would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July
30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly
represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional
Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against
defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR).
Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests.
They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance
and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering
the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing
Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political
question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss,
further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special
civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political
issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs
result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege
in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided
by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the
Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies,
among many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of
E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the
governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural
resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has
the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint,
the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the
constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction
vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to
rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is
an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest
or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the
exercise by the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must
yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is
hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE.
CASE: Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes in
his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy,
et.al.
FACTS
 On 13 June 2002, the Government of the
Philippines, acting through the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical
Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-
102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.,
Ltd. (JAPEX).
 The studies included surface geology, sample
analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and
magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite
surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in
Tañon Strait was conducted.
 On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX
converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No. 46
(SC-46) for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block
covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the
Tañon Strait.
 From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic
surveys in and around Tañon Strait, including a
multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering
approximately 751 kms. to determine the area’s
underwater composition.
 During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX
committed to drill one exploration well. Since
the same was to be drilled in the marine waters
of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan where the
Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape
in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements under Presidential Decree No.
1586 (PD 1586), entitled “Establishing an
Environmental Impact Statement System,
Including Other Environmental Management
Related Measures and For Other Purposes.”
 On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area
Management Board (PAMB) of the Tañon Strait
issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted
the Initial Environmental Examination
commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably
recommended the approval of the latter’s
application for an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC).
 On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII
granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon
Strait.
 From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008,
JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a depth
of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.
 On 17 December 2007, two separate original
petitions were filed commonly seeking that the
implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for
violation of the 1987 Constitution.
 The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the
“Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit the
waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined
by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-
Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and
friends seeking their protection. Also impleaded
as unwilling co-petitioner is former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527,
the petitioners are the Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-
stock, non-profit, non-governmental
organization established for the welfare of the
marginal fisherfolk in Region VII and
representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of
the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are:
- A study made after the seismic survey
showed that there is a drastic reduce in
fish catch by 50-70% attributable to the
destruction of the “payao” or the artificial
reef.
- The ECC obtained by the respondents is
invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to its
issuance.
 - SC-46 is null and void for having violated
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, considering that there is no
general law prescribing the standard or
uniform terms, conditions, and
requirements for service contracts
involving oil exploration and extraction
- FIDEC alleges that it was barred from
entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer
radius from the point where the oilrig was
located, an area grated than the 1.5-
kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in
the Initial Environmental Examination
 The respondents in both petitions are: the late
Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca,
DENR-Region VII Director and Chairman of
Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese
company; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc.
(SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
Their counter-allegations are:
- The “Resident Marine Mammals” and
“Stewards” have no legal standing to file
the petition.
- SC-46 is constitutional.
- The ECC was legally issued.
- The case is moot and academic since SC-
46 is mutually terminated on 21 June
2008.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON Petitioners have a legal standing
3. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional
RULING
1. No. The Court makes clear that the “moot and
academic” principle is not a magic formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Despite the termination of SC-
46, the Court deems it necessary to resolve the
consolidated petitions as it falls within the
exceptions. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is
violative of the Constitution, the environmental
and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect
the public’s interest, and the respondents’
contested actions are capable of repetition.
2. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,”
and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action
before our courts for violation of our
environmental laws on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any
Filipino citizen in representation of
others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an
action to enforce rights or
obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen
suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action
and the reliefs prayed for,
requiring all interested parties to
manifest their interest to intervene
in the case within fifteen (15) days
from notice thereof. The plaintiff
 may publish the order once in a
newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines or furnish all
affected baragngays copies of said
order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No.
8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be
governed by their respective
provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007,
years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been
consistently held that rules of procedure may be
retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and
will not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as
there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, the SC had already taken a permissive
position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed
the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn “based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.”
It is also worth noting that the Stewards
in the present case are joined as real parties in
the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species.
3. Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides in part:
“The President may enter into
agreement with foreign-owned
corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the
State shall promote the
development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the
Congress of every contract entered
into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from
its execution.” (Emphases supplied)
The disposition, exploration,
development, exploitation, and utilization of
indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are
governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87)
or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of
1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87 is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general
law, the absence of the two other conditions,
that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and
that the Congress be notified of such contract,
renders it null and void.

SC-46 appears to have been entered into
and signed by the DOE through its then
Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public
respondents have neither shown nor alleged
that Congress was subsequently notified of the
execution of such contract.
Service contracts involving the
exploitation, development, and utilization of our
natural resources are of paramount interest to
the present and future generations. Hence,
safeguards were out in place to insure that the
guidelines set by law are meticulously observed
and likewise eradicate the corruption that may
easily penetrate departments and agencies by
ensuring that the President has authorized or
approved of the service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is
required that the Petroleum Board, now the
DOE, obtain the President’s approval for the
execution of any contract under said statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality of
SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve as
a guide for the Government when executing
service contracts.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon
Strait is an environmentally critical area,
having been declared as a protected area in
1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of
its management plan may only be implemented
pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing
an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to
determine the effects of such activity on its
ecological system.
Public respondents admitted that JAPEX
only started to secure an ECC prior to the 2nd
sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling
of the exploration well. This means that no
environmental impact evaluation was done
when the seismic surveys were conducted.
Unless the seismic surveys are part of the
management plan of the Tañon Strait, such
surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of
NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general
law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized,
the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed
only through a law passed by Congress, since
the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is
no such law specifically allowing oil exploration
and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy
resource exploitation and utilization may be
done in said protected seascape.
MMDA V. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA
BAY (CASE DIGEST)
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against
several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged
that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen
way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as plaintiffs,
prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila
Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan
of action for the purpose.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents,
ordering the defendant-government agencies to clean
up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152
relates only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart
from raising concerns about the lack of funds,
petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the
Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be
compelled by mandamus.
The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the
Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents?
Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by
mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay?
RULING:
Issue 1:
PD 1152 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs.
The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is
not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution
incident.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal
provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up
the bay, they and the men and women representing
them cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the
Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Issue 2:
Yes, petitioners may be compelled.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is
set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152)
and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of
putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be
characterised as discretionary, for, as earlier stated,
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law
to public functionaries to act officially according to
their judgment or conscience.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters
would yield to the conclusion that these government
agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating
directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation,
protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They
are precluded from choosing not to perform these
duties.
The petition is DENIED.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL,
respondents.
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder,
or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide
management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two
(2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder,
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price
and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which
GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of
the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is
premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondents in refusing the matching
bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount
and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract. A provision which lays
down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II
of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power
to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per sejudicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently,
if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences
and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel
when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite,
it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine
history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of
the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns
the 51% will have actual control and management of
the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will
have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so
if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For,
while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional
fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore
it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic
law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that
this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are
understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These
are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the
forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners
when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid
of the foreign group is to insist that government be
treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people.
The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so
than let the government develop the habit of forgetting
that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions
and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but
to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and
to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided
in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the
bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT
the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the
sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the
purpose.
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD
VS. COURT OF APPEAL AND SOLAR
TEXTILE FINISHING CORP.
Respondent Solar assailed the Ex parte Cease and
Desist Order by petitioner Pollution Adjudication
Board on the ground that the former was denied due
process and that the degree of threat required for the
said Order is remiss. Petitioner reasoned that under
PD No.984 Section 7(a), the Board has the legal
authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the
operations of an establishment when there is prima
facie evidence that such establishment is discharging
effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which
exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by
the NPCC.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of petitioner.
The Court held that the Board may issue the ex parte
cease and desist order upon prima facie evidence that
the respondent corporation has waste discharge
beyond the allowable standards set by the NPCC
(Sec5, Effluent Regulations of 1982 and Sec7(a),PD
984). If it has not yet been subject to the allowable
standard, the Board may still issue ex parte cease and
desist order upon prima facie evidence that the
effluent pose an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life. The
court held that the Board, as the government entity
tasked to determine whether the effluents of a
particular industrial establishment comply with or
violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and
regulatory provisions, has the authority to issue the
order as it may see fit. This is, after all, allowed by law
to address relevant pollution issues as an immediate
recourse.
