MVRS

vs
Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Phils. (2003)

FACTS:

Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than seventy
(70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims (Linzag, Arcilla, de Guzman,
da Silva, Junio) filed in the RTC a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a
class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS Publications, Inc.,
arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.

The article reads:

“ALAM BA NINYO Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi
kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi
nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila
ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang
pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."

Islamic Da’Wah: the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; not
only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and
disparage the Muslims and Islam, that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted
not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world.

MVRS Publications, Inc. : the article did not mention respondents as the object of the
article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an
expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause
damages. RTC dismissed the complaint; persons allegedly defamed by the article were
not specifically identified
CA reversed RTC decision. The defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic
faith. The suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the
requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all Muslims.

ISSUE:
Whether this is a valid class suit.

HELD:
NO, it is not a valid class suit.

DOCTRINE:

Justice Jose C. Vitug: class suit elements:

(a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other
members of the class;

(b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the
class; and,
(c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the
class.

Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests not
only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. But they
obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group and were not
able to demonstrate they have the same interests with the rest of Muslims.
 REBECCA PACAÑA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAÑA,
v.
ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC., EARL U KOKSENG, LILIA TORRES, DALLA P.
ROMANILLOS and MARISSA GABUYA
G.R. No. 168979 December 2, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioners Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaña, children of Lourdes Teves

Pacaña and Luciano Pacaña, filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla
and Marisa for accounting and damages. The petitioners filed the complaint in their own
names although Rosalie was authorized by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and
special power of attorney (SPA).

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, that the
petitioners are not the real parties in interest to institute and prosecute the case and that
they have no valid cause of action against the respondents.

The RTC denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss as well as respondents’ motion for
reconsideration.

The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the Court of Appeals, invoking grave abuse of discretion in the denial of their motion to
dismiss. The CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion as the petitioners filed the complaint and the amended complaint as attorneys-
in-fact of their parents. As such, they are not the real parties in interest and cannot bring
an action in their own names.

The petitioners filed the present petition and argued, among others, that in annulling the
interlocutory orders, the CA unjustly allowed the motion to dismiss which did not conform
to the rules. Specifically, the motion was not filed within the time for, but before the filing
of, the answer to the amended complaint, nor were the grounds raised in the answer.
Citing Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the respondents are deemed to have waived
these grounds, as correctly held by the RTC.
The respondents argued that the grounds invoked in their motion to dismiss were timely
raised, pursuant to Section 2, paragraphs g and i, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
Specifically, the nature and purposes of the pre-trial include, among others, the dismissal
of the action, should a valid ground therefor be found to exist; and such other matters
as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. Finally, the special civil action of
certiorari was the proper remedy in assailing the order of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a
motion to dismiss attended by grave abuse of discretion.
RULING: YES.

We find the petition meritorious.

In Barrazona v. RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, the Court held that while an order denying
a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are
proper remedies to address an order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction.
The writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

The motion to dismiss in the present case based on failure to state a cause of action was
not timely filed and was thus waived.

DOCTRINE:

Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following
grounds:
1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
2) litis pendencia;
3) res judicata; and
4) prescription.
Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be considered as
waived in the event that they are not timely invoked. As the respondents’ motion to
dismiss was based on the grounds which should be timely invoked, material to the
resolution of this case is the period within which they were raised. Both the RTC and the
CA found that the motion to dismiss was only filed after the filing of the answer and after
the pre-trial had been concluded.
The Court cannot uphold the dismissal of the present case based on the grounds invoked
by the respondents which they have waived for failure to invoke them within the period
prescribed by the Rules.

Therefore, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders
denying the respondents’ motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration.
 ROSENA FONTELAR OGAWA,
-versus-
ELIZABETH GACHE MENIGISHI,
G.R. No. 193089, 09 July 2012

FACTS:

Petitioner Roseña Fontelar Ogawa and respondent Elizabeth Gache Menigishi were
childhood friends and former residents of Sorsogon City. Respondent married a Japanese
national, Tomohito Menigishi (Tomohito),and lived in Japan. Sometime in June 1992, the
Menigishis’ visited the Philippines and introduced Yashoyuki Ogawa (Yashoyuki),
Tomohito’s friend, to petitioner. Yashoyuki and petitioner eventually got married in the
Philippines and thereafter, also lived in Japan.

