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Reference:
B. PBB (Mal) 100 Malaysian Armed Forces Staff Manual Volume 1- Service Writing
(Provisional).
INTRODUCTION
1. After the surrender of Japanese during World War II, the Viet Minh, under Ho Chi
Minh’s leadership, contested the return of the French to Indo-China. The Japanese
victories of 1941-42 had dispelled the myth of western invincibility. Because the French
had not shared in the campaigns, which eventually defeated Japan, their prestige had
suffered.
2. The year 1946 started with the hope of a negotiated peace, but ended in violence.
After the Viet Minh won a clear majority in the National Assembly elections, it was
obvious the France would have to negotiate with, or to fight, the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, and its new president, Ho Chi Minh. Promising negotiations held in Paris
between Ho and Jean Sainteny in March 1946, considered the prospect of Vietminh
control over Tonkin and phase-out French Government in Annam and Cochin China
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within French’s Indochinese Federation. But Admiral Geoges Thierry d’Argenlieu, the
‘pacification’ efforts in the south to wipe out Viet Minh influence in the two regions.
3. Between 1945 and 1954, the French had totally deployed more than 250,000
French Union Forces, plus another 100,000 soldiers of the national armies of the
‘Associated States’ (Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam), aim to defeat the Viet Minh. The
French high command hoped to wipe out the Viet Minh insurgency in a single bold
stroke. To capture top Viet Minh leaders inside their jungle hideouts, the French launched
an ambitious plan code-name Operation LEA in October 1947 and managed to storm Ho
Chin Minh’s Viet Bac headquarters and captured vast stores of arms, food and material.
However, in a defensive manoeuvre often repeated, Ho’s entire top command and 40,000
Viet Minh slipped through the French pincer movement and went into the jungle. Thus
began the French military’s search for a conventional set-piece battle against Ho’s elusive
guerrillas. This is starting point of first Vietnam War between the French and Viet Minh.
The war with the French colonial forces soon became serious and both sides suffered
punishing defeats. The French felt they had superior firepower if they could ever force
the Viet Minh to stand and fight, but their inability to deal a crushing blow to the
supposedly backward Communist forces was both frustrating and humiliating. The
French and Viet Minh manoeuvre in Indochina during winter 1953-54 are shown at
Annex A.
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4. The war prolonged until in late 1953, the French commander-in-chief, General
Henri Navarre, again sought an opportunity to snare Viet Minh, with an eye towards
improving French negotiating position at a future settlement. General Navarre ordered the
investment of Dien Bien Phu to block an expected Viet Minh invasion of Laos. His
intention was to force Viet Minh to hurl his main-force unit into an elaborate ‘killing
zone.’
5. Why Dien Bien Phu was important? It is important to examine the origins of Dien
Bien Phu in the thinking of the French High Command and to state the evolution of the
plan, which led to the stationing of 16,000 troops there. Dien Bien Phu is situated in a
valley amongst an ankle of mountains over 150 miles across where there is a tendency to
great strategic importance and to think that therefore the French were stupid to commit
such large numbers to the defence of a post which could not exercise much influence over
AIM
6. The aim of this paper is to critically stimulate and analyse the Battle of Dien Bien
Phu.
SCOPE
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a. Background.
b. The Battle.
c. The Aftermath.
d. Analysis.
e. Conclusion.
BACKGROUND
8. Earlier, Dien Bien Phu had been taken out from the French hands in late 1952 by
General Giap 316 Division whom, with 148th Independent Regiment, had forced their
way through from the Red River. The French Commander in Chief, General Raoul Salan,
regarded this loss as serious, largely because of the access routes into Laos, which were
now under Viet Minh control. On 30 Dec 1952, he issued Directive No. 40 ordering a
“ The reoccupation of Dien Bien Phu must constitute in the fourth coming period
the first step for the regaining of control of the T’ai country for the elimination of
the Viet Minh from the area west of the Black River”.
9. Before General Salan was relieved by General Navarre he stressed the importance
of Dien Bien Phu in two memorandums to the Minister for Associated States, Jean
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1953, and expounded his formula for inflicting the maximum damage on the Viet Minh in
activity.
