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speak and think of the concept involved definition of such concepts. In extreme
as if it referred to a "thing" ontologi- cases, it appears that some scientists,
cally independent of all the sets of oper- particularly those in the social sciences,
ations, the description of any one of conceive of science as a technique for
which could serve as the definition of "measuring" the things to which many
the concept. It is usually implied in of the words in the ordinary language
such discussions that the "thing" itself presumably refer. While it is not the
cannot be directly sensed, but that we writers' intention to depreciate the use-
"infer" its existence from the observable fulness of common-sense knowledge,
evidence (i.e., from the pattern of in- they wish to point out that if it had no
variant relationships among the opera- limitations, scientific knowledge would
tionally defined concepts). Hence, it not be necessary. Also, if the language
would be said, we may measure elec- of common sense were sufficiently pre-
tricity, even though we cannot directly cise, it would be unnecessary to study
sense it, in much the same way that we mathematics and logic. In many cases
might assemble evidence concerning the it appears that attempts to quantify (re-
existence and size of a hidden room in define) words from the natural language
a house by comparing external measure- are uneconomical. Many such con-
ments of the building with measure- cepts refer in a vague way to highly
ments of the observable rooms in it. complex sets of interrelations among
It should be apparent from what has distinguishable phenomena. It appears
been said previously that this is merely that the most economical way to study
a manner of speaking, and like many such patterns would be to define several
metaphorical expressions, generates lit- concepts referring to these phenomena,
tle confusion unless one begins to ac- with subsequent attempts to make ex-
cept its literal meaning. In the latter plicit by empirical investigations the in-
event, scientifically sterile arguments terrelationships holding among them.
arise as to what the "thing" would look An all too frequent substitute for such
like if we could directly sense it, or as a procedure consists of an attempt to
to what the "correct" way is to measure "capture" all the phenomena and re-
(define) it. lationships in the definition of a single
It frequently happens in the develop- concept.
ment of a science that a word appearing The complaint is not infrequently
in the everyday, common-sense language heard that if one subscribes to opera-
is taken into the language of that disci- tionism, he places severe and perhaps
pline and is given a new definition. In crippling limitations upon the extent of
most such cases, the new meaning is in the generalizations he can make. The
some sense similar to the meaning of the argument proceeds along the following
word in the ordinary language. The lines: Suppose a psychologist does a
words "force" and "mass," for example, series of experiments on the learning of
occurred in the English language before a task under certain conditions, using
they were utilized in Newtonian physics. adult human subjects, and concomit-
Most high school students of introduc- antly defines a concept that he calls
tory physics learn to distinguish between "habit!." Operationally, the definition
the two meanings such words have, and of this term includes references to the
little confusion seems to result. In the specific task, the conditions of learning,
newer sciences, however, attempts are and the human subjects. Now, if he
often made to convey factual informa- changes the task and the conditions, he
tion through the use of words from the must, according to the principles of
ordinary language without explicit re- operationism, define a new concept,
INTELLIGENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 259
"habit. If he keeps the same task hensiveness which is paid for by vague-
and conditions, but uses chimpanzees, he ness and triviality" (3, p. 438).
must again define a new concept, A similar objection to operationism
"habits." Obviously—the argument probably arises from a failure to under-
continues—such a procedure requires an stand the formal (analytic) approach
inconvenient number of terms. Thus, utilized by many writers in the exposi-
operationism is too stringent and places tion of this principle. The logician in-
too many restrictions upon scientific structs us that a definition is arbitrary
generalization. Since the business of in the sense that it is the designation
science is the discover}' of general laws, of a symbol (word) as a representation
operationism defeats the purpose of sci- of an idea or complex set of ideas;
ence. which particular symbol is selected is
There are two distinct issues involved of no formal importance; what is im-
in the preceding argument. First, no portant is that the relationship between
one would argue that the subscripts to the word and its meaning be made clear
the above concepts do not have discrim- and explicit. There is no empirical con-
inable referents, and phenomena which nection between a word and its referent.
can be reliably discriminated may, if Objections to this formulation often
one's purpose requires it, be given dif- take a form that suggests some type of
ferent names. Scientific practice may word fixation or "concretism." It seems
not typically be so formal as to apply doubtful that such a mode of thought
subscripts to the terms, but it does actually underlies many of these objec-
differentiate among habits as studied in tions. What such people probably in-
T mazes, in Skinner boxes, or in classical tend to emphasize—and logicians would
conditioning situations. Therefore, sec- be the first to agree—is that, in science,
ond, the question actually is whether a concepts are defined for some purpose.