PRINCIPE VS. FFIB
FACTS: August 28, 1990- Philjas Corporation, whose
primary purposes, among others are: to own, develop,
subdivide, market and provide low-cost housing for the
poor, was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). February 19, 1991 - then City
Mayor Daniel S. Garcia, endorsed to the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) the proposed
CHS. Thereafter, or on 07 March 1991, based on the
favorable recommendation of Mayor Garcia,
respondent TAN, issued the Preliminary Approval
and Locational Clearance (PALC) for the development
of CHS. On July 5, 1991, then HLURB Commissioner
respondent TUNGPALAN issued Development Permit
No. 91-0216 for land development only for the entire
land area of 12.1034 hectares covered by TCT No.
35083 (now TCT 208837) and with 1,003 saleable
lots/units with project classification B. P. 220 Model A-
Socialized Housing (p. 96, Records), with several
conditions for its development. Three (3) days
thereafter or on July 8, 1991, respondent JASARENO,
allowed/granted the leveling/earth-moving operations
of the development project of the area subject to
certain conditions.
On November 18, 1991, then HLURB Commissioner
AMADO B. DELORIA issued Certificate of
Registration No. 91-11-0576 in favor of CHS, with
License to Sell No. 91-11-0592 for the 1,007 lots/units
in the subdivision. Eventually, on December 10, 1991,
respondent POLLISCO issued Small Scale Mining
Permit (SSMP) No. IV-316 to Philjas to extract and
remove 10,000 cu. meters of filling materials from the
area where the CHS is located. Thereafter, or
on January 12, 1994, Philjas applied for a Small Scale
Mining Permit (SSMP) under P. D. 1899 with
the Rizal Provincial Government to extract and
remove 50,000 metric tons of filling materials per
annum on CHS 2.8 hectares. Thus, on January 17,
1994, respondent MAGNO, informed ELIEZER I.
RODRIGUEZ of Philjas that CHS is within the EIS
System and as such must secure ECC from the
DENR.Philjas was accordingly informed of the matter
such that it applied for the issuance of ECC from the
DENR-Region IV, on February 3, 1994. On March 12,
1994, an Inspection Report allegedly prepared by
respondent BALICAS, attested by respondent
RUTAQUIO and approved by respondent
TOLENTINO re: field evaluation to the issuance of
ECC, was submitted.
Consequently, on April 28, 1994, upon
recommendation of respondent
TOLENTINO, Philjasapplication for ECC was
approved by respondent PRINCIPE, then Regional
Executive Director, DENR under ECC-137-RI-212-94.
A Mining Field Report for SSMP dated May 10,
1994 was submitted pursuant to the inspection report
prepared by respondents CAYETANO, FELICIANO,
HILADO and BURGOS, based on their inspection
conducted on April 25 to 29, 1994. The report
recommended, among others, that the proposed
extraction of materials would pose no adverse effect to
the environment.
Records further disclosed that on August 10, 1994,
respondent BALICAS monitored the implementation
of the CHS Project Development to check compliance
with the terms and conditions in the ECC. Again,
on August 23, 1995, she conducted another monitoring
on the project for the same purpose. In both instances,
she noted that the project was still in the construction
stage hence, compliance with the stipulated conditions
could not be fully assessed, and therefore, a follow-up
monitoring inspection was the last one conducted by
the DENR.
On September 24, 1994, GOV. CASIMIRO I. YNARES,
JR., approved the SSMP applied for by Philjas under
SSMP No. RZL-012, allowing Philjas to extract and
remove 50,000 metric tons of filling materials from the
area for a period of two (2) years from date of its
issue until September 6, 1996. On November 15, 1999,
the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding
petitioner Principe administratively liable for gross
neglect of duty and imposing upon him the penalty of
dismissal from office. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following
respondents are hereby found GUILTY as charged and
meted the respective penalties provided under Section
22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules, Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987, viz,:
Antonio G. Principe - Penalty of Dismissal from the
Service for Gross Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may dismiss petitioner
from the service on an administrative charge for gross
neglect of duty, initiated, investigated and decided by
the Ombudsman himself without substantial evidence
to support his finding of gross neglect of duty because
the duty to monitor and inspect the project was not
vested in petitioner.
