Geoforum 43 (2012) 716–724

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Geoforum
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The limits of armed contestation: Power and domination in armed groups

Klaus Schlichte ⇑
Institut für Interkulturelle und Internationale Studien, Universität Bremen, D-28359 Bremen, Germany

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Non-state war actors have only recently become a subject of study in political geography while other
Available online 6 April 2012 social sciences such as political anthropology, sociology and political science have addressed this subject
in their respective conceptual language. This article, drawing on empirical research on war actors in 14
Keywords: countries and using data on a sample of 80 such groups, advocates using the language of political soci-
War ology, and in particular that of Max Weber and Norbert Elias, to study this form of contestation. It pre-
Armed groups sents some major findings of an empirical analysis built on these conceptualizations. Written from a
Political sociology
political science perspective it tries to link up to the discourse in other social sciences, especially in polit-
Norbert Elias
Max Weber
ical geography.
Domination Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Weber and Norbert Elias will be fundamental in order to under-

Estimates of the most prominent research centers on wars show
that since the end of the Second World War there have been
around 200 major armed conflicts, of which the overwhelming part
were intra-state, with numerous foreign interventions (Gantzel
and Schwinghammer, 2000; Schlichte, 2002). Intra-state wars are
defined by the observation that so-called non-state actors wage
war against national governments or that rivaling factions fight
over state control while central authority has already broken
down. Given the fact that in war most groups show dynamics of
fractionalization and splintering, it is plausible to assume that
the number of non-state actors in these wars amounts to at least
1000. The number of groups which might have begun with low lev-
els of violence and withered away after first encountering repres-
sive action is unknown. The fact that there is still a multitude of
such actors today is supported by the data published by the Lon-
don based International Institute for Strategic Studies: it lists 332
in 28 major armed conflicts for 2005 alone (IISS, 2006).
Non-state war actors have attracted considerable attention in
political science, sociology and political geography alike. However,
discussions remain largely confined within their disciplinary
boundaries. While in sociology and political anthropology, much
emphasis is put on cultural traits of actors, authors from political
science just presuppose rational utilitarian logics of action. In this
article, I intend to offer a theoretical understanding that allows
bridges to be built across these disciplinary boundaries by referring
to conceptions of political sociology. Ideas and concepts of Max
⇑ Tel.: +49 421 218 67475; fax: +49 421 218 7248.
E-mail address: klaus.schlichte@iniis.uni-bremen.de
URL: http://www.iniis.uni-bremen.de
stand armed groups as often pluri-local political actors and their
dynamics. Armed groups can be seen as instances of contestation,
and their politics are, as I argue, also informative for the theoretical
discussion of power and space that has developed in political geog-
raphy over the last 10 years. It is also a subject that brings together
social anthropology, sociology and political science, creating the
usual mutual misunderstandings and misrepresentations between
‘‘foreign’’ disciplines, but at the same time offering opportunities
for mutual enrichment. Before I outline this argument more exten-
sively, I will sketch some main strands of research on armed
groups in different social sciences, focusing on how these actors
have been represented and to what extent these debates have been
related to conceptualizations of power.
Non-state armed actors have attracted a lot of scholarly atten-
tion in political science and sociology over the past 15 years, and
increasingly so since the events of September 11, 2001. In a first
round, most of the literature followed the resurgence of nationalist
and ethnic movements that were observed in the Caucasus, during
the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, but also in Africa and
Asia in the early 1990s (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Snyder, 2000;
Wimmer, 2002). Simultaneously, the economic underpinnings of
civil war became another major object of research in political sci-
ence, giving greater emphasis to the rational underpinnings of
war behavior (e.g. Elwert, 1997; Keen, 1998) of which few contri-
butions have seen the transnational embeddedness of actors and
their economic relations (cf. Jean and Rufin, 1999).
Particularly in political science, research has been dominated
over the past 10 years by rationalist assumptions and preferably
quantitative methodologies, tallying events country by country,
without paying much attention to the incorporation of cases into
international politics or examining their interconnectedness.

0016-7185/$ - see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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 K. Schlichte / Geoforum 43 (2012) 716–724
Armed actors appear here as utility-maximizing individuals with-
out any historical background, and their internal relations are
either conceived as being entirely instrumental or built on ‘‘social
capital’’ (cf. Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein, 2007).
One area of research which moves beyond this rationalist, util-
ity-maximizing conception of violence is the research on Islamist
movements, as testified by the boom of literature on terrorism
since 2001 (e.g. Pape, 2003; Hofman, 2006). While this literature
has often blurred the distinction between small groups that rely
exclusively on terrorist strategies and mass movements in civil
wars such as the FARC in Colombia or Hizbollah in Lebanon, it is
also heavily influenced by the overarching objective of contribut-
ing to the fight against non-state war actors in the context of coun-
ter-insurgency strategies. As such, it has not delivered much
insight into the dynamics of such organized actors or their
embeddedness in wider power relations. Where this is undertaken,
scholars tend to reduce the interpretation of these actors by apply-
ing a rationalist reductionism.
This stands in sharp contrast to what has happened in social
and political anthropology. Here, numerous, highly valuable case
studies on armed groups and intra-state war have been produced.
Some of them, like Geffray’s work on Mozambique (1985), Ellis’
work on Liberia (1999), or McKenna’s study of the Philippines
(1999) have led to the dissolution of earlier stereotypical explana-
tions of the politics of armed groups that were deduced from Wes-
tern political self-perceptions. Most of the contributions in
anthropology, however, have stuck to the tradition of the disci-
pline, focusing on narrow local dynamics at the cost of neglecting
the increasing internationalization of armed conflict. The discipline
is still dominated by an understanding that – in a clear normative
code – puts ‘‘the local’’ in contradistinction to the state (cf. Fergu-
son and Gupta, 2002).
