
2. The Court of Appeals failed to determine the nature of the first contract of sale between the private
respondents by considering their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[31] More specifically, it
overlooked the fact that the first contract of sale between the private respondents shows that it is in
fact an equitable mortgage.
The requisites for considering a contract of sale with a right of repurchase as an equitable mortgage are
(1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and (2) that their intention
was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.[32] A contract of sale with right to repurchase gives
rise to the presumption that it is an equitable mortgage in any of the following cases: (1) when the price
of a sale with a right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) when the vendor remains in possession
as lessee or otherwise; (3) when, upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase, another
instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) when the
purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5) when the vendor binds himself to pay the
taxes on the thing sold; (6) in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the
parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation.[33] In case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be
construed as an equitable mortgage.[34]
In this case, the following circumstances indicate that the private respondents intended the transaction
to be an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale: (1) Private respondents Veneracion never took
actual possession of the three lots; (2) Private respondents De la Paz remained in possession of the
Melencio lot which was co-owned by them and where they resided; (3) During the period between the
first sale and the second sale to private respondents Veneracion, they never made any effort to take
possession of the properties; and (4) when the period of redemption had expired and private
respondents Veneracion were informed by the De la Pazes that they are offering the lots for sale to
another person for P200,000.00, they never objected. To the contrary, they offered to purchase the two
lots for P180,000.00 when they found that a certain Mr. Tecson was prepared to purchase it for the
same amount. Thus, it is clear from these circumstances that both private respondents never intended
the first sale to be a contract of sale, but merely that of mortgage to secure a debt of P150,000.00.
With regard to the second sale, which is the true contract of sale between the parties, it should be
noted that this Court in several cases,[35] has ruled that a purchaser who is aware of facts which should
put a reasonable man upon his guard cannot turn a blind eye and later claim that he acted in good faith.
Private respondent Reynaldo himself admitted during the pre-trial conference in the MTC in Civil Case
No. 9523 (for ejectment) that petitioner was already in possession of the property in dispute at the time
the second Deed of Sale was executed on June 1, 1983 and registered on March 4, 1984. He, therefore,
knew that there were already occupants on the property as early as 1981. The fact that there are
persons, other than the vendors, in actual possession of the disputed lot should have put private
respondents on inquiry as to the nature of petitioners right over the property. But he never talked to
petitioner to verify the nature of his right. He merely relied on the assurance of private respondent
Godofredo De la Paz, who was not even the owner of the lot in question, that he would take care of the
matter. This does not meet the standard of good faith.
3. The appellate courts reliance on Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code to determine private
respondents Veneracions lack of knowledge of petitioners ownership of the disputed lot is erroneous.
Art. 1357[36] and Art. 1358,[37] in relation to Art. 1403(2)[38] of the Civil Code, requires that the sale of real
property must be in writing for it to be enforceable.It need not be notarized. If the sale has not been put
in writing, either of the contracting parties can compel the other to observe such requirement.[39] This is
what petitioner did when he repeatedly demanded that a Deed of Absolute Sale be executed in his favor
by private respondents De la Paz. There is nothing in the above provisions which require that a contract
of sale of realty must be executed in a public document. In any event, it has been shown that private
respondents Veneracion had knowledge of facts which would put them on inquiry as to the nature of
petitioners occupancy of the disputed lot.
Second. Petitioner contends that the MTC in Civil Case No. 9523 (for ejectment) erred in denying
petitioners Motion for Execution of the Judgment, which the latter filed on June 6, 1989, two years after
private respondents Veneracion filed a notice of appeal with the MTC on March 3, 1987 without paying
the appellate docket fee. He avers that the trial courts denial of his motion is contrary to this Courts
ruling in the cases of Republic v. Director of Lands,[40] and Aranas v. Endona[41] in which it was held that
where the appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the reglementary period, the decision of the
MTC becomes final and unappealable as the payment of docket fee is not only a mandatory but also a
jurisdictional requirement.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case of Republic v. Director of Lands deals with the requirement
for appeals from the Courts of First Instance, the Social Security Commission, and the Court of Agrarian
Relations to the Court of Appeals. The case of Aranas v. Endona, on the other hand, was decided under
the 1964 Rules of Court and prior to the enactment of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg.
129) and the issuance of its Interim Rules and Guidelines by this Court on January 11, 1983. Hence, these
cases are not applicable to the matter at issue.
On the other hand, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[42] it was held that although an appeal fee is required
to be paid in case of an appeal taken from the municipal trial court to the regional trial court, it is not a
prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under 20[43] and 23[44] of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P.
Blg. 129). Under these sections, there are only two requirements for the perfection of an appeal, to wit:
(a) the filing of a notice of appeal within the reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the last day
to appeal by any party. Even in the procedure for appeal to the regional trial courts,[45] nothing is
mentioned about the payment of appellate docket fees.
Indeed, this Court has ruled that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not
automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of the
appellate court.[46] Thus, private respondents Veneracions failure to pay the appellate docket fee is not
fatal to their appeal.
Third. Petitioner contends that the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his motion for
reconsideration was rendered in violation of the Constitution because it does not state the legal basis
thereof.
This contention is likewise without merit.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of
a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor. This
requirement was fully complied with when the Court of Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its
decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not
raised anything new.[47] Thus, its resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration states:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Decision filed by the petitioners.
Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the movants have been
considered and passed upon in the Decision sought to be reconsidered. Thus, We find no reason to
disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[48]
Attorneys fees should be awarded as petitioner was compelled to litigate to protect his interest due to
private respondents act or omission.[49]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and a new one is RENDERED:
(1) declaring as null and void the deed of sale executed by private respondents Godofredo and Manuela
De la Paz in favor of private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion;
(2) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz to execute a deed of absolute sale in
favor of petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez;
(3) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz to reimburse private respondents
spouses Veneracion the amount the latter may have paid to the former;
(4) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City to cancel TCT No. T-44612 and issue a new one in
the name of petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez; and
(5) ordering private respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the sum of P20,000.00 as
attorneys fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

[1]
Per Judge Johnson L. Ballutay.
[2]
Per Judge Adriano I. Tuason.
[3]
Records (Civil Case No. 44-AF-8642-R), pp. 146-147.
[4]
Id., p. 190.
[5]
Id., pp. 132, 180.
[6]
Id., pp. 134-136.
[7]
Id., p. 217; TSN (Engr. Felix D. Minor), p. 10-11, Feb. 23, 1989.
[8]
TSN (Fr. Dante Martinez), pp. 4, 6-9, 12-16, 45, Dec. 11, 1987.
[9]
Records (Civil Case No. 44-AF-8642-R), p. 131; TSN (Fr. Dante Martinez), p. 9, Dec. 11, 1987.
[10]
Records (Civil Case No. 44-AF-8642-R), p. 148.
[11]
Id., pp. 193-194.
[12]
TSN (Reynaldo Veneracion), pp. 3-8, Sept. 28, 1988.
[13]
Id., pp. 18-19, Nov. 3, 1988.
[14]
Records (Civil Case No. 44-AF-8642-R), p. 183.
[15]
TSN (Reynaldo Veneracion), pp. 10-17, 16-17, Sept. 28, 1988; Records (Civil Case No. 44-AF-8642-R),
p. 144.
[16]
TSN (Fr. Dante Martinez), pp. 25-28, Dec. 11, 1987; Records (Civil Case No. 44-AF-8642-R), 149, 184.
[17]
Records (Civil Case No. 44-AF-8642-R), pp. 151-152.
[18]
Id., p. 145, 197.
[19]
Id., p. 198.
[20]
Id., p. 155.
[21]
Id., p. 140; Order, p. 1.
[22]
CA Rollo (CA-G.R. SP. No. 24477), p. 42; MTC Judgment, p. 5.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 56-61; CA Decision, pp. 6-11.
[24]
Id., p. 63; Resolution, p. 1.
[25]
Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 486 (1996); Philippine Home Assurance Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 257 SCRA 468 (1996); Floro v. Llenado, 244 SCRA 715 (1995).
[26]
Balatbat v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 128 (1996).
[27]
Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 446 (1994).
[28]
TSN (Reynaldo Veneracion), p. 16, Sept. 28, 1988.
[29]
TSN (Engr. Felix D. Minor), pp. 10-11, Feb. 23, 1989; Records (Civil Case No. 44-AF-8642-R), p. 217.
[30]
Celeste v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 79 (1992).
[31]
Matanguihan v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 380 (1997).
[32]
Id.
[33]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1602.
[34]
Id., Art. 1603.
[35]
De la Cruz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 660 (1988); Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 230
SCRA 446 (1994); Balatbat v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 128 (1996).
[36]
Art. 1357. If the law requires a document or other special form, as in the acts and contracts
enumerated in the following article, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that
form, once the contract has been perfected. This right may be exercised simultaneously with the action
upon the contract.
[37]
Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document:
(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest therein
are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 and 1405;
[38]
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
....
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of
an interest therein;
[39]
Heirs of Amparo del Rosario v. Santos, 108 SCRA 43 (1981).
[40]
71 SCRA 450 (1976).
[41]
117 SCRA 753 (1982).
[42]
253 SCRA 632 (1996).
[43]
Sec. 20. Procedure for taking appeal. - An appeal from the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts or municipal circuit trial courts to the regional trial courts, and from the regional trial courts to
the Intermediate Appellate Court in actions or proceedings originally filed in the former shall be taken
by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or order appealed from.
[44]
Sec. 23. Perfection of appeal. - In cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall be
upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.
[45]
INTERIM RULES AND GUIDELINES, 21.
[46]
Fontanar v. Bonsubre, 145 SCRA 663 (1986); Del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,
136 SCRA 669 (1985).
[47]
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 1 (1990).
[48]
Rollo, p. 63; Resolution, p. 1.
[49]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 2208 (2).
58. Abarquez vs. Rebosura, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-94-986 (January 28, 1998)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91262. January 28, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILFREDO LLAGUNO, JUDY REYES @ FLORANTE

REYES @ LORENZO PEDROSA and a certain "ATIS", Accused, JUDY REYES @ FLORANTE REYES @
LORENZO PEDROSA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the information charges a complex crime and the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to support
a conviction for such complex crime or for one of its component offenses, the accused may still be
convicted of the other component offense which may have been sufficiently proven. Conformably, when
an accused who is charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder is erroneously convicted
of murder by the trial court, he may on appeal be relieved from his erroneous conviction but still be
found liable for slight illegal detention, because the elements of the latter crime are necessarily included
in the information for the complex one.
Statement of the Case
On appeal before this Court is the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court 2 of Cebu City, Branch XVII, in
Criminal Case No. CBU 50414, dated July 25, 1989, convicting Judy Reyes of murder.
Appellant Judy Reyes, together with two others, was charged in an Information dated February 16,
1987, which reads as follows: 3
"The undersigned 3rd Asst. Fiscal of the City of Cebu 4 accuses BOY LLAGUNO, JUDY REYES @ FLORANTE
REYES and a certain "ATIS" of the crime of KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 4th day of February, 1987, at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with
firearm, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with
deliberate intent, did then and there kidnap and detain one Bienvenido Mercado, and while under
detention, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly
and unexpectedly shot said Bienvenido Mercado with said firearm, hitting him on the vital part of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries(sic):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘GUNSHOT WOUND THROUGH AND THROUGH FROM FRONTAL AREA OF THE HEAD TO OCCIPITAL
AREA.’
as a consequence of which, Bienvenido Mercado died a few days later." 5
Arraigned on June 11, 1987, Accused Wilfredo (Boy) LLaguno and Judy Reyes, assisted by Counsel
Ernesto Amores, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 6 Accused "Atis" was at large; hence, he was not
arraigned.
A consolidated Motion to Remand Case for Reinvestigation and Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest
alleging lack of preliminary investigation was filed by Llaguno and Reyes through Counsel Rolando M.
Lim on February 23, 1987. 7 The motion was granted and the records were returned to the City Fiscal’s
Office. Subsequently, in an Order dated September 23, 1987, the trial court, then presided by Judge
Mario M. Dizon, dismissed the case against Wilfredo "Boy" Llaguno: 8
"It appearing from the Reinvestigation Report & Recommendation dated September 14, 1987, filed by
3rd Asst. Fiscal Rodolfo V. Perez and duly approved by the City Fiscal, that the State has no evidence to
present against, and secure the conviction of accused WILFREDO ‘BOY’ LLAGUNO, as prayed for, the
instant case against said accused is ordered DISMISSED, and, accordingly, he is ordered immediately
released, unless he is also detained for another cause. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
On October 26, 1987, Fiscal Generosa Labra requested a resetting of the case because no witness for the
prosecution was available. Atty. Vicente Cabahug, the appellant’s counsel, objected on the ground that
the remaining accused, Judy Reyes, was detained, adding that a previous warning had already been
given to the prosecution in the last hearing during which it also failed to present any witness. Thus, the
trial court provisionally dismissed the case: 9
"In view of this, the instant case as against JUDY REYES is hereby ordered provisionally dismissed. The
accused Judy Reyes, @ Florante Reyes is hereby ordered released from the BBRC 10 unless he is also
detained for another case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Two days after, on October 29, 1987, Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza 11 representing the Citizens Legal
Assistance Society of the Philippines (CLASP) as private prosecutor, and with the "conforme" of Asst.
Fiscal Labra, filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for the reinstatement of the case against the
appellant. 12 In an Order dated November 2, 1987, the trial court granted the motion and trial
thereafter ensued. After the evidence from both parties had been presented, the assailed Decision
penned by Judge Jose P. Burgos was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: 13
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused Judy Reyes alias
Florante Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt, not of the complex crime as charged in the information
but of the offense of MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with
the aggravating circumstances of employing means to weaken the defense or means to insure or afford
impunity, the use of a motor vehicle, commission of the offense at nighttime and in an uninhabited
place and sentence is hereby rendered ordering the accused to serve the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessory penalties under the law, to indemnify the heirs of Bienvenido
Mercado the sum of Thirty [Thousand] (P30,000.00) Pesos and [to] pay the costs."cralaw virtua1aw
library
On September 26, 1989, the accused through Counsel Cabahug filed a Notice erroneously appealing the
judgment to the Court of Appeals. 14 Correcting the lapse, 15 the Court of Appeals in a letter dated
December 6, 1989 16 forwarded the records of the case to this Court. After this Court’s receipt of all
pleadings and documents, the case is now ripe for resolution. 17
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The solicitor general’s summary of the facts is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On February 5, 1987 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning, the appellant Judy Reyes, chief security and rattan
controller at GF International Export Inc., Cebu City, informed Tomas Banzon, the company duty guard,
that he caught a thief on February 4, 1987 (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 26). Appellant then took Banzon
to his room where a person named Bienvenido Mercado was found tied to a wooden post in the room.
Appellant told Banzon that Mercado was the thief he caught (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 28)chanrobles
law library
At 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 6, 1987, Dr. Jovita Ceniza, manager of the company, called
up Banzon by phone inquiring if there was any unusual incident. Banzon replied that he would give a
report after two (2) hours, and when appellant learned of this, he warned Banzon to keep quiet about
Mercado’s detention or be killed (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 31). Appellant at the time was armed with
a .45 caliber pistol (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 31). When Dr. Ceniza went to the company’s office later
in the afternoon, she met the appellant who told her it was all finished and that he was going to Santo
Niño to confess as he had killed someone (TSN, December 7, 1987, p. 28).
At 9:00 o’clock in the morning of February 7, 1987 Banzon inquired from appellant as to the
whereabouts of Mercado and appellant replied that he already disposed of him (TSN, November 24,
1987, p. 33). Banzon, at that time, noticed that appellant’s arm had teeth marks, and when Banzon
inquired as to the cause thereof, appellant replied that he was hit by a piece of wood (TSN, November
24, 1987, p. 33).
Also on February 7, 1987, the body of Bienvenido Mercado was found by the police in Sogod, Cebu,
which showed a gunshot wound on the forehead and multiple abrasions in the arms and body (TSN,
November 24, 1987, p. 11)." 18
In the place where they found the body, the police also found an empty shell of a .45 caliber bullet. 19
According to Banzon, on February 5, 1987, he noted that the company-owned Datsun pickup was still
sporting its gray corduroy seat covers, but on February 7, the seat covers were gone. Banzon asked Cirilo
Eric Medico, the guard who relieved him, what happened to the seat covers, and Medico replied that
they had been taken by one Boy Saragoza to have them washed as they had been bloodstained. Feeling
anxious and suspicious, he called up the Security Agency and asked for permission to take a leave of
absence on February 8. 20
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant narrates the facts as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Appellant is of legal age, single and a resident of GF International Export, Inc. compound located at
H. Abellana Street, Basak, Mandaue City.
1.1. At the time of his arrest, appellant was employed as a Rattan Controller of GF International Export,
Inc.
2. Sometime evening of 4 February 1987, one Bienvenido Mercado, while in the presence of his mother
and common-law wife, was invited by Atis and a certain Alex to join a drinking spree with the latter.
2.1. At the time of the aforesaid invitation, the aforenamed Bienvenido Mercado was wearing a blue t-
shirt and an orange short pants.
3. Unfortunately, however, Bienvenido Mercado was last seen alive during the aforementioned
invitation.
4. In the meantime, on the same evening of 4 February 1987, appellant was, all the while, within the
premises of GF International Export, Inc.
5. Moreover, at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, or more appropriately, on 5
February 1987, appellant, from his sleeping quarter, proceeded to take a bath at a place near the
guardhouse of GF International Export, Inc. and, thereafter, proceeded to dress up and prepare for work
on the said day.
6. On 7 February 1987, at around 5:43 o’clock in the afternoon, the body of a dead person and an empty
caliber .45 shell were recovered.
7. After the aforestated recovery, a Post-Mortem Examination was immediately conducted.
8. While in his hut, appellant was arrested for Illegal Possession Of Firearm on 12 February 1987.
9. On 15 February 1987, the previously-mentioned recovered body was identified to be that of

forenamed Bienvenido Mercado." 21
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court held the appellant liable for murder, stating:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is clear from the established evidence on record that after the victim was detained by the accused for
a day in his rest house at the compound of GF International, he brought the victim with the use of
Datsun pick-up to Sogod, Cebu for salvaging in the evening of February 5, 1987, the day when accused
ordered for no overtime work in the GF premises to better perpetuate the offense of killing the victim in
Sogod, Cebu with hands tied using a .45 caliber pistol." 22
Although herein appellant was charged with "kidnapping with murder," the trial court convicted him
only of "murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating
circumstances of employing means to weaken the defense or means to insure or afford impunity, the
use of a motor vehicle, commission of the offense at nighttime and in an uninhabited place." 23 The trial
court, however, did not find him liable for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code because the victim was detained only for one day.
The Issues
In his brief, appellant imputes the following "errors" to the trial court, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I.
The trial court erred in lending credence to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution.
II.
The trial court erred in holding that the testimonies of appellant and his witnesses were mere denials.
III.
Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the existence in this case of circumstances sufficient to sustain
a conviction."cralaw virtua1aw library
The foregoing boil down to the following issues: (1) the credibility of witnesses and (2) the sufficiency of
the prosecution’s evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court finds appellant liable only for slight illegal detention, not for
murder or kidnapping with murder.
First Issue : Credibility of witnesses
Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses,
appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court. This rule is justified by the fact that the
trial court is in a better position to decide the question. 24 Having the advantage of directly observing
witnesses, "the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that
will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere
reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs
that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of
a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession
or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears
were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying
the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict."25cralaw:red
The records reveal, however, that this doctrinal guide should not apply in this instance, for the judge
who penned the Decision did not personally hear the evidence for the prosecution. Judge Jose P.
Burgos, the ponente, started presiding at the trial only on January 9, 1989 26 after the first witness for
the defense had been presented. 27 Hence, he did not personally observe or assess any of the
prosecution witnesses. Thus, as an exception to the rule, we meticulously reviewed the evidence to
determine for ourselves the credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the judgment of conviction.
Buttressing his defense of denial, appellant propounds several challenges to the credibility of the
prosecution account. He maintains that Banzon was in no position to witness the alleged detention. He
also denies that he had confided to Banzon and to Dr. Ceniza that the victim was in his custody and that
he intended to "salvage" or kill him. He posits further that there were several inconsistencies in the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses. We will deal with each of these contentions.
In his Brief, appellant assails the testimony of Banzon that he saw the victim hanging by his hands at
eight o’clock in the evening of February 5, 1987 and for thirty minutes thereafter. He contends that
Banzon was "in no position to have witnessed the purported detention" of Victim Mercado, because
Banzon’s work shift ended at eight o’clock in the evening and the endorsement of his duties to the relief
guard took only a few minutes. 28
We are not convinced. It was not proven that Witness Banzon left at exactly eight o’clock that evening,
or right after he had turned over his responsibilities to the relieving guard. In fact, a reasonable
allowance of time may be considered in the turnover of responsibility by one guard to another; Banzon
could still have been inside the GF premises at 8:30 in the evening of February 5, 1987. Banzon himself
testified that he was invited to appellant’s room at 8:10 that evening. 29 Thus, we find appellant’s attack
on Witness Banzon’s allegation that he was at the GF premises on February 5, 1987 to be insignificant.
Appellant further contends that it is unbelievable that he would confide to Banzon the following: that he
had detained Victim Mercado, that he had intended to "salvage" the latter, or that he had already done
so. He maintains that it has not been shown that Banzon enjoyed his confidence. 30 He raises the same
arguments in respect to the revelations he allegedly made to Dr. Ceniza. He states that he and Dr. Ceniza
were already at odds with each other prior to February 1987. 31
It must be stressed, however, that during the trial, appellant never denied the statements of Banzon. In
spite of the damaging accusations of Banzon, appellant, on the stand, did not dispute the former’s
presence at the GF premises. Only in his appeal brief did he do so. We find appellant’s denial a mere
afterthought, and thus undeserving of credence. The testimony of Banzon clearly shows appellant’s
penchant for boasting: 32
"Atty. Ceniza:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q. What transpired on the occasion of your meeting of [sic] the accused?
A. He said they were able to catch a robber in the evening of February 4 but I did not believe him
because I have not seen (the robber).
Q. What else transpired in your conversation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. No more.
Q. In the evening of February 5, 1987 what did you do?
A. About 8:10 in the evening of February 5 he brought me to his room.
Atty. Ceniza:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q. Who is that he?

Witness:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. Lorenzo Pedrosa.
Q. That means Judy Reyes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the purpose of Judy Reyes in bringing you to his room?
A. He showed me the person that he hanged. He was tied in both hands and raised upwards to a
wooden brace of the house.
Q. What was the tenor of your conversation if any to Lorenzo or between Lorenzo and you?
A. I asked him why he brought this [sic] here. He told me that is [sic] a prison cell for those who have
committed a crime.
Q. Where was the room of Judy Reyes?
A. Inside the premises of the company GF International Inc.
Q. Was that all that transpired in your conversation on that occasion?
A. I asked why he brought this person here and he answered me that Boy Saragoza will come back for
him and I asked him what has he done and he said, he is a robber. He has stolen something.
Q. Was that all that transpired in your conversation?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What else?
A. I asked that person who was hanged. I asked him what was his name and he said his nickname was
Ben and his full name is Bienvenido Mercado and he is a resident of Tabo-an and a ‘cargador.’"
The testimony of Dr. Ceniza confirmed Banzon’s account that appellant detained and planned to kill the
victim. As in the case of Banzon, Ceniza’s testimony was not objected to by appellant. Thus: 33
Q. And what was the answer of Lorenzo (Pedrosa or Judy Reyes)?

A. And then he said, you know that if I had to narrate (it) all it will take more than one hour.
Q. Please limit you answer. Particularly, what Lorenzo told you about?
A. He asked permission[;] he wanted to use the Datsun because he was going to salvage a man. He
wanted to finish him before the next day. At this point I plead [sic] with him, "Please don’t do it." And I
said, I told him that Dong if that is your problem, I will help you. Just don’t ‘salvage.’
Q. And what did Lorenzo told [sic] you?
A. He said that he was going to use the Datsun to salvage a man because he said he wanted to finish him
before the next day. At this point I said, ‘Dong don’t do that. If you have a problem I will go there and I
will talk to you.’ To the extent I also told him, ‘We will give money. I will not do anything to you.’ But he
said (that) he has to finish this man because if the man will not be eliminated he will be in hot water. It
was a very long conversation.
Q. By the way, what did Lorenzo tell you about this man hanging in one of the buildings of the company?
A. He said he is [sic] a thief. So I said, ‘But why did you have to bring him there?’ and he said, ‘He has
stolen something.’ I said, ‘Why did you not ask the assistance of the security guard instead of you
yourself handling that fellow?’ Then he did not say anything. So I shifted [the topic], I told him ‘I will be
the one to take care if he will just release him.’ He said, ‘No, I will have to salvage him.’"
Furthermore, appellant’s self-serving negative defense of denial cannot be given greater weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 34 Jurisprudence teaches us that
"affirmative testimony has greater value than a negative one, for the reason that he who denies a
certain fact may not remember exactly the circumstances on which he bases his denial." 35
Appellant also cites inconsistencies in the version of the prosecution. Banzon insisted that Victim
Mercado was in yellow short pants when he last saw the latter alive; when recovered, Mercado was in
orange short pants. 36 Appellant further points out the following inconsistencies: there was a
discrepancy in the names of those who invited Mercado to a drinking session; the duty shift of Banzon
was actually 8:00 p.m. to midnight; appellant was arrested on February 11, 1987, not February 12, 1987;
and Banzon called up the security agency regarding the matter of bloodstains on February 7, 1987, not
February 14, 1987 as testified to by him. 37
Again, we hold that these insignificant lapses do not taint the credibility of the witnesses.
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of their declarations. In fact, these
inconsistencies reinforce rather than weaken their credibility, for they lessen the prospect of a
rehearsed testimony. Au contraire, such discrepancies serve to add credence and veracity to their
categorical, straightforward and spontaneous testimonies. 38
Appellant next assails the credibility of Dr. Ceniza. He alleges that Dr. Ceniza’s behavior towards the
incident was surprising, for upon learning of the presence of the victim inside the company premises,
she did her usual rounds at the hospital instead of checking on the unusual occurrence. 39
Admittedly, Company President Ceniza’s reaction at a time of crisis is open to criticism. However, this
does not lessen the weight of her testimony. Different people react differently to startling occurrences.
In any event, she did testify that she kept in touch with the personnel at GF at that time.chanrobles law
library
Second Issue : Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence
In deciding this appeal, we emphasize that the burden of proof in criminal cases is on the prosecution.
Thus, a finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s own evidence, not on the
weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense. 40
Circumstantial Evidence Sufficient
to Convict Appellant of Murder?
Because there were no eyewitnesses to the killing, the trial court’s resort to circumstantial evidence was
inevitable. A conviction may rest purely on circumstantial evidence, provided the following requisites
concur: 41
"(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt." 42
Hence, the Supreme Court has held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, that is, the circumstances proved must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty." 43
Let us consider the chain of circumstances proven by the prosecution. Banzon testified that appellant
detained Mercado in his (appellant’s) room by tying his hands to a brace in the ceiling with the apparent
intention of "salvaging" or killing the victim, a suspected robber. Appellant threatened Banzon and
warned him not to report the incident to Dr. Ceniza. Appellant took the Datsun pickup on February 6,
1987 and claimed the next day that he had already "disposed" of the man. Banzon saw the Datsun
pickup stained with blood. He also noticed traces of blood on the canal near the parked Datsun.
Appellant himself asked permission from Dr. Ceniza to use the pickup in order to "salvage" a man. He
later told Dr. Ceniza that he was going to confess because he was feeling bad after he had killed a man.
44
These circumstances, at first glance, may create a strong suspicion that appellant did commit the alleged
killing. Nevertheless, a closer examination reveals that the facts from which this inference was derived
do not prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the author of the killing.
Appellant draws attention to the conflict between the testimonies of Dr. Ceniza and Banzon 45
regarding the time when the victim was taken out of the GF premises and the time when he was killed.
According to Dr. Ceniza, appellant told her on February 6, 1987 that he was going to confession in the
afternoon because he was feeling bad. Dr. Ceniza took appellant’s statement to mean that the victim
had already been taken out of the GF premises and killed. Banzon, on the other hand, testified that
appellant told him in the morning of that same day that the victim was still in the company premises.
Furthermore, he testified that it was only around four o’clock in the afternoon of February 6, 1987 when
appellant brought the pickup out of the premises of GF. In other words, Banzon’s testimony sought to
establish that the victim was taken out of the GF premises after office hours on February 6, 1987. 46 The
inconsistencies in their testimonies are evident from the following: 47
Q. How about on the following day, February 6, 1987, do you recall anything unusual that happened
relative to that man hanging behind the GF International Building?
[Dr. Ceniza]
A. The first thing that I know that one of the supervisors told me that the man was no longer there. On
the 6th I went to the office and proceeded upstairs. Then when I was upstairs we met, Lorenzo and I,
upstairs and he followed up (sic) and then he told me it is all finished. So, I said then I asked him, ‘What
about the rattan?’ because we have to look for rattan. Then he followed me to my office and then I sat
down my office and he sat in one of the chairs and he said, will go to Sto. Nono (sic) because I am going
to confess. Because I feel bad. That is the way when you have killed. This afternoon I will go to Sto. Niño
tp (sic) confess.’"
Based on the above, appellant was assumed to have killed Mercado in the morning of February 6, 1987.
However, this was contradicted by Banzon: 48
Q. That was February 5 in the evening. On February 6, 1987 in the morning do you recall any unusual
incident that happened?
A. Yes, sir. On the following day that was February 6, I was already on duty at 8:00 o’clock and after a
while he (appellant) about 9:00 o’clock Lorenzo Pedorsa (sic) passed and I asked him, ‘Boss, is the man
still there?’ and he said, ‘Yes.’(sic) because Boy Saragoza did not come back for him.’
Q. What else transpired in your conversation?
A. I asked if it is not dangerous for him and he said it is not.
Q. What else transpired?
x x x
Q. Was there any other unusual incident that happened in the evening of February 6?
A. I don’t know anything.
Q. How about the following day, February 7, 1987, do you recall anything unusual that happened?
A. On February 7 when I was on duty again Lorenzo passed by about 9:00 o’clock in the guardhouse. And
then I asked Lorenzo what happened to him, and he said, ‘I had already disposed of him.’ And I said,
What ‘happened to your arm? There is showing that it was bitten by human teeth.’"
This Court cannot rest easy with this discrepancy. Such glaring and material inconsistency creates a
reasonable doubt whether it was appellant himself who took Mercado, the victim, out of the GF
premises and consummated the killing.
The two testimonies are clearly inconsistent. It is possible to conjecture that the victim was killed
between the time when Banzon spoke with Appellant Reyes that morning of February 6, 1987 about
9:00 a.m. and the time when appellant told Dr. Ceniza that he would go to confession in the afternoon
of that day because he felt guilty about having killed the victim. However, we find this thought difficult
to accept, because the prosecution failed to establish the time when Dr. Ceniza talked to appellant.
Furthermore, from the supposition of the prosecution, it would follow that the victim was killed inside
the GF premises and that, after office hours, the body was transported from the premises with the use
of the Datsun. It is undisputed, however, that a spent .45 caliber shell was found beside the body,
indicating that the victim was shot in the place where his body was found, i.e., outside the GF premises.
Clearly, there are unexplained missing links in the prosecution account. Where was the victim killed?
Inside or outside the GF premises? Was he dead or alive when his body was taken out of the premises?
Who took the victim out of the GF premises? Was the Datsun pickup used in transporting the victim
from the premises? Where was appellant between the time he talked to Banzon and the time he talked
to Dr. Ceniza on February 6, 1987? Who actually killed Mercado?
In the light of these unexplained questions, the trial court erred in nonetheless holding that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution shows, beyond moral certainty, that appellant
was guilty of murder. In so doing, the lower court transgressed the basic rule that "when the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence, in view of
the constitutional presumption of innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus
insufficient to support a conviction." 49 Parenthetically, when the prosecution’s case is anchored only
on circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty of the crime sought to be proven, and no other. In addition, the circumstances under
consideration must not support any rational hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused.
50 Consequently, appellant may not be held criminally liable for killing the victim.
Kidnapping Was Sufficiently Proven
The trial court did not find appellant liable for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code on the ground that the period of detention was less than five days: This Court, however,
finds that the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently proves beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code. Article 268 of the Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 268. Slight illegal detention. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any
private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding article without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated therein. The same penalty shall be incurred by
anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of the crime.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three days from the
commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose intended, and before the
institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine not exceeding 700 pesos."cralaw virtua1aw library
The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by the trial court, clearly established
that appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority to do so. Banzon testified that he
witnessed the victim hanging by the arms in appellant’s room. Banzon’s testimony significantly jibes
with the physical evidence showing that the victim sustained multiple abrasions in both arms. 51
Furthermore, Dr. Ceniza narrated that several employees called her up in the morning of February 5,
1987 asking for permission to go home, because there was a "man hanging at the back in one of the
buildings of GF International." 52 Dr. Ceniza’s testimony was urrebutted. All these ineludibly prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was deprived of his liberty by Appellant.
It must be emphasized that appellant was charged with the special complex crime of kidnapping with
murder, not of two independent charges of kidnapping and murder. "In a complex crime, although two
or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as
in the conscience of the offender." 53 Hence, in deciding this appeal, the Court is not confined to the
conviction for murder; rather, the scope of its review encompasses the offense charged in the
information, which the prosecution sought to prove. It is a well-settled doctrine that an appeal "throws
the whole case wide open for review and empowers (even obligates) the appellate court to correct such
errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if they have not been assigned." 54 When an
accused appeals, he stands for a new trial of the whole case. 55 Since the information charged the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder, the acts constituting slight illegal detention were necessarily
included in the information, and may thus be validly taken into account in the resolution of the present
appeal. Manifestly, appellant was fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of slight illegal detention and
granted a fair opportunity to defend himself. At this juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the
trial court merely made a finding that appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal detention for
the sole reason that the victim’s detention did not exceed five days. 56 The court a quo, however, found
that appellant illegally detained the victim for at least one day, 57 which act by itself constitutes slight
illegal detention. Besides, the trial court appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a
qualifying circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no proof beyond
reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records indisputably prove culpability for slight
illegal detention.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant Judy Reyes is hereby CONVICTED of
slight illegal detention and SENTENCED to the intermediate penalty of ten years of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
He is acquitted of murder. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Penned by Judge Jose P. Burgos.
2. Rollo, pp. 15-26.
3. Rollo, p. 5.
4. Rodolfo V. Perez.
5. It was not proven that Bienvenido Mercado, after being shot "through and through" his head, was still
able to survive a few days after the shooting.
6. Record, p. 54.
7. Ibid., pp. 13-19.
8. Ibid., p. 77.
9. Record, p. 95.
10. Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center located at Lahug, Cebu City.
11. Husband of one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Dr. Jovita Ceniza.
12. Record, pp. 96-97.
13. Rollo, pp. 25-26.
14. Record, p. 269.
15. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 122.
16. Rollo, p. 2.
17. The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by this Court on February 6, 1996 of the
confirmation of appellant’s confinement at the NBP.
18. Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 126-127.
19. Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 19.
20. TSN, November 24, 1987, pp. 33-35.
21. Appellant’s Brief filed by Atty. Bert M. Vega, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 58-59.
23. Ibid., pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 25-26.
24. People v. So, 247 SCRA 708, 716, August 28, 1995, per Kapunan, J .
25. People v. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 405, 410-411, August 7, 1990, per Cruz, J .
26. Records, p. 165.
27. Ibid., p. 156.
28. Rollo, pp. 62-63.
29. TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 26.

30. Rollo, p. 63.
31. Ibid., p. 68.
32. TSN, November 24, 1987, pp. 26-28.
33. TSN, December 7, 1987, pp. 25-26.
34. People v. Ballagan, 247 SCRA 535, 547, August 23, 1995, per Romero, J .
35. People v. Palomar, G.R. No. 108183-85, p. 18, August 21, 1997, per Panganiban, J., citing People v.
Acuña, 248 SCRA 668, 667, October 2, 1995, per Romero, J .
36. People v. Mendoza, 236 SCRA 666, 673, September 22, 1994, per Regalado, J .
37. Rollo, pp. 63-64.
38. Ibid., pp. 70-71.
39. Rollo, p. 67.
40. See People v. Paguntalan, 242 SCRA 753, 779, March 27, 1995, per Melo, J.
41. People v. Fulinara, 247 SCRA 28, 43-44, August 3, 1995, per Romero, J .
42. Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
43. People v. Binamira, G.R. No. 110397, pp. 17-18, August 14, 1997, per Panganiban, J; citing People v.
Adofina, 239 SCRA 67, 76-77, December 8, 1994. See also People v. Payawal, 247 SCRA 424, 431, August
16, 1995, per Vitug, J .
44. TSN, December 7, 1987, p. 28.
45. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 15-16; rollo, pp. 68-69.
46. Rollo, pp. 68-69.
47. TSN, December 7, 1987, pp. 27-28.
48. TSN, November 24, 1987, pp. 29-33.
49. People v. Agustin, 246 SCRA 673, 681, July 18, 1995, per Regalado, J .
50. See People v. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37, 44, March 29, 1995, per Quiason, J .
51. See testimony of Dr. Romeo Pregado who conducted the post mortem examination on the
deceased, TSN, p. 6, November 24, 1987.
52. See TSN, pp. 20-21, December 7, 1987.
53. Reyes, J., The Revised Penal Code, p. 653, Book One (1993).
54. People v. Alejandro, 225 SCRA 347, 350 August 17, 1993, per Cruz, J .
55. Francisco, Rules on Criminal Procedure, p. 496.
57. Ibid.
59. Maquiran vs. Judge Lopez, A.M.-RTJ-00-1606
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1606. June 20, 2001]
PATRIA MAQUIRAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay
City, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for gross negligence filed by Patria Maquiran against Judge Lilia C.
Lopez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City.
It appears that on August 31, 1990, complainant Patria Maquiran filed a suit for damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. 7548, arising from the death of her husband due to an accident. The case, entitled Heirs of
Pablo Maquiran and Jean Castillo v. Manila Aero Transport System, Inc., Captain Anastacio Maravilla
and Maria Basilonia So, was assigned to respondent judge. The case was submitted for decision in
August 1994 after the parties had submitted their memoranda. On March 25, 1996, counsel for
complainant moved for the resolution of the case.[1] However, up to the time the complaint in this case
was filed on September 16, 1999, no decision had as yet been rendered by respondent judge.
In her comment, dated January 10, 2000, respondent judge claimed that she had finally decided the case
and given copies of the decision to the parties. She explained that during the almost five years that the
case was pending decision, many things had happened to her: that she was confined in the hospital and
was scheduled for an operation for the removal of a mass in her uterus, but for her extremely high
blood pressure; that her parents died and she was left with the responsibility of having to take care of
her retardate sister and a brother who was suffering from a nervous breakdown; that as Executive
Judge, she was given additional administrative duties; and that she had to conduct continuous hearings
by reason of the designation of her court as a Special Criminal Court.
The Office of the Court Administrator found respondent administratively liable and recommended that
she be ordered to pay a fine of P4,000.00 for inefficiency with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Except as to the penalty recommended, we find the report of the OCA well taken.
Under Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution, lower courts have three months within which to decide cases
or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution.Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required
period. Indeed, this Court has constantly impressed upon judges may it not be said without success the
need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice
denied. For delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary. Hence, failure of judges to render judgment within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on them.[2]
This is not the first time respondent judge is being sanctioned for failure to decide a case within the time
for doing so. In Dizon v. Lopez,[3] she was found guilty of delay in the decision of a case and inefficiency,
thus:
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was promulgated with the reading of the
dispositive portion, her decision was already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the process of
preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its promulgation. Respondent judge
states that after the dispositive portion had been read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma.
Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II, presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text
of the decision. The court found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of private
document under Art. 172, par 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in
furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision was unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing her decision and to a series of personal
problems which contributed to this delay in the release of her decision, to wit: she has only two (2)
stenographers to attend to daily trials in her court, making it necessary for her to make use of the Social
Worker assigned to her to type her decisions. During the period January to December 1993, she had to
dispose of 285 cases, apart from the fact that there was an unusually big number of criminal, civil, and
land registration cases as well as special proceedings filed in her court which required the holding of
hearings in the mornings and in the afternoons. During the same period, she went through some
personal tragedies. She lost her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she had raised from childhood, due to
a hospital accident. This was followed by the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother, Margarita Lopez,
who had been under respondents care for the past eight years after suffering a stroke. On September
17, 1993, respondents father died of diabetes, a renal failure, pneumonia, and cardiac
arrest. Respondent was the one who single-handedly brought them in and out of the hospital because
all her able-bodied relatives are abroad. Respondent herself was found to be suffering from diabetes
and hypertension, necessitating her treatment and leave of absence from September 27, 1994 to
December 12, 1994, in addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from these, respondents family
suffered financial reverses because of estafa committed against them.[4]
Considering that the case was respondents first one and that her failure to decide the case on time was
occasioned by the death of her parents, financial reverses of the family, and respondents poor
health factors which this Court considered mitigating respondent was simply given a reprimand and a
warning:
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been read in open court on April 22,
1993 was to incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see
why it took respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was able to do
so. Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out her decision by a series of personal and
other problems which leads the Court to believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had not
finished the preparation of the entire decision. At all events, she could have applied for extension of
time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of judgment until she had finished it.[5]
However, respondent judge was again found administratively liable in Ricafranca, Jr. v. Lopez,[6] for
failure to decide a case until five years after it was submitted for resolution. It is noteworthy that her
excuse is the same one given in this case, to wit:
That on or about those dates, the undersigned was in and out of the hospital for the removal of a mass
on both (sic) her uterus and in fact was scheduled for operation several times and was rolled in and out
of the operating table (sic) five (5) times only to be brought out of the operating room upon advice of
her cardiologist because of extremely high blood pressure.
Likewise, on or about said times, she lost both her parents and had to take care of her handicapped
sister (a retardate) and a brother (who is suffering from a nervous breakdown and always lost his way)
and the undersigned single-handedly has to look for him at least (sic) he dies of hunger and exposure to
the elements, thus even aggravating further her health condition.
Additionally, she was designated as one of the Special Criminal Courts and lately as the only Family
Court continuously hearing cases mornings and afternoons not to mention her administrative duties as a
former executive judge and representing courts in other official functions.[7]
While again noting respondents predicament in mitigation of her liability, this Court imposed on her a
fine of P5,000.00. This Court said:
We note that this is not the first time that an administrative case was filed against respondent judge for
delay in deciding a case pending before her sala. In 1997, in the case of Dizon v. Lopez, the Court
reprimanded respondent judge for a similar offense. Nonetheless, we also note, as in the case of Dizon,
that there were factors beyond the control of respondent that prevented her from giving her full
attention to her official duties and responsibilities at the time. Aside from the fact that she was afflicted
with a grave illness, she also had to take care of her sister and brother who were both suffering some
disability. Although these do not justify her failure, they nonetheless serve to mitigate her culpability. In
the light of these circumstances, we hold that the imposition of a fine of five thousand pesos upon
respondent judge is just and reasonable.[8]
The reasons adduced by respondent judge for her failure to decide Civil Case No. 7548 for a period of
five years is unsatisfactory. While respondent judge claimed that she had decided the case and had in
fact furnished the parties copies of the same, she did not state when she had done so. It would appear
that she did so only shortly before she filed her comment on the complaint in this case on January 10,
2000, after a delay of more than five years. Hence, her excuse. Although we are inclined to be
compassionate, respondent must realize that compassion has its limits. After all, respondent could have
asked for time within which to decide cases, although not for such a long time as five years. Then, too,
she could have gone on sick leave. But for her not to decide a case for five years cannot be wholly
excused. A heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the reglementary period,
but not her failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the case on time.[9]
Respondent likewise blames her failure to decide Civil Case No. 7548 on her administrative duties as
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City and the fact that she was required to conduct
continuous trials because her court had been designated a Special Criminal Court. However, she could
have declined her designation as Executive Judge. She could also have asked to be relieved of her other
duties. But she never did so.
WHEREFORE, a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) is imposed on respondent Judge
Lilia C. Lopez for delay in deciding Civil Case No. 7548 with warning that repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Annex A of Complaint.
[2]
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Brs. 29, 56, & 57, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, 316 SCRA
272 (1999).
[3]
278 SCRA 483 (1997).
[4]
Id. at 486-487.
[5]
Id. at 488-489.
[6]
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1583, November 15, 2000.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Adao v. Lorenzo, 316 SCRA 570 (1999); Request of Judge Irma Zira V. Masamayor, RTC-Branch 52,
Talibon, Bohol for Extension of Time to Decide Criminal Case No. 96-185, A.M. No. 99-1-16-RTC, 308
SCRA 553 (1999).
60. RE: Problem of Delays in Cases before the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC (November 28, 2001)
EN BANC
[A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC. November 28, 2001]
RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN.

RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
Submitted to the Court for consideration is a resolution of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereafter, the IBP) recommending an inquiry into the causes of delays in the resolution of
incidents and motions and in the decision of cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.
The Antecedents
On July 31, 2000, the IBP, through its National President, Arthur D. Lim, transmitted to the Court a
Resolution[1] addressing the problem of delays in cases pending before the Sandiganbayan (hereafter,
the Resolution).[2] We quote the Resolution in full:[3]
WHEREAS, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution guarantees that, [a]ll persons shall have the right to
a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies,
WHEREAS, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers mandates that [a] lawyer
shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice;
WHEREAS, it is the duty of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to undertake measures to assist in the
speedy disposition of cases pending before the various courts and tribunals;
WHEREAS, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has received numerous complaints from its members
about serious delays in the decision of cases and in the resolution of motions and other pending
incidents before the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 requires all Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to submit to the
Supreme Court a bi-annual report indicating the title of the case, its date of filing, the date of pre-trial in
civil cases and arraignment in criminal cases, the date of initial trial, the date of last hearing and the date
that the case is submitted for decision, and to post, in a conspicuous place within its premises, a
monthly list of cases submitted for decision;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 has not been made applicable to the
Sandiganbayan;
WHEREAS, considering that the Sandiganbayan is also a trial court, the requirements imposed upon trial
courts by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 should also be imposed upon the
Sandiganbayan;
NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines hereby resolves as follows:
1. To recommend to the Supreme Court that Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 be made
applicable to the Sandiganbayan in regard cases over which the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction;
and
2. To recommend to the Supreme Court an inquiry into the causes of delay in the resolution of incidents
and motions and in the decision of cases before the Sandiganbayan for the purpose of enacting
measures intended at avoiding such delays.
Done in Los Baos, Laguna, this 29th day of July, 2000.
On August 8, 2000, the Court required Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena to
comment on the letter of the IBP and to submit a list of all Sandiganbayan cases pending decision, or
with motion for reconsideration pending resolution, indicating the dates they were deemed submitted
for decision or resolution.[4]
On September 27, 2000, complying with the order, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena submitted a
report[5] (hereafter, the compliance) admitting a number of cases submitted for decision and motion for
reconsideration pending resolution before its divisions. We quote:
Cases Submitted W/ Motions For
For Decision Reconsideration
1st Division 341 None
2nd Division 5 None
3rd Division 12 None
4th Division 5 None
5th Division 52 1
Total 415[6]
Thus, the Sandiganbayan has a total of four hundred fifteen (415) cases for decision remaining
undecided long beyond the reglementary period to decide, with one case submitted as early as May 24,
1990,[7] and motion for reconsideration which has remained unresolved over thirty days from
submission.[8]
On October 20, 2000, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena submitted a schedule of
cases submitted for decision, the schedule indicating the number of detained prisoners, of which there
are (were) none.[9]
On October 26, 2000, the IBP submitted its reply to the compliance stating: First, that it was not in a
position to comment on the accuracy of the compliance; nonetheless, it showed that there was much to
be desired with regard to the expeditious disposition of cases, particularly in the Sandiganbayans First
Division, where cases submitted for decision since 1990 remained unresolved. Second, the compliance
did not include pending motions, and it is a fact that motions not resolved over a long period of time
would suspend and delay the disposition of a case. Third, since the Sandiganbayan is a trial court, it is
required to submit the same reports required of Regional Trial Courts. Fourth, the Constitution[10]states
that, all lower collegiate courts must decide or resolve cases or matters before it within twelve (12)
months from date of submission; however, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is required to resolve
and decide cases within a reduced period of three (3) months like regional trial courts, or at the most, six
(6) months from date of submission.[11]
On November 21, 2000, the Court resolved to direct then Court Administrator Alfredo L.
Benipayo (hereafter, the OCA) to conduct a judicial audit of the Sandiganbayan, especially on the cases
subject of this administrative matter, and to submit a report thereon not later than 31 December
2000.[12]
On December 4, 2000, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
admitted that the First Division of the Sandiganbayan[13] has a backlog of cases; that one
case[14] alone made the backlog of the First Division so large, involving 156 cases but the same has been
set for promulgation of decision on December 8, 2000, which would reduce the backlog by at least fifty
percent (50%).[15]
On January 26, 2001, the Court Administrator submitted a memorandum to the Court[16] stating that the
causes of delay in the disposition of cases before the Sandiganbayan are:[17]
(1) Failure of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to submit reinvestigation report despite the lapse of
several years;
(2) Filing of numerous incidents such as Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash, Demurrer to Evidence, etc.
that remain unresolved for years;
(3) Suspension of proceedings because of a pending petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Supreme Court;
(4) Cases remain unacted upon or have no further settings despite the lapse of considerable length of
time; and
(5) Unloading of cases already submitted for decision even if the ponente is still in service.
We consider ex mero motu the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as an
administrative complaint against Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena for serious delays in the
decision of cases and in the resolution of motions and other pending incidents before the different
divisions of the Sandiganbayan, amounting to incompetence, inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and
misconduct in office.
We find no need to conduct a formal investigation of the charges in view of the admission of Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena in his compliance of October 20, 2000, that there are indeed hundreds of cases
pending decision beyond the reglementary period of ninety (90) days from their submission. In one case,
he not only admitted the delay in deciding the case but took sole responsibility for such inaction for
more than ten (10) years that constrained this Court to grant mandamus to dismiss the case against an
accused to give substance and meaning to his constitutional right to speedy trial.[18]
The Issues
The issues presented are the following: (1) What is the reglementary period within which the
Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction? (2) Are there cases submitted
for decision remaining undecided by the Sandiganbayan or any of its divisions beyond the afore-stated
reglementary period? (3) Is Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1094 applicable to the
Sandiganbayan?[19]
The Courts Ruling

We resolve the issues presented in seriatim.
1. Period To Decide/Resolve Cases.-- There are two views. The first view is that from the time a case is
submitted for decision or resolution, the Sandiganbayan has twelve (12) months to decide or resolve
it.[20] The second view is that as a court with trial function, the Sandiganbayan has three (3) months to
decide the case from the date of submission for decision.[21]
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission to the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced
by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other
lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.[22]
The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The provision refers to regular courts of
lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals.[23]
The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the
inherent powers of a court of justice,[24] with functions of a trial court.[25]
Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one.[26] The Sandiganbayan was originally
empowered to promulgate its own rules of procedure.[27]However, on March 30, 1995, Congress
repealed the Sandiganbayans power to promulgate its own rules of procedure[28] and instead prescribed
that the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed
with the Sandiganbayan.[29]
Special courts are judicial tribunals exercising limited jurisdiction over particular or specialized
categories of actions. They are the Court of Tax Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Sharia Courts.[30]
Under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
In his report, the Court Administrator would distinguish between cases which the Sandiganbayan has
cognizance of in its original jurisdiction,[31] and cases which fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.[32] The Court Administrator posits that since in the first class of cases, the
Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial court, then for that classification of cases, the three (3) month
reglementary period applies. For the second class of cases, the Sandiganbayan has the twelve-month
reglementary period for collegiate courts.[33] We do not agree.
The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606[34] is clear on this issue.[35] It provides:
Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases As far as practicable, the trial of cases before the
Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until terminated and the judgment shall be
rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision.
On September 18, 1984, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its own rules,[36] thus:[37]
Sec. 3 Maximum Period to Decide Cases The judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan
shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for
decision (underscoring ours).
Given the clarity of the rule that does not distinguish, we hold that the three (3) month period, not the
twelve (12) month period, to decide cases applies to the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the
Sandiganbayan presently sitting in five (5) divisions,[38] functions as a trial court. The term trial is used in
its broad sense, meaning, it allows introduction of evidence by the parties in the cases before it.[39] The
Sandiganbayan, in original cases within its jurisdiction, conducts trials, has the discretion to weigh the
evidence of the parties, admit the evidence it regards as credible and reject that which they consider
perjurious or fabricated.[40]
Compliance with its Own Rules
In Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) v. Court of Appeals,[41] the Court faulted
the DARAB for violating its own rules of procedure. We reasoned that the DARAB does not have
unfettered discretion to suspend its own rules. We stated that the DARAB should have set the example
of observance of orderly procedure. Otherwise, it would render its own Revised Rules of Procedure
uncertain and whose permanence would be dependent upon the instability of its own whims and
caprices.
Similarly, in Cabagnot v. Comelec,[42] this Court held that the Commission on Elections ought to be the
first one to observe its own Rules. Its departure from its own rules constitutes arrogance of power
tantamount to abuse. Such inconsistency denigrates public trust in its objectivity and
dependability. The Court reminded the Comelec to be more judicious in its actions and decisions and
avoid imprudent volte-face moves that undermine the public's faith and confidence in it.
The ratio decidendi in the afore-cited cases applies mutatis mutandis to the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan ought to be the first to observe its own rules. It cannot suspend its rules, or except a
case from its operation.
2. Undecided Cases Beyond the Reglementary Period.-- We find that the Sandiganbayan has several
cases undecided beyond the reglementary period set by the statutes and its own rules, some as long as
more than ten (10) years ago.
According to the compliance submitted by the Sandiganbayan, three hundred and forty one (341) cases
were submitted for decision but were undecided as of September 15, 2000. A number of the cases were
submitted for decision as far back as more than ten (10) years ago. As of September 15, 2000, the
following cases[43] had not been decided:[44]
First Division
Case Title Case No. Date Submitted for

Decision
(1) People v. Paares 12127 May 24, 1990

(2) People v. Gabriel 11999 December 11, 1990
Duero
(3) People v. 133533 December 14, 1990

RhizaMonterozo
(4) People v. Zenon 13353 January 7, 1991

R. Perez
(5) People v. Bernardo 12305-12306 February 7, 1991

B. Dayao, Jr.
(6) People v. 13521 May 7, 1991

Melquiades Ribo
(7) People v. Carlos 12102 June 19, 1991

Benitez
(8) People v. Salvador 11156-11160 August 9, 1991

P. Nopre, et. al.
(9) People v. Delfina 12289 August 28, 1991

A. Letegio
(10) People v. Rodolfo 13618 August 28, 1991

A. Lasquite
(11) People v. 13679-13680 September 3, 1991

Potenciana Evangelista
(12) People v. Ramon 16516 December 2, 1991

N. Guico, Jr. et. al
(13) People v. Ruperto 16239 January 10, 1992

N. Solares
(14) People v. Socorro 13708 March 9, 1992

Alto
(15) People v. 130151 March 11, 1992

TomasBaguio
(16) People v. Felipa D. 13672 April 13, 1992

de Veyra
(17) People v. 12139 July 23, 1992

Felicidad Tabang
(18) People v. Jose 14227 September 9, 1992

S. Buguia
(19) People v. Eleno T. 13689-13695 January 6, 1993
Regidor, et al.
(20) People v. 14411 February 2, 1993

Serafin Unilongo
(21) People v. 15168 June 21, 1993

Manuel Parale, et al.
(22) People v. Robert 14375 June 21, 1993

P. Wa-acon
(23) People v. Linda J. 13668 July 13, 1993

Necessito
(24) People v. Simon 16946 August 4, 1993

Flores
(25) People v. 14986 August 31, 1993

Alejandro F. Buccat
(26) People v. 15301 March 9, 1994

IrmaCollera Monge
(27) People v. 9977 May 10, 1994

Melencio F. Ilajas
(28) People 13747-13748 August 19, 1994

v.Buenaventura
Q.Sindac, et al.
(29) People v. Jesus A. 17514 August 24, 1994

Bravo
(30) People v. Raul S. 15006 November 15, 1994

Tello
(31) People v. Celso 14975 January 10, 1995

N. Jacinto
(32) People v. 17670 January 24, 1995

MayorAntonio Abad
Santos, et al.

Lamberto R. Te
(34) People v. 21020 July 18, 1995

AleFrancisco
(35) People v. Dir. Felix 13563 July 25, 1995
R. Gonzales, et al.
(36) People v. 14324 January 3, 1996

MayorAdelina
Gabatan, et al.
(37) People v. 17202 January 4, 1996

Victoria Posadas-
Adona
(38) People v. Roberto 16854 January 22, 1996

Estanislao Chang, et al.
(39) People v. 16927-16928 March 13, 1996

Godofredo Yambao, et
al.
(40) People v. Honesto 13171 April 26, 1996

G. Encina
(41) People v. 13971 May 10, 1996

Pablito Rodriguez
(42) People v. Leandro 17759 June 28, 1996

A. Suller
(43) People v. Trinidad 16695 August 26, 1996

M. Valdez
(44) People v. Vivencio 19651 January 27, 1997

B. Patagoc
(45) People v. 14195 March 31, 1997

Engr.Antonio B.
Laguador
(46) People v. Paterno 16583-16585 March 31, 1997

C. Belcia, Jr.
(47) People v. 21608 March 31, 1997

SPO3Serafin V. Reyes
(48) People v. 22195-22196 March 31, 1997

MayorSamuel F.
Bueser, et al.
(49) People v. Romeo 14223 May 6, 1997

C. Monteclaro
(50) People v. Rodolfo 20948-20949 October 17, 1997
E.Aguinaldo
(51) People v. Aniceto 23324 October 27, 1997

M. Sobrepea
(52) People v. Marietta 17001 November 26, 1997

T. Caugma, et al.

MayorMeliton
Geronimo, et al.
(54) People v. 17600 April 7, 1998

Fernando Miguel, et
al.
(55) People v. Rogelio 17601 April 7, 1998

A. Aniversario
(56) People v. Corazon 9812-9967 May 8, 1998

Gammad Leao
(57) People v. Teresita 17901 June 8, 1998

S. Lazaro
(58) People v. Brig. 20688 October 19, 1998

Gen. Raymundo
Jarque, et al.
(59) People v. Pros. 23509 October 19, 1998

Filotea Estorninos
(60) People v. Orlando 19534-19545 October 20, 1998

Mina
(61) People v. Vice 23042 October 20, 1998

Gov. Milagros A.
Balgos
(62) People v. Ceferino 18857 November 17, 1998

Paredes, Jr., et al.
(63) People v. Brig. 18696 January 15, 1999

Gen. Rayundo Jarque,
et al.
(64) People v. 23336 January 15, 1999
MayorAgustin R.
Escao, Jr.
(65) People v. 23374 January 15, 1999

MayorEdgar V. Teves,
et al.
(66) People v. 22832 January 29, 1999

C/Supt. Alfonso T.
Clemente, et al.
(67) People v. 19059-19063 February 18, 1999

Dominica Santos
(68) People v. Edith G. 23273 April 20, 1999

Tico
(69) People v. 23511 August 6, 1999

Sec.Hilarion J. Ramiro,
et al.
(70) People v. Timoteo 24042-24098 August 6, 1999

A. Garcia, et al.
(71) People v. Mayor 24402 August 6, 1999

Jeceju L. Manaay
(72) People v. 24355 August 18, 1999

Dir.Rosalinda Majarais,
et al.
(73) People v. Victor S. 24281 August 13, 1999

Limlingan
(74) People v. Nestor 24631 August 31, 1999

S. Castillo, et al.
(75) People v. 22145 September 6, 1999

Apolinar Candelaria
(76) People v. 19773-19779 October 11, 1999

Bernardo Billote
Resoso
(77) People v. 24433-24434 October 11, 1999

Atty.Alfredo Fordan
Rellora, et al.
(78) People v. Faustino 98 December 22, 1999
Balacuit
(79) People v. 23418-23423 January 6, 2000

MayorBernardino
Alcaria, Jr., et al.
(80) People v. Joel 24319-24329 January 6, 2000

R.Lachica, et al.
(81) People v. 24531-24534 April 27, 2000

JoseMicabalo, et al.
(82) People v. 23069 May 29, 2000

MayorEduardo Alarilla
(83) People v. Pros. 23323 May 29, 2000

Nilo M. Sarsaba, et al.
(84) People v. Philip G. 24150 May 29, 2000

Zamora
Second Division*

Decision
(1) People v. Marcelino Cordova, et 18435 August 11, 2000

al.
(2) People v. Benjamin T.Damian 22858 August 11, 2000
(3)People v. Lino L. Labis, et al. 22398 July 18, 2000
(4)People v. Alfredo Sarmiento, et 24407-24408 August 11, 2000

al.
Third Division**

Decision
(1) People v. Sergia Zoleta A/R # 016 November 16, 1999
(2) People v. Manuel Solon Y A/R # 029 December 9, 1999

Tenchaves
(3) People v. Eliseo L. Ruiz 13861-13863 April 6, 2000
(4) People v. Manuel R. Galvez, et 13889 September 30, 1999

al.
(5) People v. Tolentino Mendoza, et 16756 August 28, 1999
al.
(6) People v. Rodrigo Villas 19563 April 6, 2000
(7) People v. Ernesto Vargas 19574 April 6, 2000
(8) People v. Ernesto, Vargas, et al. 20053 April 6, 2000
(9) People v. Marcelo T.Abrenica, et 23522 July 6, 2000

al.
(10) People v. Florencio Garay, et 25657 May 5, 2000

al.
Fourth Division***

Decision
(1) People v. Jaime Alos, et Al. 17664 August 31, 1999
(2) People v. Antonio R. De Vera 23366 November 26, 1999
(3) People v. Aurora Mantele 24841-42 May 9, 2000
(4) People v. Olegario Clarin, Jr., et 25198 July 12, 2000

al.
Fifth Division****

Decision
(1) People v. Nestor A. Pablo 13344 January 16, 1998
(2) People v. Hernand D.Dabalus, et 14397 January 13, 1999

al.
(3) People v. Eduardo Pilapil 16672 March 23, 2000
(4) People v. P/Sgt. Nazario 17030 April 16, 1998

Marifosque
(5) People v. Ignacio B. Bueno 17055 September 12, 1995
(6) People v. Corazon G. Garlit 17072 March 31, 1997
(7) People v. Mayor RufoPabelonia, 17538 November 14, 1995

et al.
(8) People v. Enrique B. Lenon, et 17617 March 13, 1996
al.
(9) People v. Constancio Bonite, et 17618-17619 May 1, 1995

al.
(10) People v. Jesus Villanueva 17884 January 9, 1996
(11) People v. Ricardo T.Liwanag, et 18008 March 9, 1998

al.
(12) People v. Ma. Lourdes L. Falcon 18036 January 18, 1995
(13) People v. Luis D. Montero, et 18684 July 24, 1998

al.
(14) People v. Roel D. Morales 18699 December 22, 1995
(15) People v. Diosdado T. Gulle 18759 October 18, 1995
(16) People v. Benjamin Sapitula, et 18785 August 31, 1995

al.
(17) People v. Danilo R. Santos, et 18932 November 4, 1997

al.
(18) People v. Pat. DaniloMaraon 19039 May 24, 1995
(19) People v. Romeo Cabando, et 19378-19379 May 27, 1996

al.
(20) People v. SPO2 Rodolfo Burbos 19593 July 6, 1998
(21) People v. Guillermo M. Viray, 19614 August 31, 1998

et al.
(22) People v. Mayor Bonifacio 20427 November 5, 1999

Balahay
(23) People v. Enrique Sy, et al. 20487 December 17, 1998
(24) People v. PO2 Manuel L. Bien 20648-20649 March 31, 1998
(25) People v. Felipe L. Laodenio 23066 September 28, 1999
(26) People v. Mayor Walfrido A. 23427 January 16, 1998

Siasico
The Sandiganbayan is a special court created in an effort to maintain honesty and efficiency in the
bureaucracy, weed out misfits and undesirables in the government and eventually stamp out graft and
corruption.45 We have held consistently that a delay of three (3) years in deciding a single case is
inexcusably long.46We can not accept the excuses of Presiding Justice Sandiganbayan Francis E.
Garchitorena that the court was reorganized in 1997; that the new justices had to undergo an
orientation and that the Sandiganbayan relocated to its present premises which required the packing
and crating of records; and that some boxes were still unopened.47
We likewise find unacceptable Presiding Justice Garchitorenas excuse that one case alone48 comprises
more that fifty percent (50%) of the First Divisions backlog and that the same has been set for
promulgation on December 8, 2000.49 As we said, a delay in a single case cannot be
tolerated, para muestra, basta unboton. (for an example, one button suffices). It is admitted that there
are several other cases submitted for decision as far back as ten (10) years ago that have remained
undecided by the First Division, of which Justice Garchitorena is presiding justice and chairman. Indeed,
there is even one case, which is a simple motion to withdraw the information filed by the
prosecutor. This has remained unresolved for more than seven (7) years (since 1994).50 The compliance
submitted by the Sandiganbayan presiding justice incriminates him. The memorandum submitted by the
Court Administrator likewise testifies to the unacceptable situation in the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, there
is a disparity in the reports submitted by the Sandiganbayan presiding justice and the OCA. According to
the Court Administrator, the cases submitted for decision that were still pending promulgation51 before
the five divisions of the Sandiganbayan are:52
First Division
Case Date
Number Submitted
Criminal Cases
1. 11156 8/9/91
2. 11157 8/9/91
3. 11158 8/9/91
4. 11159 8/9/91
5. 11160 8/9/91
6. 11999 12/10/90
7. 12102 7/1/91
8. 12127 2/12/90
9. 12139 6/10/92
10. 12289 8/28/91
11. 12305 2/7/91
12. 12306 2/7/91
13. 13015 3/2/92

14. 13171 11/16/95
15. 13353 10/6/90
16. 13521 12/12/99
17. 13563 7/4/95
18. 13618 7/14/91
19. 13668 6/13/93
20. 13672 3/5/92
21. 13679 8/6/91
22. 13680 8/6/91
23. 13689 11/14/92
24. 13690 11/14/92
25. 13691 11/14/92
26. 13692 11/14/92
27. 13693 11/14/92
28. 13694 11/14/92
29. 13695 11/14/92
30. 13708 3/9/92
31. 13747 8/19/94
32. 13748 8/19/94
33. 13971 3/12/95
34. 14223 3/7/97
35. 14227 9/5/92
36. 14230 11/30/90
37. 14287 7/3/94
38. 14324 11/5/95
39. 14375 5/22/95
40. 14411 1/24/93

41. 14975 9/29/94
42. 14986 12/11/92
43. 15006 11/19/94
44. 15168 3/25/93
45. 15301 3/16/94
46. 16239 12/26/91
47. 16516 11/19/91
48. 16583 8/13/96
49. 16584 8/13/96
50. 16585 8/13/96
51. 16695 8/15/96
52. 16854 1/15/96
53. 16927 12/17/95
54. 16928 12/17/95
55. 16946 8/4/93
56. 17001 9/4/97
57. 17278 5/2/94
58. 17447 9/6/94
59. 17448 9/6/94
60. 17514 8/19/94
61. 17600 8/30/97
62. 17601 8/30/97
63. 17670 11/25/94
64. 17759 6/25/96
65. 17901 5/28/98
66. 18283 2/21/95
67. 18696 8/9/98

68. 18857 10/21/98
69. 19059 2/11/99
70. 19060 2/11/99
71. 19061 2/11/99
72. 19062 2/11/99
73. 19063 2/11/99
74. 19534 9/2/98
75. 19535 9/2/98
76. 19651 11/15/96
77. 19708 8/25/98
78. 19773 5/21/99
79. 19774 5/21/99
80. 19775 5/21/99
81. 19976 5/21/99
82. 19977 5/21/99
83. 19978 5/21/99
84. 19979 5/21/99
85. 20588 2/14/95
86. 20688 7/9/98
87. 20948 10/9/97
88. 20949 10/9/97
89. 21020 7/4/95
90. 22145 7/7/99
91. 22195 6/14/96
92. 22196 6/14/96
93. 22832 10/21/98
94. 23042 8/27/98

95. 23146 11/13/00
96. 23273 4/19/99
97. 23323 3/23/00
98. 23324 8/3/97
99. 23336 9/4/97
100. 23374 12/17/98
101. 23418 10/15/99
102. 23419 10/15/99
103. 23420 10/15/99
104. 23421 10/15/99
105. 23422 10/15/99
106. 23423 10/15/99
107. 23509 9/5/98
108. 23511 4/23/99
109. 23540 10/15/99
110. 24042 4/28/99
111. 24043 4/28/99
112. 24044 4/28/99
113. 24045 4/28/99
114. 24046 4/28/99
115. 24047 4/28/99
116. 24048 4/28/99
117. 24049 4/28/99
118. 24050 4/28/99
119. 24051 4/28/99
120. 24052 4/28/99
121. 24053 4/28/99

122. 24054 4/28/99
123. 24055 4/28/99
124. 24056 4/28/99
125. 24057 4/28/99
126. 24058 4/28/99
127. 24059 4/28/99
128. 24060 4/28/99
129. 24061 4/28/99
130. 24062 4/28/99
131. 24063 4/28/99
132. 24064 4/28/99
133. 24065 4/28/99
134. 24066 4/28/99
135. 24067 4/28/99
136. 24068 4/28/99
137. 24069 4/28/99
138. 24070 4/28/99
139. 24071 4/28/99
140. 24072 4/28/99
141. 24073 4/28/99
142. 24074 4/28/99
143. 24075 4/28/99
144. 24076 4/28/99
145. 24077 4/28/99
146. 24078 4/28/99
147. 24079 4/28/99
148. 24080 4/28/99

149. 24081 4/28/99
150. 24082 4/28/99
151. 24083 4/28/99
152. 24084 4/28/99
153. 24085 4/28/99
154. 24086 4/28/99
155. 24087 4/28/99
156. 24088 4/28/99
157. 24089 4/28/99
158. 24090 4/28/99
159. 24091 4/28/99
160. 24092 4/28/99
161. 24093 4/28/99
162. 24094 4/28/99
163. 24095 4/28/99
164. 24096 4/28/99
165. 24097 4/28/99
166. 24098 4/28/99
167. 24150 1/31/00
168. 24236 2/14/00
169. 24237 2/14/00
170. 24281 5/9/99
171. 24319 11/4/99
172. 24320 11/4/99
173. 24321 11/4/99
174. 24322 11/4/99
175. 24323 11/4/99

176. 24324 11/4/99
177. 24325 11/4/99
178. 24326 11/4/99
179. 24327 11/4/99
180. 24328 11/4/99
181. 24329 11/4/99
182. 24339 10/20/00
183. 24355 2/18/99
184. 24395 7/13/99
185. 24402 6/17/99
186. 24433 9/6/99
187. 24434 9/6/99
188. 24531 12/16/99
189. 24532 12/16/99
190. 24533 12/16/99
191. 24534 12/16/99
192. 24631 8/9/99
193. 24768 7/8/00
194. 6672 7/11/90
195. 9977 5/10/94

Civil Case
1. 0112 1/11/92
2. 0116 10/16/91
3. 0156 3/14/97
Second Division
Case No. Date

Submitted
Criminal Case
1. 19542 4/16/99
2. 19004 9/10/96
3. 22934 10/14/00
4. 20483 8/28/96
5. 20484 8/28/96
6. 23529 10/23/00
7. 23530 10/23/00
8. 23338 12/2/99
9. 18786 11/28/00
10. 19686 07/2/97
11. 184403 12/4/98
12. 184404 12/4/98
13. 184405 12/4/98
14. 184406 12/4/98
15. 184407 12/4/98
16. 184408 12/4/98
17. 184409 12/4/98
18. 184410 12/4/98
19. 184411 12/4/98
20. 184412 12/4/98
21. 184413 12/4/98
22. 184414 12/4/98
23. 184415 12/4/98
24. 184416 12/4/98
25. 184417 12/4/98
26. 13827 8/30/00
27. 13828 8/30/00

28. 13829 8/30/00
29. 13830 8/30/00
30. 13831 8/30/00
31. 13832 8/30/00
32. 18965 11/30/00
33. 19848 3/28/96
34. 20765 8/30/96
35. 20816 3/11/98
36. 19692 8/27/00
37. 19693 8/27/00
38. 19694 8/27/00
39. 19695 8/27/00
40. 19696 8/27/00
41. 19697 8/27/00
42. 19698 8/27/00
43. 19699 8/27/00
44. 19700 8/27/00
45. 19701 8/27/00
46. 19702 8/27/00
47. 19703 8/27/00
48. 19704 8/27/00
49. 19705 8/27/00
50. 19706 8/27/00
51. 19707 8/27/00
52. 23262 10/11/00
53. AR#035 12/9/00
54. 24994 8/17/00

55. 21097 12/13/00
56. 20660 12/20/00
57. 23111 11/27/00
58. 24407 7/27/00
59. 24408 7/27/00
60. 18435 3/21/00
61. 22858 8/4/00
62. 22976 5/4/99
Civil Case
1. 0171 7/10/00
Third Division
Case Date
Number Submitted
1.SCA/005 12/18/00
2.A/R 016 8/5/99
3.A/R 029 10/2/00
4.487 4/8/98
5.488 4/8/98
6.489 4/8/98
7.490 4/8/98
8.491 4/8/98
9.11794 6/10/00
10.13861 4/6/00
11. 13862 4/6/00
12. 13863 4/6/00
13. 13889 3/25/99
14. 16756 8/25/99
15. 17532 12/11/00

16. 18867 10/5/00
17. 18868 10/5/00
18. 18869 10/5/00
19. 18870 10/5/00
20. 18871 10/5/00
21. 18872 10/5/00
22. 19182 4/6/00
23. 19563 4/6/00
24. 19574 4/6/00
25. 19622 4/6/00
26. 19623 4/6/00
27. 19624 4/6/00
28. 20053 4/6/00
29. 20054 4/6/00
30. 20271 12/18/00
31. 22143 12/18/00
32. 23014 9/23/00
33. 23522 7/6/00
34. 23699 3/22/00
35. 23700 3/22/00
36. 23701 3/22/00
37. 23802 9/10/00
38. 23803 9/10/00
39. 24153 12/18/00
40. 24697 9/10/00
41. 24698 9/10/00
42. 24741 12/7/00

43. 24779 10/28/00
44. 24780 10/28/00
45. 24781 10/28/00
46. 25657 5/5/00
Fourth Division
Case No. Date

Submitted
1. 11960 09/21/98
2.17664 01/29/98
3.13036 02/22/99
4.13037 02/22/99
5.13593 05/21/96
6.13594 05/21/96
7.13757 03/21/97
8.14380 02/14/95
9.16809 03/26/00
10.17015 06/06/94
11.17016 06/06/94
12.17140 06/13/96
13.17141 06/13/96
14.17209 12/27/96
15.17805 02/15/00
16.17806 02/15/00
17.17809 02/15/00
18. 17856 04/02/00
19. 18005 05/07/96
20. 18006 05/07/96
21. 18257 09/22/97

22. 18894 11/17/00
23. 18895 11/17/00
24. 18896 11/17/00
25. 18900 10/28/00
26. 18935 06/16/00
27. 18936 06/16/00
28. 18937 06/16/00
29. 19567 05/21/96
30. 20338 05/19/97
31. 20469 07/07/00
32. 20470 07/07/00
33. 20471 07/07/00
34. 20472 07/07/00
35. 20473 07/07/00
36. 20474 07/07/00
37. 20475 07/07/00
38. 20476 07/07/00
39. 20664 06/29/96
40. 20685 02/18/00
41. 20828 09/13/00
42. 21093 08/07/99
43. 21131 08/04/96
44. 21778 09/29/97
45. 21779 09/29/97
46. 21780 09/29/97
47. 22891 03/02/00
48. 22892 03/02/00