HELD: As heretofore stated, the responsibility of
monitoring housing and land development projects is
not lodged with the office of petitioner. The
Administrative Code of 1987 spelled out the mandate
of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, the agency that has authority over
petitioner, which reads:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy.- (1) The State shall
ensure for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true
value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
Section 2. Mandate.- (1) The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the
country’s natural resources.
However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 90, the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which
became the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), is the sole regulatory body for housing and
land development.
MUSTANG LUMBER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber
dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development. The
Special Actions and Investigation Division of the
DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of narra
flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the
lumberyard of the petitioner. The SAID organized a
team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct
surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members
saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's
truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could
not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its
cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound.
The team was not able to gain entry into the premises
because of the refusal of the owner. The team was able
to secure a search warrant. By virtue thereof, the team
seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard
four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs;
a negligible number of narra lumber; and
approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts
of various species including almaciga and supa. On 4
April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the
petitioner's lumberyard and placed under
administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume
of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to
produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of
lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices
covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their
source and origin. Parenthetically, it may be stated
that under an administrative seizure the owner
retains the physical possession of the seized articles.
Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed
by the owner or his representative. The owner is
prohibited from disposing them until further orders.
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a
letter to the Chief of SAID Robles requesting an
extension of fifteen days to produce the required
documents covering the seized articles because some of
them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin,
were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles
denied the petition. Subsequently, the Sec. of DENR
Factoran issued an order confiscating the woods seized
in the truck of the petitioner as well as those found in
their lumberyard.
Issue: Whether or not that a lumber cannot be
considered a timber and that petitioner should not be
held for illegal logging.
Held: The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any
manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded
from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, and thus possession thereof without the
required legal documents is not a crime. On the
contrary, the SC rules that such possession is
penalized in the said section because lumber is
included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry
Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as
defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs
and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wall bond, block board, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood products. This simply
means that lumber is a processed log or processed
forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term
lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or
logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in
the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words
and phrases used in a statute should be given their
plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And
insofar as possession of timber without the required
legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or
processed timber.
BALICAS VS. FFIB
FACTS: On March 12, 1994, an Inspection Report
allegedly prepared by respondent BALICAS, attested
by respondent RUTAQUIO and approved by
respondent TOLENTINO re: field evaluation to the
issuance of ECC, was submitted. Consequently, on
April 28, 1994, upon recommendations of respondent
TOLENTINO, Philjas application for ECC was
approved by respondent PRINCIPE, then Regional
Executive Director, DENR under ECC-137-R1-212-
94. A Mining Field Report for SSMP dated May 10,
1994 was submitted pursuant to the inspection report
prepared by respondents CAYETANO, FELICIANO,
HILADO and BURGOS, based on their inspection
conducted on April 25 to 29, 1994. The report
recommended, among others, that the proposed
extraction of materials would pose no adverse effect to
the environment.
Records further disclosed that on August 10, 1994,
respondent BALICAS monitored the implementation
of the CHS Project Development to check compliance
with the terms and conditions in the ECC. Again, on
August 23, 1995, she conducted another monitoring on
the project for the same purpose. In both instances,
she noted that the project was still in the construction
stage hence, compliance with the stipulated conditions
could not be fully assessed, and therefore, a follow-up
monitoring is proper. It appeared from the records that
this August 23, 1995 monitoring inspection was the
last one conducted by the DENR. On September 24,
1994, GOV. CASIMIRO I. YNARES, JR., approved the
SSMP applied for by Philjas under SSMP No. RZL-
012, allowing Philjas to extract and remove 50,000
metric tons of filling materials from the area for a
period of two (2) years from date of its issue until
September 6, 1996.[4]
Immediately after the tragic incident on August 3,
1999, a fact-finding investigation was conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman through its Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), which duly filed an
administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several officials of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), and the local government of Antipolo.
The charge against petitioner involved a supposed
failure on her part to monitor and inspect the
development of Cherry Hills Subdivision, which was
assumed to be her duty as DENR senior
environmental management specialist assigned in the
province of Rizal.