Up until the early 2000s, global power relations were not a sub-
ject in anthropology. The self-imposed restriction to the local focus
has now been lifted, and the same is true with respect to the sub-
ject of political violence. Nordstrom’s work (2004) on the global
connections of war economies in Africa and Asia has attracted
much attention in the discipline and beyond, but recent case stud-
ies now also transcend the traditional boundaries of the discipline
by following the movements of their cases: Falge (2011) has for in-
stance shown how densely the web between Nuer refugees in the
US and the politics of the SPLA in Southern Sudan is woven. Studies
on relations between diaspora communities and non-state war ac-
tors, reaching from Sri Lanka to Toronto and from Asmara to Frank-
furt show that conflicts are not confined to the sites of the actual
fighting (Radtke, 2009).
The observation that marginalized youth plays a decisive role in
the formation of violent contestation globally has also stimulated
new anthropological research on global youth cultures whose fash-
ion accessories and icons appear under very different settings: She-
pler (2005), for example, observes how US rap music has aptly
been appropriated by the youth in Sierra Leone. The same selective
appropriation takes place with the international NGO discourse on
child soldiers or the iconography of leftist guerillas. In terms of
symbolic references, it is becoming increasingly difficult to differ-
entiate ‘‘local’’, ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘global’’ arenas.
In political geography, non-state war actors have only recently
moved into the focus of attention (e.g. LeBillon, 2001; Korf and
Fünfgeld, 2006). Political violence, though exclusively in the form
of wars between states, is a long-standing, established field of re-
search (Boulding, 1962; Sprout, 1963) and has been a, if not the
major subject of geopolitics, since the times of Ratzel and Hausho-
fer (cf. Diner, 1993). This older research field was built on an
understanding of space and power that seems outdated now, as
mere proximity no longer seems to be a guarantee of influence. Re-
cent debates in political geography have reflected a lot on the
717
question of how power and domination are to be re-considered
in the age of globalization. It is in linking up with these debates
that I want to position my contribution.
One of the most prominent geographers, Harvey (2005), advo-
cates an understanding of political geography that builds on
Marx’ theory of capital accumulation and class domination to ex-
plain uneven development. Further work from a Marxist, femi-
nist, and ‘post-development’ perspective has delivered a host of
other and related ideas and observations on the spatial dimen-
sions of domination (see e.g. Sparke, 2004). Seemingly, the ‘‘big
N-word’’, neoliberalism, has become one of the most heavily dis-
cussed concept in political geography for finding a common con-
ceptual denominator in the study of contemporary political
order. This entails the risk that neoliberalism might become
something like ‘‘a consolatory code-word that masks and thereby
exacerbates the challenges of contemporary engagement’’ (Spark,
2006, p. 358), a tendency that would turn against the committed
academic’s original intentions and, as one might object, also con-
ceal rather than reveal power dynamics that are not reducible to
neoliberal governmentality.
The over-stretched concept of neoliberalism is, however, not
the only idea that has been developed in political geography in re-
cent years. While Sharpe et al. (2000) still employ a binary under-
standing of domination and resistance, they already take into
account relational understandings of power as promoted by Ste-
phen Lukes and Anthony Giddens, in the wake of Georg Simmel
or Max Weber. The contribution, however, that comes closest to
the conceptualization suggested in this article is the writing on
power and space in geography which has been proposed by Allen
(2003). He understands power as ‘‘a relational effect of social inter-
action’’ (Allen, 2003, p. 2) that can therefore be interpreted as a
continuation of seminal understandings of power in political soci-
ology. Allen’s conceptualization has the decisive advantage that it
overcomes the idea of a close correlation between proximity and
power (2003, p. 192). Allen’s contribution might not have con-
vinced political geographers altogether (cf. Low, 2005). However,
as I shall argue, it at least builds a bridgehead to those discussions
in political sociology that have come to terms with the analysis of
non-state political dynamics as the politics of armed groups.
In order to show that political sociology offers a particularly
appropriate vocabulary for this interdisciplinary encounter, I will
first briefly discuss how armed groups, their politics and power
relations have been discussed in the respective disciplines. Being
a political scientist, the focus of my discussion will be on political
science literature, at the risk of leaving considerable room for crit-
icism concerning my superficial reading of other disciplines’ con-
tributions. However, the aim of this contribution being to initiate
a discussion rather than create disciplinary domination, any obser-
ver of the topical field will see that this will be of mutual benefit.
In the next section, I will explain the particular aptness of Max
Weber’s and Norbert Elias’ contributions to political sociology for
the analysis of armed groups politics. I will combine this with a
brief discussion of the attribute ‘‘political’’ that accompanies so
many descriptions of selves and others. This understanding, as I
hope to demonstrate, is also able to accommodate spatiality as
the corresponding key notion of political geography.
The second section of this article is devoted to empirical find-
ings on the politics of armed groups. Their formation processes,
their internal structures and dynamics, their failure and their
transformation are all telling for the theoretical discussions that
sociology, political geography and political science share with re-
spect to the current global political order. The article will conclude
with a summary of such findings and a brief theoretical outlook.
For the empirical findings presented in this article, I will draw
on the results of a larger research project undertaken between
2001 and 2008 at Humboldt University, Berlin. It consisted of a
718 K. Schlichte / Geoforum 43 (2012) 716–724
team of one post-doc researcher and seven PhD students.1 In this
research project, an in-depth-analysis of armed groups, including
field research, was carried out in fourteen countries. Hypotheses
and theses of these theory-driven studies were tested against a
dataset on eighty armed groups, henceforth referred to here as the
MAG-database. The construction of the mechanisms outlined in this
contribution is based on the comparative, reiterative discussion of
cases within the research team. In order to identify common features
of armed groups, in-depth ‘‘biographies’’ of single case studies were
used to develop hypotheses which were then tested against the data
gathered for 80 cases assembled in the data base.