Operation ATLANTE.
launched.
e. A quest for a major set piece battle, attacking Giap’s rice granaries,
reserves of men and finally the main Viet Minh battle force.
10. At this stage, Dien Bien Phu did not feature prominently in Navarre’s plan and it
seems likely that he had no formed intention of giving effect to Salan’s Directive No. 40.
However, General Rene Cogny (GOC 2nd Infantry Division) suggested to General
Navarre that it would be a good idea to set up a base or mooring point for carrying
guerrilla warfare into Giap’s rear should he decide to renew his drive on Laos. A natural
11. The plan was to establish a major French base of operations, complete with
airfield, at Dien Bien Phu. Attacks would then be launched against Viet Minh supply
routes known to crisscross the area, hoping to lure the enemy into a major attack on the
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heavily fortified French positions. But this concept was fatally flawed by several
assumptions that were to result in catastrophe for the French, they did not believe the Viet
Minh would be able to marshal a well equipped, well disciplined army many times the
size of the French garrison in the area; they don’t believed that the Viet Minh would be
able to position superior artillery and major anti aircraft weapons in the heavily jangled
hills of the area; and they relied far too heavily on their ability to re-supply and support
12. On 20 Nov 1953, work began on the defensive positions and strong points as an
Francoise, Gabriele, Huguette and farther to the south and relatively isolated, Isabelle.
The troop built up at that time was three battalions of 2,100 paratroopers and an
additional 4500 in the weeks that followed. The Viet Minh on the other hand had the 148th
Regiment of the Viet Minh Army and the 316th Division consisting of three Infantry
13. While General Navarre and his colleagues had been making elaborate and
ambitious plans, General Giap and the Viet Minh High Command had been taking stock
of their own situation. At the end of the 1952/1953 campaign seasons, Giap’s forces were
scattered over Tonkin and northern Laos, remote from their main bases, short of supplies
and exhausted after months of fighting across over 100 miles of jungle and mountain
country. It had certainly been successful campaigns with which the French had been
forced out of Tonkin and northern Laos, but Giap had to plan his reaction to a possible
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French attempt to regain some of this country, while at the same time avoid being drawn
into a major action, which would divert his own strategy from its course. It was clear that
Giap’s operational plan calls for a complete wipe out at all costs the whole enemy force at
14. It was unfortunate for the French that Navarre did not see the vulnerability of the
Viet Minh held territory close to the delta. Giap decided to take a chance on the security
of his rear areas in order to force the French out into the more remote areas where they
15. When Giap first learned of the French had landed several battalions of troops at
Dien Bien Phu on 20 Nov 1953, he stated that the first problem he had to resolve was
whether to place a small force around the French to contain the garrison while his main
force was left free for mobile operations, or to make a direct attack with the bulk of his
main force on the Dien Bien Phu garrison and leave the diversionary offensives to local
forces. Dien Bien Phu was obviously the main feature of the French strategy for the
coming months and so they had much to loose by a defeat there. Giap’s preliminary
moves to Dien Bien Phu can best be seen in the map as per Annex B.
16. The strength comparison between the French and Viet Minh forces are shown at
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50 X 75 mm Howitzer
30 X heavy Mortar
50 x 37 mm AAG
17. The most striking feature of the tactical dispositions of the opposing forces was
that the Viet Minh were up on the hill-sides, overlooking and dominating the French who
were down in the valley. One French theory justifying a battle under these conditions was
that since the crest of the hill line was so far away the Viet Minh would have to expose
themselves on the forward slopes of these hills, where the French could see both them
and any Arty pieces which they attempted to use. In practice this theory proved
particularly empty.
THE BATTLE
18. This idea and Navarre’s concept of the role of Dien Bien Phu had been hardening
throughout the following months. The mooring point idea was given away completely in
four of a fortified camp from which a pitched defensive battle could be fought. Navarre’s
directive to General Rene Cogny forecasts the time table of the battle several weeks
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would elapse while the Viet Minh were moving their forces into position then would
come a reconnaissance phase of from six to ten days and finally the assaults which would
last several days and which must end with the failure of the Viet Minh offensive.
