HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO represented by DAVID ALILANO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO E. EXAMEN,Respondent .
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by the heirs of Pedro Alilario
against Atty. Roberto E. Examen for misconduct and malpractice for falsifying documents and presenting these as evidence in
court thus violating the Lawyer's Oath,2 Canons 1,3 104 and 19,5 and Rules 1.01,6 1.02,710.01,8 and 19.019 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-23261 covering a 98,460 sq.
m. parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D located in Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. Pedro and Florentina died on
March 6, 1985 and October 11, 1989, respectively.
It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale10 were executed by the Spouses Alilano in favor
of Ramon Examen and his wife, Edna. Both documents were notarized by respondent Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of the vendee.
Sometime in September 1984, Spouses Examen obtained possession of the property.
On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat
against Edna Examen and Atty. Roberto Examen.11 It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen introduced into evidence the
March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale.
On November 15, 2003,12 the heirs of Alilano filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Examen, based on Barretto v.
Cabreza,13 violated the notarial law when he notarized the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is prohibited from notarizing
a document when one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil
degree. It is also alleged that Atty. Examen notarized the documents knowing that the cedula or residence certificate number used
by Ramon Examen was not actually his but the residence certificate number of Florentina. Atty. Examen also falsely acknowledged
that the two witnesses personally appeared before him when they did not. Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the infirmities
of these documents, Atty. Examen introduced these documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR.
In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was no longer any prohibition under the Revised Administrative Code for a
notary public to notarize a document where one of the parties is related to him by consanguinity and affinity. 14 With regard to the
use of Florentina’s residence certificate as Ramon’s, Atty. Examen said that he was in good faith and that it was office practice
that the secretary type details without him personally examining the output. 15 In any event, he reasoned that the use of another’s
residence certificate is not a ground for disbarment and is barred by prescription based on IBP Resolution No. XVI-
2004-13 dated January 26, 2004 where it was proposed that the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Section 1, Rule VIII, be revised to include a prescription period for professional misconduct:
within two years from the date of the act.16
In its Report and Recommendation,17 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Examen liable for breach of the
Notarial Law and introducing false Absolute Deeds of Sale before court proceedings. It stated that there was ample evidence to
support the complainants’ contention that the Spouses Alilano did not voluntarily and knowingly convey their property, i.e.
denials under oath by attesting witnesses and NBI Report by Handwriting Expert Jennifer Dominguez stating that Pedro Alilano’s
signature in the September 1984 Absolute Deed of Sale was significantly different from the specimen signatures. It
also noted that Ramon Examen’s residence certificate number, date and place of issue were also falsified since the residence
certificate actually belonged to Florentina Pueblo. It thus recommended that the penalty of disbarment be imposed.
The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007 Resolution18 adopted the IBP CBD’s report but modified the penalty
to suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years and a suspension of Atty. Examen’s Notarial Commission
for a period of two years.
Atty. Examen moved for reconsideration. In its Notice of Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion for reconsideration. It also
modified the penalty imposed to suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year and disqualification from re-
appointment as Notary Public for a period of two years.19
We agree with the IBP that Atty. Examen is administratively liable and hereby impose a modified penalty.
In disbarment cases the only issue that is to be decided by the Court is whether the member of the bar is fit to be allowed the
privileges as such or not.20 It is not therefore the proper venue for the determination of whether there had been a proper conveyance
of real property nor is it the proper proceeding to take up whether witnesses’ signatures were in fact forged.
NO PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS FOR
ACTS OF ERRING MEMBERS OF THE BAR
In Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,21 the Court En Banc opined that there can be no prescription in bar discipline cases. It pointed
out this has been the policy since 1967 with the Court’s ruling in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo22 and reiterated in Heck v. Santos23 where
we had the chance to state:
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding
from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely
exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the
practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the
time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and
bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the
bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial
Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint
will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer…. (Italics supplied)24
We therefore ruled in Frias, that Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP CBD was void and had no legal effect
for being ultra vires and thus null and void.25
This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Bengco v. Bernardo,26 where the Court stated that putting a prescriptive period
on administrative cases involving members of the bar would only serve to embolden them to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of
being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.
Atty. Examen’s defense of prescription therefore is of no moment and deserves scant consideration.
THE SPANISH NOTARIAL LAW OF 1889 WAS REPEALED BY THE
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917
Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. However, the law
governing Notarial Practice is changed with the passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised Administrative Code, which took effect in
1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice27 was passed by the Supreme Court.