The in-depth studies of ‘‘biographies’’ dealing with organiza-
tional features as well as their practices on the battlefield and also
in areas they controlled, are based not only on literature but also
on field research carried out by members of the research group
in the respective countries. ‘‘Biographies’’ in the database, how-
ever, were constructed exclusively on the basis of academic case
literature and press reports.2 What was crucial for the interpreta-
tion of this data was the intensive comparative discussion within
the research group which brought together expertise not only from
political science, but also of regional studies, sociology, political
anthropology, history and economics.
2. On figurations
The term figuration was introduced into sociological discussions
by Norbert Elias, who defined it as the changing pattern of relations
between interdependent individuals (1991, p. 76f). This understand-
ing avoids the reduction of the political to either intended actions of
individuals or to the ‘‘structure’’ of societies or systems, but stresses
relations between individuals or other units of figurations as the for-
mative element of society. Central to this understanding are the
qualities of the relations between members of a figuration.
Conceptually, Elias’ aim was precisely to find a third way be-
tween the analytical poles of methodological individualism and ab-
stract structuralism. Using the term figuration, Elias aimed to show
that societies consist of numerous ensembles of social relation-
ships that are also interrelated. Within figurations the relations be-
tween these interdependent individuals are seen as ‘‘unstable
power balances’’. By using the term ‘‘balance’’ it was Elias’ inten-
tion to avoid the claim that these relations are among equals or
‘‘just’’ in a normative sense. Quite to the contrary, he stressed the
continuing struggle in these relations, the never-ending game of
‘‘balance’’ between those involved. Such power relations are not
exclusively dominated by one side only. They consist of mutual
dependencies, exactly as Hegel depicted it in his famous dialectic
of lordship and bondage in his ‘‘Phenomenology of the Spirit’’.3 A
command must be responded to with obedience, a wish with fulfil-
ment. And powerful as a master might be, to some extent he is al-
ways dependent on the servant’s service. These relations are
always open to renegotiation, and therefore Elias described figura-
tions as ‘‘fluctuating power balances’’ (1991, p. 142).
Figurations are thus more structured than what have recently
been defined as ‘‘assemblages’’, a notion that goes back to Gilles Del-
1
Cf. http://www.ipw.ovgu.de/en/research_activities/inhalt/projects_and_confer-
ences /micropolitics/contact.html. Funding for this research was provided by
Volkswagen-Foundation (Hannover, Germany). The author to discussions with Teresa
Koloma Beck, Daria Isachenko, Stefan Malthaner, Astrid Nissen, Katrin Radtke, Jago
Salmon and Alex Veit from which numerous of the insights and reflections presented
here originate.
2
All these groups were active for more than a year between 1945 and 2005. The
sample included 24 groups from Sub-Saharan Africa, 23 from the Middle East,
including Northern Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia, 20 groups from Asia, 7 cases
from Latin America and 6 European groups. Given the fact that only documented
cases could be looked at, the sample has of course a selection bias.
3 4
For a very clear and convincing analysis of the power dynamics in this text cf.
Wartenberg (1990, pp. 121–126).
euze’s and Felix Guattari’s work. Assemblages are understood as het-
erogeneous complexes the internal logics and shapes of which
cannot yet be fully discerned, the actors still not fully known and pat-
terns of relations not yet established (Collier and Ong, 2005), as we
might observe in newly connected forms of territory, authority and
rights (cf. Sassen, 2006). By comparison, the concept of figurations
more appropriately labels those sets of social relations that have al-
ready crystallized to the extent that members as well as the rules of
their interactions can already be described. These descriptions focus
on the relations between members by observing their practices, or
‘‘social action’’ in the sense defined by Max Weber.
In the understanding promoted in this article, figurations are al-
ways political because the relations that constitute them have a
power element. Such ‘‘power balances’’ as Elias put it, constitute
figurations, but they do not exist among equals. There are differ-
ences in the ability to exert power, as the more powerful dispose
of more means or resources than the less powerful in any relation.
But only in extreme situations is the power absolute. When phys-
ical violence is exerted among unequal opponents this might be
the case. Most often in social life, power needs the readiness to fol-
low, it is not absolute. That is why Elias follows Max Weber inas-
much as he conceives power as a ‘‘chance’’, a probability to
enforce one’s will ‘‘in a social relationship’’ (1985, p. 80).
In Elias’ understanding, moreover, power becomes a quality of rela-
tions, i.e. figurations consist of interdependencies each of which is
marked by a power asymmetry. Such interdependencies are observa-
ble, and so are the power balances that are at work in these relations.
It is therefore possible to reason about the hierarchies within a figura-
tion, even though ‘‘power’’ as such cannot be observed directly.
Power according to Max Weber is the probability to enforce
one’s will despite resistance no matter what this chance relies
on. Following Elias, this probability should best be seen as a ‘‘struc-
tural feature’’ (Struktureigentümlichkeit) of social relationships.
With a further conceptual distinction taken from Max Weber, it be-
comes possible to see more of the dynamics of such relations.
2.1. Power and domination in figurations
Fundamental to Max Weber’s political sociology is the distinction
between power (Macht) and domination (Herrschaft). Whereas the
former encompasses all kinds of action that aims at influencing some-
body else’s behavior, the latter designates institutionalized power.
Domination is an institutionalized, legitimate form of power. As will
be shown in the next section, this conceptual distinction is the key
to understanding the politics of armed groups. Apart from gaining
power through the exertion of violence, their entire politics consists
of attaining legitimacy. The politics of armed groups as figurations
is about turning the power of violence into legitimate domination.
Forms of power vary, ranging from talking to exerting physical
violence or applying bureaucratic rules. Probably any difference in
a social relationship can be turned into power, which is why Weber
stated that the notion of power is ‘‘sociologically amorphous’’
(1985, p. 28). Differences in available options and resources, in
time, mobility and all qualities of social ties for that matter are
as important as personal qualities or knowledge and experience.
All these differences have led to numerous attempts in social the-
ory to differentiate forms of power.4
As power is ubiquitous and as it can be based on so many differ-
ent things, it might, for analytical reasons, make more sense to look
at domination as a legitimate form of power. Rules in behavior,
speeches and actions make domination much more easily discern-
able than the often covert, not outspoken faces of power.
Cf. for example, Michael Mann’s differentiation of ‘‘sources of power’’ (1986) or
Sofsky and Paris (1994) distinctions.
 K. Schlichte / Geoforum 43 (2012) 716–724
Weber defines domination as ‘‘the probability that certain spe-
cific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group
of persons’’.5 Here, clearly, the institutional character of domination
comes to the fore. The word ‘‘order’’ already directs us to the steep
and mutually recognized relation that any form of domination pre-
supposes. It is legitimate power. All agents involved in this relation-
ship know the rules, they are engrained in their habitus.
Institutionalized power is not usually contested. A ‘‘command’’ is a
speech act that presupposes an already established hierarchical rela-
tionship between those uttering the order and those receiving it. The
word ‘‘obedience’’ refers also to some pattern that is already in place,
and the expression ‘‘circumscribed group of people’’ means exactly
that group that forms the institution. Order and obedience are the
combination that signify to Weber the clearest case of authority –
it is not a mere mechanical reaction, though modern armies and
bureaucracies certainly played a central role in Weber’s conception
of authority as institutionalized power. However, the idea of author-
ity as institutionalized power is also the link to Weber’s theory of
legitimacy that encompasses much more than the logic of modern
bureaucratic armies.
The fundamental question that armed groups – but also any
other political actor – have to solve is: How can power be trans-
formed into domination? In order to achieve their desired political
results, it is not enough to force others into that direction. Such
achievements will always be unstable, and the costs of attaining
them are extremely high. Legitimate order, i.e. domination, is more
stable and through the volitional participation of others much less
costly to maintain.6
From the viewpoint of a social scientist observer, the reverse
development is no less interesting: What ways and causes of the
dissolution of institutionalized power are there? How does author-
ity disintegrate into mere power again? Contestation, I argue, can
be understood as one step in such processes. It mainly concerns
challenges to an existing legitimate order as a whole or parts of
that order. It may also concern the outcomes it produces if these
are not deemed to be in line with the normative understanding
of what is legitimate. Contestation may then either lead to the
change of legitimate order or to its reinforcement, however, it is
not very likely that this order will remain totally unaffected, given
that such a challenge can already be seen as a proof of a legitimacy
crisis, as Max Weber’s political analyses repeatedly state (Weber,
1988). It is this dynamic between states of power and states of
domination that form the core of what is considered ‘‘the political’’
in political sociology.
In his works on different figurations, Norbert Elias builds on
Weber’s distinction. In his major study on the ‘‘civilising process’’
(Elias, 1988) he enlarges Weber’s model by adding to it mecha-
nisms that allow us to understand the changes in political rule as
legitimate orders. As interdependencies grow between political ac-
tors in the course of modernization, new forms of legitimate orders
became possible. First kings were able to attract feudal knights to
their courts. This created the ‘‘mechanism of monopolisation’’, as
even slight advantages of the emerging kings allowed them to
5
That is the translation taken from Max Weber, Economy and Society. An outline
of interpretive sociology, ed. by G. Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley, Cal. University of
California Press, p. 212. The understanding that domination is a special instance of
power Weber (1985) is supported by almost all his interpreters. The most attentive
comment on this fundamental couple in Weber’s famous definition is probably given
by Tyrell (1980) and Colliot-Thélène (2001).
6
The distinction between power and its sub-type domination can be identified as a
continuous theme in both Max Weber’s and Norbert Elias’ works. The interpretation
of politics within and around armed groups as political is thus not only a ‘‘Weberian’’
one. It is compatible with the political sociology of Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu and
Michel Foucault and probably others, as Colliot-Thélène (2001) and Lemke (2001)
argue. Although using different terminologies, their works deal very often with the
very same distinction – mere power on the one hand, and institutionalized power,
authority, on the other.
719
accumulate more and more means in their centers of power, the
royal courts, and to turn them into the symbolic center of legiti-
mate rule (Elias, 1990). The absolutist state arose out of this move-
ment, and it remained a legitimate and unquestioned form of rule
throughout early modern Europe. Only later, with the growing
power of the bourgeois classes, did this figuration have to yield
to another legitimate order, the modern nation-state. Elias called
the mechanism of this change the ‘‘publicisation’’ (Veröffentlichung)
of the monopoly of violence that was created by kings and – to a
lesser extent – queens.
The new figuration, the modern nation-state, became so legiti-
mate that it also became a yardstick in social and political theory.
Even today, it is the standard paradigm for academic writing on
political issues and it is the common conception of editorials in
newspapers and speeches of statesmen. It was only in the second
half of the twentieth century that a growing number of observers
started to discuss the effect of transnational interdependencies
on the future of the nation-state as the basic form of political
organization.
Elias saw the use of violence for the creation of monopolies as a
form of power, and he did so too in the case of bourgeois revolu-
tions that turned these monopolies into bourgeois states. His con-
tribution to the understanding of this fundamental process was
then to show how these macro-stories had their equivalents in
mind structures and forms of behavior. A comparison between
states and armed groups might reveal similar patterns in the way
power within and around these figurations is turned into domina-
tion and vice versa.
In the next section it will be suggested that Weber’s and Elias’
historically informed political sociology is analytically fruitful for
the study of the politics of armed groups, one prominent current
form of contestation. The underlying theoretical idea that has been
presented here and will be used in this next section can be summa-
rized as follows: Within figurations, seen as settings of interdepen-
dent members, mere power can be turned into domination when
power holders are successful in legitimizing their position. This
pursuit of legitimacy, this endeavor to turn existing differences
into something that the ruled see as a legitimate order, accounts
for a lot of what we consider political life. But once achieved, dom-
ination can erode again, be it through external shocks, incremental
change, or by mistakes committed by the rulers themselves, etc.