49. 23007 05/24/99
50. 23058 04/27/00
51. 23059 04/27/00
52. 23060 04/27/00
53. 23061 04/27/00
54. 23062 04/27/00
55. 23366 03/28/99
56. 23415 05/25/00
57. 23534 12/15/00
58. 23708 09/27/00
59. 24447 09/18/00
60. 24448 09/18/00
61. 24464 07/26/00
62. 24465 07/26/00
63. 24742 10/10/00
64. 24841 03/22/00
65. 24842 03/22/00
66. 24851 10/29/00
67. 25198 05/31/00
68. 25389 09/26/00
69. 25543 12/27/00
70. 25658 07/28/00
Fifth Division
Case Number Date

Submitted
Criminal Cases
1. 14397 1/4/99
2. 16672 2/13/00
3. 17030 2/19/98
4. 17826 12/9/00
5. 17827 12/9/00
6. 18478 8/21/00
7. 18684 5/29/98
8. 18880 12/6/00
9. 19510 12/4/00
10. 19511 12/4/00
11. 19512 12/4/00
12. 19593 6/5/98
13. 19614 7/31/98
14. 19668 7/26/98
15. 20194 1/8/01
16. 20427 11/3/99
17. 20648 1/4/98
18. 20649 1/4/98
19. 20694 3/11/98
20. 21882 8/12/00
21. 22184 12/16/00
22. 22873 12/4/99
23. 22926 11/13/00
24. 23066 8/16/99
25. 23319 9/30/00
26. 23450 9/16/00
27. 23515 1/29/00
28. 24155 11/30/00
29. 24379 8/27/00

30. 24759 5/5/00
31. 24858 12/28/00
We find that Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena failed to devise an efficient recording and filing
system to enable him to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely
disposition. This is his duty on which he failed.53
Memorandum of the Court Administrator
On November 14, 2001, the Court required the Office of the Court Administrator54 to update its report.55
On November 16, 2001, OCA Consultant Pedro A. Ramirez (Justice, Court of Appeals, Retired) submitted
a compliance report with the Courts order. The compliance report shows that to this day, several cases
that were reported pending by the Sandiganbayan on September 26, 2000, and likewise reported
undecided by the OCA on January 26, 2001, have not been decided/resolved. We quote the compliance
report:56
First Division
Case Number Date Submitted Ponente Assigned Reason for Not Deciding
Case
194. 11999 12/10/90 Garchitorena Under study, submitted

before the reorganization
195. 12102 7/1/91 Garchitorena Under study, submitted

before the reorganization
196. 12127 2/12/90 Not reported; unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report
197. 12139 6/10/92 Castaneda* Under studysubmitted

before the
reorganization
198. 12289 8/28/91 Castaneda Under studysubmitted

before the
reorganization
199. 12305-06 2/7/91 Castaneda Under studysubmitted

before the
reorganization
200. 13015 3/2/92 Garchitorena Under studysubmitted

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization
before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization
213. 14223 3/7/97 Death of accused is unconfirmed and dismissal of the case
was held in abeyance. (Ong, J.)*
214. 14227 9/5/92 Castaneda Under study submitted
before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization
219. 14411 1/24/93 Garchitorena Under study submitted

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization
before the
reorganization
227. 16583-85 8/13/96 Castaneda Under study submitted

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization
230. 16927-28 12/17/95 Castaneda Under study submitted

before the
reorganization

before the
reorganization
232. 17001 9/4/97 Not yet assigned
233. 17278 5/2/94 Death of accused is unconfirmed and dismissal of the case
was held in abeyance. (Ong, J.)
236. 17759 6/25/96 Ong Decided and set for

promulgation
239. 18857 10/21/98 Not yet assigned
240. 19059-63 2/11/99 Not yet assigned
241. 19534-35 9/2/98 Not yet assigned
243. 19773-79 5/21/99 Not yet assigned

247. 21020 7/4/95 Ong Set for Promulgation on

November 27, 2001
249. 22195-96 6/14/96 Castaneda Under study, submitted

before the
reorganization
250. 22832 10/21/98 Not yet assigned
252. 23146 11/13/00 Not yet assigned
257. 23374 12/17/98 Not yet assigned
258. 23418-23 10/15/99 Not yet assigned
261. 23540 10/15/99 Not yet assigned
262. 24042-98 4/28/99 Ong Set for Promulgation on

November 27, 2001
264. 24236-37 2/14/00 Not yet assigned
266. 24319-29 11/4/99 Not yet assigned
267.24319-29 11/4/99 Not reported; unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report
269.24395 7/13/99 Not reported; unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report

271. 24433-34 9/6/99 Not yet assigned
272. 24531-34 12/16/99 Not yet assigned
275. 6672 7/11/90 Garchitorena Under Study, before the

reorganization
276. 9977 5/10/94 Garchitorena Under Study, before the

reorganization
Summary/Tally
Cases Assigned to Garchitorena, PJ. 9
Cases Assigned to Castaneda, J. 42
Cases Assigned to Ong, J. 5
Cases not yet assigned 73
Cases not accounted for or reported 9
__________
Total 138
Second Division
Case Number Date Submitted Ponente Assigned Reason for Not Deciding
Case
63. 19542 4/16/99 For retaking of testimony due to incomplete TSN
64. 13827-32 8/30/00 Victorino For promulgation
65. 18965 11/30/00 For retaking of testimony due to incomplete TSN
Third Division
Case Number Date Ponente Assigned Reason for Not
Submitted Deciding Case
47. SCA/005 12/18/00 Ilarde --
48. A/R 029 10/2/00 Illarde
49. 487-491 4/8/98 With pending demurrer to evidence, submitted,

01/26/01 re Submitted, 03/20/01
50. 11794 6/10/00 De Castro --
51. 17532 12/11/00 Ilarde --
52. 18867-72 10/5/00 Pending trial per order dated 08/17/00
53. 19182 4/6/00 Unloaded to the 5th Division, 10/13/97
54. 19563 4/6/00 No Assignment --
55. 19574 4/6/00 No Assignment --
56. 19622-24 4/6/00 Unloaded to the 5th Division, 10/13/97
57. 20053-54 4/6/00 Not with the 3rd Division
58. 20271 12/18/00 Illarde --
59. 22143 12/18/00 De Castro --
60. 23014 9/23/00 De Castro --
61. 23699-701 3/22/00 Ilarde --
62. 23802-03 9/10/00 No Assignment --
63. 24153 12/18/00 No Assignment --
64. 24697-98 9/10/00 Ilarde --
65. 24741 12/7/00 De Castro --
66. 24779-81 10/28/00 No Assignment --
67. 25657 5/5/00 With Defense pending motion for the re-examination of
the Information and the parties affidavits, etc. Order
dated 08/31/01
Summary/Tally
Cases Assigned to Illarde, J. 9
Cases Assigned to De Castro, J. 4
Cases not yet assigned 8

Others 18
____________
Total 39
Fourth Division**
Case Number Date Submitted Ponente Assigned Reason for Not

Deciding Case
71. 11960 09/21/98 Draft of decision penned by J. Nario in view of

the dissenting opinion of one Justice was
referred to a Division of five (5) composed of
Nario, Palattao, Ferrer, Badoy, Jr. and De
Castro, JJ.
72. 16809 03/26/00 Palattao --
73. 23058-62 04/27/00 Nario --
74. 25389 09/26/00 Nario --
Fifth Division
Case Number Date Submitted Ponente Assigned Reason for Not

Deciding Case
32. 14397 1/4/99 Badoy, Jr. Inherited case/lack of

personnel

personnel

personnel
35. 18478 8/21/00 Estrada Inherited case/lack of

personnel

personnel

personnel
38. 19510-12 12/4/00 Estrada Inherited case/lack of

personnel

personnel
personnel
41. 20194 1/8/01 Chico-Nazario Complicated Issues

personnel
43. 20648-49 1/4/98 Badoy, Jr. Inherited case/lack of

personnel
44. 20694 3/11/98 Estrada Inherited case/lack of

personnel
45. 22926 11/13/00 No report, Unaccounted for by the

Sandiganbayan report

personnel
47. 24155 11/30/00 Estrada Not yet due
48. 24379 8/27/00 Estrada Draft decision

released 7/31/01
Summary/Tally
Cases Assigned to Badoy, J. *** 11
Cases Assigned to Estrada, J. 7
Cases Assigned to Chico-Nazario, J. 1
No report/Unaccounted For 1
_________
Total 20
3. Applicability of SC Adm. Circular No. 10-94.-- Supreme Court Circular No. 10-94 applies to the
Sandiganbayan.
Administrative Circular 10-9457 directs all trial judges to make a physical inventory of the cases in their
dockets. The docket inventory procedure is as follows:58
a. Every trial judge shall submit not later than the last week of February and the last week of August of
each year a tabulation of all pending cases which shall indicate on a horizontal column the following
data:
1. Title of the case

2. Date of Filing
3. Date arraignment in criminal cases of Pre-trial in civil cases and
4. Date of initial trial
5. Date of last hearing
6. Date submitted for Decision
b. The tabulation shall end with a certification by the trial judge that he/she has personally undertaken
an inventory of the pending cases in his/her court; that he/she has examined each case record and
initialled the last page thereof. The judge shall indicate in his/her certification the date when inventory
was conducted.
c. The Tabulation and Certification shall be in the following form.
Docket Inventory for the Period
January __ to June ___, ___/July
To December ___, ___
(Indicate Period)
Court and Station ________
Presiding Judge ________
Title of Date Filed Pretrial/ Initial Hearing Date of Last Date submitted for
Case Hearing Decision
Arraignment
CERTIFICATION:
I hereby certify that on (Date/Dates___), I personally conducted a physical inventory of pending cases in
the docket of this court, that I personally examined the records of each case and initialled the last page
thereof, and I certify that the results of the inventory are correctly reflected in the above tabulation.
_________.
_____________________
Presiding Judge
Given the rationale behind the Administrative Circular, we hold that it is applicable to the
Sandiganbayan with respect to cases within its original and appellate jurisdiction.
Mora Decidendi
We reiterate the admonition we issued in our resolution of October 10, 2000:59

This Court has consistently impressed upon judges (which includes justices) to decide cases promptly
and expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. Decision making is the
primordial and most important duty of the member of the bench.60 Hence, judges are enjoined to decide
cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency61 that warrants disciplinary
sanction, including fine,62 suspension63 and even dismissal.64 The rule particularly applies to justices of
the Sandiganbayan. Delays in the disposition of cases erode the faith and confidence of our people in
the judiciary, lower its standards, and bring it into disrepute.65 Delays cannot be sanctioned or tolerated
especially in the anti-graft court, the showcase of the nations determination to succeed in its war
against graft (underscoring ours).
In Yuchengco v. Republic,66 we urged the Sandiganbayan to promptly administer justice. We stated that
the Sandiganbayan has the inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders to make them
conformable to law and justice. The Sandiganbayan as the nations anti-graft court must be the first to
avert opportunities for graft, uphold the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases and
avert the precipitate loss of their rights.
Practice of Unloading Cases
According to the memorandum submitted by the OCA, there is a practice in the first and third divisions
of the Sandiganbayan of unloading cases to other divisions despite the fact that these cases have been
submitted for decision before them. We cite relevant portions of the memorandum:67
Cases Submitted for Decision When Unloaded to the Fourth Division
Case No. Title of the Case Division where case Date Submitted for
originated
Decision
1) 17015 PP vs. Raul Zapatos 3rd 06/06/94
2) 17016 PP vs. Raul Zapatos 3rd 06/06/94
3) 14380 PP vs. Francisco Ramoran 3rd 02/14/95
4) 18005 PP vs. Panfilo Bongcac 3rd 05/07/96
5) 18006 PP vs. Panfilo Bongcac 3rd 05/07/96
6) 13593 PP vs. Dominador 3rd 05/30/96

Meninguito

Meninguito

Meninguito
9) 17140 PP vs. Jose Caf, et. al. 3rd 06/13/96
10) 17141 PP vs. Jose Caf, et. al. 3rd 06/13/96

11) 20064 PP vs. Ben dela Pena 3rd 07/01/96
12) 21131 PP vs. Rufino Mamanguin 3rd 08/05/96
13) 17209 PP vs. Isidro Catapang 3rd 12/27/96
14) 13757 PP vs. Catalino Daganzo 3rd 03/21/97
15) 18257 PP vs. Zenaida Sazon 1st 09/22/97
Cases Submitted for Decision When Unloaded to the Fifth Division
Case Number Date Submitted
1. 10264 12/22/90
2. 13344 5/14/97
3. 16223 4/25/94
4. 16574 5/30/95
5. 16760 5/25/95
6. 16810 1/23/96
7. 17018 7/20/94
8. 17055 7/5/95
9. 17139 4/24/94
10. 17162 2/23/95
11. 17193 3/8/94
12. 17426 2/12/94
13. 17480 3/22/94
14. 17538 11/20/95
15. 17567 2/24/93
16. 17598 8/3/94
17. 17617 3/28/96
18. 17618 4/6/95
19. 17619 4/6/95
20. 17640 6/12/95

21. 17661 12/15/94
22. 17666 8/25/97
23. 17884 11/12/95
24. 17902 4/16/95
25. 18008 9/15/97
26. 18423 1/15/96
27. 18687 9/30/94
28. 18759 10/12/95
29. 18785 7/13/95
30. 18932 4/20/97
31. 18988 10/25/95
32. 18999 12/21/95
33. 19039 5/6/95
34. 19378 4/17/96
35. 19379 4/17/96
36. 19679 10/5/95
37. 19712 2/18/95
38. 19907 6/22/95
39. 20487 12/14/96
40. 20624 7/15/95
41. 23427 7/25/97
We suggest a review of the practice of unloading cases that greatly contributes to the backlog of
undecided cases. When a case has been heard and tried before a division of the Sandiganbayan, it is
ideal that the same division and no other must decide it as far as practicable.
We further note that several cases which were earlier reported as undecided by the Sandiganbayan and
the OCA have been decided since the reports of September 26, 2000 and January 26, 2001. Nonetheless,
the delay in deciding these cases is patent and merits reprobation. According to the compliance report
submitted by the OCA on November 16, 2001, there are several cases decided way beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by law, even assuming without granting, a reglementary period of
twelve months from the time a case is submitted for decision.68
In a case brought before this Court, Presiding Justice Garchitorena admitted fault and that the fault is
exclusively his own, in failing to decide the case, though submitted for decision as early as June 20,
1990.69 This case was not even included among pending cases in the Sandiganbayan report of
September 26, 2000.
The following cases were decided, though beyond the prescribed period:
First Division
Case Number Submitted for Decision Date of Promulgation Ponente
14195 March 31, 1997 November 10, 2000 Ong
21608 March 31, 1997 November 15, 2000 Ong
20588 February 14, 1998 January 12, 2001 Ong
19651 November 15, 1996 January 26, 2001 Ong
17670 November 25, 1994 January 26, 2001 Ong
17447-48 September 6, 1994 February 22, 2001 Ong
18283 February 21, 1995 February 23, 2001 Ong
17514 August 19, 1994 April 24, 2001 Ong
Second Division
18403-18417 December 4, 1998 February 2, 2001 Victorino
18435 August 11, 2000 March 26, 2001 Victorino
18786 November 28, 2000 March 28, 2001 Legaspi
19004 September 10, 1996 March 16, 2001 Victorino
19692-19707 August 27, 2000 February 26, 2001 Sandoval
19848 March 28, 1996 January 29, 2001 Victorino
20483-20484 July 26, 1995 April 6, 2001 Victorino
20660 December 20, 2000 August 2, 2001 Legaspi
20765 August 30, 1996 February 23, 2001 Victorino
20816 March 11, 1998 January 25, 2001 Victorino
21097 December 13, 2000 June 15, 2001 Victorino
22858 August 11, 2000 January 31, 2001 Victorino

22934 October 14, 2000 February 15, 2001 Sandoval
22976 May 4, 1999 March 1, 2001 Sandoval
23111 November 27, 2000 March 14, 2001 Sandoval
23262 October 11, 2000 May 16, 2001 Victorino
23338 December 2, 1999 December 14, 2000 Sandoval
23529-23530 October 23, 2000 March 28, 2001 Victorino
24407-24408 August 11, 2000 January 24, 2001 Legaspi
24994 August 17, 2000 May 30, 2001 Sandoval
AR#035 December 9, 2000 August 28, 2001 Legaspi
Third Division
A/R 016 November 16, 1999 January 26, 2001 Ilarde
13861-13863 April 6, 2000 December 22, 2000 Del Rosario
13889 September 30, 1999 May 10, 2001 Ilarde
16756 August 28, 1999 December 11, 2000 Del Rosario
23522 July 6, 2000 January 12, 2001 Del Rosario
Fourth Division
17664 August 31, 1999 June 1, 2000 Pallatao
17016 June 6, 1994 March 27, 2001 Ferrer
17140-41 June 13, 1996 February 6, 2001 Nario
17209 December 27, 1996 April 30, 2001 Ferrer
17805-09; February 15, 2000 October 10, 2001 Palattao

17814
17856 April 2, 2000 June 25, 2001 Palattao
18005-06 May 7, 1996 May 18, 2001 Ferrer
18257 September 22, 1997 July 26, 2001 Ferrer
18894-96 November 17, 2000 March 20, 2001 Palattao

18900 October 28, 2000 March 23, 2001 Ferrer
18935-37 June 16, 2000 January 18, 2001 Palattao
19567 May 21, 1996 January 15, 2001 Ferrer
20338 May 19, 1997 February 9, 2001 Ferrer
20469 July 7, 2000 June 25, 2001 Palattao
13036-37 February 22, 1999 February 28, 2001 Ferrer
13593-94 May 21, 1996 January 15, 2001 Ferrer
20470-76 July 7, 2000 June 25, 2001 Palattao
20664 June 29, 1996 February 20, 2001 Ferrer
20685 February 18, 2000 March 2, 2001 Palattao
20828 September 13, 2000 October 8, 2001 Palattao
21093 August 7, 1999 January 15, 2001 Palattao
21131 August 4, 1996 February 13, 2001 Ferrer
21778-80 September 29, 1997 June 21, 2001 Ferrer
22891-92 March 2, 2000 December 13, 2000 Ferrer
23007 May 24, 1999 March 14, 2000 Ferrer
13757 March 21, 1997 July 2, 2001 Ferrer
14380 February 14, 1995 April 23, 2001 Ferrer
17015 June 6, 1994 March 27, 2001 Ferrer
23366 November 26, 1999 October 29, 2001 Ferrer
23415 May 25, 2000 May 28, 2001 Palattao
23534 December 15, 2000 February 28, 2001 Palattao
23708 September 27, 2000 September 10, 2001 Nario
24464-65 July 26, 2000 June 26, 2001 Nario
24742 October 10, 2000 March 22, 2001 Ferrer
24841-42 May 9, 2000 March 7, 2001 Ferrer
25198 July 12, 2000 February 6, 2001 Nario

25543 December 27, 2000 February 26, 2001 Palattao
25658 July 28, 2000 July 20, 2001 Palattao
24447-48 September 18, 2000 December 7, 2001 Palattao
Fifth Division
17826-17827 December 9, 2000 March 28, 2001 Chico-Nazario
19668 July 26, 1998 February 9, 2001 Badoy, Jr.
21882 August 12, 2000 July 25, 2001 Chico- Nazario
22184 December 16, 2000 May 21, 2001 Chico- Nazario
22873 December 4, 1999 May 31, 2001 Chico- Nazario
23319 September 30, 2000 April 23, 2001 Chico- Nazario
23450 September 16, 2000 March 16, 2001 Chico- Nazario
23515 January 29, 2000 May 28, 2001 Cortez-Estrada
24759 May 5, 2000 July 10, 2001 Cortez-Estrada
24858 December 28, 2000 May 31, 2001 Chico-Nazario
Relief of Presiding Justice
At this juncture, the Court cites the case of Canson v. Garchitorena.70 In that case, we admonished
respondent Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena. General Jewel F. Canson, Police Chief
Superintendent, National Capital Region Command Director, complained of deliberate delayed action of
the Presiding Justice on the transfer of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, depriving complainant of his right to a just and speedy trial. Due to a finding of lack of bad
faith on the part of respondent justice, we issued only a warning. However, the dispositive portion of
the decision cautioned respondent justice that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.71
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena sits as the Chairman, First Division, with a backlog of cases
pending decision. At least seventy-three cases have been unassigned for the writing of the extended
opinion, though submitted for decision. It may be the thinking of the Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan
that an unassigned case is not counted in its backlog of undecided cases. This is not correct. It is the duty
of the Presiding Justice and the Chairmen of divisions to assign the ponente as soon as the case is
declared submitted for decision, if not earlier. If he fails to make the assignment, he shall be deemed to
be the ponente.
The Constitution provides that a case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.72 In Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court provided that A case is
considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of the parties at the termination
of the trial. The ninety (90) days period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of
the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be
considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or the expiration of the
period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason
to interrupt or suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another
judge not the deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days from
the completion of the transcripts within which to decide the same.73 The designation of a ponente to a
case is not a difficult administrative task.
Administrative sanctions must be imposed. Mora reprobatur in lege.74 Again, we reiterate the principle
that decision-making is the most important of all judicial functions and responsibilities.75 In this area,
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, as the ponente assigned to the cases submitted for
decision/resolution long ago, some as far back as more than ten (10) years ago, has been remiss
constituting gross neglect of duty and inefficiency.76 As we said in Canson,77unreasonable delay of a
judge in resolving a case amounts to a denial of justice, bringing the Sandiganbayan
into disrepute, eroding the public faith and confidence in the judiciary.78
Consequently, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena should be relieved of all trial and administrative
work as Presiding Justice and as Chairman, First Division so that he can devote himself full time to
decision-making until his backlog is cleared. He shall finish this assignment not later than six (6) months
from the promulgation of this resolution.
We have, in cases where trial court judges failed to decide even a single case within the ninety (90) day
period, imposed a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to the equivalent of their one
months salary.79 According to the report of the Sandiganbayan, as of September 26, 2000, there were
three hundred forty one (341) cases submitted for decision before its first division headed by the
Presiding Justice. In the memorandum of the OCA, there were one hundred ninety eight (198) cases
reported submitted for decision before the First Division.80 Even in the updated report, there are one
hundred thirty eight (138) cases still undecided in the First Division.
In fact, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena admitted that he has a backlog.81 He claimed that one
(1) case alone comprises fifty percent (50%) of the backlog. We find this claim exaggerated. We cannot
accept that a backlog of three hundred forty one (341) cases in the First Division could be eliminated by
the resolution of a single consolidated case of one hundred fifty six (156) counts. A consolidated case is
considered only as one case. The cases referred to were consolidated as Criminal Case Nos. 9812-9967,
People v. Corazon Gammad-Leao, decided on December 8, 2000. What about the one hundred eighty
five (185) cases that unfortunately remained undecided to this date? Worse, the motion for
reconsideration of the decision in said cases, submitted as of January 11, 2001, has not been resolved to
this date.82 The First Division has only thirty (30) days from submission to resolve the same. It is now ten
(10) months from submission. The expediente and the motion were transmitted to
the ponente, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, on that date, but to this day the case remains
unresolved.83Unfortunately, even other divisions of the Sandiganbayan may be following his example.84
In the first report of the Court Administrator, he indicated a total of one hundred ninety five (195)
criminal cases and three (3) civil cases, or a total of onehundred ninety eight (198) cases submitted for
decision as of December 21, 2000.85 Almost a year later, as of November 16, 2001, there are still one
hundred thirty eight (138) cases undecided submitted long ago. For almost one year, not one case was
decided/resolved by the Presiding Justice himself.86
Directive
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court resolves:
(1) To IMPOSE on Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00),
for inefficiency and gross neglect of duty.
(2) Effective December 1, 2001, to RELIEVE Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of his powers,
functions and duties as the Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan, and from presiding over the trial of cases
as a justice and Chairman, First Division, so that he may DEVOTE himself exclusively to DECISION
WRITING, until the backlog of cases assigned to him as well as cases not assigned to any ponente, of
which he shall be deemed the ponente in the First Division, are finally decided. There shall be no
unloading of cases to other divisions, or to the First Division inter se.
In the interim, Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, as the most senior associate justice, shall TAKE
OVER and exercise the powers, functions, and duties of the office of the Presiding Justice,
Sandiganbayan, until further orders from this Court.
(3) To DIRECT Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and the associate justices of the Sandiganbayan
to decide/resolve the undecided cases submitted for decision as of this date, within three (3) months
from their submission, and to resolve motions for new trial or reconsiderations and petitions for review
within thirty (30) days from their submission. With respect to the backlog of cases, as hereinabove
enumerated, the Sandiganbayan shall decide/resolve all pending cases including incidents therein within
six (6) months from notice of this resolution.
(4) To ORDER the Sandiganbayan to comply with Supreme Court Administrative Circular 10-94, effective
immediately.
(5) To DIRECT the Sandiganbayan en banc to adopt not later than December 31, 2001 internal rules to
govern the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them and other
matters leading to the internal operation of the court, and thereafter to submit the said internal rules to
the Supreme Court for its approval.87
This directive is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
De Leon, Jr., J., see dissenting and concurring opinion.
Buena, J., on official leave.

*
Second Division composed of Edilberto G. Sandoval (Associate Justice and Chairman); Godofredo L.
Legaspi (Associate Justice) and Raul V. Victorino (Associate Justice).
**
Third Division composed of Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (Associate Justice and Chairman); Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro (Associate Justice) and Ricardo M. Ilarde (Associate Justice, Retired November 27,
2001).
***
Fourth Division composed of Narciso S. Nario (Associate Justice and Chairman); Rodolfo G.
Palattao (Associate Justice) and Nicodemo T. Ferrer (Associate Justice).
****
Fifth Division composed of Minita V. Chico-Nazario (Associate Justice and Chairman); Ma. Cristina G.
Cortez-Estrada (Associate Justice) and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. (Associate Justice).
45
2000 Annual Report of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, Annex H, p. 258.
46
Dealing with a single delay in the municipal circuit trial court, Re: report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dingle-Duenas, Iloilo, 345 Phil. 884 (1997).
47
See Comment of Presiding Justice, G. R. No. 145851, Licaros v. Sandiganbayan.
48
Criminal Cases Nos. 9812-9967, People v. Corazon Gammad-Leao, involving 156 cases.
49
Rollo, p. 56.
50
See Semestral Inventory of Pending Cases, for the period January to July, 2001, Sandiganbayan, First
Division, dated August 24, 2001, submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator by Estella
Teresita C. Rosete, Executive Clerk of Court, First Division, Sandiganbayan.
51
As of December 21, 2000.
52
Memorandum for Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Rollo, pp. 61-104.
53
Cf. Re: Request of Judge Masamayor, RTC-Br. 52, Talibon, Bohol, For Extension of Time to Decide Civil
Case No. 0020 and Criminal Case No. 98-384, 316 SCRA 219 (1999); Bernardo v.Fabros, 366 Phil. 485
(1999).
54
In a Memorandum signed by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. addressed to Justice (Ret.) Pedro A.
Ramirez, OCA Consultant.
55
Rollo, pp. 489-498.
56
Compliance Report of Justice Ramirez, Rollo, pp. 341-354, at pp. 342-348
*
Justice Catalino R. Castaneda, Jr. joined the Sandiganbayan on September 24, 1997.
*
Justice Gregory S. Ong was appointed to the Sandiganbayan on October 5, 1998.
**
The Fourth and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan were created only on September 25, 1997.
***
The case assignments of Justice Badoy, Jr. were all transferred to Justice Villaruz when Justice Badoy,
Jr. transferred to the Third Division. The report of the Sandiganbayan with respect case assignments is
dated September 30, 2001 (See Annex E).
57
Dated June 29, 1994.
58
A(2) a.-c., Administrative Circular 10-94.
59
Resolution of the Court En Banc, Rollo, pp. 19-21, at p. 20.
60
Rivera v. Lamorena, 345 Phil. 880, 883 (1997).
61
Cueva v. Villanueva, 365 Phil. 1, 10 (1999).
62
Report on the Judicial Audit in RTC, Br. 27, Lapu-Lapu City, 352 Phil. 223, 232 (1998); Sta.
Ana v. Arinday, Jr., 347 Phil. 671, 674 (1997).
63
Bolalin v. Occiano, 334 Phil. 178 (1997).
64
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City, 354 Phil. 8 (1998);
Abarquez v. Rebosura, 349 Phil. 24, 38 (1998); Longboan v. Hon. Polig, 186 SCRA 557 (1990).
65
Sta. Ana v. Arinday, Jr., supra, Note 62.
66
333 SCRA 368, 387 (2000).
67
Memorandum to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Rollo, pp. 61-104, at pp. 88, 93.
68
Compliance Report of Justice Ramirez, Rollo, pp. 341-354, at pp. 349-353.
69
G. R. No. 145851, Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, filed on November 23, 2000.
70
370 Phil. 287 (1999).
71
Supra, at p. 288.
72
Article VIII, Sec. 15 (2), Constitution.
73
Supreme Court Circulars, Orders and Resolutions, October 1999 ed., pp. 144-145.
74
Delay is reprobated in law (Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, 1951, West Publishing Co., p. 1160.
75
Rivera v. Lamorena, 345 Phil. 880, 883 (1997).
76
Sabado v. Cajigal, 219 SCRA 800 (1993); Casia v. Gestopa, Jr., 371 Phil. 131 (1999); Report on the
Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Brs. 29, 56 and 57, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, 316 SCRA 272 (1999); Re:
Cases Left Undecided by Judge Narciso M. Bumanglag, Jr., 365 Phil. 492 (1999); Re: report on the Judicial
Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 68, Camiling, Tarlac, 364 Phil. 530 (1999); Bernardo v. Fabros, 366 Phil.
485 (1999); Louis Viutton S. A. v. Villanueva, 216 SCRA 121 (1992); Imposed in a case where there was
failure to decide a case despite the lapse of years from its submission (Lambino v. de Vera, 341 Phil. 62,
67 (1997).
77
Supra, Note 61, at p. 303-304.
78
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dingle-Duenas, Iloilo, 345
Phil. 884 (1997).
79
Supra, Note 78.
80
As of December 21, 2000.
81
Supra, Note 14, Rollo, p. 56.
82
As of November 16, 2001. See Compliance Report, dated November 16, 2001, of Justice Ramirez.
83
Compliance Report of Justice Ramirez, Rollo, pp. 341-354, at p. 354.
84
According to the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division Clerk of Court, a motion for reconsideration in the
case of People v. Bienvenido Tan (Crim. Case No. 20685) submitted on May 4, 2001, has also remained
unresolved. Another instance of violation of the thirty day reglementary period for resolving motions for
reconsideration.
85
Supra, pp. 17-18 of this resolution.
86
On December 08, 2000, Presiding Justice Garchitorena decided a single consolidated case of 156
components, Crim. Cases Nos. 9812 to 9967, for estafa through falsification of public documents.
87
R. A. No. 7975, Section 4.
[1]
Dated July 29, 2000, done in Los Baos, Laguna. Signed by Arthur D. Lim (National President), and the
following Governors: Carmencito P. Caingat (Central Luzon), Jose P. Icaonapo, Jr. (Greater Manila),
Teresita Infatado-Gines (Southern Luzon), Serafin P. Rivera (Bicolandia), Celestino B. Sabate (Eastern
Visayas), David A. Ponce de Leon (Western Visayas), Paulino R. Ersando (Western Mindanao). The
following did not take any part in the Resolution: Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Executive Vice President) was on
study leave, and Nicanor A. Magno (Governor for Eastern Mindanao) was on sick leave.
[2]
Rollo, p. 2.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 3-4.
[4]
Rollo, p. 5.
[5]
Dated September 26, 2000, Rollo, pp. 6-18.
[6]
Rollo, p. 6.
[7]
As of September 15, 2000, Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[8]
Resolution of the Court En Banc dated October 10, 2000, Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 30-43.
[10]
Article VIII, Section 15 (1), Constitution.
[11]
Reply, Rollo, pp. 45-46.
[12]
Rollo, p. 52.
[13]
First Division composed of Francis E. Garchitorena (Presiding Justice and Chairman); Catalino R.
Castaeda, Jr. (Associate Justice) and Gregory S. Ong (Associate Justice).
[14]
Criminal Cases Nos. 9812-9967, People v. Corazon Gammad-Leao, involving 156 cases.
[15]
Rollo, p. 56.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 61-101. The memorandum was a report on the judicial audit and physical inventory of
pending cases before the five (5) Divisions of the Sandiganbayan conducted by the Court
Administrators Judicial Audit Team. The team was composed of Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo,
together with Consultants Narciso T. Atienza, Conrado M. Molina, Romulo S. Quimbo, Pedro A. Ramirez,
and staff. The report was prepared from December 11 to 19, 2000.
[17]
Rollo, pp. 61-104, at p. 100.
[18]
Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001.
[19]
Memorandum to Chief Justice Davide dated January 26, 2001, Rollo, pp. 61-101, at p. 101.
[20]
Pursuant to Section 15 (1) Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
[21]
Section 6, P.D. No. 1606, as amended; Section 3, Rule XVIII of the Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan.
[22]
Cited in Montes v. Bugtas, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1627, April 17, 2001.
[23]
See 2000 Annual Report of the Supreme Court, pp. 7-8.
[24]
R.A. No. 8249 (An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan) classifies the
Sandiganbayan as [A] special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the
inherent powers of a court of justice x x x (Section 1).
[25]
R. A. No. 8249, Section 2, empowers the Sandiganbayan to hold sessions x x x for the trial and
determination of cases filed with it.
[26]
R. A. No. 8249, Section 1.
[27]
P.D. No. 1606, Section 9, as amended.
[28]
R.A. No. 7975, Section 4, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the
divisions, the rotation of justices among them and other matters relating to the internal operations
of the court which shall be enforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court.
[29]
Ibid.
[30]
Supra, Note 23, at p. 8.
[31]
Enumerated under Section 4 of R. A. No. 8249
[32]
Under R.A. No. 8249, Section 4, The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise oftheir own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
[33]
Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator, Rollo, pp. 137-147, at p. 147.
[34]
Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486, creating a special court to be known as the Sandiganbayan.
[35]
R.A. No. 8249 is silent on this matter. Amendments are to be construed as if they are included in the
original act (Camacho v. CIR, 80 Phil. 848 [1948]).
[36]
P.D. No. 1606, Section 9, provides, The Sandiganbayan shall have the power to promulgate its own
rules of procedure and, pending such promulgation, the Rules of Court shall govern its proceedings.
However, R.A. No. 7975, Sec. 4, repealed this provision, approved March 30, 1995, effective May 6,
1995.
[37]
Rule XVIII, Section 3, The Sandiganbayan, Revised Rules of Procedure.
[38]
R.A. No. 7975, Section 1.
[39]
Cario v. Ofilada, 217 SCRA 206 (1993).
[40]
Dacumos v. Sandiganbayan, 195 SCRA 833 (1991), discussing the power of a trial court.
[41]
334 Phil. 369, 386 (1997).
[42]
329 Phil. 300, 309-310 (1996).
[43]
All pending before the Sandiganbayans First Division, of which Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena is the Chairman.
[44]
Compliance, Rollo, pp. 7-18.
61. People vs. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 (1975)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35377-78 July 31, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING ABANO, defendants-appellants.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid
Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of Criminal Case No.
3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, is charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions.
As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the
Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are many political enemies of the Crisologo family in
that vicinity; some of the adherents of the Crisologos had in fact been murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his
father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to death while hearing mass at the Vigan cathedral.
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for a gunwielder or grenade-thrower
who wants to assassinate him. He could even be lynched or shot to death on the specious pretext that
he was trying to escape.
Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the
transfer of the venue of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to "order a change of venue or
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is involved is not merely a miscarriage of
justice but the personal safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to
undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.
Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a justification for transfer of venue
(See State vs. Siers, 136 S. E. 503, 103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).1äwphï1.ñët
We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not merely the change of
the place of hearing but also the transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No. 3949 to another court.
According to Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence against him is in the custody of the authorities at
Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City and
the holding of the trial at Camp Crame appear to be the most convenient arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to
the City Court of Quezon City where it should be re-docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof. The case
may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in
bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion of the hearing.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.
Antonio, J, took no part.
62. Mondiguing vs. Abad, 68 SCRA 14 (1951)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41313 November 6, 1975

ALIPIO MONDIGUING and ANDRES DUNUAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao; PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES; MARIANO PACTIW, alias Bugbug; DULMOG ABLUYEN and ANGELINA
ABLUYEN, respondents..
R E S O L U T I O N.
AQUINO, J.:
Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants accused of double murder,
frustrated murder and attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of
Ifugao Province (People vs. George Bayucca et al.). That case was filed in connection with an ambuscade
which was perpetuated on July 23, 1970 at Baag, Banaue, Ifugao. As a result of that incident, Governor
Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao was wounded and his executive assistant and his driver were killed. Up to
this time the accused in that case have not been arraigned. .
On September 4, 1975 Mondiguing and Dunuan filed in this Court a petition to transfer the venue of the
case to Baguio City or Quezon City. They claimed that they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in
Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First Instance of that province is a
protege' of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former Congressman Romulo Lumauig, and because their
witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals. The petitioners further claimed
that, as may be inferred from previous incidents recounted in the petition, their lives and the lives of
their witnesses and lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and antagonisms
spawned by the case and the political rivalry between the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The
accused, George Bayucca was killed on October 28, 1970 and Alipio Mondiguing resigned as mayor of
Banaue and took refuge in Baguio City). .
The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the change of venue but he invited the Court's
attention to the suggestion of Governor Lumauig that the case may be transferred to the proper court in
Isabela in view of its proximity to Ifugao. .
Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his comment disputed the correctness or truth of the grounds
relied upon for the change of venue and prayed that the petition be dismissed. He said that, if there
would be bias on his part, he would be biased in favor of the People of the Philippines. He said that the
crime charged was not "committed personally against" Governor Lumauig. That statement is not correct
since the governor is one of the victims mentioned in the information. .
Judge Abad revealed that petitioner Dunuan sent to the court a letter dated August 30, 1975 wherein he
declined the services of Atty. Jose W. Diokno (who filed the instant petition for transfer of venue). In
view of that disclosure, the petition herein should be regarded as having been filed only by Alipio
Mondiguing. .
The fact is that this Court in Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 522, 534, disqualified
Judge Abad from trying the electoral protests filed by Crescencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against
Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan. In that case it was alleged that Judge Abad was a political
leader of Governor Lumauig and was recommended to his present position by the Lumauig brothers. .
The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is justified. A change of the place of trial in
criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. "The interests of the public require
that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and
punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime" (Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, 562). .
This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution). It "possesses inherent power and
jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be
transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice
and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that
originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
miscarriage of justice" (People vs. Gutierrez, L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172, 185). .
A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where it was shown that the accused might be
liquidated by his enemies in the place where the trial was originally scheduled to be held (People vs.
Pilotin Vincent Crisologo, movant, L-3537778, July 31, 1975).
After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in Mondiguing's petition to support his
request for a change of the place of trial, we have reached the conclusion that his petition is
meritorious. .
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and considering that his
life would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he should be tried by the Circuit Criminal
Court in the City of Baguio. .
The other relief sought by Mondiguing, which is that he be transferred from the Philippine Constabulary
headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao to Camp Crame should be submitted for the consideration of the Circuit
Criminal Court. .
WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing for the transfer of the venue of Criminal Case No. 140 of
the Court of First Instance of Ifugao is granted. The said case should be transferred to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District so that it may be heard in Baguio City. .
SO ORDERED. .
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando J., is on leave.
63. People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)
epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY)
GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR,
OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all
surnamed DOES respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid any
miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in the implementation of the right to bail 2 are
involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must
have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the
conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less than that full measure
of attention to certain fundamentals. They ignored the principle that the responsibility for the conduct
of the prosecution is with the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions
raised, the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further
action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the
petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private
respondents, 4the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened
with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the
Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner
private prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of the
Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point
but instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the
order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the
accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of
trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the evidence presented by the
Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that
province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies of seven persons
believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd
PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common
graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica,
Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC
provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the
accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and
fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129,
4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary
examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable
cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest. However, without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court
granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco
Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been released from
detention. In a parallel development. the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of
their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10
kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials
with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the
accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made
on the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a
change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court Resolved
to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and
cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari,
of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail
to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of
the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid
criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided
by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First
Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the
period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said
Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on
the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary
measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of
venue has become moot and academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo
Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola
on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments
were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there being a failure to
abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged
with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds
must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such
hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place of trial, in this case,
from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional Convention of
1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B.
L. Reyes as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel
the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what
they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts
have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the
Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this
case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would
be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of qqqts fear, they
may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was
not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent
Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds.
Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added that
there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying,
but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim
and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor
of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this
Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is
justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of venue, the
cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was granted to the accused in
the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative
doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking for the
Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due
process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for
bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the
course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied
such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court
granting bail should be considered void on that ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come to
mind: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime
whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental
as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable
men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof.
But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be
strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This norm which is of the
very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the
opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that
the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching.
That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is
nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of
the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of
private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera JJ.,
concur.
Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1 According to Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution: "The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers: (4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice."
2 According to Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution: All persons, except those charged with capital
offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties.
Excessive bail shall not be required."
3 The name of the highly-experienced counsel Juan Hagad was included in the list of private
prosecutors, but he did not sign the petition.
4 The private respondents are Francisco (Ecot) Garcia and Ricardo (Cadoy) Garcia.
5 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Roberto E. Soberano and Solicitor Roberto A. Abad.
6 Comment, 1-2.
7 Ibid, 2.
8 Ibid, 2-4.
9 Resolution of the Court dated March 5, 1981.
10 Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.
11 L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172.
12 Ibid, 180.
13 Comment of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 9.
14 Comment of respondent Florendo Baliscao, erroneously entitled Rejoinder to the Petition, 1.
15 Comment of respondent Pablo Sola, erroneously entitled Opposition of respondent Mayor Pablo
Sola, 1.
16 L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522.
17 Ibid, 524.
18 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1933).
19 Cf. Inocencio v. Alconcel, G. R. No. 55658, February 5, 1981.

64. People vs. Estrada, Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 26558 (September 12, 2007)

SANDIGANBAYAN
Quezon City
---
SPECIAL DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Criminal Case No. 26558

Plaintiff, For: PLUNDER
- versus –
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, PRESENT:

Former President of the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PJ,
Republic of the Philippines,
Chairperson
JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA,
VILLARUZ, JR., and
CHARLIE "ATONG" TIU HAY SY ANG,
PERALTA, JJ.
EDWARD S. SERAPIO,
YOLANDA T. RICAFORTE,
ALMA ALFARO,
JOHN DOE also known as PROMULGATED:
ELEUTERIO RAMOS TAN or MR. UY, September 12, 2007
JANE DOE also known as
DELIA RAJAS,
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, Accused.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------x
DECISION
Republic Act (RA) No. 7080 as amended was approved on July 12, 1991, creating and introducing into
our criminal legal system the crime of "plunder". This law penalizes public officers who would amass
immense wealth through a series or combination of overt or criminal acts described in the statute in
violation of the public trust. RA No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was a consolidation of Senate Bill no.
733 and House Bill No. 22752. The Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 733, quoted in the case of Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 555), explains the reason behind
the law as follows:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the
public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and
abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be
penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft
but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The
above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a
legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and
as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power.
The majority opinion in the above-cited case, penned by Honorable Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, further
explained the rationale behind the Anti-Plunder Law in this manner:
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places
which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more
elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious
ways to milk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the
increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the
national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of
grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament
to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the
avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men’s souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national
importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner’s ignominious fall
from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing
saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by
responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we
emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment. [Emphasis Supplied]
The present case is the first of its kind to be filed charging the highest official of the land, a former
President, among others, of the offense of plunder. Needless to state, the resolution of this case shall
set significant historical and legal precedents.
Throughout the six years over which the court proceedings in this case unfolded, this Court confronted
numerous novel and complicated legal issues (including the constitutionality of the plunder law,
propriety of house arrest, among others), heard lengthy testimonies from several dozens of witnesses
from both sides and perused voluminous documentary evidence and pleadings from the parties.
Considering the personalities involved and the nature of the crime charged, the present case aroused
particularly intense interest from the public. Speculations on the probable outcome of the case received
unparalleled attention from the media and other sectors of society. Indeed, the factual and legal
complexities of the case are further compounded by attempts to sensationalize the proceedings for
various ends.
However, this Court is ever mindful of its imperative duty to act as an impartial arbiter: (a) to serve the
interest of the State and the public in punishing those who would so severely abuse their public office
and those private individuals would aid them or conspire with them and (b) to protect the right of the
accused to be only convicted upon guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the decision of this
Court follows, upon no other consideration other than the law and a review of the evidence on record.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND THE PROCEEDINGS
__________________________
This case for plunder commenced with the filing on April 4, 2001 of the Information which is quoted
hereunder:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former Joseph Ejercito Estrada, together with Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong" Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, by himself and in conspiracy with his co-accused,
business associates and persons heretofore named, by taking advantage of his official position,
authority, connection or influence as President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth, and unjustly enrich
himself in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through a combination and series
of overt and criminal acts, described as follows:
(a) by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many instances, so-called "jueteng money"
from gambling operators in connivance with co-accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and
Edward Serapio, as witnessed by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, among other witnesses, in the aggregate
amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), more or less, in consideration
of their protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers in their illegal "jueteng" activities; and
(b) by misappropriating, converting and miusing for his gain and benefit public fund in the
amount of ONE HUNDRRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a
portion of the One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in conspiracy with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang,
Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, as
witnessed by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, among other witnesses; and
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and
the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase and buy a combined total of 681,733,000 shares of stock of
the Belle Corporatiion in the aggregate gross value of One Billion Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Million Five
Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), for the
purpose of collecting for his personal gain and benefit, as in fact he did collect and receive the sum of
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P 189,700,000.00), as
commission from said stock purchase; and
(d) by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P 3,233,104,173.17) comprising his unexplained wealth acquired, accumulated and amassed
by him under his account name "Jose Velarde" with Equitable PCI Bank;
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Various motions were filed by accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (FPres. Estrada), Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada (Jinggoy Estrada), and Edward S. Serapio (Serapio). Accused Serapio filed his Urgent
Omnibus Motion (a) to Hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and further Proceedings; (b)
to conduct a determination of probable cause; (c) for leave to file accused’s motion for reconsideration
and /or reinvestigation; and (d) to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges
against accused Serapio dated April 6, 2001. While accused FPres. Estrada filed three (3) motions; (1)
Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings, dated April 9, 2001, (2) Position Paper Re: Probable Cause (ex
abundante ad cautelam) dated April 9, 2001 which was joined by accused Jinggoy Estrada, and (3)
Motion to (a) remand the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation consistent with the
Honorable Supreme Court’s Resolution in G.R. No. 147512-19 (Joseph E. Estrada v. Hon. Aniano Desierto,
et al.); and (b) hold in abeyance judicial action in the case particularly the issuance of a warrant of arrest
and steps leading thereto until after the conduct of a proper preliminary investigation, dated April 11,
2001.
In a Resolution promulgated on April 16, 2001, the Court directed the prosecution to submit to the
Court not later than April 18, 2001 the required affidavits, counter-affidavits, and supporting evidence as
well as other supporting documents accompanying the Information, which were needed to determine
the existence of probable cause for the issuance or non-issuance of a warrant of arrest. As directed, the
prosecution filed on April 18, 2001 its Manifestation and Compliance.
On April 19, 2001, the prosecution filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to admit Amended Information,
which is quoted hereunder:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG SALONGA" AND
a.k.a. "JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE

AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM
OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’
ANG, JOSE ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur
under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR
LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE
THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,

KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On April 20, 2001, the Court in its Minute Resolution granted and admitted the prosecution’s Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information dated April 18, 2001.
On April 25, 2001, the Court promulgated its Resolution which stated:
xxx xxx xxx the Court finds and so hold that probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to
justify issuance of warrants for the arrest of accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas.
No bail is fixed for the provisional liberty of the accused for the reason that the penalty imposable for
the offense of plunder under RA No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of RA No. 7659, is reclusion
perpetua to death.
Director General Leandro R. Mendoza, Chief of the Philippine National Police, shall implement the
warrant of arrest upon service to him by Mr. Edgardo A. Urieta, Chief of the Sheriff and Security Services
Division of the Sandiganbayan. Once arrested, all the accused shall undergo the required processes and
be detained at the PNP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City subject to, and until, further orders
from this Court.
On the 25th day of April 2001, on the basis of the said resolution, the Court issued an Order of Arrest and
Hold Departure Order for all the named accused in the present information. The Philippine National
Police (PNP) submittd its Report of Compliance dated April 25, 2001 which stated:
1. That in compliance with the Order of Arrest issued by the Honorable Court in the above
captioned criminal case, accused Joseph E. Estrada and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, both residence of no. 1
Polk Street, North Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila voluntarily surrendered to the undersigned on 25
April 2001 at about 3:00 o’clock PM at said residence in the presence of their counsels.
2. That right after their surrender, they were brought inside Camp Crame, Quezon City for the required
processes and pending further orders from this Honorable Court they shall be kept in Camp Crame;
A Compliance/Return of Warrant of Arrest was also filed on April 26, 2001 by P/Chief Superintendent
Nestor B. Gualberto.
As to accused Serapio, the PNP’s Report of Compliance reads in part:
2. That one of the accused named therein, Atty. Edward S. Serapio, surrendered to the Chief, Philippine
National Police, through the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon
City on April 25, 2001 at about 9:45 PM where the required processes were administered to him and
pending further orders from this Honorable Court he shall be kept in Camp Crame;
The Court, in its Minute Resolution dated April 26, 2001, set the arraignment of the detained accused on
May 3, 2001 which was cancelled due to the different motions filed by the accused. Accused Jinggoy
Estrada filed his Motion to Quash or Suspend dated April 24, 2001 and a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion
dated April 30, 2001. Among other motions, accused FPres. Estrada filed his Motion to Quash dated
June 7, 2001 and accused Serapio filed his Motion to Quash (Re: Amended Information dated April 18,
2001) dated June 26, 2001. In its Resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Court denied all the aforesaid
motions to quash and accused Jinggoy Estrada’s Very Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001. The
Court’s Resolution dated July 9, 2001 was sustained by the Honorable Supreme Court in the Decisions
rendered in Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001) and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002).
On July 10, 2001, the Court denied the motion to defer filed by accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada and proceeded with the arraignment of accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, and Serapio
under the Amended Information. The accused having refused to enter a plea, the Court entered a plea
of not guilty for all the three (3) accused.
Petitions for Bail / House Arrest
With the detention of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in Camp Crame on April 25, 2001, both
accused filed on the same day an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Place on House Arrest.
The Court on June 9, 2001, issued a Resolution denying accused FPres. Estrada’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Place on House Arrest and issued an Order for the confinement of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada at Fort Sto. Domingo, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, subject to the need for their continued confinement at
the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC) where they were then confined. In view of the said
resolution, accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, on June 13, 2001, filed an Omnibus Motion (Re:
Resolution promulgated on June 9, 2001) pressing in the alternative a Motion for Detention in Tanay,
Rizal.
On March 17, 2004, FPres. Estrada filed a Motion to Modify Custodial Arrangement dated March 17,
2004 and, on March 30, 2004, the counsel de officio of accused FPres. Estrada filed a Manifestation
dated March 29, 2004 informing the Court, among others, that the said accused was willing to have his
property in Tanay, Rizal placed under the control and supervision of the Court and the Philippine
National Police for the duration of his detention.
On July 12, 2004, the Court issued a joint resolution granting FPres. Estrada’s motion to modify Custodial
Arrangement dated March 29, 2004 subject to the conditions imposed by the Court. Accused FPres.
Estrada filed a Compliance and Acceptance of Conditions on July 13, 2004. Since then, accused FPres.
Estrada has been detained in his property at Tanay, Rizal.
When the Court ordered the arrest and detention of the accused in these cases, accused Serapio filed
his petition for bail on April 27, 2001. Accused Jinggoy Estrada’s petition for bail was included in his Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001.
Accused Serapio’s Petition for Bail was deferred indefinitely as prayed for by the said accused while, on
August 14, 2001, accused Jinggoy Estrada filed an Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons
dated August 16, 2001 which the prosecution opposed. On December 20, 2001, the Court issued its
Resolution denying accused Jinggoy Estrada’s Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons.
Considering the denial of the said motion for bail for medical reasons, accused Jinggoy Estrada, on April
17, 2002, filed an Omnibus Application for Bail dated April 16, 2002. After hearing, the Court issued a
Resolution on March 6, 2003 which granted accused Jinggoy Estrada’s Omnibus Application for Bail. The
prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March 13, 2003 was denied in this Court’s Resolution
dated April 30, 2003. The aforesaid Resolutions granting bail to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada were upheld by
the Honorable Supreme Court in a Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 158754, People vs. Sandiganbayan
(Special Division) and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada (August 10, 2007).
As to accused Serapio, the Court’s Resolution dated September 12, 2003 also granted accused-movant
Serapio’s Urgent Petition for Bail dated April 27, 2001. The Court fixed the amount of bail of accused
Serapio and Jinggoy Estrada at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each which was to paid in
cash.
While the case was already in the trial stage, on January 4, 2002 the counsels for the accused Estradas
wrote a letter to the Acting Presiding Justice requesting for a re-raffle of the cases against the accused,
citing as grounds the continuing uncertain composition of the justices handling the cases against the
accused Former President, et al., at that time. The prosecution filed its Opposition to Request for Re-
Raffle On January 9, 2002 and its Comment/Suggestion on January 10, 2002 that a Special Third Division
be constituted to be composed of the present Presiding Justice, the only remaining member of the Third
Division to which the case was raffled, and two other Sandiganbayan Justices who are not retirables
within the next three (3) years. Justice Anacleto Badoy, the Chairman of the Third Division, was due to
retire on October 2002, while Justice Ilarde, the other member, retired on November 27, 2001. On
January 11, 2002, the Sandiganbayan En Banc issued its Resolution 01-2002 recommending to the
Supreme Court that the cases against accused FPres. Estrada, et al., be referred to a Special Division. The
Supreme Court on January 21, 2002 promulgated its Resolution Creating the Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder Case and all related cases filed
or may hereafter be filed against accused FPres. Estrada, and those accused with him, until they are
resolved, decided and terminated. In the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court
retained, as Junior Member, the present Presiding Justice who was then the only remaining member of
the Third Division to which the Plunder Case was raffled, and designated the then Presiding Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario, as Chairperson, and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval as Senior Member.
This was not the first time that a Special Division of the Sandiganbayan was constituted to try a case. A
Special Division was previously constituted to try and decide the Aquino-Galman cases in that
composition of the said Division was also maintained until the case was decided notwithstanding the
subsequent changes in the composition of the Division due to promotions and/or retirement of its
members.
During the same year, the counsel de parte of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada all withdrew
their appearances. The Court on March 1, 2002, in order to protect the rights and interest of the
accused, appointed the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) and those who have been recommended by the
Board of Governor of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to represent accused FPres. Estrada and
Jinggoy Estrada as counsel de oficio, namely, Former Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan Manuel
Pamaran, Atty. Prospero Crescini, Atty. Irene Jurado and Atty. Manuel Malaya. The PAO lawyers
mentioned their duration as counsel de oficio, hence, (Ret.) Presiding Justice Pamaran and the private
practitioners represented accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada up to the time the prosecution
rested its case and submitted to the Court its Formal Offer of Evidence. However, before the
presentation of the evidence for the defense, accused FPres. Estrada, in a Letter dated September 1,
2004, informed the Court that he have decided to re-engage the services of the members of his original
de parte panel of lawyers.
Upon conclusion of the presentation of prosecution evidence and after the Court have ruled on the offer
of evidence of the prosecution, accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio filed their respective
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. In a Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004, the
Court granted accused FPres. Estrada’s Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case
Nos. 26905 and 26565 while it denied the same motion of all the accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 for
lack of merit. Subsequently, the Demurrer to Evidence of accused FPres. Estrada was filed. In its Joint
Resolution dated July 12, 2004, the Court resolved to deny FPres. Estrada’s Demurrer to Evidence in
Criminal Case No. 26905 but granted the Demurrer to Evidence of FPres. Estrada in Criminal Case No.
26565.
After the presentation of the evidence for accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, accused Serapio
manifested that he opted not to present his own evidence but adopted the evidence presented by
FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada. The said accused then formally offered their evidence. The Court
issued its resolution on the formal offer of evidence for accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and
Serapio. On the other hand, the prosecution manifested that it was not presenting any rebuttal evidence
but formally offered additional evidence and tendered excluded evidence in its Supplemental Formal
Offer of Exhibits [Re: Exhibits Identified, Presented, and Marked during the Cross Examination of
Defense Witnesses] with Tender of Excluded Evidence dated March 29, 2007. The Court issued its
Minute Resolution dated April 19, 2007 on the said additional offer of evidence of the prosecution.
In an Order dated May 9, 2007, the Court gave the parties a period of time to file their respective
memoranda and scheduled the Oral Summation requested by accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada on June 15, 2007. After the Oral Summation, the case was submitted for decision.
Incidentally, on November 10, 2006, the National Bureau of Investigation filed its Return of "Alias" Order
of Arrest, informing the Court that one of the accused in this case, Atong Ang was extradited from the
United States of America and was already under the custody of the said agency. At his arraignment,
accused Atong Ang refused to enter a plea and the Court entered a plea of not guilty for the said
accused.
On January 24, 2007, when the case was scheduled for Pre-Trial only for accused Atong Ang, the
prosecution and the said accused, assisted by his counsel, manifested in open court that they had
executed a Plea Bargaining Agreement. The Court’s Resolution dated March 14, 2007 approved the Plea
Bargaining Agreement entered into by the parties.
On March 19, 2007, during accused Atong Ang’s re-arraignment, the said accused pleaded guilty to a
lesser offense of Corruption of Public Officials under Article 212 in relation to Article 211 of the Revised
Penal Code. On the same day, the Court rendered its decision against accused Atong Ang sentencing
said accused to "two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional minimum, as minimum, to six
(6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum, and to pay the amount of P25,000,000.00 to
the Government as his civil liability". Accused Atong Ang immediately filed a Petition for Probation (with
Motion to Deduct Period of Preventive Imprisonment from the Term of Imprisonment and to Post Bail
Pending Resolution thereof) which the Court granted in a Resolution dated May 25, 2007. Accused
Atong Ang is now under probation.
STATEMENT OF THE STIPULATIONS

OF THE PARTIES AT PRE-TRIAL
________________________________
After the arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was conducted which led to the issuance of the
Amended Pre-Trial Order dated June 14, 2001, quoted in part hereunder:
When this case was called for pre-trial on September 3, 2001, accused JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE
"Jinggoy" P. ESTRADA appeared, assisted by counsels, Atty. Jose B. Flaminiano, Atty. Cleofe Villar-
Verzola, Atty. Rene A. V. Saguisag and Atty. Raymond Parsifal A. Fortun. Accused Edward S. Serapio
likewise appeared, assisted by his counsels, Atty. Sabino Acut, Jr. and Atty. Martin Israel L. Pison. The
People was represented by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio,
Jr., Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, Ombudsman Prosecutor III Antonio T. Manzano and
Humphrey T. Monteroso.
The accused Estradas and Edward S. Serapio submitted their WAIVER OF APPEARANCE dated September
3, 2001 stating as follows:
Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Edward S. Serapio hereby waive their appearance
during the pre-trial and the trial of this case subject to the conditions that:
a. whenever his/her/their name/s/are mentioned at any stage of the proceedings of this/ these
case/s whether in testimonial or documentary evidence, such name/s refer/s to his/her/them;
and
b. whenever his/her/their appearance shall be require by the Court at any time, they will appear,
otherwise warrant/s shall issue for their arrest.
The aforementioned three (3) accused verbally manifested in open Court that they fully understand and
agree with their conditions contained in their Waiver of Appearance.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution, the accused Estradas and accused Serapio agreed to stipulate on the following facts, as
proposed by the prosecution to wit:
1. That accused Joseph Estrada (“Estrada” for short) took his oath of office as President of the
Republic of the Philippines on 30th June 1998, [cf. Proposal No. 1(For all specifications) of
accused Estrada’s Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01 August 2001];
2. That accused Joseph Estrada is married to Dra. (now Senator) Luisa P. Ejercito; [cf. Proposal No.
2 (For all Specifications) of accused Estrada’s Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated
01 August 2001];
3. That accused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Jr. (“Jinggoy” for short) is the son of accused Joseph
Estrada; [cf. Proposal No. 3 (For all Specifications) of accused Estrada’s Proposed Stipulation of
Facts of the defense dated 01 August 2001;
4. Edward S. Serapio is a lawyer and a former professor of law at the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law; [cf. Proposal No. 1 of accused Atty. Edward Serapio’s Request for Stipulation of
Facts and Admission of Documents dated 01 August 2001;
5. On April 29 1999, Atty. Serapio was appointed by President Joseph Estrada as Presidential
Assistant for Political Affairs with the rank of Undersecretary. [cf. Proposal No. 2 of accused Atty.
Edward Serapio’s Request for Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Documents dated 01 August
2001;
6. He accepted such appointment. [cf. Proposal No. 2. 1 of specification of accused Atty. Edward
Serapio’s Request for Stipulation of Facts and Admission of documents dated 01 August 2001.
The other stipulations of facts proposed by the accused Estradas and admitted by the prosecution were:
1. That From 1998-2001, Mr. Luis "Chavit" Singson was elected Governor of the province of Ilocos
Sur; [cf. Proposal No. 6 (For all Specifications) of accused Estrada’s Proposed Stipulation of Facts
of the defense dated 01 August 2001];
2. That the amount of P40 Million was withdrawn by a person representing herself to be accused
Alma Alfaro from Land Bank of the Philippines-Shaw Branch on 28th August 1998; [cf. Proposal
No. 5 of specification (b) of accused Joseph E. Estrada and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada’s Stipulation of
Facts and Admission of Documents dated 01 August 2001.
The accused Estradas proposed and the prosecution admitted the following stipulation of facts:
1. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Rodolfo "Bong" Pineda; [cf. Paragraph 13 of
the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
2. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows "Atong" Ang; [cf. Paragraph 17 of the
Prosecution’s Additional stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
3. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Lucio Co; [cf. Paragraph 23 of the
Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
4. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Jaime Dichaves; [cf. Paragraph 24 of the
5. That accused President Estrada is a close and childhood friend of Carlos A. Arellano; [cf.
Paragraph 1 Re: Belle case of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August
2001];
6. That accused President Estrada appointed Carlos A. Arellano as Chairman of the Social Security
System on July 1, 1998; [cf. Paragraph 2 re: Belle case of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation
of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
7. That Carlos A. Arellano was appointed by accused President Estrada as President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Social Security System; [cf. Paragraph 3 re: Belle case of the
8. That accused President Estrada knew of the existence of Belle Corporation; [cf. Paragraph 7 re:
Belle case of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the prosecution admitted by accused Serapio:
1. That Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (hereinafter the "Foundation") has a huge fund of more
than P211 Million.
The only issue that was raised by the parties for resolution is whether or not accused JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, JOSE "Jinggoy" P. ESTRADA and ATTY. EDWARD S. SERAPIO are guilty of the offense charged in
the Amended Information.
The accused Estradas raise also the issue of whether or not the allegations in the information would
constitute the crime of plunder as defined by R.A. No. 7080. (COMMENT ON, AND MOTION TO CORRECT
PRE-TRIAL ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 13, 2001, filed by accused Estrada’s on September 21, 2001)
The evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense in support of, or in denial, of the
speculations of the predicate acts adverted to in each of the paragraphs are discussed hereunder in
seriatim:
EVIDENCE PRESENTED:
RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH A OF THE

