G.R. No.

L-44251 December 29, 1977

FELIX MONTEMAYOR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, BLAS F. OPLE and ARANETA UNIVERSITY
FOUNDATION, respondents.

FERNANDO, J

Considerable stress is laid by petitioner in this motion for the reconsideration of our
decision of May 31, 1977 dismissing the certiorari proceeding to set aside a resolution
of respondent Secretary of Labor granting clearance to private respondent, the Araneta
University Foundation, for his dismissal as professor in such University, but without
payment to him of P14,480.00 as accrued back wages. As will be shown, there is lack
of support in law for such a contention. While there is sympathy for the plight in which
petitioner no finds himself, still the norm followed by this Court in suits
for certiorari directed against the Secretary of Labor does not call for an affirmative
response. Moreover, his own motion for reconsideration categorically stated that he
would not "like anymore to teach in the [Araneta University Foundation] and so [he is]
not asking for reinstatement." 1
1. In the petition for certiorari, what was complained of was lack of procedural due
process not in the proceeding before the labor officials but before the Araneta
Foundation. 2 Such a charge was reiterated in the memorandum filed on his behalf by
his then counsel, the principal point raised being that the members of the panel of
investigators were all prejudiced against him and that it was not "therefore amazing that
the poor petitioner in the instant case does not have a chance." 3 It was admitted though
that previous investigation that took place on April 24, 1974 "was attended by petitioner
as well as complainant with his two witnesses." 4 In the decision sought to be
reconsidered, mention was made of such a fact. After which, there was reference to a
denial of a motion for postponement filed by petitioner in the second investigation. Such
a deficiency, as was explained in our decision, was remedied in view of the fact that
petitioner had the chance to air his side before the Labor Commission. It is well-settled
that an infirmity that would vitiate the original proceeding could thereafter, either on a
motion for reconsideration or on review by another body, be subject to correction. 5 In
this motion for reconsideration, petitioner had shifted ground.

The major thrust now is that the hearing before the National Labor Relations
Commission did not conform with the requirements of procedural due process as the
witnesses against petitioner were not called before it so that they could be cross-
examined. As pointed out in the comment of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza: "This
argument is untenable. it is a well-settled principle that the right of an accused or a
party to be confronted by the witnesses against him is a personal privilege which the
latter may avail himself of or which he may waive, as he may see fit. The waiver may
take the for of an express consent, by failure to assert it on time, or by conduct
inconsistent with a purpose to insist on it. In the case at bar, petitioner's lack of
objection in the formal hearings before the labor Arbiter to the presentation of the
testimonies of his complainants and their witnesses taken during the school
investigations and his lack of assertion of his right to cross-examine them on their
affidavits submitted thereat, coupled with the fact that he presented his evidence,
together with his affidavit, impugning the regularity of the proceedings before the
investigating committees and assailing the legality of his removal, are clear indications
that petitioner had waived his right to confront his complainants and elected to rely
solely on the strength of his own evidence. He cannot now complain that he was denied
such a right. It is significant to note in this regard that petitioner never impugned the
regularity of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. On the contrary, he admitted that
'indeed, the NLRC Hearing Officer, the Labor Arbiter, strictly followed the due-process
requirements.' (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 10)." 6
2. Petitioner would seem to mitigate the force of such admission about the observance
of procedural due process by asserting that it was incumbent on the respondent
University to present the witnesses in the National Labor Relations Commission hearing.
There is a misapprehension on his part. All he is guaranteed under the authoritative
Ang Tibay doctrine is that he be heard. 7 Implicit in such a concept is that the burden
is cast on him to sustain his side of the controvers. If he fails to do so, the administrative
agency concerned could rely on the evidence offered by the other party. That was what
happened in this case. 8 If at all then, petitioner had only himself to blame.
3. Nor is petitioner's case for reconsideration bolstered by the reference to the high Ideal
that animates the concept of due process. As was pointed out in J. M. Tuason and
Co. v. The Land Tenure Administration: 9 "It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on
arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any government act that smacks of whim or caprice.
It negates state power to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so
often, the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands as a
guaranty of justice. The is the standard that must be met by any governmental agency
in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it." 10
If the various proceedings had in this case, including the firs investigation, were
considered in their totality, it cannot be said that the decision arrived at by respondent
Secretary of Labor is susceptible to the charge of arbitrariness. It is worth noting anew
that there was a previous investigation where petitioner had he chance to cross-examine
the witnesses against him. At that time, the finding was adverse. It was true his services
were not terminated, a lighter penalty being imposed on him. Viewed in such a light,
the imputation that respondent Secretary of Labor, which is the only issue before us,
acted in disregard of the due process mandate is not borne out. There is no justification
for reconsideration.
4. On the question of the injury to his reputation arising from the dismissal of his
petition for certiorari, it should be made clear that the only issue before this Court in
this proceedings is whether or not the actuation of an administrative official in the
enforcement of the Labor Code could be stigmatized as a denial of due process. The
conclusion reached buy this Court after a review of the records is that it could not be
so considered. That was all that was decided. The decision reached by respondent public
official to grant clearance to private respondent Araneta University Foundation was thus
upheld. That is the import of the decision. In contemplation of law, it is not strictly
accurate to state that there was a finding on the part of this Court that immorality was
proven against the petitioner. All that is signified by the decision sought to be
reconsidered is that the procedure followed resulting in this clearance for his dismissal
cannot be characterized as tainted by a denial of procedural due process. That was the
issue before us. That was what was passed upon and decided. His dismissal from the
service then could be viewed in a light les damaging to his prestige and reputation.
Considering his ability and talent as revealed by his pleadings, whatever injurious effect
the decision may have had could be mitigated by the lapse of time.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

