Tariff and customs code

Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary (1992)

FACTS:
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other
duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was
passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique
Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article
VI of the Constitution, which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume
such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other
bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however,
that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this
case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

AKBAYAN vs AQUINO

This case is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan,
concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services,
investment, etc.

Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners –NGOs, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers
– sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA,
including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an
inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the
negotiation is completed.

Petitioner-members of the House of Representatives additionally anchor their claim to have a right to the
subject documents on the basis of Congress inherent power to regulate commerce, be it domestic or
international. They allege that Congress cannot meaningfully exercise the power to regulate international trade
agreements such as the JPEPA without being given copies of the initial offers exchanged during the negotiations
thereof. In the same vein, they argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations
since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived
only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and
402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464.
ISSUE: WON Congress may interfere with treaty negotiations based on their inherent power to regulate
commerce?

HELD: No. The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and
international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes. Thus it
provides:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII the article on
the Executive Department which states:

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the
President only by delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is
vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into
trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of
a power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives
accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.

This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement
of Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the
relevant provisions of the Constitution.

It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in
the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only
to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means
of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

Jurisdiction
Ponce Enrile vs Vinuya

Facts: Upon the application of the ASAC, Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and
detention against the Cadillac Car of Cenadoza because taxes herein were not paid. Warrant was served and enforced
even before a complaint of replevin was filed. Cenadoza is the predecessor in interest of respondent Vinuya. Claiming
to be aggrieved by such seizure, Vinuya filed a complaint for replevin in the RTC. Judge issued an order to a sheriff to
take possession of the Cadillac.
Issue: WON the judge has jurisdiction to entertain a replevin complaint filed by Vinuya for recovery of a Cadillac car
which is subject of a seizure or forfeiture proceeding
Ruling: No. The rule is that exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs
prevents a CFI(RTC) from assuming cognizance over such matter. The Collector’s decision is appealable to the
Commssiner of Customs whose decision is in turn appealable o the CTA. An aggrieved party may appeal from a
judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals directly to the SC. The Judicial recourse of the property owner is not in the RTC,
but in the CTA, and only after exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs.
Republic vs CFI, 1992

Facts: The Anti-Smuggling Action Center (ASAC) found that import shipment machineries of Meyer Steel Pipe Corp
(Meyer) were grossly misdeclared, misclassified and undervalued. Thus, Collector of Customs issued a warrant of seizure
and detention against the subject machinery. Upon request of Meyer, it was allowed provisional release and installation
of the machineries provided that it is guarded by Customs guards and a bond filed.
ASAC filed a motion for recon regarding the allowance of provisional release. Collector clarified the matters and said
that the allowance is only intended for the test run evaluation to be conducted by the suppliers (another company) by
which Meyer is continuously paying their engineers’ stay.
After trial and hearing, Collector issued ordering the forfeiture of the machinery for having been imported in violation
of the implementing rules and regulations on overcrowded industries concomittant with the power vested to the Collector
of Customs under Section 2312 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Meyer filed suit in lower court alleging that in the previous order by Collector, it was not given notice of the Motion for
Reconsideration of ASAC of petitioner’s order dated July 31, 1975. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss by petitioner
and issued preliminary injunction against Collector.

Issue: Does lower court have jurisdiction to order injunction against Collector?

Ruling: No.
The mandate of the law is specific. Section 2312 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides:

"SEC. 2312. Decision or Action by Collector in Protest And Seizure Cases. — When a protest in proper form is presented
in a case where protest is required, the Collector shall issue an order for hearing within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the protest and hear the matter thus presented. Upon the termination of the hearing, the Collector shall render a decision
within thirty (30) days, and if the protest is sustained, in whole or in part, he shall make the appropriate order, the entry
reliquidated if necessary."

On the other hand, Section 2313 of the same law states:

"SEC. 2313. Review by Commissioner. — The person aggrieved by the decision or action of the Collector in any matter
presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen (15) days after notification in writing by
the Collector of his action or decision, give written notice to the Collector and one copy furnished to the Commissioner of
his desire to have the matter reviewed by the Commissioner. Thereupon the Collector shall forthwith transmit all the
records of the proceedings to the Commissioner, who shall approve, modify or reverse the action or decision of the
collector and take such steps and make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to his decision." (Emphasis supplied)

While Section 7 of R.A. 1125 declares, thus:

"Jurisdiction — The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided —
x x x
"(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected: fines forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto;
or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of the law administered by the Bureau of
Customs."cralaw virtua1aw library
Clearly then, the question of seizure and forfeiture is for the Collector of Customs to determine in the first instance and
then the Commissioner of Customs. This is a field where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an appeal
may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A court of first instance (RTC) thus, don’t have jurisdiction.

Jurisprudence also support the same matter and in Enrile vs Vinuya, "it is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of
Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from
the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously
been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings."

Judge of CFI (RTC) should have dismissed the case right away. Furthermore, it did not have jurisdiction to issue
injunction.

Chia vs Acting COC

FACTS:

A verified report of a confidential informant that asserted electronic and electrical equipment and other articles illegally
imported into the Philippines by a syndicate engaged in unlawful “shipside” activities (foreign goods are unloaded form
foreign ships in transit through the Bureau of Customs, thereby evading payment of the corresponding customs duties,
and were found inside the “Tom’s electronics” and “Sony Merchandising” after valuation, the Collector of Customs issued
warrants of seizure for various electronics equipment like cassette tape recorders, car stereos, phonograph needles,
portable TV sets, imported long playing records, spare parts of TVs and Radios and other electrical appliances

Issue: Whether the warrants of seizure and detention are general warrants issued in violation of Rule 126, Sections 3 of
Rules of Court?

Ruling: No. The warrants issued by the Collector of Customs in this case were not general warrant, as erroneously alleged
by petitioner for they identified the stores to be seized, described the articles to be seized and specified the provision of
the Tariff and Customs Code. Section 2536 (Seizure of other articles) – The Commissioner of Customs and Collector of
Customs and or any other Customs officer, with the prior authorization in writing by the commissioner, may demand
evidence of payment of duties and taxes on foreign articles. Search of Dwelling House (Section 2209) – Upon warrant
issued by a Judge of the Court or such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law, upon sworn application
showing probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 111202-05 January 31, 2006

FACTS:
The whole controversy revolves around a vessel and its cargo. On January 7, 1989, the vessel M/V "Star Ace,"
coming from Singapore laden with cargo, entered the Port of San Fernando, La Union (SFLU) for needed
repairs. The vessel and the cargo had an appraised value, at that time, of more or less Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200,000,000). When the Bureau of Customs later became suspicious that the vessel’s real purpose in
docking was to smuggle its cargo into the country, seizure proceedings were instituted under S.I. Nos. 02-89
and 03-89 and, subsequently, two Warrants of Seizure and Detention were issued for the vessel and its cargo.

Respondent Cesar S. Urbino, Sr., does not own the vessel or any of its cargo but claimed a preferred maritime
lien under a Salvage Agreement dated June 8, 1989. To protect his claim, Urbino initially filed two motions in
the seizure and detention cases: a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Lift Warrant of Seizure and Detention.
Apparently not content with his administrative remedies, Urbino sought relief with the regular courts by filing a
case for Prohibition, Mandamus and Damages before the RTC of SFLU, seeking to restrain the District
Collector of Customs from interfering with his salvage operation. The RTC of SFLU dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction because of the pending seizure and detention cases. Urbino then elevated the matter to the CA.
The Commissioner of Customs, in response, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, advising the CA that it
intends to question the jurisdiction of the CA before this Court. The motion was denied. Hence, in this petition
the Commissioner of Customs assails the Resolution "F" recited above and seeks to prohibit the CA from
continuing to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether Urbino's claim is a preferred lien in this case.

HELD:
No.

xxx

First of all, the Court finds the decision of the RTC of Manila, in so far as it relates to the vessel M/V "Star
Ace," to be void as jurisdiction was never acquired over the vessel. In filing the case, Urbino had impleaded the
vessel as a defendant to enforce his alleged maritime lien. This meant that he brought an action in rem under the
Code of Commerce under which the vessel may be attached and sold. However, the basic operative fact for the
institution and perfection of proceedings in rem is the actual or constructive possession of the res by the tribunal
empowered by law to conduct the proceedings. This means that to acquire jurisdiction over the vessel, as a
defendant, the trial court must have obtained either actual or constructive possession over it. Neither was
accomplished by the RTC of Manila.

In his comment to the petition, Urbino plainly stated that "petitioner has actual[sic] physical custody not only of
the goods and/or cargo but the subject vessel, M/V Star Ace, as well." This is clearly an admission that the RTC
of Manila did not have jurisdiction over the res. While Urbino contends that the Commissioner of Custom’s
custody was illegal, such fact, even if true, does not deprive the Commissioner of Customs of jurisdiction
thereon. This is a question that ought to be resolved in the seizure and forfeiture cases, which are now pending
with the CTA, and not by the regular courts as a collateral matter to enforce his lien. By simply filing a case in
rem against the vessel, despite its being in the custody of customs officials, Urbino has circumvented the rule
that regular trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and
forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs, on his mere assertion that the administrative
proceedings were a nullity.

On the other hand, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the res ahead and to the exclusion of
the RTC of Manila. The forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs are in the nature of
proceedings in rem and jurisdiction was obtained from the moment the vessel entered the SFLU port. Moreover,
there is no question that forfeiture proceedings were instituted and the vessel was seized even before the filing
of the RTC of Manila case.

The Court is aware that Urbino seeks to enforce a maritime lien and, because of its nature, it is equivalent to an
attachment from the time of its existence. Nevertheless, despite his lien’s constructive attachment, Urbino still
cannot claim an advantage as his lien only came about after the warrant of seizure and detention was issued and
implemented. The Salvage Agreement, upon which Urbino based his lien, was entered into on June 8, 1989.
The warrants of seizure and detention, on the other hand, were issued on January 19 and 20, 1989. And to
remove further doubts that the forfeiture case takes precedence over the RTC of Manila case, it should be noted
that forfeiture retroacts to the date of the commission of the offense, in this case the day the vessel entered the
country. A maritime lien, in contrast, relates back to the period when it first attached, in this case the earliest
retroactive date can only be the date of the Salvage Agreement. Thus, when the vessel and its cargo are ordered
forfeited, the effect will retroact to the moment the vessel entered Philippine waters.