AMENDED INFORMATION
____________________________
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, JOSE
‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
The alleged co-conspirators of accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada named in this
paragraph (a) are: Charlie "Atong" Tiu Hay Sy Ang (Atong Ang), Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte (Ricaforte) and Edward S. Serapio. The paragraph also refers to unidentified co-conspirators by
the usual "Jane Does" and "John Does".
I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
The principal witness of the prosecution in this first specification of the predicate acts of plunder is
Former Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" C. Singson. He testified extensively on the charge that FPres.
Estrada accumulated ill-gotten wealth in the above-mentioned amount through the monthly remittance
to him of seems of money collected from operations of illegal gambling, commonly known as "jueteng",
based in the different provinces of the country allegedly in consideration of the prosecution or
unimpeded operation of said illegal gambling.
The gist of the testimony of Singson relative to paragraph (a) of the Amended Information is set forth
hereunder:
GOVERNOR LUIS "CHAVIT" CRISOLOGO SINGSON (Gov. Singson) was 61 years old, married, a
businessman, and a resident of Mabini Street, Poblacion, Vigan, Province of Ilocos Sur at the time he
took the witness stand as prosecution witness. The examination of the witness was done by Solicitor
General Simeon Marcelo under the control and supervision of the Ombudsman who was present. The
counsel de oficio of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, (Ret.) Justice Manuel R. Pamaran,
objected to the appearance of the Solicitor General, which the Court noted. [TSN dated July 17, 2002,
pp. 166-167] The testimony of Gov. Singson was presented to corroborate the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Maria Carmencita Itchon, Emma B. Lim and the Equitable PCI Bank Branch
Managers where Ricaforte opened accounts, and to prove that accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada,
Atong Ang, Ricaforte, Serapio and the other accused, in conspiracy with one another, amassed and
accumulated ill-gotten wealth for principal accused FPres. Estrada’s benefit while he was the
13th President of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Four Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight
Hundred Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos and Seventeen Centavos
(P4,097,804,173.17), part of which was derived from:
(1) the collection of jueteng protection money from November 1998 to August 2000, in the amount of
Five Hundred Forty Five Million Pesos (P545,000,000.00) more or less and the amount of Two Hundred
Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) also from the said illegal gambling protection money; and
(2) misappropriation, diversion and conversion for his personal gain as benefit public funds in the
amount of One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) more or less, representing a portion of
the Two Hundred Million pesos (P200,000,000.00) Tobacco Excise Share allocated for the Province of
Ilocos Sur under Republic Act No. 7171.
Gov. Singson was also presented by the prosecution to prove that Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio conspired
with and/or acted as co-principals by indispensable cooperation of FPres. Estrada in the running of the
illegal numbers game of jueteng and in the receipt by FPres. Estrada of jueteng protection money; that
accused Jinggoy Estrada regularly collected jueteng protection money every month from January of
1999 to August 15, 2000, as an indispensable part of the amassing and accumulating ill-gotten wealth by
principal accused FPres. Estrada and as part of the series and/or combination of overt or criminal acts
constituting the crime of plunder; that Serapio conspired with FPres. Estrada and the other accused in
receiving the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) which came from jueteng operations and in
hiding and/or laundering the same through the banking system and that Serapio was the personal
lawyer of FPres. Estrada and that in furtherance of the conspiracy he set up various juridical entities to
mask and/or hide various illegal proprietary and business interests of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson would
also identify certain documents, checks, pictures and other facts relevant to the foregoing, which tend
to prove the combination and/or series of overt and criminal acts, constitutive of the crime of plunder
(and to oppose the petition for bail of Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson’s testimony was also offered to
prove the illegal use of alias). [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 168-174]
Gov. Singson testified that he was called by FPres. Estrada at his house in Polk Street, Greenhills, on
August of 1998. Gov. Singson was then the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur. Gov. Singson went to Polk
Street in the evening. He was assisted by a security guard towards the kitchen where he found Atong
Ang and FPres. Estrada talking how to expand the operations of jueteng, an illegal numbers game, in the
provinces where there was yet no jueteng protection money. Shortly, Bong Pineda arrived. Gov. Singson
heard FPres. Estrada told Bong Pineda that starting on that day not to bring money at his house because
it was very obvious. Gov. Singson did not know Bong Pineda very much but he saw Bong Pineda in
Congress when he was investigated regarding jueteng. The jueteng money would protect jueteng
operator from being arrested. FPres. Estrada then instructed Bong Pineda to give the money to Atong
Ang or to Gov. Singson because the latter was a Governor so it would not be obvious if he brought
money to FPres. Estrada. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 178-187]
According to Gov. Singson, the day after the aforementioned meeting, Atong Ang started meeting with
the jueteng operators in his office near the municipal hall of San Juan. [Ibid, p. 188] Atong Ang and the
operators were bargaining how much protection money from each province will be given to FPres.
Estrada. [Ibid, p. 193] After the final talk, they started collecting jueteng protection money, specifically
from August of 1998. [Ibid, p. 203]
Gov. Singson knew FPres. Estrada for almost thirty (30) years before August of 1998. FPres. Estrada was
not yet a mayor but a movie actor as Gov. Singson’s mother was a producer. [Ibid, p. 191] Gov. Singson
first met Atong Ang at the cockpit and gambling places. He had known Atong Ang for a long time even
when FPres. Estrada was still the Vice President. According to Gov. Singson, Bong Pineda was a close
"compadre" of FPres. Estrada while his son, Jinggoy Estrada, was Bong Pineda’s godson by marriage.
[Ibid, p. 197]
Gov. Singson claimed that he was present in not all but several meetings of Atong Ang with the jueteng
collectors. He was present when there was an agreement on the three percent (3%) of total collections
in every province, as fixed by Atong Ang. [TSN dated July 22, 2002, pp. 12-13] Jueteng money was
delivered to FPres. Estrada initially every end of the month, starting September of 1998 and later every
15th and at the end of the month. [Ibid, p.14]
On October of 1998, Gov. Singson and Atong Ang brought the jueteng protection money of about Nine
Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00) for the said month to FPres. Estrada at his house, in No. 1 Polk Street in
Greenhills, but FPres. Estrada and Atong Ang had a nasty quarrel about the sugar allocation request of
Atong Ang which was denied by FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson brought home the said P9,000,000.00 but,
the following day, FPres. Estrada called him up asking him to pay F.P. Estrada’s obligations which went
on until the said amount was consumed and Gov. Singson was instructed by FPres. Estrada to continue
the collection of the jueteng money. [Ibid, pp. 26, 22-23]
Gov. Singson continued the collection as instructed by FPres. Estrada, still with the help of Atong Ang,
from November of 1998 until August of 2000. The amounts of money collected from jueteng during the
said period were listed in the ledger per month and per province. The ledger also listed the expenses
paid for using the jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 24-27]
Every fifteen (15) days, Gov. Singson himself delivered protection money to FPres. Estrada in the
amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) or a total of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) every
month. Emma B. Lim delivered once the jueteng money to FPres. Estrada in Malacañang. The protection
money was delivered usually in cash but sometimes in check. Chavit Singon presented to this court two
(2) sets of ledger. The first set consisted of nine (9) pages covering the month of November of 1998 up
to July of 1999 (Exh. W7 to Exh. E8). The September 1998 and October 1998 collections were not
reflected in the said ledger since the ledger was done only after FPres. Estrada and Atong Ang quarreled
in October 1998. The second set of ledger covered the months of August of 1999 to August of 2000
(Exh.A-4 to Exh. A-4-d). [TSN dated July 22, 2002, p. 27-31]
Gov. Singson prepared the pages of the first set of ledger (Exh. W7 to E8) with the help of Emma B. Lim
and Ma. Carmencita Itchon and on the following year, Ricaforte joined them. [Ibid, pp. 35-36]
The pages of the second set of ledgers starting August of 1999 to August of 2000 [Exhibit A-4 and
submarkings] were prepared by Ricaforte under the supervision of Gov. Singson who also checked the
said ledger. [Ibid, pp. 36-37]
Ricaforte was introduced to Gov. Singson by FPres. Estrada before his birthday on April 19, 1999. She
was designated by FPres. Estrada as auditor because FPres. Estrada was strict with money. Gov. Singson
was thankful for Ricaforte’s designation because he did not want FPres. Estrada to distrust him. [Ibid, p.
40] Gov. Singson considered Ricaforte as the employee of FPres. Estrada with respect to the jueteng
collections because not only was she introduced to Singson by FPres. Estrada, the latter also told
Singson to give her Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80, 000.00) monthly salary.
Ricaforte held office at LCS Building owned by Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 42-43] Gov. Singson did not know
Yolanda Ricaforte or her husband Orestes Ricaforte before April of 1999. Gov. Singson identified
Ricaforte from a picture (Exh. A-6-b-1) where she was seated beside Menchu Itchon, the assistant of
Gov. Singson. The picture was taken during the wedding of Raquel, the daughter of Gov. Singson where
FPres. Estrada and his wife Senator Loi Ejercito stood as wedding sponsors. [Ibid, p. 45-48]
According to Gov. Singson, the jueteng collections were placed in a scratch paper as they came every
fifteen (15) days, at the middle and the end of the month or five (5) days after the end of the month.
When all the collections had arrived, the list was finalized and then transferred to the computer. The
ledgers were prepared upon instructions of FPres. Estrada because the latter was strict with money.
[Ibid, pp. 37-40, 41-42]
Gov. Singson explained in detail the entries on the left hand portion of the ledger for November of 1998
up to July of 1999. In the province of Ilocos Sur, the total collection for fifteen (15) days was Seven
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P750,000.00), in the province of La Union for 15 days, Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) total collection, while in Bulacan for 15 days, One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) total collection (Exh. W7) of protection money for FPres. Estrada. The entries for the
other provinces were similar. On the left side column were the names of the provinces, the middle
column pertained to the number of days, i.e., whether for 15 or 30 days and the right column, the total
amount of collections of jueteng protection money, in order that jueteng operators will not be
"arrested" or apprehended. There was one (1) collector for three (3) provinces. [Ibid, pp. 53-54]
In the second set of ledger (Exh. A-4 to A-4-d) Ricaforte gave a code name for every province below the
title "Theme". The number of days, either 15 or 30, under the title "days" and the total amount of
protection money for FPres. Estrada below the title "points" were indicated in the ledger. [Ibid, pp. 55-
56]
Gov. Singson narrated that when FPres. Estrada was still the Vice President, they were already collecting
jueteng money but not in all provinces. When FPres. Estrada assumed the presidency, he called Gov.
Singson and Atong Ang to start jueteng collections in provinces without protection money. Atong Ang
talked to certain persons in the said provinces so that the collection of protection money could start.
Every province had a collector but sometimes there was one collector for three (3) provinces. The
collections were submitted to Gov. Singson but sometimes they would get the money from the house of
the collectors. The jueteng collections which FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to operate for FPres.
Estrada’s own benefit was at the national level, meaning nationwide. They did not interfere with jueteng
operations at the lower level. Before there were "Kangaroo" type of jueteng operations or "Guerilla
Type". They did it on their own and they did not pay protection money. When the jueteng operators
gave protection money to FPres. Estrada, they were not apprehended anymore although there were
instructions to the contrary which were for show or for record purposes only. [Ibid, pp. 59-64]
There were local officials who did not allow jueteng like Governor Lina in Laguna. He changed the
Provincial Commander several times but jueteng still continued. In the other places the protection
money for jueteng given to the local officials was different from that given to the higher levels. [Ibid, pp.
65-66]
In Exhibit A-4, ULAC stands for Bulacan and the figure 1.00 means One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for
fifteen (15) days, as protection money for FPres. Estrada. If the number of days was blank it meant 15
days, otherwise the number 30 was indicated.
In the ledger (Exh A-4-C up to A-4-I) covering the periods of January of 2000 up to August of 2000, the
same figures appeared but the code names of the provinces were replaced by their original names as
instructed by FPres. Estrada who was confused with the code names. Under the sub-title "amount", the
total amount of protection money given to FPres. Estrada was reflected. For instance, in Ilocos Sur, the
amount of 500 meant Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 67-68]
The other entries were similar, except for the substitution of the code names with actual names of the
provinces. For instance, the amount of protection money given to FPres. Estrada corresponding to Ilocos
Sur entered as 500, was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). For the province of Bulacan the
number of days was blank and the figure 1,000 was entered. This means that for Bulacan for 15 days the
total protection money given to FPres. Estrada was One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). According to
Gov. Singson, the collections were delivered in exact amount so they removed the zeroes in the ledger
so as not to lengthen the entries. [Ibid, pp. 69-70]
The two boxes of entries at the right bottom of the ledger marked as Exhibits A-4 to A-4-l, reflected the
expenses to show where some of the money collected went. [Ibid, p. 70] The first entry (Exh. W7-1)
showed that Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) went to "Jimpol", which referred to then Secretary
Jimmy Policarpio. The latter confirmed to Gov. Singson this receipt of the said amount from Bong Pineda
which Secretary Policarpio, then a political liaison officer for Congress, would use for the media. [Ibid,
pp. 74-75] In the ledger for November of 1998, the entry 300 Goma (Exh W7-2) means that Three Million
Pesos (P3,000,000.00) was given to the Office of the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). [Ibid,
pp.74-76] Gov. Singson himself brought the money at first to General Lastimoso, the Chief of the PNP
but he refused to receive the money. Later Atong Ang identified the persons from PNP who will pick up
the money and help them in the operation. Gov. Singson called up FPres. Estrada to inform him that
Lastimoso refused to receive the money. Gov. Singson was worried Lastimoso may not coordinate with
them. One time, Gov. Singson was called to Malacanang and he met General Lastimoso there and FPres.
Estrada told the latter to coordinate with Gov. Singson about the operation of jueteng. General
Lastimoso expressed the need to coordinate with the Regional Commanders to apprehend jueteng
operations for show only ("kunwari"). [Ibid, pp. 77-80]
The entry "November 1998, 5.00, AS Sunday" (Exh W7-3) means that the amount for Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) protection money was given to FPres. Estrada, whose code name was "Asiong Salonga"
on a Sunday. Gov. Singson himself gave the money to FPres. Estrada. The next entry "1.000 Jing" (Exh
W7-4), would show that One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was given to Jinggoy Estrada, whose code
name was "Jing". According to Gov. Singson, Jinggoy Estrada was the collector of protection money for
the Province of Bulacan which should be Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) for every month but
Jinggoy Estrada kept the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and remit to Gov. Singson only Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) or One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for every 15 days. [Ibid, pp. 80-82]
Atong Ang told Gov. Singson that Jinggoy Estrada got One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and Jinggoy
Estrada confirmed it but when they told FPres. Estrada about it, he instructed them not to give Jinggoy
Estrada money and he will be the one to give money to Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson removed the
name of Jinggoy Estrada from the list and they kept it a secret from FPres. Estrada that Jinggoy Estrada
was taking jueteng money because Jinggoy Estrada will get angry too if he was not given a share. Jinggoy
Estrada was then the Mayor of the Municipality of San Juan. Jinggoy Estrada collected money from the
Province of Bulacan at the later part of January of 1999. [Ibid, p. 82-85]
The entry "500 JD" (Exh W7-5) means that Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) went to Jude
Estrada, a son of FPres. Estrada. Jude confirmed to Gov. Singson that he received the said amount of
jueteng protection money from Atong Ang who reported that to Gov. Singson. The entry "1.800 ad
check" (Exh W7-6) refers to One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,800,000.00) covered by a
bad check, part of jueteng money, which bounced. This was PCI Bank Check No. 0019063 (Exh. F8) given
to Gov. Singson by one Celso De Los Angeles. The entry "17.300 total expenses" (Exh. W7-7) represents
the Seventeen Million Three Hundred Pesos (P17,300,000.00) the amount of total expenses for the
month of November of 1998. The total expenses every month were entered in the ledger (Exh. X7 to E8,
and Exh. A-4 to A-4-d. [Ibid, pp. 85-92])
In the entry for December of 1998 (Exh. X7), the first entry "5.00, AS" (Exh. X7-1) shows the Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that was given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from the collection of jueteng
protection money. The ledger for January 1999 bearing as first entry "6.00 cash January 2, AS" (Exh Y7-1),
reflected the Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) cash from the same source given personally by Gov.
Singson to FPres. Estrada. The entry "3.00 check, February 1, 1999, AS" (Exh. W7-2) shows that Three
Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) in check was given to FPres. Estrada on February 1, 1999 as part of
protection money. [Ibid, pp. 93-95] Another entry "5.00 check, February 1, 1999 AS" (Exh Y7-3), refers to
the Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) Check given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from jueteng
protection money. This check (Metrobank Check No.0000917, Exh G8-1) was deposited in the account of
Paul Boghart, who was mentioned during the impeachment trial at the Senate as a foreigner assisting in
the "PR" of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 93-97]
The entry "3.500 cash, January 19, AS" (Exh. Y7-4) pertains to Three Million Five Hundred Pesos
(P3,500,000.00) cash from the protection money given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada on January 19
(1999). The entry "5.00, February 18, AS" (Exh. Z7-1) refers to the Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
given by Gov. Singson to FPres. on February 18, 1999 from the same protection money. Gov. Singson
explained that the entry "400 tax" (Exh Z7-2) at the right hand portion of Exhibit Z7, refers to the Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) which he got for reimbursement of the expenses that he paid or
would pay but were not recorded in the ledger. In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh. A8), April 1999 (Exh.
B8), May 1999 (Exh. C8), June 1999 (Exh. D8), July 1999 (Exh. E8), and August 1999 (Exh A-4) there were
similar entries of "tax" which were also intended for the same purpose. Gov. Singson called them
"butal". Gov. Singson had the permission of FPres. Estrada that all amounts less than One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) were considered "butal" which Gov. Singson kept for reimbursement of expenses which
FPres. Estrada would ask Gov. Singson to pay. If the total amount collection was Four Million Two
Hundred Pesos (P4,200,000.00), Gov. Singson got Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) of the
said collection as "butal" and included the same in the ledger as "tax". [Ibid, pp. 98-101]
In the ledger for February 1999 collection appears a handwritten entry "+ 4.00 capitol February 3, 1999".
This entry pertains to the Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) "kickback" which FPres. Estrada asked Gov.
Singson to give him on February 3, 1999 out of the Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) allotted for
the repair of the capitol of Ilocos Sur. This P4 Million was added to the "total to date" of the collection
which consequently amounted to Thirty Eight Million Pesos (P38,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 102-103]
In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh. A8), the first entry "5.00, 4/6/99, AS" (Exh. A8-1) shows that Five
Mllion Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that Gov. Singson gave FPres. Estrada on April 6, 1999. Gov. Singson wrote
on the ledger "AS", i.e. Asiong Salonga, the code name of FPres. Estrada [Ibid, p. 103]
Regarding the entry "500 3/23 c/0 Malou AS" (Exh A8-2), Gov. Singson explained that Malou Florendo,
the Secretary of FPres. Estrada, coordinated with Gov. Singson by telephone for the delivery of the
amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada. Emma B. Lim delivered the money as
Gov. Singson was in the province when FPres. Estrada called up Gov. Singson to tell him he needed
money very badly. [Ibid, pp. 104-106]
On April 1, 1999, Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) were given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from
jueteng protection money as shown by the entry "5.00 4/1/99 AS" (Exh B8-1). The next entry, "1.00,
William Gatchalian" (Exh "B8-2), refers to the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to
William Gatchalian upon instruction of FPres. Estrada. Gatchalian had a Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00) check but FPres. Estrada won only Nineteen Million Pesos (P19,000,000.00) in their
mahjong game, so FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to give to Gatchalian the change of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) charged to the jueteng protection money. Gov. Singson gave Gatchalian the said
amount through a Metrobank Check No. 0001066 (Exh H8 and H8-1). [Ibid, pp.106-109]
The entry in Exhibit B8 which reads "200 Jerry and Len" (Exh B8-3) reflects the One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) each given to then Secretary Lenny De Jesus and Secretary Jerry Barican, or a total
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), as "balato" as instructed by FPres. Estrada.
[Ibid, pp. 109-110]
Senator Tessie Oreta and Sonny Osmena were also given One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) each or a
total of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in Cebu aboard the Presidential Yatch "Ang Pangulo" as
shown by the entry "2.00 Tessie and Sonny" (Exh. B8). Gov. Singson gave the said sums of money to the
Senators, which he funded through the jueteng protection money, in the form of Metrobank Check No.
0001081 (Exhs. I8 and I8 -1 and Metrobank Check No. 0001082 (Exhs. J8 and J8-1) upon instruction of
FPres. Estrada, as their "balato" for the winning of the latter in "Mahjong". [Ibid, pp. 112-114]
The amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) was given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from the
jueteng protection money on each of the following dates as shown by the entries in the ledger: (1) May
1, 1999 ("5.00 5/1/99 AS" – Exh. C8-1); (2) May 18, 1999 ("5.00 5/18/99 AS" – Exh. C8-2); (3) June 1, 1999
("5.00 6/1/99 AS" – Exh. D8-1); (4) June 18, 1999 ("5.00 6/18/99 AS" – Exh. D8-2); (5) July 31, 1999 ("5.00
7/1/99 AS" – Exh. E8-1); and (6) July 19, 1999 ("5.00 7/19/99 AS" – Exh. E8-2). From May 1, 1999 to July
19, 1999, the total amount of money given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada would amount to Thirty
Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) based on the ledger. [Ibid, pp.115-118]
The entry reading "123,000 total to date" (Exh E8-3) represents the total amount of One Hundred
Twenty Three Million Pesos (P123,000,000.00) that remained as of July 1999. [Ibid, pp. 118-119]
After July 1999, particularly on August 1999, FPres. Estrada called Gov. Singson, Ricaforte and Serapio to
a meeting at Mandaluyong. Gov. Singson was instructed by FPres. Estrada in the presence of Ricaforte
and Serapio to turn-over all the balance of the money from jueteng to the account of Ricaforte. Gov.
Singson was keeping most of the above-mentioned P123,000,000.00 in the bank and the others in cash
in his office because FPres. Estrada would ask for money from time to time. Gov. Singson turned-over
the aforementioned balance of the jueteng money partly in check and partly in cash in the office of
FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte and Serapio were there with the Former President. [Ibid, pp.119-123]
Part of the aforesaid P123,000,000.00 was covered by Metrobank Check No. 0001360 (Exh K8 and K8-1)
of Gov. Singson in the amount of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P17,210,000.00)
[Ibid, p. 123]. The second and third checks (Exhs A-2-b and A-7-c) were PCI Bank checks in the account
name of William Gatchalian each in the amount of Thirty-Five Million Pesos (P35,000,000.00) or a total
of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). Gov. Singson narrated that the amount of Sixty-Two Million
Pesos (P62,000,000.00) from the jueteng protection money was lent to William Gatchalian. Out of this
transaction, FPres. Estrada earned Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) such that William Gatchalian paid
a total of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 124-125]
Gov. Singson presented Metrobank Check No. 0001332 with account name Governor Luis "Chavit"
Singson, in the amount of Forty-Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P46,350,000,00)
payable to William Gatchalian (Exh L8 and L8-1). This check, according to Gov. Singson was part of the
jueteng protection money lent to William Gatchalian. The rest of the P62,000,000.00 were in cash and
covered by other checks. [Ibid, pp. 126-127]
The Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) earned from the loan by FPres. Estrada was taken as advance by
the latter before due date of the P70,000,000.00 of Gatchalian. For this reason, the P8,000,000.00 was
not anymore added to the balance of P123,000,000.00 of jueteng money. [Ibid, pp. 127-130] The
advance of P8,000,000.00 was covered by Metrobank Check No. 0001388 with the account name
Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson (Exhs. M8 and M8-1). During the impeachment trial at the Senate, it
turned out that the P8,000,000.00 was deposited in the account of Senator Loi Estrada [Ibid, pp. 130-
131,139]
The fourth check which covered part of the total balance of P123,000,000.00 jueteng protection money
was a Far East bank Check in the amount of Thirty-Four Million Six Hundred Forty Two Thousand Four
Hundred Forty Two Pesos (P34,642,442.00) payable to the order of Fontain Bleau, Inc. (Exh B6). [Ibid, p.
124] According to Gov. Singson, the Far East Bank check payable to the order of Fontaine Bleau, Inc. was
paid by Fontana to Fontaine Bleau, Inc. which was a casino owned by FPres. Estrada and built with the
use of jueteng protection money. The bulk of the P123,000,000.00 were turned-over by Gov. Singson in
the form of checks. The cash amounted only to Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) only. [TSN
dated July 24, 2002, pp.8-9]
In the second set of ledger covering the months of August 1999 to August 2000 (Exh A-4) are found the
following entries: (1) "3.00 AS 9/6 8 o’clock a.m." (Exh A-4.1) and (2) "5.00 AS 8/16/99" (Exh A-4.2). The
entries represent the two (2) Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada
on September 6 at 8 o’clock in the morning and on August 16, 1999 or a total of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) as part of jueteng collection. [Ibid, pp. 10-13]
The other entries in the said ledger are: (1) "16.310 August 1-15" (A-4-3); (2) "13.150 August 16-31"
(Exh. A-4-4); (3) "29.460 total for August" (Exh. A-4-5); (4) "15.200 expenses" (Exh. A-4-6); (5) "14.260
subtotal" (Exh. A-4-7); (6) ".260 tax" (Exh. A-4-8); (7) "14.000 total to date" (Exh. A-4-9). Gov. Singson
explained that the entries mean (1) that the total collection for August 1-15, 1999 amounted to Sixteen
Million Three Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P16,310,000.00); (2) that from August 16-31, 1999 the total
collection was Thirteen Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P13,150,000.00); (3) that the total
collection for the whole month of August 1999 was Twenty Nine Million Four Hundred Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P29,460,000.00) which all went to FPres. Estrada. The expenses for the said month reached
Fifteen Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P15,200,000.00). The said amount of expenses was
deducted from the total collection for the same month. The remainder, described as "subtotal",
amounted to Fourteen Million Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P14,260,000.00). Of the latter sum
of money, Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P260,000.00) was treated as "butal" and taken by Gov.
Singson to be used as reimbursement for expenses which Gov. Singson was requested by FPres. Estrada
to pay. The balance of Fourteen Million Pesos (P14,000,000.00) was deposited in the bank for President
Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 14-18]
The "tax" entries in the ledger, starting Exhibit Z to Z-7, covered the amounts less than One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) which were treated as "butal" that remained with Gov. Singson to reimburse him
for expenses which were not recorded in the ledger but should be deducted from the money of FPres.
Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 19-21]
Gov. Singson mentioned that he personally gave or handed to FPres. Estrada even if Malou Florendo,
FPres. Estrada’s secretary, was around. Gov. Singson either left the money beside FPres. Estrada or
behind the latter’s chair. FPres. Estrada would count the money by the bundle [Ibid, pp. 22-23]. The Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) delivered by Emma B. Lim to Malou Florendo not to FPres. Estrada
personally was confirmed by the latter to have been received by him. Emma B. Lim delivered the money
to the Malacañang Palace because of the changes in the instructions given by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp.
23-24]
The net balance of Fourteen Million Pesos (P14,000,000.00) for August 1999 was deposited by Ricaforte
at Equitable PCI Bank. The same was done to the net monthly balances for September 1999, October
1999, November 1999, December 1999, January 2000, February 2000, March 2000, April 2000 and May
2000. [Ibid, pp. 25-27]
The other entries in the second set of ledger for September 1999 and October 1999 as follows: (1) "AS
11:30 am/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-a-1); (2) "10/29 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-b-1"); (3) 10/14 AS/258 5.000
(Exh A-4-b-2), mean that Gov. Singson whose code name was "258" gave FPres. Estrada, referred to as
"AS", which stands for Asiong Salonga Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on each of the following dates:
(a) in September 1999 at 11:30 in the morning; (b) on October 29, 1999; and (c) on October 14, 1999.
In the November 1999 ledger (Exh A-4-c), the following entries appear (1) "11/30 laptop
comp./print.105,850" (Exh. A-4-c-1) (2) "11/30 2 Starex 800 each/258 1.600" (Exh. A-4-C-2); (3) "11:30
AS/258 12p.m PG5.000" (Exh. A-4-C-3); (4) "11/15 AS/258 at 4p.m 5.000" ( Exh. A-4-C-4 ), and (5) "11/08
Jimpol 2.400".
Gov. Singson explained the foregoing entries in the November 1999 ledger as follows: On November 30,
1999, the amount of P105,850.00 was used to buy the laptop computer with printer of Ricaforte. On
November 30, 1999, Gov. Singson purchased Two (2) units of Starex at Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
each or a total amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00). One unit of Starex
went to Ricaforte and was registered in her name. The other was left in their office. At 12:00 noon on
November 30, 1999, Gov. Singson brought Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada in his
house at P. Guevarra St. at Greenhills as part of jueteng protection money. At that time, Guia Gomez,
one of the most loved of FPres. Estrada, resided at the said house. Gov. Singson also gave Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to former FPres. Estrada on November 15, 1999 at 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
On November 8, 1999, the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000.00) was
given by Bong Pineda to Secretary Jimmy Policarpio, as confirmed by both of them to Singson. During
the prior months, only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) per month were given to Policarpio, as shown
by the ledger, but this was increased by Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) because Policarpio
told Gov. Singson that the Media was costly ("Magastos"). [Ibid, pp. 30-39]
The ledger for December 1999 (Exh. A-4-d), contains the following entries: (1) "12/30 AS/258 5.000"
(Exh A-4-d-1) and (2) "12/04 AS/258 5.00" (Exh A-4-d-2). According to Gov. Singson the aforesaid entries
show that he gave to FPres. Estrada, as part of Jueteng protection, the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) on December 30, 1999 and another Five Million Pesos (P5 Million) on December 4,
1999. [Ibid, pp.39-41]
The ledger for January 2000 (Exh A-4-E) contains the following entries: (1) "1/31/00 AS at PR 5.000" (Exh
A-4-E-1); and (2) "1/15/00 AS at Pr 5.000". According to Gov. Singson "PR" stands for Presidential
Residence and "AS" for Asiong Salonga, that he gave to FPres. Estrada the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) twice, one on January 31, 2000 and the other January 14, 2000, at the Presidential
Residence. [Ibid, pp.41-43]
According to Gov. Singson, he was ordered by FPres. Estrada to give to him Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) of the jueteng collection every fifteen (15) days of the month. All the jueteng collections
were for FPres. Estrada. The total amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) were given to him
every month plus the expenses ("gastos") and the remainder or the rest of the collection were
deposited in the bank for FPres. Estrada in the name of Ricaforte. A total amount of Two Hundred
Sixteen Million Pesos (P216,000,000.00) were deposited in the bank for FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 43-44]
Gov. Singson agreed at first that he would not earn anything from jueteng, provided that the share of
Ilocos Sur from the excise tax under R.A. No. 7171 amounting to billions of pesos would be released to
them for their projects. Gov. Singson testified that, after the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos
(P130,000,000.00) were taken from him, the release of the funds did not continue. The Former
President did not comply with the agreement. [Ibid, pp. 44-46]
In the ledger for February 2000 (Exh A-4-F), the following entries appear: (1) "AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-F-
1); and (2) "2/17/00 AS 258 5.000" (Exh A-4-F-2). Gov. Singson testified that these entries mean that he
gave to FPres. Estrada, Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) as part of jueteng protection money in an
unspecified day in February of 2000 and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) of the same money
on February 17, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 48-49]
The ledger for March 2000 (Exh A-4-G), bears the following entries: (1) "3/16/00 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-
g-1); and (2) "4/3/00 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-G-2). According to Gov. Singson the entries mean that he
gave Five Million Pesos (P5 Million) on March 16, 2000 and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
on April 3,2000, both as part of jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 49-50] Gov. Singson explained that
"258" was his code name which he had been using even in their radio communication and that later,
FPres. Estrada would kid him with his code name when they played mahjong. [Ibid, p. 52]
In the April 2000 ledger (Exh A-4-H), the entry "4/14/00 AS/258 5.000" appeared twice, (Exh A-4-H-1)
because according to Gov. Singson he gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) twice, one in the morning
and another in the afternoon on the same day, April 14, 2000, or a total of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) from jueteng protection money collection, because FPres. called him up twice on the
said date as his birthday on April 19, 2000 was nearing. [Ibid, pp. 53-54]
At the ledger for May 2000 (Exh A-4-i), the first entry also at the right hand portion was "5/31 AS/258
5.000" (Exh A-4-i-1) and next entry was "5/13 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-i-2). Gov. Singson explained that
the entries meant that he gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on May 31, 2000 and another Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada on May 13, 2000, both part of the jueteng protection
money. Gov. Singson also mentioned that the entries sometimes were not in chronological order, but
they were for the same month. [Ibid, pp. 55-56]
The June 2000 ledger (Exh A-4-j), the entry at the right hand portion reads: "6/30 AS/258 3.300", and the
next entry is "6/15 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-j-2). According to Gov. Singson, these means that he gave to
FPres. Estrada Three Million Three Hundred Thousand (P3,300,000.00) from jueteng protection money
collection on June 30, 2000, and Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) from the same collection, on June
15, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 56-57]
The succeeding ledgers for July 2000 (Exh A-4-k) the following entries appear: (1) "7/14 AS/258 2.650"
(Exh. "A-4-k-1) and (2) "8/12 AS/258 3.600" (Exh.A-4-k-2). Gov. Singson explained that the entries mean
respectively that he gave the amount of Two Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P2,650,000.00)
on July 14,2000 and Three Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,600,000.00) to FPres. Estrada as part
of jueteng protection money collection. [Ibid, pp.57-58] To the question of why the amounts were less
than P5,000,000.00 on the said occasions, Gov. Singson replied that it so happened that those were the
only cash in his possession when the requests for money were made and that they stopped jueteng
collection because Atong Ang started with "Pick 2" and later "Bingo 2 Balls" which according to FPres.
Estrada would have a semblance of legality. [Ibid, pp. 59-60]
The ledger for the month of August 2000 (Exh.A-4-L) contains the entry "8/16 AS/258 3.050" (Exh. A-4-L-
1). Gov. Singson testified that he gave FPres. Estrada on August 16, 2000 the amount of Three Million
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P3,050,000.00) as part of protection money collected from jueteng. [Ibid, pp. 62-
63] According to Gov. Singson the President was very strict with money and so they had an auditor and
he checked the ledger monthly so that they could not make any kickback ("Kupit") from the jueteng
collection. [Ibid, pp. 63-64]
Gov. Singson testified that the jueteng collector for Bulacan on November and December 1998 was
Jessie Viceo. In January 1999 the jueteng collector for Bulacan was Jinggoy Estrada as shown by the
ledger where he was identified as "Jing" who got One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) (Exh. W7). Viseo
and Jinggoy Estrada were friends so the latter supervised the jueteng collection in Bulacan, although he
was residing in San Juan. When FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson not to give money to Jinggoy
Estrada and so that the latter will not get mad at him, Gov. Singson and Jinggoy Estrada agreed to keep
it a secret from the FPres. that Jinggoy Estrada managed the jueteng collection in Bulacan and that out
of the total monthly collection of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) from Bulacan, Jinggoy Estrada
gave only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to Gov. Singson and he retained One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00). The money was either picked-up from the office or house of Jinggoy or the latter sent
the money to Singson. The secret arrangement started in November 1999 and lasted until the end of
August 2000. [Ibid, pp. 69-70] However, the arrangement did not appear in the ledger because they will
be scolded by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 71] When asked whether Jinggoy Estrada personally collected the
jueteng money, Gov. Singson replied that it was Jinggoy Estrada and Jessie Viceo who talked with each
other, sometimes they got the jueteng money from the office of Jinggoy Estrada or sometimes the latter
sent it to the office of Singson, but Gov. Singson knew that Jinggoy was in charge of the jueteng
collection. The secret arrangement came about because jueteng collection in Bulacan was a problem
from the start as there were delays or sometimes the checks paid by Jessie Viceo bounced. Viceo agreed
to the arrangement because he was a close friend of Jinggoy Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 71-72] Gov. Singson
knew Viceo personally because he would see Viceo in the cockpits which the latter frequented. [Ibid, p.
74]
Gov. Singson considered the biggest among the expenses charged to the "Tax" the One Million Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00) given to Laarni Enriquez whom Gov. Singson described as the
most beloved or favorite of FPres. Estrada [Ibid, p. 75]. According to Gov. Singson, he was assessed, like
other persons who attended the birthday party of Laarni, the aforesaid P1,200,000.00 as his share in the
price of the necklace birthday gift amounting to Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for Laarni.
Jaime Dichaves collected the said amount from Gov. Singson after the party. Gov. Singson paid by check
which was deposited in the account of Laarni at PSBank. [Ibid, pp. 76-81] It was Congressman Mark
Jimenez who pinpointed the guests who would share (P1,200,000.00) each for the gift for Laarni after
they had just finished playing mahjong with FPres. Estrada during the party. [Ibid, p. 84] Gov. Singson
charged the P1,200,000.00 as "tax" in the jueteng collection because it was "a big amount of money".
[Ibid, pp. 87-88]
In the early part of the year 2000, FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson to transfer Two Hundred
Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) of jueteng money to Serapio. The instruction was given by FPres.
Estrada to Gov. Singson in Malacañang Palace in the presence of Ricaforte and Serapio. According to
Gov. Singson, Serapio said "Ako na ang bahalang magpa-ikot-ikot" which Gov. Singson took it to mean
that Serapio would see to it that the Two Huundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) jueteng money
would not be traced before it reached him. FPres. Estrada checked Gov. Singson in April 2000 when
FPres. Estrada’s birthday was approaching, whether the money was so transferred. The transfer of funds
was confirmed to Gov. Singson by both Ricaforte and Serapio. The jueteng money delivered to Serapio
initially amounted to One Hundred Twenty Three Million Pesos (P123,000,000.00) but it was increased
later to Two Hundred Sixteen Million Pesos (P216,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 88-94]
Gov. Singson testified that Serapio was the trusted lawyer of FPres. Estrada who formed fake
corporations for FPres. Estrada which Serapio would narrate to Gov. Singson when they often see each
other in Malacañang Palace. Serapio was introduced to Gov. Singson in 1999 after the birthday of FPres.
Estrada.
Gov. Singson delivered jueteng money to FPresident Estrada in a black bag, like an attaché case. He
delivered money at the houses of FPres. Estrada, particularly once at P. Guevarra Street, twice or thrice
or four times or five times at Polk Street. [Ibid, pp. 95-98]
Atty. Kenneth S. Tampal of the office of the Senate Legal Counsel brought the black bag referred to by
Gov. Singson which was marked as Exhibit "MMM" at the Senate Impeachment Proceedings and the set
of ledgers for the period beginning August 1999 to August 2000 (Exhibits A-4 to A-4-l). The bag was a
leatherette attaché case with two (2) combination locks numbered 000. [Ibid, pp. 103-105] According to
Atty. Tampal, the exhibits are in the custody of the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel. [Ibid, p. 110]
Gov. Singson testified that the abovementioned black bag (Exh. O8) was one of the black bags which
they used to deliver money to FPres. Estrada in Malacañang Palace. [Ibid, p. 113] The said black bag can
contain five or even six million pesos. [Ibid, pp. 115, 118] He would leave the bag with money and
brought with him the bag without money. The bag contained two (2) combination locks. The
combination of both was "000" although he change it to "419", representing the birthdate of FPres.
Estrada, April 19, at the time he delivered money in Malacañang Palace to FPres. Estrada, but the latter
asked him to revert to "000" combination because FPres. Estrada could not open the lock. [Ibid, pp. 118-
119] There were four (4) pieces of this type of bag. [Ibid, pp. 115-116]
The bills placed in the bag were in One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) denomination. Many times Singson
himself delivered the jueteng money to FPres. Estrada in Malacañang Palace. To go to the Presidential
Residence (PR), he passed through the main gate where there were guards. At first, the Secretary would
call to give the guards instruction not to inspect the bag. Later on, the guards came to know Gov.
Singson and allowed him to enter without inspecting the bag. Jueteng money was either delivered to
Gov. Singson’s office or picked-up by Gov. Singson, or his driver or his security or the people in his office.
[Ibid, pp. 121-124]
The total amount of money Gov. Singson collected from jueteng operations for FPresident Estrada
starting November 1998 to August 2000 was Five Hundred Forty Million Pesos (P540,000,000.00) more
or less, according to Gov. Singson.
Gov. Singson personally delivered about Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to FPres.
Estrada. [Ibid, p. 124-125]
In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh AAAAAAAA), the entry "Bicol15 1.100" means in the Province of Bicol
for fifteen (15) days the protection money collection for FPres. Esrada was One Million One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,100,000.00). In the ledger for the month of November 1998 (Exh. W7), there was an
entry "1.500 Anton and 2.500 Anton". According to Gov. Singson, the entry was made because Atong
Ang told him the amounts of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) and Two Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), or a total of Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00),
collected from Bicol were recorded / listed in the name of Presidential Assistant Anton Prieto. Atong Ang
informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada knew about it and the latter so confirmed to Gov. Singson.
[Ibid, pp. 125-127]
While jueteng protection money collection started in September 1998, the ledger started only in
November 1998 when Gov. Singson alone was asked to continue the jueteng collection. [Ibid, pp. 128-
129]
In the July 2000 ledger (Exh. A-4-k), the total amount of jueteng collection and the total amount of
expenses were the same so the balance at the end of the month was zero because "Pick 2" replaced
jueteng, as Gov. Singson, Dante Tan and FPres. Estrada discussed in Malacañang and in his new home at
New Manila called "Boracay". "Pick 2" was the brainchild of Dante Tan and "Bingo 2 Ball" was the
brainchild of Atong Ang. [Ibid, pp. 129-132] In "Boracay", Bong Pineda told Dante Tan, Gov. Singson and
FPres. Estrada that "Pick 2" may be hard to be understood by the people because there will be 75
numbers. [Ibid, p. 134]
In August 2000, "Pick 2" started and, in September 2000, before his departure for the United States,
FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to hasten the start of "Bingo 2 Balls". Atong Ang called Gov. Singson
when he was in Malaysia in September 6, 2000 and told him that FPres. Estrada would like to rush the
start of "Bingo 2 Balls". Gov. Singson replied that was nice and asked that Atong Ang reserve Ilocos Sur
for him. However, the following day the son of Gov. Singson informed him that the other half of the
franchise was given to his political opponent, Eric Singson, whom he defeated in the election. Eric
Singson was his distant relative. [Ibid, pp. 138-141]
According to the son of Gov. Singson, Atong Ang told him that he had the provincial commander
transferred and the Chief of Police replaced. His father could not do anything to stop "Bingo 2 Balls" as it
was decided by FPres. Estrada and his political career was finish. Gov. Singson talked with Atong Ang
when he was in Malaysia and told him that they should wait for FPres. Estrada to return. FPres. Estrada
returned from the United States on September 13, 2000. Gov. Singson also arrived from Malaysia the
following day. The following day, Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada over the phone why the franchise
was given to his political enemy. Gov. Singson told him that all the mayors will be embarrassed. FPres.
Estrada replied that he had nothing to do with it. Gov. Singson thought that FPres. Estrada was fooling
him. He told FPres. Estrada that it was a matter of pride, that all his mayors were getting embarrassed.
FPres. Estrada replied that he did not care, so Gov. Singson told him "Kung dahil lang dyan pagkatapos
ng lahat bibitawan mo ako, bibitaw na rin ako sa iyo". [Ibid, pp. 142-146]
Gov. Singson then asked his lawyers to prepare his affidavit because he knew that his life would be in
danger if he would part ways with FPres. Estrada, who was very powerful and Gov. Singson had no
evidence. Gov. Singson then called Ricaforte and asked her to fax to him the ledger. Ricaforte asked if
they were going to Malacañang. Gov. Singson knew that Ricaforte did not know yet what was
happening. After she faxed the ledger from her house to Gov. Singson, the latter asked his lawyer to
continue with the preparation of his affidavit. Gov. Singson said he prepared the affidavit so that if
anything happened to him it would be known who was responsible. When asked if he was threatened,
Gov. Singson replied that he knew FPres. Estrada and the men around him so he knew that his life was in
danger. [Ibid, pp. 146-150]
The first set of ledgers was faxed to Singson, while the second set (Exhs. A-4 to A-4-1) was in the
possession of Ricaforte which she produced during the impeachment proceedings. The prosecution
would have the latter subpoenaed fom the Senate. Everyone that Gov. Singson consulted gave the same
comment. Nobody will believe Gov. Singson because FPres. Estrada was the most popular President
elected. Gov. Singson talked with Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson told Jinggoy Estrada that his family got
One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) from him and that Jinggoy Estrada got part of the
said money. Gov. Singson also told Jinggoy Estrada that jueteng money all went to his father and that
Jinggoy Estrada also had a part of it. Jinggoy Estrada told Gov. Singson, they would fix it. [Ibid, pp. 147-
155]
Nothing happened so Gov. Singson talked with JV Ejercito, another son of FPres. Estrada. JV Ejercito
asked Gov. Singson not to come out and that he will talk with his father. Again nothing happened so
Gov. Singson approached Secretary Ronnie Zamora and showed him the ledger. The latter reacted that
the ledger was a serious matter, "Delikado ito". Zamora asked Gov. Singson not to come out and he told
Gov. Singson that he would see FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson then went to see Former Secretary Edgardo
Angara at the latter’s GMA Farm in Batangas and showed to him the ledger. Secretary Angara asked
Gov. Singson not to come out publicly because the ledger was a serious matter and even they, the
cabinet members may be affected. After that first meeting in Batangas, Chavit Singon saw Secretary
Angara at the Philippine Plaza and he latter told Gov. Singson that it was alright as he was able to talk to
FPres. Estrada. Secretary Angara, according to Gov. Singson, told FPres. Estrada that Gov. Singson was a
big help to them in politics and that he was just asking for a small favor. Secretary Angara also asked
FPres. Estrada not to embarrass Gov. Singson’s mayors. This matter might be known by the media.
Secretary Angara informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada got mad and replied "Sinong tinakot nya?"
Before Secretary Angara left, he told FPres. Estrada that he saw Gov. Singson’s jueteng ledger and he
found it a ground for impeachment. FPres. Estrada appeared surprised ("Nagulat") but did not say
anything. Secretary Angara assured FPres. Estrada, he will first talk with Gov. Singson and fix it. For the
third time, Gov. Singson saw Secretary Angara at New World Hotel. He asked Gov. Singson to give him
until the end of September 2000 because the FPres. was a "macho" and would not easily give in.
However, Gov. Singson replied that he was already decided because his mayors kept on calling him.
Incidentally according to Gov. Singson, these political enemies were operating the "Bingo 2 Balls". [Ibid,
pp. 156-164]
After Secretary Angara, Gov. Singson also approached Congressman Mark Jimenez, who said after he
met with FPres. Estrada, General Lacson and Secretary Ronnie Zamora that "Bingo 2 Balls" will not stop
in Ilocos Sur but that Gov. Singson should lie low first. Gov. Singson replied that he had decided already
to come out and he informed his mayors that he will expose the anomalies involving FPres. Estrada.
Gov. Singson talked with Jimenez over the phone when he was then at Holiday Inn on October 3, 2000.
There was a conference of the Mayors League in the Philippines. Gov. Singson left Holiday Inn together
with twenty-two mayors. According to Gov. Singson, armed men followed him at about 11:30 that
evening at San Marcelino Street and that his vehicle was blocked by three cars and one motorcycle, all
passengers by which were fully armed by armalite. Two of the cars were TMG cars and the other, a
civilian red car. Gov. Singson told the mayor with whom he was talking over the phone that they should
all go to San Marcelino, behind Jai-Alai because of an emergency. His driver was instructed by Gov.
Singson not to open the door of his vehicle. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 11-19]
PAOC men signaled Gov. Singson to get out of his vehicle, a bullet-proof Ford Super Van but he refused.
He went out of the van after the mayors arrived one after another. The PAOC team told Gov. Singson
that they received information that he had a blinker that, although he did not use it, mere possession
was already a violation and that they wanted to bring this to Crame and after he suggested that he be
given a ticket of the volation but he instead asked that they go to the police precincts at the United
Nations Avenue. Only the two TMG Officers went to the police precinct with Gov. Singson who rode in
his own van. There were media people at the police precinct. When asked why he was being harassed
although he was influencial to the FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson replied to the media that he will expose
the anomalies of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 20-26]
The following day the incident was published in the newspapers and shown on television. The group of
FPres. Esrada tried to settle with Singson. JV Ejercito was the first to call repeatedly (every two minutes)
to ask Gov. Singson to return the call of FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson called the latter who asked that
they talk because he was confused with the problems of the Abu Sayyaf and the First Lady. Gov. Singson
replied he had already given his word. They talked for the second time and then third time, it was FPres.
Estrada himself who called. The next person to call was Atong Ang who was pleading to Gov. Singson to
fix the matter. Gov. Singson brought up the P130 Million from the excise tax which Gov. Singson said
was taken by Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada. Atong Ang promised that the said amount will be returned
to Gov. Singson and that the "Bingo 2 Balls" will be given to Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson informed him
that it was too late. Atong Ang called Gov. Singson about twenty (20) times [Ibid, pp. 27-37]
After Atong Ang, Former Secretary Alfredo Lim called to convince Gov. Singson to settle and to see
FPres. Estrada. Alfredo Lim asked Gov. Singson to proceed with the press conference but he should put
the blame on Atong Ang and that they will take care of Atong Ang. Alfredo Lim gestured with his right
fist thumb down. Gov. Singson understood this to mean that Atong Ang will be killed. Gov. Singson did
not agree because he might be implicated. He asked them to look for a good reason. [Ibid, pp. 38-42)
The next to call Gov. Singson was Jinggoy Estrada. The latter and Gov. Singson talked on October 8,
2000. Jinggoy Estrada also sent many emissaries to talk with Gov. Singson. That evening Gov. Singson
went to Cardinal Sin at his San Miguel Residence. Gov. Singson explained to Cardinal Sin the situation
and left to him the evidences so that in case anything happens to Gov. Singson, he would know who will
be responsible. Gov. Singson saw the Cardinal with his sisters. Cardinal Sin told Gov. Singson to go ahead
that he will pray for Gov. Singson and that God will be with them. [Ibid, pp. 42-26]
Gov. Singson returned to his house at 10:00 o’clock in the evening where Jinggoy Estrada called him and
sent emissaries again to Gov. Singson. At 12:00 midnight Jinggoy Estrada and some friends of his arrived
at Gov. Singson’s house in Blue Ridge, Quezon City. Jinggoy Estrada pleaded to Gov. Singson until 3:00
o’clock the following morning. Gov. Singson told Jinggoy Estrada that it was too late because his press
conference will happen in a while and all that the Estradas could do was to deny what Gov. Singson will
reveal at the press conference. He further said to Jinggoy Estrada that he will not mention the latter’s
name. [Ibid, pp. 46-51]
Gov. Singson proceeded with his press conference on October 9, 2000 at Club Filipino. He gave the two
reasons: first, FPres. Estrada insulted him and wanted him killed so he was not a true friend anymore;
and second, he already had the evidence and they will kill him even if he did not pursue his planned
press conference. It was better for him to be killed with honor and to show how corrupt the government
was under the Estrada Administration. According to Gov. Singson, FPres. Estrada wanted to replace
jueteng with "Bingo-2-Balls" because he will earn more, about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) a
day. Gov. Singson explained how much FPres. Estrada would receive from "Bingo 2 Balls". [Ibid, pp. 51-
59]
Gov. Singson also mentioned that FPres. Estrada owned the "Boracay Mansion" in New Manila. He
identified this property through a computer generated picture (Exh. P8). [Ibid, pp. 60-67] Gov. Singson
also described the house of FPres. Estrada at Polk St., Greenhills which he had visited frequently as well
as the house of the FPres. in P. Guevarra Street which was just 2 to 3 kilometers away from Polk Street.
[Ibid, pp. 68-72]
Gov. Singson testified as to the other properties of FPres. Estrada like Fontainbleau, Inc., a casino. A
check (Exh. V6) payable the order of Fonteinbleau, Inc. was among the checks turned over to Ricaforte.
Gov. Singson helped put up the said casino for FPres. Estrada. However, his name does not appear as an
incorporator of the said company in its Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 22). According to Gov. Singson, the
shares in the company were distributed as follows: five percent (5%) to Butch Tenorio, the President of
the casino; twenty-five percent (25%) for Gov. Singson; seventy percent (70%) for FPres. Estrada which
were placed in the names of Jaime Dichaves and his classmate Susie Pineda. [Ibid, pp. 72-76]
To prove his close relationship with FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson mentioned that Jacob, a son of the
FPres. Estrada by Laarni Enriquez, was his baptismal godson while FPres. Estrada stood as sponsor (in
the wedding with his two children, Racquel and Randy). [Ibid, pp.76-78]
On cross examination, Gov. Singson was confronted with his testimony during the Senate impeachment
trial, contained in the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings held on December 13,
2000 at pages 234 and 235 (Exh. 28-Serapio and submarkings). In the said testimony, Gov. Singson did
not mention that Serapio was present when he turned over to Ricaforte the jueteng protection money,
partly in cash and partly in check. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 147-150] Gov. Singson insisted that
Serapio was present but he was being confused by the Senators sympathetic to FPres. Estrada. It
appears, however, that Singson was not asked during impeachment proceedings who were present
during the aforementioned turn-over of jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 150-151] Gov. Singson also
testified that he did not know if Ricaforte withdrew the amount in cash. Gov. Singson was only told by
Ricaforte that she gave the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to Serapio. [Ibid, pp. 153-156
Gov. Singson also admitted that the P200,000,000.00 were transferred to the Muslim Youth Foundation,
Inc. [Ibid, p. 156] and that he likewise testified before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on October 17,
2000, as shown by the transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing of that Committee (Exh. 29 and
submarkings). Ibid, pp. 158-159]. Gov. Singson acknowledged that he had came across the Certificate of
Incorporation and By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exh 1-Serapio and submarkings).
The said foundation’s Certificate of Incorporation was dated November 17, 2000, and that the Articles of
Incorporation was dated February 15, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 167-168] Gov. Singson saw for the first time
during his cross-examination the certification of the Branch Manager of Equitable-PCI Bank that the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. maintained an account in the total amount of Two Hundred Three
Million One Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-One Pesos and Twenty Seven Centavos
(P203,136,931.27) (Exh 17; 17-a-Serapio). [Ibid, p. 169]
EMMA BARBON LIM (Emma Lim) worked for Gov. Singson since July 1987 as Liaison Officer at the
latter’s private office in LCS Building, San Andres corner Diamante Street, San Andres Bukid, Metro
Manila. LCS stood for Luis Chavit Singson. Emma Lim did personal errands for Gov. Singson, like
collecting jueteng money from different persons for FPres. Estrada pursuant to the instructions of Gov.
Singson.
As early as January 1999, Emma Lim was already receiving deliveries of jueteng money. Gov. Singson
told her to take care of the money that she was receiving because it was not the money of Gov. Singson
but of FPres. Estrada. She started collecting jueteng money sometime in April 1999. She personally went
to the person from whom she collected the money. She knew that it was jueteng money because Gov.
Singson told her so and that it was also confirmed by Ricaforte.
She also knew that it was jueteng money because there was an instance that Ricaforte scolded her for
opening an envelope. Ricaforte told her that it was strictly confidential and it was intended for FPres.
Estrada. Emma Lim also personally delivered jueteng money to Malacañang.
According to Emma Lim, Ricaforte was the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada. This was how she was
introduced by Gov. Singson to her and how she introduced herself when she reported at the LCS Office.
Ricaforte also held office in the same address. Emma Lim’s other co-employee was Menchu Itchon. [TSN
dated July 1, 2002, pp. 12-17]
Witness testified that she collected jueteng money from Undersecretary (USec) Anton Prieto, Jinggoy
Estrada and Bong Pineda.
USec Anton Prieto was the Presidential Assistant for Bicol Affairs. He was the one in charge of jueteng
collection in the Bicol Area. Witness met Prieto personally and he introduced himself to the witness as
such. Every time he called the office, he always said that he was an Undersecretary in Malacañang.
Sometime on April 1999, Emma Lim met Prieto at the lobby of Dusit Hotel Nikko in Makati. Usec Prieto
handed to her a sealed mailing envelope which she brought to their office at LCS Building. Emma Lim
called Gov. Singson who asked her to open the envelope to know how much she received. The envelope
contained a post dated check (Exh F7, F7-1 to F7-5) in the amount of P1,190,000.00. Emma Lim deposited
the check (Exh G7, G7-1 to G7-4) in the account of Gov. Singson at the Metrobank, Ayala Center Branch
on April 7, 1999.
Three days after the check was deposited, the New Accounts Department of the Metrobank Ayala
branch informed Emma Lim that the check was dishonored because the signature was different. The
check was returned through Usec Prieto’s messenger.
Emma Lim usually deposited the PNB Naga Branch checks from Prieto in the Account No.
0963011682260 of Gov. Singson. The deposit slips (Exhibits I7 to Q7 and submarkings) listed the deposits.
At one time, Ricaforte scolded her for opening the envelope because it was strictly confidential and that
it was for FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte took the check from the Emma Lim. [Ibid, pp. 17-56]
Ricaforte first reported at the LCS building on April 16, 1999. She introduced herself as the accountant-
auditor of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson also introduced her as such.
Emma Lim collected jueteng money twice from Bong Pineda, who was in charge of the jueteng
collections in Pampanga because Gov. Singson told her so.
Sometime on January 2000, upon instruction of Gov. Singson, Emma Lim and Gov. Singson’s driver
Faustino Prudencio went to the house of Bong Pineda at No. 2 Albany Street, Northeast Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila to pick-up money. At Pineda’s house, Pineda’s secretary, Marty, asked her to enter
an office room to wait for Bong’s brother Romy Pineda. When Romy Pineda arrived, he placed a
shopping bag on top of the table and asked Emma Lim to count the contents. The money was
P5,000,000.00 in P1,000 denominations. After counting the money, they returned the money inside the
shopping bag and Mr. Pineda made her sign a half sheet of bond paper evidencing that she received the
money. Emma Lim then kept the money inside the vault at the LCS office and informed Gov. Singson
that she had picked up the money.
The second time Emma Lim collected money from Bong Pineda was sometime on February 2000. They
were on their way home after collecting money from Jinggoy Estrada. Menchu Itchon called her and told
her that Gov. Singson wanted her to drop by the house of Mr. Bong Pineda to pick-up money. Emma Lim
proceeded and Marty again ushered her to the office room. Romy Pineda arrived. He opened what
appeared to be a bookshelf and came out with a red Salvatore Ferragamo shopping bag (Exhibit R7)
containing P5,000,000.00. The money was in P1,000 bills and in 5 bundles containing P1,000,000.00
each. Romy Pineda asked her to sign a paper that she received the amount. She kept the money in the
vault assigned to her at the LCS office. She informed Gov. Singson that she received the money from
Bong Pineda, and Gov. Singson told her that he will pass by for it. [Ibid, pp. 58-80]
She collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada three times. These were sometime in January,
February 2000 and March 17, 2000.
For the first collection, Gov. Singson called her up at the LCS office and told her to call the office of
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to inquire if she can pick up what was to be picked up. The staff of Jinggoy
Estrada who answered the phone told her to go there after lunch. Witness left the office at 1:00 o’clock
with the driver of Gov. Singson and proceeded to the office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor
of the Municipal Hall of San Juan, Metro Manila.
When she arrived at the office, the staff at the receiving section gave her a sheet of paper where she
wrote her name and office. The bodyguard of Jinggoy Estrada arrived and handed to her something
which was wrapped in a magazine and sealed with scotch tape. The bodyguard told her not to count the
money because there were many people around. She then brought the package back to the LCS office
and kept it in the vault. She called Gov. Singson and told him that she already picked up the money from
Jinggoy Estrada. When Gov. Singson arrived, witness counted the money in his presence and it was
P1,000,000.00 which she turned over to Gov. Singson.
Sometime in February 2000, she again collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson
called her up and instructed her to call up the office of Jinggoy Estrada. She was able to talk to Jinggoy
Estrada’s secretary Josie and was told to go to their office after lunch.
Josie ushered her inside the office of Jinggoy Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada was there. Witness greeted him a
good afternoon and he smiled. Josie asked her to sit in front of her table which was about 4 to 5 meters
away from Jinggoy Estrada. Josie took up a paper bag from under her table and placed it on top of the
table. She asked the witness to count the contents. The witness counted that there were ten (10)
bundles of P1,000.00 bills. Each bundle had 100 pieces and the total amount was P1,000,000.00. She
then asked permission to leave. After coming from the office of Jinggoy Estrada, they proceeded to the
house of Bong Pineda.
She collected jueteng money for the third time from Jinggoy Estrada on March 17, 2000. She again went
to the office of Jinggoy Estrada after lunch after contacting Josie. When she arrived there, she was
ushered inside the office of Jinggoy Estrada. She can no longer remember the number of staff inside the
office. It was Josie who told her to sit down in front of the table of Jinggoy Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada took
out a check from his wallet and gave it to her saying, "Sabihin mo kay Gob tseke na lang." Emma Lim
then kept the check inside her bag. The amount was P1,000,000.00 with United Overseas Bank
Philippines, San Juan Branch as the drawee bank. The witness deposited the check to the account of
Gov. Singson at Metrobank, Ayala Center. The deposit slip (Exhibit S7) was presented.
According to the witness, the check was personalized because it bore the picture of Jinggoy Estrada at
the background. Emma Lim had seen this kind of check of Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 82-111] Emma Lim
maintained her testimony notwithstanding that she was shown a certification dated December 11, 2000
issued by Isabelita M. Papa, Executive Vice President of United Overseas Bank of the Philippines, stating
that Mr. Jose P. Estrada, also known as Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, never had a current or checking account
with the said bank. [TSN dated July 10, 2002]
She knew that the money she kept in the vault assigned to her were jueteng collections because
Governor Singson and Ricaforte told her so. [TSN dated July 1, 2002, p. 81]
On July 3, 2002, Emma B. Lim continued her direct examination and testified that she personally met
FPres. Estrada when she delivered jueteng money to Malacanang. As instructed by Gov. Singson, she
was fetched by Singson’s driver, personal aide and security guard at Singson’s office at LCS. She boarded
the Ford Expedition when they passed by the LCS office.Singson called to ask Emma Lim to double check
the money inside the car if it was Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Gov. Singson’s driver Faustino
Prudencio, personal aide Jemis Singson and security guard Frederico Artates were inside the car too
when she bundle count the money. They proceeded to the residence of FPres. Estrada at Polk Street,
Greenhills. However, Artates and Jamis Singson were informed by the security guards that Malou
Florendo and FPres. Estrada were not at home. They waited outside and decided to take their lunch in a
restaurant in Greenhills. They brought the black bag containing the money with them at the restaurant.
Gov. Singson’s personal aide was holding the bag. Driver Faustino Prudencio received instruction from
Singson for them to proceed to Malacanang. It was already 1:00 o’clock, after lunchtime in 1999 during
the Maslog book scam in Malacanang. She recalled it because her companion warned her not to open
the bag because "Baka ma-maslog ka ". In that incident, Maslog was caught bringing money inside
Malacanang. Emma Lim was dropped-off at the circle inside Malacanang. She carried the black bag
containing P5,000,000.00. Emma Lim introduced herself to the security guard as Emma from the office
of Governor Gov. Singson and told him Malou Florendo was expecting her. The amount of P5,000,000.00
was in One thousand (P 1,000.00) peso bills. [TSN dated July 3, 2002, pp. 190-207] The security guard
allowed her to enter, without passing the bag through the x-ray. The guard was not strict and pointed to
her the Presidential Residence. There was another security guard in front of the house and Emma Lim
gave the same introduction and that Malou Florendo was expecting her. Emma was allowed to enter.
She was met by Malou inside the residence, Emma Lim saw FPres. Estrada, wearing a cream polo. Emma
Lim handed the black bag to Malou Florendo. Emma Lim and FPres. Estrada were within each other’s
view. Malou placed the black bag beside an office table. Emma Lim heard Malou told Gov. Singson over
the phone that she was already there. Emma Lim left for the LCS office. [Ibid, pp. 242-261] Emma Lim
described the black bag as rectangular with numbered combination lock. The width was about 8 inches,
the length, 18 inches and the height was 12 inches. It was made of canvass or synthetic material. Emma
demonstrated in court that she could carry a bag of similar size with P 5,000,000.00 inside. Five bundles
of bills weighed four (4) kilos and eight (8) grams. [Ibid, pp. 263-279,280] The bag weighed 2 kilos and 6
grams. The bag and its contents weighed 7 kilos and 4 grams. [Ibid, p. 288]
On cross-examination, Emma Lim testified that she worked for Gov. Singson since 1987. She started
living at LCS Office since 1989 until she got married in 1996. She did not pay rent just like the other
employees of Singson. She was not related to Singson. Her brother Roy Barbon worked as driver for
Singson between 1990 and 1992. She did not feel beholden to Gov. Singson because she worked for her
salary. She did not owe him a debt of gratitude but it should be the other way around because she got
embroiled in this trouble because of jueteng collections. [Ibid, pp. 296-308]
Emma Lim attended a dinner at Malacañang Palace on February 16, 2001. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp.
75-77] She was appointed at John Hay Development Corporation during the term of President Arroyo.
She received Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) per board meeting. Emma Lim also worked as liaison
officer of Gov. Singson for overseas workers. [Ibid, pp.87-88] She knew that she was collecting jueteng
money because Gov. Singson said so and Ricaforte comfirmed. Further the money delivered was
bundled by millions and no money of that amount arrived their office when Gov. Singson was not yet a
collector. [Ibid, p. 99]
MARIA CARMENCITA ANCHETA ITCHON (Itchon), a Certified Public Accountant, testified that she was
hired by Gov. Singson to be an accountant of Fountain Bleau Incorporated (later renamed Fontain Bleau
Incorporated) on February 19, 1999. According to Itchon, the said corporation, which was set-up to build
a casino in Clark Air Base, Pampanga, was owned by former President Estrada. Witness knew that this
was owned by Estrada because Gov. Singson said so and it was confirmed by Mrs. Ricaforte. [TSN, June
17, 2002, pp. 115-118]
She allegedly knew that Fontain Bleau Incorporated got its funding from the jueteng collections of FPres.
Estrada because Gov. Singson would always tell her to wait for the jueteng collection of FPres. Estrada
every time she asked for funds. [Ibid, pp. 119-122]
As Accountant, she was the one who made the listings of the pre-operation and expenses of Fontain
Bleau and during that time she was the Accountant, she already received jueteng collections for FPres.
Estrada.
Itchon further testified that she received jueteng collections, amounting to a total of around Six Million
Pesos (P6,000,000.00) in cash and check, about six (6) times. She received these jueteng collections from
the messengers of Mr. Anton Prieto and former San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or Jingle Bells. After
receiving the collections, she would inform Gov. Singson and then either Gov. Singson took the
collection from her or they turned it over to Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte.
Itchon identified Fontain Bleu’s original Certificate of Incorporation (Exh. P6) and the Articles of
Incorporation and By Laws attached (Exh. P6-1), which were in her possession. These incorporation
documents showed the date of Fontain Bleau’s registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (April 5, 1999), the names of its incorporators, and its office address at the 2 nd Floor, LCS
Building, San Andres Bukid, Manila. Itchon’s sketch of the office was marked as Exh. Q6. [Ibid., pp. 123-
124,132-137]
Itchon averred that before she personally met Yolanda Ricaforte at the office in LCS, Ricaforte used to
call their office and introduced herself as the Accountant – Auditor for FPres. Estrada. As early as March
19, 1999, Singson told Itchon that she would be working with Yolanda Ricaforte, the Accountant of
FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte began to report for work in the same office as Itchon on April 16, 1999. [Ibid,
pp. 129-132, 138-141]
Singson and Ricaforte told Itchon that Ricaforte will be her [Itchon’s] immediate supervisor. Ricaforte
checked Itchon’s entries in her journal. Ricaforte signed the check that Itchon prepared for payment for
the supplier of Fontain Bleau and Ricaforte brought Itchon every time she went to the Pampanga office.
Itchon proceeded to narrate how in the course of their work she and Ricaforte became close and had
many conversations including among others how FPres. Estrada came to appoint Ricaforte’s husband
Orestes Ricaforte as undersecretary of Tourism and how FPres. Estrada gifted Orestes with the Black
Lexus that Yolanda and Itchon usually used in traveling to the Pampanga office. Itchon had photographs
of gatherings she attended with Ricaforte (Exh. A-6-vvvvv). [Ibid, pp. 143-152]
Itchon knew Ricaforte to be the Accountant–Auditor of FPres. Estrada in Fontain Bleau Incorporated and
for juetengcollections because Ricaforte reported directly to FPres. Estrada. Itchon then narrated how
on June 15, 1999, she and Mrs. Regina Lim (one of the incorporators of Fontain Bleau) brought Ricaforte
to Malacañang at around 3:30 p.m. They brought her there because Ricaforte said she would report to
FPres. Estrada. Before going to Malacañang, Ricaforte took their records of Fontain Bleau, got Itchon’s
journal and the list of expenses and then Itchon briefed her regarding their expenses. [Ibid, pp. 155-162]
Itchon also testified that Ricaforte also reported to FPres. Estrada by phone, sometimes using the
landline in the office and sometimes using her [Ricaforte’s] cell phone. Itchon knew that the calls were
made to FPres. Estrada because she was around when Ricaforte was making calls, and Ricaforte would
ask her to keep quiet because she was calling the President. The calls were made inside the LCS office.
Itchon explained that she knew that the cell phone number of Ricaforte was 0918-9021847 because the
number was originally issued in Itchon’s name. The cell phone was supposed to be hers. When they
were in Fontain Bleau, they bought cell phones and the application form for the number was under
Itchon’s name. Itchon was the one who assigned it to herself. But when the cell phones came, Itchon
testified that Ricaforte took the cell phone no. 0918-9021847 and the number 0918-9021849 originally
assigned to Ricaforte went to Itchon. Itchon also testified that Ricaforte called up Estrada in her
presence about five times.
Itchon prepared a summary of the calls (Exh. R6 with submarkings) made by Ricaforte. Itchon explained
that these were the summary of phone calls of Ricaforte to FPres. Estrada at the presidential residence;
to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or Jingle Bells, to Mr. Edward Serapio, to Governor Singson and to Mr. Romy
Pineda, the brother of Bong Pineda. She took the information from the fifteen (15) Statements of
Account of Ricaforte for her cell number 0918-9021847. The phone billings of Ricaforte particularly with
reference to cell phone no. 0918-9021847 were with Itchon. [Ibid, pp. 163-175]
Itchon averred that she prepared or came up with a summary of calls made by Mrs. Ricaforte upon the
advice of her lawyer Atty. Pablito Sanidad because when she and Mrs. Ricaforte testified in the Senate
Blue Ribbon Hearing Committee, Mrs. Ricaforte testified that she seldom or never called up President
Joseph Estrada, Mr. Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Governor Singson and Mr. Romy Pineda.
Itchon also testified that when she prepared the summary based on the entries on the particular phone
billings, she found out several phone calls to those persons mentioned. [TSN, June 19, 2002, pp. 8-12]
Fifteen (15) Statements of Account (Exhs. S6, S6-1 up to S6-14) issued by Smart communications were
also identified by Itchon purporting to be statements of account of Cell phone No. 0918-9021847. The
Statements of Account covered the billing period ending July 1999 and billing period ending August 31,
2000. The billing statements of account were received by Itchon from the company for her to pay. The
cell phone bills were being paid by Fontain Bleau, but when Fontain Bleau ceased to exist, the phone
bills were paid by Ricaforte with money from jueteng collections. [Ibid, pp. 15-18]
Itchon affirmed that she was present during Mrs. Ricaforte’s phone call to the presidential residence in
five instances. During these times, Mrs. Ricaforte was at the LCS office and Itchon was either beside her
or in front of Mrs. Ricaforte’s office table. Itchon pointed out in the sketch (Exh. Q6) she prepared where
she was during the five times when the calls were made in her presence.
The number or numbers Ricaforte called up were 736-8855 and 736-8858. Itchon testified that she knew
that the numbers pertain to the numbers in the Presidential Residence because they had office records
and she also tried calling the number. When she dialed the numbers she asked if it was the PMS. The
answer was it was the Presidential Residence. When asked why Itchon checked and called the numbers
in the first place, she answered that when she checked Mrs. Ricaforte’s cell phone bills, she found out
that the numbers were there so she tried calling to check whether it was the Presidential Residence.
When asked what was the nature or gist of the conversation from the end of Mrs. Ricaforte when she
called up the Presidential residence, Itchon answered that Mrs. Ricaforte said: "Malou, this is Yolly. Is
the President already calling for me? If he needed me, just call me on the cell phone." According to
Itchon, Malou was the secretary of FPres. Estrada and Itchon knew this because it was Mrs. Ricaforte
who told her. [Ibid., pp. 18-23]
According to Itchon, there were also calls made to former San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and, in her
summary, Ricaforte called up Mayor Jinggoy Estrada twenty-four (24) times. On at least five occasions,
Itchon testified that she was present when Ricaforte called up Jinggoy Estrada while they [Itchon and
Ricaforte] were both in the LCS office. Itchon distinctly remembered two dates of Ricaforte’s phone calls
to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada – (a) August 16, 1999 when Ricaforte called up Jinggoy in his residence
because that was the first call of Ricaforte when she started concentrating as the accountant-auditor of
former President Estrada in his "jueteng" collections; and (b) November 15, 1999 because Ricaforte
called up Mayor Jinggoy several times as they were waiting for Mayor Jinggoy’s jueteng collection from
which they would get their salaries.
The cell phone number of Jinggoy Estrada was 0917-526-0217 and his landline number was 724-4736.
Itchon knew that these numbers pertain to Jinggoy Estrada because she got the numbers from Gov.
Singson. She got the number because she wanted to check the cell phone bills of Ricaforte because
there were times that she remembered that Ricaforte had been calling the number of Jinggoy Estrada
which Itchon was not aware of. [Ibid, pp. 23-28]
Based on Itchon’s as well as the phone billings, Ricaforte called up Atty. Edward Serapio six (6) times at
cell phone No. 0918-9012071. Itchon also got the number of Atty. Serapio from Gov. Singson. Based on
the Smart Communications phone billings, Ricaforte called up Atty. Serapio on March 23 and 24, 2000,
and April 3, 12, 13, and 14, 2000. (Exh. S6 with submarkings) [Ibid., pp. 29-35]
According to Itchon’s summary, Mrs. Ricaforte called up Gov. Singson 209 times at cell phone nos. 0917-
8387171 and 0918-9002443. Itchon was present several times when Ricaforte called up Gov. Singson.
Itchon knew that these numbers pertained to Gov. Singson because she was familiar with these cell
phone numbers. [Ibid, pp. 37-38]
Itchon also testified to calls made by Ricaforte to a certain Romy Pineda, the brother Bong Pineda,
whom she knew was a jueteng lord. Itchon testified that Ricaforte called up Romy Pineda in his landline
number, 722-7366. Based on the Summary that Itchon prepared, Ricaforte called up Romy Pineda twice.
[Ibid, pp. 38-39]
Itchon further testified that Fontain Bleau, Inc. was not able to operate because Fontain Bleau could not
comply with PAGCOR’s requirement for a 200-room hotel accommodation so it was not issued a license
to operate.
After the non-issuance of the license to operate, Fontain Bleau entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with RN Development Corporation on July 19, 1999 (Exhs. T6, T6-1 to T6-2). The
Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") stipulated that RN Development Corporation will reimburse all
the pre-operations expenses of Fontain Bleau and that Fontain Bleau will have a 10% share from the
casino that will be established by RN Development Corporation. Itchon was present during the signing of
the MOA. She identified the signatures of the witnesses to the MOA; namely, a certain Pax who was
introduced to Itchon as Atong Ang’s sister (Exh. T6-2-c) and Yolanda Ricaforte (Exh. T6-2-d). Itchon
testified that she came to know Atong Ang during the negotiation of the MOA and that Atong Ang was
present during the signing.
As far as Itchon knew, the pre-operational expenses of Fontain Bleau was around Sixty Five Million Pesos
(P65,000,000.00). This was reimbursed by RN Development Corporation to Fontain Bleau pursuant to
their Memorandum of Agreement. Itchon brought with her a copy of RN's deposit slip and their first
payment in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) (Exh. U6) and testified that the
depositor’s signature therein was Emma Lim’s, one of the secretaries in the LCS office. Itchon also had a
photocopies of the second check that RN paid to Fontain Bleau in the amount of Thirty Four Million Six
Hundred Forty Thousand Four Hundred and Forty Two Pesos (P34,640,442.00) (Exh. V6) and of the
acknowledgement receipt (Exh. V6-1) signed by Ricaforte and Atty. Manuel Singson, as Director and
Corporate Secretary, respectively of Fontain Bleau. Itchon further testified that Ricaforte got the
originals of these documents but Itchon had them photocopied for her record before Ricaforte took the
originals.
Since Fontain Bleau was unable to operate, all the employees of Fontain Bleau in the Pampanga office
were terminated. It was only Itchon and Mrs. Ricaforte who were retained. [Ibid, pp. 39-58]
In August 1999, Ricaforte already concentrated on being the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada in his
"jueteng" operation and then Itchon was told by Gov. Singson to help Ricaforte. Nothing happened to
Fontain Bleau anymore. Itchon allegedly knew that in August 1999, Ricaforte concentrated in the
jueteng collection because Itchon was there when Gov. Singson briefed Ricaforte regarding the
collection of the jueteng operation and she [Ricaforte] was given the code name "Madam Auring" by
Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 58-60]
Itchon’s testimony then detailed how she participated in the "jueteng" collections. She was tasked to
receive the "jueteng" collections that were brought to the office. There were also times when Itchon or
Emma Lim were called by Ricaforte to help compute and count the money turned over to Ricaforte such
as double checking through a calculator. Collections that Itchon received were brought by messengers of
Mr. Anton Prieto and sometimes by the messengers of Gov. Singson who picked up the jueteng
collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Itchon knew Prieto’s messenger because when the messenger
came, the checks were inside the white envelope with markings "Menchu/Emma" and then the
messenger introduced himself as messenger of Anton Prieto. Itchon was also present when Gov. Singson
was giving instructions to his messengers to get jueteng collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Gov.
Singson’s messengers were Mr. Jamis Singson and Edward Iverra. Each collection was One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) per collection in cash. She remembers these collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada on
two (2) occasions because it was from there that they (Ricaforte, Lim, Itchon and Iverra) took their
salary.
According to Itchon, these jueteng collections came in around 15th and 30th of the month. From the time
that they started concentrating on the jueteng collection for the former President on August 1999,
Itchon received these collections about six (6) times, covering the period August 1999 to August 2000.
The total collections she received after August 1999 was around Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00).
With respect to the Seven Million Peso collections that she received, there were times when Gov.
Singson took the collection directly from her and there were times when Gov. Singson instructed her to
turn over the collection to Ricaforte. As Accountant of Fontain Bleau, she also received six (6)
collections, for the period February 1999 to July 1999. All in all Itchon averred she received twelve (12)
collections. [Ibid, pp. 61-66]
Itchon also testified that Emma Lim was the secretary of Governor Singson and also a co-employee at
the LCS Office. Since Emma Lim was also helping in the jueteng collections, she also received salary from
Ricaforte. [Ibid, pp. 71-72]
On cross examination, Itchon explained that the name of the former President allegedly did not appear
in the Articles of Incorporation of Fontain Bleau because of his public position and because the source of
its funds was illegal [TSN, June 24, 2002, pp. 19-20]. Emma Lim, Jamis Singson, Edward Iverra and
sometimes Ricaforte collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada. Jamis Singson turned over to Itchon
the jueteng collection about once or twice in 2000 between January to August 2000. Itchon testified that
they helped Gov. Singson count Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00) from the jueteng collections sent
through the messengers and some from the collections of Gov. Singson himself and placed the said
amount of money in a black bag to be brought to FPres. Estrada but she admitted she did not see the
delivery to President Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 23-30, 101]
Itchon and the others at the office would allegedly wait for the call of Ricaforte to Jinggoy every pay day
because their salaries would come from Jinggoy’s jueteng collection. Itchon was only present around
five (5) times that Ricaforte called Jinggoy, although Ricaforte called Jinggoy 24 times. (Ibid, pp. 39-46)
Itchon also mentioned during her cross-examination that Gov. Singson was reimbursed for the jueteng
money advanced to Fontain Bleau when the latter was acquired by RN Development Corporation. RN
Development Corporation’s partial payment in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) was
deposited in the account of Fontain Bleau by Ricaforte and Ricaforte thereafter returned to Singson the
said amount through a Metrobank check payable to Singson. (Exhs. X6, X6-1, X6-2) [Ibid, pp. 125-127;
TSN, June 26, 2002, pp. 25-26]
According to Itchon, the use by Ricaforte of the cell phone no. 0918-9021847 in the name of Itchon was
proven by the cell phone number declared by Ricaforte in the bank where she deposited money (Ibid, p.
19). She admitted that she and Emma Lim were appointed by President Arroyo as Director of John Hay
Poro Point Development Corporation on September 2001. (Exh. 26, 26-a to 26-c-1) [TSN, June 26, 2002,
pp. 51-56]
On redirect, Itchon referred to the acknowledgement receipt dated March 12, 1999 (Exh. Y-6) for the
advance rental of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) as well as the landscape plan of said company
(Exhs. E7, E7-1 to E7-6) as proof that that original name of Fontain Bleau was spelled Fountain Bleau
Holding, Inc. [Ibid, p. 100]
Smart Communications billings identified by Itchon were marked as Exhs. X6, X6-1 to X6-2 [Ibid, pp. 101-
105]. Itchon also brought to court the journal (Exhs. A7-1 to A7-5) and computerized list (Exh. B7, B7-1 to
B7-3) of the pre-operation expenses of Fountain Bleau amounting to Sixty Five Million (P65,000,000.00)
which were reimbursed by RN Development Corporation. She also presented the computerized list of
said expenses with specifics (Exh. C7, C7-1 to C7-4) and some of the checks of Gov. Singson which were
used to pay the expenses of Fountain Bleau from March 3, 1999 to June 20, 1999 (Exh. D7, D7-1 to D7-95)
The funds of Fountain Bleau were taken by Gov. Singson from jueteng collections. The check covering
part of the reimbursement to Fountain Bleau in the amount of Thirty Four Million Six Hundred Forty
Thousand Four Hundred and Forty Two Pesos (P34,640,442.00) was marked as Exh. V6 (with
submarkings). [Ibid, pp. 106-117]
VICENTE RAGIL AMISTAD (Amistad) was a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer stationed at Vigan City
Police Station, assigned to former Gov. Singson since 1989 until the time of his testimony. On three (3)
occasions in 1999 and 2000, Amistad was instructed by Gov. Singson to go to the house of Bong Pineda
at Albany Street, Northeast Greenhills and received from Romy Pineda, Bong Pineda’s brother, the
followings sums of money: Seven Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P7,750,000.00); Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) and Three Million Two Hundred Fifty Pesos (P3,250,000.00). Amistad
would bundle count, place the money in a plastic bag and bring it to Gov. Singson at LCS building, after
signing a receipt prepared by Romy Pineda. [TSN, September 16, 2002, pp. 15-56]
Amistad also testified that upons instruction of Singson, he went to the office of then Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada at the second floor of the Municipal Hall of San Juan in 1999. After Mayor Jinggoy Estrada called
up someone, he [Jinggoy] asked Amistad to go down and get what Jinggoy would give him in front of the
Municipal Hall. At the ground floor, the security guard of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada gave him a package
wrapped in a newspaper with scotch tape, which he brought to Gov. Singson at LCS Building. Amistad
testified that he was was scolded by Gov. Singson because the money inside the package was short.
Gov. Singson called up Jinggoy and informed the latter about the shortage. The following day Amistad
was informed by Gov. Singson that the shortage of Jinggoy was already given to him.
JAMIS BATULAN SINGSON (Jamis) was the personal aide of Gov. Singson, who was not related to him.
Jamis Singson knew FPres Estrada and Gov. Singson to be close friends who played mahjong and drank
together. Jamis Singson was constantly with Gov. Singson when he delivered jueteng money to FPres
Estrada. [TSN, September 18, 2002, pp. 25-31] Jamis Singson saw Gov. Singson counting the jueteng
money before he placed them in a black bag which he would carry.
Jamis also testified that in March 1999, he, Artates and driver Prudencio went to the house of Bong
Pineda. Artates went inside the house and when he went out, he was carrying a shopping bag full of
money. Jamis then transferred the money to a black bag which Gov. Singson used to deliver money to
FPres. Estrada. Jamis described the black bag’s measurements and how it was opened from the top with
a combination (lock) ( Exh. "08"). The money totalled Five Million Pesos (P 5,000,000.00 ) in five (5)
bundles of One Million Pesos ( P1,000,000.00 ) each. They proceed to LCS Building in San Andres to pick
up Emma Lim as instructed by Gov. Singson. Inside the vehicle, Emma Lim counted the money. [Ibid, pp.
68-81] They went to the Polk Street house of FPres. Estrada but the latter was not home. While having
lunch at a restaurant, Emma Lim received a call from Gov. Singson instructing them to go to
Malacañang. Emma Lim alighted from the vehicle with the black bag and entered passing through the
guard house in going to the Presidential residence. They waited outside. Emma Lim asked to be fetched
later and she was no longer holding the black bag. [TSN, ibid, pp. 83-90]
Jamis also testified to one occasion in the middle of 1999 when he himself was instructed by Gov.
Singson to collect money from the house of Bong Pineda. That time Jamis received Seven Million Pesos
(P7,000,000.00) in a shopping bag from Romeo "Romy" Pineda. Romy made Jamis sign a blue book and
then Jamis brought the money to Gov. Singson in the latter’s office. [Ibid, pp. 91-101]
Jamis also testified he collected jueteng money from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada twice on Gov. Singson’s
instructions. For the first occasion, on or about October 1999 Jamis went to the office of then Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor Municipal Hall of San Juan at around 4pm to 5 pm. Inside the said
office, Jinggoy Estrada’s bodyguard Nestor showed a sando plastic bag to Jinggoy Estrada and after that
Jamis saw Jinggoy pointing to him [Jamis]. Jamis brought the plastic bag, which Jamis subsequently saw
contained an indeterminable amount of money, to Singson at the latter’s office. [Ibid, pp. 105-121]
The second time Jamis collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada was immediately after the first
time, in the evening.Thus, Gov. Singson instructed Jamis to proceeed to the house of Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada in Greenhills. At Mayor Jinggoy’s house, Jamis again received a plastic sando bag from "Nestor".
Jamis brought the bag to Gov. Singson’s office and handed it to Menchu (Ma. Carmencita) Itchon as Gov.
Singson instructed. Jamis identified Menchu in Court. He said she was the companion of Ricaforte in the
office. [Ibid., pp. 121-132]
ATTY. DAVID JONATHAN YAP (Atty. Yap), the Senate Legal Counsel, testified that he acted as the
Deputy Clerk of the Senate Impeachment Court. Among others, his office was in charge of receiving all
documents and pleadings relating to the impeachment trial. He was in charge of marking the Exhs.
requested by the parties and keeping them in custody. He brought to this Court in compliance with a
subpoena a fifteen (15)-paged document marked in this case as prosecution’s Exhs. "A-4" to "A-4-L"
[TSN, September 25, 2002, p. 63] He identified his signatures that he affixed on the Exhibits on
December 7, 2002. He testified that he saw Yolanda Ricaforte when she brought those documents to the
Senate Impeachment Court in compliance with a subpoena dated December 5, 2000 (Exh. E) issued by
Chief Justice Davide. Atty. Yap was present when Ricaforte took her oath on the witness stand on
December 7, 2000 He identified Ricaforte from a photograph (Exh. A6-V5-1). The Original documents
were placed in a vault inside his office, where they had been kept and deposited since they were turned
to him during the impeachment trial, except only when they were sent over to the Sandiganbayan as
requested. [Ibid., p. 77]
Atty. Yap was at the back of Yolanda Ricaforte at the Senate Impeachment Trial when she gave her
testimony that the ledger she brought is an ordinary "listahan." [TSN, Senate Impeachment Trial, p. 144;
see also TSN of these cases,September 25, 2002, pp. 78-79]
EDELQUINN DE GUZMAN NANTES (Nantes) was the Branch Manager of Equitable-PCI Bank, Scout
Tobias-Timog Branch on September 1, 1999. Nantes knew Yolanda Ricaforte because the latter was a
client of the bank. Ricaforte told Nantes that she [Ricaforte] was in the real estate and fish pond
business.
Nantes personally attended to Ricaforte when the latter opened checking and savings account with the
branch on September 1, 1999. She asked Ricaforte to fill up all the required documents for opening
current and savings accounts such as the signature cards for Current Account No. 0107-00638-9 and
Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. (Exhs. A-6, A-6-a and A-6-b) [TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 67-72]
Ricaforte opened one checking account, one savings account, seven special savings accounts and a PCI
Emerald Fund. The initial amount of deposit in the savings account was Seventeen Million Two hundred
Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000.00) as shown by the deposit slip for Savings Account No. 0517-
042227 (Exh. A-6-aa). The Seventeen Million Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P17,210,000.00) was in
check payable to cash. The Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) was deposited in the checking account No.
0107-001638-9 (Exh. A-6-bb) and the balance of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Five Thousand Pesos
(P17,205,000) was deposited in the savings account. [Ibid, pp. 80-85]
There were deposits made on the savings account of Ricaforte after the initial deposit. Nantes presented
and identified the deposit slips and the statement of accounts of Ricaforte (Exh. A-6 and submarkings)
which were: Deposit Slip dated September 1, 1999 (Exh. A-6-aa) with the amount of Seventeen Million
Two Hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-cc)
with the amount of Three Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,700,000.00); Deposit Slip dated
September 29, 1999 (Exh. A-6-dd) with the amount of One Million Six Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand
Pesos (P1,697,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ee) with the amount of Ten
Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P10,400,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 15, 1999 (Exh. A-
6-ff) with the amount of Five Million Seven Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P5,775,000.00);
Deposit Slip dated September 17, 1999 (Exh. A-6-gg) with the amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P750,000.00); Deposit Slip dated October 4, 1999 (Exh. A-6-hh) with the amount of Nine Million
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P9,050,000.00); Deposit Slip dated October 19, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ii) with the amount
of Six Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P6,650,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 4, 1999
(Exh. A-6-jj) with the amount of Six Million Nine Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P6,930,000.00);
Deposit Slip dated November 16, 1999 (Exh. A-6-kk) with the amount of Four Million Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P4,600,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 19, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ll) with the amount of
One Million Seven Hundred Eleven Thousand Pesos (P1,711,000.00); Deposit Slip dated December 7,
1999 (Exh. A-6-mm) with the amount of Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P989,150.00); Deposit Slip dated January 10, 2000 (Exh. A-6-2) with the amount of Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00); and a deposit slip (Exh. A-6-3) with the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P2,460,000.00).
Bank statements reflected withdrawals (Exhs. A-6-nn to A-6-zz) from the savings account for the period
September 30, 1999 to October 31, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 87-97]
With respect to the Current Account No. 0107-00638-9, witness identified the specimen signature card
(Exh. A-6-a and A-6) to show that the initial deposit slip was Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) (Exh. A-6-
bb). [Ibid, p. 98]
Ricaforte signed in the presence of Nantes the Authority to Debit and Transfer Funds (Exh. A-6-G) which
allowed funds to be automatically transferred from savings to current account to cover checks issued.
[TSN dated May 27, 2002, pp. 11-16]
The initial deposit for the First Special Savings Account No. 0157-90392-6 was Seventy Million Pesos
(P70,000,000.00) as shown by the Special Savings Passbook (Exh. A-6-S3) of Ricaforte dated December 2,
1999. The account was closed on April 13, 2000. It had a balance of Seventy One Million Three Hundred
Ninety Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Five and Eight Centavos (P71,390,875.08) which was
transferred to Ricaforte’s regular Savings Account. [Ibid, pp. 22-24, 43]
In the Second Special Savings Account covered by Special Savings Passbook No. 392093 dated February
7, 2000 (Exh. A-6-X3) showed the initial deposit of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) was taken from
the regular savings account. A withdrawal of the whole amount of Ten Million One Hundred Thirteen
Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Fifty Seven Centavos (P10,113,836.57) was made on April
13, 2000 reflected in the Credit Advice dated April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-ZZZ). [Ibid, pp. 49-60]
The Third Special Savings Account was opened on March 29, 2000 for Two Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). The money was taken from her regular Savings Account No. 0157-
04427-0. The amount of Two Million Five Hundred One Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Six Pesos and Sixty
Six Centavos (P2,501,666.66) was withdrawn from the special savings account as shown by the certified
true copy of the Credit Advice dated April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-C4). [Ibid, pp. 84, 93-95]
The Fourth Special Savings Account No. 3157-00073-9 covered by the Special Savings Passbook No.
392178 (Exh A-6-E4) had an initial deposit of Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P9,700,000.00) as found in the deposit receipt dated April 5, 2000 (Exh A-6-D4). On April 13, 2000, the
Special Savings was cancelled and preterminated. The amount of Nine Million Seven Hundred Three
Thousand (P9,703,000) was credited to Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. [Ibid, pp. 115-124]
The Fifth Special Savings Account (Exh. A-6-G4) which was opened on May 29, 2000 under the name of
Yolanda T. Ricaforte had an initial deposit of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00).
The initial deposit was withdrawn from her regular Savings Account. The Special Savings was closed on
September 4, 2000 and the amount of Two Million Five Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Four Hundred
Eleven Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P2,559,411.20) was credited to her Regular Savings Account 0157-
04227-0. [Ibid, pp. 128-129, 135, 138]
The Sixth Special Savings Account (Exh. A-6-L4), under the name of Yolanda T. Ricaforte, was opened on
May 4, 2000 for One Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,900,000.00). The account was closed on
September 4, 2000 as per Debit Advice dated September 4, 2000 (Exh. A-6-P4) for the matured Special
Savings Account worth Two Million Twenty Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Nine Pesos and
Eighteen Centavos (P2,022,429.18). [Ibid, pp. 147–153]
The Seventh Special Savings Account No. 3157-00088-7 dated June 1, 2000 (Exh. A-6-Q4) was worth Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in cash. The account was closed on September 4, 2000 and the proceeds
were credited to the Regular Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. The balance (Exh. A-6-T4) then was Two
Million Thirty Five Thousand Thirty Five Pesos and Ninety One Centavos (P2,035,035.91). [Ibid, pp. 156,
166]
The PCI Emerald Fund was in the amount of Six Million Six Hundred Sixteen Thousand Six Hundred
Seventy Six Pesos and Nineteen Centavos (P6,616,676.19) (Exh. A-6-U4 and Exh. A-6-V4). The fund was
then rolled-over monthly as evidenced by the Confirmation letter (Exh. A-6-Z4) dated December 6, 2000.
It was again rolled-over several times until it was redeemed on June 5, 2002. [Ibid, p. 168, 176 -193]
The first four Special Savings Accounts were all debited on April 13, 2000 and Ricaforte purchased a
Cashier’s Check payable to Cash for Ninety One Million Pesos (P91,000,000). The Application for
Cashier’s check (Exh. "A-6- R5") was signed by Ricaforte as purchaser. The Cashier’s check (Exh. A-6-
S5 and Exh. A-6-U5) was cleared and accepted by Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Pacific Star Branch, based
on the dorsal portion of the check.
The last three Special Savings Accounts (Special Savings Account Nos. 3157-00077-1, 3157-00080-1, and
3157-00088-7) were closed on September 4, 2000 and all the proceeds were credited to the regular
savings account, and then invested in the PCI Emerald Fund for Six Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P6,600,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 168, 206-207]
Nantes met Ricaforte more than twenty times and identified the latter through a picture shown by the
prosecution. (Exh. A-6-V5) [TSN, May 29, 2002, pp. 16-20]
The current account balance is at Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) (Exh. A-6-W5) and that of the Savings
Account is One Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six and Sixty Nine Centavos
(P197,736.69) (Exh. A-6-X5). The last withdrawal from the savings account was made on October 5, 2000
for automatic transfer to the current account in the amount of Seventy Nine Thousand Six Hundred Sixty
Four and Eighty Centavos (P79,664.80). The last deposit was on October 4, 2000, through a credit
memorandum of Thirty Seven Thousand Twenty Nine Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P37,029.17)
which represented the interest of the PCI Emerald Fund. After October 5, 2000 there were no more
counter transactions, only the entry of interest earned and withholding tax. [Ibid, pp. 23-27]
ROSARIO SALUDO BAUTISTA (Bautista) is the Senior Branch Manager of the Equitable, PCI Bank,
Diliman, Matalino Branch. Bautista personally attended to Yolanda Ricaforte who was a walk-in client of
the branch on November 19, 1999. Ricaforte opened a savings account and used her California driver’s
license and passport for identification.
The duly accomplished specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-z) was presented to show the existence of the
savings account. It was personally accomplished by Mrs. Ricaforte in the presence of Bautista. The initial
deposit of Mrs. Ricaforte was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in cash. [TSN, May 29, 2000,
pp. 93-96]
Ricaforte returned to the branch on November 22, 1999. She opened a combo account and closed the
savings account she opened on November 19, 1999. The combo account was Savings Account Number
0288-02037-0 and Current Account Number 0238-00853-0. As a new account, Bautista required Mrs.
Ricaforte to accomplish signature cards (Exh. A-7 and A-7-a). When the combo account was already
opened, Ricaforte presented for deposit two (2) checks totaling Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00).
Each check (Exh. A-7-B and A-7-C) was payable to cash for Thirty Five Million Pesos (P35,000,000.00).
The drawer was William T. Gatchalian and the drawee bank was PCI Bank, main office in Makati City.
Ricaforte told Bautista that the money came from the proceeds of the sale of a prime property sold to
Mr. Gatchalian. As precautionary measure, the branch of Bautista checked with the drawee bank PCI
Makati and they learned that Gatchalian’s account was a good account.
There were additional deposits made to the account. One deposit made on November 23, 1999 was a
check (Exh. A-7-h) issued by Governor Luis Gov. Singson dated November 22, 1999 for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) payable to cash. The drawee bank was Metro Bank, Ayala. The second check deposit
made was on December 16, 1999 payable to cash with PNB, Naga Branch as drawee bank. The check
(Exh. A-7-i) was dated December 9, 1999. The check was deposited and subsequently cleared.
On December 2, 1999, Ricaforte deposited Three Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P3,050,000.00) in cash
(Exh. A-7-d). The cash was in big bills, P1,000 and P500 denominations. Ricaforte explained to Bautista
that the amount came from other accounts in other banks because she planned to transfer all her other
accounts to Equitable, Diliman, Matalino Branch. Another cash deposit (Exh. A-7-f and Exh. A-7-aa) was
made on January 28, 2000 for One Million Pesos. [Ibid, pp. 100-130]
Ricaforte also opened a special saving account number 3288-00079-3 in the amount of Seventy Million
Pesos (P70,000,000.00). The initial deposit was taken from Ricaforte’s savings account (Exh. A-7-j). The
account was opened with passbook number 394979 (Exh. A-7-bb) and the specimen signature card (Exh.
A-7-cc). The account has already been closed. [Ibid, pp. 132-135]
On February 24, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte again transferred Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000) from her
ordinary savings account to a special savings account deposit (Exh. A-7-w) with Account Number 3288-
00087-4. Ricaforte also accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-dd) for the Special Savings
Account.
On April 13, 2000 Mrs. Ricaforte applied for a Sevety Seven Million Peso (P77,000,000) cashier’s check
against her special savings deposit account. She accomplished an application form (Exh. A-7-l) for the
transaction. Ricaforte had to accomplish a deed of undertaking (Exh. A-7-n) because the cashier’s check
was payable to cash. The cashier’s check (Exh. A-7-ee) was deposited on April 25, 2000 at the Pacific Star
Branch of Equitable PCI Bank in Makati. The name and account number were not indicated on the check.
[Ibid, pp. 148 -159]
Mrs. Ricaforte always dealt with Bautista as the Bank Manager for her transactions. Bautista identified
Ricaforte as the one wearing red (Exh. A-6-vvvvv-1) when shown a group picture. Bautista also identified
the girl beside Mrs. Ricaforte as Mrs. Itchon, one of the witnesses in the impeachment proceedings.
Aside from the personal visits of Mrs. Ricaforte, Bautista also called her on cell phone no. 0918-9021847
or home landline 9518854 whenever there was a maturity or an updating of interest. [Ibid, pp. 162-168]
At the time of Bautista’s testimony, the balance in the account of Ricaforte was around Two Million Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,200,000.00). It is still earning interest.
SHAKIRA CASTRILLO YU (Yu) was the Manager of Equitable PCI Bank, Pedro Gil-Robinson’s Branch since
it opened on August 1999. Yu knew Yolanda T. Ricaforte as she was one of their depositors. Ricaforte
told Yu that she was connected with Fil-East Travel and Tours which is located at the second floor of the
Manila Midtown Hotel. Ricaforte first opened a Regular Savings Account, participated in the Reverse
Repurchase Agreement and subsequently opened a Special Savings Account.
Ricaforte opened the Regular Savings Account on January 6, 2000. It was Ms. Evelyn Ponce, the Cash
Operations Officer who attended to her as Yu was not around. Yu brought with her the specimen
signature card (Exh. A-8-P) for Savings Account No. 027602029-3 and the New Accounts Record (Exh. A-
8-Q) which were filled out by Ricaforte. [TSN, June 3, 2002, pp. 85-92]
The initial deposit (Exh. A-8-Q-3) of the Regular Savings Account was Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) in
cash (Exh. A-8-R). When witness asked Ricaforte where the initial deposit came from, Ricaforte said it
was proceeds of a sale of a property. [Ibid, pp. 97-100]
Other deposits made to the Regular Savings Account were the following: a check deposit amounting to
Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand (P2,965,000) with Governor Luis Chavit Singson as
drawer; a cash deposit of One Million Five Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P1,540,000) deposited on
January 25, 2000 and a One Million Three Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P1,340,000) check deposit
(Exh. A-8-D) with Governor Singson as drawer (Exh. A-8-D-1). [Ibid, pp. 101-112]
On January 31, 2000, Ricaforte told Yu that she wanted to earn higher interest so witness advised her to
participate in the Reverse Repurchase. Ricaforte asked Yu to debit her Regular Savings Account for
about Eight Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P8,900,000.00) (Exh. "A-8-P"). On February 29, 2000
Ricaforte informed Yu that she did not want the Reverse Repurchase and she wanted a bank product
that earned a higher interest with passbook as documentation. The Certificate of Participation without
Recourse (Exh. A-8-F) was then paid on February 29, 2000 in the amount of Eight Million Nine Hundred
Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos and Eighty Two Centavos (P8,940,752.82).
Yu then advised Ricaforte to open a Special Savings Account. They took out her participation in the
Reverse Repurchase for P8,900,000.00 plus interest and Ricaforte asked them to debit more or less One
Million Fifty-One Thousand Pesos (P1,051,000.00) from her Regular Savings Account because she
wanted her Special Savings Account to be in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). The
specimen signature card of the Special Savings Account and the Credit Memo (Exh. A-8-G) under the
account name Yolanda Ricaforte for the Account No. 276-90238-5 dated 2/29/2000 were shown as
evidence of the existence of the account. The three signatures appearing in the card belonged to Mrs.
Yolanda Ricaforte signed in front of Yu.
Subsequently, Ricaforte withdrew her Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) plus interest from the Special
Savings Account and transferred the amount to her Regular Savings Account. The Special Savings
passbook of Mrs. Ricaforte (Exh. A-8-H) contained the entry Out of Return P10,019,555,55. [Ibid, 113-
120]
On April 13, 2000, Ricaforte applied for a cashier’s check in the amount of Eleven Million Pesos
(P11,000,000) debited to her Regular Savings Account. The application for Cashier’s check (Exh. A-8-I),
the receiving copy of the Cashier’s check, the Letter of Undertaking and Cashier’s check (Exh. A-8-T)
were all presented. The Application for Cashier’s Check stated that the Cashier’s Check is allowed to be
payable to cash except that the bank will not be held responsible for the loss thereof or a demand for a
refund or replacement. It is no longer allowed starting around July or August 2000.
Ricaforte instructed Yu to transfer Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from her Regular
Savings Account on May 23, 2000 to her Special Savings Account to earn higher interest. A Special
Savings Account Passbook (Exh. A-8-L) was issued to Mrs. Ricaforte which credited the Eight Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) to the Special Savings Account. [Ibid, pp.120-127]
At present, the outstanding balance of the Special Savings Account is more or less Six Hundred Thirty
Four Thousand Pesos (P634,000.00). The regular Savings Account has an outstanding balance of more or
less Sixty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P69,800.00).
After being shown a photograph, Yu identified Yolanda Ricaforte as the person wearing maroon or red in
the picture (Exh. A-6-Z5). Yu was able to talk to Mrs. Ricaforte over the phone around six (6) times. She
used the cell phone number indicated in the records. [Ibid, pp. 128-132]
VERGEL LEJARDE PABILLON (Pabillon) knew a person by the name of Yolanda Ricaforte because
Ricaforte opened regular Savings Account No. 0193-61496-8 and Special Savings Account No. 02193-
15050-3 with Equitable PCI Bank T.M. Kalaw Branch on February 8, 2000 while Pabillon was still
manager of the branch.
Ricaforte mentioned to Pabillon that she was connected with a certain company under the name of Phil.
East Travel and Tours located at Ramada Hotel, Mabini. She handed her California Driver’s license as
identification card and signed the specimen signature cards about one foot away from the witness.
Pabillon brought the Individual Account Record (Exh. A-9-C) and the signature cards signed by Mrs.
Ricaforte as evidence of the Account. The initial deposit made were in the form of a PNB Manager’s
Check (Exh. A-9-A) in the amount of Ten Million Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Seven Pesos
and Seventy-Eight Centavos (P10,007,777.78) and One Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,400,000.00) in cold cash. Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00) of that amount was placed in the
Special Savings Account and Four Hundred Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Seven Pesos and
Seventy Eight Centavos (P407,777.78) was placed under the Regular Savings Account. [TSN, June 5,
2002, pp. 98-109]
On April 13, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte went to the bank and informed the witness that she needed Eleven
Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00) in the form of manager’s check, payable to cash, to be taken out from
the existing Special Savings Account No. 02193-6-15050-3. The manager’s check dated April 13, 2000
payable to cash was presented (Exh. A-9-B). Ricaforte had to sign a Purchaser’s Undertaking bearing her
name as purchaser. (Exh. A-9-F) [Ibid, pp. 113-127]
Mrs. Ricaforte opened a third account, Special Savings Accounts No. 02-193-15177-1, in the amount of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). A debit memo (Exh. A-9-G) showed the transfer of the
P500,000 from the regular Savings Account 0193-64196-8 to the special savings account.
On August 31, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte went to the bank and requested for another Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Peso (P250,000.00) manager’s check payable to her to be deducted from Special Savings
Account No. 02193-15177-1. A bank document which served as a registered copy of the issuance of the
manager’s check was presented. (Exh. A-9-H) [Ibid, pp. 128-129]
Pabillon identified Ricaforte from a group photograph (Exh. A-6-B5) [Ibid, pp. 133-134]
The witness availed of the early retirement offered by Equitable PCI. He testified in the impeachment
trial even if he was already supposed to go on early retirement because he just wanted to tell the truth
regarding what transpired to the opening of the account of Mrs. Ricaforte. [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 54-
56]
EDGARDO LIM ALCARAZ (Alcaraz) was the branch manager of Equitable PCIBank, Scout Albano branch
for almost three years. He met Yolanda Ricaforte because she was one of their clients. She opened three
accounts with the bank on March 2, 2000 and he was the one who personally attended to her. These
were savings account and current account under the automatic transfer facility and a special savings
account.
Alcaraz testified on documents to show that Yolanda Ricaforte opened these three accounts, such as the
individual account record which showed information about Ricaforte, her special instructions and the
summary of the accounts that she opened. The other documents pertained to the specimen signature
cards signed by Ricaforte for Checking Account No. 5732-01-975-7, Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3
and Special Savings Account No. 5733-00721-0. Ricaforte submitted her local driver’s license and her
California driver’s license for identification. She told witness that she was engaged in the prawn business
in Iloilo. Alcaraz contacted Ricaforte two or three times using the numbers she wrote in the account
record. He also had a calling card from Ricaforte (Exh. A-10-F). [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 79-84]
The initial deposit in cash for the savings account opened by Ricaforte was One Million Nine Hundred
Ninety Five Thousand (P1,995,000.00). The initial deposit for Checking Account 5732-01-975-7 was Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). The initial deposit for Special Savings Account No. 5733-0721-0 was Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000). Copies of the deposit slips (Exhs. A-10-G, A-10-H, A-10-I) [Ibid. pp. 97-99]
On April 12, 2000, Ricaforte pre-terminated the special savings account. This is shown by its passbook
(Exh. A-10-J). A credit memo (Exh. A-10-L) showed that Ricaforte requested that the proceeds of the
special savings account be credited under the Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3.
On the same day, Mrs. Ricaforte applied for a manager’s check in the amount of Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00) payable to bearer. The application form for manager’s check (Exh. A-10-C), the proof
sheet copy of the manager’s check (Exh. A-10-K) and the copy of the check were presented (Exh. A-10-
M). [Ibid, pp.102-108]
As of the time of Alcaraz’ testimony, the regular savings account still existed with an outstanding
balance of One Hundred Three Thousand Pesos (P103,000.00). The checking account was still active with
an outstanding balance of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). With respect to the checking account,
Ricaforte issued a check in the amount of P500,000.00 on March 12, 2000. Since the accounts are
automatic transfer accounts, the funds from the savings account were automatically transferred to the
checking account. [Ibid, pp. 100-101]
EMMA AVILA GONZALES (Gonzales) had been the Branch Manager of Equitable Savings Bank, Isidora
Hills Branch for more than three years up to time she testified in this Court. Gonzales knew a person by
the name of Yolanda Ricaforte who was one of the clients of the bank.
She first met Ricaforte on March 15, 2000 when she opened a special savings account with the branch.
She walked into the bank, approached the witness and told her that she wanted to open an account and
that she was a valued client of other branches of Equitable Savings Bank. The specimen signature card
(Exh. A-11) and deposit slip (Exh. A-11-A) were shown to prove the opening of the special savings
account. The initial deposit was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) cash, in ten bundles of five
hundred (500) peso bills. Ricaforte said she was a businesswoman but did not specify the kind of
business she was engaged in. With respect to the initial deposit of Ricaforte, the account is still
outstanding. The original copy of the Equitable Special Savings Passbook No. 123727 (Exh. A-11-I) shows
the outstanding balance to be Five Hundred Ninety Three Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and
Thirty Two Centavos (P593,496.32) as of June 10, 2002. The difference in the amount was the interest
earned from the time it was opened. There was no movement of the fund except for the interest. [TSN,
June 10, 2002, pp. 162-169, June 17, 2002, p. 10]
Ricaforte also opened Special Savings Account No. 077090498-6 (Exh. A-11-H and Exh. A-11-D)
amounting to Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00). The initial deposit was an MBTC (Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Co.) Ayala Branch Check No. 1070. It was payable in cash and the drawer was Governor Luis
"Chavit" Singson. It was cleared after three days. The account was pre-terminated on April 14, 2000. The
withdrawal slip (Exh. A-11-E) showed that the amount withdrawn was Seven Million Nineteen Thousand
Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P7,019,736.11). Ricaforte received the payment in
the form of a Cashier’s check (Exh. A-11-F) payable to cash in the amount of Seven Million Pesos
(P7,000,000.00) and cash in the amount of Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and
Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11). The dorsal portion of the Cashier’s check showed that it was deposited in
Equitable Banking Corporation, Makati Pacific Star. On the other hand, the amount of Nineteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11) cash was used to open
regular Savings Account No. 0770009375 (Exh. A-11-I). The latest bank statement (Exh. A-11-J) showed
that the account still existed but the balance was no longer Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty
Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11). [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 172-189]
Witness was able to verify the phone number given by Mrs. Ricaforte because when she called the
number, Mrs. Ricaforte answered the phone. [TSN, June 17, 2002, pp. 11-13]
ANTONIO MARTIN SAGRITALO FORTUNO (Fortuno) was the Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI
Bank, Pacific Star Branch since January 28, 2002. The witness averred that he handled the opening of
accounts; supervised the investment section; the foreign telegraphic transfer as well as the domestic
telegraphic transfer and the safekeeping of the records of deposits; and other transactions which
transpired in their branch.
Fortuno brought with him documents relating to the deposit of six (6) cashier’s/manager’s checks in the
total amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to the Pacific Star Branch and the
transfer of these funds from cashier’s checks to the account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation in the
100 Strata Branch of Equitable PCI Bank. [TSN dated September 27, 2002, p. 127]
He identified an Acknowledgement Letter [Exh. I9, with sub markings; Exh. 16-a (Serapio)] dated April 25,
2000 addressed to Atty. Edward Serapio from Beatriz L. Bagsit, who was then Division Head of the
Makati Area. The letter acknowledged receipt of six (6) checks for deposit on a staggered basis and on
various different dates to the account of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation maintained at the Ortigas Strata
Branch. The checks were as follows:
(1) PCIBank Manager’s Check NO. 573-000035822 dated April 12, 2000 for P3 Million (Exh. A-10-m);
(2) PCIBank Manager’s Check No. 019L-000061146 dated April 13, 2000 for P11 Million (Exh. A-9-b);
(3) Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No. 0226-00949 dated April 13, 2000 for P11 Million (Exh. A-8-t);
(4) Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No. 0238-000941 dated April 13, 2000 for P77 Million (Exh. A-7-
ee);
(5) Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No.107-013064 dated April 13, 2000 for P91 Million; (Exh. A-6-r5)
(6) Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No.6720-00042 dated April 14, 2000 for P7 Million; (Exh. A-11-g)
Fortuno also identified the passbook for Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5 (Exh. J9, with sub markings)
which was opened on April 25, 2000. A bearer account is an account wherein there is no name
mentioned in the account. According to Fortuno, the six (6) manager’s checks were the manager’s
checks that were deposited on April 25, 2000 in the bearer account for the total amount of Two
Hundred Million (P200,000,000.00).
According the witness, the instruction in the letter was to deposit the funds on a staggered basis and
they can do so if they first deposit all the checks simultaneously for the three-day clearing.
On the basis of debit memos, manager’s check applications, detailed report transaction and deposit slips
or receipts, the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was gradually withdrawn from the bearer
account and transferred to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation from April 27, 2000 to May 11, 2000.
The six (6) checks were deposited in Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5 of which fourteen (14)
withdrawals in Manager’s Checks (Exh. K9 to X9, with sub markings) were made in various amounts and
these withdrawals were further divided into twenty-eight (28) deposits into the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation. Each withdrawal was divided into two deposits, as shown by the Account Information Slips,
Deposit Receipts and Detailed Report for Transfers and Debit/Credit Memos (DRTM) (See Exhs. K9 to X9,
with sub markings) brought by the witness. [Ibid, pp. 32-96]
The bearer account was closed on November 14, 2000 as evidenced by the Fund Transfer Memo (Exh.
Z9), and contained the interest for Ninety Seven Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Two Pesos (P97,392)
which was transferred to the account of the Foundation. [Ibid, pp. 97-98]
AIDA TUAZON BASALISO (Basaliso) was the operations officer of Equitable PCIBank, Ortigas-Strata 100
Branch since July 1997. She brought with her bank documents on the accounts of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation maintained at the Equitable PCIBank, Strata-Ortigas Branch including the inter-branch
deposits from the Equitable PCIBank, Pacific Star Branch for the total amount of P200 million to the
Account No. 0192-85835-6 in the name of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
The signature card for Savings Account No. 0192-85702-3 (Exh. A10) of the Treasurer-in trust has the
signature of Mr. George Go, the former Chairman of the Board of the bank. The list of Contribution (Exh.
B10) also had the signature of the treasurer, Mr. George Go. The two documents were given to Basaliso
by Catherine Mercado, someone who usually transacted business at the branch.
Witness also identified the Signature Cards of the Savings and Checking Accounts of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation. On the signature cards (Exh. C10) pertaining to the Savings Account No. 0192-85835-
6, the signatures of Mr. Raul De Guzman, Mr. George Go, Mr. Edward Serapio and Mr. Danilo Reyes, Ms.
Mila Reforma appear. Two signature cards were needed for the same account because the corporation
consisted of five (5) signatories.
The signature cards (Exh. D10 and Exh. D10-1) for current Account No. 0142-62890-2 showed the
signatures of the same five persons.
She identified the Secretary’s Certificate (Exh. E10) showing that the Corporate Secretary was Edward S.
Serapio, the Certificate of Incorporation with SEC Registration No. 2000002526 (Exh. F10) and the Articles
of Incorporation (Exh. G10) and the by-laws (Exh. H10).
Witness also testified on a debit memo (Exh. I10) dated April 20,2000 in Savings Account No. 019285702-
3 amounting to One Hundred Thousand Two Hundred One Pesos and Ten Centavos (P100,201.10) and
credited (Exh. I10-2) to 014262890-2 the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the opening of
the checking account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation and a Credit Advice (Exh. I10-1) to Savings
Account No. 019285835-6 amounting to Ninety Thousand Two Hundred One Pesos and Ten Centavos
(P90,201.10) to open the savings account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
Basaliso also testified on "no book cash deposits" made to the savings account of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation. No book meant that the deposit was made by the depositor without bringing his savings
passbook. DRTM (Detailed Report of Transfer Debit and Credit memos) (Exhs. J10 to R10) were presented
to show the transactions. The following deposits were made: Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) total
deposit on April 27, 2000, Six Million Seven Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P6,725,000.00) and
Eight Million Two Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P8,275,000.00) on April 28, 2000, Five Million
One Hundred Eight Thousand Pesos (P5,108,000.00) and Nine Million Eight Hundred Ninety Two
Thousand Pesos (P9,892,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on May 2, 2000, Three
Million Ninety One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Pesos (P3,091,450.00) and Six Million Nine Hundred
Eight Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P6,908,550.00) totaling Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) on
May 3, 2000, Six Million One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Five Pesos
(P6,118,225.00) and Eight Million Eight Hundred Eighty One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Five
Pesos (P8,881,775.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on May 4, 2000, Five Million Nine
Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Pesos (P5,936,000.00) and Nine Million Sixty Four Thousand Pesos
(P9,064,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on May 8, 2000, Seven Million Pesos
(P7,000,000.00) and Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos on May 9, 2000,
Seven Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P7,250,000.00), Seven Million Three Hundred Ninety
Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P7,399,800.00), Nine Million Three Hundred Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P9,375,000.00), Nine Million Four Hundred Forty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Pesos
(P9,449,400.00), Nine Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P9,600,000.00) and Eleven Million Nine
Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P11,925,800.00) totaling to Fifty Five Million
(P55,000,000.00) on May 10, 2000, Six Hundred Thirty Four Thousand Pesos (P634,000.00), Two Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), Three Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P3,800,000.00), Five Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P5,200,000.00), Nine Million One Hundred
Thirty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Pesos (P9,139,280.00), Nine Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P9,500,000.00), Nine Million Eight Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P9,836,500.00) and Nine Million Eight Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Pesos
(P9,889,720.00) totaling about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) on May 11, 2000. There was also a
credit memo made on November 14, 2000 amounting to Ninety Seven Thousand Three Hundred Ninety
Two Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P97,392.50) (Exh. S10). Bank statements pertaining to the periods April 1-
28, 2000 up to December 2000, except statements for July, August and October were presented.
At the time of Basaliso’s testimony, the current account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation with a
balance of Eight Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P8,600.00) (Exh. T10) was dormant. The Savings Account
No. 0192-85835-6 was inactive with a balance of Two Hundred Seven Million One Thousand Eight
Hundred Eighty Three Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P207,001,883.53) (Exh. U10).
Witness also testified that any two persons out of the five signatories of the Foundation were
authorized to transact regarding the accounts. Based on record, the amount of Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was deposited into the account without a single centavo being lost. The
passbook [See Exh. U10,36(Serapio)] had a balance of Two Hundred Seven Million One Thousand Eight
Hundred Eighty Three Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P207,001,888.53) because it already earned
interest. There were no withdrawals from the Savings and Current Account from the time they were
opened. [TSN dated October 2, 2002 and October 7, 2002]
ATTY. CECILIO ALEJANDRO VILLANUEVA (Villanueva) is the assistant Corporate Secretary of PAGCOR.
Witness brought with him the Minutes No. 36 of PAGCOR’s Regular Board Meeting dated September 5,
2000, under Agenda Item No. 002646 of the Best World Gaming and Entertainment Corporation
Cancellation of Quick Pick bingo and conduct of PAGCOR’s Two Balls Bingo Games (Exh. S15). Witness
brought with him pp. 28-30 with referred to Item Agenda No. 002646. Villanueva’s testimony was
offered corroborate the testimony of Gov. Singson that the consultancy firm of Atong Ang will receive
6% of the gross income from Bingo Two Balls.
On cross examination, witness testified that he has no personal knowledge whether the Bingo 2 Balls
was actually implemented. [TSN dated December 2, 2002 and TSN dated December 4, 2002]
MARIANITO MANIGBAS DIMAANDAL (Dimaandal) was the Assistant Director of the Malacañang
Records Department since 1993. Dimaandal identified the appointment papers of Atty. Serapio as
Presidential Assistant for Political affairs, Office of the Presidential Adviser for Political Affairs (Exh. V10)
and Mr. Orestes Ricaforte as Undersecretary, Department of Tourism (Exh. W10) and the assumption
into office by Ms. Yolanda Ricaforte to the PCGG representing the San Miguel Campo Creo Group (Exh.
X10).
Witness also brought a Certification (Exh. Y10) issued by the Office of the President that the phone
numbers 736-8856 and 736-8858 were in fact the telephones assigned to and connected to the
presidential residence during the incumbency of FPres. Estrada.
On December 16, 2002, Dimaandal was recalled to the witness stand. He further presented and
identified the Appointment of Edward S. Serapio as Member Ad Interim of the Judicial and Bar Council
representing the Private Sector dated July 1, 2000 (Exh. I17) issued by FPres. Estrada; a Memorandum to
All Heads of Office and Units signed by Former Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora (Exh. J17); and a
Memorandum to All Heads of Office and Units from the Office of the President dated April 29, 1999
(Exh. K17 with submarkings) with the subject title "Special Instructions to the Presidential Assistant for
Political Affairs" and with the contents read as follows: "Be informed that I have given special
instructions to Atty. Edward S. Serapio, Presidential Assistant I for Political Affairs, to undertake, in
addition to his regular duties and responsibilities, the following functions: 1) provide prompt objective
and independent advice on any legal question, matter, or issue which may be of special concern to the
President; 2) update the President on recent developments in law or jurisprudence on such subjects,
areas, or issues which the President may so specify; 3) study and review documents, deeds, contracts,
memoranda or other papers which the President may opt to refer to him for study and review; 4)
coordinate with various units of the Office of the President, Departments, and other agencies and
instrumentalities of the government on any legal matter which the President may refer to him; and 5)
perform other duties and responsibilities as may be directed by the President. Atty. Serapio will be
directly reporting to the President on any of the foregoing matters. For your information and guidance."
On March 31, 2003, witness Dimaandal was again recalled to the witness stand. He presented and
identified copies of Proclamation No. 145 dated July 17, 1999 (Exh. X19), Proclamation No. 194 dated
October 11, 1999 (Exh. Y19), Proclamation No. 202 dated October 21, 1999 (Exh. Z19), Proclamation No.
205 dated October 25, 1999 (Exh. A20), Proclamation No. 225 dated January 30, 2000 (Exh. B20),
Proclamation No. 234 dated January 28, 2000 (Exh. C20), Proclamation No. 273 dated April 23, 2000 (Exh.
D20), Proclamation No. 355 (Exh. E20), Administrative Order Nos. 28, 29, 32, 50, 59, 69, 73, 87, 89 (Exhs.
F20 – N20), Memorandum Order Nos. 82, 88, 89 (Exhs. O20-Q20) and memorandum Circular No. 45 (R20) .
These documents were signed by FPres. Estrada and his signatures were marked accordingly. [TSN dated
October 7, 2002; December 16, 2002; and March 31, 2003]
SALVADOR ROSAL SERRANO (Serrano) was the Vice-President of Security Bank Corporation and the
head of its Centralized Operation and Control Division. [TSN dated November 25, 2002] He was
responsible for the day to day operations of one hundred nineteen (119) branches of the Security Bank
Corporation; supervised the record keeping and accounting of the branch transactions; ensured the
compliance of their branches to bank policies and procedures; supervised the safekeeping of all
documents of all branch transactions; and issued certified true copies of documents in relation to the
original documents kept by the bank.
Serrano was called by the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of prosecution witness Gov. Singson
that he issued a check payable to cash from funds of jueteng protection money to accused FPres.
Estrada and that the said accused, in turn, delivered the check to Mr. Paul Bograd who subsequently
deposited the check to his account at the Security Bank Corporation; and to identify and authenticate
the documents he was subpoenaed to bring.
Serrano identified a microfilm copy of Metro Bank Check No. 0000917 for the amount of Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that was deposited through Security Bank Corporation on February 2, 1999. The
maker of this check was Gov. Singson and which check was deposited to Account No. 061-0-14636-7
whose account holder was Paul Gary Bograd as evidenced by a deposit slip of Security Bank Corporation
(Exhs. N14; N14-1; N14-2; N14-3; O14; O14-1; O14-2; and O14-3).
Also presented was a statement of account showing that an amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000)
was credited on February 2, 1999 to the account of Paul Gary Bograd (Exhs. P14 and P14-1). Serrano also
identified the specimen signature card of Paul Gary Bograd showing that the latter was a depositor in
their bank and that he [Bograd] held the Account No. 061-0-14636-7 of Security Bank Corporation (Exhs,
Q14; Q14-1; and Q14-2).
PATRICK DEE CHENG (Cheng), an employee of CITIBANK for 12 years, became the Branch Banking Head
of CITIBANK on November 2001. [TSN dated October 7, 2002 and TSN dated October 9, 2002] As
banking head, he had overall supervision and responsibility for all the branch banking operations of
CITIBANK in all of its six (6) branches.
Cheng presented and identified the following:
(1) deposit slip (Exh. Z10, with sub markings) dated October 4, 1999 for the account of Luisa P. Ejercito
("Mrs. Ejercito") under Account No. 166820 covering the deposit of Metrobank Check No. 00138 (See
Exh. M8 as original and Exh. A11 as micro film copy) dated September 29, 1999 by Gov. Singson in the
amount of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000) and another check in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P400,000);
(2) Account Opening Form (Exh. B11) for Account No. 166820 of Mrs. Ejercito;
(3) Hold-all-Mail Agreement (Exh. C11, with sub markings) dated March 9, 2000 of Mrs. Ejercito which
designated Ms. Lucena Baby Ortaliza to be her authorized representative;
(4) deposit slip (Exh. D11, with sub markings) of William T. Gatchalian dated August 20, 1999 with
Account No. 8131201377 for Forty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P46,350.000.00)
which covered the deposit of Metrobank Check No. 000132 dated August 21, 1999 of Gov. Singson in
the amount of P46,350,000.00;
(5) certified copy of the microfilm of the Metrobank Ayala Center Branch Check NO. 000132 (See Exh.
E11, with sub markings) dated August 21, 1999 drawn by Gov. Singson, payable to William Gatchalian in
the amount of P46,350,000;
(6) Relationship Opening Form – Personal (Exh. F11, with sub markings) of Mr. William T. Gatchalian; and
(7) Signature Card (Exh. G11, with sub markings) of Mr. William T. Gatchalian for a Peso Checking Account
with Account No. 8131201377 opened on March 13, 1996.
MELCHOR SUAREZ LATINA (Latina) is head of Remedial Management, Globe Telecommunication in

