RULE 31
FIRST DIVISION contending parties. It was created not to hinder
[G.R. No. L-64250. September 30, 1983.]
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
and ERLITO LORCA, Petitioners, v. HON. LUIS
L. VICTOR, Judge Presiding over Branch XVI
of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
TIMOTEA T. MORALDE, CAYETANO T.
MORALDE, JR., ALEXANDER T. MORALDE,
EMMANUEL T. MORALDE, and JOCELYN
MORALDE ABELLANA, Respondents.
Benito P. Fabio for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Michael Moralde for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDICIAL
ECONOMY AND ADMINISTRATION AS WELL
AS CONVENIENCE OF THE PARTIES;
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF
CASES IN THE CASE AT BAR. — There is,
however, a more pragmatic solution to the
cotroversy at bar; and that is to consolidate the
Gumaca case with the Cavite case.
Considerations of judicial economy and
administration, as well as the convenience of the
parties for which the rules on procedure and
venue were formulated, dictate that it is the
Cavite court, rather than the Gumaca court,
which serves as the more suitable forum for the
determination of the rights and obligations of the
parties concerned. As observed by both the trial
and appellate courts, to require private
respondents who are all residents of Kawit,
Cavite, to litigate their claims in the Quezon
Court would unnecessarily expose them to
considerable expenses. On the other hand, no
like prejudice would befall the defendants
transportation companies if they were required
to plead their causes in Cavite, for such change
of venue would not expose them to expenses
which are not already liable to incur in
connection with the Gumaca case.
2. ID.; PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF
PROCEDURE. — The whole purpose and
object of procedure is to make the powers of the
court fully and completely available for justice.
The most perfect procedure that can be devised
is that which gives opportunity for the most
complete and perfect exercise of the powers of
the court within the limitations set by natural
justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives
the most perfect opportunity for the powers of
the count to transmute themselves into concrete
acts of justice between the parties before it. The
purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter,
but to give it effective facility in righteous action.
The purpose of procedure is not to thwart
justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of
and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute
the thing itself which courts are always striving
to secure to litigants. It is designed as the
means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other
words, it is a means to an end. It is the means
by which the powers of the court are made
effective in just judgments. When it loses the
character of the one and takes on that of the
other the administration of justice becomes
incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself
open to grave criticism." (Manila Railroad Co. v.
Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523)
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
A petition for certiorari to set aside the decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R.
No. SP-00708 entitled "Superlines
Transportation Co., Inc., Et. Al. versus Hon. Luis
L. Victor, Et Al.," which affirmed the orders dated
March 28 and April 27, 1983 of herein
respondent Judge Luis L. Victor in Civil Case
No. N-4338 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
entitled "Timotea T. Moralde, Et. Al. versus
Pantranco South Express, Inc., Et. Al."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On December 19, 1982, Bus No. 3008 of the
Pantranco South Express, Inc., Pantranco for
short, driven by Rogelio Dillomas, collided with
Bus No. 331 of the Superlines Transportation
Co., Inc., Superlines for short, then driven by
Erlito Lorca along the highway at Lumilang,
Calauag, Quezon, resulting in the instantaneous
death of Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., a passenger
in the Pantranco bus.cralawnad
On January 4, 1983, Superlines instituted an
action for damages before the then Court of
First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca Branch,
against Pantranco and Rogelio Dillomas, driver
of said Pantranco Bus No. 3008. In its
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 1671-G,
Superlines alleged that the recklessness and
negligence of the Pantranco bus driver was the
proximate cause of the accident and that there
was want of diligence on the part of Pantranco
in the selection and supervision of its driver.
On February 11, 1983, private respondents
Timotea T. Moralde, widow of the deceased
Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., and her children,
Cayetano, Jr., Alexander, Ramon, Emmanuel, all
surnamed Moralde, and Jocelyn M. Abellana,
filed a complaint for damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. N-4338 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City, against Superlines and its driver,
Erlito Lorca, as well as Pantranco and its driver,
Rogelio Dillomas. The cause of action pleaded
against Superlines was based on quasi-delict,
while that against Pantranco, on culpa-
contractual.
On February 28, 1983, herein petitioners
Superlines and its driver Erlito Lorca filed a
motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. N-4338 on
the ground of pendency of another action,
obviously referring to Civil Case No. 1671-G
pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon, Gumaca Branch.
Finding that the two cases (Civil Cases No.
1671-G and No. N-4338) involved different
parties as well as different causes of action,
respondent Judge Luis Victor denied the motion
to dismiss in the challenged order of March 28,
1983. Superlines moved for a reconsideration,
but the same was denied on April 27, 1983.
Dissatisfied, Superlines filed with the
Intermediate Appellate Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, which petition, however, was denied
due course. Hence, this present recourse.
It is suggested by petitioners that private
respondents Moraldes should pursue their claim
for damages by intervening in the Gumaca
action, pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 12 of the Rules
of Court and in the light of Municipality of
Hagonoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources [73 SCRA 507] and Orellano v.
Alvestir [76 SCRA 536]. It is contended that
since the right of private respondents to claim
damages is founded on the same facts involved
in the Gumaca action, any judgment rendered
therein will amount to res judicata in the Cavite
case, for whatever adjudication is made in the
former case between Pantranco and Superlines
as regards either of the parties’ culpability would
set said issue at rest. Furthermore, such
intervention would prevent multiplicity of suits
and avoid confusion that may arise should the
trial courts render conflicting
decisions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners’ stand is consistent with our ruling in
the case of Marapao v. Mendoza, 119 SCRA 97,
where We held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While respondent Castillo has not been
impleaded in the Bohol case, she has similar
interests as Hotel de Mercedes, the defendant
therein which is her employer. Petitioner and
private respondent both claim damages based
on the same incident. A decision, whether in
favor of petitioner or private respondent in the
Bohol case would amount to res judicata in the
Cebu case. Damages in favor of one party
would preclude damages in favor of the other.