19. French patrols began raiding out from Dien Bien Phu in December but by end of
January, Viet Minh ambushes restricted them to the valley of their base. By early
February, Viet Minh troops and the only serviceable road ringed the entire valley, Route
41(the only route lead to the area) awas blocked. The French Air Force did its best to
interdict the Viet Minh supply routes from Hoah Binh and Yen Bay. Its attempt to block a
road with a massive bombardment failed because the Viet Minh engineers cut a bypass
for the porters, bicyclists and trucks. French efforts to spread the attack throughout the
length of the routes failed because nowhere was it possible to achieve sufficient
concentration. The Viet Minh logistic system was flexible enough to keep up flow of
supplies.
20. General Giap’s task was to reduce the northern outposts before mounting a major
assault on the main defences round the airstrip. Probing attacks began on 11 March and
early in the morning of the 13th, preceded by a furious bombardment from all his guns,
which caved in the defences, Giap launched his first major attack against Beatrice.
Concentrating a division against a battalion, the strong point was overwhelmed. Two days
later the same fate befell Gabrielle. A counter-attack force merely succeeded in bringing
off the survivors. The French artillery had been severely mauled in its open pits and its
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Minh at arm’s length from the airstrip, fell on the night of 17 th March. There was now a
lull period during which the Viet Minh sapped their way forward to enclose the main
positions with a continuous trench system, adjusted their artillery and bombarded the
21. The French dropped another three more parachute battalions to reinforce de
Castries after the first phase of the Viet Minh attack. While the reinforcements were
valuable they did not alter the force ratio. Some 16,000 French Union troops faced
49,500 Viet Minh. A further 31,500 Viet Minh were involved in the delivery of supplies.
22. The second phase opened twelve days later against the main position in a series of
overlapping attacks. All the artillery was concentrated in turn for divisional attacks on
Dominique by 312 Division on the 30th Mar, on Huguette by 308 Division on 1 April and
on Elaine by 316 Division on 3rd April, In the south 57 Brigade of 304 Division attacked
Isabelle on the 3rd April, as well in order to interfere with the mutual artillery support
between the positions. As soon as General de Castries committed his reserves to counter-
attack or reinforce on strong point, Giap switched his attack to another direction.
However, apart from the loss of Francoise and half the airfield the French managed to
prevent any major inroads. The Viet Minh suffered such heavy casualties that Giap was
forced to call off his attacks and to use his political officers to launch a massive
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23. In place of massive assaults Giap resorts to eighteenth century siege methods,
sapping his way forward into French positions from all sides under cover of a massive
and accurate bombardment. French air support was unable to make an impression on the
Viet Minh trenches and in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire the Air Force’s losses began
to mount. As the perimeter grew smaller and the Viet Minh pushed their anti-aircraft guns
closer in, air supply became more difficult. About 30% of the airdrops fell into Viet Minh
hands. With the onset of the rains in March and the monsoon in earnest in April the
French trenches in Claudine and Dominique become flooded. Another parachute battalion
was dropped into the garrison on the night of 11/12 April. General de Castries desperate
for reinforcements that over 600 volunteers, none with parachute training’ from all the
races in the French Union, were dropped in as individual battle casualty replacements.
24. During the last few days of April, Giap allowed his men a few day rest prior to a
final major effort to gain a victory before discussions on Indo-China opened at Geneva on
8th May. During that time the French made an attempt to take the press pressure off the
garrison and help it to break out. Plan ‘Xenophon’ and ‘Ariane’ were modified, because
there was insufficient air transport to supply a relief force with more than 45 tons a day
after the commitment of 150 tons a day for Dien Bien Phu had been met. The supply
situation became more serious on 2 May when the French and American civilian pilots
flying the bulk of the C119s refused to continue unless covered by fighter-ground attack
flak suppression sorties. The relief force operation, renamed ‘Condor’, failed well short
of Dien Bien Phu and the garrison’s last slim chance of breaking out to the south
disappeared.
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25. On 1 May, Giap attacked the perimeter on all sides and maintained the pressure
for a week. On the night of 2/3 May, Cogny committed the last parachute battalion from
his Airborne Reserve. During the next few days the Viet Minh gradually crumbled the
position. The aircrew and aircraft to provide close air support and air supply gradually
melted away under the attrition of the Viet Minh anti-aircraft guns. On 7 May, De
Castries surrendered and Isabelle gave up the next day. The French at Dien Bien Phu
defence layout and Viet Minh attacking approach are best shown at Annex C.