differentiation among such referents, The scientist always wishes to define his
either by name or by description, is a concept in such a way that it will have
convenience or a hindrance. Concept a factual exemplification; that is, the
analysis may be useful in pointing to referent of the term must exist in the
the gaps in factual information where same way that the referent of "chair"
more careless terminological usage has exists. Moreover, the scientist wants
obscured this lack. While it may point his concept to enter into statements of
out logical differences among several laws—in many cases, to enter only into
concepts, it cannot indicate when there certain laws. These two requirements
is sufficient empirical evidence to col- depend upon factual matters for their
lapse these several concepts into a single realization. Thus, when the logician
one, or, more precisely, when it is pos- says that definitions are purely arbi-
sible and useful to define a more general trary, he speaks from a formal point of
concept which incorporates subsidiary view and does not intend anything so
concepts previously defined. Much of nonsensical as that empirical considera-
what is called theory in present-day psy- tions do not enter into the scientist's
chology represents attempts to formu- selection of a particular definition. It
late more and more general concepts, should be apparent that the answers to
whether they be called "habit," "drive," this objection, as well as to the one just
"aggression," "sign-gestalt-expectations," previously stated, constitute restatements
or what. In this last respect, scientists, of the Meaning I—Meaning II distinc-
without aid from the tnethodologist, tion in slightly different guises.
are generally on guard against what The reader may note in this section
Bergmann calls "that spurious compre- of the paper an omission of any dis-
260 C. C. SPIKER AND B. R. MCCANDLESS
rect)?" Formally correct definitions of is desirable, and that such factors should
all these concepts may be given. Which be included with greater premeditation.
of the several concepts of intelligence One might well ask how one is to ar-
proves to be the most useful, in the rive at a sensible decision on this pro-
sense of entering into laws which lead posal until the goals of intelligence test-
ultimately to more accurate predictions ing have been relatively clearly set
of human behavior, remains to be seen. forth. The issue, it would seem, is not
There is little use in speculating unduly one of a definition of an "absolute" in-
on this point, considering our current telligence that will be used generally;
state of ignorance concerning the vari- rather, it is necessary to state explicitly
ables associated with these concepts. the criterion (or criteria) to be pre-
Only empirical research can provide an dicted, and then to discover the tasks
unequivocal answer. that will predict it.
A similar analysis clarifies arguments Heredity-environment. One of the
concerning whether or not intelligence most intense controversies in psychology
tests need to contain "nonintellective" in recent years was the heredity-environ-
items. We may recognize, first, that the ment issue. On the one side 1 was a
occurrence of the terms "intellective" group of individuals insisting that "in-
and "nonintellective" in everyday lan- telligence" is something not directly in-
guage does not guarantee that they re- fluenced by the environment, i.e., not
fer to any features or phenomena that directly influenced by learning. On the
may be either consistently or usefully other side, it was maintained that in-
distinguished. If it is assumed for the telligence could be affected by learning
moment that the terms are both useful experiences. This issue was closely re-
and unambiguous, the proper question lated to the argument over the con-
to ask is whether or not such items in a stancy of IQ, the insistence that IQ's
test will facilitate the achievement of obtained from certain tests (viz., the
the purpose for which the test was con- Stanford-Binet) did or did not fluctuate
structed. Test constructors are (un- markedly from time to time for a given
derstandably) rarely explicit about all individual. Reverberations of these
the predictions they wish to make with controversies are still heard in current
their tests, and it is impossible to de- discussions of culture-free intelligence
termine, a priori, whether or not any tests.
particular class of items will prove gen- The salient points in this controversy
erally useful. Many of the controver- were rarely, if ever, clearly and ex-
sial points concerning "the nature of in- plicitly delineated. The polemical pa-
telligence" stem from an assumption pers written on the subject indicate that
that all investigators constructing or much of the difficulty centered around
working with "intelligence tests" have a careless use of terminology on both
single common goal. sides, and they suggest that a methodo-
In this connection, Wechsler (10) logical analysis should prove clarifying.
asks if "the capacity for social adapta- For example, the terms "environment"
tion" is not also a "sign of intelligence." and "heredity" were never clearly de-
He states that intelligence tests involve
1
more than "mere learning ability or The writers know of no reputable psy-
reasoning ability or even general intel- chologist who could be said to belong un-
lectual ability." They also contain equivocally in one or the other of these
mythical groups. Rather, the points at issue
other "capacities which cannot be de- have been schematized in this way in order to
fined as either purely cognitive or intel- represent more simply the pattern of the con-
lective." He goes on to state that this troversy.
INTELLIGENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 263
fined, thus sharing the same ambiguity tions arise as to the importance of com-
as "intelligence"—the concept they were mon uterine experiences, of the physical
intended to clarify. In the biological similarity of identical twins in leading
sciences, the term "heredity" is used to more similar environmental experi-
precisely only in relation to the geno- ences, of the reliability in identifying
typically traced characteristics of the identical twins except at birth, and so
ancestors of the individual whose hered- on. Jones (9) includes critical analy-
ity is under discussion. Any attempts ses of many papers in this area.
to define "intelligence" by referring to Much of the argument on the heredity-
"heredity" would presuppose applica- environment issue was not confined to
tion of the procedures of the geneticist such empirical questions as the forego-
to the "intelligence" of the ancestry— ing paragraphs describe. Many workers
and the circularity of this is apparent. in the area desired and expected a con-
When one turns to research on the re- cept of intelligence which would pro-
lationships between "heredity" and "en- vide a quantitative index that would
vironment" on the one hand and "in- not change with time for the individual
telligence" on the other, and construes except under the most unusual condi-
these concepts operationally in terms of tions, e.g., brain damage, psychosis, pa-
the research reports, one finds numer- ralysis, etc. An intelligence test which
ous definitions. A typical pattern of suggested that intelligence fluctuated
research was to provide an experimental from day to day was therefore unsatis-
group of children with specified experi- factory; it was not a "real measure" of
ences, to give pre- and posttraining in- intelligence. The first empirical studies
telligence tests, and then to compare the reporting systematic changes in IQ for
IQ gains with those of a control group groups were looked upon with consid-
not having the same intervening train- erable suspicion by many investigators.
ing. If greater gains occurred for the These studies and their supporters were
experimental group than for the con- answered with suggestions about uncon-
trol, it was held that the "environment" trolled variables that might have pro-
had influenced "intelligence." Few, if duced changes in IQ scores without af-
any, of these studies were devoid of fecting the fundamental intelligence. It
serious experimental errors, the most now appears that this objection referred
damaging of which, in the writers' opin- to the plausible possibility that IQ
ion, was the typical failure to assign scores may be changed without ma-
subjects at random to the experimental terially affecting performances on tasks
and control groups. The foster home for which there was either a presumed
studies provide another pattern of re- or an experimentally established rela-
search used by the "environmentalists," tionship with the IQ scores. The litera-
and were similarly limited by experi- ture shows an interesting neglect of this
mental errors. possibility by those who insisted on the
The "hereditarians" had their own effectiveness of environmental factors in
crucial experimental designs. If the changing the level of intelligence. An
IQ's for pairs of siblings reared sepa- obvious example of such a factor is
rately correlated positively and signifi- coaching.
cantly, it was the result of common he- A terminological analysis helps to
redity. If the IQ's for pairs of mono- bring the conflicting conclusions into
zygotic twins correlated significantly agreement. If intelligence is under-
higher than the IQ's for pairs of bi- stood to refer to the performance on
zygotic twins, it was the result of more a given scale (Meaning I only), then
similar heredity for the former. Ques- without question, some environmental
264 C. C. SPIKEE AND B. R. MCCANDLESS
to be made is that both the mental and relevant of these principles was given,
the physiological correlates remain for- and the principles were then applied to
ever distinct from the behaviorally de- such problems as the organization of
fined (psychological) concepts. Even if intelligence, the heredity-environment
one finds an invariant relationship be- issue, and the validity of intelligence
tween a psychological and a physiologi- tests. The aim of the analysis in each
cal variable, they remain two things. case was to separate terminological and
One has found a law relating them. other logical issues from the factual
The failure to recognize this point has issues with which they have become
apparently led some writers to think of confused. It was seen that there is
the physiological or mental variables as little left that can be considered con-
the "true" ones, which are only approxi- troversial, except in the sense that any
mately "measured" by behavioral vari- question of fact may be a controversial
ables. What some psychologists seem point until adequate evidence is pro-
to ask is whether or not the test re- vided for its resolution. The confusions
flects accurately the appropriate mental that arise as a result of trying to for-
variables. The hopelessness of any im- mulate single answers to multibarrelled
mediate attempt to answer such a ques- questions can be eliminated.
tion is obvious. The most convincing
answer one could give is the same an- REFERENCES
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SUMMARY michael (Ed.), Manual of child psy-
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This paper is an attempt to examine 582-632.
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