charge of terminated accounts. [TSN dated October 9, 2002]
He brought with him a certification (Exh. H11) October 4, 2002 issued by Atty. Melchor S. Latina, and
subscribed before Atty. Gilbert Escolo that Globe Cellular Phone No. 0917-5260217 was registered in the
name of Jinggoy Estrada. The certification was supported with the Service Agreement for Cellular Mobile
Phone Service (See Exh. H11-1, with sub markings) executed by the applicant Jinggoy Estrada and the
supporting documents required in connection with the subscription of cell phone; specifically, a
photocopy of Jinggoy Estrada’s driver’s license (Exh. H11-2) and statement of his Philippine National Bank
Visa (Exh. H11-3) as proof of billing. The cellular phone issued to Jinggoy Estrada has already been cut-off
since December 15, 2000 based on Globe Telecom records (Exh. H11-4).
ATTY. OSWALDO CHONG SANTOS (Atty. Santos) was a partner of the De Borja Santos Law Firm during
the time of the impeachment proceedings against the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
[TSN dated January 6, 2003 and TSN dated January 8, 2003]
In a letter dated December 22, 2000, the De Borja Santos Law Firm was requested by the Prosecution
Panel of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation regarding the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, Inc. (Exhibit A-12-a)
Atty. Santos testified that the commissioned law firm of which he was a member started conducting
research and investigation on the alleged foundation on December 28, 2000. They gathered available
documents pertaining to the Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. from the Records Division of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). On January 5, 2001, witness Santos then went to the corporate
address of the subject foundation indicated in the SEC documents (Exh. V17) that the investigating team
gathered which was at 15th Floor, Strata 100 Building, Emerald Avenue, City of Pasig. He found out from
his inquiries that the said office address was occupied by the law firm of De Borja Medialdea Bello
Guevarra and Jerodias. Atty. Santos clarified that his partner named De Borja was not the same person
indicated in the aforementioned law firm and that the witness had no idea if they were related.
Thereafter, the witness contacted the phone number of the subject foundation indicated in the SEC
documents that the investigating team had but got the response that the phone number belonged to
the aforesaid law firm and not to the subject foundation.
The witness then presented and identified a copy of the Report (Exh. A12) of the investigating team on
the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. He said that the original copy was submitted to the Prosecution
Panel of the House of Representatives and he attested as to the truth of the contents of the report. Atty.
Santos mentioned that the said report stated that the law firm occupying the supposed corporate office
of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. "used to be the law firm of the Acting Corporate Secretary
Atty. Edward S. Serapio".
Atty. Santos also identified the SEC documents that the investigating team had gathered which were
previously produced and identified by prosecution witness Atty. David Jonathan Villegas Yap. These SEC
documents were as follows: a Certificate of Corporate Filing / Information dated December 28, 2000
pertaining to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; a Certificate of Incorporation of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation, Inc. dated February 17, 2000 with SEC Reg. No. A20002526; a Covering Sheet of the
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; the Articles of Incorporation of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation,
Inc.; a Certificate of Filing of the Amended By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. dated
April 3, 2000; another Covering Sheet of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; and the Amended By-
Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhs. T17, U17 V17, W17 with submarkings, X17, Y17 and
Z17 with submarkings)
The witness testified on cross examination that the Erap Muslim Foundation, Inc. was duly organized
and obtained a juridical personality in accordance to law. The Amended By-Laws of the subject
corporation, which was approved by the SEC, allegedly provided that the members of the Board of
Trustees were not entitled to receive allowances or honoraria in the performance of their duties. Atty.
Santos was not, however, familiar to the Minutes of the Organizational Meeting of the Board of Trustees
held on March 22, 2000 (Exh. 4-Serapio); the Community Tax Certificate (Exh. 5-Serapio) of the
foundation; and the Mayor’s Permit (Exh. 6-Serapio) as well as the Business Permit (Exh. 9-Serapio) of
the foundation. He qualified that he verified from the Office of the Bureau of Permit of Pasig City that
the foundation had registered its Business License though he did not see the Mayor’s Permit of the
foundation and mentioned the same in the report. Atty. Santos likewise admitted that he did not come
across documents relating to the operations of the foundation but testified consistently on matters
pertained the report. (Exhs. 7-Serapio, 8-Serapio, 10-Serapio to 15-Serapio, and 21-Serapio to 27-
Serapio, inclusive of submarkings)
CAROLINA SANTIAGO GUERRERO (Guerrero) is the Branch Manager of PS Bank Murphy Branch, Quezon
City. She brought with her a deposit slip (Exh. A13) processed on December 23, 1999. The deposit
involved a Metrobank Ayala Center Check No. 001547 (Exh. N8) issued by Luis Chavit Singson in the
amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000). The check was deposited to the
account of Laarni Enriquez with Account No. 0180409000-3. The account statement for the month of
December 1999 (Exh. C13, with sub markings) of Laarni Enriquez showed that the amount of One Million
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000) was credited to her account on December 24, 1999.
The signature card (Exh. B13) showed that the account was opened on July 18, 1996. The card contained
Enriquez’s address as 95 8th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and her description as Filipino, 5’5", 34 years
old, brown, medium built and tiny mole on the right cheek.
Guerrero further testified that the biggest single check deposit of Ms. Enriquez in the particular savings
account was made on August 4, 1998 for P40 Million. This was shown through a bank statement of
account (Exh. D13) brought by the witness. The subject account was already closed as shown by the
December 27, 2000 bank statement. The address given in the statement had changed to 771 Harvard
Street, Wac-wac Subdivision, Mandaluyong. (TSN dated October 30, 2002, pp. 6-28)
DR. ROGELIO V. QUEVEDO (Dr. Quevedo) was, at the time of his testimony, the Head of the Legal and
Carrier Business of Smart Communications, Incorporated. The prosecution offered his testimony to
corroborate the Itchon’s testimony regarding the Smart cellular phone numbers used by Atty. Serapio
and Ricaforte.
Dr. Quevedo identified a Certification signed by him that Smart Cellular Phone Nos. 0918-9012071 and
0918-9021847 were registered in the names of Atty. Edward Serapio and Fontain Bleu, Inc., respectively.
(Exh. G12) [TSN dated October 28, 2002, p. 74]
With respect to Smart Cellular Phone No. 0918-9012071, witness identified the application form
accomplished by an Edward S. Serapio of the De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra Serapio Law Office
(Exh. H12), Certification regarding mobile phone number, phone model, INEI and ICCID (Exh. I12), Official
Receipt No. 82116771 (Exh. J12), Sales Invoice No. A0161625 (Exh. K12), Account Summary dated March
6, 1999 (Exh. L12), photocopy of Statement for Atty. Serapio’s Philippine National Bank Visa Card (Exh.
M12), photocopy of Atty. Serapio’s Citibank card (Exh. N12), Customer Inquiry Menu (Exh. O12), Customer
Address Inquiry (Exh. P12), On Line Aging Information (Exh. Q12), Service Disconnection document
showing termination of the account upon request of the customer on December 20, 2000 (Exh. R12) and
Certification Account Memo Inquiry (Exh. S12). [Ibid., pp. 75-90]
With respect to Smart Cellular Phone No. 0918-9021847, Dr. Quevedo presented and identified the
application form of Fontain Bleau, Inc. for two (2) cellular phones for Yolanda Ricaforte and Maria
Carmencita Itchon showing that the number 0918-9021847 was issued to Itchon while the number
0918-9021849 was issued to Ricaforte (Exh. T12), Customer Inquiry Menu (Exh. U12), Customer Address
Inquiry (Exh. V12), Account Maintenance Inquiry (Exh. W12), On Line Aging Information (Exh. X12) and
audio recording for the voice mail of 0918-9021847 by a certain "Yolly" (portion of TSN marked as Exh.
Y12). [Ibid., pp. 91-115] Dr. Quevedo further testified that the account for 0918-9021847 had already
been disconnected.
II. EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
The following are the witnesses for the defense under paragraph (a):
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA (FPres. Estrada) took the witness stand on March 22,
2006, March 29, 2006, April 5, 2006, April 19, 2006, April 26, 2006, May 24, 2006, May 31, 2006, June 7,
2006, June 14, 2006, June 21, 2006 and June 28, 2006. At the outset, FPres. Estrada denied that Gov.
Singson was his close friend because he had only one close friend, the late actor Fernando Poe, Jr. Gov.
Singson was just an ordinary friend and a political ally to him. He seldom saw Gov. Singson when he was
a Mayor of San Juan. Although he admitted that they sometimes went out, as they had common friends.
FPres. Estrada stated that all allegations in specification (a) of the Amended Information were lies, as he
did not receive a single centavo from any form of illegal gamling, even when he was still a mayor and he
never conspired with jueteng lords. As mayor of San Juan, his policy ws to make San Juan jueteng free so
he directed the Chief of Police of San Juan to go all out against all forms of gambling. He even personally
raided all gamling dens and had all indulging in jueteng and other forms of gamling arrested and jailed.
However, their wives and children came to him and explained that their husbands could not find other
jobs. He promised to put up a livelihood program for them. (TSN, April 5, 2006, morning session, pp.20-
26)
FPres. Estrada also cited national artist Nick Joaquin’s book "Joseph Estrada and other Sketches" (Exh.
457), particularly the article in the said book "Erap In a New Role" (Exh. 457-a), which narrated an
incident when he padlocked a gambling den when he was still mayor. (Exhs.457-a-1; and 457-a-2) [TSN,
April 5, 2006, pp.35-36]
FPres. Estrada asserted that his policy against gambling had not changed, even when he was a senator,
Vice President and President. However, he realized when he was a mayor that jueteng which was a
gambling for the poor was illegal and its collectors were harassed while the casino for the rich was legal.
He delivered his first privilege speech at the senate on November 25, 1987 (Exh. 458) where he
advocated the legalization of jueteng in order that the government through PAGCOR could earn Twelve
Million Pesos (P 12, 000,000.00) everyday or Three Hundred Sixty Million Pesos (P 360, 000,000.00) a
month which could be used to provide essential services for the poor instead of the enrichment of the
police and illegal operators. Although when he was Vice-President and appointed by President Fidel V.
Ramos as Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, jueteng was not part of his mandate but
he was to go against kidnapping, carnapping and illegal drugs. As President, he appointed Justice Cecilia
Munoz-Palma as Chairperson of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and asked her to study
how to legalize jueteng. She retired only after less than two (2) months to take care of her sick husband.
Later it was assigned to her successor Rosario Lopez, who begged off as she was new on the job.
Chairperson Alice Reyes of PAGCOR took over and finished the study.
Chairperson Reyes reported to former FPres. Estrada that the answer to jueteng was Bingo-2-Balls and
that if jueteng was to be legalized the government could earn no less than Five Billon Pesos
(P5,000,000,000.00). The study of jueteng showed that from Regions I to V only the collectors, cabos
and runners numbering one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) benefit from jueteng whereas if jueteng is
legalized, the jueteng cobradors will became members of the SSS or GSIS, they would have decent jobs,
ceased to be harassed and victims of extortion. First Lady Loi Ejercito woud have funds to provide
dialysis machines for the poor. The legalization of jueteng will minimize if not totally eradicate
corruption among police officials and local government officials (Ibid, pp.43-48) According to Alice
Reyes, the Presidential social funds could be augmented if jueteng was to be legalized. However, FPres.
Estrada told Reyes that instead the Mayors and governors social fund should be created because these
local officials are besieged with requests for medicines, funerals, bills, bills for tuition fees etc. [Ibid,
pp.47-50]
FPres. Estrada instructed Chairperson Reyes to implement right away the Bingo-2-Balls. There was a dry-
run in Bulacan and it was very successful. It earned Twenty Four Million Pesos (P24, 000,000.00) in less
than three (3) weeks in a few towns in Bulacan. Unfortunately, the jueteng lords who were against it
caused trouble and it was stopped. There were allegations that FPres. Estrada was receiving jueteng
money. [Ibid, pp.53-54]
FPres. Estrada denied that in August 1998 he had a meeting with Atong Ang at the kitchen of his
residence at Polk Street, Greenhills, which was allegedly witnessed by Gov. Singson who arrived later,
followed by Bong Pineda. From the start, FPres. Estrada had told Ang to distance himself from the
former President, Ang never stepped into his house nor in Malacañang except during the wedding of his
daughter where he did not even see Ang. Bong Pineda too had never stepped into his house. Gov.
Singson only fabricated the alleged meeting. His testimony in the impeachment that he saw Bong Pineda
when he arrived at Estrada’s house and the testimony in this trial that Pineda arrived later were
conflicting. [Ibid, pp.55-62] FPres. Estrada also belied the testimony of Singson that he told Bong Pineda
that he should not be the one to bring the jueteng money because it would be very obvious. FPres.
Estrada denied that he entered into any transaction regarding any illegal form of gambling specially
jueteng. [Ibid, pp.57-70] He admitted that Bong Pineda was his "kumpadre". The father of the wife of his
son Jinggoy, Precy, was a friend of Bong Pineda. They were from Pampanga. The family of Precy, not the
Estradas, got Mrs. Pineda, the wife of Bong, as principal sponsor at the wedding of Jinggoy and Precy. He
wondered why Bong Pineda was not presented by the prosecution as witness when Singson kept on
referring to him. [Ibid, pp.70-74]
On the delivery to him of jueteng money, FPres. Estrada denied Singson delivered jueteng protection
money to him at his house at Polk Street, the Presidential Residence in Malacañang and at P. Guevara
Street. He also denied that Emma Lim delivered jueteng money to his Secretary Malou Florendo at
Malcañang and that contrary to the testimony of Emma Lim, it was hard for anybody, including his
dentist, to enter the Presidential Residence in Malacañang without passing through the strict security
check. He never heard of Emma Lim except during the impeachment trial. He never asked Singson to pay
his obligations, as he did not have any debt, nor did he ask Singson to buy any appliance for him. He
refused gifts like appliances which he would just raffle off during Christmas. He had never seen
Carmencita Itchon, who he learned was a relative of Singson. Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon were
rewarded for testifying against him at the trial with their appointment as member of the Board of
Directors of Camp John Hay [Poro Point Development Corporation, now Poro Point Management
Corporation] (Exh. 459-A-2, 459-A-3) He emphatetically stated that he did not receive a single centavo of
jueteng money. [TSN, April 5, 2006, afternoon session, pp.3-19]
FPres. Estrada denied any knowledge of the ledgers of jueteng money testified to by Singson. He stated
he had not seen said ledgers, he had nothing to do with them and he could not understand them. He
first saw the ledgers on television during the impeachment trial. Acording to him, Singson only
fabricated the ledgers; like the documents pertaining to the excise tax. [Ibid., pp.24-35, 46, 49, 52-55]
FPres. Estrada also called a lie the testimony of Singson that he instructed Singson to pay Mr. Paul
Bograd Five Million Pesos (P 5, 000,000.00) from the jueteng money. He did not ask Singson to keep
money from him, so he could not order Singson to pay Paul Bograd and he did not owe the latter
anything. [TSN, April 19, 2006, p.14] He explained that the check for P1,200,000.00 (Exh. N8) which
Singson allegedly gave as birthday gift for Laarni Enriquez was actually intended for his son Jacob and his
two siblings, specifically, P1,000,000.00 for Jacob, the godson of Singson and P100, 000.00 each for
Jacob’s two (2) siblings, as Christmas gift. The check was dated December 22, 1999 whereas the birthday
of Laarni was September 22, 1999, Former President Estrada was surprised at the big amount and he
thought that Singson was trying to ingratiate himself to him. [TSN, April 19, 2006, pp.15-16]
FPres. Estrada also belied the claim of Singson that he advanced the Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00)
interest from the Sixty-Two Million Pesos (P62, 000,000.00) of jueteng money lent to Wlliam Gatchalian.
He denied too that he ordered Singson to lend the said amount of money to Gatchalian because he did
not ask Singson to keep any money for him. [Ibid., pp.23-25]
Regarding Yolanda Ricaforte, former President Estrada admitted he knows Yolanda, who is the wife of
the Former Tourism Attache in Tokyo, Orestes Ricaforte. Orestes met him when he arrived at the airport
for a speaking engagement for Overseas Filipino Workers in Tokyo. He met Orestes again after four (4)
or five (5) years when he, then already the Vice-President, had a speaking engagement with the Filipino
community in Los Angeles. There Orestes introduced his wife Yolanda to FPres. Estrada. He met Yolanda
again during the oath-taking of Orestes as Undersecretary of Tourism. He appointed him Undersecretary
as he promised if he would become President when they were in Los Angeles. He also appointed
Yolanda as director of Campo Carne as requested by Orestes because their income was not enough as
they had two (2) children studying in Los Angeles. [Ibid., pp.27-30]
FPres. Estrada however denied that Yolanda at any time was his employee. He seldom saw Yolanda after
the oath-taking of her husband. He did not approve her auditor for jueteng as claimed by Singson. He
had nothing to do with the money deposited by Yolanda, as he did not have in his possession any bank
documents. [Ibid., pp.30-33]
Regarding the testimony of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Former President Estrada testified that
even before he became mayor and when he was a mayor, he was giving scholarships to poor deserving
students, since he believed that education would give them the opportunity to rise above poverty. His
number one program as mayor was to put up the first municipal high school, which as cited by national
artist Nick Joaquin in his book (Exhs. 457 and 457-A-3), was the project closest to his heart as it will offer
free education to the needy young. He said that 60% of elementary graduates could not afford to go to
high school and thereby they could become a potential trouble group. This is the root cause of
criminality and he would rather spend money on free high school than spend it to enlarge the municipal
jail. [Ibid., pp.33-35]
Former President Estrada also established the Movie Workers welfare Foundation (MOWELFUND) when
he was still an actor (Exh. 460). The MOWELFUND sent to the United States to study film making seven
(7) scholars who were shown in The Evening Post, June 1, 1981 edition (Exh. 461). He also put up the
ERAP Foundation in 1988 to give scholarship to poor but deserving students. ERAP is the acronym of
Education Research and Assistance Program. It was registered with the SEC as shown by its Articles of
Incorporation (Exh. 462) The incorporators of the Foundation were: former Senate President Joverto
Salonga; former President Estrada’s brother-in-law, Raul P. de Guzman, former Vice-President of the
University of the Philippines and member of its Board of Regent’s; Mr. Anthony Dee, former owner of
China Banking; Mr. Dee K Chong, member of the Board of Directors of China Banking; Mr. Manuel
Zamora, a businessman and bar topnotcher; Mr. Antonio Abacan, now President of Metrobank; Mr.
Ronald Allan Poe, also known by his screen name Fernando Poe, Jr.; Mr. Iñigo Zobel of Makati; Mr.
Carlos Tuason, a former Chairman of the Philippine Sports Commission and a cousin of Mr. Jose Mike
Arroyo; Mr. Danny Dolor, a businessman; Mr. Hermogenes Tantoco, a big fishpond owner in Malolos,
Bulacan; and Mdme. Maria Clara Lobregat former City Mayor of Zamboanga (Exh. 462-B). According to
the memorandum of Executive Director of the ERAP Foundation, Jing Ancheta (Exh. 463), for school year
1988-1989 to 2005-2006, a total of 6,574 availed of the scholarship of the said Foundation, of which
2,512 graduated, 2,251 discontinued and 811 then currently enrolled. There were scholars from
Cordillera Administrative Region. (Exh. 464); National Capital Region (Exh. 464-A); Regions I to XIIb (Exhs.
464-B, 464-C, 464-D, 464-E, 464-F, 464-G, 464-H, 464-I, 464-J, 464-K, 464-L, and 464-M); ARMM (Exh.
464-N); CARAGA Region (Exh. 464-O). The list of schools attended by the scholars and the attachment to
the memorandum of Mr. Ancheta which was a Report of the e-Cares Program of Fr. Larry Faraon, dated
March 19, 2006 re: Students and Profile were marked as Exhs. 463-C and 465 (with submarkings)
respectively. [TSN, ibid, pp.43-58]. According to Former President Estrada, the seed money for the
foundations came from his salary as mayor. He said that from the time that he was a mayor, then
Senator, Vice-President and President, he never received a single centavo from his salary. They all went
to the Foundations. [Ibid, p.60]
FPres. Estrada testified that he devoted his salaries as public official to scholarship for the poor because
without them, there would be no Erap. The poor patronized his movies and supported him in his
political career. He solicited donations for his scholarship programs but donors wanted to remain
anonymous. He put up the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation because it was his campaign promise for the
people of Mindanao. In the Mindanao State Colleges, in Marawi City, he promised to send one hundred
(100) Muslim Youth yearly to Australia and America. When he was elected President, he spoke on
January 25, 1999 of his project Muslim Youth Foundation in Smokey Mountains (Exh. 466) and in
Angelicum College in Sto. Domingo Church at Quezon City during the launching of the Educational
Reentry, Agenda for the President to the Poor (Exh. 467 and 467-a). To comply with this promise, he
asked his brother-in-law, Dr. Raul de Guzman to put up the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, whose
articles of Incorporation was duly registered with the SEC (Exh. 252 [also Exhs. G10, W17 to W17-6 of
Prosecution]) [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.11-24]
Aside from Dr. de Guzman, the other incorporators of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation were
Professor Danilo Reyes of the University of the Philippines (UP) who had a Masteral and Doctorate
Degree in Pulic Administration at UP, another UP Professor, Mila Reforma, Mr. George Go, one of the
owners PCI-Equitable Bank, and Atty. Edward Serapio, a valedictorian of the Ateneo de Manila College of
Law and a bar topnotcher. The latter was introduced to him in 1999 by then Secretary Lito Banayo of the
Philippine Tourism Authority. He appointed Serapio as Presidential Assistant on Political Affairs because
he was impressed by his bio-data. Serapio is not that close to him as he dealt with Serapio on an official
and professional level. He denied that Serapio established a fictitious ("kalokohan") corporation for him.
He described Serapio as an ex-seminarian, a scholar, a very respectable person, very conservative, very
professional, a family man and of unquestionable integrity [Ibid., pp.24-28]. Former President Estrada
was automatically the Chairman Emeritus of the foundations that he established. He was the number
one fund-raiser but he is not a signatory to the checks of the foundation. The seed money of the
foundation came from his salary. He sponsored an Erap Golf Tournament which raised P27,000,000.00,
some part of which went to MOWELFUND and most of it to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Funds
were also raised from Valentines Ball at Manila Hotel and from solicitations from his businessman
friends and classmates. [Ibid., p.29]
Regarding the meeting allegedly attended by him, Singson, Ricaforte and Serapio where he instructed
Singson to give to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, through Serapio, jueteng money in the amount of
Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200, 000,000.00. former President Estrada claimed that no such meeting
took place. He only learned from Atty. Serapio that Singson gave P200,000,000.00 to the foundation
which he said came from an anonymous donor. He ordered Atty. Serapio to return the money to
Singson because his immediate reaction was that it was jueteng money. The Former President Estrada
emphatically stated: "I’m sure it’s from jueteng." [Ibid., p.34] He knew because Singson had been
offering this to him a long time ago. According to Serapio he did not know it was jueteng money and
that he received the money in good faith. When the former President told Serapio to take all possible
means to return the money, Serapio replied that he would consult the Board of Trustees first. Former
President Estrada did not know what happened after that because rallies and the impeachment started.
(Ibid, pp.34-36). He learned later that the money was intact at the Equiatble-PCI Bank and that it earned
interest, per bank certification (Exh. 257-C) and passbook (Exh. 257, 257-A and 257-B). At the time of the
testimony, the money based on the aforesaid documents amounted to P 213, 000,000.00. (Exh. 257-B)
[TSN, ibid, pp.41-45] Dr. Raul d Guzman informed him that the scholarship was continuing but the
foundation could not send scholars to the US but only to the universities in the Philippines. One of the
scholars, Janice Halim Negrosa was in the courtroom, at the time of this testimony of the former
President [Ibid., p.46]. He was happy with the continuation of the scholarship because it was his vow to
help the poor who supported him in his election as Mayor, Senator, Vice-President and President. [Ibid,
pp.47-48] He established two (2) foundations, the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation and the Erap Para sa
Mahirap Foundation to emphasize the assistance to our Muslim brothers, the true pure-blooded
Filipinos who defended us from foreign invaders. It was impossible to use the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation for money laundering because he was not a signatory to the checks of the foundation. Its
treasurer was the Chairman of the bank who would not allow his name to be used in money laundering.
If the Foundation would be dissolved, all its assets would go to the government. [Ibid., pp.50-55; and
Exh. 252-C]
In support of his policy to go after illegal gambling, former President Estrada cited the memorandum
and verbal directives that he issued to the PNP to implement this policy. In a memorandum dated
August 3, 1998 (Exh. 132) of Acting PNP Chief Roberto Lastimoso pertaining to the aforesaid directives,
he reported that he conducted 1,600 operations resulting in the arrest of 807 suspects, confiscation of
P320,039.70 in cash and jueteng paraphernalia, the filing of 253 cases in court with 13 cases still under
investigation. The report gave the statistics of illegal gambling for the semester 1998 and informed the
former President that he [Lastimoso] gave an ultimatum to all PRO Directors to pursue the anti-illegal
gambling campaign without end, until finally stopped and eradicated. Another report of the PNP Acting
chief stated in part:
"Dear President Estrada: This pertains to our compliance with the presidential directive dated August 14,
1998, regarding the resurgence of illegal gambling operations in the country. Please be informed that
the directive was sent to all PNP Regional Directors to identify, find, arrest and file charges appropriate
in Court against individuals who are using the name of President Estrada, or supposed connection with
his office to promote these illegal activities, and to come up with rigid measures and tangible results and
immediately stop all forms of illegal gambling, particularly jueteng and masiao." (Exh. 134) [TSN, April
26, 2006]
On October 7, 2000, Former President Estrada issued a Memorandum to the Secretary of Inetrior and
Local Government, the Director General of PNP that pending review of PAGCOR’s Bingo-Two-Ball which
was in the meantime suspended, they were directed to intensify anti-jueteng operations to prevent
unscrupulous individuals from taking advantage of the situation. (Exh. 468) He also issued another
memorandum to the incoming Director General Panfilo Lacson reiterating his directive against illegal
gambling and requiring periodic and timely reports on all actions relative thereto. (Exh. 469) [TSN, ibid.,
pp.56-64]
On the testimony of Gov. Singson that he was used and humiliated by the former President and ordered
killed by the latter, the former President testified that on the contrary, it was Singson who used his
name specifically in jueteng collections and Singson made it appear that he could influence him, that
Singson was close to him, and that Singson joined his state visits even if he was not invited. Singson was
accosted by the Traffic Management Group (TMG) because he was illegally using sirens and blinkers, as
testified to by TMG’s General Paredes. [Ibid, pp.65-66]
According to Former President Estrada, Singson leveled the serious accusations against him because of
his mounting problems. Singson had only two (2) sources of income, the tobacco excise tax under R.A.
No. 7171 and jueteng. Singson could not liquidate his cash advance from the tobacco excise tax share of
Ilocos Sur. He told Singson that he could not help him because COA was an independent constitutional
body. Singson was also against Bingo-2-Ball which was already conceptualized because he would lose his
source of income. [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.64-69] Former President Estrada was informed that Singson
talked to then Secretary Alfredo Lim seeking his intercession to seek a meeting with Former President
Estrada so that jueteng would not be legalized or that if legalized (through Bingo-2-Ball) the franchise be
given to him, otherwise it would mean his [Singson’s] political death. Former President Estrada refused
to talk with Singson and told Secretary Lim to talk to Chairperson Alice Reyes. Singson approached also
other persons aside from Secretary Lim and Senator Edgardo Angara. Senator Angara told FPRes.
Estrada that Singson went to see him on a Sunday asking help about jueteng and Bingo-2-Ball. He told
Senator Angara to tell Singson not to talk to him but to Chairperson Alice Reyes. Angara mentioned that
Singson threatened to expose him but he said he had nothing to hide and if Singson wanted so, to let
him do it. Former President Estrada then immediately had the accusations investigated as he had
confirmed that for a long time, Singson had already been using his name, specifically in jueteng
collection. He was hurt by the accusations of Singson as he was turned from being a President, with the
biggest mandate in a clean election, into a prisoner because of a big lie started by one person, Governor
Singson. Moreover his son Jinggoy and Atty. Serapio were also detained for two (2) years when they
knew nothing about jueteng [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.69-77.]
JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA was elected Vice Mayor of San Juan in 1988 and Mayor of San Juan in 1992. [
TSN, November 17, 2004, pp. 15-16.]
Mayor Jinggoy stated that he first got to know Gov. Singson, whom he considered as an acquaintance,
during the presidential campaign of his father, FPres. Estrada, in the 1998 elections. At that time, Gov.
Singson supported FPres. Estrada and hosted a lunch for FPres. Estrada’s entourage when they
campaigned in Ilocos Sur. After the presidential campaign, he said he met Gov. Singson only
occasionally. [Ibid., pp. 16-17]
Mayor Jinggoy denied the testimony of Gov. Singson that he was the collector for jueteng protection
money in the province of Bulacan starting January 1999 to August 2000. Witness also stated that he has
never been called "Jingle Bell" nor had he received or heard communication where he was called "Jingle
Bell". Witness also denied the statement of Gov. Singson that a certain Jessie Viceo was the collector of
jueteng protection money in the province of Bulacan from January 1999 to August 2000, because
witness had never been a collector or protector of jueteng. However, Mayor Jinggoy admitted that he
came to know Jessie Viceo when the latter was running for congressman since Viceo was also aligned
with their political party during the time witness was assigned to campaign for his father in the province
of Bulacan. After that, witness stated that he met Viceo three times in social functions. Again, witness
considered Viceo as an acquaintance. [Ibid., 18-22]
Mayor Jinggoy also denounced for being untrue the allegation that as collector of jueteng protection
money in Bulacan, he collected Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) monthly of which One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) was retained by him and the other Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) was sent to Gov.
Singson’s office or was picked up by Gov. Singson’s aides from witness’ office in the municipal hall of San
Juan or from witness’ residence. [Ibid., p. 22]
He further added that he had never used a personalized check with his picture printed on the check as
testified to by Emma Lim who allegedly deposited such check drawn against the United Overseas Bank
of the Philippines, San Juan Branch to Gov. Singson’s account with Metro Bank Ayala Branch. Mayor
Jinggoy presented a certification to prove that he does not maintain a current account with the said
bank. [Ibid., pp. 25-26]
Witness also denied the testimony of prosecution witnesses Vicente Amistad and Jamis Singson who
both claimed to have collected/received jueteng protection money from the witness. With respect to
the statements of Jamis Singson, Mayor Jinggoy asserted they were untrue since he did not have a
security aide named Nestor. Further, the testimony of Jamie Singson that on other occasion, the latter
got protection money from witness’ residence at Polk St., Greenhills is also not true because he does not
live in Polk St. but in 97 Kennedy St., North Greenhills. [Ibid., pp. 26-28]
As regards the rest of the testimony of Gov. Singson, Mayor Jinggoy also stated that following were
totally untrue: that in his conversation with Gov. Singson, witness confirmed that he received a part (or
Fifteen Million Pesos) of the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos that came from the tobacco excise funds
because witness was never involved nor did he know anything about it; that before the press conference
held on October 9, 2000 at the Club Filipino, witness tried to dissuade Singson from making the expose
because at that time witness was in Australia watching the Sydney Olympics. [Ibid., pp. 29-32] Witness,
however, admitted that three weeks before he left for Australia, Singson called him up before meeting
him at the Kamayan, EDSA where witness was having dinner with his basketball team to ask if witness
can convince his father or Atong Ang to give Singson the franchise of Bingo 2 Ball and not to his
(Singson) political enemies, to which Mayor Jingoy replied that he will try to talk to Atong Ang. Witness
also denied the allegation that he called up Gov. Singson at midnight of October 8, 2000, on the eve of
the press conference where according to Gov. Singson, witness told Gov. Singson that "baka naman
isama mo pa ako dito, Governor", because witness was then shooting a movie with Judy Ann Santos.
[Ibid., pp. 34-39, 102]
Bong Pineda was an acquaintance of Jinggoy Estrada. He denied having known Orestes Rusty Ricaforte
and Yolly Ricaforte, while he admitted having known Bonito Singson whom he met once or twice. [Ibid.,
65-68]
Jinggoy Estrada testified that the Municipality of San Juan maintained a current account with the
Philippine National bank and Land Bank and not with the United Overseas Bank. He, himself maintained
a personal account with United Coconut Planters Bank. [Ibid., pp. 86-88]
Mayor Jinngoy knew Atong Ang personally, whose real name was Charlie and he first come to know him
even before the 1998 presidential elections. He testified that he did not know Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio
Tan, Victor Tan Uy, or a Jojo Uy, and a yatch by the name of Escalera. [Ibid., 99-104]
ALICIA PEREZ LLAMADO REYES (Reyes) was the Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer of PAGCOR
since January 2, 1987. She was appointed by Former President Corazon C. Aquino, reappointed by
Former President Fidel V. Ramos, and again reappointed by Former President Joseph E. Estrada. [TSN,
March 7, 2005]
The witness testified that Atong Ang proposed to her the operation of Bingo Two Balls sometime in the
year of 2000. She welcomed the idea since Atong Ang successfully handled the Jai-Alai operations of
PAGCOR. Witness Reyes then suggested for a written proposal from Atong Ang. In a Letter dated
September 1, 2000 addressed to the Director of PAGCOR Jose Rodriguez III (Exh. 286), Atong Ang
proposed the feasibility of the Bingo Two Balls. The proposal was duly approved for negotiation by the
Board of Directors of PAGCOR in a Memorandum dated September 5, 2000 (Exh. 287 with submarkings).
Witness Reyes added that the proposal had the confirmation of FPres. Estrada who even told her to
"study the proposal and if it will displace Jueteng then he [was] all for it". For the purpose of
implementing the initial operation of Bingo Two Balls, the officers of PAGCOR called a meeting in
Parañaque Casino and invited several personalities knowledgeable in number gaming operations in the
Philippines. Gov. Singson did not attend the meeting since the latter was not interested according to
Atong Ang. The operation of Bingo Two Balls in Ilocos Sur was nonetheless offered to three relatives of
Gov. Singson.
Among the conditions for the operation of Bingo Two Balls was the drawing of winning numbers in
public and that no payments will be made "under the table". It was agreed that 23% of the total revenue
will be remitted to PAGCOR and 77% of the total revenue will inure to the benefit of the operators. The
Bingo Two Balls nationwide operation was estimated to gain P50 to 65 Million of sales a day. Atong Ang
was supposed to be given a management fee of 8% but was reduced to 7% and then to 5%. The
management fee was finally recommended to be reduced at 2% by the head of the Bingo Department of
PAGCOR in a Recommendation Letter dated November 30, 2000 (Exh. 290).
The dry-run operation of Bingo Two Balls lasted for 20 days particularly in the Province of Bulacan.
According to witness Reyes, PAGCOR got P24 Million from the initial operation of Bingo Two Balls from
the Province of Bulacan alone. FPres. Estrada then ordered for the suspension of the operation of Bingo
Two Balls allegedly because of adverse publicity and criticisms from the press.
On cross examination, witness Reyes clarified that there was no written agreement for the dry-run
operation of the Bingo Two Balls and that the conditions set forth in the initial operation was not final.
She also stated that the P24 Million that was remitted to PAGCOR represented the 23% share that was
agreed upon and that part of this share was remitted to the Social Fund of the Office of the President.
The 77% share of the income was returned to the operators.
On re-direct examination, the witness testified that the Social Fund of the Office of the President was
created during the term of Former President Aquino. During her administration, this fund was utilized
mostly for building school houses which policy was also adopted during the administration of Former
Presidents Ramos and Estrada.
ATTY. EMILIA SAMONTE PADUA (Padua) was the Managing Head of the Entertainment and Bingo
Department of PAGCOR since July of 1996 to June of 2001. She managed, supervised, and controlled the
nationwide commercial bingo operations and bingo derivatives, such as Quick-Pick Games and Bingo
Two Balls. [TSN, March 9, 2005]
The witness testified that her department reviewed and evaluated the Bingo Two Ball Project Proposal
of Atong Ang to PAGCOR. The said project proposal was approved for an initial operation and that the
Officer-In Charge for the project was Jose Rodriguez III while the Consultant of the project was the
Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc. of which Atong Ang was the General Manager. Atong Ang
also served as the Marketing Agent of PAGCOR for the project and, as such, he identified the operational
areas and the pre-qualified applicants. The Bingo Two Ball Project was partially implemented from
September 18, 2000 to October 7, 2000 in the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, CAR, Cordillera
Administrative Region, Albay, Bicol, Cavite, Marinduque, Lucena, Batangas, Northern and Southern
Luzon, and in Visayas. PAGCOR allegedly attained its financial goals and objectives in the organizational
stage of the project. Witness Padua presented and identified PAGCOR’s Share Based on Reported Sales
Quota (Exh. 288) prepared by the consultancy group of Atong Ang to corroborate the success of the
initial operation of the Bingo Two Balls Project.
Based on a Memorandum dated November 14, 2000 (Exh. 290) approved by the Board of Directors of
PAGCOR, the 20-day operation of the Bingo Two Ball Project aggregated a gross sale of P106,206,661.00
and that P24,427,532.00 was collected by PAGCOR which represented its 23% share. The consultancy
group of Atong Ang gained 2% from the 23% share of PAGCOR. Though there was no written agreement
between PAGCOR and the consultancy group of Atong Ang as regards the payment of the latter’s 2%
share, the Board of Directors of PAGCOR decided that the consultancy group of Atong Ang was entitled
to such share.
Witness Padua also testified that among the objectives of the Bingo Two Ball Project were to eradicate
the illegal number games such as Jueteng and to create employment opportunities. However, the said
project was ordered suspended by the Office of the President because of adverse criticisms and
questions of legality from the public.
On cross examination, witness Padua admitted that there was no bidding conducted by PAGCOR in
awarding the operation of the Bingo Two Ball Project to Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc.
She explained that since Atong Ang also headed the Power Management Corporation which successfully
handled the Jai-Alai Operations of PAGCOR, the Board of Directors of PAGCOR decided to engage the
services of the Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc. of Atong Ang to handle the Bingo Two Ball
Project. The witness further testified that some of the appointed operators of the Bingo Two Ball Project
were reputed as Jueteng Operators but qualified that she only knew them as such after the initial
operation of the said project.
On re-direct examination, witness Padua testified that assuming the Bingo Two Ball Project was not
suspended and a contract was perfected between PAGCOR and the operator the contract would
nonetheless pass the review and approval of the Office of the Government Corporate Council (OGCC)
and the Office of the President.
SENATOR ALFREDO SIOJO LIM (Sen. Lim) was appointed as the Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG) on January 8, 2000. [TSN, March 14, 2005]
On October 7, 2000, Sen. Lim read in the newspaper the alleged attempted ambush on the life of Gov.
Singson and discussed the issue with Congressman Luis "Baby" Asistio during their breakfast meeting at
the Manila Yacht Club. Thereafter, Sen. Lim and Baby Asistio visited Gov. Singson at his residence in Blue
Ridge, Quezon City. Governor Casimiro Ynares, Jr. later arrived and joined their conversation. According
to Lim, Gov. Singson related to them the details of the attempted plot against the life of Gov. Singson on
the late evening of October 3, 2000. On said date, members of the Traffic Management Group (TMG)
armed with long rilfes and not wearing proper uniforms, accosted the vehicle occupied by Gov. Singson
along San Marcelino Street, for beating a red light and having a blinker on top of his vehicle. Gov.
Singson initially refused to alight from his vehicle and got down only when the mayors that he just had a
meeting with arrived on the scene. Singson argued with the TMG Officers and refused to be brought to
Camp Crame. The dispute ended when the TMG Officers finally agreed that they will no longer force
Gov. Singson to be brought to Camp Crame since the blinker of the vehicle of Gov. Singson was
surrendered to them.
Gov. Singson allegedly said that Atong Ang and Ping Lacson were the persons responsible for the
attempted ambush on his life, and that both conspired to have him killed because Gov. Singson was
against the Bingo Two Balls gaming proposal of Atong Ang and that there was an arrangement for the
raising of campaign funds for the presidential candidacy of Ping Lacson. Sen. Lim further related that
Gov. Singson also implicated FPres. Estrada on the alleged attempted ambush on his life on the theory
that Atong Ang and Ping Lacson will not have the courage to have him killed without the approval of
FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson also grumbled about the awarded franchises for the operation of the Bingo
Two Balls in Ilocos by Atong Ang to the political opponents of Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson also mentioned
that FPres. Estrada did not help him sort out his problems with the Commission on Audit (COA).
Sen. Lim further testified that on the following day, October 8, 2000, he and Congressman Baby Asistio
went to the Malacañang Palace and met FPres. Estrada. The witness relayed to FPres. Estrada the
sentiments and allegations of Gov. Singson. FPres. Estrada denied Gov. Singson’s accusations that he
had something to do with the attempted ambush and that he would initiate an investigation on the
matter. FPres. Estrada said that Gov. Singson was his good friend and that he was with Lim in Cebu City
and Cagayon de Oro during the alleged incident. As to the issue regarding the Bingo Two Ball Project of
Atong Ang, FPres. Estrada said that he was convinced by PAGCOR that it could triple its proceeds as
compared to the operations of Jai-Alai. FPres. Estrada would also trigger an investigation regarding Gov.
Singson’s allegation that Atong Ang had planned to divert the proceeds of the Bingo Two Ball Project of
PAGCOR. Witness Lim added that FPres. Estrada admitted that he left Gov. Singson to explain to COA
because he had no control and supervision over the said constitutional body.
The witness also refuted the testimony of Gov. Singson that he conveyed the impression to Gov. Singson
that FPres. Estrada gave the signal to kill Atong Ang. Witness Lim claimed that his thumbs down gesture
to Gov. Singson meant that FPres. Estrada would have Atong Ang ordered investigated and not to have
the latter killed.
On cross examination, witness Lim testified that he had no personal knowledge as to the purchase of
shares from Bell Corporation by GSIS and SSS; as to the matters regarding the Ilocos Sur Excise Taxes;
and as to the Jueteng collection ledger of Yolanda Ricaforte.
VIOLETA SUAREZ DAMITAN (Damitan) was the Executive Assistant of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation employed by Raul P. De Guzman on January 1, 2004 (Exh. 278). [TSN, March 16, 2005] She
was responsible, among others, for the safekeeping of the records of the said corporation such as the
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, and the records of applicants to the scholarship program of the
foundation.
Damitan testified that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation provided scholarship education programs to
the less privileged Muslim youth Filipinos. The applications and recommendations filed were reviewed
by the Screening Committee and approved by the Board of Trustees of the foundation.
Damitan presented and identified the credentials and pertinent records of Sittie Shahani Laminero who
was one of the applicants granted a scholarship program by the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (Exhs.
295, 296, 297 and submarkings). She likewise presented and identified several documents enumerating
and showing other grantees of the said scholarship program, namely, Salvador Ongay Domona, Sohayle
Hadji Abdul Rachman, Janice Halim Negrosa, Roque Santos Morales, and Ahmad Robert (Exhs. 279, 280,
298, 299 and submarkings). The witness further presented and identified a Minutes of the Meeting of
the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation on July 21, 2000 to show the appointment
of the other employees of the foundation and the accounts of the scholarship program (Exh. 274 and
submarkings).
SALVADOR ONGAY DOMONA [TSN, March 16, 2005], JANICE HALIM NEGROSA [TSN, March 30,
2005], ROQUE SANTOS MORALES [TSN, March 30, 2005] and H. SOLAYHE A.A. MARANGIT [TSN, March
28, 2007], all similarly testified that they were granted scholarships by the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation. Witness Domona applied and was admitted for the scholarship program on the year 2003;
witness Negrosa applied and was admitted to the said program on the year 2004; witness Morales
applied and was admitted to the same program on the year 2004 and witness Marangit applied and was
admitted to the same program in 2004. These witnesses also presented and identified their respective
credentials and pertinent documentary evidence. (see also Exhs. 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308,
309, 310, and submarkings)
ATTY. CARINA JAVIER DEMAISIP (Demaisip) was appointed Assistant Corporate Secretary of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. on January 1, 2004 (Exh. 277). She assisted the release of funds and
prepared the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Trustees of the foundation. [TSN dated March 30,
2005 and TSN dated April 4, 2005]
Demaisip testified that Raul P. De Guzman solicited her services for the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation
sometime on July of 2003 which was after the incarceration of Atty. Edward S. Serapio, the Corporate
Secretary. The foundation was located at the 4th Floor of VAG Building in Greenhills, Ortigas Avenue. The
witness then identified several minutes of the meetings approved by the Board of Trustees of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation (Exhs. 279, 281, 312, and submarkings) and corroborated the testimony of
witness Violeta S. Damitan regarding the approved and awarded scholarship programs by the
foundation (Exh. 313 and submarkings). She also testified that among the reasons why the foundation
had no scholars for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, except for Salvador O. Domona, were because
of (a) the ineffectiveness of the Board of Trustees brought by the charges against FPres. Estrada, (b) the
lack of funds to operate the foundation due to the freeze orders, and (c) the failure of the institutions to
comply with the requirements of the scholarship program. The funds of the foundation became
available on November 11, 2003. Hence, the foundation started releasing checks only thereafter
although some of the applications for the scholarship program were already reviewed and approved
before the availability of the funds.
MARIA LOURDES LOVERO FLORENDO (Florendo) was an Executive Assistant in the Office of the Vice
President and the Confidential Secretary of accused FPres. Estrada. [TSN, April 20, 2005 and April 25,
2005]
Florendo testified that she did not know and had never met on any occasion Emma Lim. The witness
said that she was shocked when she read from the newspaper that Emma Lim allegedly gave her a black
bag containing P5,000,000.00 at the Presidential Residence. She refuted the statements that Emma Lim
gave during the Impeachment Trial on December 11, 2000 that the latter went straight to her and
handed a black bag which contained P5,000,000.00; that Emma Lim was not required at the guardhouse
of the Presidential Residence to have her black bag examined in the X-Ray Machine; that there were no
furniture or sala sets at the right side of the entrance of the Presidential Residence; that witness
Florendo received the black bag and placed it near a table and that she talked to Gov. Singson and told
him that "they already arrived"; and that Emma Lim went out running towards her vehicle after giving
the black bag to witness Florendo (Exh. 320-C and submarkings).
NORMAN DELOS SANTOS BORDADORA (Bordadora) was a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer since
July of 1996. He testified that he was the author of an article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer Newspaper
entitled "Chavit, I Have Never Been Into Jueteng" which was published on May 21, 2005 (Exh. 335). The
source of the contents of his article was allegedly Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson whom witness
Bordadora had interviewed through a cellular phone which was not recorded. The witness clarified that
he interviewed Gov. Singson on the alleged jueteng involvement of Archbishop Cruz and not on the
jueteng expose in the year 2000. [TSN, June 22, 2005]
ATTY. JOSEPH QUION ORSOS (Orsos), P/SUPT. ARTURO LACSINA PAGLINAWAN (Paglinawan), P/SUPT.
RODOLFO SANTOS AZURIN, JR. (Azurin), POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR NOEL BIACA VALLO (Vallo), P/SUPT.
ELISEO DECENA DE LA PAZ (Dela Paz), JONIRO FORMILLEZA FRADEJAS (Fradejas) and RENATO
MENDOZA PAREDES (Paredes), all testified to matters related to the October 3, 2000 traffic incident
involving Gov. Singson and the Traffic Management Group ("TMG").
Orsos, a Police Officer and the Chief of the Legal Services of the TMG, presented and identified a Roster
of Troops dated October 3, 2000; a Disposition of Personnel as of August 28, 2000 dated October 31,
2000; a Memorandum dated October 4, 2000 regarding the apprehended motor vehicle of Gov. Singson;
and another Memorandum dated October 4, 2000 (Exh. 360) regarding the traffic violation of the driver
of Gov. Singson. He admitted he had no personal knowledge of the incident. [TSN, July 13, 2005, Exhs.
358-61 with submarkings] Paredes, Director of the TMG, identified a Memorandum dated October 4,
2000 signed by him and previously marked as Exh. 360. [TSN dated August 17, 2003] Paglinawan, Chief
of the General Assignment Section of the Western Police District, testified that there were no records in
the WPD that Gov. Singson filed a case in relation to the October 3, 2000 incident. [TSN, July 18, 2005]
Azurin, Chief of the Special Operations Division of the TMG, testified that, on October 3, 2000, he was
called by Vallo for assistance in some misunderstanding with Gov. Singson. He also testified to what
happened after they proceeded to the WPD headquarters in UN Avenue and related that the agents of
the TMG Group were wearing proper uniform but admitted that he himself was not in proper uniform.
Azurin testified that the blinker and siren found in the vehicle of Gov. Singson were confiscated for
violation of a Memorandum dated July 14, 1998 issued by the Office of the President. [TSN, July 18,
2005, and Exh. 362 with submarkings] Vallo, Chief of the Operation Task Force Limbas of the TMG,
testified to the TMG’s spotting of an accelerating vehicle (Gov. Singson’s), the chase and the accosting of
the vehicle for a traffic violation. Dela Paz, Police Chief Superintendent of the Philippine National Police,
identified his signature in a Memorandum sent to relevant offices pertaining to the use of blinkers [TSN,
August 8, 2005, Exh. 364] Fradejas, Executive Assistant II of the Traffic Engineering Center of the Metro
Manila Development Authority, identified a Certification pertaining to the DPWH Phase I installation of
traffic lights in Metro Manila. [TSN dated August 8, 2005, Exh. 384]
DR. GEMMA BAULA DAVID (David) had been the dentist of FPres. Estrada since the latter was still a
Senator. David testified that she provided dental treatments to FPres. Estrada at the latter’s residence in
No. 1 Polk Street, Greenhills, and at the Presidential Residence in Malacañang. The witness related that,
every time she visited FPres. Estrada at his residence in Greenhills as well as in the Presidential
Residence in Malacañang for the scheduled dental appointment, she had to pass the strict security
protocols conducted at the entrance of both locations. She further related that at there was a walk-
through metal detector at the Presidential Residence in Malacañang. [TSN, May 30, 2005]
MARICHU ANDUEZA VILLANUEVA (Villanueva) was a Journalist of the Philippine Star Newspaper and a
member of the Malacanang Press Group. She authored the article entitled "Palace Backs Ping on Anti-
Jueteng Drive" in the June 17, 2000 issue of the said newspaper which was based on a press conference
she attended in Malacañang Palace on June 16, 2000. [TSN, September 26, 2005; Exh. 415 and
submarkings]
ATTY. RICARDO VILLANUEVA PUNO, JR., a practicing lawyer, testified that he joined the government as
Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson on or about March 16, 2000 and stayed in that position
until January 20, 2001. In such position, he would only speak of information that he was authorized to
disseminate to the public or the media at that particular time. His position gave him the privilege of
being present at discussions on policies, which included Presidential meetings. [TSN, October 3, 2005]
To the best of his recollection, the policy of the FPres. Estrada then was always to fight illegal gambling.
That has been the declared policy even during the tenure of the witness as Press Secretary and
Presidential Spokesperson. He had a general recollection of this policy, but he had no specific
recollection of the times it was actually mentioned.
He could not recall specifically a press conference held on June 16, 2000, although he saw the June 17,
2000 issue of the Philippine Star attached to the subpoena [Exh. 415], but there was a time when he
held a series of briefings for media at 2:00 p.m., and it was probably during one of those briefings that
the points in the article were raised. The article referred to a drive by the then Director General of the
Philippine National Police against jueteng. The question asked of the witness at the time was probably,
whether FPres. Estrada in fact prescribed jueteng reduction. It was very clear that it was in fact the
policy at that time, based on their previous conversations. The article, however, referred to the drive
allegedly initiated by then PNP Director Panfilo Lacson. Up to the time that the witness left in January
2001, he could not remember any reversal of that policy. He would not know, however,
if jueteng continued despite the campaign against it, because his office as Press Secretary was not
monitoring the situation.
ATTY. HILARIO PAUL HAVOC RAGUNJAN, JR. was a commissioned Notary Public who notarized the
Letter dated May 28, 2005 of Rodolfo Q. Pineda (Exh. 331) addressed to the Chairman of the Committee
on Games and Amusements of the House of the House of Representatives, Hon. Mario Z. Almario.
Witness Ragunjan, Jr. testified that he personally knew the affiant of the letter but had no personal
knowledge as to the contents of the said letter. [TSN, June 6, 2005]
MARIBETH ANG ESCOBAR, Officer-in-Charge of the United Overseas Bank (UOB) San Juan Branch,
testified on a Certification dated June 28, 2002 addressed to Atty, Irene Jurado issued by Ms. Elma
Gutierrez, who was no longer connected with UOB. Witness had been the OIC of UOB San Juan since Ms.
Gutierrez’ resignation. (TSN, November 22, 2004, p. 48)
The said Certification stated: "This is to certify that based on our records from 1999 up to the present,
we have no current account listed under the name of the client Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada." She
verified the facts stated in the Certification by personally checking the records on file in their system and
there was no reading of an account under the name of Senator Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, upon receipt of
the subpoena. (Ibid., p. 54)
Escobar also testified that she was not aware and has not seen any check with photo of the client on the
face of the check. She has never processed a customized check but has seen one with the logo of a
company like Sunlife. Witness stated that the Certification was issued based on the letter dated June 28,
2002 of Atty. Irene D. Jurado to the Manager of UOB San Juan. (Ibid., pp. 54-58)
Witness testified that although the certification stated only that Jose Jinggoy Estrada had no current
account, her verification of their their records showed that there was no Jose Jinggoy Estrada on the list
of active accounts of UOB San Juan, as well as in the dormant accounts. Similarly, the Municipality of San
Juan had no account with the UOB San Juan, more so the Municipality of Marikina. (Ibid., pp. 94-98)
ROSEMARIE J. SAN GREGORIO, Community Affairs Officer II of the Municipal Government of San Juan,
testified that she didn’t know personally a lady by the name of Emma Lim, but has seen her testify
before the Impeachment Court on television. She remembered particularly the testimony of Emma Lim
because Emma Lim mentioned the name of her officemate, Josie, who was with the witness when they
were watching the proceedings in the television along with Lauro Quirino, who was their receptionist in
the Mayor’s Office. Witness remembered that among the testimony of Emma Lim was that she went to
the Municipal Office to collect money. Witness stated that she and Josie Ramos were surprised and
amazed with Emma Lim’s testimony since she [Emma Lim] did not go to the Mayor’s Office. Josie Ramos
was the one handling papers for the signature of the Mayor. [TSN, November 24, 2004, pp. 26-42]
JOSEFINA QUIAZON RAMOS worked as one of the secretaries in the Office of the Mayor, Municipality of
San Juan for 1998 to 2001, preparing documents for signature of then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Witness
Ramos corroborated the testimony of Rosemarie San Gregorio that Emma Lim did not go to the Office of
then Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in January, February and March 2000 to pick up allegedly jueteng
money from the Office of the Mayor.
Ramos described as untrue the testimony of Emma Lim that Emma Lim talked to Ramos and was asked
to sit in front of Ramos’ table in the Office of the Mayor on February and March 2000. Witness stated
that Emma Lim never went to the Office of the Mayor in San Juan. Witness was surprised when Emma
Lim mentioned her name during the impeachment trial, and that she told this to Mayor Estrada who
called her up after Emma Lim testified. Mayor Estrada was also surprised and told her that "what is that
woman saying, that woman is a liar". [TSN, December 6, 2004]
SUSAN MACALLA AVILES was the Social Secretary of Ms. Guia Gomez and a resident of No. 1 Ibuna
Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. She testified that, as social secretary, she was
the one who received guests, entertained them and was the one who would call to serve the visitors
coffee or juice at the house of Guia Gomez at No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan.
Aviles asserted that Gov. Singson never went to the house at P. Guevarra. [TSN, December 1, 2004, p.16-
17] She clarified that the house on P. Guevarra and Ibuna were one and the same because their address
was No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan. (Ibid., p.44)
NOEL ISRAEL BUENDIA was previously a security guard assigned at the residence of Guia Gomez at No. 1
Ibuna corner P. Guevarra Streets, San Juan, from February 26, 1998 up to 2002, and as such, was
stationed at the gate along Ibuna St. from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and the one assigned in the front and
in-charge of asking visitors. During his assignment at Guia Gomez’s residence, Buendia testified that he
did not see Gov. Singson go there. [TSN, December 1, 2004]
CONGRESSMAN LUIS A. ASISTIO (Cong. Asistio) testified that he was at San Francisco, California on July
24, 2000 as part of the official Philippine Delegation accompanying then President Joseph E. Estrada in
his state visit to the United States of America, and that it was there that he saw Gov. Singson, at the
lobby of the Fairmont Hotel where they stayed, telling him of the latter’s problem that FPres. Estrada
did not want to see him. Cong. Asistio, together with Gov. Singson, went to the room of FPres. Estrada,
and Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada to call the Chairman of the COA for the relief of the Auditor
assigned in his province to which FPres. Estrada replied that he might get into trouble as the Chairman
of the COA is a constitutional appointee and suggested that Gov. Singson instead talk to then Executive
Sectary Ronaldo Zamora to resolve his problem.
Witness also testified that after returning from the U.S. and prior to the expose or press conference
made by Gov. Singson in October 2000, he received a call from the latter asking him if they could meet it
Manila Peninsula, and, at the same time, Gov. Singson told him of his problem and his grievances (sama
ng loob) against FPres. Estrada, including placing his political opponents in positions of power in his
province, such as, the relief of the Provincial Commander and conferring on his brother, Bonito, who is
his mortal enemy, a position regarding jueteng.
Cong. Asistio clarified that in the many meetings he had with Gov. Singson during the period late August
to September 2000, they mainly talked about the state of the Ilocos Sur provincial leadership and
occasionally Gov. Singson’s suspicions regarding Atong Ang’s designs to corner bingo two balls and ease
him out. According to Cong. Asistio, Gov. Singson is worried that his continued provincial leadership will
be affected by the developments. Cong. Asistio also testified they never talked about jueteng, or receipt
of jueteng monies or the alleged receipt of money from R.A. 7171 since according to him, he knew of
these issues only during the Impeachment Trial and he thinks that these are mere figments of Gov.
Singson’s imagination.
Cong. Asistio also testified that he, together with Mayor Lim, went to the house of Gov. Singson to
persuade the latter not to push through with the press conference.
Cong. Asistio also testified that in his visits to Malacañang during the time of FPres. Estrada, at least
three times a week, he never saw Atong Ang there because Atong Ang was banned by the FPres. Estrada
from entering Malacañang. [TSN, October 11, 2004 and October 13, 2004]
ATTY. ESTELITA D. CORDERO (Cordero) testified that she was a close friend Mrs. Lydia "Honey Girl"
Singson, sister of Gov. Singson, and worked as a legal consultant for Mrs. Honey Girl Singson when the
latter was appointed as Director General of the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC) until
October 12, 2000. [TSN, November 8, 2004, pp. 9, 11-12, 14]
Cordero testified that in October 2001, members of the Save Ilocos Sur Alliance (SISA) visited her in her
office and requested her to go over several audit reports (1999 to 2000, SAO Special Report 1999) of the
province and to find out if there is any basis for filing any action against responsible public officials of the
province. [Ibid., p. 38] After going through the documents, witness Cordero, together with members of
SISA and other concerned citizens, decided to file criminal complaints against Gov. Singson and other
responsible officers of the province who did some anomalous transactions to the detriment of the
province. [Ibid., pp. 44-45]
Witness thought that the testimony of Emma Lim in the impeachment trial were all lies because from
the statement of Gov. Singson, he did not have anything to do with jueteng and the delivery of the
money. Thus, witness claimed that all of these were fabricated statements on the part of Emma Lim.
[TSN, November 10, 2004, pp. 26-28]
Witness Cordero also testified that Gov. Singson was the jueteng lord in their province and neighboring
provinces, and all matters relating to jueteng, such as, employment, people, operations were under the
control of Gov. Singson. [Ibid., pp. 29-30]
BRIG. GEN. RODOLFO DOCTOR DIAZ, a retired military officer, was assigned as the Commanding Officer
of the Presidential escorts, one of the major units of the Presidential Security Group, in 1998 when
FPres. Estrada assumed office. He testified that he was familiar with the private residence of FPres.
Estrada in No. 1 Polk Street. Quezon City. According to Gen. Diaz, only the First Family’s vehicles were
allowed to park in the garage. Only five vehicles could be accommodated there and usually the cars
parked there were the President’s primary and secondary car, as well as an SUV and two more cars.
Witness also detailed the security measures followed in Polk Street. In Polk Street, visitors were never
allowed to park their cars inside the garage. [TSN, June 1, 2005, pp. 50-56]
The witness did not see Atong Ang either at No. 1 Polk Street or in Malacanang since the President has
been elected. He had seen Mr. Jaime Dichaves twice; Mr. Baby Asistio, once or twice. He did not see
Governor Singson in No. 1 Polk Street [Ibid., pp. 81-83]
RICARDO GREY GOLPEO, General Manager of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) from
February 2000 to February 2001, testified that he and then PSCO Chairman Rosario Lopez were
summoned by FPres. Estrada to Malacañang in March 2000. On that occasion, FPres. Estrada informed
them that jueteng had become a big problem to him and wanted to know if the PCSO can do something
to fight jueteng. The witness replied that they will study the instruction of the President. Chairman
Lopez instructed witness to personally handle the matter. At the time the witness left PCSO, he testified
that the PCSO had not come up with a suggestion to the President on how to eradicate jueteng. [TSN,
April 11, 2005, pp. 11-17, 19, 30)]
DANILO DELA ROSA REYES was a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, Inc. and the Acting Treasurer of the said foundation. He was also an Associate Professor at
the National College of Public Administration and Governance in the University of the Philippines (UP)
Diliman and the Vice President for Educational Services for the "Erap Para sa Mahirap" Foundation
Reyes testified that the "Erap Para sa Mahirap" Foundation was duly established in 1988 and had 14,000
recipients of scholarships as of the year 2000. Among the Incorporators of the said foundation was
FPres. Estrada. The "Erap Para sa Mahirap" Foundation, however, encountered financial constraints so
the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. came into existence.
Reyes related that Raul P. De Guzman, a brother-in-law of FPres. Estrada, invited him to join in
establishing a foundation for the poor and deserving Muslim students in line with the vision of FPres.
Estrada of developing a new generation of Muslim leaders. He then identified the documents related to
the registration of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhs. 251 to 255, 262 to 271, inclusive of
submarkings) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Erap Muslim Youth Foundation,
Inc. was duly organized in accordance with law and had conducted its business upon incorporation for
bona fide purposes as stated in its Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 252) and Amended By-Laws (Exh. 255).
The original Members of the Board of Trustees were: Prof. Mila Reformina, Dr. Raul P. De Guzman, Atty.
Edward S. Serapio, Dr. Danilo Reyes, and Mr. George L. Go, who later resigned.
The word ERAP affixed to the name "Muslim Youth Foundation" was allegedly an acronym for
"Education, Research, and Assistance Program". The funding of the said foundation was provided by the
Erap Golf Cup, which donated the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00); the contributions of
the Board of Trustees in the amount of P20,000.00 each; and a Two Hundred Million Peso
(P200,000,000.00) donation from a donor which, according to Serapio, would like to remain anonymous.
The amount of Ten Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P10,100,000.00) was deposited with the
UCPB and eventually transferred to Metrobank while the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00)
was deposited with Equitable PCI Bank. The Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) was the source of the
foundation’s operating expenses and for minimal scholarship program during the time material in this
case.
According to Reyes, the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. had (four (4) scholars for MA in Islamic
Studies in the University of the Philippines for school year 2004-2005. For the second semester of that
school year, the foundation added four (4) more scholars for Masters Degree, two in the University of
the Philippines and the other two in the Philippine Normal University. The scholars were only given Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) per semester. Reyes explained that the foundation was in hiatus for three
(3) years because its funds were frozen by a court order and that they conducted meetings after the
recuperation of Dr. De Guzman who got sick, and after the release on bail of Atty. Serapio.
Reyes also testified as to the appointment papers of the employer of the foundation, such as the
Executive Assistant, the Assistant Corporate Secretary and the Utility Messenger. The office address of
the foundation was transferred from Pasig to the VAG Building in San Juan. [TSN, February 21, 2005;
February 23, 2005; and March 2, 2005]
EUGENE MACAMASBAD, a Police Senior Inspector with the Philippine National Police, brought with him
the documents required in the subpoena addressed to Gen. Arturo Lomibao of the PNP or his authorized
representative. He produced a certified true copy of a Memorandum Circular 2000-003, certified by
Celia Redison (Exh. 365). As to the memorandum dated July 19, 2000 which was subpoenaed, the same
could not be located as shown by a certification dated 29 July 2005 issued by the Deputy Chief of the
PACER. (Exh. 380) [TSN, August 1, 2005, pp. 60-69] The witness came to Court and produced the above
documents only upon verbal instruction from his officers. He was not the records custodian and he did
not have any knowledge about records being maintained by their office. [Ibid., pp. 70-72, id.]
SEN. EDGARDO ANGARA, a lawyer and a senator when he testified in Court, knew Gov. Singson. They
were compadres, being godfathers at the wedding of Singson’s niece. In September 2000, Gov. Singson
made an unexpected visit at Senator Angara’s farm to request that the witness talk to President Estrada
about the 2-balls game. Gov. Singson told the witness that the franchise for the said game in Ilocos Sur
was given to his political opponent and he was losing face with his supporters. Gov. Singson wanted the
franchise to go to him or if it cannot be granted, that the game of 2-balls not be allowed altogether in
Ilocos. The witness replied that he would go down to Manila and call the President to relay Gov.
Singson’s message. [TSN, June 1, 2005, pp. 13-15]
Sen. Angara remembered Gov. Singson saying that the franchise was given to Eric Singson. Gov. Singson
even mentioned a list of of jueteng payoffs and that one of the beneficiaries was the President. When
Sen. Angara mentioned to FPres. Estrada Gov. Singson’s request regarding 2-balls and statements
regarding jueteng, the President denied that he was a recipient of any payoff, saying he had nothing to
do with it [2-balls] but that it was Atong Ang’s jurisdiction [Ibid., pp.16 and 24]
After Sen. Angara relayed the answer of the President, Gov. Singson asked the witness to talk to Atong
Ang and the witness said he will try. When the witness was able to talk to Atong Ang and repeated Gov.
Singson’s request, Atong Ang replied he will study it or that he will have to consult PAGCOR. The witness
denied having told Gov. Singson "Grabe ‘to. Huwag kang lumabas at akong bahala kay Presidente dahil
baka pati kaming mga Cabinet members maaapektuhan nito." [Ibid., pp. 17-18, 24-25] Witness saw the
list of payoffs shown by Singson, but he did not read it. [Ibid., pp. 30, 43]
FINDINGS OF FACT
Re: Sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information
With respect to the alleged acts of receiving or collection of sums of money from illegal gambling,
commonly known as "jueteng", in the form of share or percentage, the Court finds credible material
portions of Gov. Chavit Singson’s testimony insofar as they are corroborated by independent and
competent evidence.
The Court concedes that Gov. Chavit Singson did not have the purest of motives in exposing the jueteng
collections which he testified were done for the benefit of FPres. Estrada. Undoubtedly and by his own
admission, he resented not being given the franchise for the Bingo Two Balls, the government
sanctioned numbers game, in his home province of Ilocos Sur. He feared the demise of his political
career as the said franchise was given to his political opponents, Eric Singson and his brother Bonito
Singson, to the embarrassment of the mayors who were affiliated to him. Gov. Chavit Singson was
disappointed to say the least that Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, JV Ejercito, the other son of FPres. Estrada,
Secretary Edgardo Angara, Secretary Alfredo Lim, friends like Luis Asistio and Mark Jimenez, whom Gov.
Chavit Singson approached to intercede to FPres. Estrada to help him secure the franchise, were
unsuccessful. Gov. Chavit Singson was also displeased that FPres. Estrada would not use the Office of
the Presidency to help him with his trouble with the Commission on Audit which was demanding his
liquidation of the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) share of Ilocos Sur in the excise taxes
collected under RA No. 7171. The Court will not cite the alleged attempt on the life of Gov. Chavit
Singson in the evening of October 3, 2000 considering the contradictory evidence on this matter
consisting of the testimony of the enforcement officers on the incident.
The acts of collection of jueteng protection money for FPres. Estrada from various provinces nationwide
per month as well as the payments to him and to various persons from such sums of money with his
approval or acquiescence were methodically detailed in two sets of ledgers: the first set covering the
period beginning November 1998 to July 1999 (Exh. W7 to E8), and the second set for the period starting
August 1999 to August 2000 (Exh. A-4 to A-4-l). The first set of ledgers were personally prepared by Gov.
Chavit Singson, aided by Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon, while the second set of ledgers were
prepared by Yolanda Ricaforte, under the supervision of Gov. Chavit Singson and also with the help of
Lim and Itchon. Insofar as the collection of jueteng money is concerned, Emma Lim and Carmencita
Itchon, by their own admission performed similar roles as Yolanda Ricaforte except that the latter
received double the amount of the monthly salary of Lim and Itchon by virtue of her "supervisory"
status.
The accused would have this Court dismiss the ledgers as hearsay and/or mere fabrications. However,
there are circumstances which lend credibility to the said ledgers. The first set of ledgers (Exh. W7 to E8)
was faxed by Ricaforte to Singson just before Gov. Chavit Singson made his expose while the second set
of ledgers (Exh. A-4 to A-4-l) was in the possession of Ricaforte, which she produced during the Senate
Impeachment proceedings, as testified to by Atty. David Jonathan Yap, the Senate Legal Counsel.
Yolanda Ricaforte was closely associated to FPres. Estrada, being the wife of Orestes Ricaforte, who was
appointed by FPres. Estrada as Undersecretary of Tourism. Ricaforte opened several accounts in the
different branches of Equitable PCI Bank with unusually huge deposits and investments in multiple of
millions of pesos during the period covered by the second set of ledgers.
Per testimony of Nantes, in Scout Tobias-Timog Branch, Ricaforte opened a savings account, a current
account, seven special savings account and a PCI Emerald account. In the Savings Account No. 0157-
04227-0 alone, after the initial deposit of P17,205,000.00 on September 1, 1999, she deposited from
September 7, 1999 to January 10, 2000, a staggering total amount of P57,712,150.00. The initial
deposits for each of the seven (7) Special Savings Accounts were: P70,000,000.00 (December 2, 1999);
P10,000,000.00 (February 7, 2000); P2,500,000.00 (March 29, 2000); P9,700,000.00 (April 5, 2000);
2,500,000.00 (May 29, 2000) P1,900,000.00 (May 4, 2000); and P2,000,000.00 (June 1, 2000). The
deposit in the PCI Emerald Fund was P6,616,676.19 (December 6, 2000).
According to Rosario S. Bautista, in Diliman-Matalino Branch, Ricaforte opened on November 19, 1999 a
combo account: Savings Account No. 0288-02037-0 and Current Account No. 0238-00853-0 with an
initial deposit of P70,000,000.00 covered by two (2) PCI Bank Checks payable to cash each in the amount
of P35,000,000.00, drawn by William T. Gatchalian. Additional deposits were: a check (Exh. A-7-h) issued
by Gov. Chavit Singson on November 22, 1999 for P1,000,000.00; another check dated December 9,
1999 with PNB Naga as drawee bank (Exh. A-7-j); cash deposit of P3,050,000.00 (Exh. A-7-d) on
December 2, 1999; and cash deposit of P1,000,000.00 on January 28, 2000.
In the Pedro Gil-Robinsons Branch, according to Shakira C. Yu, Ricaforte opened on January 6, 2000, a
Regular Savings Account with an initial deposit of P6,000,000.00. Other deposits consisted of: (1) check
drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson for P2,965,000.00; (2) cash deposit of P1,540,000.00 on January 25, 2000;
and check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson in the amount of P1,340,000.00.
In the T.M. Kalaw Branch, Pabillon testified that Ricaforte opened Regular Savings Account No. 0193-
61496-8 and Special Savings Account No. 02193-15050-3 on February 8, 2000, with the initial deposits in
PNB Managers Check (Exh. A-9-A) in the amount of P10,007,777.78 and cash of P1,400,000.00.
In the Scout Albano Branch, Alcaraz testified that Ricaforte opened on March 2, 2000 three accounts
with initial deposits as follows: Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3, P1,995,000.00; Special Savings
Account No. 5733-0721-0, P2,000,000.00; and Checking Account No. 5732-01-975-7, P5,000.00.
In Isidora Hills Branch, Gonzales testified that Ricaforte opened on March 15, 2000, among others,
Special Savings Account No. 077090498-6 with the initial deposit of P7,000,000.00 in the form of
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. Check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson payable to cash.
Bank officials, such as Salvador R. Serrano, Patrick Dee Cheng, and Carolina S. Guerrero, testified to the
existence of checks paid by Chavit Singson which landed in the accounts of persons associated with
FPres. Estrada: (1) Metrobank Check No. 0000917 of Gov. Chavit Singson for P5,000,000.00 which was
deposited on February 2, 1999 in Account No. 061-0-14636-7 of Paul Gary Bogard at Security Bank; (2)
Metrobank Check No. 00138 drawn by Chavit Singson on September 29, 1999 in the amount of
P8,000,000.00 deposited in the account of Mrs. Luisa P. Ejercito; (3) Metrobank Ayala Center Check No.
000132 drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson payable to William Gatchalian in the amount of P46,350,000.00;
(4) Metrobank Check No. 001547 issued by Gov. Chavit Singson in the amount of P1,200,000.00 which
was deposited in the Account No. 0180409000-3 of Laarni Enriquez on December 23, 1999.
The Erap Muslim Youth Foundation
The paper trail of the P200,000,000.00 deposited for the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.
incontrovertibly established that the said sum of money came from jueteng collections through the
cashier’s / managers checks purchased by Ricaforte using the deposits in the accounts that she opened
in the different branches of Equitable PCI Bank described above, as follows: Cashier’s Check for
P91,000,000.00, Scout Tobias-Timog Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-S); Cashier’s Check for
P77,000,000.00, Diliman-Matalino Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-7-ee); Cashier’s Check for
P11,000,000.00, Pedro Gil-Robinsons Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-9-B); Manager’s Check for
P3,000,000.00, Scout Albano Branch, April 12, 2000 (Exh. A-10-K); and Cashier’s Check for
P7,000,000.00, Isidora Hills Branch, April 14, 2000.
Antonio Fortuno, Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star Branch, testified that the
aforementioned six (6) checks were deposited in Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5. From the said
bearer account, fourteen (14) withdrawals in Manager’s Checks (Exh. K9 to X9 with submarkings) were
made in various amounts. Each withdrawal was divided into two deposits or a total of twenty eight (28)
deposits of various amounts into the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, as shown by the Account
Information Slips, Deposit Receipts, and Detailed Report for Transfers and Debit / Credit Memos (DRTM)
(Exh. K9 to X9 with submarkings).
Fortuno identified the Acknowledgement Letter (Exh. I9) dated April 25, 2000 addressed to Atty. Serapio
from Beatriz Bagsit, Division Head of Makati Area, acknowledging receipt of the said six (6) checks for
deposit on staggered basis and on different dates to the account of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.
at Ortigas-Strata Branch.
Aida T. Basaliso corroborated the testimony of bank officer Fortuno as to the inter-branch deposits at
Equitable PCI Bank Strata Ortigas Branch in Savings Account No. 0192-85835-6 of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, Inc. from the Pacific Star Branch of the same bank in the amount of P200,000,000.00 on
staggered basis.
The slew of bank documents, involving mind-boggling amounts of money and authenticated by
competent and credible bank officers, convinces the Court that collection of jueteng money for FPres.
Estrada indeed took place and the entries in the ledger were not manufactured by Gov. Chavit Singson.
Payments or disbursements of the jueteng protection money to persons related to or closely associated
with FPres. Estrada belie his denial that the funds accounted for in the ledgers belong to him. Indeed,
the Court cannot see why Gov. Chavit Singson would make such large and substantial payments in the
form of checks drawn from his Metrobank account, to personalities such as William Gatchalian, Laarni
Enriquez, Loi Estrada, or other intimate associates of FPres. Estrada unless the money belonged to FPres.
Estrada and the funds were being disbursed according to his instructions. The evidence does not show
why Gov. Chavit Singson would choose Ricaforte to take over the supervision of the jueteng collection
and let her deposit millions of pesos into Ricaforte’s accounts in the different branches of the Equitable
PCI Bank when Ricaforte had no prior association nor relation to Gov. Singson and that the latter had his
own trusted associates. As admitted by the accused, it was FPres. Estrada who had a long standing and
close relationship with Ricaforte and her husband. This fact would explain Ricaforte’s vital participation
in the preparation of the second set of ledgers. The said ledgers were prepared and later produced
before the Senate by Ricaforte and not by Gov. Singson.
The first set of ledgers show that P72,500,000.00 of jueteng money were handed to FPres. Estrada, alias
"Asiong Salonga" from November 1998 to July 1999. Based on the second set of ledgers, the total
amount of jueteng money that FPres. Estrada received was P112,800,000.00 from August 1999 to
August 2000. For the entire duration or period covered by the 2 sets of ledgers of the total amount of
P185,300,000.00. was handed by Gov. Chavit Singson to FPres. Estrada bi-monthly. The balance, after
these amounts were given to FPres. Estrada and the deduction of expenses, were deposited by Ricaforte
in her bank accounts. Based on the two (2) sets of ledgers the total jueteng collections for FPres. Estrada
from November 1998 to August 2000 amounted to P545,291,000.00. The P200,000,000.00 of these
sums of money found their way into the account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
With respect to Jinggoy Estrada, according to Gov. Singson, he was the "Jing" listed as an expense in the
ledger for P1,000,000.00. It was Gov. Singson’s testimony that FPres. Estrada (after discovering that
entry) forbade Gov. Chavit Singson from giving any further share in the jueteng protection money to
Jinggoy Estrada and that it will be up to FPres. Estrada to give Jinggoy Estrada a share. For this reason,
Gov. Chavit Singson and Jinggoy Estrada hid the fact that Jinggoy Estrada was the collector for the
Province of Bulacan and that the latter was receiving P1,000,000.00. To begin with, the prosecution’s
theory that Jinggoy Estrada had to keep his participation in the jueteng collection a secret from his own
father belied the allegation that Jinggoy Estrada’s participation in the jueteng scheme was that of a
principal or a conspirator. The grant of bail to Jinggoy Estrada was anchored on this fact advanced by
Gov. Singson in his very own testimony. Although prosecution witness Gov. Singson, and the other
witnesses who were under his employ, testified that there were instances that they collected or
received money from Jinggoy Estrada, there was no testimony to the effect that they saw Jinggoy
Estrada subtracted his share from jueteng collections or in any other way received a share from the
jueteng collections. This Court further found it difficult to believe that Jinggoy Estrada, who was not
even a resident of Bulacan, was the collector for Bulacan. Gov. Singson associates Jinggoy Estrada with
Viceo allegedly from Bulacan. Who is Viceo? Why was Viceo not charged if it was true that jueteng
collections from Bulacan came from him before they passed the hands of Jinggoy? There was no
evidence at all that the money Jinggoy Estrada turned over to Gov. Singson or the latter’s
representatives was part of the jueteng protection money collected from Bulacan or that he received
funds from a certain Viceo.
The prosecution did not also rebut the bank certification presented by the defense that Jinggoy Estrada
did not have an account with the United Overseas Bank. The certification disproved the testimony of
Emma Lim that the deposit slip in the amount of P1,000,000.00 said to be part of jueteng money was
turned over to her by Jinggoy Estrada in the form of a personalized check with his photograph, from his
account at the United Overseas Bank. The gaps in the prosecution’s evidence as to Jinggoy Estrada
create uncertainty in the mind of the Court as to the participation of Jinggoy Estrada in the collection
and receipt of jueteng money. This Court had already brushed aside prosecution’s reliance on the
telephone calls and billing statements for such calls between Ricaforte and Jinggoy Estrada to prove that
he was a jueteng collector for Bulacan, for being highly speculative. The Court’s ruling remains firm to
this day.
With respect to Serapio, neither Gov. Chavit Singson’s testimony nor the ledger entries proved that
Serapio was involved in any way in the collection or disbursement of jueteng protection money.
Certainly, Serapio’s involvement appears to have begun and was limited to the funds of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation. Serapio is being charged with "laundering" or concealing a portion of the jueteng
protection money in the amount of approximately P200,000,000.00 which was deposited in the account
of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
To this Court’s mind, while the P200,000,000.00 was clearly illegally amassed wealth, the evidence on
record is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Serapio was aware that the questioned
funds were in fact amassed from jueteng protection money collections and that the fact of the unusually
large amount of the deposits into the foundation’s account was with criminal intent on the part of
Serapio to "launder" or conceal the illegal nature of the funds to serve the purpose of the acquisition or
amassing of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada. The only evidence presented on this point is the
uncorroborated testimony of Gov. Chavit Singson that Serapio was present during the meeting wherein
FPres. Estrada instructed the transfer of the amount of P200,000,000.00 to the foundation. The Court
has reservations as to the credibility of Gov. Singson’s assertion in this regard because Gov. Singson
failed to mention Serapio’s presence on that occasion during his testimony at the Senate Impeachment
trial. Neither can the Court consider from the single fact alone that he arranged the staggered deposit of
the said sum of money to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation that he had a criminal intent to conceal ill-
gotten wealth in furtherance of the accumulation of such wealth by the principal accused. More so, this
Court is not prepared to conclusively rule that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation is not a legitimate
foundation or that it was set up purely to hide his illegally amassed wealth. The incorporation papers
and business permits of the Foundation are authentic and regular. The personalities behind the said
foundation appear to be well-respected academicians. Fortunately or unfortunately, the public
revelation of the nature of the P200,000,000.00 as part of jueteng protection money collected for FPres.
Estrada came too soon after the organization of the Foundation. The Court is not in a position to
ascertain with moral certainty if this controversy preempted any legitimate charitable activities it could
have undertaken soon after its incorporation as it was explained by defense witnesses or whether it was
as the prosecution asserted a money laundering entity. Premises considered, it is difficult to presume
any criminal intent on the part of Serapio to conceal or launder jueteng protection money in order to
contribute to the amassing and accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada in connection with
the transfer of the P200,000,000.00 to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, notwithstanding that the
evidence on record demonstrate indisputably that the said sum of money form part of ill-gotten wealth
obtained though the predicate acts charged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information.
RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH B OF THE

AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur
under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
GOVERNOR LUIS "CHAVIT" CRISOLOGO SINGSON also testified to prove the second charge in the
amended Information involving the diversion of excise taxes under Republic Act (RA) No. 7171. [TSN
dated July 29, 2002, pp. 78-80] According to Gov. Singson, Ilocos Sur was not getting its rightful share as
a beneficiary of the excise tax. He reminded FPres. Estrada of his campaign promise that he would
release all the funds to Ilocos Sur in advance, amounting more or less to Four Million Pesos
(P4,000,000.00) including interest. FPres. Estrada promised to comply but he said that because of the
huge election expenses he hoped that Gov. Singson would help. Since, Gov. Singson was afraid not to
get the funds, he said: "Why not?" when FPres. Estrada asked: "How much?" Gov. Singson replied
"Maybe Ten Percent (10%) of what you can release." FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson to prepare
his request and he will approve it. Gov. Singson brought the request addressed to Secretary Diokno of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). FPres. Estrada wrote a marginal note on the
request addressed to the DBM with instruction to approve it. The original of the letter was submitted to
Secretary Diokno. Gov. Singson produced in court a Xerox copy with the original stamp mark of receipt
dated 8/7. The marginal note reads: "Aug. 3, ’98. To Secretary Ben Diokno, Please see if you can
accommodate the request of Governor Singson" (Exh. Q8 and submarkings). [Ibid, pp. 81-96]
According to Gov. Singson, Jinggoy Estrada and Atong Ang kept on following up the release of the
money from DBM. A notice of funding check issued (Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998) (Exh. R8) was
received by Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson immediately informed Jinggoy Estrada and Atong Ang. The latter
told Gov. Singson that the President needed One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). Gov.
Singson was surprised because their agreement was only ten percent (10%). Atong told him there will be
billions of pesos, so they should be the first one to deliver to FPres. Estrada and thus be the strongest
and more influential (to the Former President). Gov. Singson then caused the preparation of a Provincial
Board resolution appropriating the sum of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). The Board
approved the appropriation of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170 Million) for the flue curing
barn and Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) for infrastructure. Atong Ang gave Gov. Singson three (3)
names to whom the money would be sent, which they did. Landbank Vigan transferred One Hundred
Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) to Landbank Mandaluyong which credited the accounts of the
three (3) persons named by Atong Ang as follows: Account No. 0561043-38, Alma Alfaro, August 27,
1998, P40,000,000.00; Account No. 0561-0445-97, Delia Rojas, August 28, 1998, P50,000,000.00; and
Account No. 0561-0446-00, Eleuterio Tan, August 28, 1998, P40,000,000.00. The total amounted to
P130,000,000.00.
The above data were contained in a certification of Landbank Branch Head Ma. Elizabeth Balagot (Exh.
S8). [Ibid, pp. 96-108] Gov. Singson did not personally know Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro or Eleuterio Tan. In
a photograph (Exh. V8), Gov. Singson identified Jojo Uy as the Eleuterio Tan who showed up at the bank
to withdraw the money. Jojo Uy, according to Gov. Singson was very close to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp.
109-110]
Gov. Singson narrated that Atong Ang called him up from his mother’s house and asked Gov. Singson to
go there where they will wait for the money. Gov. Singson went to the house of Atong Ang’s mother at
10:00 o’clock in the morning and waited there until 3:00 to 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. When the
money arrived, Gov. Singson noticed that Atong Ang left some money in the house. Atong Ang and Gov.
Singson boarded Atong Ang’s vehicle, and Gov. Singson’s vehicle with the security and driver followed
them. At the corner near the house of FPres. Estrada at Polk St., Atong Ang asked Gov. Singson to alight
from his vehicle so that it would not be obvious to the people in the vicinity. Gov. Singson alighted from
the vehicle and saw Atong Ang’s car entered inside the house of FPres. Estrada. Atong Ang was the one
driving the car. After 15 to 20 minutes, Gov. Singson followed Atong Ang to the house of FPres. Estrada.
Gov. Singson then met the First Lady, Dr. Loi Estrada who thanked Gov. Singson, saying "Chavit, thank
you very much we really needed it." Gov. Singson took the money which he and Atong Ang brought.
[Ibid, pp. 111-114] When FPres. Estrada came out, Gov. Singson asked him how much Atong Ang gave
him. FPres. Estrada answered Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). Gov. Singson informed him that
the total amount was One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). FPres Estrada got mad at
Atong Ang who explained that he gave Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) to Dr. Loi Estrada, and
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to Jinggoy Estrada. Atong Ang found it hard to explain the
remaining Twenty Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 114-116]
Gov. Singson frequented the house of FPres. Estrada. At one time, the latter asked him again to make a
request for the excise tax allocation which he will approve. Gov. Singson explained that the release of
the money must be continued in big amount so that they could cover up the One Hundred Thirty Million
Pesos (P130,000,000.00). FPres. Estrada agreed but he did not give the billions promised. Hence, Gov.
Singson could not cover up the (P130,000,000.00). When told by Gov. Singson that the Commission on
Audit (COA) was "pestering" them, FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to cover it up in the meanwhile.
The amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) out of the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos
(P130,000,000.00) was paid to the supplier of the flue curing barn which were delivered by the supplier
and inaugurated by FPres. Estrada as shown by the pictures taken on that occasion (Exhs.T8 and U8). The
flue curing barn was needed by the tobacco farmers to save time and money. [Ibid,pp. 116-121]
Gov. Singson referred to the inaugural speech of FPres. Estrada where the latter stated "walang kama-
kamaganak, walang kai-kaibigan, walang kumpa-kumpadre". Gov. Singson said after what happened
that it would mean even friends should pay to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 122-124]
Gov. Singson demonstrated in Court, from the witness stand up to the door of the courtroom and back
in more or less twenty (20) seconds, that he, who had smaller built than Atong Ang, could carry a box
containing Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) in demonetized bills from the Central Bank in One
Thousand Pesos (P1, 000.00) denomination each. There were twenty bundles of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) per bundle inside the box. The distance between the witness stand and the door of the
courtroom was thirteen (13) meters. [Ibid, pp. 124-135] The box carried by Gov. Singson weighed more
than ten (10) kilos and five bundles of cash amounting to P5,000,000.00 weighed 4.8 kilos. [Ibid, pp. 172-
173]
JAMIS BATULAN SINGSON (Jamis) further testified that he, Gov. Singson, his escort Federico Artates,
and Driver Faustino Prudence, left the office of Gov. Singson on August 31, 1998 to fetch Atong Ang in
his office at Pinaglabanan. They all proceeded to the house of the mother of Atong Ang. Gov. Singson
and Atong Ang went inside the house while the rest waited outside. Later, Atong Ang, Gov. Singson and
William Ang, the brother of Atong Ang, went out. Gov. Singson instructed them to accompany William to
Westmont Bank, Shaw Boulevard. Jamis, Artates, William Ang and the driver of Atong Ang rode the
Mitsubishi Van owned by Atong Ang. William Ang went inside the bank and after 3 hours came out with
Jojo Uy and two security guards carrying two boxes each or a total of four (4) boxes. Jojo Uy was a family
friend of Atong Ang, whom Jamis often saw in the office of Atong Ang. Jamis identified Jojo Uy in a
photograph (Exh. V8). Each of the boxes were brown in color, with a length of more than ten (10) inches,
height of twelve (12) inches and thickness of eight (8) to ten (10) inches. [TSN dated September 18,
2002, pp. 38-55] Jamis and Artates each brought two (2) boxes inside the vehicle and went back to the
house of the mother of Atong Ang, with an armored van following them. The four boxes were brought
inside the house where Gov. Singson and Atong Ang were seated on a sofa. After lunch, Jamis saw the
men of Atong Ang loading something in the vehicle of Atong Ang.
Gov. Singson boarded the car of Atong Ang and instructed Jamis to just follow them to FPres. Estrada’s
house at Polk Street in Greenhills, but they were instructed by Gov. Singson to wait at the corner.
William Ang earlier informed them that the boxes contained money for FPres. Estrada. Jamis did not
actually see the money. After an hour, Gov. Singson asked to be fetched from FPres. Estrada’s house.
[Ibid, pp. 59-68]
MARIA ELIZABETH GOZO BALAGOT testified that she was the Manager of Land Bank Vigan Branch from
August 3, 1998 to December 31, 2000 and had over-all supervision and control of the accounts of said
Branch.
According to witness Balagot, on August 27, 1998, Land Bank Vigan Branch received a Facsimile of Inter-
Office Debit Advice (Exh. L18 and submarkings) dated August 27, 1998 from Land Bank Malacañang
Branch with instruction to credit Current Account No. 04021045-70 of the Provincial Government of
Ilocos Sur the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). Land Bank Vigan Branch
complied with the instruction and correspondingly sent an Inter-Office Credit Advice (Exh. M18 and
submarkings). Later in the afternoon of August 27, 1998, authorized (Exh. N18) representatives from the
Office of the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, namely, Maricar Paz and Marina Atendido, presented
Check No. 0000097650 (Exhs. O18 and P18 and submarkings) dated August 27, 1998 in the amount of One
Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) issued to the order of Luis "Chavit" Singson
accompanied by an Accountant’s Advice for Local Check Disbursement (Exh. Q18 and submarkings) dated
August 27, 1998.
Witness Balagot confirmed that on August 27, 1998, the Provincial Administrator of Ilocos Sur called up
Land Bank Vigan Branch requesting for encashment of the One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos
(P170,000,000.00) that had been credited to the account of the province. She asked for three (3) days
for encashment as a matter of bank policy but since the Provincial Administrator told her the money is
immediately needed, she suggested for them to apply for a demand draft payable and encashable in
Land Bank Makati Branch. Maricar Paz advised witness Balagot that the demand drafts should be
payable to Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro, Nuccio Saverio, and Eleuterio Tan, although she was not given the
reason why the drafts had to be issued in their names. She never received any call from FPres. Estrada
instructing her as to the said names.
On August 28, 1998, witness Balagot called up Gov. Singson to inform him that Delia Rajas and Eleuterio
Tan were trying to deposit their demand drafts in Westmont Bank and the governor responded that it
was okay with him. She made a second call to the governor in the afternoon to inform him of the
presence of Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan in Land Bank Shaw Branch and they were insisting that the
checks be encashed there. Witness Balagot informed the governor that she could not accept the
encashment at the said branch, but Gov. Singson told her to do what they wanted. She testified that she
called the governor instead of Maricar Paz because she knew for a fact that the one giving instructions
to Maricar Paz was the governor himself.
Witness Balagot then advised Land Bank Shaw Branch to cancel the demand drafts and the amounts
covered will just be coursed through the individual accounts by inter-branch transaction. Witness
Balagot then prepared an Inter-Branch Transaction Advice for Eleuterio Tan (Exh. Z18) and Delia Rajas
(Exh. Y18) and credited the amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000,00) and Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00) to their respective accounts. The cancelled demand drafts were returned to Land Bank
Vigan Branch with a Memorandum (Exh. A19) dated August 31, 1998. The demand draft issued to Nuccio
Saverio, on the other hand, was encashed in Land Bank Makati Branch.
Witness Balagot also identified and affirmed her Sworn Affidavit (Exhibit B19 and submarkings) dated
November 6, 2000 relative to the foregoing facts. [TSN dated January 20, 2003 and TSN dated January
22, 2003]
MARIA CARIDAD MANAHAN RODENAS was the cashier at Land Bank Shaw Branch. She testified that
she knew a person by the name of Alma Alfaro as the authorized representative of valued clients, Mrs.
Catalina Ang and Yolanda Uy, and as an account holder of the branch. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 13-
16] According to witness Rodenas, Alfaro claimed to be an employee of Power Express and that Power
Express was owned by Catalina Ang. [TSN, November 11, 2002, pp. 21-25]
Witness Rodenas testified that on August 27, 1998, she assisted Alma Alfaro open her own savings
account with the branch with an initial deposit of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) (Exh. H13). Alfaro
presented her school ID (Exh. F13-2) and SSS card (Exh. F13-1) as valid IDs and personally accomplished
the signature card (Exh. G13). Alfaro indicated her business address to be c/o Power Express and
residence address as Capt. Savy Street, Zone IV-A, Talisay, Negros Occidental. After complying with
requirements, Alfaro told witness Rodenas that Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) coming from Land
Bank Vigan Branch will soon be credited to her account. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 16-27] True
enough, Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) from Land Bank Vigan Branch was credited online to
Alfaro’s newly created account. When Alfaro told witness Rodenas that she wanted to withdraw the
money right away, the latter told Alfaro to just come back the following day as she will still have to
prepare the money. Witness Rodenas then requested from Land Bank’s Greenhills Cash Center the
amount of Forty Six Million Pesos (P46,000,000.00) to cover the amount needed by Alfaro as well as to
cover other withdrawals for the day as shown by the Fund Transfer Request (Exh. I13).
When Alma Alfaro returned to the bank on the following day, she proceeded to withdraw Forty Million
Pesos (P40,000,000.00) (Exh. J13) in cash from her account. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 27- 43] In that
same afternoon, Alma Alfaro asked witness Rodenas to help her two friends, whom she introduced as
Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas, with their demand drafts. Delia Rajas brought two demand drafts,
Demand Draft No. 099435 in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) (Exh. L 13) and Demand
Draft No. 09936 in the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) (Exh. K13). Eleuterio Tan’s
Demand Draft, on the other hand, was in the amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) (Exh. M13).
Witness Rodenas testified that Tan and Rajas asked that they be accommodated in Land Bank Shaw
Branch because they considered it too risky to encash their demand drafts in the cash department in
Buendia, Makati and thereafter to bring it back to Mandaluyong since they were from Mandaluyong.
[TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 136] After examining the demand drafts presented, witness Rodenas
advised Rajas and Tan that she could not accommodate their request because Land Bank Shaw Branch
was not the paying unit of the drafts and that she did not have the amount with her at that time. Due to
their insistence, however, witness Rodenas conferred with Elizabeth Balagot and Lawrence Lopez, the
Branch Manager and Branch Accountant of Land Bank Vigan Branch, who told her to just cancel the
demand drafts and let Rajas and Tan open accounts with their branch so that they could credit the
amounts online. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 44-51]
Eleuterio Tan presented two IDs (Exh. N13) and accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh. O13) and
cash deposit slip (Exh. P13) for One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). Witness Rodenas identified Eleuterio
Tan in a picture (Exh. F9). Delia Rajas also presented two IDs (Exh. Q13) and accomplished a specimen
signature card (Exh. R13) and deposit slip (Exh. S13) for One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00).
Witness Rodenas sent the cancelled demand drafts by facsimile to Land Bank Vigan Branch and after
sometime the Vigan Branch credited online the proceeds of the demand drafts to the newly created
accounts of Tan and Rajas. The original of the demand drafts were later returned to the Vigan Branch.
[TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 133] Tan and Rajas then accomplished withdrawal slips (Exh. T13 & Exh. U13)
to withdraw Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) and Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00), respectively.
Thereafter, Eleuterio Tan filed three (3) applications for cashier’s check (Exhs. W13, V13 & X13) causing
Land Bank Shaw Branch to issue THREE (3) cashier’s checks (Exhs. W13-1, V13-1 & X13-1) in his name in the
amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) each. The three (3) cashier’s checks were later
deposited at Westmont Bank, Mandaluyong Branch to Savings Account No. 2011-00772-7. [TSN,
November 4, 2002, pp. 52-91]
SPO2 FREDERICO APENES ARTATES was a policeman since 1988. At the time of his testimony, he was
assigned at the Vigan City Police Station but detailed to Gov. Singson as security escort.
Witness Artates testified that on August 31, 1998, he was in the office of Gov. Singson at the LCS
Building in San Andres Bukid, Manila, together with Gov. Singson, Jamis Singson and driver Faustino
Prudencio. According to him, Gov. Singson instructed them to go to the apartment of Atong Ang’s
mother and while there they accompanied William Ang, Atong’s brother to Westmont Bank at Shaw
Boulevard, Mandaluyong City where they got four (4) boxes of cash from the said bank and returned
back to the house of Atong Ang’s mother and later on proceeded to FPres. Estrada’s house at Polk
Street. He described each of the boxes to be 10 inches in length, 12 inches in height 15 inches in width
[TSN, September 25, 2002, pp.90-107]. [TSN dated September 25, 2002]
ILONOR ANDRES MADRID testified that she was the Chief of License Section, Operations Division, Land
Transportation Office. Madrid presented and identified certifications dated January 2, 2001 (Exh. I11) and
December 6, 2000 (Exh. D9) pertaining to the data in the driver’s license of Victor Jose Tan Uy, and
identified computer generated photographs of Victor Jose Tan Uy (Exhs. J11 & D9-1). [TSN, October 9,
2002, pp. 127-148]
GWEN MARIE JUDY DUMOL SAMONTINA was the Assistant Vice-President and Head of Records and
Information Management Center of the Social Security System (SSS) since January 1998. She was the
official records custodian of the SSS and in-charge of ensuring that all records received by the branches
were archived.
Witness Samontina brought with her the Social Security Form E-1 (Exh. V11-1 and sub markings) filed by
Delia Ilan Rajas. This form showed that her address was No. 48 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila and SSS number was 33-2365508-7. Witness also brought several SSS Form R-1 and R1-A filed by
the employers of Rajas with SSS namely (1) Admate Company, Inc., (2) Energetic Security and Specialists,
Inc. (3) Jetro Construction and Development Inc., (4) Power Management and Consultancy Inc. The
forms (Exhs. W11, X11, & Y11, and sub markings) filed by Admate Company, Inc. showed the company
address to be No. 46 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The first R1-A Form filed on
December 8, 1994 showed Rajas as the only employee. The R1-A Form filed on May 6, 1998 showed that
Rajas as listed as one of the employees. The forms were accomplished by the employer’s representative
and treasurer, Yolanda A. Uy. The forms submitted by Energetic Security and Specialists, Inc. (Exhs.
Z11 and A12, with sub markings) showed the business address to be No. 46 Calbayog Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The forms showed that Charlie T. Ang and Delia Rajas appeared as
employees. The forms were accomplished by Ma. Rosanie U. Ang. The Form R-1 (Exh. B12, with sub
markings) of Jetro Construction and Development, Inc. filed on October 9, 1990 showed that it had two
employees. This document was accomplished by Yolanda Ang. Its Form R1-A (Exh. C12, with sub
markings) filed on March 15, 1995 showed that it had 18 employees, including Delia Rajas. The address
is still No. 46 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and it was prepared by Yolanda A. Uy. The
forms (Exhs. D12, E12 & F12, with sub markings) of Power Management and Consultancy Incorporation
were received by SSS on June 8, 2000. It had an office address at 188 Captain Manzano Street, Corner N.
Domingo, San Juan, Metro Manila. Among the officers listed were Charlie T. Ang, Nerissa S. Ang, and
William T. Ang. Delia Rajas appeared as one of its employees. [TSN, October 23, 2002, pp. 25-60]
II. EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
During his testimony, accused FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vehemently denied that
he asked Gov. Singson to give him part of Ilocos Sur’s share on the tobacco excise tax imposed by
Republic Act No. 7171; that when he was approached by Gov. Singson regarding the said share of his
province, he told Singson to make a formal request, and that Singson already had a prepared request
(Exh. Q) to which FPres. Estrada wrote his marginal note addressed to then Budget Secretary Diokno,
stating: "Please see if you can accommodate".
FPres. Estrada explained that he could not have alluded to his election expenses because contributions
to his 1998 Presidential Campaign were overflowing; that he rejected many contributions which kept
pouring in as it was the case with a very popular candidate like him; that he even asked his party
treasurers to distribute campaign funds to their candidates for Mayor, Congressman and Governor, that
Gov. Singson got a big share of the campaign funds, that Gov. Singson’s testimony on the percentage he
allegedly asked for was a lie as he would not take away funds intended for farmers and that in fact
during his term as President he rejected an offer of Fourteen Million Dollars (US $14,000,000) for him to
sign a sovereign guaranty; that he did not know Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan or Mr. Uy, and Delia Rajas,
that being the President, he could not have conspired with Delia Rajas whom he heard was a cook; that
he met Charlie "Atong" Ang sometime in 1993 or 1994, when the latter was introduced to him by his
friend, Jojo Antonio; that he was not that close to Ang; that Atong Ang never went to his house at Polk
Street, Greenhills, San Juan to deliver money from the excise tax as testified to by Gov. Singson; that the
garage in his house could not accommodate Atong Ang’s vehicle since the Presidential Car was parked
there and there were security arrangements if he was at home and that Gov. Singson was merely
passing the blame to him because he would not help Gov. Singson with his problem with the
Commission on Audit. [TSN, March 22, 2006, pp. 63-113]
On March 29, 2006, FPres. Estrada testified that Atong Ang did not go to his residence at Polk Street,
Greenhills nor at Malacañang except when Atong Ang attended the wedding of his daughter; that in the
reenactment at the Bangko Sentral, it was shown that One Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) in bills
could not fit into four (4) boxes contrary to the testimony of Gov. Singson, and that the weight of the
said sum of money was equivalent to two and one half sacks of rice which could not be carried by one
person.
FPres. Estrada disclaimed any knowledge of Prosecution’s Exhibits "A19", "X18" and "Y18" and also
Landbank check dated August 27, 1998 for Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) and Gov. Singson’s
September 3, 1998 letter to Elizabeth Balagot, Landbank Manager of Vigan Branch in Ilocos Sur. He also
testified that the Notice of Funding Check Issued, Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998 signed by DBM
Secretary Benjamin Diokno addressed to the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, [Exh. R8] did not reach
the Office of the President.
According to FPres. Estrada, he did not know, nor have seen, Alma Alfaro, the person mentioned in the
certification that inter-branch deposits made by the provincial government of Ilocos Sur from August 27
to 28, 1998, particularly on August 27, 1998 to Account No. 0561-0445-38 in the name of said Alma
Alfaro in the amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00). He said that he saw her for the first time
only during the Impeachment Trial. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.42-49] He also did not know, nor have
seen, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan, the owners of the bank accounts at Land Bank Shaw Branch who
were recipients of the online credit from Land Bank Vigan Branch on August 28, 1998 in the amounts of
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) and Forty MiIlion Pesos (P40,000,000.00) respectively [TSN, ibid,
pp.50-51]. The persons shown in the photographs marked as prosecutions Exhibits "F", "G9", and "T8"
were not known to him. He was able to identify the photograph marked as Exhibit "U8" which was the
inauguration of the flue-curing plant in Ilocos Sur, which he later on learned was a mere show-off
("pakitang tao") because the project did not push through.
FPres. Estrada likewise denied any knowledge of prosecution’s exhibits presented to identify Victor Jose
Uy (a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan) (Exhs. "N9", "N13", "T11" & "J"); Delia Rajas (Exhs. "V", "W", "H", "H13", "Y", "Y-3",
"Z11", "A12", "B12-4", "C12", "D12" & "Q13") and Alma Alfaro (Exhs. "F12" & "F13"). [TSN, March 29, 2006,
pp.59-68,79,80]
FPres. Estrada likewise disclaimed any knowledge of prosecution’s exhibits regarding the
P130,000,000.00 excise tax share of Ilocos Sur [Exhs. H13, I13, J13, K13, M13, L13, O13, P13-1, R13, S13, E13, U13,
V13, V13-1, W13, W13-1, X13, X13-1, Y13, Z13, M17, N17, O17, P17, Q17, R17, S17, L18, M18, N18, O18, P18, Q18, R18, S18,
T18, B19, Z18. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.76-95]
FPres. Estrada also belied Gov. Singson’s testimony of that he ordered Gov. Singson to cover up his
unliquidated cash advances by countering that Gov. Singson tried to cover up his own cash advances as
the Commission on Audit was already going after him and he wanted to pass the blame to FPres.
Estrada. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp. 98-100] When he learned about the Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00) excise tax share of Ilocos Sur, he instructed then Justice Secretary Artemio G.
Toquero to investigate the matter. Secretary Toquero, in turn, referred the matter to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). After one week, NBI Regional Director Carlos Saunar submitted a report
through a Memorandum dated October 20, 2000 (Exh. 199) to Secretary Toquero. Director Saunar also
submitted to FPres. Estrada a December 12, 2000 letter (Exh. 201); another document (Exh. 204)
addressed to Secretary Toquero on the subject – Governor Luis Chavit Singson, et al. for malversation of
public funds – Twenty Million Pesos (P20, 000,000.00) and for violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act
No. 3019; an affidavit of Agustin D. Chan, Jr. (Exh. 202) and to which is an attached letter dated
December 3, 2000 of Agustin T. Chan, Jr. (Exh. 202-D) with attached certification (Exh. 206-C) demanding
that Gov. Singson settle his outstanding cash advance in the amount of One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000.00) and Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) under Check Nos. 98397 and 42364 dated
December 29, 1999 and March 19, 1999, pursuant to paragraph 9.1 and 9.3.3.3 of COA Circular No. 97-
002 and Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445; an affidavit of Elizabeth Arabello dated January 12, 2001 (Exh. 205);
a document entitled "WP, item Singson cash advances" (Exh. 208), which details the unliquidated cash
advances of Gov. Singson at year end 1999 amounting to One Hundred Thirty Five Million Five Hundred
Eighty Four Thousand Eight Hundred Eighteen Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P135,584,818.17); and
NBI Disposition Form, Subject Results of Evaluation and Evidence in Support of COA Reports on the
provincial government of Ilocos Sur for the years 1997 and 1998 (Exh. 198), stating that the amount of
Four Hundred Thirty Five Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Eight Pesos
(P435,190,298.00) was spent by Gov. Singson on the Tomato Paste Plant which COA found to be a non-
functioning and non-operational project and to have incurred the loss of more than Twenty Million Six
Hundred Fifty-five Thousand and Seventy-four Pesos (P20, 655, 074.00) as of June 30, 1998 [TSN, March
29, pp.106-131] and that there were ELEVEN (11) other cases of unsettled, unliquidated or dissolved
cash advances of Gov. Singson which included the One Hundred Seventy Million (P170,000,000)
unliquidated cash advances for the purchase of equipment for the Tobacco Flue Curing Plant involved in
this case. [TSN, ibid, pp.143-144]
FPres. Estrada narrated that Director Saunar informed him that the case against Gov. Singson was clear
and should be filed right away with the Office of the Ombudsman. Director Saunar gave him a copy of
the complaint–affidavit of the NBI (Exh. 200, 200-N, 200-0, 200-P, 200-Q) recommending the filing of the
appropriate charges against Gov. Singson and other Ilocos Sur provincial officials among others for the
non-delivery of the supplier NS International, Inc. of the equipment for the flue curing barn and re-
drying plant in the amount of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) (Exh. 200-R). [TSN,
March 29, 2006, pp. 7-18] However, Gov. Singson was granted immunity from criminal prosecution and
Gov. Singson was able to pass on the case against FPres. Estrada by implicating the latter as the one who
ordered him and testifying against him. [TSN, ibid, pp.19-25]
The last time FPres. Estrada talked to Gov. Singson was when he stopped over at San Francisco USA for a
speaking engagement on his way to an official visit to Washington he was surprised that Gov. Singson
who was not a member of his delegation fetched him at the airport. After his speaking engagement, he
went up to his room where Congressman Asistio and Gov. Singson had a big problem with the COA in
Ilocos Sur because the provincial auditor did not want to cooperate with him. Gov. Singson asked FPres.
Estrada to help transfer the said auditor, which request he refused because COA is an independent
constitutional body. Gov. Singson insisted that FPres. Estrada call the COA Chairman to interfere in his
behalf. He reminded Gov. Singson that he should not look after himself but he should protect the name
of the Office of the President. Gov. Singson then abruptly stood up and grudgingly left. FPres. Estrada
came to know of the name of the COA provincial auditor during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
hearing and he was Atty. Agustin Chan who testified at the hearing and demanded that Gov. Singson
liquidate his cash advances. Later, FPres. Estrada read from the newspaper that Chan was ambushed
and killed in a town in Ilocos Sur. [TSN, ibid, pp.31-44]
ATTY. AGATON S. DACAYANAN was the State Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned at the
Province of Ilocos Sur for the years 1995 to 1999. He examined, audited and settled all accounts of the
Province of Ilocos Sur based on the documents submitted by, and gathered from the Provincial
Accountant, Provincial Treasurer, Budget Officer and other officials who have access to the financial
transactions of the provincial government. He submitted Annual Audit Reports at the end of every year.
Witness Dacayanan then presented and identified the Annual Audit Reports for the years ended
December 31, 1995 (Exh. 187 and submarkings); December 31, 1996 (Exh. 188 and submarkings);
December 31, 1997 (Exh. 189 and submarkings); and, December 31, 1998 (Exh. 190 and submarkings).
[TSN dated September 20, 2004, TSN dated Septebmer 22, 2004 and TSN dated September 29, 2004]
BONIFACIO M. ONA was Director III of COA and the Officer-In-Charge of its Special Audit Office. Witness
Ona testified that one of his duties as OIC of the Special Audit Office was to transmit the Report
prepared by their audit teams to the different auditing units and as such he had the chance to review as
to its form the Special Audit Report for the Province of Ilocos Sur for the period 1999 (SAO Report No.
99-31) (Exh. 191 and submarkings), which he presented to the Court by virtue of a subpoena duces
tecum, and after which he transmitted the same to the Governor of Ilocos Sur. [TSN dated October 4,
2004]
ELVIRA JAVIER FELIX was State Auditor IV of the COA. Witness testified that she was the Officer-in-
Charge of the Provincial Auditor’s Office from October 5, 2001 to July 31, 2002, and she presented and
identified Annual Audit Reports for the Province of Ilocos Sur for the years ended December 31, 2001
(Exh. 192 and submarkings), and December 31, 2002 (Exh. 193 and submarkings).
Witness Felix also presented and identified copies of the Annual Audit Reports of the Province of Ilocos
Sur for the years ended December 31, 1999 (Exh. 194 and submarkings) and December 31, 2000 (Exh.
195 and submarkings) which she secured from the Provincial Auditor’s Office, and which were prepared
during the term of then Provincial Auditor Atty. Agustin Chan who was killed in an ambush on October 4,
2001. [TSN dated October 4, 2004 and TSN dated October 6, 2004]
ELIZABETH M. SAVELLA was an Auditor of the Corporate Government Sector of the COA. Savella
testified that she was assigned previously with the Special Audit Office of the Commission of Audit and
was designated in 1999 as the Team Leader of a Special Audit Team that conducted a special audit of the
Province of Ilocos Sur for the period from 1996 to 1999. Being the Team Leader, witness Savella was the
one assigned to consolidate all the audit findings submitted by the team members to come up with the
audit report. The said audit report was SOA Report No. 99-31 (Exh. 191 and submarkings).
Witness stated that the scope of the audit was the financial transaction and operation of the Province of
Ilocos Sur for the period 1996 to 1999. They looked, particularly, into the utilization of R.A. 7171 funds
and the utilization of the PNB loan specifically the implementation of the Tomato Flue Curing Plant
Project, stating that the audit aims to evaluate the regularity of the implementation of the province’s
projects. [TSN dated October 6, 2004 and TSN dated October 11, 2004]
CONGRESSMAN LUIS A. ASISTIO testified that he knows Gov. Singson and met him several times. He
said that on July 24, 2000, he accompanied Gov. Singson to see FPres. Estrada at his room at the
Fairmont Hotel at San Francisco, California where Gov. Singson requested FPres. Estrada to call the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit to ask for the relief of the Auditor assigned to his province to
which FPres. Estrada declined.
Asistio clarified that in the many meetings he had with Gov. Singson during the period late August to
September 2000, they never talked about alleged receipt of monies from R.A. 7171 and he knew of
these issues only during the Impeachment Trial. He thinks that these are mere figments of Gov.
Singson’s imagination since they never talked of anything except the provincial leadership.
Gov. Singson also did not mention the name of accused Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. He added that Gov.
Singson at one time went to his house when there was an ongoing rally at Makati prior to the press
conference and told him that he (Gov. Singson) does not consider FPres. Estrada as his friend anymore.
Asistio added that he watched the Impeachment Trial against FPres. Estrada and thinks that it is a farce
because in all their conversations, Gov. Singson never mentioned about R.A. 7171 nor talked about
jueteng, except probably when he said "kunin na nilang lahat huwag lang yung liderato".
Asistio stated that in his visits to Malacañang during the time of FPres. Estrada, at least three times a
week, he never saw Atong Ang there because Atong Ang was banned by FPres. Estrada from entering
Malacañang. [TSN dated October 11, 2004 and TSN dated October 13, 2004]
CARLOS P. SAUNAR was Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. In October 2000, he
was the Chief of the Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, assuming the position from 1997 or 1998 up to July
2001, and as such was tasked to investigate the public disclosures made by then Gov. Singson as per
instructions of then NBI Director Federico Opinion, who was, in turn, directed by then Justice Secretary
Artemio G. Tuquero in a Memorandum dated October 10, 2000 (Exh. 199 and submarkings).
In the conduct of their investigation, Saunar and his team of investigators secured documents from the
COA, such as, the Audit Reports of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur and the Schedule of
Unliquidated Cash Advances, and subpoenaed the concerned public officials and employees of the
Province of Ilocos Sur. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 67-69]
After evaluating the reports and evidence, witness submitted an Evaluation Disposition Form (Exh. 198
and submarkings) dated 16 October 2000 which made mention of 11 cases (Annex A of Disposition
Form) (Exh. 198-B) of irregularities that were assigned to different teams for investigation. [TSN,
October 13, 2004, pp. 80, 84]
The result of Saunar’s investigation on the P170,000,000.00 alleged unliquidated cash advances of
Governor Singson and some other cash advances was contained in a Revised Report of Investigation
which became the subject of a Complaint-Affidavit (Exh. 200 and submarkings) dated 10 January 2001
signed by Carlos S. Caabay, then acting Director, NBI, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. Witness
explained that the Revised Report of Investigation traced the P170,000,000.00 from its source up to its
liquidation. [TSN, October 13, 2004, p. 96]
Saunar testified that they made a record check and searched, as requested by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, for the whereabouts of accused Alma Alfaro, accused Eleuterio Tan and accused Delia Rajas
but failed to locate them. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 107-110] The NBI filed two (2) other cases
involving cash advances of the Gov. Singson with the Office of the Secretary of Justice, one of which is
contained in a case transmittal (Exh. 201 and submarkings) dated 12 December 2000 addressed to
Honorable Artemio G. Tuquero relating to the P100,000,000.00 cash advance of Gov. Singson and
supported by a Report of Investigation dated 12 December 2000 (Exh. 201-B). The other case transmittal
(Exh. 204 and submarkings) they filed with the Department of Justice on December 14, 2000 was in
connection with the cash advance of Gov. Singson in the amount of P20,000,000.00, and supported by
another Report of Investigation dated 14 December 2000 (Exh. 204-B). In all the investigations
conducted by the NBI on the cash advances of Gov. Singson, Saunar said that they prepared an analysis,
"WP-Singson Cash Advance" (Exh. 208 and submarkings) (WP stands for working paper), and that based
on the working paper, Gov. Singson had accumulated cash advances of Three Hundred Five Million Six
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P305,600,000.00) between the period January 1997 to January 2000. From
this total, the amount of P170,015,181.83 appears to have been settled, leaving a balance of
unliquidated cash advances of Gov. Singson of P135,584,818.70 as of January 2000. [TSN, October 25,
2004, pp. 53-54]
The amount of P163,663,636.27 as appearing in the working paper, which was also the subject matter of
the complaint-affidavit filed with the Ombudsman (Exh. 200), is supposed to be the amount that was the
settlement of the cash advance of P170,000,000.00 less 30% withholding tax supposed to be remitted to
the BIR. The P170,000,000.00 pesos came from the P200,000,000.00 representing the share of the
Province of Ilocos Sur from the excise taxes collected pursuant to R.A. 7171 that was released by the
DBM. The P170,000,000.00 was then cash advanced by Gov. Singson from the account of the Province of
Ilocos Sur in LBP Vigan Branch, wherein a certain Marina Atendido deposited the amount of
P40,000,000.00 in favor of the account of Alma Alfaro at the LBP Shaw Boulevard Branch through an
inter-branch accommodation. The same was withdrawn in cash by Alma Alfaro. [TSN, October 25, 2004,
pp. 57-63]
As to the remaining P130,000,000.00, four (4) demand drafts were applied for by Maricar Paz, one of
which was issued in favor of Luccio Saberrio in the amount of P40,000,000.00 which was withdrawn in
LBP Makati, where the amount of P35,000,000.00 was deposited to another savings account (the
account number is indicated in the demand draft) in the same LBP Makati while the P5,000,000.00 was
cashed. The second demand draft pertains to another P40,000,000.00 pesos in favor of Eleuterio Tan
which was negotiated at the LBP Shaw Boulevard Branch but was cancelled, and in lieu of this, the
corresponding amount was wire transferred from LBP Vigan to LBP Shaw Boulevard. The two remaining
demand drafts pertain to Delia Rajas, one in the amount of P20,000,000.00 and the other in the amount
of P30,000,000.00, and were negotiated in LBP Shaw Boulevard but were also cancelled, the
corresponding total amount of P50,000,000.00 was then wire transferred and deposited to the account
of Delia Rajas in LBP Shaw Boulevard. [TSN, October 25, 2004,, pp. 64-70]
Saunar reiterated that they conducted an in-depth investigation of the expose’ made by Gov. Singson,
which includes alleged violations on the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, malversation of public funds
and violation of R.A. 4200, pursuant to the memorandum issued by the Secretary of Justice. However,
their investigation so far has not reached the point of illegal jueteng or illegal gambling. They did not
conduct an in-depth investigation on the activities of Mr. Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada because they
have not reached that point where the evidence would show that they have participated. [TSN, October
25, 2004, pp. 102-104]
However, they already filed a complaint-affidavit dated January 10, 2007 which referred to the One
Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) that was cash advanced by Gov. Singson based on the
evidence they gathered so far in their investigation.
Saunar further testified that on November 2000, Director Opinion directed him to accommodate
interviews on the result of their investigation in connection with the P170,000,000.00 alleged cash
advance of Gov. Singson which was done in his office when he was still the Chief of the NBI Anti-Graft
Division, and the result of which appeared in a VCD. [TSN, November 3, 2004, pp. 18, 26-27]
[TSN dated October 13, 2004, TSN dated October 25, 2004, TSN dated October 27, 2004 and TSN dated
November 3, 2004]
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP) OCULAR INSPECTION
On May 25, 2005, the Court conducted another ocular inspection at the Money Museum of the BSP
upon the request of the accused Estradas. The Court observed that if the P130,000,000.00 were all in
P1000.00 denominations and divided into 130 bundles with each bundle consisting of 1000 pieces of
P1000.00 peso bills amounting to P1 Million pesos, only a maximum of 20 bundles amounting to P20
Million pesos would fit in a box (Exh. X-Ocular Inspection), with an inner or interior dimensions of 12
inches width, 10 inches height and 15 inches length which measurement was given by prosecution
witnesses Artatez and a certain OJ Singson during their testimony. Thus, the P130 Million pesos would fit
in 6 and ½ boxes.
If the P130,000,000.00 were in P500.00 denominations and divided into 260 bundles with each bundle
consisting of 1000 pieces of P500.00 bills amounting to P500,000.00, the P130,000,000.00 pesos would
fit in 13 boxes.
A Certification issued by the BSP that the P1,000,000.00 pesos in P1000.00 bills would weigh about just
under a kilo has already been submitted by the accused in the previous hearing. [TSN dated May 25,
2002, pp. 10-11]
FINDINGS OF FACT
Re: Sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information
With respect to the predicate act of divesting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur, this Court finds that indeed an amount of
P130,000,000.00 out of the P200,000,000.00 share in tobacco excise taxes of the Province of Ilocos Sur
was withdrawn from the provincial coffers and misappropriated and misused to the damage and
prejudice of the said province.
The evidence presented before this Court establish beyond doubt that Gov. Singson initiated the process
that eventually led to the allocation and release of funds by the national government to the Province of
Ilocos Sur of the amount of P200,000,000.00 from the excise tax imposed pursuant to Republic Act No.
7171. As chief executive of the Province of Ilocos Sur, Gov. Singson personally handed a letter to FPres.
Estrada requesting the release of Ilocos Sur’s share in the tobacco excise taxes [Exh. Q8] to pin him on
his campaign promise to the people of Ilocos Sur during the 1998 Presidential Elections. FPres. Estrada,
through a marginal note on Gov. Singson’s letter, endorsed the request to then Sec. Benjamin Diokno of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) [Exh. Q8-1]. The DBM released the amount of
P200,000,000 to the Province of Ilocos Sur as its share in tobacco excise taxes as shown in the Notice of
Funding Check Issued, Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998 signed by DBM Sec. Benjamin Diokno and
addressed to the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur [Exh. R8]. Gov. Singson forthwith caused the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur to enact a Resolution appropriating the sum of P200,000,000.00,
of which P170,000,000.00 was intended for flue-curing barns and P30,000,000.00 for infrastructure.
Gov. Singson caused the release of P170,000,000.00 from the said fund as shown by the Authorization
he issued to Maricar Paz and Marina Atendido, employees of his office to officially transact with Land
Bank Vigan Branch, in behalf of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur dated August 27, 1998 [Exh
"N18"], Check No. 0000097650 dated August 27, 1998 issued to the order of Luis "Chavit" Singson in the
amount of P170,000,000.00 [Exhs. O18 and P18], and an Accountant’s Advice for Local Check
Disbursement dated August 27, 1998 [Exh. Q18]. This amount, however, was broken down into smaller
amounts and deposited/transferred to the accounts of individuals identified with or known associates of
Atong Ang, namely Alma Alfaro, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan, as shown by a certification of Land Bank
Vigan Branch Manager Ma. Elizabeth Balagot [Exh. S8], Demand Draft Application Nos. 656 and 712 in
the name of Delia Rajas [Exhs. R18 and S18], Demand Draft Application No. 734 in the name of Eleuterio
Tan [Exh. T18], and Demand Draft Application No. 722 in the name of Nuccio Saverio [Exh. U18], and the
four demand drafts issued pursuant thereto [Exhs. V18, K13, L13 and M13]. A fifth demand draft in the
name of Gov. Singson was inexplicably cancelled albeit the amount covered by it was deposited in the
account of Alma Alfaro through an Inter-Branch Deposit Accomodation Slip [Exh. X18] as instructed by
Maricar Paz to Land Bank. The demand drafts issued to Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan were similarly
cancelled and the amounts of P40,000,000.00 and P50,000,000.00 covered by the demand drafts were
deposited in the accounts of Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas, respectively, at Land Bank Shaw Branch.
Alma Alfaro’s P40,000,000.00 was withdrawn by her in cash a day after it was deposited in her account
at Land Bank Shaw Branch on August 27, 1998 [TSN, November 4, 2003, pp. 27-43]. On the other hand,
Tan and Rajas withdrew on the same day P40,000,000 and P50,000,000, respectively, from their
accounts and Tan used the proceeds to buy Three (3) cashier’s check in the amount of P30,000,000 each
or a total of P90,000,000 [Exhs. W13-1, V13-1 & X13-1]. The Three (3) cashier’s check were deposited in
Savings Account No. 2011-00772-7 at Westmont Bank, Mandaluyong Branch [Ibid, pp. 52-91]. The
P40,000,000.00 originally covered by the demand draft in the name of Gov. Singson which was cancelled
and subsequently withdrawn by Alma Alfaro was not shown to have been deposited at Westmont Bank.
Who profited from this sum of money? The Court can only surmise given the dearth of even the
prosecution’s evidence on what happened to the money after it was received by Alma Alfaro.
Significantly, it appears that of the P170,000,000.00 appropriated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Ilocos Sur for flue-curing barns only the amount of P40,000,000.0 went to the supplier of the flue-curing
barn, Nuccio Saverio who encashed his demand draft at Land Bank Makati Branch. Saverio could collect
only the said amount in view of the testimony of Gov. Singson that he delivered only one module of flue
curing barns costing P40,000,000.00.
According to Jamis Singson and Artates, they accompanied William Ang, the brother of Atong Ang, to
Westmont Bank to withdraw money but they just waited outside the bank. They helped carry the four
(4) boxes to the vehicle when William and the security guards brought the said boxes outside the bank.
Thereafter, they joined William transport the boxes to the home of Catalina Ang, and later to the
residence of FPres. Estrada at Polk Street. Jamis and Artates were told by William Ang that the boxes
contained money for FPres. Estrada.
The prosecution’s evidence that only the amount of P90,000,000.00 was deposited in Westmont Bank
created a loophole in the impression given by the testimony of Gov. Singson that he and Atong Ang were
supposed to bring the P130,000,000.00 withdrawn from Westmontbank to the residence of FPres.
Estrada. The Court can only speculate that this could have been the reason why during the Ocular
Inspection at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) the amount of P130,000,000.00 could not fit the four
(4) boxes described by Gov. Singson and the other prosecution witnesses.
There are also gaps in the prosecution’s evidence on the alleged delivery to FPres. Estrada of the
diverted funds or a portion thereof. It was not established how much cash was allegedly stashed in the
boxes that came from Westmont Bank and which were unloaded/reloaded at the house of Catalina Ang
or how much cash was in the boxes allegedly brought to FPres. Estrada’s house. No one testified that he
saw cash being handed to FPres. Estrada, Sen. Loi Estrada or Jinggoy Estrada. Serious doubts are
engendered by the bare testimony of Gov. Singson, the prosecution’s star witness, who, by his own
account, did not even touch the boxes of money, nor count the money inside the boxes that arrived at
the home of Catalina Ang and allegedly reloaded for delivery to Polk Street. Gov. Singson did not also
see the alleged turnover of the money by Ang to FPres. Estrada, Dr. Loi Estrada or Mayor Jinggoy as he
stayed at the corner of Polk Street, so many meters away from the highly fenced and gated house of
FPres. Estrada. The Court finds it queer that Gov. Singson would stay only at the corner of the street
where FPres. Estrada’s residence is located instead of accompanying Ang to witness the delivery of
money that, according to him, was important to him and his constituents in Ilocos Sur. Only Atong Ang
could have credibly testified on the alleged delivery of money but the prosecution did not present him
as a witness, despite his plea of guilt to a lower offense and his admission that he partook of
P25,000,000.00 of the P130,000,000.00 of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. This Court could not admit
without corroborating evidence Gov. Singson’s bare testimony that FPres. Estrada purportedly got mad
that Atong Ang gave him only P70,000,000.00 and that Atong Ang had given P20,000,000.00 and
P15,000,000.00 to Dr. Loi Estrada and Mayor Jinggoy respectively. In this Court’s view, certain details of
Gov. Singson’s testimony on this point are rather incredible and far-fetched. Gov. Singson had not
offered any explanation why and how Atong Ang had the temerity or the guts to divide the money
among FPres. Estrada and the members of the First Family and decide by himself the amount of their
respective shares without prior clearance of FPres. Estrada, then the highest executive official of the
land.
Furthermore, the record is bereft of evidence to confirm Gov. Singson’s testimony that FPres. Estrada
was interested in the diversion of tobacco excise taxes or that there was an agreement between Gov.
Singson and FPres. Estrada that 10% of any amount released to the Province of Ilocos Sur would be
turned over by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson’s statements that Atong Ang and Mayor
Jinggoy kept following up the release of the money and that Atong Ang informed Gov. Singson that
FPres. Estrada wanted not just 10% but P130,000,000.00 of the P200,000,000.00 are likewise
uncorroborated. Regarding the testimony of Gov. Singson implicating Jinggoy Estrada in the commission
of the predicate act mentioned in sub-paragraph (b), the Honorable Supreme Court early enough had
clarified the import of the charge against accused Jinggoy Estrada under the Amended Information in
this manner:
xxx xxx xxx Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating
a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur, which Act is the offense
described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not
mention petitioner (Jinggoy Estrada) but instead names other conspirators of the Former President.
[Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, supra, p. 553]
The recent decision in People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada (G.R. No. 158754, promulgated August 10, 2007) which upheld this Court’s Resolution granting
bail to Jinggoy Estrada, has explained the essence and import of the above-quoted ruling:
Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so as to implicate individual respondent for
predicate acts described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the Amended Information, petitioner now
argues:
It should be emphasized that in the course of the proceedings in the instant case, respondent Jinggoy
Estrada waived the benefit of the said ruling and opted, instead, to participate, as he did participate and
later proceeded to cross examine witnesses whose testimonies were clearly offered to prove the other
constitutive acts of Plunder alleged in the Amended Information under sub-paragraphs "b", "c", and "d".
We disagree.
At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded "benefits" to respondent Jinggoy that were
inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were extended, as the Court did not read into
the Amended Information, as couched, something not there in the first place. Respondent Jinggoy’s
participation, if that be the case, in the proceedings involving sub-paragraphs "b", "c", and "d", did not
change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion of the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 148965.
For when it passed, in G.R. NO. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts envisaged and ascribed in the
Amended Information against Jinggoy, the Court merely defined what he was indicted and can be
penalized for. In legal jargon, the Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, right guaranteed an accused under the Constitution. In fine, all that the Court contextually did in
G.R. No. 148965 was no more than to implement his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation
in the light of the filing of the Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Court’s holding in G.R. No.
148965 freed individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be given to
the Amended Information.
The mere fact that FPres. Estrada endorsed Gov. Singson’s request for release of funds to the then DBM
Secretary for review does not indicate any undue interest on the part of FPres. Estrada in the grant of
Gov. Singson’s request. The tenor of the marginal note itself was simply for the DBM Secretary to "see if
[he] can accommodate the request of Governor Singson." Finally, not a scintilla of evidence links FPres.
Estrada to any of the obscure personalities who withdrew the P130,000,000.00, namely, Delia Rajas,
Alma Alfaro, and Eleuterio Tan and to any of the official bank documents that made possible the
diversion and misappropriation of the aforesaid public funds.
In sum, the paper trail in relation to the P130,000,000.00 diverted tobacco excise taxes began with Gov.
Singson and ended with Atong Ang. This Court does not find the evidence sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that FPres. Estrada or any member of his family had instigated and/or benefited from
the diversion of said funds.
RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH C OF THE
AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE
THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE
Under paragraph (c) of the Amended Information, accused FPres. Estrada was charged with the crime of
plunder, for having willfully, unlawfully and criminally acquired, amassed or accumulated and acquired
ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P189,700,000.00 representing commissions or percentages by reason
of the purchase of shares of stock of Belle Corporation by SSS and GSIS.
The gravamen of this specific charge is whether FPres. Estrada, unjustly enriched himself at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic by receiving a commission of
P187 Million as consideration for the purchase by SSS and GSIS of Belle Shares. Even if the Prosecution is
able to establish that FPres. Estrada used his official position, authority, relationship and influence and
directed, ordered and compelled Carlos A. Arellano (then President of the SSS) and Federico C. Pascual
(then President of GSIS) for SSS and GSIS to buy Belle shares with money of the GSIS and SSS which are
held in trust by the said institutions for the millions of employees of the government and the private
sector, such fact alone does not constitute an overt or criminal act, the commission of which would
warrant a conviction for plunder. Prosecution must establish that, in consideration of the purchase by
GSIS and SSS of the Belle Shares, FPres. Estrada received the amount of P189,700,000.00 as commission.
In discharging its burden of proof that FPres. Estrada directed, ordered and compelled, for his personal
gain and benefit, the GSIS to purchase 351,878,000 shares of stock more or less, and the SSS to purchase
329,855,000 shares of stock more or less, of the Belle Corporation in the amount of more or less One
Billion One Hundred Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Six Hundred Seven Pesos And Fifty
Centavos (P1,102,965,607.50) and more or less Seven Hundred Forty Four Million Six Hundred Twelve
Thousand And Four Hundred Fifty Pesos (P744,612,450.00), respectively, or a total of more or less One
Billion Eight Hundred Forty Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty Seven Pesos And
Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), the prosecution presented its principal witnesses in the persons of
Arellano, Pascual, Ocier and Capulong.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

WILLY NG OCIER (Ocier) was the Vice Chairman and Director of Belle Corporation on June 24, 1999. He
testified that SSI Management, a company created by Roberto Ongpin was the Selling stockholder of
Belle shares totaling 650,000,000. [TSN January 9, 2002, p.94] Roberto Ongpin, in his personal capacity,
originally gave an option to Mark Jimenez to purchase these 650,000,000 shares of Belle [Ibid., pp. 67-
68] because Roberto Ongpin at that time granted (sic) to transform Belle Corporation into the foremost
gaming company in the Philippines, and he wanted somebody to help him "acquiring (sic) licenses to do
Jai-Alai and to do Super Sabong, Bingo, Casino, etc., etc." [Ibid. pp. 71 and 72] and Mr. Roberto Ongpin
whom he held in high regard, told him that Mark Jimenez was a very close friend of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid.
p. 84] The option was given as an incentive for Mark Jimenez as a favor to Roberto Ongpin. [Ibid. p. 88]
Mark Jimenez was not able to exercise the option because Ongpin was ousted from the Board of Belle
on June 15, 1999. [Ibid. p. 90]
After a meeting of the Board of Directors of Belle Corporation on July 20, 1999 (Exh. P), when Dichaves
asked Ocier about the option given by Ongpin to Mark Jimenez and if the option can be given to him,
Ocier told Dichaves that the option cannot be given anymore because of the fact that the shares are
intended to be sold in light of a recent call for unpaid subscription. [TSN, January 7, 2002, p. 17] The
Board of Director of Belle Corporation decided to make a call for payment of unpaid subscriptions to
raise money to address the debt problem of the Corporation. [TSN, October 1, 2001, p. 79] When asked
what can be done in relation to the Belle shares, Ocier explained to Dichaves that he needs the latter’s
help in selling the Belle shares to cover for the 75 per cent unpaid subscription and the two of them
basically agreed to divide the work wherein Ocier would contact his foreign brokers to sell the shares
and Dichaves will contact his local counterparts or contacts if he can sell the shares locally. [TSN, January
7, 2002, p.18]
Ocier further testified that overtime (sic) the market was not very strong, so the foreign brokers took
quite a while to make decisions about their action of buying Belle shares. [Id.] In a subsequent meeting
with Dichaves, Ocier testified that Dichaves confirmed to him that there was a good chance that GSIS
and SSS may be willing to buy the Belle shares and when he asked when the shares can be transacted he
was assured by Dichaves that the latter had taken up the matter already with FPres. Estrada and that
Dichaves told him that the Former President had already spoken to Carlos Arellano of SSS and Ding
Pascual of GSIS about the said matter. [Ibid. p. 19]
After a few weeks, Dichaves called Ocier and told the latter that the transaction may be pushing through
but that Dichaves wanted to take up a matter of condition that was proposed for the transaction to push
through which was to the effect that Ocier will have to give a commission for the transaction to push
through. [Ibid .pp. 20-21] Ocier testified that since the shares involved was approximately 600,000,000
to 650,000,000 and the price of Belle at that time at about P3.00 per share, the total expected proceeds
of the sale was almost Two Billion Pesos (P2,000,000,000.00) and the commission that Jaime was asking
for amounted to Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). [Ibid. p. 23]
When asked to whom the commission should be given, Ocier answered that according to Dichaves, the
condition was being imposed by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 26] When asked for his reaction to the
information conveyed by Dichaves that it was FPres. Estrada that imposed the condition, Ocier testified
that his reaction was that he felt that it was quite a big amount of commission to be paid and that
normally, in real estate and stock transactions, commissions range between three (3) to five (5) percent
only and he told Dichaves that he finds that quite high [Ibid. p. 34], to which Dichaves answered that
"that was the condition." [Ibid. p. 36] When asked what his answer was to the answer of Dichaves that
that was the condition, Ocier answered that he was constrained to agree because Dichaves told him that
"that was the only way for the transaction to push through." [Id.] Ocier further testified that on October
21, 1999, Belle shares totaling 447,650,000 were sold by SSI Management to GSIS and SSS through
Eastern Securities Development Corporation [Ibid. p. 39; Exh. Q; Q-1; Exh. T] while other Belle Shares
were sold through other brokers. [TSN dated January 14, 2002, p. 20]
CARLOS ALMARIO ARELLANO (Arellano) was appointed Chairman and President of SSS on July 1, 1998
by FPres. Estrada. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 49] The transaction with Belle was initiated on October 6,
1999. He got a call from FPres. Estrada and was told: "Gusto ko kayo ni Ding Pascual ay tignan ninyo ang
pagbili ng Belle Corporation sa stock market. [Ibid. pp. 75- 77] He thought that the words "tignan ninyo"
was an instruction for him. [Ibid. p. 80] After the instruction, he asked the people in the Investment
Department of SSS to take a look and review the shares of Belle as an investment item in the portfolio of
SSS and also to find out to what extent the SSS can further increase the SSS position in the said stock.
[Ibid. p. 82]
As far as the Investment Committee was concerned, they agreed that Belle is still possible investment
for the SSS. [Ibid. p. 94] In answer to the instruction of the President he said "Opo, opo." [Id.] He got a
call from FPres. Estrada the week after and he was asked to see the President at Malacanang. [Ibid. p.
95] At Malacañang, he saw FPres. Estrada with Jaime Dichaves. While he was there he approached the
FPres. who stood up and took him aside and asked whether this time, he had followed FPres.
instructions to buy Belle shares. He replied: "Tinitignan pa po ng Investment committee namin." [Ibid.
pp. 97, 104] He did not immediately buy the Belle shares because he felt that it was not the proper
timing and the volume that was being considered was too much and not yet the proper time. [Ibid. p.
102] When he answered this to the Former President, he recalled that the reaction of the Former
President was to tell him "Bilisan ninyo na, bilisan." [Ibid. p. 107] Upon receiving these instructions, he
still did not do anything for a few days after. [Ibid. p. 115] After several days, he received another call
from FPres. Estrada and he repeated "Bilisan mo, bilisan ninyo na. [Ibid. p. 124] As far as he was
concerned, it was more serious than previous orders given to him. [Id.] On October 21, the SSS
implemented the transaction. [TSN dated November 7, 2001, p. 110]
FEDERICO CALIMBAS PASCUAL (Pascual) was the President of GSIS in 1999, testified that he had a
meeting with FPres. Estrada on September 6, 1999 and in that meeting, he was instructed by the FPres.
Estrada to buy Belle Shares. It was only in October 9, 1999 when he ordered his people to buy Belle
Shares because First: he was hoping that the President was not serious in his September 6, 1999
instruction and he was hoping the President would forget his instruction. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p.
20] Second, because he was not very comfortable with Belle because some people are of the opinion
that Belle Shares, because the corporation is involved in jai-alai and gambling, is "speculative flavor."
[Id.]
In another telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada on October 9, 1999, he felt that the President
was more serious in his instructions in the sense that, he was away and there was this telephone call
and he felt that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [Ibid. p. 24] In the telephone call, he was asked by
FPres. Estrada "bakit hindi ka pa bumibili ng Belle" to which he replied "tatawag ho ako sa head office at
papa-aralan ko." [Ibid. pp. 56-57]
When he returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1999, he learned that GSIS had purchased
351,000,000 Belle Share worth P1,100,000,000.00 as shown by the investment committee confirmation
report.
On cross-examination, he testified that his purpose in executing his affidavit was to remove from the
minds of the doubting public that he benefited from the Belle Shares. [Ibid. p. 48; Exh. O to O-4] The
alleged money making that intervened or supervened in the purchase of Belle Shares was not included
in his affidavit because the purpose was to show how GSIS purchased shares of Belle on the instruction
of the Former President. [Ibid. p. 54] The purchases of Belle Shares were made when he was abroad.
FPres. Estrada gave him the instructions to buy and he also made instructions to his people to buy, that
was the chain of events. [Ibid. pp. 68; 74] He authorized the purchase of Belle Shares only if Belle was a
qualified share. [Ibid. p. 69] If he did not make that call to the people in GSIS about the Former
President’s instruction, there was probably no possibility of GSIS acquiring Belle Shares during that
period of time beginning October 13 to October 21. [Ibid. p. 77] Except for the instruction, there was
nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous about the transaction and he does not know whether somebody
benefited from the purchase of Belle Shares that took place between October 13 to 21. [Ibid, p. 83]
RIZALDY TADEO CAPULONG (Capulong) was the Deputy Chief Actuary and Assistant Vice-President of
the Securities Trading and Management Department of the Social Security System (SSS). He headed the
Actuary Department which was responsible in making long term and short term projections of the
revenues and expenditures of SSS. As AVP of the Securities Trading and Management Department,
Capulong was in charge of providing research and operational support to top SSS offices with regard to
equities and investment.
Capulong testified that he made the recommendation which cost the SSS P1,300,000,000.00 because
per his research, evaluation and verification, it was a profitable transaction. He had gone into the
validity and legality of the acquisition of the Belle Shares and he was convinced that they were all
proper, legal and beyond reproach. He signed the recommendation and submitted it for approval of the
Executive Management Committee and then for the approval of the Social Security Commission.
Capulong clarified that it was an approval for allocation not for funding. For SSS to be able to acquire
shares of their corporation, it was necessary that there was an approval for an allocation. SSS had the
amount of money but it was not reserved for Belle transactions even with the approval of the
recommendation. The money will only be identified and allocated at the time of transaction. [TSN dated
February 6, 11, 13, and 18, 2002]
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
REYNALDO PASTORFIDE PALMIERY (Palmiery) was the Senior Executive Vice-President and the Chief
Operating Officer and Member of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS). Palmiery was the Chairman of the Investment Committee of the GSIS in 1998 to 2000. The
Investment Committee discusses the new proposals for investment which were elevated by the
Corporate Finance Group of the GSIS. The process is that the Finance Corporate Group first studies and
evaluates stocks which are not yet qualified and accredited to be purchased and elevates this to the
Investment Committee for discussion, and if it is approved by the Investment Committee then it is
elevated to the board for approval.
Palmiery testified that the GSIS had been trading all Belle Shares in 1993. The first acquisition of GSIS
then was about 18 million shares, or 5% of the outstanding stocks of Belle Corporation, and that the
GSIS booked an aggregate trading gain of P145,859,195.95 on the purchase of Belle Shares alone (Exh.
236 and submarkings).
Palmiery then presented and identified a Joint Counter-Affidavit which the members of the Investment
Committee filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. He confirmed the statement contained in the last
paragraph of the joint affidavit that the Investment in Belle Shares was made solely on the basis of the
compliance with the law and GSIS internal guidelines. Palmiery was not aware of any phone call made by
FPres. Estrada to Pascual. He further explained that the acquisition of the Belles Shares was pursuant to
the directive of General Manager Pascual. Palmiery related that he received a call from Pascual and
instructed him to review and study the prospects of Belle Corporation with the end objective to
purchase shares of stock of the said corporation up to the limit allowed under the existing guidelines of
GSIS. The evaluation was pursued and approved.
On cross-examination, Palmiery admitted that under GSIS Resolution No. 284 series of 1992, General
Manager Pascual was given the sole authority to trade in stocks listed or traded in the two (2) major
stocks exchange, and under GSIS Resolution No. 273, he was granted the continuing authority to buy
Belle Shares. Resolution No. 273 was then amended in 1998 by the GSIS providing for the continuing
authority for the President and General Manager as well as the Executive Vice President and the Senior
Vice President for Corporate Finance to purchase and sell stocks traded in the Stocks Exchange at
prevailing prices.
On re-direct examination, Palmiery testified that when General Manager Pascual called and instructed
him to purchase Belle Shares the number of shares to be purchased was specified to be within the limits
of the GSIS Guidelines which was the number of shares equivalent to one board seat or 10% of the
outstanding shares whichever is higher. [TSN dated December 13, 2004 and TSN dated January 24, 2005]
HON. HERMOGENES DIAZ CONCEPCION (Conception) was a Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
Concepcion testified that he was familiar with the Belle Resources and Shares of Stocks, and confirmed
the veracity and accuracy of the statement in paragraph 10 of his Affidavit. With respect to the
acquisition that took place on October 13 to 21, 1999, witness Concepcion explained that the
President/General Manager of the GSIS has full authority to buy and sell shares listed in the stock
exchange of the amounts within the boundary set forth by the Board of Trustees. So, the President buys
and sells these securities without the Board knowing what he did because decisions have to be made
sometimes on the spot in order to get a better margin. Paragraph 16 (2) of the Counter-Affidavit was
checked with the records of the GSIS, the Committee in charge of the investment, and the amounts
made by the GSIS on these shares, P145,859,195.94, was furnished to them. Witness Concepcion
explained that during the period from 1993 to 2000, the GSIS would buy shares then sell them, buy
shares then sell them, and by that process, the GSIS made P145 Million as profit or actual gain. Witness
also stated that paragraph 16 (9) which refers to the purchase of 351,878,000 shares was based on the
records of the GSIS.
Concepcion also testified that then President and General Manager Federico Pascual never told them
that FPres. talked to him nor discussed to the witness the alleged directive or pressure brought upon
him by FPres. Estrada. There was no need to ask Federico Pascual why he bought shares because there
is the presumption that our functions are regularly performed. [TSN dated December 8, 2004]
MERCEDITAS GARCIA GACULITAN (Gaculitan) was the Corporate Secretary of the Social Security
Commission (SSS). Gaculitan testified that before these investments in Belle Resources Corporation
were made prior approval of the investment by the Commission en banc were obtained since all
purchases and all investments are required to be approved or passed upon by the Social Security
Commission. [TSN dated December 13, 2004]
Accused FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA testified on his own defense. The relevant
portions of his testimony are set forth below.
The purchase of Belle Shares according to accused FPres. Estrada
In the Memorandum for FPres. Estrada, the defense stated that under this indictment, the Prosecution
incur the bounden duty to prove:
1. accused Estrada’s acts constitutive of directing, ordering and compelling the GSIS and SSS to buy
Belle Shares;
2. the purchase were made solely due to the said acts of compulsion by accused Estrada;
3. the extent and parameter of Estrada’s acts relative to the questioned purchases;
4. the alleged profit commission is government fund or money; and
5. damages to the government or People of the Philippines.
The Defense claims that the prosecution’s evidence itself shows that (1) the transaction complained of
was perfectly valid, since accused FPres. Estrada did not direct, order or compel SSS and GSIS to buy
Belle Shares and (2) there is no proof that any commission was paid to the accused. [Defense
Memorandum, p. 192]
To bolster its claim that the purchase of Belle Shares was a perfectly valid transaction, the Defense
pointed to the following portions of Arellano’s testimony:
1. That the purchase of Belle Shares was a routine transaction in the regular course of business, for
SSS had previously purchased Belle Shares at profit;
2. What was told by FPres. Estrada to Arellano was simply to initiate the acquisition of Belle
Shares. How many shares he was ordered to buy and at how much price per share, was never
dealt with in the phone conversation;
3. The above notwithstanding, Arellano proceeded on his own volition with the acquisition of the
249 Million Belle Shares.
4. The Decision to purchase was exclusively his and the policy making body of SSS.
[Ibid. pp. 193-194, citing TSN, November 8, 2001, pp. 63, 73-74, 75-76]
The Defense argues that the reason why Arellano testified in the manner he did and executed an
affidavit implicating FPres. Estrada in the instant plunder case notwithstanding that there was nothing
irregular, illegal or anomalous in the October 21, 1999 acquisition of Belle Shares was because his
testimonies and affidavit are his last ditch effort to exculpate himself from possible plunder charges
where he may be detained without bail considering that plunder is a capital offense. [Ibid. p. 197]
Likewise, the Defense cited the testimony of Capulong who testified that he examined and audited all
the acquisition papers and the various confirmation slips and official receipts covering the acquisition
and found them to be in order. Hence he had no objection to, but on the contrary, approved the
payment of the said acquisition. Said witness also testified that as far as he was concerned, there was
nothing illegal or irregular or anomalous in the SSS purchase of Belle Shares in October 21, 1999 and
that it was a legal investment and a valid investment that is in the list of investment of SSS. That it is not
an irregular investment and it is said that it might be somewhat not ordinary in the sense that in this
case there was a call. [Ibid. p. 198, citing TSN, November 14, 2001, p. 53]
Insofar as the acquisition by GSIS of Belle Shares, the Defense argued that the purchase by GSIS was in
accordance with investment policy and rules.
The Defense sought to establish that the Belle Shares were qualified under GSIS policy and charter and
GSIS may by itself and in accordance with its rules, purchase Belle Shares without the need of any order
or compulsion from anybody as shown by the testimony of Pascual, the President of GSIS when he
admitted that even way back in 1993, GSIS had been purchasing or dealing with Belle Shares and had
already made profits at the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 up to the present prior to his
coming in as the new General Manager of GSIS. [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 61 to 62] That the
purchase was in accordance with the GSIS policy was established by Pascual’s testimony that the trading
department under the Corporate Finance Group investigated and made further inquiries in connection
with the shares and concluded that there would be no violation that could have been committed by GSIS
in the purchase of the shares. [TSN, December 3, 2001, pp. 14 and 15] Pascual further testified that the
price of P3.13 per share was the worth of the shares around the time it was purchased and it was
reported to him by his people that the reason why they bought so much was because there was a
history of profitability and that they already had a P1,000,000,000.00 turnover plus and he felt that it
was "a good buying afterwards." (sic) [Defense Memorandum, p. 204] Pascual also testified that he had
no information if anybody benefited from the purchase of Belle Shares that took place on October 13 to
21 and admitted that GSIS was suffering a paper loss because of the purchase. [Ibid. p. 204-205, citing
TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 83-84]
Defense argued that assuming arguendo that there was an instruction from FPres. Estrada for such
purchase, such instruction was not too compelling or irresistible to directly cause the execution of the
purchase suggestion and that such instruction was immaterial because the GSIS Board which approved
the transaction did not receive the alleged instruction of the Former President and that in the same
vein, the GSIS decided on the purchase independently, free from any compulsion by an outsider as the
instruction given by Pascual was to the effect that a study be conducted and if the Belle Shares are
qualified, to buy within the range of their authority. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 205-206, citing TSN,
December 3, 2001, p. 93]
As to Pascual’s testimony that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him for the purchase of a (sic)
particular shares, the Defense pointed out that as per admission of Pascual, what he meant by unusual
was that FPres. Estrada called him when he was out of the country. Defense pointed out however, that
as testified by FPres. Estrada, the latter did not know that Pascual was out of the country when he
called. [Ibid. p. 209] Defense pointed out that, by Pascual’s admission, the GSIS Board was not pressured
into finding that the Belle Shares were okay, above board, and that they were not pressured by anybody
into concluding the purchase. [Ibid. p. 214, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93]
FPres. Estrada testified that he appointed Arellano and Pascual and he knows that Belle Resources is the
developer of Tagaytay Highlands because sometimes, he spends his weekend in Tagaytay Highlands.
[TSN, April 26, 2006 (pm), p. 10-11] He denied that he instructed or ordered Pascual to buy Belle Shares
on September 6, 1999 during a meeting with him. What he told Pascual was to study and make due
diligence if Belle Shares will be beneficial to the GSIS. To which Pascual answered "Yes" and that he has
this Corporate Finance Group to make the study. As to the testimony of Pascual regarding his telephone
conversation with FPres. Estrada, the latter testified that he did not know that Pacual was abroad and he
talked to him not about Belle Shares but about delayed benefits of GSIS members. [Ibid. pp. 17, 24] He
denied ordering Pascual to buy Belle Shares. [Ibid. pp. 15-17] He claimed there was nothing irregular
about his instruction to Pascual when he only told him to make a serious study and due diligence. [Ibid.
p. 22]
As regards Arellano’s testimony, FPres. Estrada denied that he ever called Arellano nor did he order him
to buy Belle Shares. He remembers that Mr. Jaime Dichaves told him, that being one of the members of
the Board of Directors, the latter informed him that Belle Resources are offering their stocks to GSIS and
SSS and that Dichaves was looking for investors, local and foreign and he told Dichaves that it will be
upon the study of SSS and GSIS who will decide whether they are buying or not. [Ibid. p. 25] As regards
the telephone conversation with Arellano, FPres. Estrada testified that they talked in Tagalog and he
said to Arellano to study the offer of Belle Resources and if it will be beneficial to the government then
why not. To which Arellano answered "Yes, sir," that he would refer the matter to the Investment
Committeee to give due diligence. [Ibid. pp. 26-27] FPres. Estrada denied that he pressured Arellano and
said that he noticed that the testimony of Pascual and Arellano are the same as if they are of the same
script. [Ibid. p. 29] FPres. Estrada stated that Pascual or Arellano, admitted buying Belle Shares and they
were the ones who decided the amount and how much to buy and they did not inform him anymore.
[Ibid. p. 32] As regards the testimonies of Pascual and Arellano, FPres. Estrada testified that it seems
they have only one lawyer. He learned that Pascual and Arellano were called by then DOJ Secretary
Perez and it was the latter who pressured them to testify against him and they were threatened to be
charged with plunder. He also learned that Secretary Perez gave them a lady lawyer but he does not
know the relation of Perez to that lady lawyer. [Ibid. p. 37] FPres. Estrada testified that after Arellano
testified in Court, the latter called him and apologized because according to him, he could not do
anything since he was threatened by Secretary Perez with the words that if they can send the President
to jail, what more of him? [Ibid. p. 41]
FPres. Estrada also denied knowledge of the alleged conversation and transaction between Ocier and
Dichaves. He testified that Mr. Dichaves was, at that time, one of the members of the Board of Directors
of Belle Resources and a business man. [Ibid. p. 42] FPres. Estrada cited instances when he was offered
commissions but he rejected them such as the IMPSA and SGS deals. [Ibid. pp. 45-48] His reaction to
Arellano’s statement to him that the latter was threatened was to say that he understood because the
same thing happened to him when he was offered by Secretary Nani Perez that he could go to any
country of his choice but he refused. [Ibid. pp. 49-50]
FINDINGS OF FACT
Re: Sub-paragraph (c) of the Amended Information
We find that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that FPres. Estrada directed and
instructed Arellano and Pascual for SSS and GSIS respectively to buy Belle Shares.
As can be culled from the testimonial and documentary evidence of the Prosecution, the following
circumstances surround the purchase of the Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
On July 20, 1999, Ocier and Dichaves discussed the matter of the sale of the 650,000,000 shares of Belle,
in the light of a recent call for payment of unpaid subscription which the Board of Directors of Belle
Corporation decided to address its debt problems. Ocier explained to Dichaves that he needs the latter’s
help in selling the Belle Shares to cover for the 75 per cent unpaid subscription. They agreed to divide
the task of looking for buyers of these Belle Shares with Ocier looking for foreign buyers and Dichaves to
look for local buyers. [ TSN, January 7, 2002, p.18]
In a subsequent meeting with Dichaves, the latter confirmed to Ocier that there was a good chance that
GSIS and SSS may be willing to buy the Belle shares as Dichaves had taken up the matter already with
FPres. Estrada and that Dichaves told him that the Former President had already spoken to Carlos
Arellano of SSS and Ding Pascual of GSIS about the said matter. [Ibid, p. 19]
After a few weeks, Dichaves called Ocier and told the latter that the transaction may be pushing through
but that a commission will have to be paid as a condition for the purchase to push through. [Ibid. p. 21]
As per Ocier’s testimony, Dichaves told him that it was FPres. Estrada who imposed the condition. [Ibid.
p. 26] Since the shares involved was approximately 600,000,000 to 650,000,000 and the price of Belle at
that time was about P3.00 per share, the total expected proceeds of the sale was almost Two Billion
Pesos and the commission involved would amount to Two Hundred Million Pesos. [Ibid. p. 23]
Since the payment of the commission was the only way for the transaction to push through, he was
constrained to agree to the payment of the commission. [Ibid. p. 36]
On September 6, 1999, at a meeting with FPres. Estrada, Federico Pascual, President of GSIS was
instructed by the President to buy Belle Shares. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 20]
On October 6 1999, Carlos Arellano got a call from FPres. Estrada and was told: "Gusto ko kayo ni Ding
Pascual ay tignan ninyo ang pagbili ng Belle Corporation sa stock market. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 77]
He thought that the words "tignan ninyo" was an instruction for him. [Ibid. p. 80] After the instruction
he asked the people in the Investment Department of SSS to take a look and review the shares of Belle
as an investment item in the portfolio of SSS and also to find out to what extent the SSS can further
increase the SSS position in the said stock. [Ibid. p. 82]
He got a call from FPres. Estrada the week after and he was asked to see the President at Malacanang.
[Ibid. p. 95] At Malacañang he saw FPres. Estrada with Jaime Dichaves. While he was there he
approached the President who stood up and took him aside and asked whether this time, he had
followed FPres. Estrada’s instructions to buy Belle shares. He replied: "Tinitignan pa po ng Investment
committee namin"; [Ibid. p. 97-104] When he answered this to the President, he recalled that the
reaction of the President was to tell him "Bilisan ninyo na, bilisan." [Ibid. p. 107] Upon receiving these
instructions, he still did not do anything for a few days after. [Ibid. p. 115]
After several days, he received another call from FPres. Estrada and the latter repeated "Bilisan mo,
bilisan ninyo na." As far as he was concerned, it was more serious than previous orders given to him.
[Ibid. p. 124]
October 9, 1999 while Pascual was abroad, he talked by phone to FPres. Estrada who asked him "bakit
hindi ka pa bumibili ng Belle" to which he replied "tatawag ho ako sa head office at papa-aralan ko."
[TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 56-57] He felt that the President was more serious in his instructions in
the sense that, he was away and there was this telephone call and he felt that FPres. Estrada was
already agitated. [Ibid. p. 24] He ordered the purchase of the Belle Shares on the same day. The
President gave him the instructions to buy and he also made instructions to his people to buy, that was
the chain of events. [Ibid. pp. 68; 74]
For the period October 13-21, 1999, GSIS bought 351,878,000 Belle Shares and paid P1,102,965,607.50
(Exh. N), and the Social Security System (SSS) bought 329,855,000 Belle Shares for P744,612,450.00 on
October 21, 1999. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p.78]
That the purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS was the result of the instructions of the FPres. Estrada
is borne out by the following circumstances:
1. The sequence of events beginning from the time Ocier agreed to the payment of commission, to
the instructions transmitted personally and by telephone calls from FPres. Estrada to Pascual
and Arellano, to the actual purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
2. The haste with which GSIS and SSS bought Belle Shares. In the case of GSIS, from October 9,
1999 (when the "agitated instructions" were given) to October 13, 1999 (the date when the first
purchases were made) or a period of 4 days. In the case of SSS, a few days after October 13,
1999, ( the date when the "more serious" order was given by FPres. Estrada to Arellano) to
October 21, 1999 (the date when the purchases were made) or a period of no more than 8 days.
The instructions to buy originated from FPres. Estrada and cascaded to Pascual and Arellano
then to GSIS and SSS respectively.
3. The obedience to FPres. Estrada’s instructions despite Arellano’s reluctance to do so because he

believed that it was not the proper timing and the volume that was being considered was too
much and not yet the proper time. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 102] And in the case of Pascual,
his reluctance to buy because he was not very comfortable with Belle because some people are
of the opinion that Belle Shares, because the corporation is involved in jai-alai and gambling, has
speculative flavor. [TSN, November 22, 2001, Ibid. p. 20]
4. The relationship of Pascual and Arellano to FPres. Estrada, who, being the appointees and
subordinates of FPres. Estrada, cannot refuse the instruction of their superior.
5. The manner in which the instructions were given. In the case of Arellano, he felt that the third
order was more serious than previous orders given to him. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 124]
And, in the case of Pascual, because he felt that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [TSN,
November 22, 2001, p. 24]
We find no merit to the claim of the Defense that the prosecution’s evidence itself shows that: (1) The
transaction complained of was perfectly valid, since accused FPres. Estrada did not direct, order or
compel SSS and GSIS to buy Belle Shares and (2) There is no proof that any commission was paid to the
accused. [Defense Memorandum, p. 192]
The denial of FPres. Estrada that he instructed Pascual and Arellano to buy Belle Shares cannot
overcome the straightforward and direct testimony of Pascual and Arellano attesting to the persistent
instructions given by FPres. Estrada which is replete with details. Mere denial by an accused, particularly
when not properly corroborated or substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial, being in the nature of
negative and self-serving evidence, is seldom given weight in law. Positive and forthright declarations of
witnesses are often held to be worthier of credence than the self-serving denial of the accused. [People
v. Quilang, 312 SCRA, 328, 329]
Neither can We give more weight to the claim of the Defense that the purchase of Belle Shares was a
perfectly valid transaction even as it pointed to the following portions of Arellano’s testimony:
1. That the purchase of Belle Shares was a routine transaction in the regular course of business, for
SSS had previously purchased Belle Shares at profit;
2. What was told by FPres. Estrada to Arellano was simply to initiate the acquisition of Belle
Shares. How many shares he was ordered to buy and at how much price per share, was never
dealt with in the phone conversation;
3. The above notwithstanding, Arellano proceeded on his own volition with the acquisition of the
249 Million Belle Shares.
4. The Decision to purchase was exclusively his and the policy making body of SSS. [Ibid. 193-194,
citing TSN, November 8, 2001, pp. 63, 73-74, 75-76]
for prefatory to these actions of the SSS were the instructions given by FPres. Estrada to Arellano and
the compliance with said instructions by Arellano. While it is true that the SSS had previously granted
authority for additional investment by SSS in Belle Shares prior to and up to 1999, it was only in the 1999
purchases that there was an instruction coming from FPres. Estrada through Arellano to purchase Belle
Shares.
The evidence of the Defense show that the 1st Indorsement dated September 29, 1999 re: proposal to
increase by P450,000,000.00 the investment allocation for Belle to total P1,300,000,000.00 was not
signed by Arellano (Exh. 242), contrary to the assertion of the Defense. [In its formal offer of Evidence
on p. 45, Defense claimed that Exh. 247 was executed by Arellano. Exh. 247 is the same as Exh. 242]
Neither was there any documentary evidence submitted showing the approval by the Commission of the
proposal increasing by 450,000,000 the investment allocation for Belle to total P1,300,000,000.00.
Likewise, the testimony of Capulong - that he examined and audited all the acquisition papers and the
various confirmation slips and official receipts covering the acquisition and found them to be in order
and hence, he had no objection to, but on the contrary approved the payment of the said acquisition;
that as far as he was concerned, there was nothing illegal or irregular or anomalous in the SSS purchase
of Belle Shares in October 21, 1999 and that it was a legal investment and a valid investment that is in
the list of investment of SSS; that it is not an irregular investment and it is said that it might be
somewhat not ordinary in the sense that in this case there was a call [Defense Memorandum, p.198,
citing TSN, November 14, 2001, p. 53], in fact corroborates Arellano’s statement that indeed there was a
call from FPres. Estrada instructing the purchase of Belle Shares.
Moreover, Capulong, in his testimony, stated that Belle Corporation Shares were no longer qualified
stocks since Belle had not declared dividends whether in cash or stock in 1997, 1998 and 1999. [TSN,
February 14, 2005, p. 75]
He likewise testified that it was former President and Chairman Carlos A. Arellano who directly gave the
orders to the brokers to purchase Belle Shares in behalf of the SSS and he (Capulong) had nothing to do
directly insofar as the acquisition was concerned since his participation is merely limited to recommend
the increase of the funding for the acquisition of the shares. [TSN, February 11, 2002, p. 11]
Capulong further testified that for the month of October, 1999, the SSS bought 389,855,000 shares with
a value of P1,031,126,400.00. [Ibid. p. 38] In his subsequent testimony, Capulong testified that on
October 21, 1999, the SSS bought 249,679,000 shares at the value of P784,551,150.00 at an average
price of P3.14/share. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p. 78] After October 21, 1999, Belle Shares was on a
downward trend going down to the P1.00 level by the year 2000. By October 23, 2001, it went below
P1.00, then it went down to 70 centavos by February 15, 2001. As of February 11, 2002, it was being
traded at 40 to 50 cents. [Ibid. pp. 92-93]
Capulong further testified that out of the 249,679,000 shares which SSS bought on October 21, 1999 for
P784,551,150.00, a total of 96,366,000 shares were sold at an average selling price of P1.7736/share
resulting in a loss amounting to P127,464,710.00. [TSN, February 18, 2002, pp. 94-95]
The Defense argues that the reason why Arellano testified in the manner he did and executed an
affidavit implicating FPres. Estrada in the instant plunder case notwithstanding that there was nothing
irregular, illegal or anomalous in the October 21, 1999 acquisition of Belle Shares was because his
testimonies and affidavit are his last ditch effort to exculpate himself from possible plunder charges
where he may be detained without bail considering that plunder is a capital offense. [Defense
Memorandum, p. 197]
This argument of the Defense are mere allegations and extracted from FPres. Estrada’s testimony that
Arellano called him up and explained the circumstances behind Arellano’s execution of his Affidavit
which are however, uncorroborated.
Neither do we find that the presence of the instruction from FPres. Estrada is negated by the argument
of the Defense that the acquisition by GSIS of Belle Shares, was in accordance with investment policy
and rules.
The Defense sought to establish that the Belle Shares were qualified under GSIS policy and charter and
GSIS may by itself and in accordance with its rules, purchase Belle Shares without the need of any order
or compulsion from anybody as shown by the testimony of Pascual, the President of GSIS when he
admitted that even way back in 1993, GSIS had been purchasing or dealing with Belle Shares and had
already made profits at the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 up to the present prior to his
coming in as the new General Manager of GSIS. [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 61 to 62] That the
purchase was in accordance with the GSIS policy was established by Pascual’s testimony that the trading
department under the Corporate Finance Group investigated and made further inquiries in connection
with the shares and concluded that there would be no violation that could have been committed by GSIS
in the purchase of the shares. [TSN, December 3, 2001, pp. 14 and 15] Pascual further testified that the
average price of P3.14 per share was the worth of the shares around the time it was purchased [TSN,
November 22, 2001, pp. 89-90] and it was reported to him by his people that the reason why they
bought so much was because there was a history of profitability and that they already had a
P1,000,000,000.00 turnover plus and he felt that it was "a good buying afterwards." (sic) [TSN,
November 28, 2001, p. 55]
Nowhere in the argument of the Defense does it establish the absence of the instruction of FPres.
Estrada to Pascual, other than the self-serving denial of FPres. Estrada.
Moreover, as Pascual testified, the GSIS profits in 1999 did not come from Belle Shares. Furthermore,
the fact that GSIS made profits to the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 did not mean that it
made profits from the Belle Shares purchased in 1999. As testified by Pascual, the actual profit of the
GSIS in 1999 did not come from Belle Shares but from other stocks and there was no contribution to the
profit of GSIS from the Belle Shares acquisition because up to the present they are still holding on to the
Belle Shares. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 81] Even the evidence of the Defense shows that as of
December 29, 2000, the value of Belle Shares had gone down to P0.69/share from the average purchase
price of P3.14/share and an allowance for probable loss of P374,052,750.00 had been set up (Exh. 250,
J-12).
FPres. Estrada’s testimony that he called Pascual to inquire about delayed GSIS benefits is negated by
the fact that after the call to Pascual, the latter gave instructions to buy Belle Shares. If benefits were
being delayed, why would GSIS spend billions of pesos to buy Belle Shares instead of setting aside these
monies to avoid delay in GSIS benefits?
Defense argued that assuming arguendo that there was an instruction from FPres. Estrada for such
purchase, such instruction was not too compelling or irresistible to directly cause the execution of the
purchase suggestion and that such instruction was immaterial because the GSIS Board which approved
the transaction did not receive the alleged instruction of the President and that in the same vein, the
GSIS decided on the purchase independently, free from any compulsion by an outsider as the instruction
given by Pascual was to the effect that a study be conducted and if the Belle Shares are qualified, to buy
within the range of their authority. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 205-206]
Pascual’s testimony that when he talked to FPres. Estrada and the latter asked him why he had not
bought Belle Shares in an agitated tone; that he did not mention the instruction of FPres. Estrada to
others because the instruction was specific to him; that on October 9, 1999 after his telephone
conversation with FPres. Estrada, he gave the instruction to GSIS to buy Belle Shares should be afforded
stronger weight and more probative value than the arguments of the Defense. As stated earlier, the
Prosecution has established that it was the instructions of FPres. Estrada that triggered the instructions
of Pascual and Arellano to GSIS and SSS respectively which caused these agencies, in turn to follow the
usual procedures established for the purchase of the shares which finally culminated in the purchase of
the Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
As to Pascual’s testimony that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him for the purchase of a (sic)
particular shares, the Defense pointed out that as per admission of Pascual, what he meant by unusual
was that FPres. Estrada called him when he was out of the country. Defense pointed out however, that
as testified by FPres. Estrada, the latter did not know that Pascual was out of the country when he
called. [Ibid. p. 209] Defense pointed out that, by Pascual’s admission, the GSIS Board was not pressured
into finding that the Belle Shares were okay, above board, and that they were not pressured by anybody
into concluding the purchase. [Ibid. p. 214, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93]
We fail to see how the admission of Pascual that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him to inquire
about why GSIS had not purchased Belle Shares in an agitated tone and the statement of FPres. Estrada
that he did not know that Pascual was out of the country at the time he called Pascual could lead to the
conclusion that the GSIS Board was not pressured into finding that the Belle Shares were "okay," "above
board" and that they were not pressured by anybody into concluding the purchase. The issue was not
whether the GSIS Board was pressured into finding that the Belle Shares purchase was "okay" or "above
board," but whether FPres. Estrada pressured Pascual into ordering GSIS to buy Belle Shares.
The testimonies of defense witnesses, Justice Hermogenes D. Concepcion, Jr., the former Chairman of
GSIS, and Reynaldo Palmiery, Executive Vice-President of GSIS, did not disprove that FPres. Estrada gave
instructions to Pascual for GSIS to buy Belle Shares since, as admitted by them, they were not aware of
such instructions. Nowhere in the testimony of Pascual did he state that he informed these people of
the instructions of FPres. Estrada because, as stated by Pascual, the instructions were specific to him so
he didn’t want to involve his management anymore. [TSN, November 28, 2001, pp. 9- 10]
The P189,700,000.00 Check No. 6000159271 payable to cash, drawn on International Exchange Bank
with Eastern Securities Corporation as drawer [Exh. R-R-4]
After the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the Belle Shares, Ocier caused the preparation of a check by
Eastern Securities Development Corporation in the amount of P189,700,000.00 representing the profit
commission to be paid from the sale. [TSN, January 14, 2002, p. 33-36]
Ocier identified International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5, 1999, payable
to cashin the amount of P189,700,000.00 with Eastern Securities Corporation as Drawer. Ocier testified
that the check was prepared so that he can hand carry and deliver it to Dichaves as per their agreement
when he agreed to pay P 200,000,000.00 commission. [TSN, January 7, 2002, p. 49] When asked who
was supposed to get the commission, Ocier answered that according to Jaime Dichaves, President
Estrada was supposed to get the commission. [Ibid. p. 55]
Ocier testified that he delivered the check to the residence of Dichaves in No. 19 Corinthian Gardens,
Quezon City [TSN, January 9, 2002, p. 13] and he delivered the check because he had a pre-arranged
appointment with Dichaves wherein he was supposed to hand the check to Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 15] Mr.
Dichaves arranged the appointment because he wanted Ocier to explain in person why the check
amount is P189,700,000.00 when the pre-agreed amount was P200,000,000.00. [Ibid. p. 18] Ocier
explained that he deducted transaction taxes and brokers’ commissions from the amount of
P200,000,000.00 and rounded the figure to P189,700,000 of (sic) which Dichaves agreed. Ocier learned
later on that the check he delivered to Dichaves was deposited at Far East Bank to the account which he
believes belonged to Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 60]
On cross-examination, Ocier admitted that FPres. Estrada was not present when he had his conversation
with Dichaves on the Belle shares on July 20, 1999. [TSN, January 14, 2002, pp. 20-29] Neither did he talk
to FPres. Estrada after the check for P189,700,000.00 (Exh. R) was issued and cleared nor did he inquire
from FPres. Estrada whether he received or was credited in any of his account with the amount stated in
the check. [Ibid. pp. 39-40] Ocier likewise testified that he did not have the opportunity to discuss the
profit commission, nor the receipt of the profit commission nor the Velarde account with FPres. Estrada
despite the fact that he had constant meetings with FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 60-61]
When Ocier was asked if he could say that Dichaves was instructed by FPres. Estrada regarding the profit
commission, Ocier answered that he trusts his cousin Dichaves and whatever the latter tells him he
would normally believe. Ocier also testified that the totality of what he stated in his affidavit about the
instruction, or the representation made by Dichaves was not corroborated or confirmed by FPres.
Estrada or anybody else representing him because it was just between him and Dichaves. [Ibid. pp. 39-
45]
Citing Ocier’s testimony, Defense argues that such testimony on the subject sales and commission are
purely hearsay and does not bind FPres. Estrada. What is clear on the record is that the commission
went to Dichaves as gleaned from Ocier’s testimony. [Defense Memorandum, p. 221-222]
In an attempt to establish that there was no evidence that FPres. Estrada received any percentage or
commission from the sale of Belle Shares, the Defense pointed out that Capulong’s testimony indicated
that while there was a broker’s commission, which was paid to brokers like Abacus Securities
Corporation. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 215-216, citing TSN, February 11, 2002, pp. 13-16] In the case
of the 389,855,000 Belle Shares bought by SSS for P1,031,126,400.00, the payments went from SSS to
the brokers, the buying brokers. [TSN, February 11, 2002, p. 38[
The Court finds that International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5,
1999, payable to cash in the amount of P189,700,000.00 with Eastern Securities Corporation as Drawer
(Exh. R), was paid as commission in consideration of the purchase of Belle Shares by SSS and GSIS. While
the testimony of Ocier to the effect that Dichaves told him that it was FPres. Estrada who imposed the
condition for the payment of commission is hearsay insofar as FPres. Estrada is concerned, the said
testimony is admissible as proof that such statement was made by Dichaves to Ocier. Testimony of what
one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the
statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial
evidence necessary to convict the accused. [Bon vs. People, 419 SCRA 103]
As regards the argument that Capulong’s testimony indicated that while there was a broker’s
commission, this was paid to brokers such as Abacus Securities Corporation and that the purchase price
of P 1,031,126,400.00 for 389,855,000 Belle Shares went from SSS to the buying brokers, again, we find
this argument of the Defense to be unavailing. The issue is not whether FPres. Estrada received Broker’s
commission or received the payment from SSS, but whether he received the commission mentioned by
Dichaves to Ocier as consideration for the purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
Having found that a commission was paid in consideration of the purchase of Belle Shares by SSS and
GSIS, the next issue that this Court must determine is whether the commission went to FPres. Estrada or
Dichaves.
The paper trail for International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271
First: Far East Bank and Trust Co. (Cubao-Araneta Branch)

In tracking the check (Exh. R), Prosecution presented Ms. Yolanda de Leon, (De Leon), Senior Manager of
BPI (Cubao-Araneta Branch) formerly Far East Bank and Trust Co. [BPI merged with Far East Bank
sometime in 2000] De Leon testified that Dichaves was one of the valued clients of the Bank and that
Jaime Dichaves and Abby Dichavez had joint current and savings accounts with then Far East Bank and
Trust Company in 1999. The Current Account had the No. 0007-05558-7 and the Savings Account had
the No. 0107-38639-9 (C/A No. 0007-05558-7 and S/A No. 0107-38639-9). [TSN, February 4, 2002, pp.
23-24; (Exhs. BB and Z)] She identified the microfilm copy of International Exchange Bank Check No.
6000159271 [Ibid. p. 39-41; Exh. DD] dated November 5, 1999 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 as the
check that was deposited to the savings account of Dichaves on November 5, 1999 as evidenced by the
microfilm of the deposit slip [Ibid. pp. 42-44; Exh. EE] and the bank statement of account for S/A No.
0107-38639-9 dated November 30, 1999. [Ibid. pp. 48-49; Exh. FF, FF-1]
She testified that on November 9, 1999, the amount of P189,700,000.00 was auto- transferred from S/A
No.0107-38639-9 to C/A No.0007-05558-7 as appearing in the Statement of Accounts for S/A No. 0107-
38639-9 and C/A No. 0007-05558-7. [Id.; Exh. FF-2; Exh. GG, GG-1] She also testified that Jaime Dichaves
drew a check against C/A No. 0007-05558-7 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 as evidenced by Far East
Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 3165579, a microfilm copy of which she identified. [Ibid. p. 52-53; Exh.
HH] She testified that at the dorsal portion of the microfilm copy of Check No. 3165579, there appears
an account number 160-625015 [Ibid. p. 56; Exh. HH-4] but she could not identify the bank that the
account belongs because the bank indorsement of the other bank was not clearly visible. She further
testified that both C/A No. 0007-05558-7 and S/A No. 0107-38639-9 were closed as of February 29, 2000
and March 31, 2000 respectively. [Ibid. p. 57; Exhs. II and JJ]
On cross-examination, De Leon testified that she had no hand in the preparation of the Statement of
Accounts marked as Exhs. FF, ZZ, II and JJ. [Ibid. p. 84]
The Court finds that International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5, 1999 was
deposited to Far East Bank and Trust Co. S/A No. 0107-38639-9 of Jaime Dichaves and auto-transferred
to C/A No.0007-05558-7 of Jaime Dichaves who drew from the latter account, Far East Bank and Trust
Co. Check No. 3165579 for P189,700,000.00.
Second: EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch to EPCIB Binondo Branch S/A 0160-62501-5 with the Account
Name Jose Velarde
The prosecution’s evidence on the deposit of Far East Bank Araneta Check No. 3165579 which was the
subject of an inter-bank deposit from EPCIB Greenhills Ortigas Branch to EPCIB Binondo Branch Account
No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde consisted in the testimony of Ms. Glyzelyn Bejec, the
Teller who processed the Deposit Receipt marked as Exhibit I5. She testified that as of November 8,
1999, she was assigned to the EPCI Bank Greenhills Ortigas Branch as Customer Service Assistant Teller
with Teller Identification No. 8. Her basis for indicating the number "0160-62501-5" in the Deposit
Receipt was the Account Information Slip which is filled in by the depositor or the representative of the
depositor. [TSN, May 6, 2002, pp. 46-47; 61]
After she was given the Account Information Slip together with the four checks, she first verified the
face of the check as to the date, the amount in words and figures, after which she stamped the non-
negotiable endorsement at the back of each check, and also, she wrote down the account number
indicated on the Account Information Slip given to her. She wrote down the account no. 0160-62501-5
at the dorsal portion of the check after which she deposited the checks to the Account No. indicated in
the Account Information Slip. [Ibid. p. 65; 68]
She explained that the deposit process involved first, encoding the account number given in the Account
Information Slip, after which she swiped each check on the check reader and encoded the amount on
each check and after that a deposit receipt was generated. After she had encoded the account number
and the amounts of the four (4) checks that she processed for deposit the account name that reflected
in the computer was "Jose Velarde." [Ibid. p. 69-70]
The checks that she processed for deposit were forwarded to their distributing for safekeeping and
microfilming the next day. When she was shown the certified copy of Far East Bank Check No.
3165579 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 from the Philippine Clearing House Corporation, she
testified that this was the same check she processed and she identified the dorsal portion where she
wrote Account No. 160-625-015 (sic). Her other means of identifying the check was her Teller ID no.8
which appears at the check (Exh U4-1) and she identified the account holder of the check as Jaime C.
Dichaves or Abe (sic) C. Dichaves and she attested that the check is payable to cash. She testified that
the Bank accepts checks even if not endorsed by the depositor she accepted the check even without
endorsement because it was given to her by the Branch Manger for deposit. [Ibid. p. 72-84]
On cross-examination she testified that she threw away the Account Information Slip because the
deposit receipt had been generated or the transaction has been validated in the deposit receipt. [Ibid, p.
89]
To corroborate the testimony of Ms. Bejec, the prosecution presented Ms. Teresa Barcelona, the Branch
Manager of the EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch during the period November, 1999. She identified inter-
bank deposit receipt dated 8 November 1999 which was previously marked as Exh. I5 issued by the
EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch for deposit to account number 0160-62501-5 with the account name
Jose Velarde. The transaction is an inter-bank deposit of four (4) checks to the account of Jose Velarde
maintained at the Binondo Branch. [TSN, May 15, 2002, p. 80] The total amount of the four (4) checks is
P263,292,303.65 of which one check is issued by Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch with
Check No. 3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00. [Ibid. p. 81; Exh. U4-1]
The person who transacted the inter-bank deposit with the EPCIB Greenhills Ortigas Branch was Ms.
Baby Ortaliza who transacted personally with the witness and it was Ms. Baby Ortaliza who received the
third copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [Ibid. p. 82] This transaction was processed by
Teller Glezelyn Bejec as her Teller ID appears in the deposit receipt. [Id.]
The Defense argued that Bejec stated that the checks were handed to her by the Branch Manager,
Teresa Barcelona and not by the person who made the deposit, and that the depositor did not appear
before her. Not one of the bank personnel or any other witness presented by the prosecution testified
that FPres. Estrada had any participation in the opening of Current Account No.000110-525495-4 (sic)
and Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde, nor its closing. Not one of the
prosecution witnesses testified as to the source of the funds deposited in the said accounts. Nor was
there any witness who could identify any of the persons who issued the checks deposited under the said
account and under what circumstances the same were issued. In short, there is no proof that FPres.
Estrada "willfully, unlawfully and criminally amassed, accumulated and acquired ill-gotten wealth in the
amount of P 3.2 Million (sic)." Neither is there proof that this money came from "commissions, gifts,
percentages, kickbacks or any form of pecuniary benefits given to him" as the source of said money have
not been identified or traced. There is no evidence to show that he had enriched himself at the expense
of the Filipino people. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 242-243]
At any rate, Defense argues that the documents submitted as exhibits by the prosecution only tend to
prove what checks were deposited to the said Account No.0160-62501-5 of Equitable PCI Bank in the
name of Jose Velarde. [Ibid. p. 242]
The Court finds that the Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch Check No. 3165579 amounting to
P189,700,000.00 drawn by Dichaves was deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 account of Jose
Velarde as part of the deposit to said account totaling P263,292,303.65 (Exh. I5; U4-1; 127-L).
The link between FPres. Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account
In discharging its burden of proof to establish that the Jose Velarde Account belong to FPres. Estrada,
the prosecution relied on the following:
1. The testimony of Clarissa Ocampo that she saw Fpres. Estrada signed "Jose Velarde" on the
Debit-Credit instruction for S/A 0160-62501-5 (Exh. E5);
2. The admission of FPres. Estrada [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23] that he signed "Jose Velarde" on Exh.
E5;
3. The many bank transactions of Baby Ortaliza involving the personal accounts of FPres. Estrada
and his family, the personal account of Loi Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account;
4. The use of the Jose Velarde Current Account for the purchase of the Boracay Mansion;
5. The funding that the Jose Velarde Account received from the Urban Bank Special Trust Account
of FPres. Estrada’s son, Jose Victor Ejercito; and
6. The customary signing of FPres. Estrada as "Jose."
The signatures of FPres. Estrada as "Jose Velarde" in the Investment Management Agreement (IMA),
Signature Cards, Investment Guidelines, Directional Letters, and Debit-Credit Authority for EPCIB
CA/SA 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde
Clarissa Ocampo testified that after explaining the documents being presented for his signature, she and
Atty. Curato saw FPres. Estrada signed as "Jose Velarde" on the three (3) copies of the Investment
Management Agreement (IMA) [Exh. W4 to Y4 ; TSN November 13, 2002, pp. 70 -73], two (2) signature
cards (Exh. Z4; A5) which he signed three (3) times [TSN, November 13, 2002, pp. 78-80], one (1) copy of
the Investment Guidelines (Exh. B5; Ibid. pp. 82-84), two (2) copies of the Directional Letters (Exh. C5 to
D5; Ibid. pp. 87-89), and one (1) copy of the Debit-Credit Authority (Exh. E5). [Ibid. pp. 92-93] Her
testimony regarding the Debit-Credit Authority in particular was as follows:
OMB. MARCELO
Q After these two exhibits marked as Exhibit C to the 5th power and D to the 5th power were signed
by the former President and handed by you to Atty. Curato what happened next?
A I was preparing to go and then I recalled that there was an envelope that was given to me by the
banking side which contained the funding medium and so I looked at it, I pulled out the document inside
the envelope, I read it and then I gave it to the President for signing.
Q After giving it to the President what happened next?
A Actually, I explained to him that the letter of instruction which is a debit/credit authority, I told him
that the banking side gave it to me which authorizes the bank to actually debit or draw 500 Million from
his account so I was pointing at the account number in the debit/credit authority so debit his account
draw 500 Million and credit the same amount to trust for funding of his loan to Wellex sir.
Q What was his reaction to your explanation?
A He was nodding his head sir.
Q After he nodded his head what happened?
A He signed the document and I saw him signed.
OMB. MARCELO
Q What was the signature affixed by the former President?
A He signed as Jose Velarde.
Q After the former President signed this document as Jose Velarde what happened, if any?
A I got the document and then I looked at it and I passed it on to Atty. Curato." [TSN, November 13,
2002, pp. 92-93]
On May 24, 2006, FPres. Estrada testified as follows:
Q Ms. Ocampo and Atty. Curato testified before this court that you signed as Jose Velarde in the
documents that you have just identified awhile ago and you signed as Jose Velarde, what can you say
as to that testimony?
A THAT IS TRUE. "PINIRMAHAN KO PO IYAN DAHIL PO SA PAKIUSAP NI MR. JAIME DE CHAVES (SIC)
NA OKAY NA RAW PO YONG INTERNAL ARRANGEMENT SA BANGKO AT PARA PALABASIN NA AKO
ANG MAY ARI NG JOSE VELARDE ACCOUNT PARA MASIGURO PO NA YONG KANILANG PINAUTANG,
IPAUUTANG SA WELLEX GROUP OF COMPANIES NI MR. WILLIAM GATCHALIAN AY SIGURADONG
BABAYARAN. AYAW PO NILA SANANG PAUTANGIN SI MR.GATCHALIAN BAKA HINDI DAW PO
MAKABAYAD SA TAKDANG PANAHON. [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23; Emphasis Supplied]
William Gatchalian is a big businessman. isang malaking negosyante at siya po ay may ari ng Wellex
group of companies at siya rin po ay isa sa tumulong sa aming partido noong nakaraang 1998
presidential election. [Ibid, p. 25]
Q Now, you were requested by Mr. Jaime de Chaves (sic) to make it appear that you own the Jose
Velarde account and that there was an internal arrangement between you and Mr. de Chaves (sic) I ask
you now Mr. President, when did you agree to such request and arrangement?
A Hindi lang po dahil doon sa internal arrangement. Hindi lang po dahil gusto kong tulungan si Mr.
William Gatchalian kundi higit po sa lahat ay nakita ko ang kapakanan noong mahigit na tatlong libong
(3000) empleyado na kung sakaling hindi mapapautang si Mr. William Gatchalian, maaring magsara ang
kanyang mga kumpanya at yong mga taong, mahigit tatlong libong (3,000) empleyado kasama na yong
kanilang mga pamilya ay mawawalan ng trabaho. AT INISIP KO RING NA WALA NAMING (SIC)
GOVERNMENT FUNDS NA INVOLVE KAYA HINDI NA PO AKO NAGDALAWANG ISIP NA PIRMAHAN KO."
[Ibid. p. 26-27; Emphasis Supplied]
In the Debit-Credit Authority signed by FPres. Estrada as Jose Velarde for EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5,
the following words expressly appear:
. . . my SA/CA No.0160-62501-5 maintained with your branch in the amount of P500,000,000.00 and
credit my Trust Account No. 101-78056-1 representing my initial contribution (Exh. E5-3). [Emphasis
Supplied]
Lucena "Baby" Ortaliza and the bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account
To establish the close relationship and trust of FPres. Estrada and his family on Lucena "Baby" Ortaliza,
the prosecution presented REMEDIOS AXALAN AGUILA, Personnel officer of the Office of the Vice-
President (OVP).
She testified that Ortaliza was appointed VP Staff Officer II from January 2, 1996 to June 30, 1998 by
FPres. Estrada. Being in the immediate staff of the Vice-President, she has the trust and confidence of
the Vice-President and she can report anywhere, anytime as may be directed by the Vice-President.
[TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 21-24]
Likewise, the Prosecution presented Linda P. Sison, Presidential Officer VI, Chief Personnel Data Bank,
Office of the President. She testified that Ortaliza was employed in the office of the President on July 1,
1998 and appointed Presidential Staff Officer VI by FPres. Estrada. She was assigned to the internal
house affairs office which normally attends to the needs of the President and members of the family.
She resigned effective September 30, 2000 as "Private Secretary VI" in a letter of resignation dated
October 4, 2000. [Ibid. pp. 47-48]
To establish that Baby Ortaliza transacted for the bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and his family the
Prosecution presented Salvador Serrano, Vice-President, Centralized Operations and Control Division of
Security Banking Corporation. He identified the Investment Savings Account Agreement of FPres.
Estrada [Exh. C14-C14-8] in the amount of P10,000,000.00 with Security Bank San Juan Branch where,
above the typewritten name "Joseph E. Estrada" under the word "Conforme" appears the signature of
Baby Ortaliza and he was told by the New Accounts Clerk of the San Juan Branch that Baby Ortaliza is
the representative of FPres. Estrada. [TSN, May 8, 2002, pp. 79-81; 87-90; 128-129]
The witness also identified the purchase of T-Bills by FPres. Estrada evidenced by Confirmation Sale No.
81046 (Exh. C14-9 to C14-16) value date April 10, 1997 where there appears the signature of Baby Ortaliza
above TS No. 96848. [TSN, May 8, 2002, p. 114]
The Prosecution also presented Ms. Pamela Moran who testified that Ms. Ortaliza was the only one
person transacting the accounts of FPres. Estrada when she was in charge of the New Accounts Section
of the Security Bank San Juan Branch. [TSN, May 15, 2002, p. 146; pp.149-152]
The Prosecution further presented Patrick Dee Cheng of Citibank who testified that in the Hold-All-Mail
Agreement signed by Ms. Luisa P. Ejercito, her designated representative was Ms. Lucena "Baby"
Ortaliza. [TSN, October 7, 2002; pp. 80-83; Exhs. B11; C11 and sub-markings]
The Prosecution presented Ms. Marie Rose Ancheta Claudio who was Branch Manager of Urban Bank
Greenhills Branch from 1998. [TSN, March 26, 2003, p. 92] She identified the Letter of Authority dated
November 23, 1999 addressed to Urban Bank Greenhills Branch (Exh. I19) for issuance of three (3)
Managers’ Checks in the amounts of P42,716,554.22, P10,875,749.43 and P 54,161,496.52, where the
words "Received By: Baby Ortaliza" appeared. As per the witness, however, it was not Baby Ortaliza who
received the check as she herself gave the Manager’s Checks directly to the client, Joseph Victor G.
Ejercito. [TSN, March 26, 2003, p. 168]
Having presented evidence that Baby Ortaliza transacted for FPres. Estrada and family with the Banks
where FPres. Estrada and Family had accounts, the prosecution then presented evidence of the
transactions by Ortaliza in relation to the Jose Velarde Account to establish that FPres. Estrada owns the
Jose Velarde accounts.
Thus, the prosecution presented Teresa A. Barcelona who testified that Baby Ortaliza transacted with
her personally for the deposit of P 143,000,000.00 (Exh. M5 and submarkings) into the Jose Velarde S/A
No. 0160- 62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy of the deposit receipt for the
account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 76-80]
Likewise, Baby Ortaliza transacted with her personally for the deposit of the amount of P263,292,303.65
[Exh. I5and submarkings] to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who
received the copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 80-82] Baby
Ortaliza also transacted with her for the deposit of the amount of P40,000,000.00 (Exh. N5 and
submarkings) to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the
copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 83-85] Baby Ortaliza
transacted with her for the deposit of P163,500,000.00 (Exh.Q5 and submarkings) to the Jose Velarde
S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy intended for the account
holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 89-92]
The prosecution further presented Melissa P. Pascual former bank Teller of EPCIB Virra Mall Branch who
testified that she personally processed various checks (Exhs. V15; W15; X15; Y15; A16, inclusive of
submarkings) deposited by Ms. Ortaliza to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5.
She was sure it was Baby Ortaliza who deposited these checks because their branch is so small that
everytime she comes to their branch, her voice is too loud so she would catch her attention. She would
see Ortaliza give the checks to her officer which the officer would give to her for validation, for
processing. [TSN, December 9, 2002, pp. 21-23; 35; 37-39]
The purchase of the "Boracay Mansion" for P142 Million from money which came from the EPCIB C/A-
0110- 25495-4 of Jose Velarde
The prosecution presented evidence to show that the purchase of the Boracay Mansion was initiated by
a check No. 0110-714951 dated October 5, 1999 issued by Jose Velarde from his EPCIB C/A No. 0110-
25495-4 in the amount of P 142,000,000.00 payable to Jose Luis J. Yulo (hereafter Yulo) (Exh. G16) who
deposited the same to his BPI C/A No. 0383-0748-27 which was a joint account with Ma. Carmen L. Yulo.
[TSN, December 9, 2002, p. 114-125; Exh. F16] Subsequently, on October 8, 1999, Yulo issued BPI Check
No. 0002129 (Exh. U16; T16) from his BPI Current Account which was deposited to the account of St. Peter
Holdings Corporation which, in turn, the latter used to buy three Managers’ Checks, one for
P86,766,960.00 payable to Vicente AS Madrigal and/or Gerardo Madrigal as sellers of the Boracay
Property (Exh. V16; W16); another for P53,931,535.60 payable to Mercedes A. Reyes (broker) (Exh. X16)
and the third for P1,301,504.40 payable to Vicente AS Madrigal and/or Gerardo AS Madrigal for
payment of documentary stamps (Exh. Y16). [TSN December 16, 2002, pp. 29-51] To establish that the
Boracay Property was, in reality, owned by FPres. Estrada, Prosecution presented a tag in the carpet
indicating the name: "Pres. J. Estrada" (Exh. H19-H-2) [TSN, March 19, 2003]; a "Locator Slip" which bears
the words "Approved By; MS.LAARNI N. ENRIQUEZ," (Exh. H19) a school correspondence for FPres.
Estrada’s child with Laarni Enriquez, namely: Ejercito, Ma. Jerika Larize (Exh. H19-a), and portion of the
testimony of Chavit Singson where he mentioned that FPres. Estrada’s new house in New Manila was
called Boracay. [TSN, July 24, 2002, pp. 129-134] However, Jose Luis Yulo, whom the prosecution
portrayed as the dummy of FPres. Estrada in the purchase of the Boracay Mansion was not charged as
an accused in this case which presented a legal issue as to the propriety of attachment covering the said
property during the pendency of this criminal case.
The funding of the Jose Velarde Account from the Urban Bank Account of Jose Victor Ejercito
The prosecution presented Marie Rose Ancheta Claudio who testified that JV Ejercito was the owner of
Special Account No. (SPAN) 858 with Urban Bank pursuant to a Trust Agreement executed between JV
Ejercito and Urban Bank Trust Dept. [TSN, March 26, 2003, pp. 98-99] Ma. Aileen C. Tiongson testified
that Urban Bank Manager’s Check No. 43222 (Exh. W19) for P75, 000,000.00 came from a pre-terminated
placement of SPAN 858. [TSN, April 2, 2003, pp. 20-21] This Urban Bank Manager’s Check No. 43222 was
subsequently replaced by four (4) Manager’s Checks Nos. 39975, 39976, 39977 and 39978 (Exhs. B 15-2,
B15-4, B15-6 and B15-8) in the respective amounts of P70,000,000, P2,000,000.00, P2,000,000.00 and
P1,000,000.00 (Exhs. B15-2-9).
Subsequently, on January 24, 2000, these four (4) checks were deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5
of Jose Velarde (Exh. B 15; Exh. 127-N).
Likewise, as mentioned earlier, three (3) Urban Bank Manager’s Checks for the amounts of
P10,875,749.43, P42,716,554.22 and P54,161,496.52 (Exh. I5-17, I5-18 and O5-2), received by JV Ejercito
were deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde (Exh. I5).
Prosecution’s Evidence to show that it was customary for FPres. Estrada to sign as "Jose"
Prosecution presented Marianito M. Dimaandal who identified various official documents which showed
the signature of FPres. Estrada as reading "Jose" instead of "Joseph" (Exhs. X19 to R20 ). [TSN March 31,
2003, pp.40-47]
Based on the forgoing testimonial and documentary evidence, it is the contention of the Prosecution
that it has established that FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner of EPCIB Savings Account No.
0160-62501-5 and Current Account No. 0110-25495-4 in the name of Jose Velarde.
The theory of the defense on the Jose Velarde Account