THE AFTERMATH
26. The France garrison at Dien Bien Phu fell, culminating an operation, which lasted
209 days. The last 54 days, the garrison was actually under constant attack. When the
Viet Minh finally overran the French positions, the French had suffered 2200 killed and
over 6000 wounded. More than 6000 unwounded French soldiers were taken prisoner,
but fewer than half those captured survived prison camp. It is difficult to estimate Viet
Minh casualties, although it is clear that they lost well over 10,000 killed and 20,000
27. For the French, Dien Bien Phu was the straw that broke the camel's back. Two
months later, on 20 July 1954, a formal cease-fire between the French and Viet Minh was
negotiated at Geneva. This cease-fire was never advanced beyond a military truce, and
the lack of a political settlement left the door open for the next Indochina war. In fact, the
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Viet Minh left Geneva convinced that they had been double-crossed. They believed the
Chinese forced them to accept a partition of Vietnam rather than a unified Vietnam under
their control. The victory on the battlefield was lost at Geneva as far as the Viet Minh
were concerned; however, they did not give up on their goal of unifying Vietnam.
ANALYSIS
28. The Viet Minh defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu in a set-piece battle, which,
in essence, amounted to beating the French at their own game. The shock of this defeat
reverberated throughout the western world. As French senior military officers stated
twelve years after the defeat, "Dien Bien Phu has become an acronym or shorthand
symbol for defeat of the West by the East, for the triumph of primitive.... Dien Bien Phu
resulted in severe political consequences. The French defeat was indeed an utter disaster
for both France and America who, by 1954, was underwriting 80% of French
29. Dien Bien Phu can be analysed through the use of the principles of war. Through
our analysis, the French has violated some of the principles of war at every level of war-
strategic, operational, and tactical at Dien Bien Phu. These violations contributed
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30. The first principle of war is the selection and maintenance of aim. The French
aim or objective at Dien Bien Phu was neither clearly defined nor attainable. General
Navarre's instructions prior to the airborne landing at Dien Bien Phu (Operation Castor)
were to adjust his operations to his means. French authorities in France did not learn of
the launching of Operation Castor until six hours after it started. Strategic guidance was
issued to General Navarre, but Operation Castor certainly was not designed to fulfil that
guidance. The French government by this point in the long war was interested in
stabilizing the situation in Vietnam so that peace talks could begin. A military victory was
no longer the objective as the French sought an honourable way out of the war through
negotiation. General Navarre was aware of this; nevertheless, he under took Operation
Castor despite the lack of a clear mandate for this sort of operation. French operational
objectives for Operation Castor included covering Laos, establishing a supply point for
friendly guerrilla operations, and defeating the Viet Minh in a set-piece battle. There was
no clear strategic objective for Operation Castor. The only possible attainable objective
was the set-piece battle, and the French did not properly prepare for this eventuality.