In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals,28 the Court had the opportunity to state that enactment of the Revised
Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. Thus:
It is petitioners’ contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was related to the parties in the donation within the
fourth civil degree of affinity, was, under Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish Notarial Law, incompetent and disqualified
to authenticate the deed of donation executed by the Kapunan spouses in favor of their daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo.
Said deed of donation, according to petitioners, became a mere private instrument under Article 1223 of the old Civil Code, so that
under the ruling laid down in the case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the donation was inefficacious. The appellate court,
however, in the decision complained of held that the Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed with the enactment of Act No. 496.
We find this ruling to be correct. In the case of Philippine Sugar Estate vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda. de Estuart vs.
Garcia (Adm. Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957), this Court held that "The old Spanish notarial law and system of conveyance
was repealed in the Philippines and another and different notarial law and system became the law of the land with the enactment
of Act No. 496."29 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize the absolute deeds of sale since he was related
by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition might have still applied had the applicable
rule been the Spanish Notarial Law. However, following the Court’s ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing
was the Revised Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was removed. Atty. Examen was not incompetent to notarize
the document even if one of the parties to the deed was a relative, his brother. As correctly observed by the IBP CBD:
At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing notarization was Sections 231-259, Chapter 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code and there was no prohibition on a notary public from notarizing a document when one of the interested parties
is related to the notary public within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity. 30
Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section 3(c), a notary public is disqualified among others
to perform the notarial act if he is related by affinity or consanguinity to a principal within the fourth civil degree, to wit:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
xxxx
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth
civil degree.
That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present case does not mean that he can evade administrative
liability under the CPR in conjunction with the provisions of the Notarial Law.
NOTARIES PUBLIC MUST PERFORM
THEIR DUTIES DILIGENTLY AND
WITH UTMOST CARE
In Nunga v. Atty. Viray,31 this Court stated:
…[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified
or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must
be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties.32(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus under the prevailing law at the time of notarization it was the duty of the notary public to comply with the requirements of
the Notarial Law.1âwphi1 This includes the duty under Chapter 11, Section 251 of the Revised Administrative Code:
SEC. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of cedula [residence] tax. – Every contract, deed, or other document
acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper cedula
[residence] certificates or are exempt from the cedula [residence] tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of
such certification the number, place of issue, and date of each cedula [residence] certificate as aforesaid.
Under Chapter 11, Section 249 of the Revised Administrative Code provided a list of the grounds for disqualification:
SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in
the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.
xxxx
In Soriano v. Atty. Basco,33 the Court stated that notaries public are required to follow formalities as these are mandatory and
cannot be simply neglected. Thus, the Notarial Law requires them to certify that a party to the instrument acknowledged before
him has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place of
issue and date as part of the certification. Failure to perform his duties results in the revocation of a notary’s commission. The
Court said:
As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to
his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect
for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He cannot simply disregard the requirements and
solemnities of the Notarial Law.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen and as
notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the residence certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s
residence certificate number.35 Atty. Examen interposes that he was in good faith in that it was office practice to have his
secretary type up the details of the documents and requirements without him checking the correctness of same.
A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. 36 Good
faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a notary public is personal. We note that the
error could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his functions: personally checked the correctness of the
documents. To say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions of a notary
public for it is he who personally acknowledges the document. He was behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were presented and inspect if the documents to be acknowledged
by him reflected the correct details. This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a routinary act. It is imbued with
substantive public interest owing to the public character of his duties37 .
Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make the proper notation of cedulas can only be a ground for disqualification
and not the proper subject for a disbarment proceeding. We disagree.
In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed the his oath as a lawyer, provisions of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
By his negligent act of not checking the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily notarizing documents, it cannot be said that
he upheld legal processes thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR. Neither can it be said that he promoted confidence in the legal system.
If anything, his acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. We cannot stress
enough that as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
SEC. 241. Powers of notary public. – Every notary public shall have power to administer all oaths and affirmations provided
for by law, in all matters incident to his notarial office, and in the execution of affidavits, depositions, and other
documents requiring an oath, and to receive the proof or acknowledgment of all writings relating to commerce or navigation,
such as bills of sale bottomries, mortgages, and hypothecations of ships, vessels, or boats, charter parties of affreightments, letters
of attorney, deeds, mortgages, transfers and assignments of land or buildings, or an interest therein, and such other writings as are
commonly proved or acknowledged before notaries; to act as a magistrate, in the writing of affidavits or depositions, and to make
declarations and certify the truth thereof under his seal of office, concerning all matters done by him by virtue of his office.