Contestation can be regarded as a game of challenges and attempts
to reinforce claims to the legitimate order of such figurations.
3. Dynamics of figurations: the politics of armed groups
Non-state armed groups can be understood as figurations, as
ensembles of relations between interdependent individuals. They
are bound together because they share a political fate, a common
political project, or at least an interest in the spoils of victory. They
are furthermore bound together by the symbolic construction and
the security needs that develop over the course of a civil war.
Shared narratives, social ties link the members beyond the mere
exchange of goods and mutual protection. The comparative advan-
tage of such an understanding is that it does not reduce the politics
of non-state actors to greed and crime as the majority of current
approaches do. Furthermore, it also reveals that humanitarian
agencies and allegedly selfless organizations like NGOs have power
structures as well. No matter which actor is considered, it quickly
becomes apparent how strongly historical trajectories shape their
perceptions, opportunities and strategies. Therefore, this strand
of political sociology helps to resolve the academic tension be-
tween generalization and the need for the contextualization of
political phenomena.
Armed groups as figurations consist, so to speak, of related rela-
tions: Their inner life is very much determined by the dynamics of
720 K. Schlichte / Geoforum 43 (2012) 716–724
power and authority in which violence and legitimacy often are at
odds with each other, and sometimes converge. In order to appre-
ciate the added value of this perspective for an understanding of
this form of violent contestation, I shall merely highlight two fields
of the politics of armed groups. These are, firstly, the mechanisms
of formation and, secondly, insights into the loosely hierarchical
structures of these groups. In both fields the quest for legitimacy
plays a decisive role.
The construction of the mechanisms outlined here has been
based on the comparative, reiterative discussion of cases within
the research team. In order to identify common features of armed
groups, in-depth ‘‘biographies’’ of single case studies were used to
develop hypotheses which were then tested against the data gath-
ered for 80 cases and assembled in the data base.
In the context of the in-depth studies those ‘‘biographies’’ deal-
ing with organizational features as well as with their practices on
the battlefield, but also in areas they controlled, were based not
only on literature but also on field research carried out by the
members of the research group in the respective countries. The
‘‘biographies’’ in the data base, however, were exclusively con-
structed on the basis of academic case literature and press reports.
What was crucial for the interpretation of this data was the inten-
sive comparative discussion within the research group, which
brought together expertise not only from political science, but also
from regional studies, sociology, political anthropology, history
and economics.
3.1. The formation of armed groups
Using this methodology, three mechanisms could be identified
by which armed groups come into being, and these three mecha-
nisms also help explain many features of the further trajectories
of armed groups (cf. Schlichte, 2009, chap. 2).7 The first is the mech-
anism of repression. Violent repression exerted by government forces
causes political opposition to evolve into armed action. Leaders of
these groups usually have no military experience, but are politicians
who have acquired their positions through descent, formal educa-
tion, and a long experience of political activity. Groups that emerge
out of this mechanism arm themselves, but usually they develop out
of older oppositional parties or milieus. Typical examples for this
mechanism are the leftist guerillas in Latin America between the
1950s and 1980s.
The second is the ad hoc mechanism. It is activated when neo-
patrimonial settings experience crises. Single individuals who feel
excluded from clientelist networks of a political class begin to
organize violent actions against state agencies. Groups formed
through this mechanism are new creations that can include older
modes of organization but have difficulty becoming stable due to
the vagaries of war. Charles Taylor’s ‘‘National Patriotic Front of
Liberia’’ in the 1990s, but also Yoweri Museveni’s ‘‘National Resis-
tance Army’’ can be seen as classic examples of this type.8
The third mechanism is often linked to situations of open political
violence. This spin-off mechanism is tied to state policies, but its main
characteristic is that the group’s activities become free from state
control. The formation of these groups originally started out as a
state project. In times of war, governments or single state agencies
often employ informal, non-regular armed forces they can deploy
for objectives that regular forces are unwilling or unable to achieve.
In many cases, these informal troops are initially under government
control but later develop a life of their own. A number of militias that
appeared in the wars of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s fit particularly
well into that category (cf. Schlichte, 2010).
7
Further reference on sources and literature on single cases is given in Schlichte
(2009).
8
On the NPFL’s trajectory cf. Reno (1998), on the NRA cf. Schubert (2006).
These three mechanisms do not exclude each other in the course
of a war. Two or all three can occur within a social conflict at various
points in time. The sets of conditions differ in many regards. But they
overlap as well. It is not astonishing to observe that the emergence of
armed groups in the period after 1945 is closely related to the polit-
ical dynamics of decolonization and later of postcolonial states,
especially when shrinking distributional capacities lead to exclu-
sion. Secondly, the formation of an armed group is always a highly
internationalized process as the role of exiled personnel and of for-
eign governments shows. Thirdly and most importantly, all mecha-
nisms show that a decisive element in the process of formation is
generated by states themselves. The production of violence exper-
tise – of the capacity to use arms and to organize armed forces – is
almost always learned within state institutions.
This last commonality is the subject of ongoing academic dis-
cussion. It might put into perspective the ‘‘newness’’ of so-called
new generations of warfare in which states allegedly play a less
important role, as Kaldor (1998) and Münkler (2002) have argued.
Moreover, while these findings confirm the central role of state cri-
ses for the outbreak of civil war, they relativise the ‘‘otherness’’ of
armed groups. To a large extent, political violence revolves around
political rule, but it does not necessarily entail the end of statehood
as a political form.