Montemayor vs. Araneta G.R. No. L-44251 May 31, 1977 77 SCRA 321 Academic
Freedom
NOVEMBER 2, 2017

FACTS:
Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was
found guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty
investigating committee. On 11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate
another charge of a similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked
for the postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was
denied. The committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and
on 12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the
University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to
terminate petitioner’s employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint w/ the
NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was rendered in petitioner’s favor,
but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner’s dismissal to be
justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Does academic freedom include the right of schools to dismiss teachers?
RULING:
Yes. Institutional academic freedom was vindicated in this case, where, against the plea
of academic freedom and security of tenure of a professor, the school was allowed to
separate a professor who after due process had been found guilty of violating behavioral
standards.

The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure is reinforced
by the provision on academic freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution. It
was pointed out in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission, Committee that academic freedom
“is more often Identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors
without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions
are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political,
economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert Maclver, it is ‘a right
claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his
findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any
interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable
to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.” Tenure, according to
him, is of the essence of such freedom. For him, without tenure that assures a faculty
member “against dismissal or professional penalization on grounds other than
professional incompetence or conduct that in the judgment of his colleagues renders
him unfit” for membership in the faculty, the academic right becomes non-existent,
Security of tenure, for another scholar, Love joy, is “the chief practical requisite for
academic freedom” of a university professor. As with Maclver, he did not rule out
removal but only “for some grave cause,” Identified by him as “proved incompetence or
moral delinquency.”

Montemayor v. Araneta University [GR L-44251, 31 May 1977] Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1
on leave.

Facts: Felix Montemayor was a full-time professor of Araneta University Foundation (AUF), serving as head
of its Humanities and Psychology Department. On 17 April 1974, a complaint for immorality lodged against
him by the Chaplain of the AUF for alleged immorality. Its then President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a
committee to investigate such charge. The accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral
advances committed against the person of Leonardo de Lara. The first hearing, which took place on 24
April 1974, was attended by Montemayor as well as the complainant with his two witnesses. Montemayor
sought the postponement of the investigation to 3 May 1974, which was granted. On 28 May 1974, he
filed a motion to dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance, and on 17 June 1974, he filed an affidavit to
sustain his defense. On 8 July 1974, the report and recommendation of the investigating committee came,
and was adverse to Montemayor. The recommendation was for his demotion in rank by one degree. On
5 August 1974, Salcedo adopted such recommendation and thereafter referred the same to the Board of
Trustees of the AUF for appropriate action. On 8 November 1974, new charges were filed by Professor
Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime Castañeda, and Jesus Martinez against Montemayor for conduct unbecoming
of a faculty member. Another committee was appointed. Montemayor moved to postpone the hearing
set for 18 and 19 November 1974, but was denied. The hearing proceeded in his absence. On 5 December
1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the charges against Montemayor to have been
sufficiently established and recommending to the President and the Board of Trustees of the AUF his
separation from the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of Policies of the
University. On 10 December 1974, his dismissal was ordered effective 15 November 1974, the date of his
preventive suspension. On 12 December 1974, the University filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a report of his suspension and application for clearance to terminate his employment.
Meanwhile, on 21 November 1974, Montemayor in turn lodged a complaint with the NLRC against AUF
for reinstatement and payment of back wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments
attendant thereto. There was a motion to dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter and the
NLRC found in favor of Montemayor. He was ordered reinstated to his former position with back wages
and without loss of seniority and other privileges. Montemayor's complaint for unfair labor practice was,
however, dismissed. AUF appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on 14 July 1976, set aside the
Commission's order for his reinstatement, finding Montemayor's dismissal justified. The AUF was,
however, required to pay Montemayor the amount of P14,480.00 representing the latter's accrued back
wages which the former voluntarily offered to extend him. Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision,
Montemayor filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings relating to his
dismissal from AUF.

Held: In procedural due process, there must be a hearing before condemnation, with the investigation to
proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered only after such inquiry. Academic due
process, a term coined, is a system of procedure designed to yield the best possible judgment when an
adverse decision against a professor may be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair
way of reaching a conclusion. Every university or college teacher should be entitled before dismissal or
demotion, to have the charges against him stated in writing, in specific terms and to have a fair trial on
these charges before a special or permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large.
At such trial the teacher accused should have full opportunity to present evidence. Herein, the procedure
followed in the first investigation of Montemayor (June 1974) satisfied the procedure due process
requisite. The second investigation (November 1974), however, did not. The motion for postponement
therein was denied, the hearing proceeded as scheduled in the absence of Montemayor, and the
committee lost no time in submitting its report finding the charges against Montemayor to have been
sufficiently established and recommending his removal. The deficiency, however, was remedied, as
Montemayor was able to present his case before the Labor Commission. Denial of due process happened
only in the proceeding he had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the
NLRC wherein he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case, the latter being the subject matter
of the petition for certiorari. Montemayor was afforded his day in court.