Accordingly, the RTC of Manila decision never attained finality as to the defendant vessel, inasmuch as no
jurisdiction was acquired over it, and the decision cannot be binding and the writ of execution issued in
connection therewith is null and void.

Asian Terminal Inc. vs Bautista

G.R. No. 166901, Oct. 27, 2006, Callejo, Sr.

FACTS: Section 1, Republic Act (RA) No. 8506, which took effect on February 22, 1998, provides that it shall be
unlawful for any person to import, cause the importation of, register, cause the registration of, use or operate any
vehicle with its steering wheel right hand side thereof in any highway, street or road, whether private or public, or
at the national or local. Noel Tabuelog, Ernesto de Jesus, and other defendants are duly-licensed importers of
vehicles. Sometime in April and May 1998, they imported 72 secondhand right-hand drive buses from Japan. When
the shipment arrived at the SouthHarbor, Port of Manila, the District Collector of Customs impounded the vehicles
and ordered them stored at the warehouse of the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI), a customs-bonded warehouse under
the custody of the Aviation and Cargo Regional Division. Conformably with Section 2607 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, the District Collector of Customs issued Warrants of Distraint[3] against the shipment and set the sale at public
auction. The defendant importers filed a complaint with the RTC of Paranaque City, against the Secretary of Finance,
Customs Commissioner, and the Chief Executive of the Societe Generale de Surillee, for replevin with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages. They averred, inter alia, that in accordance
with the opinion of the Assistant Director of the Customs Legal Service and the Office of the Legal Affairs of the
Department of Finance, the importation of right-hand drive vehicles are not prohibited under RA No. 8506 provided
that conversion kits are included in the imported vehicles. The defendants, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking the reconsideration of the RTC Order granting plaintiffs plea for a writ of replevin.
It likewise prayed that the writ of replevin issued by the court be quashed on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the vehicles subject of seizure and detention before the Bureau of Customs. The OSG declared that
the Bureau of Customs, which had custody of the vehicles through ATI, had exclusive jurisdiction over said vehicles
and on the issues of the seizure and detention thereof.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC has jurisdiction to try the case? No
RULING:
The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents herein, issue the
writ of replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had already seized the vehicles and set the
sale thereof at public auction. The RTC should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset. By granting the
plea for the seizure of the vehicles and the transfer of custody to the court, the RTC acted without jurisdiction over
the action and the vehicles subject matter thereof. It bears stressing that the forfeiture of seized goods in the Bureau
of Customs is a proceeding against the goods and not against the owner. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem,
i.e., directed against the res or imported articles and entails a determination of the legality of their importation. In
this proceeding, it is, in legal contemplation, the property itself which commits the violation and is treated as the
offender, without reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner.

In fine, the initial orders of the RTC granting the issuance of the writ of replevin and its implementation are void.
While it is true that the District Collector of Customs allowed the release of the vehicles and the transfer thereof to
the custody of the RTC upon the payment by the private respondents of the required taxes, duties and charges, he
did not thereby lose jurisdiction over the vehicles; neither did it vest jurisdiction on the RTC to take cognizance of
and assume jurisdiction over the petition for replevin. As very well explained by the Office of the Solicitor General,
the District Collector of Customs agreed to transfer the vehicles to the custody of the RTC since the latter had ordered
the arrest of those who would obstruct the implementation of the writ. The District Collector of Customs had yet to
resolve whether to order the vehicles forfeited in favor of the government, in light of the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice that, under RA No. 8506, the importation was illegal.

Pilipinas Shell vs Republic of the Philippines, G.R. NO. 161953, March 6, 2008
Facts: Various entities assigned their tax debit memos(TDM) and tax credit certificates(TCC) to Pilipinas Shell. Pilipinas
Shell has been using these for their tax and import duties in 1997 and 1998. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Department
of Finance informed it that its TDMs and TCCs were fraudulently issued and had to be cancelled. He said that it should pay
the value of the cancelled TCCs as well as charges. Pilipinas Shell argued that they were genuine and that it was an assignee
in good faith. It filed a protest. The Bureau of Customs did not take heed, so it filed a petition for review in the CTA.
Meanwhile, the Republic through the Bureau of Customs filed a complaint for collection in the RTC.
Pilipinas Shell argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction. It was ruled by the Supreme Court that the RTC acquires jurisdiction
over a collection case only if an assessment made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has become final and
incontestable.
Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction in this case?
Ruling: Yes.
First, under the TCCP, the assessment is in the form of a liquidation made on the face of the import entry return and
approved by the Collector of Customs. Liquidation is the final computation and ascertainment by the Collector of Customs
of the duties due on imported merchandise based on official reports as to the quantity, character and value thereof, and
the Collector of Customs' own finding as to the applicable rate of duty. Pilipinas Shell claims that it paid the duties due on
its importations. Under Section 1603 of the old TCC an assessment or liquidation by the BoC attains finality and
conclusiveness one year from the date of the final payment of duties except when:(a) there was fraud;(b) there is a
pending protest or(c) the liquidation of import entry was merely tentative.
None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. There was no fraud as Pilipinas Shell claimed (and was presumed)
to be in good faith. Records also show that petitioner paid those duties without protest using its TCCs. Finally, the
liquidation was not a tentative one as the assessment had long become final and incontestable.
Second, under Section 1204 of the TCC: “Unless relieved by laws or regulations, the liability for duties, taxes, fees and
other charges attaching on importation constitutes a personal debt due from the importer to the government which can
be discharged only by payment in full of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges legally accruing. It also constitutes a lien
upon the articles imported which may be enforced while such articles are in the custody or subject to the control of the
government.”
Since the goods have been released, the lien of the government over the goods have been extinguished. Thus, the BOC
could only enforce the payment of the personal debt by filing a collection suit.
Third, CTA does not exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case. Under the old CTA law (RA 1125) which was
effective at the time of the complaint, the CTA had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over: xxx (2) Decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention
or release of property affected; fines and forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters
arising under Customs Law or other laws or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; xxx”
Inasmuch as the present case did not involve a decision of the Commissioner of Customs in any of the instances
enumerated in Section 7(2) of RA 1125, the CTA had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Chua vs. Villanueva

FACTS: On 23 September 2001, the vessel M/V Criston carrying the shipment consisting of thirty-five thousand (35,000) bags of rice
from the Port of Manila docked at the Port of Tabaco, Albay. The rice was shipped to petitioners Antonio Chua, Jr. and Carlos Carillo
by their supplier in Manila and to be paid upon delivery thereof to Tabaco, Albay. Upon the arrival of the said vessel, Acting Port
Collector Rosalino L. Maravillo immediately conducted the usual Verification Order and/or Hold Order based on the documents
submitted. At about ten o’clock in the morning of the same day, then Commissioner of Customs Titus Villanueva, who had been earlier
informed by the NCR-Central Luzon Philippine Coast Guard that M/V Criston was never given any departure clearance by the said
office, issued a verbal instruction to then District Collector Atty. Marcial F. Lopez to issue immediately a WSD against M/V Criston
and its cargo. Since it was a Sunday, District Collector Lopez instructed his Deputy District Collector Atty. Winston B. Florin to issue
a Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD) against the vessel and its rice cargo, a part reads:

WHEREAS, based on the documents submitted to this Office, the undersigned cannot find any violation to (sic) Section 2530 of the
TCCP, as amended, however, reservation is hereby made to make necessary amendments hereto should a violation arises (sic) thereafter.

To protect their property rights and interests against the alleged illegality of the actions of the respondents Bureau of Customs officers,
petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 15, docketed as Civil Case No. T-2170, questioning the
2

authority exercised by the Customs officials in issuing an invalid WSD with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the Bureau of Customs validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject property by virtue of a warrant of seizure and
detention considering that the same expressly state that there was no violation committed under the Tariff and Customs Code

RULING: YES. Jurisdiction over the instant case is well-settled by law and jurisprudence.

The Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines under Section 602 provides:

SECTION 602. Functions of the Bureau. - The general duties, powers and jurisdiction of the Bureau shall include:

(g) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases under the tariff and customs laws.

The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions
touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No.
1125, as amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure for the
ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are
appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.

The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus. The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing
no unnecessary hindrance on the government’s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more
importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to
carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.

Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven, such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs
of jurisdiction thereon.

PPA vs Fuentes
GR 91259, 16 April 1991

FACTS: This petition for review with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed by
petitioners, Philippine Ports Authority ("PPA" for brevity), Port Manager Bienvenido Basco and the Port District
Manager, Ernesto Fernando of Davao City, challenges the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
17, in a case involving the legality of port charges imposed by the PPA on the respondent Terminal Facilities and Services
Corporation ("TEFASCO" for brevity). The port charges in question include: (1) 100% wharfage dues and berthing fees
and (2) the 10% government share in arrastre/stevedoring revenues and/or privilege fee, pursuant to Section 1213 of
the Tariff and Customs Code.

On July 11, 1974, P.D. No. 505 was promulgated, creating the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). The Decree was later
amended by P.D. No. 857 dated December 23, 1975 (otherwise known as the Revised PPA Charter). Under the Decree,
the PPA is entrusted with the function of carrying out an integrated program for the planning, development, financing
and operation of ports and port districts throughout the country. The powers, duties and jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs concerning arrastre operations were transferred to and vested in the petitioner PPA (Philippine Ports Authority
vs. Mendoza, 138 SCRA 496, 503). Pursuant to said decree, PPA was authorized to "regulate the rates or charges for port
services or port related services so that, taking one year with another, such rates or charges furnish adequate working
capital and produce an adequate return on the assets of the Authority" (PPA) (Section 20[b] and "to levy dues, rates, or
charges for the use of the premises, works, appliances, facilities, or for services provided by or belonging to the
Authority or any other organization concerned with port operations" (Section 6[b] [IX]). Furthermore, the PPA was
authorized to impose a ten percent (10%) charge on the monthly gross earnings of the operators of arrastre and
stevedoring services (also known as Government Share).

In its Board Resolution No. 7 dated April 21, 1976 embodying the "Memorandum Agreement," PPA laid down the terms
and conditions under TEFASCO was allowed to construct specialized port and terminal facilities for incoming and
outgoing foreign and domestic vessels and authorized to render port services, particularly, arrastre and stevedoring
services on incoming and outgoing cargoes loaded on or unloaded from foreign and domestic vessels. On August 30,
1988, TEFASCO filed in the trial court a complaint for "declaration of nullity, prohibition, mandamus and damages with
writ of preliminary injunction" against PPA.

In an order dated December 14, 1988 , the trial court granted TEFASCO's application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
In an order dated June 21, 1989, Judge Fuentes denied the motion.

On September 11, 1989, PPA filed an "Urgent Motion to Dismiss" the case on the ground among others that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action which is essentially an action for injunction to restrain the
collection of dues, fees, and other assessments in the nature of taxes or charges under the Customs law

TEFASCO opposed the Motion to Dismiss, alleging mainly that it is the trial court, not the Court of Tax Appeals, which has
jurisdiction over its causes of action In an order dated October 5, 1989, Judge Fuentes denied the Motion to Dismiss for
lack of merit. On December 15, 1989, PPA filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.

On December 21, 1989, the First Division of this Court, without giving due course to the petition, required TEFASCO to
comment (not to file a motion to dismiss) and issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and until
further orders from this Court, enjoining the trial court from enforcing and/or implementing the Orders dated December
14, 1988, June 21, 1989, and October 5, 1989, and the writ of preliminary injunction dated January 10, 1989.The petition
is without merit.

PPA anchors its petition on Sections 39 and 29 of PD 857, in conjunction with Sections 7, 11 and 18 of Title VII, Book II of
Republic Act 1125 to support its theory that wharfage dues, berthing fees, and the so-called "government share" are
customs charges that fall under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.

ISSUE: WON Jurisdiction is upon the Court of Tax Appeals to review appeals from decisions or rulings of the Philippine
Ports Authority?

RULING: Since jurisdiction is conferred by law (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Villa, 22 SCRA 4); and under P.D.
857, the collection of port charges ceased to be an administrative function of the Bureau of Customs and was
transferred to the PPA; that neither P.D. 857 nor R.A. 1125 contains a provision for an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals
from decisions of the PPA; and further considering that the Court of Tax Appeals is a specialized court of limited
jurisdiction, no appellate jurisdiction over PPA decisions may be vested in the Court of Tax Appeals by mere implication.
This issue was set at rest by the decision of this Court in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals (CTA Case No.
3466, Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. PPA), G.R. No. 66381, February 29, 1984, where we ruled:
There is no law or statute which expressly vests jurisdiction upon the Court of Tax Appeals to review appeals from
decisions or rulings of the Philippine Ports Authority . . . . The jurisdiction of a court to take cognizance of a case, we
believe, should be clearly conferred and should not be deemed to exist on mere implication, specifically with respect to
the Court of Tax Appeals which is a specialized court of limited jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

In view of the foregoing, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioners.
The temporary restraining order.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Marcelino E. Rodriguez

G.R. No. 160270 April 23, 2010
SECOND DIVISION; Carpio, J.:

FACTS:

On the basis of the declared value of US$6,000 of a cargo described as “agricultural product, the shipment,
which arrived at the Port of Subic was assessed customs duties and taxes. Upon examination, the subject shipment
was found to contain rice. The importer of the cargo stated that there was a “misshipment” of cargo which actually
contained rice. She then requested that the “misshipment” be upgraded from “agricultural product” to a shipment of
rice, and at the same time manifested willingness to pay the appropriate duties and taxes. However, hold orders were
issued.
A certification/letter was later issued by Fertony G. Marcelo, Officer-in-charge of he Cash Division of the
Customs Subic Port, however, SBMA, through Seaport Department General Manager Augusto Canlas refused to
allow the release of the rice shipment. Thus, a complaint for Injunction and Damages was filed with prayer for
issuance of Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against
petitioner SBMA and Augusto L. Canlas, with the RTC of Olongapo City. The injunctive relief was granted. A copy
of the complaint with summons together with the TRO was served by Sheriff upon the defendants/respondents on
the same day.
When the Sheriffs went back to defendants/respondents’ office to determine whether or not the TRO was
followed, defendants/respondents Attys. Abella and Katalbas refused to honor the TRO, alleging that said Order was
illegal. This led to the filing in the instant case a verified indirect contempt charge because of the defiance exhibited.
The defendants/respondents alleged that they cannot be cited for contempt of court because they had legal basis to
refuse to honor the TRO: that it is the Bureau of Customs that has jurisdiction, thus, the indirect contempt case has
no leg to stand on.
The RTC found the defendants/respondents guilty of indirect contempt. The CA dismissed the petition,
hence, this appeal under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Was the indirect contempt conviction proper?

HELD:

No. Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure includes, among the grounds for filing a case
for indirect contempt, are the following: “Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this rule; any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.”
The SBMA officers may be considered to have acted in good faith when they refused to follow the TRO
issued by the RTC. The SBMA officers' refusal to follow the court order was not contumacious but due to the
honest belief that jurisdiction over the subject shipment remained with the BOC because of the existing warrant of
seizure and detention against said shipment. Thus, we hold that the RTC Order dated 21 November 2002 which
found the SBMA officers guilty of indirect contempt for not complying with the RTC's TRO should be invalidated.
Smuggling
Rodriguez v. CA (sorry taas kayo ag facts, mej important mn)

Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3602 in relation to Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines. The prosecution established that vessel S/S Neptune Agate arrived at the Manila International Port
carrying one 40-foot container van containing 29,000 kilos consisting of 44,885,015 yards of 100% cotton-dyed fabric.

Ernesto M. Ereno, Import-Export Manager of the EME Customs Brokerage, Inc., filed with the Bureau of Customs Special
Permit to Transfer No. 1703 with Serial No. 150387 seeking to transfer the said container van from the Manila
International Container Port to Customs Bonded Warehouse No. 725 of the Philippine Inter-Fashion, Inc (consigneee of
cargo). at Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. The permit appeared to have been approved and signed by the proper
Customs authorities on the basis of which a gate pass was issued by the Customs wharfinger for the release of said
container. At 5:00 P.M. of September 12, 1983, the container was loaded on a truck and in accordance with Customs
rules, escorted by Customs guard accused Alfredo Fiesta, until its receipt at the Customs Bonded Warehouse at
Dasmariñas, Cavite. Once outside the Customs zone, the truck did not proceed to Cavite but went to Quezon City to the
White Plains Subdivision thereat.

The truck entered the said subdivision towards the direction of Interior 56 Queensville Compound, Manuel Pena's
residence. Manuel Pena informed his son-in-law, Eulogio Rodriguez, who lived in the same compound, to remove the
cargo from the stalled vehicle and transfer the same to their compound. Eulogio acceded to this request and finished
transferring the cargo after midnight.

The following morning, Eulogio called his brothers, Angel and Jose Rodriguez, to help him transport the textile from
White Plains to Paranaque, Metro Manila. They came over and were able to deliver some eighty (80) rolls of the textile
to No. 25 9th Street, United Paranaque Subdivision, the residence of their co-petitioner Tomas Ngo. They made another
delivery in the afternoon of the same day.

The next day, September 13, 1983, at around 1:30 P.M., Jose and Angel were on their way to make a third delivery when
they were intercepted by agents of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division.

Earlier, Colonel Guillermo Parayno, Jr., then Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division, noticed that the
container van consigned to the Philippine Inter-Fashion, Inc., was missing from the container yard. On inquiry, the
President of the said company denied ordering any shipment from abroad and claimed that they were not expecting any
such cargo. Immediately, Colonel Parayno formed teams to trace the movement of the container and finally located it at
the White Plains Subdivision in Quezon City.

One team of agents was on its way to the said subdivision when their attention was called to the delivery van along
White Plains Avenue. The team chased the van and ordered the driver to stop. The van stopped and the agents found
the two petitioners, Angel and Jose Rodriguez, one driver and one helper. They opened the door of the van and found it
full of textile which, according to the driver and helper, came from the residence of Manuel Pena at the White Plains
Subdivision. They disclosed that they were taking their cargo to No. 25 9th Street, Paranaque.

The team proceeded to Manuel Pena 's residence where Colonel Parayno informed Pena that they were going to search
his house for the textile. Pena denied possessing or keeping any textile and invited Colonel Parayno and his men inside
his house. The Customs agents looked around and found behind Pena's house a structure that appeared to be a stock
room. They opened the room and found nothing. They noticed another room behind, opened it and found it full of the
same textile as those they saw in the delivery van.

Mr. Pena informed the agents that the stock room belonged to Eulogio who also owned the house behind it. Pena
likewise claimed that the textile belonged to a certain "Rolly" whose truck happened to hit the subdivision wall near his
(Mr. Pena's) house and that the textile was being stored in his compound until delivery to its final destination at
Paranaque.
The next day, September 15, 1983, the Customs agents were armed with a search warrant and went to Tomas Ngo's
residence in Paranaque. They discovered in his bodega several rolls of the same textile they found in the delivery van
and in Pena's compound.

The agents conducted an investigation and discovered that the container van did not belong to the consignee and that it
was released from the container port by virtue of a Special Permit to Transfer in which all signatures of the approving
Customs personnel, except for one, were forged.

Issue: Whether or not the several accused were guilty of violating Sections 3601 and 3602 of the Tariff and Customs
Code?

Ruling: Yes. After importation, the act of facilitating the transportation, concealment or sale of the unlawfully imported
article must be with the knowledge that the article was smuggled. However, if upon trial the defendant is found to have
been in possession of such article, this shall be sufficient to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains his
possession to the satisfaction of the court.