In attempting to prove that the Jose Velarde account was owned by Jaime Dichaves and not by FPres.
Estrada, the defense presented Romuald Dy Tang and Beatriz Bagsit as their witnesses in addition to
FPres. Estrada.
Romuald Dy Tang testified that in 1999, he was connected with EPCI Bank as its SVP and Treasurer. The
Chairman, Mr. George L. Go referred Mr. Dichaves to him because Go told him that Dichaves wanted to
open a current account under an alias instead of his name. Mr. Dichaves also called him up and told him
the same. He knows Mr. Dichaves because the wife of Jaime Dichaves is the sister of his sister-in-law. In
effect, the wife of his brother and Jaime’s wife are sisters. What he knows is Dichaves has a lot of
business, substantial business and one of his major businesses is plaster glass. [TSN, May 4, 2005,
pp.11,15, 17, 18]
When he was called by Dichaves over the phone, the latter told him that Mr. Go referred him to Dy Tang
to open an alias account for him. Based on that, Dy Tang told Dichaves to prepare a letter for records
indicating his intention and Dichaves sent him a letter saying that he is opening an account under the
name Jose Velarde and everything should be so…for safekeeping. [Ibid. p. 20] Dy Tang identified the
letter dated August 25, 1999(Exh. 127 to 127 B-1). [Ibid. pp. 20-21] The letter was given to him on the
day Dichaves went to his office to get the signature cards. [Id.] He gave the signature card personally to
Dichaves and he did not see Dichaves sign the signature card because he was late for an appointment
and both of them had prepared for such appointment and so Dy Tang gave the signature card to
Dichaves and told him to return the same. [Ibid, p.22] He opened two accounts one savings and one
current. It was a combo account. The signature card was returned after about a month or so, after a
follow up with him and after he followed several procedures. [Id.] Both he and Betty Bagsit were jointly
assisting Mr. Dichaves. Ms. Bagsit had to assist because if he will be the only one and he travels quite
often, Mr. Dichaves will not have anybody to attend to his account. At that time Betty Bagsit was based
in the Pacific Star branch in Makati and the Jose Velarde Account was a Binondo Account where the
ledgers of the Velarde Account were kept. [Ibid., pp. 26-28] He testified that all the fixed (time) deposits
of Dichaves were moved in the branch of Bagsit in Pacific Star. [Id.]
In his sworn statement with the Ombudsman on March 23, 2001 (Exh. 327-327-C), Dy Tang stated that
he received a letter from Dichaves advising them that all transaction for the Jose Velarde account should
be coursed through him. He instructed Mr. Ceferino Ang, Vice President and Manager of Binondo
Branch to cause the opening of the account. He knows Mr. Dichaves personally because he was referred
by Mr. George Go to him and because he is the brother-in-law of Dy Tang’s brother. He went to the
office to pick up the forms for the opening of the account sometime in late August 1999. Mr. Jaime
Dichaves opened the account but Dy Tang does not know if he opened it for himself or another
person. He gave the signature cards for Dichaves to fill up. The accomplished signature cards were
given to him by Mr. Go. He was not present when the depositor affixed his specimen signature in the
said signature card as it was given to him accomplished by Mr. Go.
Beatriz L. Bagsit came into Equitable Bank as head of Pacific Star branch with rank of AVP and when they
acquired PCI Bank in 1999, she was promoted to 1st VP and the division head who handled the Makati
area. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 63]
She retired from the bank because of politics in the bank and the Jose Velarde case was coming up. She
was the one handling the Jose Velarde account which was being handled also by Mr. Jaime Dichaves.
[Ibid. p. 65] The Jose Velarde account started at Binondo Branch. It was opened there and when her
superiors transferred to Makati, they called her to handle the account of Jose Velarde and she was
introduced to Mr. Dichaves by their Executive Vice-President, Romy Dy Tang for her to handle the
account personally. [Ibid. p. 66]
There is no Jose Velarde who owns an account with their bank. Her basis for saying that Jose Velarde
account belongs to Mr. Jaime Dichaves is that there was a letter that was given to her that came from
Mr. Dichaves when the account was opened in Binondo. When the account was opened in Binondo, she
was not handling the management of the same. The Jose Velarde account was never transferred to
Makati. It was just the handling that was transferred sometime in November, 1999. [Ibid, pp. 68-70]
Based on the letter (Exh. 127) it would appear that the Jose Velarde account belonged to Jaime Dichaves
because it was Mr. Jaime Dichaves who issued the letter stating that all banking transaction of Jose
Velarde should be coursed to him. The letter was shown to her by Mr. Dy Tang in November, 1999. She
does not remember the exact date when she was told by Dy Tang to handle the account of Mr. Dichaves
in the name Jose Velarde. She was first informed about it in Dy Tang’s office and after that there was a
time when Dichaves went to Dy Tang’s office and that was the time she was introduced to Dichaves. She
first met Mr. Dichaves in January, 2000. After she was introduced to Dichaves, there were times when
he would call her for a transaction and there were times he went to her office. Sometimes Dichaves will
tell her that he will be sending somebody to get the MC which he wants her to prepare and sometimes
he would ask for the balance. [Ibid, pp. 72-96] Mr. Dichaves came to her office twice or thrice only. One
is when he visited Mr. Dy Tang, the other one is when he just passed by, just to check the account of
Jose Velarde and he gave her instruction that he will be sending representative to prepare an MC for
him that was after the February 4, 2000 transaction. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 59]
She does not know if Dichaves has an account in her area, she thinks there is none but she does not
know with other branches. The records she had access to regarding the Jose Velarde Account were the
signature card and the copy of the letter. The name "Dichaves" does not appear in the signature card.
[TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 76-84]
She saw the debit-credit authorization on her table and she kept it and did not give it to anybody. [Ibid.
p. 116] After Clarissa Ocampo was presented at the impeachment proceedings, Clarissa called her and
she told Clarissa "Kissa, hindi sa akin galing yong debit/credit" because Clarissa was asking her if she was
at the bank working and she told Clarissa that the bank was really bleeding and she took the opportunity
to tell her "Kissa, hindi sa akin galing yon. Saan ba galing yon?". [Ibid. p. 118] She testified that Clarissa
was just surprised and asked her "saan ba galing yon?". Where did it come from? She answered she
didn’t know but it didn’t come from her. That’s all she told Clarissa. After that there was a follow-up
from Atty. Curato asking her if she did not really issue the authorization and she told him "No talaga eh.
Sabi ko, hanapin natin kung saan talaga galing." She testified that later on, it was confirmed that it came
from the Trust Department. [Ibid. p. 118-119] She testified that the Prefix Number for a Binondo
Account was 0110 but she could not remember the Prefix Number for the Pacific Star Branch. [Ibid. p.
93] In her computation, the credits to the EPCIB Jose Velarde S/A No.0160-62501-5 totaled
P2,168,523,085.00 excluding centavos and credit memos. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 98]
The Court finds that the FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner of EPCIB combo account C/A No.
0110-25495-4 and S/A No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde.
The eyewitness account of Prosecution witness Clarissa Ocampo that she saw FPres. Estrada signed the
name Jose Velarde in the various documents presented to him and explained to him was undisputed by
FPres. Estrada and constitutes direct evidence that FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde.
Another direct evidence that FPres. Estrada is Jose Velarde is the admission of FPres. Estrada that he
signed as Jose Velarde in the documents presented to him by Clarissa Ocampo. One of such documents
was the Debit-Credit Authority (Exh. E5) which read: "...my SA/CA No.0160-62501-5 maintained with
your branch in the amount of P500,000,000.00 and credit my Trust Account No. 101-78056-1
representing my initial contribution." Such admission constitutes an admission that he and Jose Velarde
are one and the same person. Being a judicial admission, no proof is required and may be given in
evidence against him (Rule 129, SEC.4; Rule 130, SEC. 26).Being an admission against interest, it is the
best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is
based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration
was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it
does not. [Rufina Patis Factory vs Alusitain, 434 SCRA 429]
The evidence of the Prosecution which showed that Baby Ortaliza - a trusted person of FPres. Estrada
and who enjoyed the confidence of FPres. Estrada and Loi Ejercito - transacted the various personal
bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and Loi Ejercito as well as the Jose Velarde accounts, also constitutes
corroborative evidence that the Jose Velarde Accounts are owned by FPres. Estrada and not by
Dichaves, since Baby Ortaliza has been entrusted by FPres. Estrada to handle his own personal bank
accounts and there is no evidence that Dichaves and Baby Ortaliza are related in any way to each other.
The evidence of the Prosecution that the Boracay Mansion was purchased from funds coming from the
Jose Velarde accounts is yet another corroborative evidence that proved that the Jose Velarde accounts
are owned by FPres. Estrada. The documents found in the Boracay Mansion show that the beneficial
owner of the Boracay Mansion is FPres. Estrada and is used by Laarni Enriquez whose relation to FPres.
Estrada was never denied.
Likewise, the evidence of the Prosecution which showed that three (3) Urban Bank Manager’s Checks for
the amounts of P10,875,749.43, P42,716,554.22 and P54,161,496.52 (Exh. I5-17, I5-18 and O5-2),
received by JV Ejercito as well as the four (4) Urban Bank Manager’s Checks totaling P75,000,000.00
(Exhs. B 15-2, B15-4, B15-6 and B-15-8) were deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde
constitutes corroborative evidence that, as between FPres. Estrada and Dichaves, it can be inferred that
JV Ejercito, being the son of FPres. Estrada, would contribute to the account of his father but not if the
account were owned by Dichaves in the absence of proof that JV Ejercito was under obligation to
deposit to the said account if the same was owned by Dichaves.
The evidence of the Prosecution that it was customary for FPres. Estrada to sign as "Jose" shows that
FPres. Estrada would sign as "Jose" and further shows that, to the naked eye, the signature of FPres.
Estrada as "Jose" appearing in the various official documents signed by FPres. Estrada is similar to the
signature of "Jose" appearing in "Jose Velarde."
As to the reliance of the Defense on the testimonies of Dy Tang and Bagsit to prove that the Jose
Velarde accounts belong to Jaime Dichaves, We find that such reliance is misplaced.
Dy Tang testified that after Mr. George Go referred Dichaves to him, he told Dichaves to prepare a letter
for records indicating his intention and Dichaves sent him a letter saying that he is opening an account
under the name Jose Velarde and everything should be so…for safekeeping. [TSN, May 4, 2005, p. 20] Dy
Tang identified the letter dated August 25, 1999. [Ibid. pp. 20-21; Exh. 127 to 127 B-1]
The Letter of Dichaves dated August 25, 1999 reads as follows:
Dear Romy,
May I request that a savings account and a current account be opened with your Juan Luna branch for
Jose Velarde c/o the undersigned.
All other banking transactions of Jose Velarde shall be coursed through the undersigned.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
Jaime Dichaves
The Letter of Dichaves does not prove that he is the owner of the Jose Velarde Account. Assuming ex
gratia argumenti that the Jose Velarde Account is owned by Dichaves, why did he not deposit the
International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5, 1999, payable to cash in the
amount of P189,700,000.00 drawn by Eastern Securities Corporation directly to the Jose Velarde
Account? If Dichaves owned the Jose Velarde Account, why did he take the circuitous route of
depositing the International Exchange Bank into his Far East Bank Savings Account, then auto transfer
the amount to his Current Account, then issue his personal check payable to cash for P189,700,000.00
which was ultimately deposited to the Jose Velarde Account?
It could not be because he did not want evidence to prove that the International Exchange Bank check
was deposited to his account because he, in fact, deposited that check to his personal account.
The only logical conclusion is that Dichaves did not want evidence to show that the International
Exchange Bank check of Eastern Securities Corporation was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account
because such deposit would confirm that FPres. Estrada, once proven to own the Jose Velarde Account,
received the P189,700,000.00 commission arising from the purchase by SSS and GSIS of Belle Shares.
Dichaves’ act of covering the paper trail of the International Exchange Bank check of Eastern Securities
Corporation, albeit unsuccessfully, militates against the claim of the Defense that Dichaves owns the
Jose Velarde Account.
In his Sworn Statement dated March 23, 2001 (Exh. 327), Dy Tang stated that Jaime Dichaves opened
the account but Dy Tang does not know if he opened it for himself or another person. He gave the
signature card for Dichaves to fill up. The signature card was returned after about a month or so, after a
follow up with him and after he followed several procedures. [TSN dated May 4, 2005, p. 22] The
signature card was given to him by George L. Go already accomplished. He was not present when the
depositor affixed his specimen signature in the said signature card as it was given to him accomplished
by George L. Go.
In the signature card, it appears that it was opened on August 26, 1999 but it was received only on
October 7, 1999. Likewise, the signature card bore the signature "Jose Velarde" three times (Exh. G19,
G19-6).
In his testimony, Dy Tang testified that he doesn’t think that it would be Dichaves signing as Jose Velarde
because when Mr. Dichaves called him about his discussion with Mr. Go to open an account, Dichaves
told him that he was going to open an account under an alias account. [TSN, May 4, 2005, p. 44]
Nowhere did Dy Tang testify that Dichaves is the owner of the Jose Velarde account.
As appears in the signature card, the signature of Jose Velarde is almost identical to the signature of Jose
Velarde appearing on the three (3) copies of the Investment Management Agreement [Exh. W4 to Y4;
TSN November 13, 2002, pp. 70-73], two (2) signature cards (Exh. Z4 to A5) which he signed three (3)
times [TSN, November 13, 2002, pp. 78-80] one (1) copy of the Investment Guidelines [Exh. B5; Ibid. pp.
82-84]; two (2) copies of the Directional Letters [Exh. C5 to D5; Ibid. pp. 87-89], and one (1) copy of the
debit-credit authority [Exh. E5; Ibid. pp. 92-93], which FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde as testified
by Clarissa Ocampo and as admitted by him. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court
is authorized, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. [Cogtong vs. Kyoritsu International Et. Al., GR No. 160729, July 27, 2007]
As regards the testimony of Beatriz Bagsit, her basis for saying that Jose Velarde accounts belongs to Mr.
Jaime Dichaves is that there was a letter that was given to her that came from Mr. Dichaves when the
accounts were opened in Binondo. When the accounts were opened in Binondo, she was not handling
the management of the same. Based on the letter, she testified that it would appear that the Jose
Velarde accounts belonged to Jaime Dichaves because it was Mr. Jaime Dichaves who issued the letter
stating that all banking transaction of Jose Velarde should be coursed to him. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 68-
72]
The testimony of Bagsit does not establish that it is Dichaves who owns the Jose Velarde accounts as her
opinion was based simply on the letter issued by Dichaves. As against the inference that Dichaves
owned the Jose Velarde accounts based on the letter of Dichaves, the Prosecution’s evidence showing
that FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde in the various documents given to him for signature must be
given more weight to establish the fact that the Jose Velarde accounts belong to FPres. Estrada.
Moreover, there was a glaring inconsistency in the testimonies of Defense witness Dy Tang and Bagsit
when Dy Tang testified that all the fixed (time) deposits of Dichaves were moved in the branch of Bagsit
in Pacific Star, while Bagsit testified that she does not know if Dichaves has an account in her area, she
thinks there is none but she does not know with other branches. [TSN, May 4, 2005. pp. 26-28; TSN,
April 13, 2005, p. 76]
As regards the statement of Bagsit that the Debit-Credit authority did not come form her and that later,
it was found to have come from the Trust Department, We find the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo that
the Debit-Credit Authority came from Bagsit as being more credible. First, because the debit-credit
authority deals with S/A 0160-62501-5 which is under the Banking Department and not the Trust
Department; and Second, because as testified by Bagsit, she found the Debit- Credit Authority on her
table after it was signed but she kept it and did not give it to anybody. The Court likewise notes that
Bagsit was not involved with the EPCIB Binondo Branch but she remembers the prefix for Binondo
accounts as No. 0110, yet, she could not remember the prefix for accounts with the Pacific Star Branch
of EPCIB which she headed since 1999.
In the attempt to downplay the effect of FPres. Estrada signing as Jose Velarde in the Debit-Credit
Authority, the defense argued that the said debit-credit authority was not implemented "precisely
because the signature of accused Estrada did not match with that of the real Jose Velarde (who turned
out to be Jaime Dichaves) [Defense Memorandum, p. 251] and "probably because the bank officers got
to realize that accused President Estrada was not really the owner of the account." [Ibid., p. 263]
Besides being speculative, the arguments of the Defense are mere allegations which are not supported
by its own evidence.
The evidence of the Defense shows that prior to February 4, 2000, the account balance of S/A 0160-
62501-5 of Jose Velarde was P142,763,773.67. (Exh. 127-O) There was therefore not enough funds in
the account to transfer to the Trust Account. Thus, the Debit-Credit Authority could not be
implemented.
Subsequently, a credit memo for P506,416,666.66 was issued in favor of the said Jose Velarde S/A 0160-
62501-5 account. As per the testimony of defense witness, Beatriz Bagsit, the amount of P
506,416,666.66 represented the principal and interest of a preterminated placement of S/A 0160-
62501-5. The placement was not in the name of Dichaves but in the name of an account number, i.e.
Account No. 0160-62501-5 and behind that account is Jose Velarde. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 37]
Eventually the P500,000,000.00 was withdrawn from the savings account in exchange for an MC payable
to trust. [Ibid. pp. 30, 31]
Consequently, while the funding for the P500,000,000.00 did not come via the debit-credit authority,
nonetheless, the funding of the P500,000,000.00 came from S/A 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde.
Moreover, the debit-credit authority was not implemented because Bagsit kept the debit-credit
authority and did not give it to anybody. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 116]
Neither does the non-implementation of the Debit-Credit Authority which FPres. Estrada signed as Jose
Velarde disprove the fact that FPres. Estrada admitted that S/A 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose
Velarde is his account when he admitted affixing his signature on the Debit-Credit Authority as Jose
Velarde.
The so-called "internal arrangements" with the bank, involved the use of S/A 0160-62501-5 which had
been in existence since August 26, 1999 as the funding source of the P500,000,000.00 to be placed in
the Trust account for lending to Gatchalian. The fact that the P500,000,000.00 funding was not effected
by a debit-credit transaction but by a withdrawal of P500,000,000.00 from the said S/A 0160-62501-5
proves that the money lent to Gatchalian was the personal money of FPres. Estrada through the Jose
Velarde account of which he is the owner. As explained by FPres. Estrada, "William Gatchalian is a big
businessman. Isang malaking negosyante at siya po ay may ari ng Wellex group of companies at siya rin
po ay isa sa tumulong sa aming partido noong nakaraang 1998 presidential election." [TSN, May 24,
2006, p. 23]
FPres. Estrada further testified: "Hindi lang po dahil doon sa internal arrangement. Hindi lang po dahil
gusto kong tulungan si Mr. William Gatchalian kundi higit po sa lahat ay nakita ko ang kapakanan noong
mahigit na tatlong libong (3000) empleyado na kung sakaling hindi mapapautang si Mr. William
Gatchalian, maaring magsara ang kanyang mga kumpanya at yong mga taong, mahigit tatlong libong
(3,000) empleyado kasama na yong kanilang mga pamilya ay mawawalan ng trabaho. AT INISIP KO RING
NA WALA NAMING (SIC) GOVERNMENT FUNDS NA INVOLVE KAYA HINDI NA PO AKO NAGDALAWANG
ISIP NA PIRMAHAN KO." [Ibid. p. 26-27; Emphasis Supplied]
Moreover, as pointed out by the Prosecution, there was no need for the internal arrangement since the
loan to Gatchalian could have been extended by EPCIB directly considering that Gatchalian had put up
sufficient collateral for the loan.
From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion is that the so-called internal arrangement which allegedly
prompted FPres. Estrada to sign the various documents presented to him by Clarissa Ocampo is a futile
attempt to escape the consequence of his admission that he signed as Jose Velarde which leads to the
legal and indisputable conclusion that FPres. Estrada is the owner of the Jose Velarde Accounts.
THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
As stated earlier, SSS and GSIS used the funds belonging to its millions of members to buy Belle Shares
upon instruction of FPres. Estrada who benefited for his personal gain from the P189,700,000.00
commission paid in consideration of the purchase of the Belle shares by SSS and GSIS . The money paid
by GSIS and SSS for the Belle Shares are public funds which belong to the millions of GSIS and SSS
members. The amount of P189,700,000.00 deposited to the Jose Velarde account of FPres. Estrada are
public funds which came from the proceeds of the sale received by SSI Management through Eastern
Securities from GSIS and SSS. The Billions of Pesos that could have otherwise been used to pay benefits
to SSS and GSIS members were diverted to buying Belle Shares to comply with FPres. Estrada’s
instructions in order that FPres. Estrada could receive his P187,900,000.00 commission to the damage
and prejudice of the millions of GSIS and SSS members who were deprived of the use of such funds and
worse, who now stand to suffer the loss amounting to millions of pesos since the Belle shares are
presently priced less than their acquisition cost. [From an average price of P3.14 per share to P0.69 per
share as of December 29, 2000 (Exh. 250-J-2) and between P0.40 to P 0.50 per share as of February 11,
2002]
The Court finds that FPres. Estrada took advantage of his official position, authority, relationship,
connection and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines: a) by instructing, directing and ordering, for his
personal gain and benefit, by way of receiving commission, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) through its President Mr. Federico Pascual and the Social Security System (SSS) through its
President, Mr. Carlos Arellano, to purchase shares of stock Belle Corporation, as a consequence of
which, during the period October 13 to 21, 1999 GSIS bought 351,878,000 shares of Belle Corporation
and paid One Billion One Hundred Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Six Hundred Seven
Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,102,965,607.50) while SSS, on October 21, 1999, bought 249,679,000
shares at the value of P784,551,150.00 at an average price of P3.14/share [TSN, February 14, 2005, p.78]
or a combined total of at least One Billion Eight Hundred Eight Seven Million Five Hundred Sixteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,887,516,757.50); b) by accepting and
receiving, a commission in the amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand
Pesos [P189,700,000.00] as consideration for the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the shares of stock of
Belle Corporation pursuant to his instructions which amount was deposited in the Equitable-PCI Bank
S/A 0160-62501-5 under the account name "Jose Velarde" of which FPres. Estrada is the real and
beneficial owner; c) by depriving the millions of members of GSIS and SSS of the use of public funds in
the amount of at least One Billion Eight Hundred Eight Seven Million Five Hundred Sixteen Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,887,516,757.50) for payment of their benefits
in order that he can receive his commission of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P189,700,000.00) which likewise constitute public funds for his personal benefit and
enrichment thus causing damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Government.
RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH D OF THE

AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount
of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses to prove the enormous amounts of deposits to the
Jose Velarde Account and the person who transacted with the bank in relation thereto.
TERESA ARRASTIA BARCELONA was the Manager of Equitable PCI Bank in Greenhills-Ortigas Branch
specifically located at the Ground Floor of the Equitable Building along Ortigas Avenue corner Roosevelt,
San Juan, Metro Manila, which was within the vicinity of the business and commercial areas of
Greenhills.
Witness Barcelona then related and identified twelve (12) Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipts (Exhs.
I5 and M5 to W5) dated as follows:
1. October 20, 1999;
2. November 8, 1999;
3. November 22, 1999;
4. November 24, 1999;
5. November 25, 1999;
6. December 20, 1999;
7. December 21, 1999;
8. December 29, 1999;
9. January 4, 2000;
10. May 10, 2000;
11. June 6, 2000; and

12. July 25, 2000.
These deposit receipts allegedly show various deposits made to Account No. 0160-62501-5 under the
Account Name Jose Velarde maintained at the Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch. The transactions to
the said account were allegedly inter-branch deposits or deposits made from one branch of Equitable
PCI Bank for an account maintained at another branch of the said bank. The aforementioned deposit
receipts show that the deposits to the adverted account were transacted at the Equitable PCI Bank
Greenhills-Ortigas Branch.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated October 20, 1999, there were allegedly nine (9) checks
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The total amount of the checks deposited was P143,000,000.00.
The teller who processed the checks was Glyzelyn Bejec.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 8, 1999, four (4) checks were deposited to
the Jose Velarde Account in the total amount of P263,292,303.65. The checks deposited were as follows:
a Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch Check with Check No. 3165579 amounting to
P189,700,000.00; an HSBC Head Office Check with Check No. 0022012 amounting to P20,000,000.00; a
Union Bank Head Office Check with Check No. 034181 amounting to P10,875,749.43; and another Union
Bank Head Office Check with Check No. 034182 amounting to P42,716,554.22. These checks were
likewise processed by Glyzelyn Bejec on November 8, 1999 at 4:01 p.m.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999, three (3) checks for the total
amount of P40 Million were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the
bank’s teller Joan Mok.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 24, 1999, a check of P54,161,496.52 was
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The check was processed by the bank’s teller Leonora Royo on
November 24, 1999 at 9:26 a.m.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 25, 1999, three (3) checks for the total
amount of P20,000,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed
by the bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 20, 1999, three (3) checks for the total
amount of P163,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed
by the bank’s teller Lagrimas Claveria on December 20, 1999 at 4:12 p.m.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 21, 1999, a check of P5,000,000.00 was
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The check was processed by the bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 29, 1999, two (2) checks for the total amount
of P2,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the
bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000, seven (7) checks for the total amount
of P70,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the
bank’s teller Joan Mok on January 4, 2000 at 2:31 p.m.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated May 10, 2000, four (4) checks for the total amount of
P23,000,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the
bank’s teller Joan Mok on May 10, 2000 at 4:30 p.m.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated June 6, 2000, two (2) checks for the total amount of
P42,945,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the
bank’s teller Joan Mok on June 6, 2000 at 3:39 p.m.
Lastly, in the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated July 25, 2000, a check of P40,000,000.00 was
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. This check was processed by the bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec on
July 25, 2000 at 11:43 a.m.
It was Baby Ortaliza who personally transacted the above-mentioned checks with Barcelona whom she
identified in a photograph (Exh. X5). Barcelona related that Baby Ortaliza would hand over the checks to
be deposited together with the account information slip or passbook of Jose Velarde to her and that,
after the validation, Barcelona would hand over a copy of the deposit receipt to Baby Ortaliza. [TSN
dated May 13, 2002 and TSN dated May 15, 2002]
JOANNE GENEVIE RANIAGA MOK was a Customer Service Assistant Teller of Equitable PCI Bank
Greenhills-Ortigas Branch since July 1997. She received deposits and processed withdrawals made with
the bank.
Mok related and identified four (4) Equitable PCI Bank deposit receipts which pertained to various
checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5: Deposit Receipt dated
November 22, 1999 (Exh. N5); Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000 (Exh. T5); Deposit Receipt (Exhibit
U5) dated May 10, 2000; and Deposit Receipt (Exhibit V5) dated June 6, 2000. Mok testified that she
personally processed the checks deposited to the said account.
In the Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999, there were three (3) checks deposited with the total
amount of P40 Million. In the Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000, there were seven (7) checks
deposited with the total amount of P70,500,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated May 10, 2000, there
were four (4) checks deposited with the total amount of P23,000,000.00. Lastly, in the Deposit Receipt
dated June 6, 2000, there were two (2) checks deposited with the total amount of P44,945,000.00
Mok further related that she prepared 3 copies of the deposit receipts and that after processing the
deposit receipts she threw away the Account Information slip. [TSN dated May 20, 2002 and TSN dated
October 28, 2002]
GLYZELYN HERMOZURA BEJEC was a Customer Service Assistant Teller of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-
Ortigas Branch. She processed deposit and withdrawal transactions of the bank.
Bejec related and identified the deposit receipts of Equitable PCI Bank (Exhs. I5, M5, P5, R5, S5 and W5)
which pertained to various checks she personally processed and credited to the Jose Velarde Account
with Account No. 0160-62501-5. In the Deposit Receipt dated November 8, 1999, the total amount of
deposit was P263,292,303.65. In the Deposit Receipt dated October 20, 1999, there were nine (9) checks
deposited in the total amount of P163,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated November 25, 1999,
there were three (3) checks deposited in the total amount of P20,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt
dated December 21, 1999, the total amount of deposit was P5,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated
December 29, 1999, there were two (2) checks deposited in the total amount of P2,500,000.00. Lastly, in
the Deposit Receipt dated July 25, 2000, a check was deposited in the amount of P40,000,000.00.
On cross examination, Bejec testified that there were Account Information Slips when the checks were
presented but she already threw away the said slips. It was the policy of the bank to throw away the
Account Information Slips when the deposit receipt had been generated. [TSN dated May 6, 13, and 20,
2002]
LEONORA BACSAFRA ROYO was the Customer Service Assistant for new accounts of Equitable PCI Bank
Greenhills-Ortigas Branch since March of 1993. She testified that she was the teller who processed the
Deposit Receipt (Exh. O5) dated November 24, 1999 and that she prepared three (3) copies of the same
since it was an inter-branch check deposit transaction. The deposit receipt shows that an Urban Bank
Head Office Branch Manager’s Check No. 0000037661 dated November 23, 1999 amounting to
P54,161,496.52 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account No. 0160-62501-5 maintained at the
Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch. Teresa Barcelona, the branch manager, handed to Royo for
processing the Urban Bank Manager’s Check as well as the accomplished account information slip. [TSN
dated October 30, 2002]
ANTONIO MARTIN SAGRITALO FORTUNO was the Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI Bank, Pacific
Star Branch since January 28, 2002. The witness averred that he handled the opening of accounts;
supervised the investment section; the foreign telegraphic transfer as well as the domestic telegraphic
transfer and the safekeeping of the records of deposits; and the transactions which transpired in their
branch. Witness Fortuno brought with him to Court the documents contained in the subpoena which he
requested from the PCHC. These documents were the seventeen (17) microfilm copies of the checks
that were deposited to the Jose Velarde account from the PCHC; the nine (9) deposit slips or deposit
receipts that were deposited to the account of Jose Velarde together with the five (5) cash deposits; and
the detailed report of transfers and debit, credit memos or the DRTM from October 19, 1999 to January
24, 2000.
Fortuno related and identified the seventeen (17) microfilm copies of checks that were deposited to the
Jose Velarde account from various banks as well as the deposit receipts and the DRTMs.
The original of the checks were allegedly returned to the issuing bank after having been negotiated. The
first check deposited to the Jose Velarde account was a cashier’s check from PS Bank Head Office with
Check No. 000031436 amounting to P20,000,000.00 and dated October 18, 1999 (Exhs. R14; R14-1; and
R14-2). Fortuno narrated that this check was presented to the teller of the bank and then the teller
validated the deposit slip which was attached to the check. The amount of the check was consequently
credited to the Jose Velarde account with an Account No. 0160-62501-5. The witness, however, cannot
tell who purchased this cashier’s check. The second check deposited to the Jose Velarde account was
also a cashier’s check from PS Bank Head Office with Check No. 000031437 amounting to P20 Million
and dated October 18, 1999 (Exhs. S14; S14-1; S14-2; S14-3; and S14-4). This check allegedly passed the
same procedure as the first check before the amount of the check was credited to the Jose Velarde
account. The witness further related that the Jose Velarde account was maintained at the Binondo Juan
Luna branch and that the deposits were made in the Pacific Star.
The first deposit receipt (Exhs. T14; T14-1; T14-2; T14-3; and T14-4) was dated October 19, 1999. This deposit
receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the
total amount of P30,000,000.00, one for P20 Million and the other for P10 Million. The witness specified
that this deposit receipt indicated the account name Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star
branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on October 19,
1999 at 12:55 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited which were from the Security Bank
Corporation Main Office with Check No. 000363859 for P20,000,000.00 and Check No. 000363858 for
P10,000,000.00. He added that the checks were dated October 18, 1999.
The second deposit receipt (Exhs. U14; U14-1; U14-2; U14-3; and U14-4) was also dated October 19, 1999.
This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde
Account for the total amount of P30,000,000.00, one for P20,000,000.00 and the other for
P10,000,000.00. The witness specified that this deposit receipt contained the account name Jose
Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time
of deposit which was on October 19, 1999 at 12:53 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first
check was from the Security Bank Corporation Main Office with Check No. 000363857 for
P20,000,000.00, and the other check was from PSB Head Office with Check No. 0000031438 for
P10,000,000.00. These checks were dated October 18, 1999.
The third deposit receipt (Exhibits V14; V14-1; V14-2; V14-3; and V14-4) was likewise dated October 19,
1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde
Account for the total amount of P50,000,000.00, one for P20,000,000.00 and the other for
P30,000,000.00. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde; the branch name as
Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on
October 19, 1999 at 12:49 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first check was from the
Global Bank Head Office with Check No. 0000107383 for P30,000,000.00, and the other check was also
from the Global Bank Head Office with Check No. 00017385 for P20,000,000.00. These checks were both
dated October 18, 1999.
The fourth deposit receipt (Exhibits W14; W14-1; and W14-2) was dated November 3, 1999. This deposit
receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for P5,000,000.00.
Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch;
the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on November 3, 1999 at
11:03 in the morning; and the check deposited which was from Westmont Bank in Ayala Avenue with
Check No. 000187472 for P5,000,000.00. The said check was dated October 26, 1999.
The fifth deposit receipt (Exhibits X14; X14-1; and X14-2) was also dated November 3, 1999. This deposit
receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for P5,000,000.00.
The particulars of this deposit receipt were the same as the fourth deposit receipt except for the time of
deposit, which was at 11:04 in the morning, and the check deposited which was from Westmont Bank in
Ayala Avenue with Check No. 000187471 for P5,000,000.00. The said check was likewise dated October
26, 1999.
The sixth deposit receipt (Exhs. Y14; Y14-1; and Y14-2) was dated December 17, 1999. This deposit receipt
allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for P50,000,000.00. The
check deposited was allegedly from Equitable PCI Bank in Divisoria - M. De Santos branch with Check No.
0783236 for P50,000,000.00.
The seventh deposit receipt (Exhs. Z14; Z14-1; Z14-2; Z14-3; and Z14-4) was dated January 11, 2000. This
deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account
for the total amount of P26,325,055.65, one for P20,000,000.00 and the other for P6,325,055.65.
Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch;
the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on January 11, 2000 at
12:39 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first check was from Equitable PCI Bank in
Divisoria – M. De Santos branch with Check No. 0111-795-117 for P20 Million, and the other check was
from Bank of Commerce in Port Area with Check No. 0030474 for P6,325,055.65. The Equitable PCI Bank
check was dated January 6, 2000 while the Bank of Commerce check was dated January 11, 2000.
The eight deposit receipt (Exh. A15) was dated January 19, 2000. This deposit receipt with an account
information slip (Exh. A15-1) allegedly shows that a cash deposit of P25,000,000.00 was made to the Jose
Velarde Account. Witness Fortuno testified that the account name Jose Velarde as well as the account
number were specified in the account information slip.
Last for the deposit receipt (Exh. B15) was dated January 24, 2000. This deposit receipt allegedly shows
that there were four (4) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of
P75,000,000.00. The account name Jose Velarde as well as the account number were specified in an
account information slip (Exh. B15-1) for this deposit receipt. The four (4) checks deposited (Exhs. B15-2;
B15-3; B15-4; B15-5; B15-6; B15-7; B15-8; and B15-9) were allegedly manager’s checks from the head office of
Urban Bank and all dated January 18, 2000. Witness Fortuno testified that the first check with Check No.
00039976 was for P2,000,000.00; the second check with Check No. 00039975 was for P70,000,000.00;
the third check with Check No. 00039978 was for P1,000,000.00; and the fourth check with Check No.
00039977 was for P2,000,000.00.
Fortuno continued on his direct-examination and testified as to the Detailed Report of Transfers and
Credit Memorandums (DRTM) dated October 19, 1999; DRTM dated November 3, 1999; DRTM dated
December 15, 1999; DRTM dated December 17, 1999; DRTM dated January 11, 2000; DRTM dated
January 19, 2000; and DRTM dated January 24, 2000. The witness explained that these DRTM reflects
the inter-branch transactions which were done at the Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star branch. These
DRTM allegedly show the summary of the transactions made particularly to the Jose Velarde Account
with Account No. 0160-62501-5.
The witness testified that the DRTM dated December 15, 1999 (Exhs. C15 and C15-1) reflects the summary
of four (4) cash deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. The first cash deposit was for P25,900,000.00; the
second cash deposit was for P37,126,467.83; the third cash deposit was for P38,325,629.67; and the
fourth cash deposit was for P43,647,902.50. The DRTM dated October 19, 1999 (Exhs. D15 and D15-1)
reflects the summary of four (4) deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. The first deposit was for
P30,000,000.00; the second deposit was for P30,000,000.00; the third deposit was for P40,000,000.00;
and the fourth deposit was for P50,000,000.00. The total amount of deposits for October 19, 1999 was
P150,000,000.00. The DRTM dated November 3, 1999 (Exhs. E15and E15-1) reflects the summary of two
(2) check deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. Each of these check deposits was for P5,000,000.00 for
the total amount of P10,000,000.00. The DRTM dated December 17, 1999 (Exhs. F15 and F15-1) reflects a
deposit to the Jose Verlarde Account for P50,000,000.00. The DRTM dated January 11, 2000 (Exhs.
G15 and G15-1) reflects the summary of two (2) deposits to the Jose Velarde account for the total amount
of P26,325,055.65. The first deposit was for P20,000,000.00 and the second deposit was for
P6,325,055.65. The DRTM dated January 19, 2000 (Exhs. H15 and H15-1) shows a cash deposit to the Jose
Velarde Account for P25,000,000.00. Lastly, the DRTM dated January 24, 2000 (Exhs. I15 and I15-1)
reflects a check deposit to the Jose Velarde Account for P75,000,000.00.
Fortuno claimed that the head of the branch of the bank at the time the foregoing deposits were made
was Beatriz Bagsit. He added that the total amount of cash and check deposits for the period of October
19, 1999 to January 24, 2000 aggregated to P481,325,055.65.
On cross examination, Fortuno clarified that the Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star branch had no specimen
signatures of Jose Velarde. He also admitted that he had no personal knowledge on any matter relating
to the Jose Verlade Account nor does he know the persons who made the cash and check deposits. He
testified that none of the names of FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada appear in the deposit slips or
checks he exhibited and identified. [TSN dated November 25, 2002 and TSN dated November 27, 2002]
MICHELLETTE SOLIDUM LEGASPI was the Branch Head of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Virra Mall
Branch on December 19, 1997 until July 26, 2002. The branch was near North Greenhills Subdivision, San
Juan. It was less than 100 meters away from the Buchanan gate or perpendicular to Eisenhower Street
of the subdivision. Polk Street was one of the streets of North Greenhills where the residence of former
President Estrada was located. [TSN dated December 2, 2002, pp. 39-48]
The Virra Mall Branch was merged with the Greenhills Shopping Center Branch on July 26, 2002. All the
bank records and documents of the branch were forwarded to the warehouse of the head office.
Legaspi brought a Certification (Exhibit T15) dated November 27, 2002, accomplished and executed by
Judy L. Go, Vice-President and Branch Head, Juan Luna Binondo Center, Equitable PCI Bank which
certified that Savings Account No. 016062501-5 and Current Account No. 011025495-4 were both under
the name of Jose Velarde. [Ibid, pp. 49-56]
Legaspi then identified seven (7) Electronic Clearing Systems Reports with attached documents which
were microfilm copies of certain checks. She explained that the Electronic Clearing systems Report was
the summary of all checks received and processed at Greenhills-Virra Mall Branch and then sent to PCHC
for clearing. The microfilm copies of the checks supported the summary of the Electronic Clearing
systems Report. The documents were handed over to Legaspi by their Legal Department.
The Electronic Clearing Systems Report showed the batch sent by the branch to PCHC for clearing. The
report bore the routing number of the branch and the identification of the checks that were sent to the
Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).
For the September 10, 1999 Report (Exhibit U15, with sub markings), ten (10) checks were processed by
the branch. The microfilm copies of the checks bore the Account No. 016062501-5 which meant that the
checks were deposited to the said account. Legaspi explained that the account number was found at the
back of the checks. The back of the microfilm checks also bore a certification from the PCHC that the
item was a photocopy of the original clearing document processed by PCHC.
The following microfilm copies were presented: Allied Bank Check No. 00080546 for P10,000,000.00;
Check No. 0080566 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080548 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080542 for
P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080543 for P10,000,000.00; Check No 0084547 for P5,000,000.00; Check
No. 0080544 for P5,000,000.00; Westmont bank Ayala Branch Check No. 000181135 for P5,000,000.00;
Metrobank Check No. 0091780568 for P5,000,000.00; Far East Bank Check No. 3165562 for
P20,000,000.00 with Jaime Dichavez or Abbie Dichavez as account holder.
Attached to the report was a document entitled Detailed Report of Transfer and/or Credit and Debit
memo (U15-12) of Greenhills, Virra Mall Branch as of September 10, 1999. On the report, an inter-branch
transaction on September 10, 1999 was made for Account No 016062501-5 for P90,000,000.00. The
report was secured by the bank’s Legal Department pursuant to the subpoena.
For the September 30, 1999 Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit V15, with submarkings), two
checks were deposited to Account No 016062501-1. These were Equitable Bank Binondo Branch Check
No. 0811277 for P8,300,000.00 and Allied Bank Check No. 0080550 for P20,000,000.00. The dorsal side
of the Equitable check bore the account name Jose Velarde and Account No. 016062501-1.
Another attached document was the transaction journal log report (Exhibit V15-4) which showed the two
deposits. Reflected on the journal log was the amount P995,371.66 indicating the last balance of the
Account as of September 29, 1999. A late Deposit Transactions Report of the Branch as of September
30, 1999 reflected that the two checks deposited were late deposit transactions so that they were
considered the following day transactions. A Detailed Report of Transfer and/or Memo of Greenhills,
Virra Mall dated September 30, 1999 also reflected the two checks.
The third Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit W15, with sub markings) presented was dated
October 6, 1999. The details contained the following: Equitable Bank Manager’s check in the amount of
P300,000,000.00 deposited to Account No. 016062501-5. The journal log reported the P300,000,000.00
deposit on October 5, 1999. A detailed report of Transfer Memo (Exhibit W15-4) of the branch dated
October 6, 1999 showed that a P300,000,000.00 check deposit to Account No. 016062501-5.
The next Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit X15, with sub markings) was dated November 26,
1999 and showed that three checks were processed by the branch. These checks were: Equitable Bank
Check No. 0811579 for P20,000,000.00, Check No. 0811580 for P20,000,000.00 and Check No. 0811582
for P60,000,000.00. The dorsal portions of the checks bore the account number 01602501-5 where the
checks were deposited. The Detailed Report of Transaction Memo (Exhibit X15-5) dated November 26,
1999 also showed these three transactions. Since the checks were deposited beyond the clearing cut-off
time, the late deposit transactions report ( Exhibit X15-6) was also presented.
The Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit Y15, with sub markings) dated November 29, 1999
showed a Westmont Bank check No. 0000187474 deposit for P25 Million which against bore the
account No. 016062501-5. A detailed Report Transfer Memo (Exhibit Y15-3) was presented to show this
interbranch transaction. The late transaction report dated November 29 for the P25,000,000.00 check
deposit was also presented. [Ibid, pp. 51-137]
Electronic Clearing System Report (Exhibit Z15, with sub markings) dated December 1, 1999 showed a
Metrobank Magdalena Center Check No. 035400 for P53,000,000.00. The detailed report transfer
(Exhibit Z15-3) reflected that the P53,000,000.00 check was deposited to Account No. 016062501-5.
The last Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit A16, with sub markings) dated December 2, 1999
showed that Equitable PCI Binondo Branch Check No. 0811596 for P50,000,000.00, Check No. 0811597
for P50,000,000.00 and Allied bank Check No. 0176625 for P20,000,000.00 were processed. Attached
were two transaction journals (Exhibit A16-5) dated December 1, 1999 showing these inter-branch
transactions.
Legaspi explained that they were unable to produce the deposit slips representing the inter-branch
deposits made to the account of Jose Velarde because all the documents pertaining to the Virra Mall
branch were forwarded to the warehouse. They were still in the process of retrieving the other
documents pertaining to the deposit slips. [TSN dated December 4, 2000, pp. 11-23]
Legaspi testified that the transactions were made by Baby Ortaliza whom she identified in a photograph
(Exht X5). [Ibid, pp. 24-30]
On cross examination, Legaspi testified that she was certain that the deposit receipts were actually
accomplished and saw Baby Ortaliza several times transacting at the branch. [Ibid, pp. 31-34]
MELISSA PORTO PASCUAL was a bank teller of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills Virra Mall Branch from
April 1, 1999 to January of 2002. She processed cash deposits, check deposit deposits, withdrawals and
encashment during that time.
The witness then related and identified microfilm copies of checks which she claimed that she
personally processed for inter-branch deposits. These checks were: Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. V15-2
and submarkings) No. 0811277 dated September 26, 1999 with the amount of P80,300,000.00; Allied
Bank Check (Exh. V15-3 and submarkings) No. 0080550 dated September 15, 1999 with the amount of
P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. W15-2 and submarkings) No. 0241001331 dated
September 13, 1999 with the amount of P300,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X15-2 and
submarkings) No. 0811579 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI
Bank Check (Exh. X15-3 and submarkings) No. 0811580 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of
P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X15-4 and submarkings) No. 0811582 dated November
23, 1999 with the amount of P60,000,000.00; Westmont Bank Check (Exh. Y15-2 and submarkings) No.
0000187474 dated November 27, 1999 with the amount of P25,000,000.00; and Allied Bank Check (Exh.
A16-4 and submarkings) No. 0176625 dated December 1, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00.
The foregoing checks were deposited by Baby Ortaliza to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No.
0160-62501-5 which was maintained at Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch. Pascual described the
physical appearance of Baby Ortaliza and identified her in a photograph (Exh. X5).
To corroborate her claim that she personally processed the aforementioned checks, witness Pascual
further related and identified the Electronic Clearing System Report (Exhs. U15 to Z15-3) dated November
26, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated October 6, 1999; the Journal Report dated
October 5, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated September 30, 1999; the Electronic
Clearing System Report dated November 29, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated
December 2, 1999; and the Journal Report dated December 1, 1999. [TSN dated December 9, 2002]
LAMBERTO BAJACAN DEL FONSO (Del Fonso) was the Assistant Vice President and Department Head of
the Branch Monitoring and Administration Department of Equitable PCI Bank since 1997.
Del Fonso identified the bank statements relative to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5
for the period beginning August 1, 1999 to November 30, 2000 (Exhs. D19 to D19-13, inclusive of
submarkings) and to Current Account No. 0110-25495-4 for the period beginning August 1, 1999 to
October 31, 2000 (Exhs. E19 to E19-14). As to Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5, he testified that the
account was closed on November 13, 2000 (Exh. D19-13). As to Current Account No. 0110-25495-4,
witness Del Fonso identified a transaction for October 6, 1999 (Exh. E19-2) for an automatic transfer of
the amount of P29,304,219.69 from the savings account. On the same day, there was an Inward Check
deposit amounting to P142 million. For the other months, there were either minimal transactions or
none at all.
With respect to the account holder – Jose Velarde, Del Fonso testified that he had no address indicated
in the accounts as the same were simply "c/o EBC" or "care of Equitable Banking Corporation" through
its Head Office in Binondo, Manila. He clarified that this was allowed as a special arrangement, although
he did not know and neither had he met Jose Velarde. [TSN dated January 22, 2003]
RENE COLIN DACIO GRAY was head of the Cash Department of Urban Bank sometime on January 2000.
He presented and identified a Manager’s Check No. 43222 dated January 17, 2000 (Exh. W19) issued by
Urban Bank Greenhills Branch which totalled Seventy Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00). Gray related
that the Chairman of Urban Bank, Arsenio Bartolome, asked him to divide this check into four (4) checks
- Urban Bank Check Nos. 39975, 39976, 39977 and 39978 (Exhs. B15-2, B15-4 B15-6 B15-8) all dated January
18, 2000. [TSN, March 31, 2003, pp. 8-31]
AURORA CHUMACERA BALDOZ (Baldoz) was the Vice-President of the Receivership and Liquidation
Group 2 of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) since March 24, 1994. As such, she
actually administered the receivership, take-over and liquidation of banks that the Monetary Board
orders for closure. She testified that she became familiar with Urban Bank because it was her group that
implemented the take-over of the said bank on April 26, 2000.
Baldoz presented and identified documents relative to Account No. 858 (Exh. M19) of the Urban Bank,
particularly, the Letter of Authority dated November 23, 1999 (Exh. I19); Letter of Authority dated
January 29, 2000 (Exh. J19); Letter of Authority dated April 24, 2000 (Exh. K19); as well as Urban Bank
Check No. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 in the amount of P107,191,780.85, and a Signature Card of
Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 (Exh. L19). Baldoz further identified a Certification (Exh. N19) that she
issued to the fact that as receiver of Urban Bank, PDIC found no bank records showing any account
under the name of Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Rowena Lopez, Peachy
Osorio, Joy Melendrez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, and 777. She further certified (Exh.
N19–2) that Accounts "A/C 858" and "T/A 858" did not appear in the Registry of Deposits of Urban Bank
and were not part of the deposit liabilities of the said bank. [TSN dated March 24, 2003]
MARIE ROSE ANCHETA CLAUDIO (Claudio) was the Vice-President of Urban Bank and the Manager of
Urban Bank San Juan Branch. She was part of the senior management of Urban Bank, particularly its
business development committee which handled the business aspect of the bank. As area manager, she
was in-charge of supervising four (4) branches of Urban Bank. On the other hand, as branch manager,
she handled the accounts of the Greenhills branch clients in terms of deposits, loans and other products
and it was in the course of her duties as such that she became familiar with Trust Account No. 858 or
Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858.
Claudio testified that it was Arsenio Bartolome, then the Chairman of Urban Bank, who asked her to
open Trust Account No. 858 and to accept a deposit of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). The deposit
was accordingly processed based on Trading Order No. 776313 (Exh. Q19) dated January 6, 1999. She
came to know that the owner of the account was Joseph Victor Ejercito when she was asked to take
hold of a Trust Agreement (Exh. R19) from the Head Office about two (2) to three (3) weeks after she
accepted the cash. Claudio further testified that the Head Office gave it to her to be given in turn to the
client for signature. She added that she personally delivered the document along with a signature card
to the office of Joseph Victor Ejercito. A few weeks after she left the documents it in his office, she came
back and picked them up and gave them back tot her Head Office. She also testified that she was
familiar with the signature of Joseph Victor Ejercito because he was a client of the bank.
Also in connection with Trust Account No. 858, Claudio handled the acceptance of all deposits to the
said account through Trading Orders. Thus, she became familiar with Trading Order No. 035006-A (Exh.
S19) dated January 27, 1999 in the amount of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). For effecting
withdrawals from the said account, Claudio explained that trading orders, manager’s checks and letters
of authorities were required. She added that she was familiar with some withdrawals, particularly those
covered by Trading Order No. 060851 (Exh. T19) dated September 30, 1999 in the amount of Forty Two
Million Pesos Three Hundred Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Seventeen Centavos
(P42,360,899.17) and with maturity value of Forty Million Seven Hundred Sixteen Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty Four Pesos and Twenty Two Centavos (P42,716,554.22) (Exh. T19-2), which she approved
and which was covered by Manager’s Check No. 0000034182 dated November 8, 1999 (Exh. I5-18).
Claudio also identified a withdrawal from the account through Trading Order No. 804490 (Exh. U19) with
deal date November 5, 1999 with a maturity value of Ten Million Eight Hundred Seventy Five Thousand
Seven Hundred Forty Nine Pesos and Forty Three Centavos (P10,875,749.43) covered by Urban Bank
Manager’s Check No. 34181 (Exh. I5-17) that was processed by branch accountant Aileen Tiongson and
which she approved. Lastly, Claudio identified Trading Order No. 808554 (Exh. V19) with a net maturity
value of Fifty Four Million One Hundred Sixty One Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and Fifty
Two Centavos covered by Urban Bank Manager’s Check No. 0000037661 (Exh. O5 with submarkings).
Witness Claudio verified that she gave the three (3) manager’s checks for withdrawals to Joseph Victor
Ejercito. [TSN dated March 26, 2003]
MA. AILEEN CANDELARIA TIONGSON (Tiongson) was the Branch Accountant of Urban Bank San Juan
Branch from December 18, 1999 to March, 2000. Among her duties was to ensure that all transactions
of the bank and all policies in the branch were properly implemented. Her duties also included checking
trading orders prepared by the account officer for traditional and non-traditional products, facilitating
the issuance of certificates of deposits, and processing the issuance of manager’s checks for withdrawal
transactions. Tiongson clarified that non-traditional products included trust products or investment
placements under trust agreements.
Tiongson testified that she was familiar with Account No. 858 because she processed some of the
transactions of the client like the issuance of manager’s check. She added that she was familiar with
Manager’s Check Bearing No. 43222 (Exh. W19) dated January 17, 2000 in the amount of P75 Million
payable to cash. She added that the source of the manager’s check was the pre-terminated placement
of Account No. 858. With respect to the said check, Tiongson testified that the placing of "payable to
cash" in a manager’s check is not a regular procedure in the bank because a manager’s check should be
payable to a specified person. [TSN dated April 2, 2003]
GUILLERMO ARAZA BRIONES (Briones) was the Deputy Receiver / Liquidator of the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) assigned to Urban Bank at the time it was under receivership.
Briones testified that as Deputy Receiver, he took charge of all the assets and affairs of the bank and
also acted as custodian of the said records. In such capacity, he came across Account No. 858 as he was
instructed by PDIC Vice President Aurora Baldoz to look for documents pertaining thereto. He collated
the documents and consequently prepared an inventory list (Exh. V20 – V20-4). Briones identified and
verified the following entries therein: (1) entry A-2 as referring to Trading Order No. 020385 (Exh. T19)
dated January 29, 1999; (2) entry A-21 referring to Manager’s Check No. 43222 dated January 17, 2000
in the amount of seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00) (Exh. W19); (3) entry B-3 referring to
Trading Order No. 035006 dated January 27, 1999 (Exh. S19); (4) entry B-25 referring to Trading Order
No. 808554 dated November 22, 1999 (Exh. V19); (5) entry C-22 and C-23 referring to Trading Order No.
060851 dated September 30, 1991 (Exh. P19); (6) entry D-34 referring to Trading Order No. 804490 dated
November 5, 1999 (Exh. B20-3); and entries E-3, E-4, and E-5 referring to letters of authority dated
November 23, 1999 (Exh. I19), January 17, 2000 (Exh. J19), and April 24, 2000 (Exh. K19). After collating the
documents, he submitted them to Aurora Baldoz. [TSN dated April 9, 2003]
EMMANUEL ENRIQUEZ BARCENA was the Assistant Vice President for Operations of the PCHC during
the time material in these cases. He assisted the Vice President for Operations, Arturo M. De Castro, in
supervising the check processing operations of the corporation; he made sure that the checks delivered
by the banks were credited to the clearing account with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and
correspondingly debited to the accounts of the drawee banks; and he was also responsible for the
accuracy of the reports generated and furnished to the "clearing participants" and BSP to the delivery of
checks by the banks. The witness related that the clearing participants are the commercial and thrift
bank members of the corporation with authority from the BSP to accept demand deposits and
participate in the clearing operations. These banks send local checks to the clearing house by batches
and the clearing house receive these checks and feed the same in a reader sorter which capture the
drawee bank’s information. Thereafter, the checks are "sprayed with a tracer bond" and "microfilmed"
to identify the source of the check. The checks are then tallied against the batch control ticket and the
net results, known as the "clearing summary report", are reported to the BSP to serve as basis "for
debiting or crediting the clearing account" of the bank concerned.
The witness then related and identified several checks which were sent to PCHC and undergone the
clearing process. He was particular with the signatures of Arturo De Castro, the Vice President of PCHC,
Francisco Gementiza, the Microfilm Custodian of PCHC, and Edgar Gamboa, the Assistant of the
Microfilm Custodian of PCHC. These checks were Allied Bank Check No. 0176610 with the amount of P5
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176611 with the amount of P10 Million; Westmont Bank Check No.
0187473 with the amount of P25 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 037661 dated November 23, 1999 with
the amount of P54,161,496.52; Far East Bank Gift Check with the amount of P500,000.00; Allied Bank
Check No. 0176621 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176620 dated December 20,
1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176622 dated December 20, 1999 with the
amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176619 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P5
Million; UCPB Check No. 018706 dated December 28, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; UCPB Check
No. 018707 dated December 28, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; FEBTC Check No. 0580312 dated
May 8, 2000 with the amount of P3 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0209702 dated May 2, 2000 with the
amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0209706 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P5
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0209703 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P5 Million; Metrobank
Check No. 0830000304 dated June 3, 2000 with the amount of P22,945,000.00; Metrobank Check No.
3010003358 dated June 6, 2000 with the amount of P20 Million; Asian Bank Check No. 0022012 dated
November 5, 1999 with the amount of 20 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 034181 dated November 8,
1999 with the amount of P10,875,749.43; Urban Bank Check No. 034182 dated November 8, 1999 with
the amount of P42,716,554.22; Allied Bank Check No. 0176604 dated September 30, 1999 with the
amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176601 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of
P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176602 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million;
Allied Bank Check No. 0176605 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank
Check No. 0660139670 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P30 Million; Metrobank Check No.
0660139681 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P13 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0732114979
dated October 15, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107387 dated October
18, 1999 with the amount of P25 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107388 dated October 18, 1999 with
the amount of P25 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385384 dated November 24, 1999 with the amount
of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385385 dated November 24, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million;
Allied Bank Check No. 0176615 dated November 24, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Equitable PCI
Bank Check No. 0783278 dated December 17, 1999 with the amount of P160 Million; Equitable PCI Bank
Check No. 0783284 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P2 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check
No. 0783282 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P1.5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 080519
dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 006975 dated
December 24, 1999 with the amount of P1.5 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0189619 dated
December 23, 1999; PS Bank Check No. 031436 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million;
PS Bank Check No. 031437 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Security Bank Check
No. 0363859 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Security Bank Check No. 0363858
dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Security Bank Check No. 0363857 dated
October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; PS Bank Check No. 031438 dated October 18, 1999
with the amount of P10 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107385 dated October 18, 1999 with the
amount of P20 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107383 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P30
Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187472 dated October 26, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million;
Westmont Bank Check No. 0187471 dated October 26, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million.
Witness Barcena then related and identified in the foregoing manner Equitable PCI Bank Check No.
0783236 dated December 17, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0111-
795117 dated January 6, 2000 with the amount of P20 Million; Bank of Commerce Check No. 0030474
dated January 10, 2000 with the amount of P6,925,055.65; Urban Bank Check No. 039975 dated January
18, 2000 with the amount of P70 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039976 dated January 18, 2000 with the
amount of P2 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039977 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P2
Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039978 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P1 Million; Allied
Bank Check No. 0080566 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0080454 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080548 dated
August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080542 dated August 31, 1999
with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080543 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount
of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080547 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million;
Allied Bank Check No. 0080544 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Westmont Bank
Check No. 00181135 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Metrobank Check No.
0091780568 dated September 1, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; and FBTC Check No. 3165582
dated September 8, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million.
In another set of documentary evidence for the prosecution, the witness similarly related and identified
Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811277 dated September 26, 1999 with the amount of P8,300,000.00;
Allied Bank Check No. 0080550 dated September 15, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable PCI
Bank Check No. 001331 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P300 Million; Equitable PCI Bank
Check No. 0811579 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable Bank Check No.
0811580 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No.
0811582 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P60 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187474
dated November 27, 1999 with the amount of P25 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385400 dated
November 29, 1999 with the amount of P53 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811596 dated
December 15, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811597 dated
December 1, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; and Allied Bank Check No. 0176625 dated December
1, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million.
Witness Barcena continued on his direct examination and related and identified FEBTC Check No.
3165579 dated November 8, 1999 with the amount of P189,700,000.00; BPI Family Bank Check No.
0006623 dated July 25, 2000 with the amount of P40 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0742099
dated August 15, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0091780523 dated August
15, 1999 with the amount of P31 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385379 dated August 19, 1999 with the
amount of P20 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0830416015 dated July 29, 2000 with the amount of P22
Million; and Allied Bank Check No. 0080549 dated August 25, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million.
Lastly, the witness then presented and identified a Detail List dated November 9, 1999 of PCHC which
contained a listing of incoming checks of the participating bank in Greater Manila Area.
On cross examination, witness Barcena clarified that the checks forwarded to PCHC pertained to checks
that were not yet acted by the drawee bank as to whether the same were honored or dishonored. [TSN
dated January 13, 2003; TSN dated January 15, 2003; and TSN dated January 20, 2003]
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
The defense presented BEATRIZ LEGASPI BAGSIT, the Vice President and Division Head in the Makati
Area of Equitable PCI Bank, and ROMUALD DY TANG, Treasurer and Executive Vice President of
Equitable PCI Bank. The gists of their testimonies were already discussed in relation to sub-paragraph (c)
above. FPres. Estrada also denied on the witness stand that he owned the Jose Velarde account.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Re: Sub-paragraph (d) of the Amended Information
To reiterate, the crime of plunder is committed through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
[or "predicate acts"] described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended. The prosecution presented
overwhelming evidence that there were numerous deposits of astoundingly large sums of money into
the Jose Velarde account. However, the prosecution failed to prove the predicate act/s as defined under
Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 through which the said deposits could have been acquired or amassed,
except for the amount of P189,700,000.00, representing illegal commissions from the sales of Belle
shares and the money collected from illegal gambling. It is not per se the accumulation of wealth which
is proscribed by the Anti-Plunder Law. The acquisition of wealth of not less than P50,000,000.00 must be
linked to the commission of overt or criminal acts falling within the ambit of the said law. All that the
prosecution has succeeded in showing is that the Jose Velarde account is the repository or receptacle of
vast wealth belonging to FPres. Estrada.
RULING OF THE COURT

ON THE CHARGE OF PLUNDER
Elements of the Offense of Plunder
Having reached the foregoing Findings of Fact after a meticulous and laborious study of the voluminous
testimonial and documentary evidence of both the prosecution and the defense on the four (4) sub-
paragraphs of the Amended Information, the Court is now called upon to apply the Anti-Plunder Law to
the facts of this case. The accused are charged with plunder as defined and penalized under Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended, entitled "An Act Defining And Penalizing The Crime Of Plunder, As Amended"
(July 12, 1991). Particularly, Section 2 of the said law provides as follows:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.- Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill gotten-wealth through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount
or total value of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished
for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered
by the court. The Court shall declare any and ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and share of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof
forfeited in the favor of the State. (As to the penalty, this section is amended by Republic Act No. 9346
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. RA 9346 was signed into law on June
24, 2006. In view of its provisions, the penalty for the crime of plunder is now reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Section 2 (a) of RA 9346. In addition, the convicted person shall be eligible for
parole under Act. No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.)
Section 1 (d) of the same statute cited in Section 2 above reads:
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or in directly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the
following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversation, mis-use, or malversation of public funds or raids on the

public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other
form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/ or entity in connection with any government contract
or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset belonging to the National Government
or any of its subdivision, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or –controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form
of interest or participation including promises of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to

unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.
RA No. 7080, as amended, enunciates a rule of evidence in Section 4 thereof which is quoted hereunder:
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. – For purpose of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The case of Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, promulgated November 19,
2001), which upheld this Court’s Resolution dated July 9, 2001 denying accused Former President
Estrada’s Motion to Quash the information in this case, enumerates the elements of the crime of
plunder, as follows:
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended; and
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired
is at least P50,000,000.00.
The terms "Combination" and "Series" were likewise defined in the above-cited case as follows:
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in
Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belongings to the National Government
under Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a "series", there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling
under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation , malversation
and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the
legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have
taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. (emphasis supplied)
The Charges in the Amended Information
in Relation to Accused
The import of the charges in the Amended Information was carefully discussed by the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26,
2003, 377 SCRA 538, 553-556], as penned by now the Honorable Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in this
wise:
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-
vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with
the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes
in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in
particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts
alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A.
No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from
illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names
petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This
predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a
portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense
described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not
mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c)
alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the
Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving
commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the
"Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in
the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance
with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former
President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does
and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI
Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable
the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the
accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass
the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the
conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second
paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that
petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former
President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the
predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four,
separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to
avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law wasenacted in the
aftermath of the Marcos regimewhere charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President
Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with he
multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal
wealth.They also found out that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions,
different time and different personalities.Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a
separate case and the over-all conspiracyhad to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges.
The preparation of multiple Informations was a legl nightmarebut eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate
and independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A.
No. 7080 or the Anti Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is
pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733…
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality—to
help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in
the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy.
The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax,
that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive
commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves
two structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group
(the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the
"chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer.
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy.
The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the
spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth.
Throughout the trial before this Court, the prosecution’s task was to establish, with the required burden
of proof, the commission of the crime of plunder by the principal accused former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada in conspiracy with his co-accused "during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001"
by " willfully, unlawfully and criminally" amassing, accumulating and acquiring by himself directly or
indirectly ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of Four Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight Hundred
Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos and Seventeen Centavos ( P4,097,804,173.17), more
or less and thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, through "ANY OR A COMBINATION OR A SERIES OF
OVERT CRIMINAL ACTS, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS" described in paragraphs (a) to (d) in the
Amended Information.
After a thorough evaluation of the established facts, we hold that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt the elements of plunder as follows:
(a) The principal accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, at the time of the commission of the acts charged in
the Amended Information was the President of the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, who was granted immunity from
suit by the Office of the Ombudsman, and with the participation of other persons named by prosecution
witnesses in the course of the trial of this case, in amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten
wealth as follows:
(i) by a series of acts of receiving bi-monthly collections from "jueteng", a form of illegal gambling,
during the period beginning November 1998 to August 2000 in the aggregate amount of Five Hundred
Forty Five Millionh Two Hundred Ninety One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200,000,000.00) of which was deposited in the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation; and
(ii) by a series consisting of two (2) acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares of stock of
Belle Corporation and collecting or receiving commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of
One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P189,700,000.00) which was
deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
In Jose "Jinggoy" E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 549)
the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Contrary to petitioner’s posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal
gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several instances" means the petitioner committed the
predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the
commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted,
nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
In the same case (Jose "Jinggoy" E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.), it was held:
…Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts—that of ordering the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and
collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from Belle Corporation which became part of
the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under
items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former
President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. (emphasis supplied)
This Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, who among the accused
benefited from the misappropriation of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur and in what amounts, as
charged sub-paragraph b. The prosecution likewise failed to offer evidence on the alleged illegal sources
of the numerous deposits in the Jose Velarde account which belongs to FPres. Estrada, except for the
commission received from the sale of Belle shares to GSIS and SSS and the money collected from illegal
gambling. The Anti-Plunder Law requires the prosecution to prove the series or combination of overt or
criminal acts through which ill-gotten wealth deposited in the Jose Velarde account was amassed,
accumulated or acquired. The prosecution failed to discharge this burden of proof.
However, the two different series of predicate acts outlined above (particularly, first, the regular and
methodical acquisition of ill-gotten wealth through collections from illegal gambling and second, the
receipt of unlawful commissions from the sales of Belle shares twice), whether taken separately or
independently of the other or in combination with each other, unquestionably constitute the crime of
plunder as defined by Section 2, in relation to Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended.
The case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001) ruled:
xxx As Senate President Salonga explained, of there are 150 constitutive crimes charged, it is not
necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of them. If a pattern can be shown by proving for
example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be sufficient to secure conviction.
The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting separate crimes as just
one crime of plunder by allowing their prosecution by means of a single information because there is a
common purpose for committing them, namely, that of "amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth
through such overt or criminal acts." The pattern is the organizing principle that defines what otherwise
would be discreet criminal acts into the single crime of plunder. (369 SCRA 394, 475-476)
A pattern was established by the carefully planned system of jueteng money collection on a regular bi-
monthly basis from the dfferent provinces nationwide to enrich FPres. Estrada with the connivance
and/or participation of Gov. Singson, Yolanda Ricaforte, Emma Lim, Carmencita Itchon, SPO2 Artates,
Jamis Singson and other jueteng collectors referred to in the Amended Information as "John Does" and
"Jane Does." The Court notes that Gov. Singson in the course of his testimony mentioned certain
persons who collected jueteng money aside from himself and his employees; namely, Anton Prieto,
Bonito Singson, Bong Pineda, Charing Magbuhos, Celso de los Angeles, Jesse Viceo, Romy Pamatmat and
a certain Sanchez of Batangas. As proven, the collections in "several instances" from illegal gambling
money went way beyond the minimum of P50,000,000.00 set by the Anti-Plunder Law. These repeated
collections of jueteng money from November 1998 to August 2000 would fall within the purview of a
"series" of illegal acts constituting plunder. The said series of acts, on its own, would have been
sufficient to convict the principal accused, FPres. Estrada. However, this Court also finds that FPres.
Estrada is criminally liable for plunder for receiving commissions from the purchase of Belle Shares by
the GSIS and by the SSS in grave abuse of his power on two (2) separate occasions as charged in sub-
paragraph (b) of the Amended Information. Clearly, the receipt of these commissions on two (2)
occasions likewise meets the definition of a series of two (2) similar unlawful acts employing the same
scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth.
It is unnecessary to indulge in an exposition of whether the two series of acts falling under sub-
paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended Information, proven in the course of the trial could have
amounted to two (2) counts of plunder. It would be a purely academic exercise, as the accused cannot
be convicted of two offenses or two counts of plunder on the basis of a single Information, clearly
charging him of only one count of plunder, because that would violate his constitutional rights to due
process, given the severity of the crime charged in this case.
The predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended Information, which formed two
(2) separate series of acts of a different nature, were linked by the fact that they were plainly geared
towards a common goal which was the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth for FPres. Estrada and that
they shared a pattern or a common method of commission which was the abuse or misuse of the high
authority or power of the Presidency. (U.S. v. Hiverly, 437 F3d 752)
In sum, the Court finds that prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the commission by the
principal accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada of the crime of plunder but not so in the case
of former Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Atty. Edward Serapio.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558
finding the accused, Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of PLUNDERdefined in and penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand,
for failure of the prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds
the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and
accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention
shall be credited to him in full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
the Court hereby declares the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety One Thousand Pesos
(P545,291,000.00), with interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Pesos (P189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and
income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay Mansion" located at #100
11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio are hereby
ordered cancelled and released to the said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon
presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof and subject to the usual accounting and
auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure orders issued against the said accused are hereby
recalled and declared functus oficio.
SO ORDERED.
SGD.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Presiding Justice
Chairperson
SGD. SGD.
FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
SGD.