For her part, petitioner belied allegations that
monitoring was not conducted, claiming that she
monitored the development of Cherry Hills
Subdivision as evidenced by three (3) monitoring
reports dated March 12, 1994, August 10, 1994 and
August 23, 1995. She averred that she also conducted
subsequent compliance monitoring of the terms and
conditions of Philjas Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) on May 19, 1997 and noted no
violation thereon. She further claimed good faith and
exercise of due diligence, insisting that the tragedy
was a fortuitous event. She reasoned that the collapse
did not occur in Cherry Hills, but in the adjacent
mountain eastern side of the subdivision.
On November 15, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman
rendered a decision imposing upon petitioner the
supreme penalty of dismissal from office for gross
neglect of duty finding:
RESPONDENT BALICAS
Records show that she monitored and inspected the
CHS [Cherry Hills Subdivision] only thrice (3), to wit:
1. Inspection Report dated 12 March 1994
2. Monitoring Report dated 10 August 1994
3. Monitoring Report dated 23 August 1995
Verily, with this scant frequency, how can respondent
Balicas sweepingly claim that there was no violation of
ECC compliance and that she had done what is
necessary in accordance with the regular performance
of her duties. She herself recognized the fact that the
collapsed area is not the subdivision in question but
the adjacent mountain eastern side of the CHS. It is
incumbent upon her to establish the same in her
monitoring and inspection reports and make objective
recommendations re: it’s possible adverse effect to the
environment and to the residents of the CHS and
nearby areas. Her defense that the position of the CHS
shows the impossibility of checking the would-be
adverse effect clearly established her
incompetence. No expert mind is needed to know that
mountains cause landslide and erosion. Cherry Hills
Subdivision is a living witness to this.[5]
Petitioner seasonably filed a petition for review of the
Ombudsmans decision with the Court of Appeals. In
its decision dated August 25, 2000, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and
affirmed the appealed decision. It found that the
landslide was a preventable occurrence and that
petitioner was guilty of gross negligence in failing to
closely monitor Philjas compliance with the conditions
of the ECC given the known inherent instability of the
ground where the subdivision was developed. The
appellate court likewise denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in its resolution dated November 13,
2000.
Petitioner now comes to this Court for review
on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, of the appellate court’s decision. She alleges
that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of
law in affirming the Ombudsmans conclusion that:
1 There was gross negligence on the part of
petitioner Balicas in the performance of her
official duties as Senior Environmental
Management Specialist (SEMS) of the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) Province of Rizal, DENR
Region IV; and the alleged gross neglect of duty
of petitioner warranted the imposition of the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
2. The landslide which caused the death of
several residents of the subdivision and the
destruction of property is not a fortuitous event
and therefore preventible.[6]
ISSUES: WON the Court of Appeals committed
serious errors of law in: (1) holding petitioner guilty of
gross neglect of duty and (2) imposing upon her the
extreme penalty of dismissal from office.
HELD: In order to ascertain if there had been gross
neglect of duty, we have to look at the lawfully
prescribed duties of petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR
regulations are silent on the specific duties of a senior
environmental management specialist. Internal
regulations merely speak of the functions of the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) to which petitioner directly reports.
Nonetheless, petitioner relies on a letter[7] dated
December 13, 1999 from the chief of personnel, DENR
Region IV, which defines the duties of a senior
environmental management specialist as follows:
1. Conducts investigation of pollution sources or
complaints;
2. Review[s] plans and specifications of
proposes (sic) or existing treatment plants and
pollution abatement structures and devices to
determine their efficiency and suitability for
the kind of pollutants to be removed and to
recommend issuance or denial of permits;
3. Conducts follow-up inspection of construction
of pollution abatement/work and structures to
oversee compliance with approved plans and
specifications;
4. Recommends remedial measures for the
prevention, abatement and control of pollution;
5. Prepares technical reports on pollution
investigation and related activities; and
6. Performs related work as assigned.
It is readily apparent that no monitoring duty
whatsoever is mentioned in the said letter. The
PENRO, on the other hand, is mandated to:
1. conduct surveillance and inspection of
pollution sources and control facilities and
undertake/initiate measures relative to
pollution-related complaints of the general
public for appropriate referral to the regional
office;
2. comment on the project description,
determine if the project fall within the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
System[8] and submit the same to the regional
office; and
3. implement programs and projects related to
environmental management within the
PENRO. [9]
In addition, the PENRO is likewise tasked to monitor
the project proponents compliance with the conditions
stipulated in the ECC, with support from the DENR
regional office and the Environmental Management
Bureau.[10] The primary purpose of compliance
monitoring is to ensure the judicious implementation
of sound and standard environmental quality during
the development stage of a particular
project.Specifically, it aims to:
1. monitor project compliance with the
conditions set in the ECC;
2. monitor compliance with the Environmental
Management Plan (EMP) and applicable laws,
rules and regulations; and
3. provide a basis for timely decision-making
and effective planning and management of
environmental measures through the
monitoring of actual project impacts vis--vis
predicted impacts in the EIS.[11]
Based on the foregoing, the monitoring duties of the
PENRO mainly deal with broad environmental
concerns, particularly pollution abatement. This
general monitoring duty is applicable to all types of
physical developments that may adversely impact on
the environment, whether housing projects, industrial
sites, recreational facilities, or scientific undertakings.
However, a more specific monitoring duty is imposed
on the HLURB as the sole regulatory body for housing
and land development. It is mandated to encourage
greater private sector participation in low-cost housing
through (1) liberalization of development standards,
(2) simplification of regulations and (3)
decentralization of approvals for permits and
licenses.[12]
P.D. No. 1586[13] prescribes the following duties on the
HLURB (then Ministry of Human Settlements) in
connection with environmentally critical projects
requiring an ECC:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of
Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The
President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative
or upon recommendation of the National Environment
Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain
projects, undertakings or areas in the country as
environmentally critical. No person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such
declared environmentally critical project or area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative. For the proper
management of said critical project or area, the
President may by his proclamation reorganize such
government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations
or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of
government personnel, and their specific functions and
responsibilities.
In the related case of Principe v. Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau,[14] this Court found Antonio
Principe, regional executive director for DENR Region
IV who approved Philjas application for ECC, not
liable for gross neglect of duty. The Court reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and thereby annulled
the decision of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-09-661,
dated December 1, 1999, dismissing Principe from the
government service. We ordered his reinstatement
with back pay and without loss of seniority. The
rationale for our decision in Principe bears reiteration:
the responsibility of monitoring housing and land
development projects is not lodged with the DENR, but
with the HLURB as the sole regulatory body for
housing and land development. Thus, we must stress
that we find no legal basis to hold petitioner, who is an
officer of DENR, liable for gross neglect of the duty
pertaining to another agency, the HLURB. It was
grave error for the appellate court to sustain the
Ombudsman’s ruling that she should be dismissed
from the service. The reinstatement of petitioner is
clearly called for.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory
Construction
GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was
created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter
alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the
said region including navigation, construction, and operation
of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991.
The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its
provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and
its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing
privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter
of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of
1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the
latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction
that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general
law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The
special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid
exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and
developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local
Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to
issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters
affecting Laguna de Bay.
Tano vs Socrates GR 110249 21 August 1997
Facts: On 15 December 1992 the Sanguniang
Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa enacted Ordinance No
15-92 to establish a “closed season” for the species of
fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of
five years; and on 22 January 1993 acting Mayor
Amado Lucero issued Order No 23 to protect the coral
in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa
and the Province of Palawan from further destruction
due to illegal fishing activities. The petitioners,
invoked the Court for certiorari contending both
ordinances for depriving them of due process of law,
their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article
XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 15-92 enacted by
Sanguniang Panglungsod and Order No 23 by Acting
Mayor Lucero are within the limits of police power?
Decision: Petition dismissed and TRO lifted.
Ordinance 15-92 and Order No 23 are valid. The
relationship then between the activities barred by
Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and
the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series
of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and
the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully
obvious. In sum, the public purpose and
reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be
controverted.

Republic of the Philippines v. The City of Davao
FACTS:
Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of
Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the
Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the
Environmental Management Bureau however, was
denied on the ground that the proposed project was
within an environmentally critical area; that the City
of Davao must first undergo the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a
petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), and the latter ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:
WON the LGU’s are excluded from the coverage of PD
1586, one which requires an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC)
HELD:
No.Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that "no person,
partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate
any such declared environmentally critical project or
area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his
duly authorized representative." We note that LGU’s
are juridical persons.
HOWEVER, after consideration of the evidence finding
Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally
critical area neither being a critical project. The said
project is not classified as environmentally critical, or
within an environmentally critical area. Consequently,
the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of
Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the
performance of which can be compelled by writ
of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in
the case at bar.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA
G.R. No. 94759, Jan. 21, 1991, 201 SCRA
FACTS:
Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export ofcharcoal briquette, received
a letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the
full cessation of its plant in Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan until further order, and 2) requesting its
Plant Manager to bring before the office of the mayor
its buildingpermit, mayor's permit, and Region III--
Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-
Pollution Permit.
Technology Developers undertook to comply with the
request to produce the required documents. It sought
to secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment and
Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit although
prior to the operation of the plant, a
Temporary Permit to Operate Air
Pollution Installation was issued to it. Petitioners also
sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to
secure a mayor’s permit but were not entertained.
Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant
premises be padlocked, effectively causing the
stoppage of operation. This was done without previous
and reasonable notice.
Technology Developers then instituted an action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction against the acting mayor with
Bulacan RTC, alleging that the closure order was
issued in grave abuse of discretion.
The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was proper,
ordering the acting mayor to immediately revoke
his closure order and allow Technology Developers to
resume its normal business operations until the case
has been adjudicated on the merits.
Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented
evidence as to the allegation that "Due to the
manufacturing process and nature of raw materials
used, the fumes coming from the factory may contain
particulate matters which are hazardous to the health
of the people. As such, the company
should cease operating until such a time that the
proper air pollution device is installed and
operational."
Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order
granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
The CA denied Technology Developer's petition for
certiorari for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
W/N the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering
the stoppage of Technology Developer
HELD:
YES. The following circumstances militate against the
maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction
sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is
true that the matter of determining whether there is a
pollution of the environment that requires control if
not prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, it must be
recognized that the mayor of a town has as much
responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution,
and by virtue of his police power, he may deny
the application for a permit to operate a business or
otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures
are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of
the residents of the community from the emissions in
the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner
to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant
whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the
locality but also affect the health of the residents in
the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its
operation until further orders.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to
the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial
Governor through channels.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued
only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina
who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by
the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and
that no proper air pollutiondevice has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from
the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a
building permit issued by an official of Makati on
March 6, 1987.
6. While petitioner was able to present a
temporary permit to operate by the then National
Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987,
the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988.
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or
validate its permit much less to install any device to
control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the
health of the residents of the community.
Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on
its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It
must be stressed however, that concomitant with the
need to promote investment and contribute to the
growth of the economy is the equally essential
imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives
of the people, from the deleterious effect of the
pollution of the environment.
● The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the
sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its
action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of
its discretion. By the same token the court that issued
such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the
writ as the circumstances may warrant.
Petition denied.
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK VS. LANZANAS
FACTS: On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director
Antonio G. Principe (RED Principe) of Region IV,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), issued an Environmental Clearance
Certificate (ECC) in favor of respondent National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). The ECC authorized
NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility
in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro,
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang
Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a
mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an
eco-tourist zone. The mooring facility would serve as
the temporary docking site of NAPOCORs power
barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former
mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required
relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4
megawatts power barge would provide the main source
of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro
pending the construction of a land-based power plant
in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the
mooring facility was valid for two years counted from
its date of issuance or until 30 June 1999. Petitioners,
claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro,
Puerto Galera, sought reconsideration of the ECC
issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners
plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and
for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the
construction of the mooring facility. Impleaded as
defendants were the following: (1) NAPOCOR, (2) RED
Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director for
Environment Oscar Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro
Electric Cooperative (ORMECO), which is engaged in
the distribution of electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and
(5) certain officials of Puerto Galera. Petitioners
subsequently amended their complaint to include as
additional defendants the elective officials of Oriental
Mindoro represented by then Governor Rodolfo G.