Petitioners failed to sufficiently explain how they came into possession of the smuggled textile. They ascribe all their acts
to Mr. Pena who has long since died and to Rolly who has since disappeared, if he ever existed. The testimony of a
witness as to what he heard other persons say about certain facts in dispute is hearsay evidence and cannot be
admitted. Moreover, petitioners' version of their participation is self-serving, strains the imagination and taxes our
credulity.

Also, Section 3602 of the Code enumerates the various fraudulent practices against customs revenue such as the entry
of imported or exported articles by means of any false or fraudulent invoice, statement or practice; the entry of goods at
less than the true weight or measure; or the filing of any false or fraudulent entry for the payment of drawback or
refund of duties. The term "entry" in Customs law has a triple meaning. It means (1) the documents filed at the Customs
house; (2) the submission and acceptance of the documents; and (3) the procedure of passing goods through the
Customs house.

In the instant case, the textile from the Manila International Container Port was passed through the Customs house and
released by means of the Special Permit to Transfer purportedly accomplished and signed by the authorized Customs
personnel. The permit form was genuine but all the signatures thereon, except for one, were forged. The trial court
found that the one genuine signature of Deputy Collector of Customs Juan P. Calabig was affixed on the belief that the
permit had been regularly signed by the other authorized personnel. The fraudulent entry of the textile makes it fall
under Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The receipt, concealment, sale, purchase or the facilitation thereof
after the unlawful importation with the knowledge that the textile is smuggled becomes punishable under Section 3601
of the Code.

Rieta vs. People

Facts: The authorities intercepted a cargo truck containing 305 cases of “blue-seal” or untaxed cigarettes, which was
escorted by a toyota car loaded with firearms. The cargo truck was driven by a civilian who managed to escape. Among
those caught in the act and charged with violations were two policemen who accompanied the driver in the cargo truck,
and another civilian and three policemen manning the toyota car. Some of the policemen were found to be personnel
of COSAC or Constabulary Off-Shore Anti Crime battalion who have no mission orders. They were apprehended, charged
with smuggling, and the confiscated cigarettes were entrusted to the custody of the Bureau of Customs.

On appeal, the accused contended that the existence of the blue-seal cigarettes was not established because the
prosecution had not presented them as evidence, and that there was no crime because the corpus delicti was never
proven during the trial.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed smuggling?

Ruling: Yes. Under Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code, persons found to be in possession of smuggled items
are presumed to be engaged in smuggling. In this case, the defendants were shown to have had possession of illegally
imported merchandise without offering any satisfactory explanations. Hence, conviction is proper since they were not
able to rebut the presumption.

***Additional info just in case

On the issue of whether or not the crime was sufficiently established:

Yes. Corpus delicti may be proven by credible testimony of witnesses, not necessarily by physical evidence. This means
that the confiscated “blue-seal” cigarettes need not be presented as evidence in court to prove smuggling. In this case,
a custody receipt issued by the BOC was presented and the testimonies of the apprehending authorities identifying the
contraband items were found credible. Such are sufficient to prove the fact of the crime.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES et al. v. HONORABLE RAMON S. CAGUIOA et al.

536 SCRA 193 (2007)

Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which created the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SBF) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA). Section 12 of R.A No. 7227 of the law provides that no taxes, local and national, shall
be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to the law, Indigo Distribution
Corporation, et al., which are all domestic corporations doing business at the SBF, applied for and were
granted Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption by the SBMA.

Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, which provides that all applicable taxes, duties, charges,
including excise taxes due thereon shall be applied to cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented
liquors and wines brought directly into the duly chartered or legislated freeports of the Subic Economic
Freeport Zone. On the basis of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, SBMA issued a Memorandum declaring that,
all importations of cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the SBF, shall
be treated as ordinary importations subject to all applicable taxes, duties and charges, including excise
taxes.

Upon its implementation, Indigo et al., sought for a reconsideration of the directives on the imposition
of duties and taxes, particularly excise taxes by the Collector of Customs and the SBMA Administrator.
Their request was subsequently denied prompting them to file with the RTC of Olongapo City a special
civil action for declaratory relief to have certain provisions of R.A. No. 9334 declared as
unconstitutional. They prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was subsequently granted
by Judge Ramon Caguioa. The injunction bond was approved at One Million pesos (P1,000,000).

ISSUES:
Whether or not public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess in jurisdiction in peremptorily and unjustly issuing the injunctive writ in favor of private
respondents despite the absence of the legal requisites for its issuance

HELD:
One such case of grave abuse obtained in this case when Judge Caguioa issued his Order of May 4, 2005
and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 11, 2005 despite the absence of a clear and unquestioned
legal right of private respondents. In holding that the presumption of constitutionality and validity of
R.A. No. 9334 was overcome by private respondents for the reasons public respondent cited in his May
4, 2005 Order, he disregarded the fact that as a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, private respondents needed also to show a clear legal right that ought to be
protected. That requirement is not satisfied in this case. To stress, the possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of an actual existing right would not justify an injunctive relief.

Indeed, Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC provide for the recovery of erroneously or illegally collected
taxes which would be the nature of the excise taxes paid by private respondents should Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9334 be declared unconstitutional or invalid.

The Court finds that public respondent had also ventured into the delicate area which courts are
cautioned from taking when deciding applications for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Having ruled preliminarily against the prima facie validity of R.A. No. 9334, he assumed in effect the
proposition that private respondents in their petition for declaratory relief were duty bound to prove,
thereby shifting to petitioners the burden of proving that R.A. No. 9334 is not unconstitutional or
invalid.

In the same vein, the Court finds Judge Caguioa to have overstepped his discretion when he arbitrarily
fixed the injunction bond of the SBF enterprises at only P1million. Rule 58, Section 4(b) provides that
a bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined to answer for all damages which it may sustain by
reason of the injunction. The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or
damage by reason of the injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to
it, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.

Whether this Court must issue the writ of prohibition, suffice it to stress that being possessed of the
power to act on the petition for declaratory relief, public respondent can proceed to determine the
merits of the main case. Moreover, lacking the requisite proof of public respondent‘s alleged partiality,
this Court has no ground to prohibit him from proceeding with the case for declaratory relief. For these
reasons, prohibition does not lie.

G.R. No. 132929 March 27, 2000

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CASINO

OPERATORS CORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O N MENDOZA, J.:

The issue for decision in this case is whether the Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) is, by virtue of
its concessionaire's contract with the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), exempt from the
payment of duties, taxes and other imposts on importations. Both the Court of Appeals and the Court of Tax
Appeals ruled in the affirmative. Hence this petition.

The facts are as follows:

PAGCOR is a government corporation with exclusive franchise to operate and maintain gambling casinos. On July
5, 1977, it entered into a contract with PCOC for the operation of its floating casino off Manila Bay. This
establishment was, however, gutted by fire in 1979, for which reason, PAGCOR shifted its operations to land-
based casinos and entered into another contract with PCOC for the management of a casino at the Provident
International Resources Corporation (PIRC) building on Imelda Avenue, Parañaque City. Both contracts contained
the following stipulation:1

Sec. 2(e). The CONCESSIONAIRE shall be authorized in behalf of the FRANCHISE[E] to . . . procure either local
or imported equipment and facilities from foreign sources as may be required in the casino operation . . . .
From 1982 to 1984, PCOC imported various articles and equipment which, on the strength of endorsements of
exemption it had procured from the Ministry of Finance, were released from the Bureau of Customs free of tax.

Sometime in May 1988, the Customs Bureau received confidential information that PCOC had been able to obtain
tax exemption through fraud and misrepresentation. Accordingly, the District Collector of Customs issued a
warrant for the seizure of the imported articles. On March 12, 1989, agents of the Bureau served the warrants at
the PIRC building, where the articles were kept, and several auto parts, escalators, elevators, power systems,
kitchen equipment and other heavy equipment were seized or detained.2

After hearing, the District Collector of Customs ordered on February 22, 1990 the forfeiture of the imported
articles. PCOC appealed, but the Commissioner of Customs, on February 12, 1991, affirmed the ruling. PCOC
elevated the case to the CTA, which, on May 28, 1997, reversed the ruling of the Commissioner of Customs and
ordered the release of the articles to PCOC.

On June 20, 1997, the Commissioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied on the ground
that it was filed late. The CTA, therefore, ordered the entry of its judgment.

The Commissioner then filed a petition for certiorari. But in its decision dated March 3, 1998, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals3
—

I. ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS THAT SERVICE TO THE LEGAL
SERVICE DIVISION OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS IS BINDING ON THE OSG.

II. [ERRONEOUSLY] DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AS, ALLEGEDLY, THE PROPER REMEDY IS AN
APPEAL.

III. ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED THE ORDER TO RELEASE THE SEIZED ARTICLE ILLEGALLY IMPORTED.

First. Petitioner was represented in the CTA by the Office of the Solicitor General which deputized lawyers in the
Legal Service Division of the Bureau of Customs to serve as collaborating counsels. In accordance with this
arrangement, lawyers in both offices (Bureau of Customs and the OSG) were served copies of decisions of the
CTA. The lawyers at the Bureau received a copy of the decision of the CTA on May 30, 1997, while the OSG
received its own on June 5, 1997. As earlier stated, the OSG filed its motion for reconsideration on June 20, 1997.
Counted from this date, the motion was seasonably filed, but if the period for appealing or filing a motion for
reconsideration were reckoned from the date of receipt of the decision by the lawyers of the Bureau of Customs,
then the motion was filed five days late. The Court of Appeals ruled that service of the copy of the CTA decision
on the lawyers of the Bureau of Customs was equivalent to service on the OSG, and, therefore, the motion for
reconsideration was filed late.4

This is error. In National Power Corp. v. NLRC,5 it was already settled that although the OSG may have deputized
the lawyers in a government agency represented by it, the OSG continues to be the principal counsel, and,
therefore, service on it of legal processes, and not that on the deputized lawyers, is decisive. It was explained:
. . . The lawyer deputized and designated as "special attorney-OSG" is a mere representative of the OSG and the
latter retains supervision and control over the deputized lawyer. The OSG continues to be the principal counsel .
. . . and as such, the Solicitor General is the party entitled to be furnished copies of the orders, notices and
decisions. The deputized special attorney has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal should be
made.

As a consequence, copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized counsel, acting as agent or
representative of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually received by the latter. We have
likewise consistently held that the proper basis for computing reglementary period to file an appeal and for
determining whether a decision had attained finality is service on the OSG . . . .6

In ruling that it is service of the adverse decision on the deputized lawyers and not that on the OSG which is
decisive, the CA cited the cases of Republic v. Soriano7 and National Irrigation Administration v. Regino.8

These cases are not in point. In Soriano, the Court dismissed the petition of the OSG not because it was bound
by the earlier service of its orders on the deputized counsel but because, counted from the OSG's receipt of the
questioned orders, its Motion for Reconsideration was filed late. Thus, it was stated:9

The three . . . Orders in question were received by the OSG on October 14, 1986 having been referred to it by
the Insurance Commissioner on that same day . . . Applying the Interim Rules and Guidelines of the Rules of
Court, the OSG had until October 29, 1986 to file its appeal from the questioned Orders. Consequently, the Motion
for Reconsideration filed on November 10, 1986 was filed out of time. . . .

On the other hand, the case of National Irrigation Administration v. Regino is different because there the OSG did
not deputize any special counsel. The other counsel of record, Atty. Basuil, was deputized by the NIA. Thus, the
Court's ruling therein that the service of the lower court's order (denying motion for reconsideration) to Atty.
Basuil was also deemed service to the OSG was based on Rule 13, §2 of the Rules of Court.10 The Court itself
impliedly recognized that had Atty. Basuil been a deputized special counsel of the OSG, he would have no authority
to decide on his own what action to take on any incident regarding the case. The Court stated: "[A]s aptly noted
by the private respondent, the Solicitor General did not appoint Atty. Basuil a special attorney or his deputy."11

Second. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner should have filed an appeal and not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure because even assuming that the CTA erred in ruling that PCOC
is exempt from the payment of importation-related taxes, its error would be an error of judgment committed in
the exercise of its jurisdiction.12

We disagree. In its order of August 14, 1997, the CTA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and ordered
the entry of judgment. As far as petitioner was concerned, there was no longer any appeal and execution of the
decision was in order, whereas the prime specification of petition for certiorari is that there is no appeal, nor any
other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Third. Coming now into the merits of the case, the CTA ruled that the importations of PCOC were exempt from
tax pursuant to §4(2)(b) of B.P. Blg. 1067-B, as amended by P.D. No. 1399,13 , which provides:

Sec. 4. EXEMPTIONS. —
(2) Income and other taxes. —

(b) Others: The exemption herein granted for earnings derived from the operations conducted under the franchise,
specifically from the payment of any tax, income or otherwise, as well as any form of charges, fees, or levies,
shall inure to the benefit of and extend to corporation/s, association/s, agency/ies, or individual/s with whom the
Franchisee [PAGCOR] has any contractual relationship in connection with the operations of the casino/s authorized
to be conducted under the franchise and to those receiving compensation or other remuneration from the
Franchise Holder as a result of essential facilities furnished and/or technical services rendered to the Franchise
Holder.

This provision is not applicable because it refers to income tax exemption. As PCOC claims to be exempt from the
payment of duties, taxes, and other imposts for imported articles, the CTA should have applied instead the
provision of the first paragraph of §4(1), to wit:

Sec. 4. EXEMPTIONS. —

(1) Duties, taxes and other imposts on importations — All importations of equipment, vehicles, automobiles,
boats, ships, barges, aircraft and such other gambling paraphernalia, including accessories or related facilities,
for the sole and exclusive use of the casinos, the proper and efficient management and administration thereof,
and such other clubs, recreation or amusement places to be established under and by virtue of this Franchise
shall be exempt from the payment of duties, taxes and other imposts, including all kinds of fees, levies, or charges
of any kind or nature.

Vessels and/or accessory ferry boats imported or to be imported by any corporation having existing contractual
arrangements with the Franchisee, for the sole and exclusive use of the casino or to be used to service the
operations and requirements of the casino, shall likewise be totally exempt from the payment of all taxes, duties
and other imposts, including all kinds of fees, levies, assessments or charges of any kind or nature, whether
National or local.

Under the first paragraph above, full exemption from the payment of importation-related taxes is granted to
PAGCOR — and no other — irrespective of the type of article imported. On the other hand, while the second
paragraph grants exemption not only to PACCOR but also to "any corporation having existing contractual
arrangements with [it]," the exemption covers only the importation of vessels and/or accessory ferry boats,
whereas the imported articles involved in this case consisted of auto parts, elevators, escalators, power systems,
kitchen equipment and other heavy equipment. PCOC admittedly did not import vessels or accessory ferry boats
so as to be exempt from the payment of customs duties.

Nonetheless, the CTA ruled that PAGCOR's exemption under the first paragraph of §4(1) extends to PCOC by
virtue of the concessionaire's contract under which PCOC was allowed to import equipment and facilities for the
use of PAGCOR's casinos.14 This is not correct. It is settled that tax exemptions should be strictly construed
against those claiming to be qualified thereto.15

The CTA's ruling in Philippine Casino Operators Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,16 which it cited
in deciding this case, is not in point. The sole issue posed in that case, which it answered in the affirmative using
§4(2)(b), was whether PCOC was exempt from paying income tax, surtax of improperly accumulated profits, and
business tax.

Fourth. Prescinding from what has been said, we hold that the forfeiture of the illegally released equipment was
proper under §2530, pars. (f) and (l), sub-paragraph 3, 4 and 5 of the and Customs Code, as amended .17
Contrary to private respondent's contention, the forfeiture proceedings were not barred by prescription as the
one year prescriptive period under Sec. 160318 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, applies only in the
absence of fraud. In this case, PCOC's importations were released by the Bureau of Customs free of tax by virtue
of endorsements issued by the Ministry (now Department) of Finance. These, in turn, were issued on certain
misrepresentations of Constancio Francisco, an interlocking officer of PCOC and PIRC,19 to the effect that the
importations were exempt from taxes and duties. The following letter20 is typical of the requests he made:21

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, GR No. 195876,

2016-12-05

Facts:

On 16 April 1996, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8180,[4] otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996" took effect. It provides, among others, for the reduction of the tariff duty on
imported crude oil from ten percent (10%) to three percent (3%).

Prior to its effectivity, petitioner's importation of 1,979,674.85 U.S. barrels of Arab Light Crude Oil, thru the Ex
MT Lanistels, arrived on 7 April 1996 nine (9) days earlier than the effectivity of the liberalization provision

More than four (4) years later or on 1 August 2000, petitioner received a demand letter[5] dated 27 July 2000
from the Bureau of Customs (BOC), through the District Collector of Batangas, assessing it to pay the
deficiency customs duties in the amount of P120,162,991.00

Petitioner protested the assessment on 14 August 2000

Seeking clarification as to what course of action the BOC is taking, and reiterating its position that the
respondent's demand letters dated 29 October 2001 and 27 July 2000 have no legal basis, petitioner sent a letter
to the Director of Legal Service of the BOC on 3 December 2001 for said purpose.

On 11 April 2002, the BOC filed a civil case for collection of sum of money against petitioner, together with
Caltex Philippines, Inc. as co-party therein, docketed as Civil Case No. 02103239, before Branch XXV,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), of the City of Manila.

Consequently, on 27 May 2002, petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a Petition for Review,
raffled to the Former First Division (CTA in Division)

CTA in Division ruled to dismiss the Petition for Review on C.T.A. Case No. 6485 for lack of merit and
accordingly ordered petitioner to pay the entire amount of P936,899,883.90

CTA Former En Banc affirmed the CTA in Division's ruling pertaining to the implied abandonment caused by
petitioner's failure to file the Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration within the 30-day period, and
transfer of ownership by operation of law to the government of the subject shipment in accordance with
Sections 1801 and 1802, in relation to Section 13.01, of the TCCP... judicial no

Issues:
that the subject Memorandum dated 2 February 2001 was neither identified nor offered in evidence by
respondent during the entire proceedings before the CTA in Division.

CTA likewise cannot motu proprio justify the existence of fraud committed by petitioner by applying the rules
on judicial notice.

Ruling:

Unless any of the party formally offered in evidence said Memorandum, and accordingly, admitted by the court
a quo, it cannot be considered as among the legal and factual bases in resolving the controversy presented
before it.

it would also be an error for the CTA in Division to even take judicial notice of the subject Memorandum being
merely a part of the BOC Records submitted before the court a quo, without the same being identified by a
witness, offered in and admitted as evidence, and effectively, depriving petitioner, first and foremost, an
opportunity to object thereto. Hence, the subject Memorandum should not have been considered by the CTA in
Division in its disposition.