Presiding Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13, of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
SGD.

Presiding Justice
65. Land Bank vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 143257 (September 10, 2002)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143275. September 10, 2002]
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE
LEON, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the resolution,[1] dated February 15, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals[2] dismissing the ordinary appeal of petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity),
and resolution[3] dated May 22, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The undisputed facts as found by the appellate court are as follows:
The petitioners-appellees Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon are the registered owners of a parcel of
land situated at San Agustin, Concepcion, Tarlac covered by TCT No. 163051 with a total area of 50.1171
hectares. The subject property was voluntarily offered for sale to the government pursuant to RA 6657
at P50,000.00 per hectare. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) made a counter offer of
P17,656.20 per hectare, or a total amount of P884,877.54, but the same was rejected. Another offer was
made by DAR increasing the amount to P1,565,369.35. In view of the petitioners-appellees failure to
respond to the new offer made by DAR, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) took cognizance of the case pursuant to Sec. 16 (d) of RA 6657. Subsequently, the DARAB
issued an Order directing respondent-appellant LBP to recompute the value of the subject property in
accordance with DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992. Applying the pertinent provisions of
the said DAR administrative order, respondent-appellant arrived at a recomputed land value as follows:
Land Use Area Acquired Value/hectare Total/Land Value
Sugarland 32.4187 P61,758.85 P2,002,141.63
Riceland 16.6984 P28,449.80 P 475,066.14
Idle land 1.0000 P14,523.78 P 14,523.78
or an aggregate amount of P2,491,731.65, which was again rejected by the petitioners-appellees.
In a Petition dated October 27, 1994, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac, which is the
designated Special Agrarian Court in the area, petitioners-appellees asked the court, among others, to
fix the just compensation of the subject property.
In due time the court rendered a summary judgment on December 19, 1997 fixing the compensation of
the subject property as follows:
a. P1,260,000.00 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland;
b. P2,957,250.00 for the 30.4160 hectares of sugarland.
Within the time allowed, respondent-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
subsequently denied by the Court.[4]
xxx xxx xxx
On March 17, 1998, the Department of Agrarian Reform filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for
review of the decision of the Special Agrarian Court. The said petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
47005, was assigned to the Special Third (3rd) Division of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner LBP also
initiated in the Court of Appeals an appeal of the same decision of the Special Agrarian Court by filing a
notice of appeal. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 60365, the said ordinary appeal was assigned to the Fourth
(4th) Division of the Court of Appeals.
On November 6, 1998, the Special Third (3rd) Division of the appellate court, through then Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes[5], rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 47005 a decision[6], the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The decision dated
February 9, 1998 is partially reconsidered. The trial court is ordered to recompute the compensation
based on the selling price of palay at 213.00 per cavan. Petitioner is ordered to pay legal interest at 6%
of the compensation so fixed from 1990 until full payment is made by the government.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Thereafter, on February 15, 2000, the Fourth (4th) Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner
LBPs ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365), in a resolution dated February 15, 2000, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.[8]
In dismissing the ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) instituted by petitioner LBP, the appellate
court reasoned that the mode of appeal followed by the petitioner was erroneous considering that
Section 60 of RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, mandates that
appeals from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts should be by petition for review. Therefore, the notice
of appeal filed by LBP was ineffectual and did not stop the running of the period of appeal. Also, the
appellate court took note of the decision rendered by the Special Third (3rd) Division of the same court
involving the same issue and parties, to wit:
All these notwithstanding LBP does not stand to lose anything at all. While it did suffer a setback in this
instant case LBP in one way or the other still we note that it is likewise victorious in the appeal brought
by the DAR (CA-G.R. SP 47005). In a decision rendered on November 6, 1998 this court ordered the trial
court to recompute the compensation based on the selling price of palay at P213.00 per cavan. Thus to
this effect with more reason that we should deny the appeal even granting the mode of appeal as
availed of is correct to avoid any contradiction of this divisions with that of the other.[9]
Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution dated May 22,
2000.
Hence, this petition questioning the resolutions of the Fourth (4th) Division of the Court of Appeals on
the following assignment of errors:
IN RULING THAT SECTION 60 OF RA 6657 PROVIDES THE PROPER MODE FOR THE REVIEW OF THE
DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS DESPITE SECTION 61 OF RA 6657 WHICH EXPRESSLY
MANDATES THAT THE RULES OF COURT SHALL GOVERN THE REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL
AGRARIAN COURTS BY THE COURT OF APPEALS;
II
IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT SECTION 61 OF RA 6657 PREVAILS OVER SECTION 60 OF RA 6657,
INASMUCH AS THE MODE OF APPEAL OF A COURTS DECISION IS A MATTER OF PROCEDURE WHICH IS
COVERED BY THE EXCLUSIVE RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT UNDER SECTION 5(5),
ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE;
III
IN DECLARING THAT THE SUPREME COURT MERELY MADE AN INADVERTENT MISTAKE IN REVISING
SECTION 1, RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND REMOVING THE DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL
AGRARIAN COURT FROM THE LIST OF THOSE APPEALABLE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS BY PETITION FOR
REVIEW; AND
IV
IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONER, DESPITE ITS RULING THAT THE SUPREME COURT MADE
A MISTAKE IN ITS ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS, RENDERING SUCH DISMISSAL AS HIGHLY UNJUST,
OPPRESSIVE AND CONTRARY TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. [10]
The case at bar requires an interpretation of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657. The said provisions provide
that:
Section 60. Appeals, - An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the
decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.
Section 61.- Procedure in Review. Review by the Court of appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may
be, shall be governed by the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals, however, may require the parties to
file simultaneous memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, after which the case is
deemed submitted for decision.
Respondent spouses point to Section 60 of RA 6657 to support their view that the mode of appeal
initiated by petitioner LBP was erroneous. On the other hand, petitioner LBP believes that the mode of
appeal it used is permissible under Section 61 of the same law.
What indeed is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as Special
Agrarian Courts, in the determination of just compensation an appeal by way of a petition for review or
an ordinary appeal?
Section 2 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three modes of appeal, to
wit:
Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases or multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for Review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by Certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall
be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Petitioner LBP, in its bid to maintain the legitimacy of its appeal, contends that the proper mode of
appeal from a decision of the Special Agrarian Court is by way of a notice of appeal due to the reference
by Section 61 of RA 6657 to the Rules of Court as the governing procedure for appeals to the Court of
Appeals. This being the case, the petitioner claims that the procedure for ordinary appealed cases
provided for in Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure must be followed,
that is, a notice of appeal is required in order to perfect the appeal. According to the petitioner, this is
the proper mode of appeal in the case at bar considering that the appealed decision is that of the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure[11] (pertaining to appeals by way of petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals of decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and the Court of Tax Appeals), does not include decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts.
We deny the petition.
A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the
determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and
categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no room for a contrary
interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction, but only
application.[12]
According to the petitioner, Section 61 of RA 6657 should be followed, not Section 60. The reference by
Section 61 to the Rules of Court implies that an ordinary appeal requiring a notice of appeal is the
proper manner of appealing decisions of Special Agrarian Courts on just compensation because Section
2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that decisions of the Regional Trial
Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction follow the procedure governing ordinary appeals.
We do not agree.
First, there is no conflict between Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of Court do not at
all prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper mode of appeal for decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts. Section 61 in fact makes no more than a general reference to the Rules of Court and
does not even mention the procedure for ordinary appeals in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure as the appropriate method of elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of
Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases.
Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not permissible for decisions of
the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to determine whether a petition for review is
the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they
act as Special Agrarian Courts. Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely
mentions the Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in
its phraseology. Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a petition for review is
prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the category is for quasi-judicial agencies
and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts do not properly belong. Although Supreme Court
Circular No. 1-91[13] (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) included the decisions
of Special Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for review, its non-inclusion later on in
Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a quasi-judicial agency.
What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly regards a petition for review as the proper way of
appealing decisions of agrarian courts. So far, there is no rule prescribed by this Court expressly
disallowing the said procedure.
Third, far from being in conflict, Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with Section 60. The
reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions for review in the Rules of
Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed before the Court of Appeals shall be followed in
appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not provide
the details on how the petition for review shall be conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court is necessary. In fact, Section 61 uses the word review to designate the
mode by which the appeal is to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of Court
only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in
agrarian cases.
According to the petitioner, an ordinary appeal prescribed under the Rules of Court should prevail over a
petition for review provided under Section 60 of RA 6657 inasmuch as a contrary interpretation would
violate the constitutional provision granting to the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and Legal Assistance to the
underprivileged. (italics supplied)[14]
As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the Rules of Court that categorically prohibits the adoption of
the procedure for petitions for review of decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 60 of RA 6657 and
the provisions of the Rules of Court can be harmonized and can co-exist.
Moreover, the same Section 5 (5), Article VIII, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution quoted by the
petitioner states that (r)ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. Section 60 is obviously a special procedure.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, it cannot be otherwise merely because it was formulated by the
legislature and not by any special body. As long as the said section provides for a particular process for
the governance of the special court concerned, the provision is accurately classified as a special
procedure. Subject to constitutional limitations, the statutory enactment of a special procedure cannot
be said to encroach on the power of thisCourt to formulate rules of procedure for the reason that we
have not yet provided for a particular process specifically governing agrarian courts. In fact, this
Court exercises its constitutional power to promulgate special rules of procedure by adopting Sections
60 and 61 of RA 6657 declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided by the
Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases is the need for absolute dispatch in the determination
of just compensation. Just compensation means not only paying the correct amount but also paying for
the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered just for the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss.[15] Such objective is more in keeping with the nature of a petition for
review.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or
completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for
review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired
property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. This is exemplified by the case at bar in which
the petition for review before the Special Third (3rd) Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 47005) was disposed of way
ahead of the ordinary appeal filed before the Fourth (4th) Division (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) in the Court of
Appeals.
Inasmuch as the notice of appeal filed by petitioner LBP did not stop the running of the reglementary
period to file a petition for review, the time to appeal the decision of the Special Agrarian Court has
lapsed, rendering the said decision final and executory.
WHEREFORE, the appealed RESOLUTIONS, dated February 15, 2000, and May 22, 2000, respectively, of
the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., concur in the result.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo Brawner and concurred in by Associate Justices Fermin Martin, Jr.
and Renato C. Dacudao; Rollo, pp. 7-13.
[2]
Fourth Division.
[3]
Rollo, p. 14.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 7-8.
[5]
Former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 96-102.
[7]
Rollo, p. 101.
[8]
Rollo, p. 13.
[9]
Rollo, pp.12-13.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 24-25.
[11]
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under
Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
[12]
National Telecommunications Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 508, 514 (1999).
[13]
The Circular is entitled Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final
Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.
[14]
Section 5(5), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
[15]
Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone, 349 SCRA 240, 264 (2001).
66. In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)
[ Resolution, March 18, 1954 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES OF
1946 TO 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., PETITIONERS.
RESOLUTION
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic
Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing
admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and
the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per
cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised
to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court,
and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the
Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of
the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371,
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated
their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953
without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as
follows:
Republic Act No. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR

EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Section 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-
seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in
any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen
hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-
three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member
of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of
a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
Sec. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many, of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for: admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others
who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the. law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately,
the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned
whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected
by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended
to this decision as Annexes I and II, And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following
statistical data are set
forth:
1946 (August) …………… 206 121 18
1946 (November) ………... 477 228 43
1947 ………………………. 749 340 0
1948 ………………………. 899 409 11
1949 ………………………. 1,218 532 164
1950 ………………………. 1,316 893 26
1951 ………………………. 2,068 879 196
1952 ………………………. 2,738 1,033 426
1953 ………………………. _2,555 __986 __284
Total………. 12,230 5,421 1,168
Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic
Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a
passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in
previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as
provided for by Republic Act 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which
only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952,
and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably
affected by Republic Act No. 972, although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient
reasons to reconsider their grades.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession
and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the
court set the hearing of the aforementioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or
not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the
bar who have' amply argued, orally and in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle, the
Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios,
Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from
the memoranda of counsel for'.'petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo
and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema, themselves, has greatly
helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a
long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was
assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or
partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of
the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
"The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation."
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered
from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates
who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more
difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should
be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of
property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals
to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the
statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were
abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette has been published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with, revised and
enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began
to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those
are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but
the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal
history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by
the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous juridical history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending
the law, we can not find a case in which the validity oí a similar law had been sustained, while those
against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs.
Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of
Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the
original bill and which the proponent of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us
as a favorable precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York
revoked the decision of the Supreme Court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted
to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College
promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
"They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void.
They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-
one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and
ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State." (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
"Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested
with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was
evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions
which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the
section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision respecting the
admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection
with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in
the inference it draws from the use of the word 'admission' in the action referred to. it is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of
granting necessarily implies the 'power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
"These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act." (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of
Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission
to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public
or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of
Appeals said of the object of the law:
"The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students
in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the
institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma as graduates, the
Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary
study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination
by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study
was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
"The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the
mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court.
It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We
cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit
requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that
the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before
granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to
make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing
else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of preexisting statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present
condition of the law on the subject." (p. 89)
* * * * * *
"The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has
simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question." (P. 93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission
of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission to the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by
our Constitution to repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, to our judgment the proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals, and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest
degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on
the petitions of these same individuals, are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we
quote the following paragraphs:
"This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English
speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the
extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorneys at law, but in
England and in every state of the Union the act of admitting an attorney at law has been expressly
committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This
act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands
alone as an assertion of legislative power, (p. 444)
"No greater responsibility rests upon this court than that of preserving in form and substance the exact
form of government set up by the people, (p. 444)
"Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so
far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the
Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications, (p. 444)
"But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
"Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty, hut each is
supreme in that branch of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department
should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme
and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs.
Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rél. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
"The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of
justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers
of sovereignty to the judical department of our state government, under a scheme which it was
supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department of
government, the courts cannot escape responsibility for the manner in which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial department are exercised, (p. 445)
"The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the
courts. The quality of justice dispensed by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of
its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring
the courts themselves into disrepute, (p. 445)
"Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the
English speaking countries." (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
"Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688,
had exercised the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said
in Matter of the Sergeants at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, 'constitutes the most solid of all titles.' If
the courts and the judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be
admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that
element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential
element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial
entity cannot be denied. Our people borrowed from England this judicial entity and made of not only a
sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government.
They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercised to determine who should
constitute its attorneys at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an
intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the
three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the
Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for
attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the
legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express
constitutional provision. While the Legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of
attorneys, its power in that respect does not rest upon any power possessed by it to deal exclusively
with the subject of the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and
unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate fixing a standard of
qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make
its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which
the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course for the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars
persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law." (p. 450)
"Furthermore it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that
the Legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of
law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so
far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission
as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed.
565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 52, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W.
1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
"The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it
having been so generally held that the act of a court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment
for the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one
being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has
been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside."
(p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
"It is indispensable to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from
the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It
is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose
opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C. L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242
N. Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487, 489, 60 A. L. R. 851: 'Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with
conditions.' One is admitted to the bar 'for something more than private gain.' He becomes 'an officer of
the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due 'whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld."
Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this
country and in England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception
conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings
invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision
of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department
conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government.
It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications
of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this
respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15
L. Ed. 565, 'It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests
exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and
counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.' " (p. 727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
"In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys
to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the
court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair
private character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an
examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of
the states to which they, respectively, belong, for three years preceding their application, is regarded as
sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order
of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as
attorneys and counsellors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry
the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold
their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte
Hoyfron, 7 How. (Miss. 127; Fletcher vs. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 430. Their admission or their exclusion is
not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in
numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of
Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. 'Attorneys and Counsellors,' said that court, 'are not only
officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial
nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be intrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial
functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions :

"Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a
judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to
practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court." Re Bruen,
102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
"Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the
court." A. C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
"The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the
province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions
occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial
power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decrees.
"The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of
the government." 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
"If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling
aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or
directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry." Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less
certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the
case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
"Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish.. increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws
on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts,
subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines." Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law The primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes, continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court
has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys
at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that
Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of
individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules
on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires
it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may
and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to
the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together
for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should
consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that
with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercised
within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took the examination and failed
by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This Tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
"Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to
the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial
fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
"Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands,' is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty
of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the
passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States,
the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate
judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General,
prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city
attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or
assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine
Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to
the satisfaction of said court."
"The records of this court- disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed "to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he
received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was
examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in
the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of
the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him a license to practice law
in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occassion, he now 'possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability.'
"But it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of
right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination 'upon motion before the
Supreme Court' accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of
provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator
apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of
the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that
section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without
examination, the clause may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without
any examination.' It is contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to
give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised."
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and
17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
"Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by
the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration
wholly destroyed, by giving the word 'may,' as used in the above citation from Act No. 1597, a
mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But any act of the commission which has the effect of setting
at naught in whole or in part the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing,
defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and
with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:
"In the various cases wherein applications for admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute
have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to
believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
"In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never
had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as
provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications
at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
"In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to
practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
"In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he
has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave
evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive,
with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government
service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the
above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by
general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which
will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his
right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general
rule." (In re Guarifia, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the
fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary
and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December
31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before
November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or
to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied
for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court
declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
"This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law
schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the
application is made, is entitled 'An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors,' approved March 28, 1894, in force July 1, 1874.' The amendment,
so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: 'And
every applicant for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to
admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law office
or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent
changes in said rules'." In re Day et al, 54 N. Y., p. 646.
* * * "After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31,
1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly
issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law
studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such
years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any
student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, 'and part
in the aforesaid law school,' and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be
admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the
rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed,
confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of
legislative creation for their admission to the bar." (p. 647.)
"Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the
courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence
which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to
practice law, it could only be done by a general law, and not by granting special and exclusive privileges
to certain persons' or classes of persons. Const, art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege,
and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right
to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions,
such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such
privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some
reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable
basis for different legislation as to the different classes, and not a purely arbitrary one, having no just
relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 111. 66, 35 N. E. 62;
Eitchie vs. People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
"The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis
for classification (Williams vs. People 121 111. 48, II N. E. 881); but the place where such physician has
resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making
an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N. E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature
undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law. and. plainly, any
classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The
proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This
class is subdivided into two classes First, those presenting diplomas issued :by any law school of this
state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the
period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office,
who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and
as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to
both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed "with, and as between the two different
conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma
granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can
there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon
the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who
began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those
who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while
those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would complete two years
before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3d. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted
without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to
the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification
cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is
suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons, (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N. W. 441, where the legislature attempted by
law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a
class legislation:
"But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it he granted that the legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking
of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr.
Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626,
said: 'It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons
of like age, sex, and condition. This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature
of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may he
pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the 'estate' acquired in them that is, the right to
continue their prosecution is often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our
system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal
opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring examinations to establish the
possession on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to
practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such
examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N. C.
643, 28 S. E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. W. 345; State vs.
Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468.
"This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material
that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite
learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no manner affect the power of
the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its
favors.
"A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the
practice of law, without examination, all who had 'serve in the military or naval forces of the United
States during the World War and received an honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled
therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924¡ known as 'World
War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the
passage of this Act." This Act was held unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality
clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227
N. W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutional acceptable is explained in 1% Am. Jur. 151-153 as

follows:
"The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest
upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must
be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional
prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and
artificial once. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on
some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does
not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be
such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the
situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural reason for the difference made in their liabilities
and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a
clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally
on all." (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in
1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will
be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been
invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is
fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those
years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from
1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under
the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does
not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of
candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72
per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per
cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as
equivalent' to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be
sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be
objected to or criticized.. Now, is it desired to undo what had been done cancel the license that was
issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly
does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress
lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in
1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of
judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of
the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are
not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place.
This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment
of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which
continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what
the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave
defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that
the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for
this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in
the title of the Act. While this law according to its title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to
1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to
Section 21(1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because
it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affects the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-
1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by
this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this
Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of
the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This
is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of
these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable
reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended
to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists
immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of
justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing
rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary
to facts which are of general knowledge- and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students
inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of
1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue
in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues
who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight
members of the Court who subscribe to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the
Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No, 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952,
and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and
effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a
general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are
considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision
has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
(See Annex I Volume 94 Philippine Reports Pages 565-582)
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the
bar examination of August and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent
in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who
obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of
Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments
embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern
us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
"Sec. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent
in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative
weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per
cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law,
20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per
cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in which
they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in
determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the
candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit
of having already passed some subjects and shall be required, to the examination in all the subjects.
"Sec. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any applicant who has obtained a general average
of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th day
of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed
to take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No.
12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
"It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat
even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other government
examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due
credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while
three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests
us, the Court said:
"The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar
candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need
not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on
the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is
that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an
examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that
he has passed the last required subject, which may be several years away from the time that he
reviewed and passed the first subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in
those subjects' and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and
passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue
taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on
this plan, must pass the examination in no more than three installments; but there is no limitation as to
the time or number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object
and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and
proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so as
presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service required by
prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have obtained a passing
grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year later, and the last two
subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a
passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and
satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of
admission to the practice of law.
* * * * * * *
"We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that
any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50
per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less
than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any
subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a
passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only
prospective but retroactive in its effects.
"We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in
favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70' per cent to govern even in the
future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should
not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but
also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present
amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per
cent or more but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go
thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a
decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule
then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final
decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of
no effect.
"Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the
courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it
refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a
general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme
Court equally and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and
qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing
general average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and
in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he
was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and
allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important' aspect of the
question to be carefully and seriously considered."
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
"I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal
profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice
precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination. Moreover, the bill contains provisions to
which I find serious fundamental objections.
"Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946,
shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class
legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates
in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
"The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in
accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme
Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a
passing general average but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who
have failed. The provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing
average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be
morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to
other professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy."
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3
vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING
1953
Section 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examnations after July 4, 1946 up to
the August 1951 bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953
bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That 75
per cent passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally,
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and
included as part of the next whole number.
Sec. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination
after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades
shall be included in computing the passing' general average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.
Sec. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
"This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to
those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who
would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its
previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69
in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give
satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages
for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952
bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73
percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with
the condition that the candidate shall not obtain n any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason
for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during
the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading
material's will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last world
war.
In this bill we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as
well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of
1951.
"The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to
the practice of law 'a special class who failed in the bar examination'. He considered the bill a class
legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely
supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69
per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for
whom this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the
strength of the established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable
difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot
or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due
consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination
when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent
with the principles of their previous resolutions.
"If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which
Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a 'valid classification' as against class legislation, is
very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence :
" 'A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common
disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation
between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the
Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the diservered factions of the original unit
designated with different rules established for each.'" (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E.
465 (1926).
'"Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be
cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute
may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always.
It permits them when there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The
special public purpose will sustain the special form. * *, * The problem in the last analysis is one of
legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain
abuse will there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U.S.
36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
"This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the care or
correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per
cent in the Rules of Court.
"For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) "Pablo Angeles David

"Senator"
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again
asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information
that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the 'members of the Court are taking- the same views they
expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of
the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) Ricardo Paras
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by
virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many
times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Labrador, J.:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine
admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is
judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its exercise. This power should be distinguished from the
power to promulgate rules Which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments
to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit
or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the
passing grades, etc. are within the scope, of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a
candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope
of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general
average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as
having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It
is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing
mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and
discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations
in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking
earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-
making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit
members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
DISSENTING OPINION
Paras, C.J.:
Under section 14 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." This passing mark has always been adhered
to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates
included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for
reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were
raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the
list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a
general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a
general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would
indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or
more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had
been released, and on motion, for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent
were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in
August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949.
Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year
1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of
Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinatons held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly
ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration, invoking the precedents set by this
Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con,
approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per
cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by
the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,
Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by
the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding
(1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social
Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of names of the bar examiners before
the holding of the examinations, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission
fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act
No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the
President gave due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass
the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955
bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass.
Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any
examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such
grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No.
972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions,
praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation
that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6,
1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially
authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici
curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter"
involved "a new question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of
law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which
in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
"The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in ail courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on
pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court,
subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and
the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held
prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court
refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place,
resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases
where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and
unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in
any given year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which
the motions were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because
said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme
Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the strict and constitutional sense of the word, because
bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect
opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place,
retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto,
would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection
of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any
obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal
protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain
obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in
certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because
we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the
circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that
there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At
any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body.
It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the
classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and
circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly
sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the
Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or
acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances of
separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not
produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other.
Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had
obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and
unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after
July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because
said statute; would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court,
namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the
passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when
this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent
or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule
127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section
(fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. It stands to reason, if we are to
admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and
70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since
this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had
doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying
them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public
was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are
bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had
taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may
observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to
make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the
people through their duly elected representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are
thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the. right
men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its
entirety.
Candidates who in 1953 obtained 71.5 per cent, without falling below 50 per cent on any subject, are
considered passed.
67. Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting
as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman under
the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against
public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring
respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending
before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and
filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the
"Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-
accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal
informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that
respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no
longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases
for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed
in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M.
Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).—
Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without
giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10)
days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as
petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the Special Prosecutor's
motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No.
80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That
Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304
recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner
Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's
lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same.
Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second petition:
(1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining
order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case
No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from
conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case
No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for
petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar,
this Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by
the Solicitor General for respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the
original period within which to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court
Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of
and supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled,
"Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from
further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et
al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the
petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused
the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan;
and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in
G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article,
reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent
persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential
persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in
this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big
fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court to
stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter wanted to help
promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against
the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and
mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against two "very
powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and
Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I am a little bit
disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent
the progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while she
symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election time, 'She said that it might be
a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time could be mere
harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of the character of tile
candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent
Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the
Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof
read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal
informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the
Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his
Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following
statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was asked to 'go
slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some
members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the
Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the
press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next
several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2
May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A.
Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988,
the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the media which not
only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its
individual members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and
ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require
respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be
punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making such public
statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the
"Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila
Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had taken that the SC
Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors or motivated by a
desire to stop him 'from investigating cases against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of persons with
pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to render decisions favorable to
their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be too hard on him and
to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme
Court because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due
process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and circumstances attendant
upon the notes written to said public respondent by three (3) members of the Court have since been
submitted to the Court and now form part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require
the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes
thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same
period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent
Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of
Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply
therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for
Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution
of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he
gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to him" there being
allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial
sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4)
Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and
resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this Court
in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 21 dated 20
May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated
26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with
Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez
submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal
arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this
Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted
by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court
over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent
power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers
of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the
Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper
interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of
the parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here;
the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of
the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of
court may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where
the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which
calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35Where the respondent is a lawyer,
however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not
the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to
punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over
lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and
degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt
power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and
arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get
some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and
prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon
the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the
Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives
the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such
proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief)
Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and
judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion,
not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not involve—a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the property and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the
Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof But in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof—as
well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at
grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit
to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to
admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court.
This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested
upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties,
that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power because public
policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary
action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice
against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting
requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit
themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has
burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under
the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done
before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is
not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements
attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his
defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise
to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which
thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency,
is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set
out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the
newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of
retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices
cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop
respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court
Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April
1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that
matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure
the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling
implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country.
Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal
merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon
respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is
very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of
this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were
made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or
Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as
early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in
these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its
Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal
cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that
on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar,
the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist
from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April
1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could
scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they
have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends,"
including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge
too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three
(3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It
is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes
had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been
made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first
accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even
with respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court.
Once again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into
gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and,
more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and
powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the
one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused
persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small
offenders. This accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad
light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the
divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason'
and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without
relation to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that
respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing
to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily
and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of
respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is
unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the
attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in
those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support
thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in
the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the
judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due
process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type
proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements
adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to
transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made,
among others, the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and administrative
charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against
respondent as shown in the language of the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge'
[to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible
administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no
china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation
running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court in its decision
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the impartiality of the entire
Court" and that he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act
with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that a specified
Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision."
(Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to
heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and
statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of
acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this
Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at
respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how
respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and
willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings
aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice
and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court
as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of
the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in
our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander
case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled
threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals
had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of
Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This
suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of
Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar
some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of
the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for
Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a
Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of
the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting
the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the
abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the
purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well
know them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things
that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as
stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of
seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly
rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other
words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged
existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in
G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are
at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of
maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the
laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty
to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember
that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based on its
evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition
for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's
finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial
discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent
del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the
decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for
aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of the land when on
the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both
Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they
acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this
profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that
an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of
our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for
MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements
made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-representation and
obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated
Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to
reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public,
a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to
create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7,
Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September
1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11,
1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-
president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision
dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case,
the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the
Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was
given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case. The appointment referred to was as secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and
makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July
31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent
MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism'
in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said
decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral
Argument of the above-entitled case—which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—Section
1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part—... . Only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This
requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the
decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision
also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in
the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine
the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and
confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial
branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law and invoking the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until
restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three
(3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed,
find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous
executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest
that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous
and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we
issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case:
Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is
the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this
backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and
ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first
apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to
create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in
the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice
for or against a particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the
motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of
impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that
courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, 'although the process
has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made
is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court.
For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents
or principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing,
the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have
each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case
involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking
havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know
this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing
litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect
detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words
are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and yet, this Court
finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade
the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United
States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in ejected.
More specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption
of the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would
invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case' in its favor. A notice
of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency
between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes
that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that
the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this
Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets
with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the
belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should
not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so
desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great
injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and
had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people
may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the
contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed
to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any
reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present
members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied
resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts and government
offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no
members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings
to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to
no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things
and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which
reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost
today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we
alone may decide as to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to
uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must
uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended
Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had
exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court, made the
following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated
April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court
promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a violation of
the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation
which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means, because the rule
of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction and contentment to all
concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force
and to the ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in
the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep
their temper under control at all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the
very life of Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required
counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later
explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express
his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these
explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous and
disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the
members of the Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in
courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil.
724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of
the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right
to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration
of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with
all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise
said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812;
emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to
divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty.
Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a
number of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case
of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to
divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much
evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today
constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the
deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who
were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show cause why he should not be
disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many
blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law
and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to
lower and degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis
supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which
contained the following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce,
as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco
responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above,
the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and
an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having
proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or
with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client,
because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein
are derived, means exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language
published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many years a
member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call
the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases
in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to
make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are
annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and
hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the
consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or
less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which
the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the
purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim;
and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the
public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few
days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the
authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it had
conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he
now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he
neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining
the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved
turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In
the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively
disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed
above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29 April 1955;

8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939);
and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past
penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled
to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for
the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the
charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated
Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to
wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court.
Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire
system of administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some
impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a
complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this
Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this
Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of
free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair
criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny
him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and
of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free
press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the
press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be
vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be
protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges
under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path.
The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of
the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance
of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to
scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by
subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of
the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to
prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost,
indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than
that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also
a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to
point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of
criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are
worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is
addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will
not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the
other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations
and exhibited no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown,
and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of
27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first
place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a
finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the
Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988
Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures
brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for
which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a
particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and
redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in
general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at
a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not
effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts,
including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such
trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case
and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy
of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez,
such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the
individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel
suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of
gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice,
the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo of G.R. Nos. 79690-707, pp. 98-111, Annex "H-1 " of Petition
2 Id., pp. 126-129, Annex "I" of Petition.
3 Rollo of G.R. No. 80578, pp. 28-38, Annex "B" of Petition.
4 Id., P. 39.
5 Id., P. 48.
6 Id., pp. 57-58, Information.

7 Id., pp. 59-60.
8 Id., pp. 51-56.
9 Id., pp. 75-94.
10 Id., p. 96.
11 Id., pp. 98-106.
12 Id., p. 117.
13 Id pp. 123-129.
14 Id., pp. 131-135.
15 Id., P. 136.
16 Id., pp. 168-170.
17 A Constancia was also filed be respondent on this day arguing the merits of his motion and
supplemental motion for reconsideration.
18 Rollo of G.R. No. 80578, pp. 172-178.
19 Id., pp. 179-188.
20 Id., pp. 193-206.
21 Id., pp. 208-210.
22 Id., pp. 211-216.
23 Id., pp. 218-224.
24 Id., p. 225.
25 Id., p. 227.
26 Id., pp. 228-229.
27 Id., pp. 348-352.
28 Id pp. 235-278.
29 Id., pp. 279-301.
30 Id., pp. 314-321.
31 Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 138, Sections 27, 28 and 29, Revised Rules
of Court.
32 Rule 71, Section 3 (d) Revised Rules of Court; Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations. 136 SCRA 112
(1985); Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA, 971 Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241
(1967); Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271 (1953); In re Vicente Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567 (1923);
33 In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 (1916). 33 In Re Kelly, supra; In Re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo,
54 Phil. 801 (1930); In Re Vicente Pelaez, supra; Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, supra; and In Re
Vicente Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
34 Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra; Andres vs. Cabrera, 127 SCRA 802 (1984); Montalban vs.
Canonoy, supra; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, supra; Herras Teehankee v. Director of
Prisons, 76 Phil. 630 (1946).
35 See Section 3 (a), (c) and (d), Rule 71 and Section 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court.
36 The same rule obtains in other jurisdictions, E.g., In re Isserman, 87 A. 2d 903 (1951) certificate
denied Isserman v. Ethics Committee of Essex County Bar Assn., 345 U.S. 927, 97 L. Ed. 1357 (1953):
... The right or power of suspension or disbarment is different and distinct from the power to punish for
contempt, and the exercise of the power to punish for contempt does not prevent disbarment.
37 31 SCRA 564 (1970).
38 31 SCRA at 598-602. The same contention was made and rejected or disregarded in e.g., De Joya, et
al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 99 Phil. 907 (1956).
39 Answer with Explanation and Comment, Annex A pp. 7-1 0.
40 The question was raised by petitioner Zaldivar even earlier, on 27 August 1987, before the
Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12177.
41 See Prudential Bank v. Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia Adm. Case No. 2756, prom.
November 12,1987; Consolidated Bank v. Hon. Dionisio M. Capistrano, etc., Adm. Matter No. RTJ, prom.
March 18,1988.
42 Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 (1987).
43 Tajonera v. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438 (1981); and Richards v. Asoy 152 SCRA 45 (1987).
44 Juanita Yap Say, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73451, March 28,1988.
45 60 SCRA 234 (1974).
46 31 SCRA 1 (1970).
47 14 SCRA 809 (1965).
48 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
49 61 Phil. 724 (1935).
50 Concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 354-356 (1946).
51 In Re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 at 807 (1930).
52 In the Matter of the Citation of Atty. C.A. Frerichs 238 N.W. 2d 764 (1976), respondent attorney
charged the Supreme Court of Iowa with willfully avoiding constitutional questions raised by him thus
violating the constitutional rights of his clients. In answering the citation for contempt, respondent
argued that he was merely fulfilling his duty to be critical and exercising his freedom of expression. The
Supreme Court of Iowa said:
A lawyer, acting in a professional capacity, may have some fewer rights of free speech than would a
private citizen. As was well explained in In re Woodward, 300 S.W. 2d 385. 393-394 Mo. 1957):
...Neither the right of free speech nor the right to engage in "political" activities can be so construed or
extended as to permit any such liberties to a member of the bar; respondent's action was in express and
exact contradiction of his duties as a lawyer. A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech
or political activities until he runs afoul of the penalties of libel or slander, or into some infraction of our
statutory law. A member of the bar can, and will, be stopped at the point where he infringes our Canons
of Ethics; and if he wishes to remain a member of the bar he will conduct himself in accordance
therewith. ... .
The United States Supreme Court had before it an attorney disciplinary proceeding in In re Sawyer, 360
U.S. 622, 79 S. Ct. 1376. 3 L. ED. 2d 1473 (1959). On the "free speech" issue respondent raises here, Mr.
Justice Stewart, concurring in result, clearly was speaking for at least five members of the court when he
said:
.....A lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and honor, which experience
has shown necessary in a calling dedicated to the accomplishment of justice. He who would follow that
calling must conform to those standards.
Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be
constitutionally protected speech. ... ."' (238 N.W. 2d at 769; italics supplied)
In In re Raggio 487 P. 2d 499 (1971), the Supreme Court of Nevada said:
We are never surprised when persons, not ultimately involved with the administration of justice, speak
out in anger or frustration about our work and the manner in which we perform it, and shall protect
their right to so express themselves. A member of the bar, however, stands in a different position by
reason of his oath of office and standards of conduct which he is sworn to uphold conformity with those
standards has proven essential to the administration of justice in our courts." ... ."((487 P.2d at 5OO-
501; emphasis supplied)
53 In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 at 602 (1949).
54 SCRA at 580-581.
55 Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978).
56 Subsequent public statements and acts of respondent Gonzalez fully document the lack of
repentance and the absence of bonafides so essential for legitimate criticism and fair comment. E.g., he
repeated before a Committee of the House of Representative his charge that the Court was promoting
"unequal opportunity (for) justice in the country" by issuing restraining orders against criminal
prosecution of "big cases" (Daily Globe, May 4, 1988; Evening Star, May 4, 1988). He threatened
personally to file impeachment proceeding against three (3) members of the Court whom he had
accused of "pressuring" him to render decisions favorable to their friends (Philippine Star, May 4, 1988).
He accused the Court of "malversation of public funds" for using "public funds" to pay premiums on
"private [group hospitalization] insurance policies" of its members (Manila Chronicle, May 4, 1988). He
asserted that four (4) members of the Court could not dispense justice to him with "the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge" (Malaya, May 6, 1988; Manila Chronicle, May 10, 1988).
57 This was underscored by then Mr. Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alarcon It
might be suggested that judges who are unjustly attacked have a remedy in action for libel. This
suggestion has, however, no rational basis in principle. In the first place, the outrage is not directed to
the judge as a private individual but to the judge as such or to the court as an organ of the
administration of justice. In the second place, public interests will gravely suffer where the judge, as
such, will, from time to time, be pulled down and disrobed of his judicial authority to face his assailant
on equal grounds and prosecute cases in his behalf as a private individual. The same reasons of public
policy which exempt a judge from civil liability in the exercise of his judicial functions, most fundamental
of which is the policy to confine his time exclusively to the discharge of his public duties, applies here
with equal, if not superior, force. ... (69 Phil. 265 at 278 [1939]).
68. Aguirre vs. Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036 (June 10, 2003)
EN BANC
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking
on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to
now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant
alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant
further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In
this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is
not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of
the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the
same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before
the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a
person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his
resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the
Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this
petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May
2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before
he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a
serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly
violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent
resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan
to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the
pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May
2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and
similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On
the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been
authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said
party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or
skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the
MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons
of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public
trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate
passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had
to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act
as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to
Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he
was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as
counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there
was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[1]
105 Phil. 173 (1959).
[2]
G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210.
[3]
Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 211 Phil. 252 (1983).
[4]
In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo, etc., 30
July 1979, 92 SCRA 1.
[5]
Ui v. Bonifacio, Administrative Case No. 3319, 8 June 2000, 333 SCRA 38.
[6]
Bar Matter No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.
[7]
People v. Santocildes, Jr., G.R. No. 109149, 21 December 1999, 321 SCRA 310.
[8]
Diao v. Martinez, Administrative Case No. 244, 29 March 1963, 7 SCRA 475.
[9]
Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, B.M. No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.
[10]
Respondents Comment, Annex A.
[11]
Ibid., Annex B.
69. In RE: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 (1978)
EN BANC
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the
bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity
of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due
weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous
with the late.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The
minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is
without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2chanrobles virtual law library
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be
amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution
No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its
Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano
B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency
further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of
the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll
of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to
comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on February 23,
1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court
required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24,
1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The
matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3chanrobles virtual law library
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme
Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of
Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4chanrobles virtual law library
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5It
was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court,
entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. 6The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the
Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7chanrobles virtual law library
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there
were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration
dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full
competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned
out. 8It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the
appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be said
to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal
were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken
to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the
extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than
justified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his
part was discernible. 9The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character
invoked - the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients
who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career
been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can
integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had
elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It
may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing
the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. 11chanrobles virtual law library
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission
to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is
that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide
by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move.
Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due
contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a
privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
Endnotes:
1 In re Atty, Marcial A. Edillon, AC-1928, August 3, 1978, 84 SCRA 554.
2 The minute resolution reads in full:- "Acting on the petition of Mr. Marcial Edillon for reinstatement to
the Roll of Attorneys and it appearing that he had fully paid his delinquant membership fees due the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and submitted to the IBP Board of Governors a verified application for
reinstatement together with an undertaking to abide by all By-laws and resolutions by said Board in the
event of reinstatement, the Court Resolved to GRANT the petition of Mr. Marcial A. Edillon for as
member of the Philippine Bar. He is hereby allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys after payment of the required fees. This resolution is without prejudice to is an extended
opinion.
3 84 SCRA 559.
4 Section 10, Rule of Court 139-A.
5 84 SCRA 561.
6 Ibid, 561. The reference is to Administrative Case No. 526. In ,he Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973, 49 SCRA 22.
7 In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973, 49 SCRA 22, 33.
8 The resolution denying the motion was issued on November 13, 1978.
9 Letters dated June 5, 1979, August 7, 1979, November 13, 1979, April 12, 1980.
10 39 Phil. 778 (1919).
11 People v. Estenzo. L-24522, May 29, 1975, 64 SCRA 211; Fontelera v. Amores, L-41361. March 8,
1976, 70 SCRA 37; Royeca v., Animas, L-39584, May 3, 1976, 71 SCRA 1; Blancaflor v. Laya, L-31399,
March 17, 1978, 82 SCRA 148; Calo v. Tapucar, L-47244, January 16, 1979, 88 SCRA 78.
70. In RE: IBP Elections, Bar Matter No. 491 (October 6, 1989)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on
June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by
the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as
officers:
NAME POSITION
Atty. Violeta Drilon President
Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President
Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates
Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates
Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates
Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates
Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon
Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon
Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia
Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas
Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas
Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao
Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao
The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme
Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court
from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by
the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and
the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in
violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its
power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-
elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of
votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of
the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board.
For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of,
the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance
that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17,
1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and
"The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-
Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily
Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly
employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and
Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP
delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty.
Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay
Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the
Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the
Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying
by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some
lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is
employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of
personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos,
giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush
hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened and subjected to endless
haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the
day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved
himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their
election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some
embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the
outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of
the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to
inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the
consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening
adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that
the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the
choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers,
national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and
governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the
election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread
belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was
extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of
considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the
dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en
banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one.
Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts
and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of
IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as
Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and
Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez,
acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court
to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza,
the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up
their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of
the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the
charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them
to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were
called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention.
Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the
reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to
determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were
based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have
knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence
given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts;
and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to
impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar
or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or
employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The following acts and practices relative to
election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar
or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another
person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata of
a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such
statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the advertisement
thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a
candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink,
entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3)
making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and
practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the
Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if
elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-
laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following
violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vice-
president, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the country to
solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr.
(t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989
(t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of
chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p.
47) where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting
their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and
requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize their
commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and distributing the
nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the
House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He
obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado
V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F.
Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr.,
Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B.
Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V.
Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr.,
Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C.
Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S.
Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had
obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he
obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of
those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or
remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR)
borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional
Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty.
Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony
Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP
candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty.
Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that
sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of
his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the
DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity
brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His
request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The
Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their
support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He
recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain
regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the
middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma
Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be
allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which
included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic
Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real,
Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the
election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and
for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V.
Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr.
(Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat
(Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President,
Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern
'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog),
Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas),
Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio
L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C.
Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus
T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned
Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila
and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment from him
because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles
won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use
them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed
(t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda
Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets
of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose
Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-
Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as
Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served
as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP
delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association,
and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where
a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge
Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto
Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo
Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera
Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio
Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C.
Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni,
Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas,
Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma,
Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms,
including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by
Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of
P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her
campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms.
Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed
with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto
who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or
discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her.
Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed
by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last
telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of
P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a
downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that
down payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000
(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000

(d) Jay Castro 10,000
(e) Danny Deen 20,000
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000
(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000
(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300
(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the IBP
embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the
legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine
Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did
ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for her
hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine
Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria
Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat,
Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag,
Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta
Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta,
Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza,
Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to
Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the
Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of
the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma
Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her
slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty.
Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who
attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to
whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of
delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to
Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22,
29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a
total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28,
1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit
manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted
to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed themselves
to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion,
Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco,
Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P.
Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan,
Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg,
Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano
E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave
of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon
group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a
member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary
Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is
that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which included
Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed
the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups The
group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during
the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as
emanating from his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco
(candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila).
These two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed
before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like
Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of
lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a
candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the
member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any election
year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from
Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper
(Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data
and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce
similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own
printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the
officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor.
Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year
than in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for
chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed
during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for
Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec.
14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy
for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he
declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the
Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of
the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty.
Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room
would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents'
meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-
54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his
vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is
admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that
there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June
29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's
candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went
around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of
several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June
29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n.
June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another.
He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional
director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During
the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been
reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates had
their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and
Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty.
Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law
Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in
Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the
Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the offer because he was already
committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy,
approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already
committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal
and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this
amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about
P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces,
Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his
campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane
tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her
campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and
beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989,
violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political"
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in
five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and
entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents
who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional
governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions
aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments
and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for
delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by
Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter
presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates
which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of
uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the
convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to
Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to
the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates
(and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some
candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored
consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole
election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but
also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to
obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal
processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded
when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted
from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one
way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's
esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications
that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing
conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted
by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to
have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal
the irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art.
VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a
representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president
has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to
be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the
participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern
disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP
and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization
which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously
diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored
profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this
Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under
Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided
in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the
Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was
abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby
restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed
to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President
from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9)
IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been
completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for
their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer
and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a
Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3
of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by
the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be
rotated among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the national
convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which
shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first
paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to any
election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of
July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3)
months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter,
the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves
the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the
election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this
Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution
as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not
present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the
affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its
adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
71. Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE

OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. —
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his
official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees
with the first part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would
restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and
inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. — However, We agree
with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST
JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. — Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter
of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected
the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a
determination . . . In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope
of their administrative duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL; REASON.
— The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its
records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in
his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an
extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this
question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman
resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can,
whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated
September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and
(2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing
petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent
Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of
Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on
or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been
rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of
February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to
September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety
(90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his
official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the
investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in
Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge
who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious
misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the
State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him
by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down
to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution
granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the
Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this
Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the question
before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases
before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with,
much less resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint
that requires the resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this
Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the
complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1986.
2. L-50508-11, 139 SCRA 252 (1985).
3. The Order of September 18, 1991, in denying petitioner's ex-parte motion to refer the case to the
Supreme Court, cited Article XI, section 13 (1) and (2), which provides:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on compliant be any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at it own instance, any public official or employee of the government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
4. Rollo, p. 19.
72. Judge Jose Caoibes vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132177. July 19, 2001]
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE FLORENTINO
M. ALUMBRES, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Petitioner Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City,
seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated August
22, 1997 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the
Order dated December 22, 1997 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner
to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional
Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint[1] for
physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a
person in authority. Respondent alleged therein that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor
of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner to return the executive table he borrowed
from respondent; that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he
could finish talking, petitioner blurted Tarantado ito ah, and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left
lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses
unserviceable; and that respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He
prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another Complaint[2] against petitioner, this time and
administrative case with the Supreme Court, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying for the
dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a
judicial officer. Said complaint is based on the same facts as those in the complaint filed earlier with the
office of the Ombudsman.
In the Order[3] dated June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-
affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on
July 7, 1997 and Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court,[4] praying that the Office
of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and refer the same to
the Supreme Court which, through the Office of the Court Administrator, is already investigating what
transpired on May 20, 1997. Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of
petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive
supervision and control.
On August 22, 197, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an Order[5] denying the motion for referral to
the Supreme Court. Invoking Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman held
that it is within its jurisdiction to investigate the criminal charges of respondent Judge against petitioner.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[6] of the foregoing order, maintaining that the Office of the
Ombudsman should either refer Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 to the Supreme Court for preliminary
evaluation, or await the latters resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ which involves the same parties
and subject matter.Otherwise, petitioner argues, the absurd situation may result wherein the Office of
the Ombudsman files criminal charges against petitioner who, on the other hand, is declared without
fault by the Supreme Court.
In the Order[7] dated December 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration and required petitioner to submit a counter-affidavit within an inextendible period of
five (5) days from receipt thereof.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari, asking for the reversal of the assailed Orders dated
August 22, 1997 and December 22, 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman and the issuance of a writ of
injunction or temporary restraining order, directing the Office of the Ombudsman to refrain from taking
further action in the implementation of the challenged orders.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on case No.
OMB-0-97-0903 pending resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ.
The issue is not novel. In Maceda vs. Vasquez,[8] this Court resolved in the affirmative the issue of
whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint against a judge, or a court
employee where the same arises from their administrative duties, and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.
Invoking Section 15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman refuses to refrain from taking cognizance
of Case NO. OMB-0-97-0903 in favor of this Court on the ground that, allegedly, the accusations therein
against petitioner constitute simple criminal charges falling within the parameters of its constitutional
power and duty to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee
which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 grants, among others, the following powers and duties to the Office of the
Ombudsman:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may takeover, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault
or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith, or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act...
The foregoing provisions supply the legal basis for the Ombudsman in maintaining its jurisdiction over
the charges of physical injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon a person in authority filed by
respondent Judge against petitioner. This conclusion seems to be reinforced by Section 16 of R.A. 6770
which states that the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure or office.
The Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestations, in Lieu of Comment, correctly opined and we
quote:
xxx the grant of the aforequoted powers to the Office of the Ombudsman is not tantamount to giving it
exclusive authority thereon. In fact, Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770, which is relied upon by the Office of the
Ombudsman in its assailed order, provides that it has primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over graft and
corruption cases and felonies committed by public officers in relation to their office. Moreover, it was
held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993], that the Ombudsmans power under Section 15 (1)
of R.A. 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged.[9]
It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight
within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it
is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel.Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself
whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred
to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved
therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject
of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that
the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect
for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an
administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other
administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.[10]
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does
not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative
prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous
policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this
Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on official business.
[1]
Annex A, Petition, Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 28-30.
[3]
Original Records, p. 12.
[4]
Annex B, Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[5]
Annex C, Petition, Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[6]
Annex D, Petition, Rollo, pp. 25-27.
[7]
Annex E, Petition, Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[8]
221 SCRA 464 [1993].
[9]
Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, p. 8, Rollo, p. 64.
[10]
Supra.
73. In RE: Demetrio Demetria , A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA (March 27, 2001)
EN BANC
A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA March 27, 2001
IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO
DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN:
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness, prudence and
discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of
impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously and
conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of
preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome
of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency."1 The slightest form of
interference cannot be countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the
regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public
confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which appeared on the 21 July 2000
issues of The Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The
national dailies collectively reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried
to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and
out of prison to play in a Manila casino.2
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued a Memorandum to Justice
Demetria directing him to comment on the derogatory allegations in the news items.3 On 24 July 2000,
Justice Demetria submitted his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor (CSP) Jovencito R.
Zuño, who disclosed to the media the name of Justice Demetria, and State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C.
Formaran III, a member of the Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug queen, filed their respective Comments on
the Compliance of Justice Demetria.4
On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation and designated Mme. Justice Carolina C.
Griño-Aquino as Investigator and Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as Prosecutor. An
investigation then commenced on 22 August 2000 and continued until 16 November 2000.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuño, SP Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason,
secretary of SP Formaran, III, and Jose H. Afalla, an employee from the Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP)
Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The defense on the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses: respondent Justice
Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino Gaña, Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo
Dañosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai, MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer
of Go Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and Luisito Artiaga, official of the
Philippine Amateur Track and Field Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the prosecution are quite clear. In an Information
dated 9 December 1998, SP Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, a
certain Kenneth Monceda y Sy alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br. 18,5 with violation of Sec.
15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent and without authority of law . . . (to) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), which is a regulated drug."6 Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth
Monceda were held at the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On
25 June 1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a Petition for Bail on the ground that the evidence of her guilt was
not strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the accused, especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been
seen regularly playing in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the City Jail.7 On the same day,
Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the motion and ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2)
accused to the Manila City Jail.8
On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the evidence standing alone and unrebutted, is
strong and sufficient to warrant conviction of the two accused for the crime charged" and denied the
petition for bail of accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit.9 Consequently, both accused filed a Joint Motion
for Inhibition arguing that the trial court's actuation "do not inspire the belief that its decision would be
just and impartial."10 On 28 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint motion was utterly
without merit but considering the gravity of the offense and for the peace of mind of the accused,
inhibited himself.11
The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V. Colet. Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed
a Motion to Order the Confinement of the Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet could resolve the
motion, the case was handled by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and allowed her to be confined at the
Manila Doctors Hospital for a period not exceeding seven (7) days,12 contrary to the recommendation of
Dr. Jose Estrada Rosal, Chief of the Health Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu Yuk Lai be confined at
the Philippine General Hospital.13
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion for Extension of Medical
Confinement "for a period of one (1) month, or until such time that she is fit to be discharged from the
said hospital."14 On 7 July 2000 Judge Muro also granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to File
Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence.15 Soon, rumors circulated in the
Manila City Hall that Judge Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified employees of the RTC Manila calling
themselves "CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote the Secretary of Justice, copy furnished the Chief
State Prosecutor, the Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro ordered the
hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and there (was) already a rumor circulating
around the City Hall, that the notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to
file the Motion to Quash, which (would) be granted for a consideration of millions of pesos and the
contact person (was) allegedly the daughter of the Judge, who is an employee in the said branch."16
Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit
himself "from further handling this case and/or from resolving the demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as any other pending incidents therein."17
On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she was supposed to be confined at the
Manila Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at
the Holiday Inn Pavilion, Manila, while playing baccarat. She was unescorted at the time of her arrest.
On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and
submitted for resolution. Later, at around 11:30 o'clock, when SP Formaran III arrived in his office from
the hearing, he was informed by his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of Court of Appeals Justice
Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said that the Justice wanted to speak with him. The caller
requested for a return call. As requested, SP Formaran III immediately returned the call of Justice
Demetria but the Justice had already gone out for lunch.
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice Demetria, PATAFA President Go Teng Kok
and Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a close friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office
of SP Formaran III in the DOJ which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert Fonacier. Apparently, Justice
Demetria was not familiar with SP Formaran III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka, Prosecutor
Formaran?"18
Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his
motion to inhibit Judge Muro as this would purportedly delay the resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok
also expressed his apprehension that if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might convict his friend,
accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving bad publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III informed the Justice that a
motion for inhibition has been submitted for resolution, one basis of which was the unsigned letter of
the concerned court employees. Justice Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to anchor the
inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The Justice then advised Go Teng Kok who was
becoming persistent to "keep his cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go
Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been asking SP Formaran III to go
slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai.19 SP Formaran III at first politely declined the request. But later,
"just to put an end to (the) conversation," 20 he told them that he would bring the matter to CSP Zuño.
"Iyon pala," Justice Demetria replied. The Justice then stood up, bade good bye and left. Atty. Paas and
Go Teng Kok followed closely behind.21
Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuño and informed the latter of what had transpired. CSP
Zuño replied, "No way!" SP Formaran III also told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave the same reply.22
At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuño received a call from Justice Demetria who
requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw the motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so that
the Judge could already issue an order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na i-withdraw
na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice
Demetria was quoted as saying.23 Politely, CSP Zuño said that he would see what he could do. "Tingnan
ko po kung ano ang magagawa ko."24
On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme Court Justice . . . and an
outspoken sports person and leader"25 had been exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in
prosecuting re-arrested drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. That same afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria and
Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear the name of the Supreme Court justices who
might have been affected by the erroneous news report. The following day, 21 July 2000, several
newspapers named Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."
Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order dated 19 July 2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting
himself from further hearing the case of Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda.26
Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he
admitted that he indeed visited the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit old friends" and his
meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until that time was purely accidental. Expectedly, Atty.
Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the claim of respondent Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng
Kok about the case" without ever specifying the kind of "help" that he requested. He averred that it was
purely on the basis of erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran III that he
impliedly asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing and
requesting."27 Respondent claimed that the "help" he was requesting could well be "within legal bounds
or line of duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the discussion between Go Teng Kok
and SP Formaran III, such was not a form of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it"
when the discussion between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated. While he asked about
the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the case and bolstered his
claim that he could not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his identification by CSP Zuño as the Justice
exerting undue pressure on the DOJ were all hearsay. Respondent submitted that CSP Zuño based his
identification from a newspaper account, from the statement of his secretary that it was he (Justice
Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone and from SP Formaran III when the latter
consulted the Chief State Prosecutor about the visit of the Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him
to withdraw the motion.
In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was actually he, not Justice Demetria, who
later called up CSP Zuño to inquire about the latter's decision regarding the withdrawal of the motion to
inhibit since SP Formaran III had earlier told Go Teng Kok that the matter would be taken up with his
superiors.
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III
whom he just met for the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise
met for the first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would
be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice
asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not
accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino believes so. In her Report dated 5 January 2001, she found
respondent Justice Demetria "guilty of violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and
recommended that "appropriate disciplinary action be taken against him by this Honorable Court."28
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning. Thus, even the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, after a hearing, found that "there was a conspiracy to commit
the following offenses on the part of CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA President Go
Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice punishable under PD No. 1829 and Article 3(a) of RA
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."29
While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal case, his denial cannot stand
against the positive assertions of CSP Zuño and SP Formaran III,30 which are consistent with natural
human experience. To accept the testimony of the defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who
telephoned CSP Zuño, and not Justice Demetria, and that the "help" the respondent Justice was
requesting SP Formaran III was something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than the
withdrawal of the motion is to strain too far one's imagination.
The testimony of CSP Zuño is plainly unambiguous and indubitably consistent with the other facts and
circumstances surrounding the case —
CSP Zuño: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran
na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro."31
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III said that he would consult his
superiors regarding the proposal to withdraw the motion. The timely telephone call to CSP Zuño was
thus a logical follow-up. And no one could have made the call except respondent Justice since it is not
uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuño would recognize the voice of respondent Justice who
was CSP Zuño's former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State
Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order
si Judge Muro" could not have come from anyone else but from respondent Justice who had moral
ascendancy over CSP Zuño, he being a Justice of the Court of Appeals and a former Undersecretary and
at one time Acting Secretary of the DOJ.
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice claims he did not know and met
only that time, could not have meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit
Judge Muro. True, Justice Demetria never categorically asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion.
But when respondent Justice Demetria asked the state prosecutor at that particular time "to do
something . . . to help Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion, and
nothing else. That was the only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok wanted. The subtle pressure exerted
simply pointed to one particular act. Thus, subsequently respondent Justice called CSP Zuño to ask for
just that — the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.
Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas, went to the DOJ, first, to see Secretary
Artemio Tuquero and seek assistance in the appointment of Atty. Paas to the Court of Appeals, and
second, to "visit old friends,"32 and that the meeting with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental. But
respondent Justice never mentioned in his earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief
Justice that his primary purpose in going to the DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec. Tuquero was
not in, he instead decided to see some officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited for a long time.
We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own witnesses belied his alibi. ACSP Gaña, Jr.
testified and confirmed that Justice Demetria only said "hi."33 SSP Dañosos, denied seeing him and
claimed that it was only Atty. Paas who peeped into his room.34 Suspiciously, it was really in the office of
SP Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria did not know, where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas
and Go Teng Kok decided to "stay a while."35
Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, the Investigating Justice, Justice Demetria and
company could not have been there to exchange pleasantries with SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since
they were not acquainted with each other. Prior to this incident, Justice Demetria did not personally
know either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact corroborated by respondent himself.36
All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's earlier Compliance to the Memorandum
of the Chief Justice that "[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we decided to drop by his office
. . . (and) I stayed a while."37
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice was there "to join forces with Go Teng
Kok in arguing for the withdrawal of Formaran's Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real
purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and to the DOJ. The uncanny coincidence in the timing of Justice
Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng Kok, could not have been 'accidental' but
pre-arranged."38 And, "visiting old friends" only came as an afterthought. The circumstances simply
show that Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas, together with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the DOJ to see Sec.
Tuquero, but to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuño and SP Formaran III.
Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to help Yu Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of
whom he did not personally know, and more unthinkable that he would be asking help from SP
Formaran III whom he had just met for the first time.
The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent is a very close friend of Atty. Paas,
lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary that respondent Justice Demetria be acquainted with Go
Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the accused. It is enough that he
is a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has been helping the accused, and that he wields
influence as a former DOJ Undersecretary and later, Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court of
Appeals.
In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing and trustworthy, as compared
to those of the defense which do not only defy natural human experience but are also riddled with
major inconsistencies which create well-founded and overriding doubts.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice
is circumscribed with the heavy of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety
and must be above suspicion.39 His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to
the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private
individual.
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live up to this expectation.
Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but also
caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national
newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and interfering with her prosecution
seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness tha a seat in the Judiciary.40 High ethical principles and a sense of
propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable
in orderly society cannot be preserved.41 There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot
meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.42
WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold Justice Demetrio G. Demetria
GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any
government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government owned or controlled
corporation or institution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
Puno, J ., abroad on official leave.
Footnotes
1
Rule 2.04, Code of Judicial Conduct.
2
21 July 2000 issue of The Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. 20.
3
Exh. "A".
4
Exhs. "B" and "C."
5
Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, presiding.
6
Information dated 9 December 1998, filed by State Prosecutor Pablo C. Formaran III.
7
Exh. "F."
8
Exh. "G."
9
Exh. "H."
10
Exh. "I."
11
Exh. "K."
12
Exh. "O."
13
Exh. "N."
14
Exh. "P."
15
Exh. "S."
16
Exh. "T."
17
Exh. "U."
18
TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 35.
19
Id., p. 34.
20
Compliance of SP Pablo C. Formaran III, dated 1 August 2000.
21
TSN, 24 August 2000, pp. 25-26.
22
Id., pp. 26-27.
23
TSN, 24 August 2000, pp. 73-74.
24
Ibid.
25
Compliance of CSP Jovencito R. Zuño, dated 2 August 2000.
26
TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 53; Exh. "V."
27
Id., p. 54.
28
5 January 2001 Report of Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, p. 12.
29
Committee Report No. 396 of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights submitted on 29 August
2000.
30
See Note 28, p. 11.
31
TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 74.
32
Counter Affidavit of respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria, pars. 1 and 2.
33
TSN, 8 September 2000, p. 8.
34
Id., p. 18.
35
Exh. "5," p. 1.
36
Memorandum of the Respondent, p. 20; TSN, 13 November 2000, p. 82.
37
Compliance of Justice Demetria, dated 24 July 2000, p. 1.
38
See Note 30.
39
Jereos, Jr. v. Reblando, Sr., AM No. 141, 31 May 1976, 71 SCRA 126.
40
Dia-Añonuevo v. Bercacio, AM No. 177-MJ, 27 November 1975, 68 SCRA 81.
41
Candia v. Tagabucba, AM No. 528, MJ, 12 September 1977, 79 SCRA 51.
42
Barja Jr., v. Judge Bercacio, AM No. 561-MJ, 29 December 1976, 74 SCRA 355.
74. CSC vs. DBM, G.R. No. 158791 (July 22, 2005)
EN BANC
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 158791
Petitioner,
Present:
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
- versus - PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, CARPIO,
Respondent. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 22, 2005
_______________________
x - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the
Department of Budget and Management (respondent) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year
2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional
concept of fiscal autonomy.
By petitioners claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office by the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all sources
of funds are considered, amount to P285,660,790.44.[1] It complains, however, that the total fund
releases by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14,
thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its no report, no
release policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents
mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on
the Release of the FY 2002 Funds,[2] which documents are:
1. Annual Cash Program (ACP)
2. Requests for the Release of Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and Notice of Cash
Allocation (NCA)
3. Summary List of Checks Issued and Cancelled
4. Statement of Allotment, Obligations and Balances
5. Monthly Statement of Charges to Accounts Payable
6. Quarterly Report of Actual Income
7. Quarterly Financial Report of Operations
8. Quarterly Physical Report of Operations
9. FY 2001 Preliminary and Final Trial Balance
10. Statement of Accounts Payable
Petitioner contends that the application of the no report, no release policy upon independent
constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore,
unconstitutional.
Respondent, at the outset, opposes the petition on procedural grounds. It contends that first, petitioner
did not exhaust administrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from respondents Secretary
regarding the extent of fiscal autonomy before resorting to this Court. Second, even assuming that
administrative remedies were exhausted, there are no exceptional and compelling reasons to justify the
direct filing of the petition with this Court instead of the trial court, thus violating the hierarchy of
courts.
On the merits, respondent, glossing over the issue raised by petitioner on the constitutionality of
enforcing the no report, no release policy, denies having strictly enforced the policy upon offices vested
with fiscal autonomy, it claiming that it has applied by extension to these offices the Resolution of this
Court in A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC (Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal Autonomy) issued on
June 3, 1993, [3] particularly one of the guiding principles established therein governing the budget of the
Judiciary, to wit:
5. The Supreme Court may submit to the Department of Budget and Management reports of operation
and income, current plantilla of personnel, work and financial plans and similar reports only for
recording purposes. The submission thereof concerning funds previously released shall not be a
condition precedent for subsequent fund releases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of petitioners budget was not on
account of any failure on petitioners part to submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a shortfall
in revenues.[4]
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked by respondent applies only where there is an
express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in
court.[5] As petitioner is not mandated by any law to seek clarification from the Secretary of Budget and
Management prior to filing the present action, its failure to do so does not call for the application of the
rule.
As for the rule on hierarchy of courts, it is not absolute. A direct invocation of this Court's original
jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.[6] Petitioner justifies its direct filing of the petition with this Court as
the matter involves the concept of fiscal autonomy granted to [it] as well as other constitutional bodies,
a legal question not heretofore determined and which only the Honorable Supreme Court can decide
with authority and finality.[7] To this Court, such justification suffices for allowing the petition.
Now on the substantive issues.
That the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal
autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal
autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
In Province of Batangas v. Romulo,[8] this Court, in construing the phrase automatic release in Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution reading:
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them,
held:
Websters Third New International Dictionary defines automatic as involuntary either wholly or to a
major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition;
mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton. Further, the word automatically is defined as in an
automatic manner: without thought or conscious intention. Being automatic, thus, connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory.As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to
receive the just share accruing to them from the national coffers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)[9]
By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a

constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that
no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the above-cited
June 3, 1993 Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no
release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.[10]
Respecting respondents justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall in
revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the
second place, even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-
compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution.
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs teaches that [a]n interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.[11]
If respondents theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly
release approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month[12] that there is a
shortfall in revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering insignificant
altogether, such mandate.
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner
may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that
extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all
others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction
established by the Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the
release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a
revenue shortfall.
Significantly, the Year 2002 GAA itself distinguished between two types of public institutions in the
matter of fund releases. With respect to government agencies in general, the
pertinent General Provisions of the GAA read as follows:
Sec. 62. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No appropriations authorized in this Act
shall be impounded through deduction or retention, unless in accordance with the guidelines for the
imposition and release of reserves and the rules and regulations for deduction, retention or deferral
of releases shall have been issued by the DBM in coordination with the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance. Accordingly, all the funds appropriated for the
purposes, programs, projects and activities authorized in this Act, except those covered by Special
Provision No. 1 of the Unprogrammed Fund shall be regularly and automatically released in accordance
with the established allotment period and system by the DBM without any deduction, retention or
imposition of reserves. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sec. 63. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or reduction of appropriations
authorized in this Act shall be effected only in cases where there is unmanageable national
government budget deficit.
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this Section shall be construed to mean
that the actual national government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit
targets consistent with the full-year target deficit of P130.0 billion as indicated in the FY 2002 Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President to Congress pursuant to Section 22,
Article VII of the Constitution or there are clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of
such condition, as determined by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee and approved by
the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In contrast, the immediately succeeding provision of the Year 2002 GAA, which specifically applied to
offices vested with fiscal autonomy, stated:
Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with Fiscal Autonomy. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines,
the Commission on Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections shall be automatically and regularly released.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally allowed when there
is an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with the
Constitution, excepted from such rule the appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus,
even assuming that there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold full
release of petitioners funds without violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the
General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.
This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also states as a guiding principle
on the Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal Autonomy that:
4. After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly
released subject to availability of funds. (Underscoring supplied)
This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict the present ruling that the
funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released, a shortfall
in revenues notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total
revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total appropriations for all
entities vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it would be practically impossible to fully release
the Judiciarys appropriations or any of the entities also vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter,
without violating the right of such other entities to an automatic release of their own appropriations. It
is under that situation that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly
release appropriations is allowed.
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small portion of the total
national budget, only in the most extreme circumstances will the total revenue collections fall short of
the requirements of such agencies. To illustrate, in the Year 2002 GAA the budget for agencies vested
with fiscal autonomy amounted only to P14,548,620,000.00, which is 2.53% of the total appropriations
in the amount of P575,123,728,000.00.[13] In Year 2003 GAA, which was re-enacted in 2004, the budget
for the same agencies was P13,807,932,000.00, which is 2.27% of the total appropriations amounting
to P609,614,730,000.00.[14] And in the Year 2005, the budget for the same agencies was
only P13,601,124,000.00, which is 2.28% of the total appropriations amounting
to P597,663,400,000.00.[15]
Finally, petitioners claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower than that of the previous
fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected.
For with respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly provides:
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced
by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional Commissions, a
similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is
clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5 merely states:
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations
below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of
Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. Respondents act of
withholding the subject funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Accordingly, respondent is directed to release to petitioner the amount of Five Million Eight Hundred
Seven Thousand, Three hundred Ninety Two Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P5,807,392.30) representing
the unreleased balance of petitioners appropriation for its Central Office by the General Appropriations
Act for FY 2002.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
CONSUELO
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING YNARES-SANTIAGO

ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo at 6.
[2]
Id. at 25-35.
[3]
Id. at 99-100.
[4]
Id. at 100.
[5]
C.N. Hodges v. City of Iloilo, 125 PHIL 442, 447-448 (1967).
[6]
Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, 138 (1994).
[7]
Rollo at 9.
[8]
429 SCRA 736 (2004).
[9]
Id. at 760.
[10]
Art. VIII, Section 3.
[11]
29 SCRA 617, 628 (1969).
[12]
Respondent states in its Comment: Consequently, every month, it behooves upon the department to
coordinate with the revenue collecting agencies and determine if total revenue collections meets total
projections, if the deficit ceiling has been surpassed, and if the total disbursement program exceeds this
ceiling. On the basis of these data, total amount of cash to be released for the month is set. If the total
disbursement program is less than the ceiling, then allotments of agencies are released in full. However,
if total disbursement program exceeds the ceiling, agency allotments are only partially released.
(Rollo at 100-101)
[13]
R.A. No. 9162, General Appropriations Act, FY 2002.
[14]
[15]
[16]
Article VIII, Section 3.

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36. Miranda vs. Aguirre, G.R.

133064 (September 16, 1999)

[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999]

GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

We find merit in the petition.

In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:

"BILL ON SECOND READING

H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago

"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO

"Thank you, Mr. President.

"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments.

"Senator Roco. Mr. President.

"The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?

"Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.

"Senator Roco is recognized.

"Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.

"Thank you, Mr. President.

"Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

"Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.

"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.

"Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Sections 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:

"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

"The President. Is there any objection?

"Senator Enrile. Mr. President.

"The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.

"Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.

"Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.

"It was 7:54 p.m.

"At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.

"The President. The session is resumed.

"Senator Sotto is recognized.

"The President. The amendment is withdrawn.

"Senator Maceda. Mr. President.

"The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.

"Thank you anyway, Mr. President.

"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.

"The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.

"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

"Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments.

"APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING

"As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.

"Several Members. Aye

As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]

"House Bill No. 8729 is approved on Second Reading."

Vitug, J., see separate opinion.

Mendoza, J., see dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., joins J. Mendoza in his dissenting opinion.

Buena, J., see dissenting opinion.

[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999]

We find merit in the petition.

In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:

"BILL ON SECOND READING

H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago

The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729

"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO

"Thank you, Mr. President.

"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.