Additional reading assignment under Rule 113:

Comerciante v. People
Facts:

According to the prosecution, at around 10 o’clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan of the
NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II were abroad a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at
Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Manadaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30km per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a
distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men – later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla – standing and showing
“IMPROPER AND UNPLEASANT MOVEMENTS”, with one of them handing plastic sachet to the other. Thinking that the
sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around 4 meters,
PO3 Calag introduced himself as police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his
acquittal. However, due to Comerciante’s failure to file his own demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC, thus
acquittal. However, due to Comerciante’s failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived
and ordered him to present his evidence.

In his defense, Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain “Barok”, which was notorious drug pusher
in the area, when suddenly, He and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken
to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in
exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest
proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous.

RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt. RTC found that PO3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest
on Comerciante, which yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the RTC opined that there was probable
cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that PO3 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was carrying the said
sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent that PO3
Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly performed his duty when he arrested
Comerciante.

CA affirmed the conviction. Comerciante essentially contends that PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on
him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachet containing shabu
should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.

ISSUE:

W/N the arrest was valid

HELD: NO

In this case, the Court said that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter do
not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would
constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk"
search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.

In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante. As such, the shabu
purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from
all criminal liability.

(SEARCH AND SEIZURE TOH! REGARDING DIN EXCLUSIONARY PRINCIPLE OR INCIDENTAL SEARCH TO A
VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST) (EXCLUDE NIYO NA ITO! PROCEED KA NA SA ISANG DECISION ABOUT SA
ARREST) HEHEHE SORRY!

[Sec. 2, Article 3 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a
general rule, “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional provision.
To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Sec 3 of the Bill of Rights, provides an exclusionary rule which
instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest.

In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed. ]

[START HERE!!!!]

In the aforementioned provision of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 (Valid Warrantless) provides 3 instance when a warrantless arrest may be
lawfully effected:

(a) arrest of a suspect IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO; (b)(HOT PURSUIT) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed (c) (FUGITIVE) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.

A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on
Commerciante. PO3 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30km per hour when he
saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing “improper and unpleasant movements,” with one of them handing
plastic sachets to the other. On the bases of the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest. PO3 Calag’s testimony on direct
examination is revelatory:

Xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male persons you already identified?

A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am.

Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that particular act?

A: They were quite facing me then

Q: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City?

A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am.

Q: And who was driving the motorcycle?

A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am.

Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did you do? A: We stopped ma'am.

Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less?

A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am.

Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the reaction of these two male persons?

A: They were surprised, ma'am.

Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as police officer?

A: They were surprised.

Q: When you say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they were surprised?

A: They were stunned.

Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?

A: I arrested them, ma'am. I invited them.

Xxx xxx xxx

Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you recover the plastic sachet?

A: From his hand ma'am.

Q: Left or right hand?

Pros. Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo kung hindi mo matandaan, no problem. Kaliwa, kanan
or you cannot recall?

On the basis of such testimony, the Courts finds it highly implausible that PO3 Cala, even assuming that he has perfect vision,
would be able to identify with reasonably accuracy – especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle
cruising at a speed of 30 km per/hr - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets
held by Comerciante.

TAKE NOTE: The court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the
mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.

Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in anyway be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing “improper and unpleasant
movements” as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he
had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was
still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu.

As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that PO3 Calag had personal knowledge
that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante.

TAKE NOTE!!! [Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.]

Luz v. People

Facts:

(in short neto, nahuli kasi walang helmet, kinabahan si accused kay uneasy at hawk ng hawak sa bulsa ng jacket niya, ayun
nahuli siya na may shabu at iba pa)

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer,
substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the
direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear
helmet ( sic ) while driving said motor vehicle;

He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of
the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance,
he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the
accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches
in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked
the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that
upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets,
the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

RTC found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected
to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain. (SABI NG RTC VALID
SEARCH DAW)

Sabi ng prosecution na valid daw kasi the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter
was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98012. In other words, the
accused, being caught in a g r a n t e d elic t o violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers.

CA Affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: W/N IT IS A VALID SEARCH AND ARREST

HELD:

No!

First, there was NO VALID ARREST OF PETITIONER. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was
not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.

It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a trac violation is not the
arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under
arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody.

Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as
WAITING TIME. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police
sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet
while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was led for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless
arrest be made for such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the
police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the
motorist. In this case, however, the officer's issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for
the same violation.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed “arrested” upon being flagged down for a traffic
violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the
reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them.It may also be noted that
in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only a f t e r petitioner had been arrested
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting
for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time — after the police officers allegedly
discovered the drugs — as he was already in their custody.

[SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUE NA TO!!] Second , there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii)
search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a
"stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search
incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner's pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and
convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that
petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent.
In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether
the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature
of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person consenting.

It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was
freely and voluntarily given.

In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by
several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.

The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the
earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

People v. Lacap (In Flagrante Delicto . — Accused-appellant also complains that the NBI agents did
not have any search warrant with them at the time they arrested him. This is one of the exceptions
to the rule that a search may be conducted only by virtue of a warrant. A buy-bust operation
involves an apprehension in a g r a n t e d elic t o and, therefore, no warrant is needed to arrest the
suspect. It would be ridiculous for the buy-bust team to first obtain a search warrant when the crime
is committed right before their eyes.)

Accused Roman Lacap was indicted, tried, and subsequently found guilty by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City of violation of Art. III, par. 5 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
Dangerous Drugs Act. He was sentenced to r e clu sio n p e r p e t u a and a ne. The trial court, in
rendering judgment against accused, was more convinced of the prosecution's case and unmoved
of the accused's stance that no buy-bust operation was conducted against him and that he was a
victim of frame-up. The trial court found more credible the testimonies of the NBI agents regarding
the circumstances surrounding the buy-bust operation and that the accused was caught in a g r a n
t e d elic t o in the act of selling approximately two kilos of s h a b u to the posuer-buyer. Hence, this
appeal. Accused questioned his conviction alleging that the prosecution failed to establish the
elements of the crime. He also assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The Supreme
Court found no cogent reason to overturn the ndings of the trial court as to the credibility of the
witnesses and the rejection of accused-appellant's claim of frame-up. The Court found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses positive, credible, and entirely in accord with human
experience. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, all of whom are public ocers, were presumed to
have acted regularly and in the performance of ocial function in the absence of proof that they were
motivated by ill-will. It dismissed the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses as
minor, which did not impair their credibility. The Court further held that the actual sale of the s h a b
u , which is material to the prosecution of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, was suciently proven
by the prosecution. It excused the non-presentation of the boodle money, which is not
indispensable to the prosecution of the case. The conviction of accused-appellant was, therefore,
upheld by the Court

People v. Molina

In the morning of August 8, 1995, the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, dispatched the team
of SP04 Dionisio Cloribel, SP02 Paguidopon and SPO1 Pamplona to proceed to the house of SPO1
Marino Paguidopon, after the latter received an information from his informer that an alleged
marijuana pusher will be passing at that place anytime that morning. At around 9:30, a "trisikad"
carrying Nasario Molina and Gregorio Mula passed by. SPO1 Paguidopon then pointed at Nasario
and Gregorio as the pushers. The team then immediately boarded the vehicle, overtook the
"trisikad" and then requested it to stop. Mula then handed the black bag, which he was holding to
Molina. After introducing himself as police officer, Pamplona requested Molina to open the bag.
Molina replied " Boss, if possible we will settle this." Pamplona however insisted on opening the bag,
which revealed the marijuana leaves inside. For unlawful possession of 946.9 grams of dried
marijuana, accused-Nasario Molina and Gregorio Mula were found by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City guilty of violation of Section 8, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No.
6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentenced them to death. The court a quo
anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accusedappellants,
and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, were valid because accused-appellants
were caught in flagrant delicto in possession of prohibited drugs. Hence, this automatic review.

Held:

In acquitting accused-appellants of the crime charged, the Supreme Court held that the
accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a
bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to
commit or have committed a crime.

As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any
overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest.

2 requisites of a valid arrest (in flagrante delicto)

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.

These are clearly not present in this case.

Miclat, Jr. v. People (The petitioner, who has shabu in his house, is caught in flagrante delicto, which
is a valid warrantless arrest.) (Further, the accused pleaded in the arraignment, and as provided by
the Rules, said plea is a waiver of any defect on the legality of his arrest since he didn’t file a
motion to quash the information)

Facts: Police operatives including PDEA conducted a surveillance of drug trafficking in Palmera
Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City. The informant of the police directed them to the residence
of a certain “ABE” PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the
rest of the members of the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the
curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1½ meters, he saw
“Abe” arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu.
At the same instance they arrested the petitioner. However, the version of the petitioner is that,
together with her father and sister while watching television the police operatives barrage
themselves into their house and that the shabu was later planted to the petitioner while travelling to
the police station.

The trial court rendered the decision finding the petitioner guilty of Violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA No. 9165. The CA subsequently affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, this
appeal.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED WINDOW IS

WITHIN THE MEANING OF “PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE” FOR A WARRANTLESS
SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED (SIC) OF HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF HIS
ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS
ARREST AND CONTINUED DETENTION.

WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETS

CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF
THE RULES OF COURT.

Supreme Court ruled that at the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection raised
as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the
trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and
effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal
arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the
conviction of the accused.

While it is true that Sec. 2 of the bill of rights preserves the rights of individuals of illegal
search and seizure. However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated
provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a
previously issued warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. a peace office of a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements
must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited
or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.

Supreme Court ruled there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact of the trial
court. No evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the narration of the
prosecution witnesses of the events which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After a
careful evaluation of the records, We find no error was committed by the RTC and the CA to
disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime charged against him

Antiquera v. People
Facts:

The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan,
P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police
visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and
immediately boarded a jeep.

Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men came and peeked
through the partially opened door.

PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his
live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living
room.

This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.

While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an improvised
burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven
unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement
Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing.
A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them positive for traces of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu”.

The RTC rendered a Decision 8 8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged.

The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of
using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession. Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio and PO1
Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and rejected the self-serving claim of Antiquera.

CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: W/N THE ARREST AND SEARCH IS VALID

HELD:

NO!

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." This is an arrest IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO

1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street,
Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep
that the two seeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the seeing suspects was the
more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.

2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed,
even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan
testified:

Q: So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to
push the door was only open by 6 inches?

A: We pushed the door, Your Honor.

Q: Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside it, as a police officer?

A: Kasi po naghinala na po kami baka may…

Q: But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its opening because you did not know
what was happening inside?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera
without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.

Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible,
having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his
conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
the illegal warrantless arrest.

People v. Alvario, (Maid allegedly raped, however accused was acquitted due to reasonable doubt
as the prosecution’s evidence is weak. Officer’s arrest of the accused is also valid, as the officer
has personal knowledge of the crime allegedly committed upon the call of the sister of the alleged
victim who stated that the crime of rape was committed. The personal knowledge of the arresting
officers in the case at bar was culled from the information supplied by the victim herself who
pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest.)

The complainant, a 29-year old single mother of a two-year old child, and a house helper of the
accused-appellant, a caretaker of the house, charged the appellant with the crime of rape for
having sexually abused her on several occasions commencing the day reported for work and almost
everyday for the next six days.

The appellant did not deny the charge but invoked the "sweetheart theory" claiming that the sexual
encounter with complainant is consensual and purely voluntary because he has an existing
relationship with the victim. Their proofs of affection or understanding between him and
complainant are evidenced by her undergarment embroidered with the words "Ester love Arman"
and a handkerchief with "Ester" sewn on it. The prosecution presented the findings of the NBI
Medico-Legal Officer which showed nothing except that there was "no evident sign of extragenital
physical injuries."

The trial court found the accused guilty of five counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the five separate informations.

Reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court ruled that no rape was committed. The declarations of
the sister of the complainant relating to the actual sexual assaults, as narrated by the complainant
herself, were purely hearsay. The same is true with the testimony of the police officer who merely
responded to the complaint of rape. The medical report reveals nothing that would prove a charge
of rape and even bolsters the posture of the defense of consensual sex because of the finding that
there was "no evident sign of extragenital physical injuries. Significant circumstances affected the
credibility of the complainant. The other maid in the house was never utilized as a witness. The
house was not in an isolated place. There was a seeming indifference to her predicament. The
complainant and the other maid, alleged victim of the appellant, failure to devise a way of escaping
whenever they were left alone but opted to succumb to the fear of appellant whenever they were
left alone. She decided to call for help only when she had already been allegedly repeatedly raped.
The undergarment and handkerchief of the complainant were proofs of affection or understanding
between the complainant and the appellant.

Judgment reversed.

People v. Manlulu, (Killing of Alfaro, a police officer, but no valid arrest. However, even if the
evidence is inadmissible due to illegality of arrest, due to the credibility of the testimony against the
accused, the prosecution has proven the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt) (the illegality of
the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts
on record point to their culpability) ( This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid
warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b), Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that the arresting ocer must have "personal knowledge" of an offense which "has in fact just been
committed." In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez have "personal knowledge," nor was the
offense "in fact just been committed." While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the
information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough. ) (personal knowledge v Personal
gathering of information)

Alfaro, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot in a drinking spree. His drinking
companions, Manlulu and Samson were arrested nineteen hours after the
incident. Patrolman Perez arrested Manlulu on the information given by Manlapaz, who
was also drinking with the accused and the victim. Patrolman Perez seized from Manlulu
the .45 cal. Pistol and Casio wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, without a warrant and
without informing Manlulu of his right to counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and seizure of the gun and the watch was valid.

HELD:

The warrantless arrest was invalid. The killing took place at one o’clock in the
morning. The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven
o’clock that evening, some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the
purview of a valid warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b) Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have “personal knowledge”
nor was the offense “in fact just been committed.” While Pat. Perez may have
personally gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not
enough. The law requires “personal knowledge”. Obviously, “personal gathering of
information” is different from personal knowledge. The rule requires that the arrest
immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later.

However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness
account of Manlapaz which the Court found credible. In spite of the nullification of the
arrest of accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, as well as his extra-judicial
confession which was taken in violation of the Constitution, still the prosecution was able
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

People v. Calimlim,(rape of a 14 yr old, validity of arrest whether the legality or illegality, cnnot be
used as a defense when the accused failed to file a motion before arraignment) (the illegal arrest of
an accused is not sucient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sucient
complaint after a trial free from error. )

In four (4) separate but similarly worded informations, appellant was charged with rape committed
against 14-year old Lanie. He pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense of denial and alibi,
claiming that he was in his house sleeping during the commission of the offense and that he was
charged on the prodding of her relatives whom he did not vote for during the last election. His
defense was corroborated by his wife and his daughter. At the trial, Lanie positively identied
appellant, then armed with a knife as the person who raped her in different places: in the pig pen, in
her room, in her cousin's room and in the kitchen. She declared that she did not struggle nor shout
because she was afraid that appellant might kill her. A joint decision was rendered by the trial court
nding appellant guilty as charged. He was sentenced to death for each count of rape. This case is
before this Court on automatic review. It was held that an accused may be convicted of rape solely
on the credible, natural and convincing testimony of the victim; that ndings of the trial court on
credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed on appeal; that a young girl would not concoct a
rape charge, allow the examination of her private parts and then publicly disclosed that she has
been sexually abused if her motive was other than to bring to justice the person who deled her; that
alibi cannot prevail over positive identication; that any irregularity in the conduct of arrest is deemed
waived when not seasonably raised during arraignment; and that death penalty cannot be imposed
where no aggravating circumstance in the crime of rape was not alleged in the information.

Sec. 21 RA 9344

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST AND COMMENTS

Doctrines:

Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.”

FACTS:

On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on
the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam.
Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On
July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of
his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty
would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age
and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:

1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable
byreclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.

a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be
punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD:

1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than
what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. —
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong.Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the
court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion

perpetuasubject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing
with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community
arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and
for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting
fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)