"There is an additional reason for dismissal and
that is, to avoid multiplicity of suits. (Ago Timber
Co. v. Hon. Ruiz, Et Al., 21 SCRA 138 (1967);
Erlanger v. Villamor, 98 Phil. 1003 (1956);
Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 (1956).
"To protect the interests of respondent
employee, she may intervene as a party in the
Bohol case and file a counterclaim for damages
against petitioner."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is, however, a more pragmatic solution to
the controversy at bar; and that is to consolidate
the Gumaca case with the Cavite case.
Considerations of judicial economy and
administration, as well as the convenience of the
parties for which the rules on procedure and
venue were formulated, dictate that it is the
Cavite court, rather than the Gumaca court,
which serves as the more suitable forum for the
determination of the rights and obligations of the
parties concerned.
As observed by both the trial and appellate
courts, to require private respondents who are
all residents of Kawit, Cavite, to litigate their
claims in the Quezon Court would unnecessarily
expose them to considerable expenses. On the
other hand, no like prejudice would befall the
defendants transportation companies if they
were required to plead their causes in Cavite, for
such change of venue would not expose them to
expenses which they are not already liable to
incur in connection with the Gumaca case. The
objection interposed by Superlines that it has its
offices in Atimonan, Quezon, should not detract
from the overall convenience afforded by the
consolidation of cases in the Cavite Court. For
apart from the fact that petitioner and its driver
are represented by the same counsel with
offices located in Manila, defendants
transportation companies can readily avail of
their facilities for conveying their witnesses to
the place of trial.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The ordered consolidation of cases, to our mind,
crystallizes into reality the thinking of our
predecessors that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The whole purpose and object of procedure
is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. The most
perfect procedure that can be devised is that
which gives opportunity for the most complete
and perfect exercise of the powers of the court
within the limitations set by natural justice. It is
that one which, in other words, gives the most
perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to
transmute themselves into concrete acts of
justice between the parties before it. The
purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter,
but to give it effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient
objection which can be urged against procedure
today is that it so restricts the exercise of the
court’s powers by technicalities that part of its
authority effective for justice between the parties
is many times an inconsiderable portion of the
whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart
justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute
the thing itself which courts are always striving
to secure to litigants. It is designed as the
means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other
words, it is a means to an end. It is the means
by which the powers of the court are made
effective in just judgments. When it loses the
character of the one and takes on that of the
other the administration of justice becomes
incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself
open to grave criticism." (Manila Railroad Co. v.
Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523)

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby

denied. Civil Case No. 1671-G of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon is hereby ordered
consolidated with Civil Case No. N-4338
pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon,
Gumaca Branch, is directed to transfer, without
unnecessary delay, the records of Civil Case
No. 1671-G to the Regional Court of Cavite,
Branch XVI.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 32
G.R. No. 122216 March 28, 2001
ALJEM'S CORPORATION (LOGGING
DIVISION), represented by its President,
PACIFICO V. DIZON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HILARIO I.
MAPAYO, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Davao City, and RUDY
Y. CHUA, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the
decision,1 dated April 18, 1995, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34831, affirming the
approval by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Davao City, of the report of a commissioner on
the examination of the accounting records of
petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Aljem's Corporation Logging Division
(Aljem) was a joint venture entered into between
petitioner's representative, Pacifico V. Dizon, Jr.
and private respondent Rudy Y. Chua. Dizon
served as the venture's president, while private
respondent was its vice-president. 2 The joint
venture operated from June 1988 to August
1990. The parties initially agreed upon a 55-45
sharing basis (with the higher percentage going
to the petitioner), which they later modified to
50-50.3
On August 11, 1992, private respondent sued
petitioner for a sum of money and for damages.
In his complaint filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Davao City, private respondent
alleged, among other things, that according to
the financial report prepared by a certified public
accountant commissioned by him, the logging
operations of the joint venture earned an income
of P3,659,710.07 from January to August
1990.4 Private respondent alleged that this
figure was subsequently confirmed by
petitioner's certified public accountant, 5 but
despite repeated demands by him for the
payment of his 50% share of the income from
the logging operations of their joint venture,
petitioner refused to pay him his share.6
In its answer, petitioner alleged that private
respondent's auditor bloated the joint venture's
net operating income for the year 1990 to
P3,659,710.07 and that the correct amount, as
found by petitioner's accountant, was only
P2,089,141.80.7 Petitioner alleged that pursuant
to a partial liquidation of the joint venture on
August 2, 1990, private respondent received
P2,632,719.85 which represents his share in the
assets as well as in the net operation income of
the venture. What was left to be liquidated,
according to petitioner, were the disposition of
undivided equipment and collection of
receivables, payment of taxes, and adjustment
of private respondent's share upon the
arrangement on the value of petitioner's
equipment share in the amount of P55,970.32. 8
As an affirmative defense, petitioner averred
that taking into account the entire operation of
the joint venture, the amount of the joint
venture's undistributed assets from 1988 to
1990 was only P584,657.63. It claimed that
private respondent had no cause of action
against it (petitioner) and that the latter's claim
was based on a fraudulent scheme.9
During the pre-trial conference of the case, the
parties agreed to refer the case to a
commissioner. For this reason, Leonora B.
Cainglet was appointed commissioner by the
trial court and ordered to conduct an audit of
petitioner's accounting records.10 The
commissioner thereafter required the parties to
produce the records of the company, consisting
of the joint venture agreement, books of
accounts from the start of the joint venture's
operations up to its liquidation, sales invoices,
cash vouchers, journal vouchers, payrolls, and
other documents pertaining to business
transactions, monthly bank statements, used
and canceled checks, bank reconciliations,
savings passbooks, if any, financial statements,
and statement of joint venture liquidation. 11 The
commissioner interviewed petitioner's
representative as well as private respondent,
after which she filed her report in court,
furnishing copies of the same to the parties on
March 15, 1993.
On March 26, 1993, petitioner filed a
Manifestation and Motion, alleging that there
were discrepancies concerning sales,
depreciation, and interest between the audit
report and the report of its (petitioner's) auditor.
Petitioner asked for copies of certain cash
vouchers, journal vouchers, and checks
covering, among other things, repairs and
maintenance, representation, fuel, oil and
lubricants, and freight and handling. It was
subsequently allowed to examine the
documents in court.
On May 27, 1993, petitioner filed its comments
and objections to the commissioner's report,
praying that the commissioner be directed to
identify the transactions, receipts, or documents
which she disallowed, disapproved, or excluded,
covering the abovementioned variances, and be
ordered to correct the errors which she had
allegedly committed.12 The trial court conducted
a total of fourteen (14) hearings from May 29 to
September 28, 1993 to clarify the variances
pointed out by petitioner.13
On December 6, 1993, the trial court issued an
order confirming the commissioner's report and
adopting her findings of facts and conclusions
as those of the court.14 Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, contending that the
commissioner did not observe the mandatory
requirements of Rule 33, §§3 and 5 of the 1964
Rules of Court15 relative to the conduct of
hearings before the commissioner and the
setting of the time and place for the first meeting
of the parties, and that it was error for the trial
court to approve the commissioner's report over
the objections of petitioner. 16 Petitioner
contended that instead of merely interviewing
the parties, the commissioner should have
subpoenaed witnesses who could enlighten her
under oath about the true agreements, oral and
written, of the parties and about the manner in
which they conducted their venture and that it
was not within the power of the commissioner to
alter or modify what had been agreed upon by
the joint venturers themselves.17
On August 1, 1994, the trial court denied
petitioner's motion for
18
reconsideration. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to set aside the orders
of the trial court, but the Court of Appeals
dismissed its petition. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise
denied. Hence this petition.
The main issue in this case is whether the order
of the trial court, confirming and adopting the
commissioner's report should be set aside on
the ground that the commissioner merely based
her report on her interview of the parties and did
not hold any formal hearing.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner, the Court of
Appeals held:
While the procedure laid down by the [Rules of
Court] in the conduct of the auditing process
concerning the requirement that the parties
and/or their respective counsels should be
summoned by the commissioner for a "first"
meeting, and that the persons who are
summoned by the commissioner should be
placed under oath, [was] not done by the court
commissioner appointed by the respondent
court, We find and so hold that under Rule 33,
Section 3 of the Rules, the order of reference
may specify or limit the powers of the
commissioner, the court can direct the
commission[er] to report only upon particular
issues, or to do or perform certain particular
acts, or receive evidence only, or fix the date for
the beginning and closing of the hearings. Thus,
the court-appointed commissioner can act and
perform the power and authority only in
accordance with, and within the limits of the very
order directly handed down by the court which
appointed him. The commissioner is obliged to
work only under those constraints and within
specific pre-determined concerns.
Respondent court's order to Mrs. Cainglet was
specific, "to conduct an audit of defendant's
(petitioner's) accounting records." In compliance
with, and in fulfillment of, the order, Mrs.
Cainglet required the parties to submit the
relevant documents and papers, after which she
examined them and on the basis of which she
prepared and submitted the audit report in the
court. With respondent's court order as frame of
reference, we find and so hold that the court
commissioner performed her task within the
well-defined order to the letter. She did not hold
any hearing and swore no witnesses for she
was not ordered to do so.19
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's
assertion that it was not afforded the opportunity
to object to the disallowance or disapproval of
certain items in the computation of the assets of
petitioner. It pointed out that, among the persons
who were interviewed by the commissioner,
were petitioner's representative, Pacifico V.
Dizon, Jr., and private respondent. Petitioner,
therefore, had an adequate opportunity to
inquire about the progress of the audit and
challenge the commissioner's report if there
were certain items therein that in its opinion
should be disallowed, disapproved, or
excluded.20
In this appeal, petitioner contends that the
commissioner should have conducted a formal
hearing as the order of the trial court directed
her to conduct an "audit" of petitioner's
accounting records. It argues that the term
"audit" means "a formal or official examination
and authentication of accounts with witnesses,
vouchers, etc."21 Citing Rule 33, §2(a) of the
1964 Rules of Court, petitioner likewise
contends that as the work of the commissioner
involved the examination of along account, a
hearing was necessary and that interviews do
not suffice as the parties cannot register their
objections during an interview. Finally, petitioner
says that the conduct of a hearing and the
swearing of witnesses do not require a specific
order from the court. Rather, it is only when "the
court specifically orders the commissioner not to
hold a hearing and swear witnesses that he/she
is barred from performing such acts. Here, the
trial court's order did not specify or limit the
commissioner's powers; hence the
commissioner necessarily had to swear and
hear witnesses.22
Petitioner's contentions are well taken. Rule 33
of the 1964 Rules of Court, under which this
case was decided below, provides in pertinent
part:
SEC. 3. Order of reference, powers of the
commissioner. - When a reference is made, the
clerk shall forthwith furnish the commissioner
with a copy of the order of reference. The order
may specify or limit the powers of the
commissioner, and may direct him to report only
upon particular issues, or to do or perform
particular acts, or to receive and report evidence
only, and may fix the date for beginning and
closing the hearings and for the filing of his
report. Subject to the specifications and
limitations stated in the order, the commissioner
has and shall exercise the power to regulate the
proceedings in every hearing before him and to
do all the acts and take all measures necessary
or proper for the efficient performance of his
duties under the order. He may issue subpoenas
and subpoenas duces tecum, swear witnesses,
and unless otherwise provided in the order of
reference he may rule upon the admissibility of
evidence. The trial or hearing before him shall
proceed in all respects as it would if held before
the court.
SEC. 5. Proceedings before commissioner. -
Upon receipt of the order of reference and
unless otherwise provided therein, the
commissioner shall forthwith set a time and
place for the first meeting of the parties or their
attorneys to be held within ten (10) days after
the date of the order of reference and shall
notify the parties or their attorneys.
These provisions are substantially reproduced in
Rule 32, §§3 and 5 of the present Code of Civil
Procedure. The underscored portions of §§3
and 5 indicate quite clearly the necessity for a
formal hearing and the swearing of witnesses;
otherwise, the commissioner cannot determine
factual questions which arise in the course of his
examination of the accounts. For this purpose,
the witnesses must necessarily be sworn in and
offered for cross-examination by the parties so
that the truth of and question may be
determined. This would not be possible were the
commissioner merely to interview the parties.
Where controversial questions are involved,
such as whether certain items must be allowed
or disallowed, an adversary proceeding is
particularly indicated. That is why the last
sentence of §3 says that "The trial or hearing
before him shall proceed in all respects as it
would be held before the court." For the fact is
that the commissioner substitutes for the judge,
and whatever the judge can or cannot do, the
commissioner also can or cannot do.
Consequently, if a judge cannot decide a
question without hearing the parties on oath or
affirmation, neither can the commissioner.
Indeed, what §3 authorizes to be limited is
the scope of the proceedings before the
commissioner, but not the modality thereof.
Thus, the order of reference may specify only
particular issues to be determined by the
commissioner. It may direct him to do only
particular acts or just to receive and report
evidence. Whichever may be the case, the
requirement for the commissioner to hold a
hearing is clear, for this is the essence of due
process.
Nor can it be maintained that petitioner waived
the right to object to the proceedings before the
commissioner. Because of the lack of a formal
hearing, petitioner was denied the opportunity to
object to the procedure followed by the
commissioner as well as to the disallowance by
her of certain items in the computation of the
corporation's assets.
Neither can Rule 32, §10 of the 1964 Rules of
Court be cited to bar petitioner from questioning
the failure of the commissioner to hold a
hearing. This provision states in pertinent part:
Objections to the report based upon grounds
which were available to the parties during the
proceedings before the commissioner, other
than objections to the findings and conclusions
therein set forth, shall not be considered by the
court unless they were made before the
commissioner.
The objections referred to are those which a
party could have made during the hearings
before the commissioner, such as those relating
to the admissibility of evidence. But this
presupposes a hearing or a trial, during which
the objections should be made. Otherwise, there
would be neither occasion nor opportunity for
making the objections.1âwphi1.nêt
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner raised
the question of lack of hearing before the
commissioner only in its motion for
reconsideration of the August 1, 1994 order of
the trial court.23 This is not correct. The records
show that it actually did so in the May 28, 1993
hearing conducted by the trial court on the
commissioner's report.24 This was the first time
petitioner had an opportunity to do so since no
hearing was held before the commissioner.
Moreover, since the proceedings before the
commissioner were null and void because of the
denial of due process to petitioner, the nullity of
the proceedings can be raised at any stage of
case. It was error, therefore, for the trial court to
approve the commissioner's report over the
objection of petitioner.25
WHEREFORE, the ORDERS, dated December
6, 1993 and August 1, 1994, of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED, and this case
is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 138739 July 6, 2000
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
Spouses VICENTE and MA. SUMILANG DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial
court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing court
cannot remand the case for further proceedings.
Rather, it should render judgment on the basis
of the evidence proffered by the plaintiff.
Inasmuch as defendants in the present case
admitted the due execution of the Promissory
Note both in their Answer and during the pretrial,
the appellate court should have rendered
judgment on the bases of that Note and on the
other pieces of evidence adduced during the
trial.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the December 9, 1997 Decision1 and the May
3, 1999 Resolution2of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR CV No. 47737. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed order (dated November 4, 1994) of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch XIV) in the City of
Manila in Civil Case No. 93-66507 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of
this case be remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings. No pronouncement as to
costs."3
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioner’s
Partial Motion for Reconsideration.4
The Facts
The facts of this case are undisputed. On March
2, 1991, Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang
del Rosario (herein respondents), jointly and
severally executed, signed and delivered in
favor of Radiowealth Finance Company (herein
petitioner), a Promissory Note5 for ₱138,948.
Pertinent provisions of the Promissory Note
read:
"FOR VALUE RECEIVED, on or before the date
listed below, I/We promise to pay jointly and
severally Radiowealth Finance Co. or order the
sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FORTY
EIGHTPesos (₱138,948.00) without need of
notice or demand, in installments as follows:
₱11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive months
starting on ________ 19__ until the amount of
₱11,579.00 is fully paid. Each installment shall
be due every ____ day of each month. A late
payment penalty charge of two and a half (2.5%)
percent per month shall be added to each
unpaid installment from due date thereof until
fully paid.
xxx xxx xxx
It is hereby agreed that if default be made in the
payment of any of the installments or late
payment charges thereon as and when the
same becomes due and payable as specified
above, the total principal sum then remaining
unpaid, together with the agreed late payment
charges thereon, shall at once become due and
payable without need of notice or demand.
xxx xxx xxx
If any amount due on this Note is not paid at its
maturity and this Note is placed in the hands of
an attorney or collection agency for collection,
I/We jointly and severally agree to pay, in
addition to the aggregate of the principal amount
and interest due, a sum equivalent to ten (10%)
per cent thereof as attorney’s and/or collection
fees, in case no legal action is filed, otherwise,
the sum will be equivalent to twenty-five (25%)
percent of the amount due which shall not in any
case be less than FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) plus the cost of suit and other
litigation expenses and, in addition, a further
sum of ten per cent (10%) of said amount which
in no case shall be less than FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P500.00), as and for liquidated
damages."6
Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the
monthly installments. Despite repeated
demands, they failed to pay their obligations
under their Promissory Note.
On June 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Complaint 7 
for the collection of a sum of money before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14. 8 
During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and
collection officer of petitioner, presented in
evidence the respondents’ check payments, the
demand letter dated July 12, 1991, the
customer’s ledger card for the respondents,
another demand letter and Metropolitan Bank
dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that he did not
have personal knowledge of the transaction or
the execution of any of these pieces of
documentary evidence, which had merely been
endorsed to him.
On July 4, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
terminating the presentation of evidence for the
petitioner.9 Thus, the latter formally offered its
evidence and exhibits and rested its case on
July 5, 1994.
Respondents filed on July 29, 1994 a Demurrer
to Evidence10 for alleged lack of cause of action.
On November 4, 1994, the trial court
dismissed11 the complaint for failure of petitioner
to substantiate its claims, the evidence it had
presented being merely hearsay.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed
the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Hence, this recourse.12
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
According to the appellate court, the judicial
admissions of respondents established their
indebtedness to the petitioner, on the grounds
that they admitted the due execution of the
Promissory Note, and that their only defense
was the absence of an agreement on when the
installment payments were to begin. Indeed,
during the pretrial, they admitted the
genuineness not only of the Promissory Note,
but also of the demand letter dated July 12,
1991. Even if the petitioner’s witness had no
personal knowledge of these documents, they
would still be admissible "if the purpose for
which [they are] produced is merely to establish
the fact that the statement or document was in
fact made or to show its tenor[,] and such fact or
tenor is of independent relevance."
Besides, Articles 19 and 22 of the Civil Code
require that every person must -- in the exercise
of rights and in the performance of duties -- act
with justice, give all else their due, and observe
honesty and good faith. Further, the rules on
evidence are to be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of an action.
Issue
The petitioner raises this lone issue:
"The Honorable Court of Appeals patently erred
in ordering the remand of this case to the trial
court instead of rendering judgment on the basis
of petitioner’s evidence."13
For an orderly discussion, we shall divide the
issue into two parts: (a) legal effect of the
Demurrer to Evidence, and (b) the date when
the obligation became due and demandable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has merit. While the CA correctly
reversed the trial court, it erred in remanding the
case "for further proceedings."
Consequences of a Reversal, on Appeal, of a
Demurrer to Evidence
Petitioner contends that if a demurrer to
evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant
should be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence, and the appellate court
should render judgment on the basis of the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to
the trial court "for further proceedings" would be
an outright defiance of Rule 33, Section 1 of the
1997 Rules of Court.
On the other hand, respondents argue that the
petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its
claim, simply on the ground that they lost their
right to present evidence in support of their
defense when the Demurrer to Evidence was
reversed on appeal. They stress that the CA
merely found them indebted to petitioner, but
was silent on when their obligation became due
and demandable.
The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was
reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but
the consequence on appeal of a demurrer to
evidence was not changed. As amended, the
pertinent provision of Rule 33 reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the
plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied, he shall have the right to
present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence."14
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to
evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v.
Javellana15 pronounced:
"The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is
simple and logical. The defendant is permitted,
without waiving his right to offer evidence in the
event that his motion is not granted, to move for
a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiff’s
evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as
thus established and the applicable law, the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial
court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that
plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient for an award of
judgment in the absence of contrary evidence,
the case still remains before the trial court which
should then proceed to hear and receive the
defendant’s evidence so that all the facts and
evidence of the contending parties may be
properly placed before it for adjudication as well
as before the appellate courts, in case of
appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line
with the established procedural precepts in the
conduct of trials that the trial court liberally
receive all proffered evidence at the trial to
enable it to render its decision with all possibly
relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that
the appellate courts upon appeal have all the
material before them necessary to make a
correct judgment, and avoiding the need of
remanding the case for retrial or reception of
improperly excluded evidence, with the
possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with
all the concomitant delays. The rule, however,
imposes the condition by the same token that if
his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and
the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the
movant losses his right to present evidence in
his behalf and he shall have been deemed to
have elected to stand on the insufficiency of
plaintiff’s case and evidence. In such event, the
appellate court which reverses the order of
dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on
the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence."
(Underscoring supplied)
In other words, defendants who present a
demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the
right to present their own evidence, if the trial
court disagrees with them; if the trial court
agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate
court disagrees with both of them and reverses
the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right
to present their own evidence.16 The appellate
court shall, in addition, resolve the case and
render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a
demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.17
In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on
respondents’ demurrer to evidence, dismissed
the Complaint on the ground that the plaintiff
had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However,
on appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial
court because the genuineness and the due
execution of the disputed pieces of evidence
had in fact been admitted by defendants.
Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, the CA should have rendered judgment
on the basis of the evidence submitted by the
petitioner. While the appellate court correctly
ruled that "the documentary evidence submitted
by the [petitioner] should have been allowed and
appreciated xxx," and that "the petitioner
presented quite a number of documentary
exhibits xxx enumerated in the appealed
order,"18 we agree with petitioner that the CA
had sufficient evidence on record to decide the
collection suit. A remand is not only frowned
upon by the Rules, it is also logically
unnecessary on the basis of the facts on record.
Due and Demandable Obligation
Petitioner claims that respondents are liable for
the whole amount of their debt and the interest
thereon, after they defaulted on the monthly
installments.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that
the installments were not yet due and
demandable. Petitioner had allegedly allowed
them to apply their promotion services for its
financing business as payment of the
Promissory Note. This was supposedly
evidenced by the blank space left for the date on
which the installments should have
19 
commenced. In other words, respondents
theorize that the action for immediate
enforcement of their obligation is premature
because its fulfillment is dependent on the sole
will of the debtor. Hence, they consider that the
proper court should first fix a period for payment,
pursuant to Articles 1180 and 1197 of the Civil
Code.
This contention is untenable. The act of leaving
blank the due date of the first installment did not
necessarily mean that the debtors were allowed
to pay as and when they could. If this was the
intention of the parties, they should have so
indicated in the Promissory Note. However, it did
not reflect any such intention.
On the contrary, the Note expressly stipulated
that the debt should be amortized monthly in
installments of ₱11,579 for twelve consecutive
months. While the specific date on which each
installment would be due was left blank, the
Note clearly provided that each installment
should be payable each month.
Furthermore, it also provided for an acceleration
clause and a late payment penalty, both of
which showed the intention of the parties that
the installments should be paid at a definite
date. Had they intended that the debtors could
pay as and when they could, there would have
been no need for these two clauses.
Verily, the contemporaneous and subsequent
acts of the parties manifest their intention and
knowledge that the monthly installments would
be due and demandable each month.20 In this
case, the conclusion that the installments had
already became due and demandable is
bolstered by the fact that respondents started
paying installments on the Promissory Note,
even if the checks were dishonored by their
drawee bank. We are convinced neither by their
avowals that the obligation had not yet matured
nor by their claim that a period for payment
should be fixed by a court.
Convincingly, petitioner has established not only
a cause of action against the respondents, but
also a due and demandable obligation. The
obligation of the respondents had matured and
they clearly defaulted when their checks
bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole
debt became due one month (April 2, 1991)
after the date of the Note because the check
representing their first installment bounced.
As for the disputed documents submitted by the
petitioner, the CA ruling in favor of their
admissibility, which was not challenged by the
respondents, stands. A party who did not appeal
cannot obtain affirmative relief other than that
granted in the appealed decision.21
It should be stressed that respondents do not
contest the amount of the principal
obligation.1âwphi1 Their liability as expressly
stated in the Promissory Note and found by the
CA is "₱13[8],948.0022 which is payable in
twelve (12) installments at ₱11,579.00 a month
for twelve (12) consecutive months." As
correctly found by the CA, the "ambiguity" in the
Promissory Note is clearly attributable to human
error.23
Petitioner, in its Complaint, prayed for "14%
interest per annum from May 6, 1993 until fully
paid." We disagree.1âwphi1 The Note already
stipulated a late payment penalty of 2.5 percent
monthly to be added to each unpaid installment
until fully paid. Payment of interest was not
expressly stipulated in the Note. Thus, it should
be deemed included in such penalty.
In addition, the Note also provided that the
debtors would be liable for attorney’s fees
equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due in
case a legal action was instituted and 10
percent of the same amount as liquidated
damages. Liquidated damages, however, should
no longer be imposed for being
24 
unconscionable. Such damages should also
be deemed included in the 2.5 percent monthly
penalty. Furthermore, we hold that petitioner is
entitled to attorney’s fees, but only in a sum
equal to 10 percent of the amount due which we
deem reasonable under the proven facts. 25
The Court deems it improper to discuss
respondents' claim for moral and other
damages. Not having appealed the CA Decision,
they are not entitled to affirmative relief, as
already explained earlier.26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
appealed Decision is MODIFIED in that the
remand is SET ASIDE and respondents are
ordered TO PAY ₱138,948, plus 2.5 percent
penalty charge per month beginning April 2,
1991 until fully paid, and 10 percent of the
amount due as attorney’s fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159 January
16, 2004
TERESITA S. DAVID, BENJAMIN S.
DAVID,PACIFICO S. DAVID, NEMESIO S.
DAVID, CELINE S. DAVID, CRISTINA S.
DAVID, PAULINA S. DAVID, and LEONIE S.
DAVID-DE LEON, Petitioners,
vs.
AGUSTIN RIVERA, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Claiming to be the owner of an eighteen
thousand (18,000)-square meter portion
(hereafter, "subject land") of Lot No. 38-B, 1 a five
(5)-hectare lot situated at MacArthur Highway,
Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, herein respondent
Agustin Rivera filed on May 10, 1994
a Complaint 2 for "Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession with Prayer for Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction" before the Provincial
Adjudication Board (PARAB) of San Fernando,
Pampanga against petitioners heirs of Spouses
Cristino and Consolacion David.3 The
respondent averred that the petitioners had
been harassing him for the purpose of making
him vacate the subject land although it had
already been given to him sometime in 1957 by
the parents of the petitioners as "disturbance
compensation", in consideration of his
renunciation of his tenurial rights over the
original eighteen (18)-hectare farmholding.