Seizure and Forfeiture

6. COC vs. MANILA STAR FERRY, INC., (Dungog)
Facts: Manila Star Ferry, Inc. and the United Navigation & Transport Corporation are domestic
corporations engaged in the lighterage business and are the owners and operators, respectively, of
the tugboat Orestes and the barge-lighter UN-L-106. Ceaba Shipping Agency, Inc. (Ceaba) is the
local shipping agent of the Chiat Lee Navigation Trading Co. of Hongkong, the registered owner and
operator of the S/S Argo, an ocean-going vessel.
On June 12, 1966, the S/S Argo, the Orestes and the UN-L-106, as well as two wooden bancas of
unknown ownership, were apprehended for smuggling by a patrol boat of the Philippine Navy along
the Explosives Anchorage Area of Manila Bay. The patrol boat caught the crew of the S/S Argo in the
act of unloading foreign-made goods onto the UN-L-106, which was towed by the Orestes and
escorted by the two wooden bancas. The goods of 330 cases of foreign-made cigarettes, assorted
ladies' wear, clothing material and plastic bags, all of which were not manifested and declared by the
vessel for discharge in Manila. No proper notice of arrival of the S/S Argo was given to the local
customs authorities.
Thereafter, seizure and forfeiture proceedings were separately instituted before the Collector of
Customs for the Port and the two bancas, charging them with violations of Section 2530 (a), (b) and
(c) of the TCC. Criminal charges were likewise filed against the officers and crew of said vessels and
watercraft.
In the seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the CoC rendered a consolidated decision, declaring the
forfeiture of said vessels and watercraft in favor of the Philippine government by virtue of Section
2530 (a) and (b) of the TCC.
ISSUE: WON the subject vessels and watercraft should be forfeited in favor of the government?
HELD: Section 2530(a) in unmistakable terms provides that a vessel engaged in smuggling "in a port
of entry" cannot be forfeited. This is the clear and plain meaning of the law. It is not within the
province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of the law, for indeed, we are bound by the words of
the statute. Neither can we put words in the mouths of the lawmaker. A verba legis non est
recedendum.
It must be noted that the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 from which the TCC is based,
contained in Section 1363(a) thereof almost exactly the same provision in Section 2530(a) of the
TCC, including the phrase "except a port of entry." If the lawmakers intended the term "port of entry"
to mean "port of destination," they could have expressed facilely such intention when they adopted
the TCC in 1957. Instead on amending the law, Congress reenacted verbatim the provision of Section
1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Congress, in the very same Article 2530 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, used the term "port of destination" in subsections (c) and (d) thereof. This
is a clear indication that Congress is aware of the distinction between the two wordings.
It was only in 1972, after this case was instituted, when the questioned exception ("except a port of
entry") in Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code was deleted by P.D. No. 74.
Nevertheless, although the vessel cannot be forfeited, it is subject to a fine of not more than
P10,000.00 for failure to supply the requisite manifest for the unloaded cargo under Section 2521 of
Code, which reads as follows:
Sec. 2521. Failure to Supply Requisite Manifests. — If any vessel or aircraft enters or
departs from a port of entry without submitting the proper manifest to the customs
authorities, or shall enter or depart conveying unmanifested cargo other than as stated
in the next preceding section hereof, such vessel or aircraft shall be fined in a sum not
exceeding ten thousand pesos.
The barge-lighter UN-L-106 and the tugboat Orestes, on the other hand, are subject to forfeiture
under paragraph (c) of Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The barge-lighter and tugboat
fall under the term "vessel" which includes every sort of boat, craft or other artificial contrivance used,
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water (R.A. No. 1937, Section 3514). Said
section 2530 (c) prescribes the forfeiture of' any vessel or aircraft into which shall be transferred
cargo unladen contrary to law before the arrival of the vessel or aircraft at her port of destination
Manila was not the port of destination, much less a port of call of the S/S Argo, the importing vessel.
The S/S Argo left Hongkong and was bound for Jesselton, North Borneo, Djakarta and Surabaja,
Indonesia; and yet it stopped at the Port of Manila to unload the smuggled goods onto the UN-L-106
and the Orestes.
NOTE: Forfeiture proceedings are proceedings in rem and are directed against the res. It is no
defense that the owner of the vessel sought to be forfeited had no actual knowledge that his property
was used illegally. The absence or lack of actual knowledge of such use is a defense personal to the
owner himself which cannot in any way absolve the vessel from the liability of forfeiture.

Feeder International vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 94262, May 31, 1991
Facts: “M/T ULU WAI” was a foreign vessel owned by Feeder International form Singapore which carried 1,100 metric tons
of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil. The vessel anchored at Guiuanon Island in Iloilo. However, the Customs Team
found out that it did not have the required ship and shipping documents except for a clearance from the port of Singapore
clearing the vessel for Zamboanga.
Issue: Was Feeder International guilty of illegal importation?
Ruling: Yes. Under 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code, importation begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the
jurisdiction of the Philippines with the intention to unload therein. In this case, the vessel has entered the Philippines. The
Court ruled that there was an intention to unload. The Court based it on the following facts discovered:
 The route to Zamboanga was shorter. There is no justification why they would go through Iloilo, a longer route.
 When they anchored the master of the vessel did not file a marine protest within 24 hours as mandated by the
Tariff and Customs Code and even though there were urgent repairs needed.
 There were no shipping documents. Romeo Deposa enumerated the shipping documents they had but did not
mention the purchase order of the buyer of the oil and the bill of lading.
 There was a tugboat and a barge beside the vessel. Government witnesses testified that the tons of oil were to be
shipped to Manila. The tugboat and the barge were to be used for unloading them.

Yaokasin v Commissioner (R-U, Glenna)

Facts:
The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner Yaokasin, which
were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau
of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the
petitioner but this order was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue of
Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan
under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases where the decision is adverse to the
government, the Commissioner of Customs has the power of automatic review.

Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that these were
not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however published in
the Official Gazette.

Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to take effect

Ruling:
NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an administrative order
of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said issuance
requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to
particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As held
in Tanada v. Tuvera, “It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all
concerned.”

Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the Official
Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of Congress, executive,
administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general
applicability.

Acting Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals (Gallo)

Facts: On February 20, 1980, Andrulis representing himself as an American businessman “on joint ventures with his
Filipino counterparts”, arrived in Manila and checked in at the Century Park Sheraton Hotel. Two days later, he left
the hotel surreptitiously without paying for his bills in the amount of P2,000. The Chief Security Officer of the hotel
timely discovered the scheduled departure of Andrulis on that same day, and immediately tipped-off the Customs
authorities on Andrulis’ intention to abscond. At the Manila International Airport (MIA), the Customs authorities
looked for Andrulis from among the passengers who were already on board bound for Singapore. Andrulis locked
himself inside the airplane’s comfort room. In the course of negotiations for him to come out, he slipped through an
opening bills worth US300 dollars. He finally yielded to the authorities and surrendered the luggage he was carrying
which contained various foreign currencies consisting of US59, 639.00 dollars; 53, 100 Indonesian Rupiah, and
Singapore 308.00 dollars.

A criminal charge was filed for violation of CB Circular No. 534 in relation to RA265, the Central Bank Charter. The
Acting District Collector of Customs found Andrulis to have violated CB Circular No. 534 in relation to section
2530(f) of the Tariff and Customs Code and the various foreign currencies were declared forfeited in favor of the
Government of the Philippines, the same to be turned over to the Central Bank and exchanged with their equivalent
in Philippine pesos which shall be deposited with the National Treasury and accounted for as Customs receipts.
Herein petitioner, the Acting Commissioner of Customs affirmed the same. However, the CTA reversed such decision
on the theory that the legal presumption of ownership has to be accorded the possessor of the res, who need not be
obliged to show or prove it. Thus, petitioner filed an MR alleging that the CTA failed to consider that claimant
Andrulis had the burden of proof to show that the foreign currencies seized from him were brought into the
Philippines by him but such motion was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Who has the burden of proof in seizure or forfeiture proceedings?

Ruling: The applicable law is Section 2535 of the Tariff and Customs Code which provides:
SEC. 2535. Burden of Proof in Seizure and/or Forfeiture. — In all proceedings taken for the seizure and/or forfeiture
of any vehicle, vessel, aircraft, beast or articles under the provisions of the tariff and customs laws, the burden of
proof shall lie upon the claimant: Provided, That probable cause shall be first shown for the institution of such
proceedings and that seizure and/or forfeiture was made under the circumstances and in the manner described in the
preceding sections of this Code.

Upon the facts of the case, the requirement of the law that the existence of probable cause should first be shown
before firing of the forfeiture proceedings, had been fully met. When Andrulis was apprehended at the MIA and was
found to have in his possession the various foreign currencies, he could not produce the required Central Bank
authorization allowing him to bring them out of the country. This constituted prima facie evidence of infringement
of the provisions of CB Circular No. 534 and provided sufficient basis for the seizure 'of the said foreign exchange.
Probable cause having been shown, the burden of proof was upon Andrulis to establish that he fell within the
purview of the exception prescribed in the second paragraph of the aforequoted Section 3 of CB Circular No. 534 in
that he actually brought into the country the foreign currencies and was just taking them out. 7 This burden, Andrulis
had failed to satisfactorily discharge. The legal presumption in Section 5(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Article
541 of the Civil Code, relied upon by respondent Court, are of a general character and cannot prevail over the specific
provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code.

G.R. No. L-49298 April 26, 1990

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. DELGADO SHIPPING AGENCY and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS

Facts: The vessel SS "Eurygenes" arrived in the port of Manila and discharged a shipment of 123 bales of assorted textile
remnants. The gross weight of the shipment as declared in the Bill of Lading was 61,500 pounds. But upon examination
and appraisal by customs authorities, it was found that the actual weight was 136,343 pounds, or 74,843 pounds more.

COC: Delgado Shipping Agency violated Sec. 2523 of the Tariff and Customs Code; fine of P58,400

CTA: fine of only P18,000.00

Section 2523 of the Tariff and Customs Code reads:

SEC. 2523. DISCREPANCY BETWEEN ACTUAL & DECLARED WEIGHT OF MANIFESTED ARTICLE. — If the gross weight
of any article or package described in the manifest exceed by more than twenty per centum the gross weight as
declared in the manifest or bill of lading thereof, and the Collector shall be of the opinion that such discrepancy
was due to the carelessness or incompetency of the master or pilot in command, owner or employee of the vessel
or aircraft, a fine of not more than fifteen per centum of the value of the package or article in respect to which the
discrepancy exists, may be imposed upon the importing vessel or aircraft

Issue: WON respondent CTA erred in reducing the administrative fine imposed by petitioner COC?

Held: Yes. The imposition of administrative fine of P58,400 be reinstated.