On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, breach of
good human relation and unjust enrichment before the RTC against respondent, docketed
as Civil Case No. 2004-7299, alleging that the latter borrowed from her the amounts of
P15,000.00, P100,000.00 and P8,000.00, in September 2000, August 2001, and March
2003,respectively. Unable to pay, respondent offered to sell her building and its
improvements in Sorsogon City to petitioner for a consideration of P1,500,000.00 with
the agreement that her outstanding loans with petitioner be deducted from the purchase
price and the balance payable in installments.

As partial payment for the properties, petitioner remitted the following amounts to
respondent: (a) P150,000.00 through the account of her friend, Emma Fulleros on
October 23, 2003; and (b) P250,772.90 by way of bank remittance to respondent's
Equitable-PCI Bank Account on December 8, 2003. Having paid huge amounts and in
order to protect her proprietary rights, petitioner then demanded for the execution of the
corresponding deed of sale, but respondent backed out from the deal and reneged on
her obligations.

In her Answer with Counterclaim, respondent specifically denied her indebtedness to

petitioner and claimed that it was the latter who owed her 1,000,000.00 Yen, equivalent
to about P500,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt. In partial payment of her indebtedness,
petitioner, thus, remitted the amounts of P150,000.00 and P250,000.00 to respondent,
leaving a balance of P100,000.00. Respondent also sought reimbursement of the
advances she allegedly made for the wedding expenses of petitioner and Yashoyuki in
the amount of 4,000,000.00 Yen. While she admitted offering her property for sale to
petitioner, respondent explained that the sale did not materialize as petitioner failed to
produce the stipulated downpayment. By way of counterclaim, respondent prayed for the
award of 4,000,000.00 Yen, the balance of petitioner's purported loan in the amount of
P100,000.00; moral and exemplary damages; and attorney’s fees.

The RTC refused to give credence to respondent's testimony on her counterclaims for
being incredible, inconsistent, and contrary to human experience. It likewise disregarded
the receipt presented by respondent as proof of petitioner's purported indebtedness of
1,000,000.00 Yen.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s awards of the sums of P150,000.00 and
P250,772.90 in favor of petitioner and sustained the denial of respondent's counterclaim
of 4,000,000.00 Yen for lack of evidence.

However, it gave probative value to the receipt for 1,000,000.00 Yen and held it sufficient
to establish petitioner's indebtedness to respondent, considering the purported admission
of the former's counsel as well as petitioner's own failure to specifically deny the same
under oath as provided for under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Consequently,
it granted respondent's counterclaim of 1,000,000.00 Yen. Finally, having found both
parties at fault, the CA deleted the awards of damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Whether the disputed receipt sufficiently established respondent's counterclaim that

petitioner owed her 1,000,000.00 Yen.

RULING:

In this case, the RTC and the CA gave different interpretations on the context of the
receipt (Exhibit 1) executed by the parties and arrived at incongruent findings. On one
hand, the RTC considered it as having failed to establish any right on the part of
respondent to collect from petitioner the purported indebtedness of 1,000,000.00 Yen,
while on the other, the CA found it sufficient to confer liability.

A receipt is defined as a written and signed acknowledgment that money or good was
delivered or received.8 Exhibit 1, upon which respondent relies to support her
counterclaim, sufficiently satisfies this definition.

It reads in full:

June 13, 2003

I receive the total amount of 1,000,000 Yen (x x x)

Signed:

Elizabeth Menigishi Roseña Ogawa

However, while indubitably containing the signatures of both parties,a plain reading of
the contents of Exhibit 1 negates any inference as to thenature of the transaction for
which the 1,000,000 Yen was received and who between the parties is the obligor and
the obligee. What is apparent is a mere written and signed acknowledgment that money
was received. There are no terms and conditions found therein from which a right or
obligation may be established. Hence, it cannot be considered an actionable document
upon which an action or defense may be founded.
Consequently, there was no need to deny its genuineness and due execution under oath
in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Corollary thereto,
the manifestation made in open court by Atty. Gerona, petitioner's counsel, cannot be
construed as an admission of her liability. Hence, absent any other evidence to prove the
transaction for which the receipt was issued, the Court cannot consider Exhibit 1 as
evidence of a purported loan between petitioner and respondent which the former
categorically denied.

DOCTRINE:

It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a
counterclaim, the burden of proving the existence of the claim lies with the defendant,
by the quantum of evidence required by law which in this case is preponderance of
evidence under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of theaggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight
of evidence” or “greater weight of credible evidence.”
From the evidence on record, it is clear that respondent failed to prove her counterclaim
by preponderance of evidence. In view of the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the
findings of the CA that both parties are at fault. Accordingly, the award of damages
granted by the RTC in favor of petitioner must be reinstated with the modification.