9/25/2017

Protection Misoperations

David Till, Senior Manager, Performance Analysis

FRCC Reliability Performance Industry Outreach Workshop, Tampa, FL
September 20, 2017

Agenda

• Protection System Misoperation data collection evolution
• Analysis examples
• Misoperations by MIDAS Cause Code (mitigation development)
• Misoperations by Month and Year
• Misoperations Rate by Region and Year (trend analysis)
• NERC Protection System Misoperation trend (still improving)
• FRCC performance!
• Conclusion

2 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

1
 9/25/2017

Misoperation Data Collection

• Until 2016, Regional Entities collected protection system 
misoperation data in compliance with the PRC‐004‐4 
Protection System Misoperation Identification and Correction 
standard

• As of Q2 2016, NERC began directly collecting data based on a 
Section 1600 Data Request using the Misoperation 
Information Data Analysis System (MIDAS)

• MIDAS supports data collection standardization and MIDAS 
Phase II implementation will no longer require spreadsheets

3 3 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

MIDAS Phase II Improvements

• Secure portal

• Allows registered entities to enter or edit data through a user 
interface instead of a spreadsheet

• Search capabilities

• Benchmarking reports allow an entity to compare to regional 
and NERC misoperations rates

4 4 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

2
 9/25/2017

Misoperations Data Reporting

• Registered Entity Types
 Generator Owner (GO)
 Transmission Owner (TO)
 Distribution Provider (DP)

• Quarterly reporting due within 60 days of the end of a 
quarter

5 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Misoperations by MIDAS Cause Code

(SOR 2017 - Figure E.21)

6 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

3
 9/25/2017

PA & EA Collaborate on Misoperations

• Performance Analysis collects and analyzes data (analysis is 
statistical but not highly granular) 

• Event Analysis performs deep dives into specific events (for 
non‐statistical, but highly granular cause coding and insights)

• NOTE: PA & EA use independent cause code systems due to 
differences in granularity of respective investigations/analyses

• Inferences are drawn that dovetail with both the statistical and 
the event analysis results

• ERO Enterprise shines a spotlight; industry acts
7 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Top Three Misoperation Causes

(since 2012)

• Incorrect settings/logic/design errors 

• Relay failures/malfunctions

• Communication Failures

8 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

4
 9/25/2017

Misoperation Mitigation Emphases

• Instantaneous ground function

• Commissioning testing

• Regional pilot initiatives to address localized issues

9 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Misoperations by Month and Year

(SOR 2017 – Figure E.20)

10 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

5
 9/25/2017

Misoperations Rate by Region

(SOR 2017 – Figure 4.6)

11 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

NERC & FRCC Misoperation Trends

• NERC
 Statistically significant decrease in last 3 years (10.2/10.1/9.5/8.7%)
 Statistically significant 2016 decrease for top three causes relative to prior 
three years
 Expect to meet 2017 threshold goal of <9%, miss target of <8% based on July 
(Q3) – June (Q2) performance (calculations in progress)
 Pressing on with aggressive reduction goals

• FRCC
 Statistically significant decrease in last 4 years (13.7/11.4/9.3/5.7%)
 Statistically significant 2016 decrease for top three causes relative to prior 
three years
 GREAT JOB!

12 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

6
 9/25/2017

Conclusion

• Improvements to the MIDAS reporting tool are underway

• The NERC‐wide misoperation rate continues to drop ‐ currently 
between 8% and 9%

• FRCC misoperation rate is declining exceptionally

• THANK YOU, THANK YOU, and THANK YOU!!!

13 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

14 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY