Part 2

Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007

FACTS Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with
modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and damages filed
by Lacap against RP
Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other
contractors were pre-qualified
Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and thereafter
undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fount it
100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds due to
Lacap’s license as contractor having expired
Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractors
License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of
license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994
recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was
issued
On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against
petitioner before the RTC.14
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the
decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,the RTC issued an Order
dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18
but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for
the contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%

ISSUE WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects

RULING A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not
exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
“SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts
to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a
supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the
license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in
obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or
license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a
fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. The "plain meaning
rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of
R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by
a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment
of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such
 payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

C. BOLOS vs. D. BOLOS G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

FACTS:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respond
ent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Art. 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
On January 16, 2007, judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC) declaring the m
arriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980as
null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Articl
e 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of
the RTC on January 16, 2007 declaring as final and executory
On December 10, 2008, the Court of Appeals in an original action for certiorari under rule 65 entitled “Danilo T. Bolos v. H
on. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos” reversedthe January 16, 2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pa
sig City.
The appellate court in its decision stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal u
nder A.M. 02-11-10-
SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Mariages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages) is not applicablein
this case since the marriage of Cynthia and Danila was solemnized before the Family Code took effect.
Moreover, the appellate court relied on its ruling in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinacelli stating that “coverage of A.M. 02-
11-10-
SC extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1
988”.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the Decemb
er 10, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling because the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. 02-11-10-
SC pertains to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages”

RULING:
The Court of Appeals ruled that the categorical language in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope.

RATIONALE:
In Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, it reads that:

Section 1. Scope –
This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages
under the Family Code of the Phillipines.

The categorical language being used clearly states that the coverage of this Rule extends only to those marriages entere
d into during the effectivity of the Family Code which became effective on August 3, 1988. The Court therefore cannot ap
ply merit to the petitioner’s interpretation stating that “petitions” is being categorized in the phrase “under the Family Code
” when the Rule took effectivity.
Furthermore, the Court clarified that a cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from an
y doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation, only application. It must therefore be given its liter
al meaning and applied without attempted interpretation in what is known as “plain-
meaning rule” or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the index of intention”. Additio
nally, there is also the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the words of a status there should be no departur
e.”

YOLANDA SIGNEY, Petitioner, versus SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, and GINA
SERVANO, representative of GINALYN and RODELYN SIGNEY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 173582

Facts:
Rodolfo Signey, a SSS member, died on May 21, 2001. In his records, he declared Yolanda as primary beneficiary
and his 4 children with her as secondary beneficiaries. Yolanda then claimed for the benefits in SSS and she revealed
that the deceased had a common-law wife named Gina Servano, with whom the deceased had 2 minor children (Ginalyn
and Rodelyn). This was indeed confirmed because Gina likewise, claimed for benefits. She declared that, Yolanda and
she were just the common-law wives, and Editha Espinosa was the legal wife. Editha then also claimed for the benefits
stating that she indeed was the “legal” wife.
SSS denied the death benefits claim by Yolanda, but recognized the two minor children of Gina as the primary
beneficiaries of the deceased under the SSS Law. SSS was also able to discover that the marriage between Yolanda and
Rodolfo were null and void for having been contracted while Rodolfo’s marriage with Editha still subsisted as confirmed
by the Civil Registry.

Issue: Who is entitled to the SSS benefits of a member who was survived not only by his legal wife, but also by two
common-law wives with whom he had six children?

Held: The Court agreed with SSS, stating that the two minor children of the deceased with Gina was entitled 100% of the
benefits as provided by the SSS Law. The SSS Law was clear in stating that for a minor child to qualify as a dependent
entitled the benefit, the only requirement was that the child must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully
employed.
Though Editha waived her claim for the rights to the claim of benefits, it was not a strong ground for Yolanda’s claim
because she did not even try to allege and prove any infirmity in the marriage between the deceased and Editha, after
having been proven that her marriage with Rodolfo was null and void. She was disqualified because thet did not have a
legitimate child or children. Under the SSS Law, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased
shall be entitled the death benefits as the primary beneficiaries.

SIGNEY v. SSS GR No. 173582, January 28, 2008

Facts:
Rodolfo Signey Jr. a member of the SSS, died on May 21, 2001. In his member’s records, he had designated petitioner
Yolanda Signey as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. Petitioner filed a claim
for death benefits with the public respondent SSS. She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law
wife, Gina Servano, with whom he had two minor children.
Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death benefits which she also
declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa was the legal
wife. In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS stating that she was
the legal wife of the deceased.

SSS denied the death benefit claim of the petitioner and found that the marriage between the deceased and the petitioner
is null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted between the deceased and Editha as confirmed by the
local civil registry of Cebu. However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina,
as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition with the SSC in which she attached a waiver of rights executed by Editha whereby
the latter waived any/all claims from Social Security System (SSS), among others due to the deceased
RodolfoSigney Sr. SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC gave more weight to the SSS field investigation and
the confirmed certification of marriage showing that the deceased was married to Editha, than to
the aforestated declarations of Editha in her waiver of rights.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children of the
deceased?

Held:
As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very
clear. Hence, we need only apply the law.

Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:

SEC. 8. Terms Defined.—For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise,
have the following meanings:

xxx

(e) Dependents — The dependent shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has
not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor
has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and

Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows
that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary
beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a “dependent” the only requirements are that
he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.
In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000,
respectively. Had the legitimate child of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS
Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said legitimate
child. Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary
beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.

Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Full Text:

Facts:
Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company ate Manay, Panabo,
Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in Davao City. Although quarters were provided by the respondent to its
employees at the sawmill many of them preferred to commute and the deceased went home about thrice a week, to
which the respondent furnished the transportation. On the day following the accident, Conrado and Leonora were lawfully
wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital, Davao City, where the deceased was hospitalized up
to his death. Leonora gave birth to the posthumous daughter at the deceased named Raquel.

Issue:
Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the
posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Held:
Yes, they are dependents whiting that of expressed in the Workmen's Compensation Act.
From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent
upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and
unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered dependents.
It is also supported in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect
should be given to it by judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of statutory
provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of DSTC.
Assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute and
its purpose should prevail. In US v. Toribio, SC held that no construction is to be adopted that would tend "to defeat the
purpose and object of the legislator."
Therefore, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission of awarding the claimant widow for herself and in
behalf of her minor child the compensation and attorney's fees is affirmed.

Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., G.R. No. L-27489, April 30,1970
Objects and Methods of Construction: Mens Legislatoris/Mischief Rule

It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written.
Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
Facts: Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. Although some sort
of quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently preferred to
commute (the Company furnishes their transportation), and the deceased in particular went home about three times a
week.

At the time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to his death on September 29,
1961, the claimant-widow, Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta, was not yet married to the decedent although they had
already been living together as husband and wife for the past three months. However, on the day following the accident,
they were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized in the hospital where the deceased was hospitalized up to
his death. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous daughter of the deceased who was given
the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta. The Workmen's Compensation Commission awarded to the claimant widow for
herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount of P2,708.00 as compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorney's
fees.

Issue:

Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the
posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Held:

Yes. From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually
dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or
herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered dependents.

Ratio:

It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his death she
was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child,
Raquel Macabenta, also falls within the words the Act employs. Our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a
conceived child born for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is attended with the conditions specified,
namely, that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the mother's womb.

Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the
facts as found. What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an
interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from that intended by
the lawmakers. A paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. There can always occur to an intelligence
hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched.

Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been
ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to
the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao
Stevedore Terminal Company. Assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms
to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail.

To quote from the Lingad case anew: “For it is undeniable that every statute, much more so one arising from a
legislative implementation of a constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no question as to its conformity
with what the fundamental law requires need arise.”