For their part, the petitioners filed a Complaint4 
for ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat and Magalang,
Pampanga. They alleged that the respondent
was occupying the subject land without paying
rentals therefor. The petitioners also averred
that they need the subject land for their personal
use but the respondent refused to vacate it
despite repeated demands.
In his Answer5 to the ejectment complaint, the
respondent asserted that the MCTC had no
jurisdiction over the case in light of the tenancy
relationship between him and the predecessors-
in-interest of the petitioners, as evidenced by
the Certification 6 issued by the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Mabalacat,
Pampanga. He likewise reiterated his claim of
ownership over the subject land and informed
the court of the complaint he had earlier filed
before the PARAB.
On January 31, 1995, or during the pendency of
the ejectment case, the PARAB rendered
its Decision7 declaring the respondent as tenant
of the land and ordering that his peaceful
possession thereof be maintained. Expectedly,
the petitioners appealed the PARAB Decision to
the Department of the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
On September 28, 1995, the MCTC rendered
its Decision8 ordering the respondent to vacate
the subject land. The court found that there was
a dearth of evidence supportive of the
respondent’s claim that the land is agricultural or
that it is devoted to agricultural production.
Further, it ruled that the petitioners as the
registered owners have a better right to
possession of the subject land. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of herein plaintiffs
and against herein defendant and any one
claiming rights under him by ordering the latter
to:
(1) Vacate the subject premises and to
peacefully turn over possession of the same to
the plaintiffs or to their authorized
representatives;
(2) To pay the plaintiffs the amount of
₱720,000.00 as reasonable rentals in arrears as
of July, 1994 and to pay monthly rentals of
₱12,000.00 from August, 1994 up to the time he
(defendant) finally vacates the premises;
(3) To pay the plaintiffs the amount of
₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay the
cost of the suit;
(4) Defendant(’s) counterclaim is hereby
DENIED for lack of proof.
SO ORDERED.
Without appealing the MCTC Decision but within
the period to appeal, the respondent filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City
a Petition9 for prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
seeking the nullification of the MCTC Decision.
The thrust of the petition was that the MCTC
had no jurisdiction as the issue before it was
agrarian in nature.
On October 30, 1995, the RTC issued
a Temporary Restraining Order10 enjoining the
petitioners from enforcing the MCTC Decision.
Thereafter, it proceeded to hear the
respondent’s application for preliminary
injunction. On November 29, 1995, the RTC
granted the motion and ordered the issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction upon the posting
of bond in the amount of ₱500,000.00.11
On January 30, 1996, the petitioners filed
their Answer12 to the Petition for prohibition in
which they asserted that the MCTC could not be
divested of its jurisdiction by simply interposing
the defense of tenancy. The petitioners also
disputed the respondent’s claim that he acquired
the subject property by way of disturbance
compensation for the reason that in 1956, when
the property was allegedly given, the law
providing for the payment of disturbance
compensation was not yet in effect. Moreover,
the petitioners contended, no proof had been
adduced evidencing the conveyance of the
property in favor of the respondent.
The case went to trial with the respondent as
petitioner presenting his evidence in chief.
However, after the respondent had rested his
case, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss13  discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
raising as grounds, inter alia: (1) that the
extraordinary remedy of prohibition could not be
made a substitute for the available and speedy
recourse of appeal; (2) the jurisdiction of the
MCTC of Mabalacat, Pampanga was legally
vested, determined as it was by the averments
of the complaint in conformity with Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court; hence, the decision of the
ejectment court was a legitimate and valid
exercise of its jurisdiction.
On February 25, 1998, the RTC issued
an Order14 denying the motion to dismiss. The
court ruled that the motion, which was filed after
the presentation of the plaintiff’s evidence,
partakes of a demurrer to evidence which under
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, 15 may
be granted only upon a showing that the plaintiff
has shown no right to the relief prayed for.
Noting that "the evidence presented by the
petitioner establishes an issue which is
addressed to [the] court for resolution. . .
whether or not the respondent court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
filed before it", the RTC ruled that the denial of
the motion to dismiss is proper. The petitioners
moved for reconsideration16 but was denied in
an Order17 dated June 23, 1998.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari18 in the Court of Appeals. On
September 3, 1999, the appellate court
rendered a Decision,19 finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the
motion to dismiss, as well as the motion for
reconsideration of its order. The appellate court
ratiocinated that the order of denial is merely
interlocutory and hence cannot be assailed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. In addition, it held that issues raised in
the petition for prohibition were genuine and
substantial, necessitating the presentation of
evidence by both parties.
The petitioners now come before us, seeking
the nullification of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. At the crux of the petition is the issue
of whether the denial of the motion to dismiss by
way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted with
grave abuse of discretion.
In the Resolution of October 4, 1999,20 we
denied the petition for failure of the petitioners to
accompany the same with a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
assailed decision. The petitioners filed a new
petition primarily on the basis of Philippine
Airlines v. Confesor,21 where this Court held that
a petition dismissed under Circular No. 1-88 22 
may be filed again as a new petition as long as it
is done within the reglementary period. In
the Resolution23 of March 8, 2000, we allowed
the re-filing of the petition and required the
respondent to comment thereon.
In his Comment,24 the respondent counters that
the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
inasmuch as the MCTC had no jurisdiction to
render the assailed judgment. He points out that
the PARAB had already declared him the owner
of the land and that the PARAB decision was
affirmed by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in its Decision25 
dated March 6, 2000.