In the case of armed groups, the three mechanisms of formation
outlined above produce slightly different pathways for the future
development of the armed figurations they bring about. And
although these mechanisms do not determine the odds of these
figurations institutionalizing and turning their violent power into
domination, the divergence of structural conditions nevertheless
accounts for different probabilities.9
Groups marked by excessive violence from repressive regimes
seemingly do not suffer noticeably from legitimacy deficits.
Repressive states de-legitimize themselves, and in turn, enable tar-
geted groups to garner popular support, especially if they provide
effective protection. These groups also generally benefit from so-
cial ties and legitimate forms of organization that precede the out-
break of violence. Given their relatively strong legitimacy base
right from the start, groups that come about by the mechanism
of repression have much better chances of survival and ultimate
success than the two other types. The FMLN of El Salvador is a case
in point, showing how a very small guerilla can turn into the most
important regular political party as the FMLN is now, 30 years after
it took up arms.
The figurations of ad hoc groups, by contrast, usually have
weaker ties at the beginning. They consist of connections that are
products of circumstances rather than relations cultivated over
time. Consequently, their internal functioning is precarious. A
shared interest alone does not suffice to create stable organization,
and ad hoc groups are therefore more prone to fragmentation and
decay. In propitious settings, for instance with strong support from
other states, they can institutionalize and defeat government ar-
mies. Charles Taylor’s NPFL in Liberia –a classic case in point –
did not survive long. It splintered after only 3 months of warfare,
and remained a shaky alliance of politicians from different back-
grounds. The fact that ad hoc groups can turn out to be a success,
however, is shown by another African case: Yoweri Museveni,
President of Uganda since 1986, also began a guerilla war against
his predecessor. Using Maoist principles and ethnic ties, his ‘‘Na-
tional Resistance Movement’’ succeeded in making the transition
from bush war to regular politics.
Spin-off groups typically are figurations with organized cores,
relying on state resources during the early stages, accompanied
9
For a comprehensive discussion on these dynamics cf. chapter 2 of Schlichte
(2009).
 K. Schlichte / Geoforum 43 (2012) 716–724
by respective organizational capacities. While internal hierarchies
initially remain uncontested, spin-off groups have immense prob-
lems overcoming the de-legitimizing effects of the massive vio-
lence they often inflict. Their retrogressive discourse is seldom
able to raise huge popular support. Their fate depends on the abil-
ities of post-war states to reintegrate them into armed forces. Of-
ten they linger on in ambivalent relations to states’ armed forces.
Despite differing outcomes, as processes these three mecha-
nisms have many features in common. First, they do not start out
as unilocal events, and in these processes deterritorialized politics
already play an important role. Other states are often involved, the
experts in violence have partly acquired their skills in remote insti-
tutions, and political ideas around which a group’s programme is
centered have a long-standing international history. Even the very
act of founding an armed group sometimes takes place on another
continent or in another country and entails the coordination of ac-
tion in different arenas (cf. Schlichte, 2009, chap. 4).
However, as large and far-reaching as the internationalization
of these processes might be, the fighting of armed groups always
targets one local arena. While the political project might be con-
nected to events in other states, its primary aim is to achieve polit-
ical change in single states. One might argue that the contestations
which we observe here do not call into question the political world
order, the figuration of the state system, as such. Statehood and
state organization remain uncontested. Apparently, phenomena
of exclusion and competition between segments of political classes
are what is at stake here, rather than completely diverging ideas of
political order. The three distinct mechanisms share the common
feature that these formations often occur in critical situations in
post-colonial states, either in a crisis of distribution due to a short-
age of resources or in a crisis in which exclusion and political vio-
lence already play a role.
Another commonality concerns expertise in exerting and orga-
nizing violence. It is overwhelmingly within state institutions that
future insurgents learn how to fight by military means. Rough,
aggregated data allude to the state itself as a main source of this
capacity. Particularly those armed groups that originate through
processes resembling the second or third mechanism described
above involve personnel that has acquired a knowledge of how
to use arms and how to organize armed forces in state institutions.
Armed groups are part of a global military culture, in which strat-
egies, forms of organization as well as combat techniques and
weapons technology are deployed and appropriated in all national
contexts in which the state’s military apparatus is the main vector
of this distribution.
Fourthly, the formation of armed groups always takes place in a
particular political context. Their formation processes as well as
their own politics do not take place in empty spaces but in a con-
crete political context, with given historical experiences and polit-
icizations. These political contexts seem to be bound to pre-
existing milieus, localities, and micro-arenas. When studying the
accounts of various armed groups it is astonishing to see that inev-
itably there is a structure from which groups develop. Oppositional
milieus, universities and armies, prisons and schools appear to be
the institutional settings in which focal points crystallize that start
the formation of armed groups. The reason for this is certainly the
straightforward organizational requirement that shared interest
does not suffice for an organization to emerge. There must be other
social ties that allow the aggregation of interest. This is even more
evident when ‘high politics’ such as the incumbency of power posi-
tions is at stake, and when the outcome is settled by violent means.
Local milieus and institutions are vital, as without them there are
no focal points around which armed groups crystallize. All case
stories confirm that at the center of these figurations there are ties
that stem from shared experiences such as years in armies, schools,
prisons, or in exile, of having seen the same things and undergone
721
Table 1
Biographical characteristics of leaders. Source: MAG database.
Former professional oppositionist (73%)
Academic education (61.6%)
Former detainee of state prisons (46.6%)
Military education (43.8%)
Violent oppositional actions (43.6%)
Formerly exiled (39.7%)
Education abroad (37%)
Academic professional (31%)
Member of the ruling political class (23.3%)
Military professional (16.4%)
No sufficient data (8.8%)
n=80; no sufficient data: 8.8%; multiple selections possible.
the same or very similar experiences. Although proximity does not
equate power, nearness seems to be a necessary condition for the
production of shared life-worlds in which such core formations
can take place.
3.2. Hierarchical dynamics within armed groups
In Weber’s sociology of authority there is another major distinc-
tion that is helpful for the analysis of forms of legitimacy within
figurations like armed groups. Weber distinguishes between three
strata within any political association (Verband) (1985, p. 122).
