RULE 37 38
1977.5
G.R. No. 125799 August 21, 2003
DANILO CANSINO AND LINDA DE
JESUS, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE, RTC OF
KALOOCAN CITY, BR. 120 AND SPS.
FRANCISCO E. CASTRO and ROSARIO B.
CASTRO and,CESAR L. CRUZ, SHERIFF IV,
RTC KALOOKAN CITY, BR. 120, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Having gone through the summary procedure in
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), an appeal
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and a petition
for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA), this
ejectment case is now before this Court on a
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The case stemmed from a complaint for unlawful
detainer filed by respondent spouses Francisco
and Rosario Castro against Danilo Cansino,
Linda de Jesus and Elena Mesa1 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court. The subject matter of
the controversy is a parcel of land located at
Maligaya Park Subdivision, Kalookan City. In
their complaint, respondents alleged that
petitioners, "by strategy and stealth unlawfully
constructed their respective houses inside
plaintiffs(’) (herein respondents) aforementioned
parcel of land."2 In their answer with
counterclaim, petitioners Cansino and de Jesus
averred that their possession was "premised
upon the honest belief that the lot they were and
are still occupying was a public land;" that they
"had been in possession of the subject premises
ever since 1977;" and that "the failure (of herein
respondents) to allege when possession of
defendants (herein petitioners) started and taken
cognizance of by plaintiffs (herein respondents)
created (sic) doubts" as to the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.3
The MeTC took cognizance of the case and
treated the complaint as one for ejectment under
the Rules on Summary Procedure. It ordered the
parties to submit their respective affidavits and
those of their witnesses along with their other
evidence. Thereafter, the MeTC in its decision
dated August 12, 1994, dismissed the complaint
holding that in an ejectment case, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving prior physical
possession of the property. Respondents failed
to discharge the burden.4
On appeal with the RTC of Kalookan City, Br.
120, the court, on January 11, 1995, affirmed in
toto the decision of the MeTC. It held that
respondents were not able to present evidence
of their actual possession of the property prior to
that of petitioners, while the latter were able to
prove their possession of the property since
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
where they appended more documentary
evidence showing their ownership over the
subject property, as well as the ownership and
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. On
March 14, 1995, the RTC reversed its previous
decision. It ruled that respondents were able to
prove the ownership and possession of their
predecessors-in-interest, which dated back to
1964, way before the 1977 possession of
petitioners. Moreover, it rejected the claim of
petitioners that the subject land is public property
since it has been proven that the lot is titled and
the title has been transferred to respondents on
January 29, 1993. The title being incontrovertible
after a year, petitioners can no longer assail it.
The court considered petitioners as intruders or
squatters on the subject lot.6
Thus, petitioners filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals. They assailed the right of
the RTC to decide the issue of ownership without
any fair trial and the propriety of the action of the
RTC in considering the documentary evidence
attached by respondents in their motion for
reconsideration which were not made part of the
position paper they (respondents) previously
submitted.7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
RTC. It held that petitioners were unable to
substantiate their possession of the property.
Their "occupancy is at best due to the tolerance
of the registered owners, private respondent
spouses." Moreover, "since respondents had
prior legal possession of the property, they had
in their favor priority of time that legally entitles
them to stay in the said property."8 With regard
to the action taken by the RTC in considering the
documentary evidence attached only in the
motion for reconsideration, the appellate court
ruled that under Section 5, Rule 135 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the RTC has the
inherent power to amend and control its process
and orders so as to make them conformable to
law and justice.9
Petitioners brought the case at bar to this Court
on a petition for review on certiorari. They raise
the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 5, RULE 135 OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IS
APPLICABLE IN A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WHERE DOCUMENTS
IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE
TO PROVE SUPERVENING EVENTS.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE A CLEAR RIGHT TO
POSSESS THE SUBJECT LAND.10
Anent the first issue, Section 5, Rule 135 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Inherent powers of courts. – Every court
shall have the power:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders
so as to make them conformable to law and
justice;
xxx xxx xxx
The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC in
reconsidering its prior decision on the basis of
new evidence attached to the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that it is the
inherent right of the court to amend and control
its processes. It further ruled that procedural
technicalities should not override substantial
justice.11
We disagree. It is true that the rules provide that
courts have the inherent power to amend their
decisions to make them conformable to law and
justice. This prerogative, however, is not
absolute. The rules do not contemplate
amendments that are substantial in nature.12
They merely cover formal changes or such that
will not affect the crux of the decision, like the
correction of typographical or clerical errors.
Courts will violate due process if they make
substantial amendments in their decisions
without affording the other party the right to
contest the new evidence presented in a motion
for reconsideration.
Under Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
party may file a motion for reconsideration on the
ground, among others, that "x x x, the evidence
is insufficient to justify the decision or final order,
or the decision or final order is contrary to law."13
It requires the motion to point out specifically the
findings or conclusions of the judgment or final
order which are not supported by the evidence
or which are contrary to law, making specific
reference to the testimonial or documentary
evidence presented or to the provisions of law
alleged to be violated.14
It is implicitly clear from Rule 37 that a motion for
reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to
introduce new evidence. Petitioners correctly
contend that if respondents wanted to present
further evidence, they should have filed a motion
for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. However, for newly discovered
evidence to warrant a new trial, (a) it must have
been discovered after trial, (b) it could not have
been discovered or produced at the trial despite
reasonable diligence, (c) it must be material and
not merely collateral, cumulative, corroborative
or purely for impeaching a witness, merely
important evidence being not enough, and (d) if
presented, would probably alter the result of the
action.15
In the case at bar, respondents attached for the
first time in their motion for reconsideration,
evidence to prove their ownership over the
parcel of land subject matter of this controversy.
This cannot be countenanced. For one,
possession is the only issue in a case for
unlawful detainer.16 More importantly, there is no
justification for the delay in presenting said
evidence. We note that although it was
respondents who filed an appeal to the RTC,
they failed to submit their memorandum as
required by the said court.17 It was only after the
RTC rendered an unfavorable decision that
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
and appended their new evidence. Piecemeal
presentation of evidence is not in accord with
orderly justice.
But considering the totality of evidence, we still
rule in favor of petitioners.1âwphi1 Respondents
appended to its motion for reconsideration the
following evidence: Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-45212 issued on August 16, 1972 in the
name of the predecessors-in-interest of
respondents, Estrella Crisostomo and Azucena
Bantug;18 Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-262332 issued on January 29, 1993 in the
name of respondent spouses Francisco and
Rosario Castro;19 Contract to Sell between
Maligaya Park and Leticia Flores and Estrella
Crisostomo dated May 4, 1962;20 Location Plan
showing the site of the contested parcel of
land;21 and Real Property Tax Receipts for the
years 198822 and 1993.23
The titles presented by respondents do not
necessarily prove their right to possession,
especially since there is a separate case for the
investigation of the true status of the land
formerly in the name of Biyaya Corporation from
where respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest obtained their title.24
Neither will the contract to sell and the location
plan prove possession. Lastly, the tax receipts
presented by respondents covered only the
years 1988 and 1993. The failure of respondents
to present the receipts covering the years before
1988 and between 1988 and 1993, despite the
claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had possession over the property during these
years, creates doubt as to the validity of their
claim of prior possession.
It is fundamental that complainants in an
ejectment case must allege and prove that they
had prior physical possession of the property
before they were unlawfully deprived thereof by
defendants.25 Respondents, being the
complainants before the lower court, had the
burden of proving their claim of prior possession.
They, however, failed to prove their
claim.1âwphi1
In light of our resolution of the first issue which
clears the question of prior possession, it is
unnecessary to discuss the second issue since
petitioners’ argument touches on the ownership
of the lot subject matter of this controversy. As
discussed, the case at bar is an ejectment case
where the only issue is prior possession of the
lot. Any controversy with regard to ownership
should be ventilated in a separate action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED. The decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch 50 and the January 11, 1995 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch 120 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167245 September 27,
2006
ELPIDIO S. UY, petitioner,
vs.
FIRST METRO INTEGRATED STEEL CORP.
and HON. ANTONIO I. DE CASTRO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 3, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assails the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81046 dated
August 27, 2004 dismissing petitioner Elpidio S.
Uy's petition for certiorari and its
Resolution2dated February 22, 2005 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The facts show that on July 5, 1999, private
respondent First Metro Integrated Steel
Corporation (FMISC) filed a complaint for sum of
money with prayer for writ of preliminary
attachment against Robert Juan Uy (Robert),
Midland Integrated Construction Company
(MICC) and herein petitioner Elpidio Uy, with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94408 and raffled
to Branch 3.3
It is alleged that on June 3, 5 and 6, 1998,
FMISC delivered to MICC, Robert and petitioner
deformed steel bars valued at P695,811.00. On
June 9, 1998, Robert allegedly delivered to
FMISC Metrobank Check No. 042892 in the
amount of P695,811.00 issued by petitioner as
payment. However, the check was dishonored
upon presentment and despite demands, MICC,
Robert and petitioner refused to pay, hence the
complaint.
In their Answer with Counterclaim and
Crossclaim, Robert and MICC alleged that they
are strangers to the contract between FMISC
and petitioner; that Robert merely referred
petitioner to FMISC; that petitioner left his check
in Robert's office which was picked up by
FMISC's collector; and that the deformed steel
bars were delivered to and received by
petitioner's representatives as certified to by
Paul Eldrich V. Uy, petitioner's son.4
Petitioner filed his Answer with
Counterclaim5 claiming that he had no business
transaction with FMISC; that he issued the check
in favor of FMISC in the amount of P695,811,00
but since it was not intended as payment to
FMISC, he stopped the payment thereof.
Hearings were thereafter conducted for the
reception of evidence of FMISC, Robert and
MICC. The initial reception of petitioner's
evidence was set on February 28, 20016 but it
was cancelled because petitioner had influenza.
The hearing was reset to April 26, 2001 and May
10, 20017 but was again cancelled and moved to
October 25, 2001 and December 13, 2001.
During the October 25, 2001 hearing, petitioner
was represented by Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr.
who appeared as Atty. Molina's collaborating
counsel.8 The hearing was cancelled and
rescheduled to December 13, 2001. However,
on December 10, 2001, Atty. Molina withdrew
his appearance as petitioner's counsel with the
latter's consent.9 On December 13, 2001, Atty.
Danilo Bañares entered his appearance and
requested for a resetting on February 14 and 28,
200210 which was granted by the trial court. On
February 14, 2002, Atty. Bañares appeared but
instead of presenting evidence for the petitioner,
he requested for a postponement and resetting
of the hearing.11
During the scheduled hearing on February 28,
2002, Atty. Bañares arrived late. Upon motion of
FMISC, the trial court ordered that petitioner's
right to present evidence is deemed waived and
the parties were directed to file their respective
memorandum.12 The case was deemed
submitted for decision on November 18, 2002.13
Atty. Bañares withdrew his appearance on
January 8, 2003 with petitioner's conformity.14
On March 7, 2003, the trial court rendered
judgment,15 the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff ordering defendant Elpidio Uy to
pay the former:
a) the sum of P690,000 with interest thereon at
12% per annum from July 1998 until fully paid;
b) the sum of P110,000.00 as attorney's fees
which is 16% of the principal amount; and
c) the costs of suit.
Defendant Robert Uy's cross-claim is denied as
it is now academic. The counterclaims of both
defendants herein against plaintiff and against
each other are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.16
On April 4, 2003, petitioner received a copy of
the Decision.
On April 21, 2003, petitioner through Atty. Lucas
C. Carpio, Jr. filed a Motion for New Trial17 on
the ground of gross negligence of petitioner's
counsel in failing to attend the hearing for the
reception of evidence, thus impairing his rights to
due process.
The trial court denied the motion for new trial in
an Order18 dated October 1, 2003.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari which dismissed
the petition in its assailed Decision dated August
27, 2004. It held that the trial court correctly
denied the motion for new trial because it was
filed out of time and that a petition for certiorari is
not the proper remedy for the denial of a motion
for new trial.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence, this recourse on the grounds that
– certiorari with the Court of Appeals from the
1. The Seventeenth (17th) Division of the Court
of Appeals gravely erred in denying due course
to the Petition for Certiorari on technical grounds,
that is, for the purported failure of the Petitioner
to file with the Court a Quo his Motion for New
Trial within the reglementary period to appeal
and that the only remedy for the denial of the
latter motion is by appealing from the Judgment
or Final order and not through a Special Civil
Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.19
2. The former Seventeenth (17th) Division of the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in not finding that
the Public Respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when he issued the assailed Order
dated October 1, 2003 denying Petitioner's
Motion for New Trial.20
A scrutiny of the records discloses that while the
Motion for New Trial was received by the trial
court on April 28, 2003, the date on the Registry
Receipt attached to the Affidavit of Service21 as
well as that stamped on the envelope22 which
contained the copy of the motion, reveals that it
was filed and served by registered mail on April
21, 2003, a Monday, because April 19, 2003, the
last day for filing the same was a Saturday.
Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court states in
no uncertain terms that if the last day of the
period thus computed falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day. Thus, the motion was actually filed
on time it having been filed on April 21, 2003, the
next working day, following the last day for filing
which fell on a Saturday.
Section 9, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the remedy to an order denying a
motion for new trial is to appeal the judgment or
final order, must be read in conjunction with
Section 1, Rule 41 which provides that:
SEC. 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these
rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the
judgment or final order is not appeasable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the filing by the petitioner of a petition for
denial of the motion for new trial by the trial court
is proper.
Notwthstanding the foregoing, we find that the
trial court correctly denied petitioner's motion for
new trial.
Section 1, Rule 37 provides that a motion for
new trial may be filed within the period for taking
an appeal based on the following grounds:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against and by
reason of which such aggrieved party has
probably been impaired in his rights; or
xxxx
Negligence to be excusable must be one which
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against.23
In the instant case, we find the negligence of
petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the
hearings for the reception of
evidence inexcusable. The trial court scheduled
the hearing for the reception of petitioner's
evidence seven times. The initial hearing set on
February 28, 2001 was cancelled because
petitioner allegedly had influenza. The hearings
scheduled on April 26, 2001 and May 10, 2001
were cancelled and moved to October 25, 2001
and December 13, 2001. Petitioner was
represented by Atty. Carpio, Jr. as collaborating
counsel during the hearing on October 25, 2001
but no evidence was presented. Instead, the
hearing was cancelled. On December 13, 2001,
Atty. Bañares, petitioner's new counsel,
appeared but he requested for a resetting. On
February 14, 2002, Atty. Bañares moved to
postpone the hearing to February 28, 2002 as
previously scheduled. On February 28, 2002,
Atty. Bañares arrived late.
Scrutiny of the records disclose that the hearings
were postponed or cancelled without any
justification. However, the trial court
accommodated the requests for postponement
or resetting in order to accord petitioner due
process. Under the circumstances, we find
petitioner's counsel's failure to attend the seven
scheduled hearings without justifiable reason
tantamount to inexcusable neglect. As such, it
cannot be a ground for new trial.
In addition, the Rule requires that motions for
new trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence must be accompanied by
affidavits of merits, i.e., affidavits showing the
facts (not mere conclusions or opinions)
constituting the valid cause of action or defense
which the movant may prove in case a new trial
is granted, because a new trial would serve no
purpose and would just waste the time of the
court as well as the parties if the complaint is
after all groundless or the defense is nil or
ineffective.24
Under the Rules, the moving party must show
that he has a meritorious defense. The facts
constituting the movant's good and substantial
defense, which he may prove if the petition were
granted, must be shown in the affidavit which
should accompany the motion for a new
trial.25 We examined petitioner's Affidavit of Merit
and find that it did not contain clear statements
of the facts constituting a good and valid defense
which he might prove if given the chance to
introduce evidence. The allegations that he has
a "meritorious defense"26 and a "good
cause"27 are mere conclusions which did not
provide the court with any basis for determining
the nature and merit of the case. An affidavit of
merit should state facts, and not mere opinion or
conclusions of law.28 Petitioner's motion for new
trial and affidavit of merit did not mention the
evidence which he was prevented from
introducing, nor did it allege that such evidence
would change the outcome of the case.
Petitioner's argument that his counsel's
negligence was so gross that he was deprived of
due process fails to impress. Gross negligence
is not one of the grounds for a motion for a new
trial. We cannot declare his counsel's negligence
as gross as to liberate him from the effects of his
failure to present countervailing evidence.29 In
Air Philippines Corporation v. International
Business Aviation Services, Phils., Inc.,30 we did
not consider as gross negligence the counsel's
resort to dilatory schemes, such as (1) the filing
of at least three motions to extend the filing of
petitioner's Answer; (2) his nonappearance
during the scheduled pretrials; and (3) the failure
to file petitioner's pretrial Brief, even after the
filing of several Motions to extend the date for
filing.
Besides, we find that petitioner's and his
counsel's negligence are concurrent. During the
initial hearing for the reception of his evidence,
petitioner was absent allegedly due to influenza.
During the succeeding scheduled hearings,
petitioner was absent but his lawyer, Atty. Molina,
was present but did not present any evidence.
Instead, motions for postponement or resetting
were made. In one occasion, Atty. Molina was
absent but Atty. Carpio, Jr. appeared as
collaborating counsel. Still, no evidence was
presented but a resetting was again requested.
On December 13, 2001, petitioner hired Atty.
Bañares as his new counsel, and the hearings
were set on February 14 and 28, 2002. For
petitioner, thus, to feign and insist upon a lack of
awareness of the progress of the case is to
unmask a penchant for the ludicrous.31 When he
hired the services of Atty. Bañares, it is highly
improbable that he was unaware of the stage of
the proceedings. In keeping with the normal
cause of events, he should have made the
proper inquiries from his former counsel as to the
status of the case.
Incidentally, we find it interesting that Atty. Lucas
C. Carpio, Jr. who assisted petitioner in the
preparation of the motion for new trial, wherein
he claimed that his former counsel was grossly
negligent in defending his case, was petitioner's
collaborating counsel and who appeared in his
behalf during the October 25, 2001 hearing but
likewise presented no evidence for the
petitioner.
Finally, petitioner's counsel's inexcusable
neglect did not amount to petitioner's deprivation
of due process of law. The right to due process
safeguards the opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence one may have in support of
his claim or defense. In the instant case,
petitioner was given several opportunities to be
heard and to submit evidence but he
squandered them. Indeed, from lethargy is
misfortune born.32
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the
proceedings in the trial court as a result of the
ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of
counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If
such were to be admitted as valid reasons for
re-opening cases, there would never be an end
to litigation so long as a new counsel could be
employed to allege and show that the prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent,
experienced or learned. This will put a premium
on the willful and intentional commission of
errors by counsel, with a view to securing new
trials in the event of conviction,33 or an adverse
decision, as in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182718 September 26,
2008
JULIO B. PURCON, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
MRM PHILIPPINES, INC. and MIGUEL L.
RIVERA/MARITIME RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------------------
---------------x
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
A PETITION for relief from judgment under Rule
38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
equitable remedy that is allowed only in
exceptional cases when there is no other
available or adequate remedy. It may be availed
of only after a judgment, final order, or other
proceeding was taken against petitioner in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence.1
Before Us is a petition for relief from
judgment2 filed by Julio B. Purcon, seeking to set
aside Our July 16, 2007 Resolution,3which
denied his petition for review, as well as the
October 9, 2007 Entry of Judgment.4 He pleads
for the Court’s leniency on account of the
negligence and inefficiency of his counsel, which
resulted in the late filing of the petition and in
filing defective pleadings within this Court.
The Antecedents
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by
petitioner for reimbursement of medical
expenses, sickness allowance and permanent
disability benefits with prayer for compensatory,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees before the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In his verified position paper, petitioner alleged
that on January 28, 2002, respondent MRM
Philippines, Inc. hired him as a seaman on board
the vessel M/T SARABELLE 2. He signed a
contract for three (3) months with a monthly
salary of $584.00. According to petitioner, his
work involved a day-to-day activity that required
exertion of strenuous effort, and that he often
worked overtime due to the pressure of his work.
His contract was extended for another three (3)
months. On the second week of June 2002, he
felt an excruciating pain in his left testicle. After
being examined by a doctor at the port of France,
he was diagnosed with hernia. On June 26, 2002,
he was repatriated due to his ailment.
Upon petitioner’s return to the Philippines, he
was examined by Dr. Alegre, the company
physician, who prescribed certain medication.
On July 24, 2002, Dr. Alegre declared that he
was fit to resume work. When he reported to
MRM Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re-hired for
another contract, he was told that there was no
vacancy for him.
On September 17, 2003, he consulted Dr. Efren
R. Vicaldo, an internist-cardiologist of Philippine
Heart Center. On March 3, 2004, after a
thorough medical examination and evaluation,
he was diagnosed with EPIDIDYMITIS, LEFT;
UPPER RESPIRATORY TRACT INFACTION
WITH INPEDIMENT GRADE XIV.
Respondents, on the other hand, countered that
since petitioner’s ailment, hernia, is not
work-related, he is not entitled to disability
benefit and related claims. In fact, he was
declared fit to resume work on July 23, 2002 by
the company-designated physician.
Respondents likewise argued that his ailment is
not to be considered a permanent disability as
this is easily correctable by simple surgery. More
importantly, petitioner signed a Quitclaim and
Release which was notarized.
On March 31, 2005, Labor Arbiter Donato G.
Quinto, Jr. rendered its decision5 dismissing the
complaint for utter lack of merit. The Labor
Arbiter explained that petitioner was fit to resume
work as a seafarer as of July 23, 2002 as his
"hernia" was already cured or non-existent. In
fact, petitioner was ready to resume work.
Unfortunately, he was not accommodated due to
lack of vacancy. The fact that he was not
re-hired by respondent did not mean that he was
suffering from disability.
On May 5, 2005, complainant-appellant
(petitioner) filed a memorandum of appeal with
the NLRC Third Division.
On September 30, 2005, the NLRC Third
Division issued a resolution6 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the assailed decision dated
March 31, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
On December 20, 2005, the motion for
reconsideration was dismissed for lack of merit.
On January 27, 2006, the NLRC resolution
became final and executory and was recorded in
the Book of Entries of Judgments.
On March 2, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). However,
on June 7, 2006, the CA dismissed the case due
to formal infirmities. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. On September 29,
2006, the CA resolution became final and
executory.
On May 9, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
June 7, 2006 and September 5, 2006
Resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his
petition for certiorari.
In Our Resolution8 dated July 16, 2007, We
denied the petition for the following reasons: (1)
the petition was filed beyond the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days fixed in Section 2,
Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; (2) failure
to pay on time docket and other fees and deposit
for costs in violation of Section 3, Rule 45, in
relation to Section 5(c) of Rule 56; and (3)
insufficient or defective verification under
Section 4, Rule 7.
We likewise held that petitioner failed to
sufficiently show that the CA committed any
reversible error in the challenged resolutions as
to warrant the exercise of this Court’s
discretionary appellate jurisdiction. He was not
able to convince this Court why the actions of the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA, which have
passed upon the same issue, should be
reversed. Consequently, on October 9, 2007, an
Entry of Judgment was issued.
On May 6, 2008, petitioner filed the instant
petition for relief from judgment interposing the
following grounds:
I. The Honorable Labor Arbiter committed a
GROSS MISTAKE when he based his decision
on the fit to work certification issued by the
company-designated physician and on the
Quitclaim and Release executed by the
complainant;
II. The Honorable Labor Arbiter further
committed a GROSS MISTAKE when he
adopted the irrelevant jurisprudence cited by the
respondents and by adopting it in his decision;
III. The Honorable NLRC Third Division also
committed a GROSS MISTAKE when it affirms
the ERRONEOUS decision of the Honorable
Labor Arbiter;
IV. The factual findings of the Honorable Labor
Arbiter, and the Honorable NLRC Third Division,
are not based on substantial evidence and that
their decisions are contrary to the applicable law
and jurisprudence; and
V. The collaborating counsel of the petitioner
committed a GROSS MISTAKE in filing defective
pleadings to the prejudice of the herein
petitioner.9
The threshold issue before Us is – Can petitioner
avail of a petition for relief from judgment under
Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
from Our resolution denying his petition for
review?
We answer in the negative. A petition for relief
from judgment is not an available remedy in the
Supreme Court.
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that
when a judgment or final order is entered
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, a party in any court may file a
petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be
interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which
enumerates the original cases cognizable by the
Supreme Court, thus:
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. – Only
petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus,
disciplinary proceedings against members of the
judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
may be filed originally in the Supreme Court.
A petition for relief from judgment is not included
in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable
by this Court.
In Dela Cruz v. Andres,10 We reiterated Our
pronouncement in Mesina v. Meer,11 that a
petition for relief from judgment is not an
available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court. The Court explained that under
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60)
days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order or other proceeding to be set aside and
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting petitioner’s good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
Most importantly, it should be filed with the same
court which rendered the decision, viz.:
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order,
or other proceedings. – When a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereafter taken against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the
judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.12(Underscoring supplied)
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any
court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan
and Regional Trial Courts.
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the
previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or
issued the order to hear the petition for relief.
Under the old rule, a petition for relief from the
judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, viz.:
Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for
relief from judgment of inferior court. – When a
judgment is rendered by an inferior court on a
case, and a party thereto by fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, has been
unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has
been prevented from taking an appeal, he may
file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the
province in which the original judgment was
rendered, praying that such judgment be set
aside and the case tried upon its merits.
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for
relief from the judgment or other proceeding
thereof. – When a judgment order is entered, or
any other proceeding is taken against a party in
a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same case
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with
Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for
Municipal and Regional Trial Courts13 and
designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial
Courts as courts of record.14
Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme
Court are governed by separate provisions of the
Rules of Court.15 It may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court through resolutions or
circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court
nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA16 allows
the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.
There is no provision in the Rules of Court
making the petition for relief applicable in the CA
or this Court. The procedure in the CA from
Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45
which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies
the remedies available before said Court such as
annulment of judgments or final orders or
resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration
(Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a
petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among
the remedies available in the CA, with more
reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in
the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only
questions of law. A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, which are beyond the
concerns of this Court.ALF-itc
Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of
the petition, the same must still be dismissed.
The late filing of the petition for review does not
amount to excusable negligence. Petitioner’s
lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without
demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for
judicial relief. For a claim of counsel’s gross
negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear
abandonment of the client’s cause must be
shown.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted
to a party who seeks to be relieved from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or
mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount
to reviving the right of appeal which has already
been lost, either because of inexcusable
negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by
counsel.
In exceptional cases, when the mistake of
counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross
negligence, this Court affords a party a second
opportunity to vindicate his right. But this
opportunity is unavailing in the instant case,
especially since petitioner has squandered the
various opportunities available to him at the
different stages of this case. Public interest
demands an end to every litigation and a belated
effort to reopen a case that has already attained
finality will serve no purpose other than to delay
the administration of justice.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from
the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or
a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the
petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving
the right of appeal which has already been lost
either because of inexcusable negligence or due
to mistaken mode of procedure by counsel.17
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140630 August 12, 2004
YUSUKE FUKUZUMI, petitioner,
vs.
SANRITSU GREAT INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION, TETSUJI MARUYAMA,
AKIRA KUBOTA, YUKIO
MATSUZAKA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Order1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch
258, dated August 5, 1999 in Civil Case No.
97-0237 denying the petition of Yusuke
Fukuzumi for relief from the Order2 of the court
dated June 2, 1999 denying his notice of appeal
of the decision of the trial court against him and
consequently dismissing his appeal.
The records show that on January 26, 1999, the
trial court rendered judgment3 in Civil Case No.
97-0237 in favor of the plaintiffs Sanritsu Great
International Corporation, Tetsuji Maruyama,
Akira Kubota and Yukio Matsuzaka, ordering
defendant Yusuke Fukuzumi to pay to the
plaintiffs sums of money. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Sanritsu
Great International Corporation and against
defendant YUSUKE FUKUZUMI who is hereby
ordered to pay said plaintiff the following, to wit:
1. The amount of PhP90,000.00 representing
two (2) month's rental deposit;
2. The amount of PhP112,500.00 representing
unused rental payments for two-and-a-half (2-½)
months;
3. The amount of PhP16,500.00 for the cost of
the pressure pump and overhead tank;
4. The amount of PhP8,000.00 as cost of
hauling;
5. The amount of PhP137,148.15 as actual
damages representing plaintiffs' hotel bills at
Traders Hotel and Mount Sea Resort Hotel and
Restaurant;
6. The amount of PhP50,000.00 as and way of
attorney's fees; and
7. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
The defendant received a copy of the decision
on February 9, 1999 and on February 23, 1999,
filed his motion for reconsideration of the
decision. On April 27, 1999, the trial court issued
an Order denying the defendant's motion. The
latter received a copy of the order on May 5,
1999. Instead of perfecting his appeal on May 6,
1999, he filed his notice of appeal only on May 7,
1999, or one day beyond the reglementary
period therefor. The court issued an Order on
June 2, 1999 denying the defendant's notice of
appeal. The defendant received the court's order
on June 10, 1999. On June 22, 1999, the
defendant filed a Verified Petition for Relief from
the order of the trial court denying his notice of
appeal.
In his petition for relief, the petitioner averred that
his counsel suffered a high blood pressure on
May 6, 1999 which impelled said counsel to rest
for three days, upon the advice of his doctor,
thus, hindered him from filing the notice of
appeal on May 6, 1999. The petitioner appended
to his petition a verified Medical Certificate
issued by Dr. Ma. Lakambini Cruz-Crespo dated
June 18, 1999, viz:
medical certificate
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that I have seen and examined
Atty. Jonathan Polines, from Las Piñas on May 6,
1999 with the chief complaint of headache of two
days duration.
Impression: Essential hypertension, moderate.
The patient was advised to rest for at least 3
days (May 6-8, 1999). He was given Nifedipine
(Calcibloc).
(Sgd). MA. LAKAMBINI CRUZ-CRESPO, M.D.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
18th day of June 1999, affiant exhibited to me his
CTC No. 18652403 issued at Las Piñas City on
August 7, 1998.
Doc. No. 3408
Page No. 1075
Book No. 1 (Sgd.) (Illegible)
NOTARY PUBLIC
Series of 1999.5
On August 5, 1999, the trial court issued an
Order denying the defendant's petition on the
ground that Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court was not applicable. The defendant's
motion for reconsideration of the order was
denied by the court per its Order dated October
22, 1999.
The defendant, now the petitioner, filed his
petition for review on certiorari with this Court
alleging that:
(A) THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT
IN ACCORD WITH LAW WHEN IT RULED
THAT THE PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR
RELIEF FROM DENIAL OF APPEAL FILED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 2, RULE 38 OF THE
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS NOT
APPLICABLE SINCE THE DENIAL OF THE
APPEAL WAS BASED ON SECTION 3, RULE
41 IN RELATION TO SECTION 2, RULE 22 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
(B) THE COURT A QUO HAS SO FAR
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS WHEN, IN DENYING THE
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM DENIAL OF
APPEAL, IT DID NOT RULE ON THE MERIT
OF THE GROUNDS RAISED THEREIN BUT,
INSTEAD, SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN
SPECULATION BY SAYING THAT THE
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM DENIAL OF
APPEAL IS ALLEGEDLY MORE OF AN
AFTERTHOUGHT.6
In his comment on the petition, the respondents
averred that (a) the petitioner cannot invoke Rule
38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which applies
only to negligence of a party and not of his
counsel; (b) by his negligence, the petitioner
failed to avail of other remedies other than filing
his petition for relief from the June 22, 1999
Order of the trial court; and (c) the alleged high
blood pressure of the petitioner's counsel is
merely an afterthought.
The petition is denied.
The remedy of a party whose notice of appeal is
denied by the trial court, although such notice is
filed within the period therefor, is to file a motion
for reconsideration of such order and, if the court
denies such motion, to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. If the party
is prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing his notice of
appeal within the reglementary period therefor,
his remedy is to file a petition for relief, in the
same case, from the order of the trial court
denying his notice of appeal. This is provided in
Section 2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 2. Petition for relief from denial of
appeal.— When a judgment or final order is
rendered by any court in a case, and a party
thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, has been prevented from
taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the
appeal be given due course.
Such party is not entitled to relief under Rule 38,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court if he was not
prevented from filing his notice of appeal by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
Such relief will not be granted to a party who
seeks to be relieved from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy of law
was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken
mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the
petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving
the right of appeal which has already been lost
either because of inexcusable negligence or due
to a mistake of procedure by counsel.7
If the petition for relief is denied by the trial court,
the remedy of the petitioner is to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which reads:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.— An appeal
may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any
similar motion
seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
…
In all the above instances where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65.
(Underscoring supplied)
The petitioner's failure to file his notice of appeal
within the period therefor is far from excusable. It,
rather, shows negligence no less. The medical
certificate issued to his counsel shows that he
was examined by Dr. Lakambini Cruz-Crespo on
May 6, 1999 and was advised to rest for three
days from May 6, 1999 or until May 8, 1999. The
petitioner would like the trial court and this Court
to believe that his counsel was unable to file the
notice of appeal on or before May 6, 1999
because he was even advised to take a rest for
three days. But his counsel was able, well
enough, to prepare and file the notice of appeal
on May 7, 1999 when he was supposed to be
resting. The petitioner even failed to allege in his
notice of appeal that the same was filed one day
late because his counsel was suffering from high
blood pressure on May 6, 1999. It was only after
the petitioner received the order of the trial court
denying his notice of appeal and filed his petition
for relief on June 22, 1999 did he allege that his
counsel was suffering from high blood pressure
on May 6, 1999. It was only on June 18, 1999
that the petitioner secured a medical certificate
from Dr. Crespo.
Thus, we are not convinced by the petitioner's
claim that his counsel was suffering from high
blood pressure on May 6, 1999, which prevented
him from filing said notice of appeal on said date.
Said allegation is a mere afterthought to cover
up his and his own counsel's collective
negligence. It is settled that clients are bound by
the mistakes, negligence and omission of their
counsel.8
It bears stressing that perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by
law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as
well and failure to perfect an appeal has the
effect of rendering the judgment or resolution
final and executory.9 After all, the right to appeal
is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law.10
While we have ruled that delay in the filing of a
notice of appeal does not justify the dismissal of
the appeal, however, the petitioner has not
shown any exceptional circumstances justifying
a reversal of the assailed order of the trial court
and the reinstatement of his appeal.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the

petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.