The evident purpose of the codal provision requiring vessels to declare the correct weight of their cargo is to curb
smuggling due to under declarations. Hence, imposing the maximum fine promotes the spirit and purpose of the law,
since imposing a minimum fine would only embolden would-be smugglers and foster gross negligence on the part of the
master of the vessel in checking the true weight of the cargo.
Private respondent argues that since there was no hearing conducted by petitioner, it follows that no evidence was
presented to prove that the discrepancy in weight was due to the carelessness and incompetence of the master, owner
or employees of the vessel. The records do not sustain this argument. The decision CTA clearly states that the COC
informed private respondent about his finding of a discrepancy of more than 20% between the declared weight and the
actual weight of the disputed cargo discharged by SS "Eurygenes" and required the latter to explain in writing and show
cause why no administrative fine should be imposed on the vessel. Since no reply was made by private respondent,
administrative proceeding was instituted against the vessel and private respondent was duly notified of the hearing. On
appeal to respondent court, private respondent submitted the case for decision based on the pleadings and records of
the Bureau of Customs.

. . . No trial on the merits was conducted by this Court. One who prays for judgment on the pleadings without
offering proof as to the truth of his own allegations, and without giving the opposing party an opportunity to
introduce evidence, must be understood to admit the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the
opposing party and to rest his motion for judgment on these allegations taken together with such of his own as
are admitted in the pleadings. (Bauermann vs. Casas, 10 Phil. 836; Evangelista vs. De la Rosa, et al., 76 Phil. 115).

And even more, proceedings before the Court of Tax Appeals is a trial de novo. If petitioner desired to present
evidence in addition to those already filed in the Customs records forwarded to this Court, it could have easily
done so instead of submitting this case based on the pleadings. (CF Sharp & Co. Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs,
No. L23803, February 26, 1968, 22 SCRA 760).

It cannot be over stressed that it is the duty of the vessel's master, owner or employees to check and verify the correct
weight of its cargoes.

Hon. Ramon J. Farolan, Jr., in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs vs. CA, G.R. No. 42204, 21 January 1993

FACTS: S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port of Manila carrying among others,
80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading (Bagong Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading no.
39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,
350.00. The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment upon hearing the information that
the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of nylon under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon
re-examination, it turns out that the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as previously declared. Thus the Collector
of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the government. Private respondent filed a petition on August 20, 1976 for the
release of the questioned goods which the Court denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong
Buhay after several motion. The sixteen remaining bales were missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards released,
only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents demand that the Bureau of
Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost.

ISSUE: WON the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost by the private respondent
RULING: NO. The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with
regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately
liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state. On
this point, the political doctrine that “state may not be sued without its consent,” categorically applies. As an unincorporated
government agency without any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit.
Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency,
the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function.
Thus private respondents claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.

PATEROK VS BOC 193 SCRA 132

Facts:
 In March 1986, the Paterok shipped from Germany to the Philippines two (2) containers, one with used household goods and
the other with two (2) used automobiles (one Bourgetti and one Mercedes Benz 450 SLC). The first container was released by the
Bureau of Customs and later on, the Bourgetti car, too. The Mercedes Benz, however, remained under the custody of the said Bureau.

In December 1987, after earnest efforts to secure the release of the said Mercedes Benz, the Paterok received a notice of
hearing from the legal officer of the Manila International Container Port, Bureau of Customs informing the him that seizure
proceedings were being initiated against the said Mercedes Benz for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 73 in relation to Section 2530(F)
of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), as amended, and Central Bank Circular (CBC) 1069.

While the said case was pending, the Paterok received only on April, 1988, a letter informing her that a decision ordering the
forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had been rendered on December 16, 1986 by the District Collector of Customs. Paterok had not been
informed that a separate seizure case was filed on the same Mercedes Benz in question before the said District Collector, an office
likewise under the Bureau of Customs. Paterok later found out that on November 13, 1986, a Notice of Hearing set on December 2,
1986, concerning the said Mercedes Benz, was posted on the bulletin board of the Bureau of Customs at Port Area, Manila. He filed a
motion for new trial before the Collector of Customs, Port of Manila, but the latter, in an order dated May 30, 1988, denied the same,
invoking the failure of the former to appear in the said hearing despite the posting of the notice on the bulletin board.

The Collector of Customs contended that a reopening of the case was an exercise in futility considering that the forfeited
property, a Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, had an engine displacement of more than 2800 cubic centimeters and therefore was under the
category of prohibited importation pursuant to B.P. Blg. 73. Subsequently, the Paterok filed a petition for review with the Department
of Finance, which petition the latter referred to the public respondent. The petitioner likewise addressed a letter to the Hon. Cancio
Garcia, the Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, Malacañang, requesting the latter's assistance for a
speedy resolution of the said petition. Finally, the public respondent rendered a decision on September 22, 1989 affirming the previous
order of the Collector of Customs for the Forfeiture of the Mercedes Benz in question in favor of the government.

Issue:

1. WON a notice of hearing posted in the bulletin board is sufficient notice and failure of Paterok to appear caused her
declaration in default.
2. WON Bureau of Customs was left with no alternative but to forfeit the shipment as mandated by BP Blg 73.

Ruling:

1. No. Notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board of the public respondent in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of
the alleged prohibited article is known does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and procedural
due process. Time and again, the Court has emphasized the imperative necessity for administrative agencies to observe the
elementary rules of due process. And no rule is better established under the due process clause of the Constitution than that
which requires notice and opportunity to be heard before any person can be lawfully deprived of his rights.

In the present case, although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board, the said procedure is premised on the
ground that the party or owner of the property in question is unknown. This is clear from the provisions of the TCCP relied upon by
the public respondent, namely, Sections 2304 and 2306, captioned "Notification of Unknown Owner and "Proceedings in Case of
Property Belonging to Unknown Parties," respectively, wherein the posting of the notice of hearing on the bulletin board is specifically
allowed. But in the case at bar, the facts evidently show that the petitioner could not have been unknown. The petitioner had previous
transactions with the Bureau of Customs and in fact, the latter had earlier released the first container consisting of household goods
and the Bourgetti car to the former at her address (as stated in the Bill of Lading). If only the public respondents had exercised some
reasonable diligence to ascertain from their own records the identity and address of the petitioner as the owner and the consignee of
the property in question, the necessary information could have been easily obtained which would have assured the sending of the
notice of hearing properly and legally. Then, the petitioner would have been afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present her
defense which is the essence of procedural due process. But the public respondent regrettably failed to perform such basic duty.

2. Yes. Batas Pambansa Blg. 73, a law intended to promote energy conservation. The Paterok does not dispute the fact that the
motor car in question, a Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, has an engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters which clearly falls within
the prohibited importation specified in the law and as such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public respondents.

Inasmuch as it would be contrary to law, i.e., B.P. Blg. 73, to allow the petitioner to redeem the Mercedes Benz in question, there is
therefore no alternative, as correctly claimed by the public respondents, but to forfeit the same. We cannot agree with the proposition
that the Collector of Customs is authorized to release the motor vehicle in question to the petitioner which, in effect, would absolve
the latter from any liability. In the matter of disposing of contrabands, Section 2609(c) of the Tariff and Customs Code specifically
provides that the prerogative of the Collector of Customs is not the release of the contraband like the Mercedes Benz in question but
its sale, which presupposes a prior custody pursuant to forfeiture and seizure proceedings as in the case at bar.

As thus worded: Sec. 2609. Disposition of Contraband. — Article of prohibited importation or exportation, known as contraband,
shall, in the absence of special provision, be dealt with as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Other contraband of commercial value and capable of legitimate use may be sold under such restrictions as will insure its use for
legitimate purposes only . . .

There is nothing in the Code that authorizes the Collector to release the contraband in favor of an importer. The Code, on
the other hand, is clear that the thing may be disposed of by sale alone "under such restrictions as will insure its use for legitimate
purposes." To be sure, the restrictions to be prescribed by the Collector must coincide with the purpose underlying Batas Blg. 73, that
is, to conserve energy. Hence, he cannot allow its use (after sale), in this case a Mercedes Benz with an engine displacement of more
than 2,800 cubic centimeters, that would set at naught that purpose. He must make sure that the engine is changed before it is allowed
to ply Philippine soil.

1
EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. 177188 December 4, 2008

FACTS:
The BOC issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention of the rice shipped by M/V Criston, operated by Glucer Shipping,
on the ground that it left the Port of Manila without the necessary clearance from the Philippine Coast Guard. A
notice of the scheduled hearing of the seizure cases was sent to Glucer Shipping but it failed to appear at the
hearing. After a typhoon had passed through Albay, M/V Criston failed to return to the Port of Tabaco and was
nowhere to be found. The BOC then received information that M/V Criston was found in Bataan sporting the name
of M/V Neptune Breeze. The District Collector rendered a Decision ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Criston, also
known as M/V Neptune Breeze, and its cargo. In the meantime, El Greco, the duly authorized local agent of the
registered owner of M/V Neptune Breeze filed a Motion for Intervention claiming that M/V Neptune Breeze was a
foreign registered vessel owned by Atlantic Pacific, and different from M/V Criston which had been involved in
smuggling activities in Legaspi, Albay.

Manila District Collector issued an Order quashing the Warrant of Seizure and Detention it issued against M/V
Neptune Breeze for lack of probable cause that the said vessel was the same one known as M/V Criston which fled
from the jurisdiction of the BOC Legaspi District after being seized and detained therein for allegedly engaging in
smuggling activities. By review of the BOC, the prior order was reversed. CTA ordered forfeiture of the vessel. MR
was denied for failure to present issues that had not been previously threshed out in its earlier Decision. CTA en Banc
affirmed CTA division.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE AND M/V CRISTON ARE ONE AND THE SAME VESSEL.

RULING: YES
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are binding on this Court and can only be disturbed on
appeal if not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

The court cannot give much credence to the self-serving denial by El Greco that M/V Neptune Breeze is not the same
as M/V Criston in light of the substantial evidence on record to the contrary. The foreign registration of M/V Neptune
Breeze proves only that it was registered in a foreign country; but it does not render impossible the conclusions
consistently reached by the courts, that M/V Neptune Breeze was the very same vessel used in the conduct of
smuggling activities in the name M/V Criston.
In administrative proceedings, such as those before the BOC, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Although it was not able to participate in the proceedings, it had ample opportunity to present its side of the
controversy in before the Manila District Collector. Even the evidence presented by El Greco in the latter
proceedings fails to persuade. The only vital evidence it presented before the Manila District Collector was the
foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze. It was still the same piece of evidence which El Greco submitted to this
Court.