31. The Viet Minh aim or objectives, in contrast to the French, were clear, consistent,
and certainly attainable. Giap's objective was to destroy the French garrison at Dien Bien
Phu. Furthermore, the Central Committee, to whom Giap reported, fully supported Giap's
plans. At the strategic level the Viet Minh were anxious to gain a spectacular military
victory, which would make the French negotiate on Ho Chi Minh's terms. At the
operational level Giap realized that the French depended completely on aerial re-supply
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and aerial fire support. Giap had identified the French's critical vulnerability. Therefore,
his first priority was the early destruction or neutralization of French air power. The Viet
Minh were also looking for a set-piece battle, and they were determined not to let the
32. The second principle of war is the offensive action. Operation Castor started on
20 November 1953 with five French battalions parachuting into Dien Bien Phu. At this
point the French had seized the initiative. However, any hopes of remaining on the
offensive ended quickly. By early December French troops found it tough going beyond
the valley floor. Offensively, actions were soon limited to air support, patrols, and local
counterattacks. General Navarre started exploring withdraws plans in January 1954, but a
breakout was evaluated as suicidal. No significant attempt to break out of Dien Bien Phu
was ever made. By 13 March 1954 the attack on Dien Bien Phu had begun, and the
offensive was forever lost to the Viet Minh. Giap, on the other hand, was able to dictate
the time and place of engagements virtually throughout the operation. This time Giap did
not rush in with human wave attacks as the French had hoped. He took time to mass his
forces, bring in fire support, secure his own lines of communication, and lay formal siege
to the French garrison. The first major assault by the Viet Minh came a full three months
into the operation. The French had given Giap the offensive, and he gladly accepted it
33. The next two principles of war are cooperation and concentration of force will
be discussed together. Strategically, the forces squaring off at Dien Bien Phu approached
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mass from two completely different perspectives. The French simply were not willing to
pay the price to field a large force in Indochina. As early as 1950, the French Parliament
passed a law restricting the use of draftees to French homeland territories, which
precluded their use in Indochina. The average size of the French Expeditionary Corps in
Indochina hovered around 150,000 troops, which was insufficient to achieve strategic
mass. In contrast, the Viet Minh practiced the different ways. All men and women were
expected to do their part for the war against the French. All available resources were
mobilised to support the Viet Minh Armed Forces. By 1954 the Viet Minh had organised,
trained and equipped six regular divisions in addition to their territorial irregulars. At the
operational level the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu numbered about 13,000, or less
34. The French intended to use superior firepower and technology to defeat the
numerically superior Viet Minh. In fact, General Navarre saw Operation ‘Atlante’ as his
main effort and Dien Bien Phu as an economy of force operation. General Navarre did
not believe that Dien Bien Phu would be a decisive operation despite solid intelligence
confirming that the Viet Minh were massing there. The Viet Minh massed four divisions,
totalling more than 50,000 men, at Dien Bien Phu. At the same time Giap tied up French
forces and prevented them from responding in strength at Dien Bien Phu by staging
diversionary actions around the country. Giap was able to successfully concentrate his
forces at the decisive time and place while he skilfully employed supporting operations
aimed at deceiving the French. French intelligence saw through this plan; however,
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35. The French spread their forces at Dien Bien Phu in a series of strong points. Over
one-third of French forces in the valley were positioned at Isabelle, the southernmost
strong point in the valley. This position was seven kilometres from the nearest friendly
strong point and cannot provide mutual support to the rest of the garrison. Because of this
wide dispersal of French forces, the Viet Minh were able to concentrate forces to achieve
absolute superiority at any one French strong point. In addition, the French also lacked a
dedicated reserve at Dien Bien Phu. This poor situation was further exacerbated by the
fact that no full dress rehearsal for a counterattack was ever conducted. At every level of
war the French seem to have violated the principle of cooperation and concentration of
force while the Viet Minh did just the opposite. If Dien Bien Phu is viewed as an
economy of force action for the French, then what became of the main effort? Operation
‘Atlante’, after some initial success, quickly bogged down into a series of Viet Minh
ambushes on French convoys. The French eventually terminated Operation ‘Atlante’ with
36. The next principle is flexibility. Strategically, the French government maintained
loose control of operations in Indochina leaving much to the discretion of the on-scene
commander. As already discussed the government had taken steps, which limited their
flexibility. Once it became clear that Dien Bien Phu was going to be lost without some
sort of action, the French did not possess the strategic mobility necessary to influence the
outcome. France then turned to America, a country who did possess the flexibility to
change the course of events at Dien Bien Phu. America declined to help after some
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interesting political activities, and the fate of Dien Bien Phu was sealed. The Viet Minh
displayed strategic flexibility in their response to the French assault on Dien Bien Phu.
Plans to deal with the assault were quickly developed by Giap and approved by Ho's
Central Committee. At the operational level the Viet Minh, much to the surprise of
Viet Minh were able to concentrate their forces in a position, which put the French at
great disadvantage. First, the Viet Minh surrounded Dien Bien Phu within a month of the
original French assault. From then on the Viet Minh were able to dictate the pace of the
operation. Viet Minh tactical maneuvers were slow and methodical. Once they initiated
the attack on Dien Bien Phu, 54 days passed before the French surrendered France's
operational mobility depended on air assets. The French employed their air to attack Viet
Minh lines of communication leading to Dien Bien Phu. Air was to prevent any
significant enemy build-up in the area thereby securing the French forces at Dien Bien
supplies, heavy artillery, and combat forces. General Navarre could have introduced
additional forces into Dien Bien Phu via airborne assault; however, he did not. As a
result, France gained no advantage from her superior operational mobility assets.
37. The last two principles involved were security and surprise. The French were
lacking in both of these areas at Dien Bien Phu. Only three days after the start of
Operation Castor French newspapers ran headlines of the parachute assault, quoting
General Cogny as saying, "This is not a raid as at Long Son, but the beginning of an
offensive”. The Viet Minh never publicised their operations (especially while they were
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ongoing). Some of the biggest blunders made by the French at Dien Bien Phu can be
traced to surprise. Operationally, the French were repeatedly surprised. The capital error
at Dien Bien Phu was the underestimation of the enemy's capabilities. General Navarre
refused to believe many things about his enemy. Navarre rejected the notion that the Viet
Minh could dominate his men with artillery deployed on the hills above Dien Bien Phu.
He failed to anticipate that Giap's howitzers would close the airstrip at Dien Bien Phu
making re-supply difficult and evacuation of the wounded and withdrawal of troops
impossible. Navarre's map reconnaissance did not reveal a valley floor with thick
underbrush and deep mud during the spring monsoons, which would negate armoured
sweeps. There were other surprises in store for the French. Not only were they surprised
to be out numbered and outgunned by the enemy artillery, but they were also shocked by
their inability to destroy enemy artillery. In spite of his good intelligence, General
Navarre was taken completely by surprise when the Vietminh fielded four divisions with
heavy supporting artillery around the valley soon after the French landed. The Viet Minh
were not surprised beyond the initial assault, except perhaps by the French remaining in
the valley. This was a pleasant surprise for the Viet Minh because they were hoping that
the French would do just that. Tactically, the French could not gain much from security or
surprise as the Viet Minh could readily observe French moves along the valley floor. The
rugged terrain surrounding Dien Bien Phu offered sanctuary to the Viet Minh from
38. The Lessons Learnt. There are some lessons, which could be earned from
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c. External influence and support always important for any guerrilla warfare.
g. Good command and leadership can boots the confidence and morale of the
troops.
understanding.
39. American military men have criticised the French strategy in Indochina as
said:’ The French haven’t won a war since Napoleon. What can we learn from them?’ Did
the Americans learn much from the French experience? According to Sir Robert
Thompson, ‘the French experience in Indochina was almost totally written off and
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CONCLUSION
40. Dien Bien Phu suggested that the Viet Minh, in that terrain, probably had the best
infantry in the world, among the best generals, the best logistic support and the best fifth-
column preparation. They bring their heavy guns down from the heights about Dien Bien
Phu and dig them right in, beautifully camouflaged against aviation, in strong point in the
saucer plain within easy and lethal range of French camp. Who could have thought that
decisive? And of course that was why there had been so fantastically many thefts of
bicycles in Hanoi and the main towns before Dien Bien Phu- for a man or woman
pushing a bicycle could travel the narrowest path, carrying on it fifty or a hundred kilos
41. In order to win the battle, Giap had to make a number of important decisions,
which had they been poor, could have raised his casualty level and consumption of
supplies sufficiently to leave the outcome a stalemate. This result at the time of the
Geneva conference would have been most harmful to Viet Minh standing throughout the
world and could have led to hardening of popular attitudes in France for and additional
period of war.
42. In this battle, Giap had faithfully observed Mao Tse-Tung’s advice on
concentration of effort. ‘In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two,
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three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy’s strength), encircle the
enemy force completely, strike to wipe them out thoroughly, and do not let any escape
from the net.’ He had encouraged the French to disperse their forces with diversions,
which did not detract from the strength of his field army. In contrast, the French had
locked up their best mobile troops in the distant garrison, where they could neither be
Jun 2003
Annexes:
A. The French and Viet Minh Manoeuvre in Indochina During Winter 1953-54.
C. The French at Dien Bien Phu Defence Layout and Viet Minh Attacking Approach.
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