First are the leaders (Führer), second the staff (Stab), and third
are followers (Gefolgschaft). At first sight, this threefold distinction
might seem somewhat arbitrary, for there seems to be no reason to
assume that the structure of armed groups as figurations would
automatically follow Weberian sociology. However, even a quick
analysis of a few cases shows that there is much value in using this
distinction exactly because of its ideal-typical character. It helps
explain processes of hierarchisation within armed groups and the
competition within them– the contestation within the contesta-
tion, as it were.
Many, if not all non-state war actors show similar structur-
ations, and there are at least two reasons why this is so. Times of
war create in any actor a need for structure. Keeping action coordi-
nated becomes essential in times where any error might have
lethal consequences. So state armies and non-state combatants
alike need hierarchies in order to counterbalance the vicissitudes
and uncertainties of war.10
As Table 1 shows, leaders of armed groups share certain fea-
tures, and it is no accident that for any non-state war actor there
is clearly an identifiable person who presents himself as the head
or is at least perceived as such. This ‘‘one person at the top’’ scheme
could be interpreted as a functional requirement or ascription of
the global political system, but it could also be due to local political
traditions that often also show patriarchal features. This position is
usually contested for various reasons, which in turn demonstrates
that there is a tendency towards structuration in armed groups. As
already indicated, earlier experiences and shared life-worlds, for
instance in the military or national political systems, apparently
play an important role here. Part of how power is distributed in
a figuration is apparently determined by functional requirements
in highly competitive settings or by local historical conditions.
The leaders’ claims that they share so many – often mixed – expe-
riences with the state might be due to a bias in reporting on the
group. Nevertheless, it indicates that they are experienced in
power games both in formal regular politics and in informal
arenas.
10
In that regard there is a fundamental difference in comparison with street gangs,
for example, which might reproduce themselves without ever building up a similar
formal hierarchical structure, cf. Klein (1995, p. 6).
722 K. Schlichte / Geoforum 43 (2012) 716–724
From the data gathered we might assume that these structur-
ations follow patterns that are already in practice locally. Numer-
ous armed groups sooner or later incorporate former army or
police personnel, or people with warfare experience gathered else-
where. These members cannot imagine waging war without creat-
ing the organizational structures they have incorporated in their
own professional socialization. Uganda’s current president, Yoweri
Museveni is a case in point, as he gained his first war experience
through joining Mozambique’s anti-colonial liberation movement
in the late 1960s when he was a student. Another example is the
UCK in Yugoslav Kosovo, which was formed by men who had
mostly undergone compulsory military service in the army of the
Former Yugoslavia.
What this data shows is that power and authority in armed
groups are not built from scratch. Multiple skills and earlier expe-
riences preordain the structuration of these social figurations. This
observation applies to leaders and to staff members as well (cf.
Schlichte, 2009, p. 36).
It is much harder to make empirically sound arguments about fol-
lowers. One reason for this is that they are not that easy to distin-
guish. If armed groups had clear membership boundaries, there
would be no reason why they should not be treated analytically like
any other organization For a classic sociological understanding this
clear distinction between members and non-members is essential
for any organization. In armed groups this is not the case, as war par-
ticipation might be extremely temporary, if repetitive. Supporters
might help on some occasions but not always. And finally, blurring
the line between combatants and non-combatants is a fundamental
strategic element for any non-state armed faction.
Despite all these empirical ambiguities and doubts, the distinc-
tion between leaders, staff and followers permits a closer look at
the dynamics of power and domination that play decisive roles
in the lives of armed groups. In these figurations relations between
members are not the same all over. The relations leaders maintain
with staff members, for example, differ from the way they relate to
followers on lower levels, even if an armed group might not have a
bureaucratic hierarchy. The specific advantage of this distinction is
that it allows armed groups to be categorized according to their
relations on different levels, just as Weber did when he investi-
gated the forms of political associations in European history.
It is the explanation of this variety of relations that political
geography, with an advanced understanding of the spatial aspects
of power relations, is most competent to contribute. It is evident
that the spatial order of societies – the divide between rural areas
and dense urban settings – plays into the possibilities and limits of
insurgencies and rebellions. Not just geophysical conditions like
the well-known instrumentality of safe havens created by moun-
tains, thick forests or swamplands matter to the Maoist type gue-
rilla; the spatiality of political order is, to armed groups, a given
that will shape their internal as well as their external relations.
Whether they operate in dense urban areas or in loosely connected
mountain ranges is an important distinction, as is the question
whether armed groups fight in a logic that aims at territorial
changes with the help of neighbouring states or against a coalition
of states. On these socio-spatial aspects of organized violence,
however, research has just begun.
3.3. Power and domination beyond armed groups
The previous section of this article has shown that contestation
in the form of non-state war actors, here labeled armed groups,
shows patterns of power and domination for which the conception
of figurations has been suggested. This concept should also allow
the integration of the spatial aspects of the life of armed groups
for which only a few hints could be given here. One of the major
findings with regard to the formation of hierarchical dynamics of
armed groups was that global phenomena and relations often
interact with local traditions and milieu-specific social relations.
To a large extent, the contestations of armed groups reproduce
rather than challenge social and political structures. This becomes
particularly apparent when it comes to the spatial aspects of their
policies. While many armed groups form in political centers, in
capital universities, among the exiled in foreign metropolitan cen-
ters, they start their militant politics in remote areas as the classi-
cal guerilla doctrine stipulates. Their formation culminates in a
rush to the capital, the overtaking of government buildings, and
an attempt to regain territorial control of the rest of the country.
In this regard the siege of Sarajevo is as telling as the spatial move-
ments of the FPR in Rwanda (1990–1994), the NPFL in Liberia
(1989–1997) or the NRA in Uganda (1981–1985).
The politics of armed groups is not deterritorialized as the dis-
course on globalization might have had us believe for a while.
Rather, these politics show that their violent and non-violent ac-
tions may from time to time alter the course of boundaries by
the creation of new states or administrative lines. The logic of ter-
ritoriality, it seems, is so deeply ingrained in the habitus of these
actors, too, that a transgression does not take place (Isachenko,
2008). Challenging the power of regimes and states does not entail
the dissolution of territoriality altogether.
Armed groups seemingly do not escape the political logic that
anyone striving for domination is doomed to follow in the modern
era: First, violence needs to be regulated, and second, this usually
entails the construction of an apparatus that has its own dynamics,
often threatening the initial scheme.
For a broad band of political sociology, the key problem of polit-
ical order is the regulation of violence. The particular qualities of
physical violence as a form of power (cf. Schlichte, 2009, chap. 3)
require particular attention to its regulation by any form of domi-
nation. Be it the institution of blood feud, the rules governing no-
mad’s raids or the disciplinary code of modern military forces, all
forms of authority have rules and regulations in order to contain
the delegitimizing effects of violence. There is always a division
of labor and a moral code which regulates who is entitled to exert
violence under which circumstances. Experts in violence are sub-
ject to particular codes and a particular discipline, and at the same
time they have a disciplinary function that is thought to be com-
plementary to the working of legitimate rule. Armed groups need
to regulate the use of violence as well. The aforementioned ‘‘Na-
tional Resistance Army’’ in Uganda, for example, introduced to that
end a so-called ‘‘Ten Point Programme’’ which stipulated limits and
rules for the use of violence vis-à-vis the population. It imposes se-
vere punishments for any breach of these rules. Like states, armed
groups need to build up internal legitimacy to make such regula-
tions work.
In his historical studies, Weber hinted to the fact that most forms
of political rule require a particular type of staff that is needed to
implement decisions and to administer and control. Other authors
also theorise about the development of state officials and their life-
worlds and dynamics. Norbert Elias, in his study of the national hab-
itus of the Germans, Michel Foucault, in his analysis of what happens
in state institutions like schools, armies and hospitals, and also Pierre
Bourdieu in his succinct analysis of the ‘‘state nobility’’, have contrib-
uted to a better understanding of the fine mechanics of rule by disag-
gregating the apparatus of politics.
Such processes take place in armed groups as well. Here, too,
growth leads to organizational differentiation. Eritrea’s EPLF, for
example, already developed a state-like structure with depart-
ments and functional divisions of labor during war times. With
at times 30,000 men under arms, organizational requirements
were high (cf. Radtke, 2009, p. 90; Pool, 2001).
These findings might be taken as starting points for further
questions. A primary question concerns the usual distinction
 K. Schlichte / Geoforum 43 (2012) 716–724
between states’ armed forces and non-state armed groups. A more
intensive investigation than the one presented here might reveal
that violent challenges to incumbent regimes in numerous, if not
most, cases are closely related to the failure of regimes to offer en-
ough space for political change. Furthermore, capacities created by
states enhance the chances for success of armed groups in numer-
ous regards. This applies to soft skills as well as to military exper-
tise and hardware produced by states and used by armed groups.
States seem to be confronted with the task of controlling their vio-
lent means in the long run. It seems that the very means to counter
violent challenges lies at the root of the formation of armed groups.
The dilemma of how to control means of violence without produc-
ing even more remains unresolved. But this insight may raise skep-
ticism about current attempts to render the world more secure by
creating even more expertise on violence.
4. Conclusions: studying the political
This article sought to show that the classical distinctions of polit-
ical sociology are able to enlighten our understanding of armed con-
flicts. Armed conflict always indicates a crisis of the established
patterns of authority. The very fact that physical violence is em-
ployed shows us that authority is no longer working, at least not
for all agents. Physical violence, however, is a very specific and lim-
ited form of power. The main task for any single individual or group
that uses physical violence is to legitimize it and to turn it into
authority. This need arises for armed groups first among its mem-
bers. Even small groups need to coordinate their action, and this
necessitates durable and reliable modes of decision-making.
Interestingly, armed groups do not challenge all rules alto-
gether. They still rely on some of them, and a lot of their success
depends on their ability to build on rules that are still in place by
adding others to them. Their pursuit of legitimacy is the key to
understanding their action. Here it suffices to note that armed
groups regularly build up legitimacy in three directions: first,
amongst themselves; second, towards their environment, and
thirdly within international politics. This is not to say that all
armed groups are successful in building up a strong community
of followers or a clear, working internal structure, or that eventu-
ally in forming a strong, and convincing image in the eyes of exter-
nal beholders. In fact, most armed groups have only limited success
in this regard, or they fail; and these failures have to do with the
tricky qualities of the use of physical violence.
These observations might lead us to the broader question of
whether this conceptual language offers a general approach to
the study of contestation. My answer is a definite ‘yes’. Contesta-
tion is always the ‘‘mise en question’’ of legitimacy, be it of a single
position, a single claim or of the system as a whole. Power relations
might be loose or strict, or more or less institutionalized, or they
might or might not be apparatus-like. Only the analysis of these
relations allows us to discern – or at least to speculate about –
the forms of legitimacy that are at work.
The conceptual language suggested here sees the central chal-
lenge to armed groups in their task of transforming their power of
violence into legitimate rule, into authority. This, as I have argued,
is the core of the politics of armed groups. To conceive of armed
groups as figurations places the relationships within armed groups
at the center of attention instead of disaggregating them into uncon-
nected individuals’ actions. To understand why and how relations
within armed groups and with their social surroundings change is,
in this perspective, the central task of this field. It should go without
saying that political geography is a promising candidate to contrib-
ute to this endeavor, especially since the spatial aspects of political
orders other than the territorial state have not yet benefitted from
much attention from political scientists.
723
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