Valencia.Petitioners further prayed for the demolition
of mooring structures that respondents had already
built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended
complaint, the trial court issued a 20-day temporary
restraining order enjoining the construction of the
mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the
same on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCORs manifestation
that the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro
was the one undertaking the construction of the
mooring facility.
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers,
respondents ORMECO and the provincial officials of
Oriental Mindoro moved to dismiss the
complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering
the complaint without cause of action. They also
asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to
enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in
Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTCs
territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners opposed the motion
on the ground that there was no need to exhaust
administrative remedies. They argued that the
issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1605,[8] Sections 26 and 27 of
Republic Act No. 7160,[9] and the provisions of DENR
Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 (DAO 96-
37) on the documentation of ECC
applications. Petitioners also claimed that the
implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of
its terms. In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial
court granted the motion and dismissed petitioner’s
complaint.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in dismissing
petitioner’s complaint for lack of cause of action and
lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: The Ruling of the Court: The petition has no
merit. Presidential Decree No. 1605 (PD No.
1605),[23] as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos.
1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically threatened
zone the coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera
Bay as protected by Medio Island. This decree provides
in part:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the construction of marinas, hotels,
restaurants, other commercial structures; commercial
or semi-commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial docking
within the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera; the
destruction of its mangrove stands; the devastation of
its corals and coastline by large barges, motorboats,
tugboat propellers, and any form of destruction by
other human activities are hereby prohibited.
Section 2. x x x
No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina,
hotel, restaurants and other commercial structures in
Puerto Galera shall be issued without prior approval of
the Office of the President upon the recommendation
of the Philippine Tourism Authority. (Emphasis
supplied)
NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside
of Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio
Island,[24] PD No. 1605 does not apply to this
case. However, petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is
one of the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera[25]and thus
protected under PD No. 1605. This is a question of fact
that the DENR Secretary should have first resolved. In
any event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR will use
the mooring facility for its power barge that will
supply 14.4 megawatts of electricity to the entire
province of Oriental Mindoro, including Puerto
Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a
government-owned public infrastructure intended to
serve a basic need of the people of Oriental
Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a commercial
structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or
commercial docking as contemplated in Section 1 of PD
No. 1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not
violate PD No. 1605 which applies only to commercial
structures like wharves, marinas, hotels and
restaurants.
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local
Government Code to emphasize the legislative concern
for the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean
environment.[26] These provisions require every
national government agency or government-owned
and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations
with the local government unit concerned and to
secure the prior approval of its sanggunian before
implementing any project or program that may cause
pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover
and extinction of animal or plant species. Sections 26
and 27 respectively provide:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in
the Maintenance of EcologicalBalance. - It shall be the
duty of every national agency or government-owned or
controlled corporation authorized or involved in the
planning and implementation of any project or
program that may cause pollution, climatic change,
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land,
rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or
plant species, to consult with the local government
units, non-governmental organizations, and other
sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives
of the project or program, its impact upon the people
and the community in terms of environmental or
ecological balance, and the measures that will be
undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects
thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project
or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in
Section x x x 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is
obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where
such projects are to be implemented shall not be
evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,[27] the Court interpreted these
provisions in this manner:
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction
with Section 26 thereof x x x.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section
27 should be interpreted to mean projects and
programs whose effects are among those enumerated
in Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause
pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may
cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4)
may result in loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest
cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant
species; and (6) other projects or programs that may
call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in the locality where these will be
implemented.
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case
because as petitioners admit,[28] the mooring facility
itself is not environmentally critical and hence does
not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned
in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the
concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of
the mooring facility. It is another matter if the
operation of the power barge is at issue. As an
environmentally critical project that causes pollution,
the operation of the power barge needs the prior
approval of the concerned sanggunian. However, what
is before this Court is only the construction of the
mooring facility, not the operation of the power
barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.