M/V "DON MARTIN" VOY 047 vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE

G.R. No. 160206 July 15, 2015

DOCTRINE
The burden of proof to show that a vessel and its cargo are subject to forfeiture and seizure for violation
of the Tariff and Customs Code fall upon the party alleging that such were smuggled goods. Absent substantial
evidence to disprove documentary evidence submitted by the vessel owner there can be no forfeiture and
seizure. Inconclusive evidence pertaining to the length of the grain of rice cannot overcome documentary
evidence that show that said rice were produced, milled, and acquired locally.

FACTS
Petitioner Palacio Schipping Inc. was the owner of M/V Don Martin, a vessel of Philippine registry engaged
in coastwise trade. The vessel docked at the port of Cagayan de Oro City with its cargo of 6,500 sacks of rice
consigned to petitioner Leopoldo “Juniors” Pamulaklakin a day after its cargo was loaded in Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro. It was apprehended and seized by the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EEIB) after receiving intelligence that the cargo was smuggled. Thereafter, the District Collector of Customs in
Cagayan de Oro City issued a warrant of seizure and detention pursuant to 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines. Petitioner contended that the vessel was a common carrier and that the cargo was locally
produced and supported by several documents. However, the District Collector of Customs rendered ruling that
in the absence of a showing of lawful entry into the country, the cargo were of foreign origin and thus subject to
seizure and forfeiture for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. The grains were unusually
long and that some white sacks were marked with Premium Rice which is for yellow color sacks. It concluded
that the documents presented by petitioner were a strategy to conceal the true nature and origin of the cargoes.

ISSUES
Whether or not the CTA had jurisdiction on the forfeiture of the cargo and of the vessel
Whether or not the sacks of rice were unlawfully imported

HELD
Yes. Republic Act No. 1125 (An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals), provides that decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs in cases involving seizure and forfeiture are appealable to the CTA and the TCCP
reiterates the same for as long as the same is appealed within the period prescribed by law.
No. The onus probandi rests on the party who ordered the shipment of rice and the vessel. The
inconclusive findings cannot overcome the documentary evidence of petitioners that show that said rice was
produced, milled and acquired locally. Also, at the time the vessel and cargo were seized, the agents of the EIIB
and the Bureau of Customs never had a probable cause that would warrant the filing of the seizure proceedings.
The Government agents only made their inquiries about the alleged smuggling only three (3) days after the
seizure. This is a gross violation of Section 2535 in relation to Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines.

Authority of BOC
G.R. No. 183664 July 28, 2014
AIRLIFT ASIA CUSTOMS BROKERAGE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

 CAO 3-2006 was issued by the then Commissioner (BOC) , It covers the Rules and Regulations Governing the Accreditation of
the Customs Brokers Transacting with the BOC and essentially requires the accreditation by the BOC of customs brokers who
intend to practice before the BOC. Brokers who want to practice are required to apply for accreditation and to obtain a
Certificate of Accreditation.
 Petitioners assailed the validity of CAO 3-2006 through an action for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Issued without authority, and violates their right to practice their profession.
 RTC decided in favour of petitioners.
o This power, initially lodged with the Commissioner of the Civil Service under Section 3409 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), had been transferred upon the passageof RA 9280 to the Professional
Regulatory Board for Customs Brokers (PRBCB), which is under the supervision and administrative control of the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC).
o CAO 3-2006 imposed an additional qualification not found in the law.
 CA reversed the RTC
o Although an added burden to brokers, nevertheless bore a reasonable connection to the BOC’s aim to ensure
accountability and integrity in the transactions involving customs duties and tariff laws.
 ISSUE : WON the BOC can validly issue such Customs Administrative Order – NO
o Prior to the passage of RA 9280, the TCCP (specifically, Sections 3401 to 3409 thereof) governed the entry,
regulation, and supervision of the customs broker profession.
 Sections 3401 and 3402 of the TCCP required all applicants for customs brokers’ certificates to pass a
written examination given by the Board of Examiners for Customs Brokers under PRC supervision. BOC
Commissioner was ex officio chairman.
 Suspension/revocation also filed with Board of Examiners.
 The enactment of RA 9280, however, brought about significant changes.
 In lieu of the Board of Examiners, RA 9280 created the PRBCB. whose members are appointed by
the President from a list of recommendees submitted by the PRC which has supervisory and
administrative control over the PRBCB. Significantly, RA 9280 excluded the BOC Commissioner as
member of the PRBCB.
 Some of the powers of the PRBCB is to supervise and regulate the licensure, registration, and
practice of customs brokers profession; and to Register successful examinees in the licensure
examination and issue the corresponding Certificate of Registration and Professional
Identification Card;
o CA’s argument: It remains in the general power. It adds that "[t]o strip the BOC [Commissioner] of any disciplinary
and supervisory authority over license customs brokers… would not only cripple the [BOC’s] efforts on anti
smuggling and raising revenue.
 This general grant of power should yield to specific grant of power to CSC commissioner in the TCCP (Sec
3409) regarding the rules and regulation in the practice of the brokerage profession.
o CAO 3-2006 amounts to a licensing requirement that restricts the practice of profession of customs brokers and is
prohibited by RA 9280.
 CA: intends to regulate only the practice before the BOC, which is claimed to be one aspect
  SC: Notably, with the exception of consulting with clients, and teaching tariff and customs
administration, most of the above-enumerated activities involve dealing with the BOC. In other
words, a large part of a custom brokers’ work involves practice before the BOC.
 Moreover, a reading of CAO 3-2006 does not appear to be restricted only to "practice before the
BOC."

SUBJECT: TOPIC: Date Made: Digest Maker:

PERSONS When law takes effect 8 Aug 2018 Alrick and Rikki
CASE NAME: Commissioner of Customs vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579
PONENTE: SERENO, J. Case Date: February 1, 2012
Case Summary:
- Petitioner Commissioner of Customs (COC) issued CMO 27-2003 to impose tariffs on wheat imports
based on grade classification.
- Respondent, a wheat importer, filed for Declaratory Relief with the RTC on the ground of failure to
follow requirement of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003.
- RTC ruled in favor of the respondent
- CA dismissed the appeal
- SC denied the petition
Rule of Law/Doctrine: Failure to follow the basic requirements of hearing and publication under the Revised
Administrative Code invalidates an agency’s regulation.

Detailed Facts:
- On November 7, 2003, petitioner COC issued CMO 27-2003, which for tariff purposes, classifies wheat
according to the (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. Depending
on these factors, wheat would then be classified either as food grade or feed grade with a
corresponding tariff of 3% and 7% respectively.
- On December 19, 2003, the respondent, a wheat importer, filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with
the RTC of Las Pinas contending that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the
Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with
the University of the Philippines Law Center.
- On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days
from notice.
- Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that, among others, was an internal
administrative rule and not legislative in nature.
- On 28 February 2005, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, declaring CMO 27-2003 as INVALID and OF
NO FORCE AND EFFECT, citing the petitioner’s failure to follow the basic requirements of hearing and
publication in the issuance of the CMO.
- Petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.
- CA dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and other
importers and that the petitioners should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and
publication.
Issue:
W/N CMO 27-2003 is valid
Holding:
 Since the questioned regulation will affect the substantive rights of respondent as an importer of wheat, it
therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code in the issuance of the CMO.
Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any
sanction against any party of persons. Section

Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have
been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing
thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
Ruling:
SC denied the petition, affirming the previous declaration that the CMO is invalid
Relevant Provisions
Revised Administrative Code Chapter 2, Sec 3 and 9

Special Tax Laws

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND
INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), which was one of the laws enacted by Congress
soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement.[3] The SMA provides the structure and mechanics for the imposition of
emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports
which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.

Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation. Its principal stockholders are
Taiheiyo Cement Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation, purportedly the largest cement manufacturers in
Japan.[5]

Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation[6] (Philcemcor) is an association of domestic

cement manufacturers. It has eighteen (18) members,[7] per Record. While Philcemcor heralds itself to be an
association of domestic cement manufacturers, it appears that considerable equity holdings, if not controlling
interests in at least twelve (12) of its member-corporations, were acquired by the three largest cement
manufacturers in the world, namely Financiere Lafarge S.A. of France, Cemex S.A. de C.V. of Mexico, and
Holcim Ltd. of Switzerland (formerly Holderbank Financiere Glaris, Ltd., then Holderfin B.V.).
the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying
Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the
Tariff Commissions negative findings.

Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[11] seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff
Commissions Report. The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision[13] penned by Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion,[14] partially granted Philcemcors petition.

On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction
over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the
SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions
warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary.

Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding force was cited by the
DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light of the
appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application for
definitive safeguard measures.

The Court of Appeals had held that based on the foregoing premises, petitioner’s prayer to set aside the findings
of the Tariff Commission in its assailed Report dated March 13, 2002 is DENIED. On the other hand, the
assailed April 5, 2002 Decision of the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry is hereby SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the case is REMANDED to the public respondent Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry
for a final decision in accordance with RA 8800 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Hence, the
appeal.

Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this time that that in light of the appellate
courts Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application for definitive
safeguard measures.[41] He made a determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the
local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges.[42] Accordingly, he imposed
a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard
duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of DTI Secretary, to impose safeguard measures is valid.

Held:

NO, due to the nature of this case, the Court found that the DTI should follow the regulations prescribed by
SMA. The Court held that he assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is DECLARED NULL AND VOID and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003 is also DECLARED NULL AND VOID
and SET ASIDE. No Costs.

Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this time that that in light of the appellate
courts Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application for definitive
safeguard measures.[41] He made a determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the
local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges.[42] Accordingly, he imposed a
definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard
duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement.