Stonehill vs Diokno December 21, 2016 20 SCRA 383

Facts:

Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the
subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the
applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.

Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.

Held: No.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity.

Alih vs. Castro. 151 SCRA 279. June 23, 1987

Facts:

Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the
compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A
shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of
men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing,
paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and
ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to
them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights
The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they
were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation
of the peace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the
petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are
inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners
did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be
protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was
no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as
criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as
evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done
without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in
court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the

provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination
applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

Rizal Alih et. al., vs Castro. GR No L-69401. June 23, 1987

Facts:

A group of more than 200 Philippine marines and home defense forces raided the compound
occupied by the petitioners (Rizal Alih et. al.) is search of loose firearms, ammunition and other
explosives. The people inside the compound resisted the invasion and a crossfire between the
Philippine marines and the petitioner occurred, resulting in number of casualties. The petitioners
surrendered the next morning and 16 occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed,
paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and
confiscated several M16 rifles, M14 rifle, rifle grenades and rounds of ammunition.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and
restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these
from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing
and paraffin-testing being violative of their right against self-incrimination. Petitioner argued that
the arms and ammunition were taken without a search warrant as required by law under Sec. 3
of the 1973 Constitution, and it be declared inadmissible in relation to Sec 4 (2) of the 1973
Constitution.
Respondent justified their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders and that
the measures was necessary due to the aggravation of peace and order problem in their place.

Issue:

Whether or not the confiscated items shall be considered admissible.

Whether or not the finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-test is protected by the

constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Ruling:

No, superior orders cannot countermand the Constitution. There is no excuse for the
constitutional shortcuts done by the military. Also, the aggravation of peace and order problem
in their place does not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure (Art III Sec. 2, 1973 Philippine Constitution).

The arrest does not fall also under the warrantless arrest provided for by Rule 113 Sec. 5 of the
Rules of Court. Therefore, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are
inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings against petitioners.

With respect to the finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing, the acts are not covered
by the protection against self-incrimination, for it only applies to testimonial compulsion.

2. Warrantless Arrest
a. When justified
e. Exceptions construed strictly

People v. Burgos GR No. L-68955 September 4, 1986. Gutierrez, J:

Facts: According to the government, one Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the authorities and
pointed accused Ruben Burgos as a member of the NPA who threatened to kill him and his
family if he refused to join. The police then formed a task force to arrest Burgos. They went
to Burgos’ residence where they saw him plowing his field. They arrested him and
recovered from his house a caliber .38 revolver buried under the ground. The arrest was
made without any warrant or at least a search warrant. He was also not reminded of his
constitutional rights.

However, according to accused Burgos, he was not a member of the NPA. The gun was
actually buried by Masamlok himself a few days before the arrest without the former’s
knowledge since he was not in his house then. It was only his wife who was present and
she was threatened by Masamlok not to report the gun to the authorities. After his
warrantless arrest, he disclosed that he was tortured for days to admit the ownership of the
recovered revolver.

Issues: 1st Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Burgos is justified

2nd Issue:
Whether or not the exceptions in arrest with warrant can be liberally construed as in the
case of Burgos’ arrest
Held: 1. No, the warrantless arrest of Burgos is not justified.
2. No, the exceptions must be strictly construed.

Ratio: The warrantless arrest of Ruben Burgos was not justified

We find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest
the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had
truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the
accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the
whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by
Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no
compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution.
Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a
warrant of arrest becomes even clearer. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his
field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards
could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.

(Note: Please read the discussion about the exceptions to further understand why the
warrantless arrest of Burgos was not justified)

The exceptions must be strictly construed

Rule 113, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to

commit an offense in his presence;

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it;

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.
The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by
the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
 The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd
or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule
on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided
by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often
violated and so deserving of full protection.

Can the Reasonableness Test be used to justify the warrantless arrest made against Burgos?
(Under Sec. 6 (b))

No.

The government reasoned that the information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to
induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused was
probably guilty thereof.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime
must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have
been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test
of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

PITA VS CA

FACTS: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic, and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. Among the publications seized and later
burned was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. After his
injunctive relief was dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA, he seeks review with SC,
invoking the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.

Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal

HELD: YES. It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief of Staff (133
SCRA 800) , the SC countermanded the orders of the RTC authorizing the search of the premises
WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies, by reason of a defective warrant.
There is a greater reason in this case to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of
a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no
different from Burgos, a political case, because speech is speech, whether political or "obscene". The
authorities must apply for the issuance of the search warrant from the judge, if in their opinion, an
obscenity rap is in order. They must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
"obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State
interference and action. The judge must determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's sound discretion. If probable
cause exist, a search warrant will issue.