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it may be well to point out that
certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory
order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in
the form of a demurrer to evidence filed after the
plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested
his case. Being interlocutory, an order denying a
demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither
can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
After such denial, the petitioners should present
their evidence and if the decision of the trial
judge would be adverse to them, they could
raise on appeal the same issues raised in the
demurrer.26 However, it is also settled that the
rule admits of an exception, i.e., when the denial
of a demurrer is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.27
Thus, the petitioners submit that the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
the demurrer. They insist that appeal, not
prohibition, is the proper remedy to question the
judgment of the MCTC and that the question of
jurisdiction is one of law which may be ruled
upon without the evidence of the parties.
We are not convinced. We uphold the Court of
Appeals.
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition
for prohibition to correct what he perceived was
an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the
MCTC. Indeed, the propriety of the recourse to
the RTC for a writ of prohibition is beyond cavil
in view of the following considerations:
First. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in
this case, where two tribunals exercised
jurisdiction over two cases involving the same
subject matter, issue, and parties, and ultimately
rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out
a case for prohibition. The MCTC manifestly
took cognizance of the case for ejectment
pursuant to Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129,28 as amended. On the other hand, the
ratiocination of the DARAB, which the
respondent echoes, is that the case falls
squarely within its jurisdiction as it arose out of,
or was connected with, agrarian relations. The
respondent also points out that his right to
possess the land, as a registered tenant, was
submitted for determination before the PARAB
prior to the filing of the case for ejectment.
Indeed, Section 50 of R.A. 6657 29 confers on the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-
judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform
matters.30 In the process of reorganizing the
DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A31 created the
DARAB to assume the powers and functions
with respect to the adjudication of agrarian
reform cases.32 Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure enumerates the cases
falling within the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction of the DARAB, which is quoted
hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at
bar:
Section 1. Primary And Exclusive Original
and Appellate Jurisdiction. The board shall
have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act no.
6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-
A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No.
27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations. Specifically,
such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited
to cases involving the following:
a) The rights and obligations of persons,
whether natural or juridical engaged in the
management, cultivation and use of all
agricultural lands covered by the CARP and
other agrarian laws;
...
g) Those cases previously falling under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct
Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 946, except sub-
paragraph (Q) thereof and Presidential Decree
No. 815.
It is understood that the aforementioned cases,
complaints or petitions were filed with the
DARAB after August 29, 1987.
Matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation of Republic Act No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other
agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules
shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.
h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes,
matters or concerns referred to it by the
Secretary of the DAR.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is safe to
conclude that the existence of prior agricultural
tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the
MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tie
compels the characterization of the controversy
as an "agrarian dispute." Agrarian dispute refers
to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers' associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements. 33 Even
if the tenurial arrangement has been severed,
the action still involves an incident arising from
the landlord and tenant relationship. Where the
case involves the dispossession by a former
landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed to
have been given as compensation in
consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial
rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute.
On this point the Court has already ruled:
Indeed, section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199,
provides that 'all cases involving the
dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a
third party and/or the settlement and disposition
of disputes arising from the relationship of
landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does not
require the continuance of the relationship of
landlord and tenant — at the time of the
dispute. The same may have arisen, and often
times arises, precisely from the previous
termination of such relationship. If the same
existed immediately, or shortly, before the
controversy and the subject-matter thereof is
whether or not said relationship has been
lawfully terminated, or if the dispute otherwise
springs or originates from the relationship of
landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then)
cognizable only by the Court of Agrarian
Relations . . .34
As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters is now expressly vested in the
DAR, through the DARAB.
With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question
of jurisdiction, it follows that the respondent has
availed of the proper, speedy and adequate
remedy which is the special civil action of
prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is
the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior
court,35 or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance
the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary
course of law by which such relief can be
obtained."36 The purpose of a writ of prohibition
is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the
37
administration of justice in orderly channels.
Second. While appeal is the recognized remedy
to question the judgment of an inferior court, this
does not detract from the authority of a higher
court to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the
inferior court, among other instances, from
proceeding further on the ground that it heard
and decided the case without jurisdiction. 38 
Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by
the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy
by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where
the remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or
adequate.39
To say, as the petitioners argue, that the MCTC
Decision has already attained finality because
the respondent opted to file a petition for
prohibition instead of an appeal is to sacrifice
needlessly respondent’s right at the altar of
technicalities. Should tenancy relationship be
duly proven, the respondent as a tenant should
be protected in keeping with the social justice
precept enshrined in the Constitution.40 Also
noteworthy is the fact that the petition for
prohibition was filed within the reglementary
period to appeal; hence, it cannot be claimed
that the same was used as substitute for a lost
appeal.
At this point, let it be stressed that we are not
passing upon the propriety of the issuance of a
writ of prohibition in favor of the respondent. As
we have earlier pointed out, adjudication on this
matter is best left to the RTC, where the case for
prohibition pends, after the reception of the
evidence of both parties.
Third. We cannot also sustain the petitioners’
assertion that jurisdiction is a question of law;
hence, the RTC could have ruled on the matter
without the reception of the parties’ evidence.
The very issue determinative of the question of
jurisdiction is the real relationship existing
between the parties. It is necessary that
evidence thereon be first presented by the
parties before the question of jurisdiction may be
passed upon by the court.
It should be pointed out that the petitioners
elevated to the appellate court the Order of the
RTC denying their motion to dismiss by way of
demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is
an objection by one party to the adequacy of the
evidence of his adversary to make out a case.
Otherwise stated, the party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence
to sustain a verdict.41 In this case, the trial court
ruled that respondent’s evidence in support of
his application for a writ of prohibition was
sufficient to require the presentation of
petitioners’ contravening proof. The RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in so ruling.
The Court of Appeals is therefore correct in
upholding the lower court’s denial of the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for
review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.