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity
of the legal profession.38A lawyer’s mandate includes thoroughly going over documents presented to them typed or
transcribed by their secretaries.39
The Court notes that the case between the parties is not the first that reached this Court. In Edna Examen and Roberto Examen v.
Heirs of Pedro Alilano and Florentina Pueblo,40 Atty. Examen and his sister-in-law questioned via a petition for certiorari41 the
propriety of three Court of Appeals’ Resolutions relating to a case involving Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D this time with respect
to its fruits. There the Court of Appeals (CA) after giving Atty. Examen 90 days to file his appellant’s brief, denied a
second motion for extension of time merely on the basis of a flimsy reason that he had misplaced some of the transcript of the
witnesses’ testimonies. The CA did not find the reason of misplaced transcript as good and sufficient cause to grant the
extension pursuant to Section 12,42 Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court. It stated that it was a "flimsy and lame excuse to
unnecessarily delay the proceedings."43 The CA was of the opinion that defendant-appellant’s, herein respondent, motion was
"a mockery of the procedural rules."44This Court denied the petition for various procedural defects.45
With respect to the penalty imposed, given that Atty. Examen not only failed to uphold his duty as a notary public but also failed
to uphold his lawyer’s oath and ran afoul the provisions of the CPR, the Court deems it proper to suspend Atty. Examen
from the practice of law for a period of two years following this Court’s decision in Caalim-Verzonilla v. Pascua.46
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS. In
addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this Decision. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an
attorney, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED
IVQ LANDHOLDINGS, INC.,, Petitioner
vs.
REUBEN BARBOSA, Respondent
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner IVQ Landholdings, Inc. (IVQ) assails the
Decision2 dated December 9, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90609.
The decision of the appellate court affirmed the Decision4 dated June 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 222 in Civil Case No. Q04-52842, which adjudicated in favor of herein respondent Reuben Barbosa (Barbosa) the
ownership of the property subject of this case and ordered the cancellation of IVQ's certificate of title thereto. The resolution of the
appellate court denied the Motion for Reconsideration5 and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration6 filed by IVQ regarding
the Court of Appeals' decision.
The Facts
On June 10, 2004, Barbosa filed a Petition for Cancellation and Quieting of Titles7 against Jorge Vargas III, Benito Montinola,
IVQ, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q04-52842 in the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 222.
Barbosa averred that on October 4, 1978, he bought from Therese Vargas a parcel of land identified as Lot 644-C-5 located on
Visayas Avenue, Culiat, Quezon City (subject property). Thereafter, Therese Vargas surrendered to Barbosa the owner's duplicate
copy of her title, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 159487. In the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa and in the copy
of Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487, the subject property was described as:
A parcel of land (Lot 644-C-5 of the subdivision plan, LRC, Psd- 14038, being a portion of Lot 644-C, Fls-2544-D, LRC, Record
No. 5975); situated in the District of Culiat, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. x x x containing an area of THREE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTYTWO (3,452) square meters, more or less.8
Barbosa said that he took possession of the subject property and paid real estate taxes thereon in the name of Therese Vargas.
Sometime in 2003, Barbosa learned that Therese Vargas's name was cancelled and replaced with that of IVQ in the tax declaration
of the subject property. Upon investigation, Barbosa found out that the subject property was previously registered in the name of
Kawilihan Corporation under TCT No. 71507. Therese Vargas acquired the subject property from Kawilihan Corporation and the
date of entry of her TCT No. 159487 was November 6, 1970. On the other hand, IVQ supposedly bought the subject property from
Jorge Vargas III who, in turn, acquired it also from Kawilihan Corporation. The date of entry of Jose Vargas Ill's TCT No. 223019
was October 14, 1976. This title was later reconstituted and re-numbered as TCT No. RT- 76391. The title of IVQ, TCT No.
253434, was issued on August 6, 2003.
Barbosa argued that even without considering the authenticity of Jorge Vargas Ill's title, Therese Vargas's title bore an earlier date.
Barbosa, thus, prayed for the trial court to issue an order directing the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
Jorge Vargas Ill's TCT No. 223019 and IVQ's TCT No. 253434 and adjudicating ownership of the subject property to him.9
In their Answer10 to the above petition, Jose Vargas III, Benito Montinola, and IVQ (respondents in the court a quo) countered that
the alleged title from where Barbosa's title was allegedly derived from was the one that was fraudulently acquired and that Barbosa
was allegedly part of a syndicate that falsified titles for purposes of "land grabbing." They argued that it was questionable that an
alleged lot owner would wait for 30 years before filing an action to quiet title. They prayed for the dismissal of the petition and, by
way of counterclaim, sought the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City neither filed an answer to Barbosa's petition nor participated in the trial of the case.
During trial, Barbosa testified, inter alia, that he is the owner of the subject property that he bought from Therese Vargas. The
property was at that time registered in her name under TCT No. 159487. Barbosa took possession of the subject property seven
days after he bought the same and he employed a caretaker to live therein. Before Therese Vargas, the owner of the property was
Kawilihan Corporation, which company was owned by Jorge Vargas.11 Barbosa stated that the subject property remained registered
in the name of Therese Vargas as he entrusted her title to another person for custody but the said person went to Canada. Barbosa
paid real estate taxes on the subject property in the name of Kawilihan Corporation from 1978 until 2002. From 2003 to 2006, he
paid real estate taxes thereon in the name of Therese Vargas. 12
Barbosa added that in the year 2000, Santiago Sio Soy Une, allegedly the president of Lisan Realty and Development Corporation
(Lisan Realty), presented to Barbosa's caretaker a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, 13 which was allegedly executed by
Jorge Vargas III and Lisan Realty involving the subject property. Barbosa then went on to compile documents on the transactions
relating to the subject property.
Barbosa testified that in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of Jorge Vargas III and Santiago Sio Soy Une, the Friar
Land Survey (FLS) number was denominated as FLS-2554-D, while in the title of Therese Vargas it was FLS-2544-D. Barbosa
obtained a certification from the Lands Management Bureau that FLS-2554-D was not listed in their electronic data processing
(EDP) listing, as well as a certification from the DENR that FLS-2554-D had no records in the Land Survey Records Section of
said office. On the other hand, he obtained a certification from the Lands Management Bureau that Lot 644 subdivided under FLS-
2544-D was listed in their records. 14 Barbosa also learned that IVQ was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
only on June 5, 1998. Moreover, on January 7, 2004, IVQ filed Civil Case No. Q-17499(04), which is a petition for the cancellation
of an adverse claim filed by Santiago Sio Soy Une (Exhibit "RR"). In a portion of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in
said case, it was stated that IVQ bought the property from Therese Vargas, not from Jorge Vargas III. 15
Barbosa furthermore secured a certification from the EDP Division of the Office of the City Assessor in Quezon City that there
were no records of real property assessments in the name of Jorge Vargas III as of August 15, 2006. Moreover, Barbosa stated that
Atty. Jesus C. Apelado, Jr., the person who notarized the March 3, 1986 Deed of Absolute Sale between Jorge Vargas III and IVQ,
was not authorized to do so as Atty. Apelado was only admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in 1987. Also, the notarial
register entries, i.e., the document number, page number, book number and series number, of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of IVQ were exactly the same as those in the special power of attorney (SPA) executed by Jorge Vargas III in favor of Benito
Montinola, who signed the Deed of Absolute Sale on behalf of Jorge Vargas III. The Deed of Absolute Sale and the SPA were
notarized by different lawyers but on the same date. 16
On the part of the respondents in the court a quo, they presented a lone witness, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo. Her testimony was offered
to prove that she was the legal consultant of IVQ; that IVQ's TCT No. 253434 was acquired from Jorge Vargas III through TCT
No. RT-76391; that Jorge Vargas Ill's title was mortgaged at Philippine National Bank (PNB), Bacolod; that Benito Montinola, the
attorney-in-fact of Jorge Vargas III, sold the subject property to Lisan Realty who in tum assigned its rights to IVQ and; that IVQ
redeemed the property from PNB. Barbosa's counsel offered to stipulate on the offer so that the witness' testimony could already
be dispensed with. 17
As to the supposed sale to Lisan Realty and Lisan Realty's assignment of rights to IVQ, the counsel for Barbosa agreed to stipulate
on the same if the transactions were annotated in Jorge Vargas Ill's title. The counsel for IVQ said that they were so annotated.
Upon inquiry of the trial court judge, the counsel for IVQ clarified that the transfers or assignment of rights were done at the time
that the subject property was mortgaged with PNB. The property was then redeemed by IVQ on behalf of Jorge Vargas III. 18
The Decision of the RTC
On June 15, 2007, the RTC granted Barbosa's petition and ordered the cancellation of IVQ's TCT No. 253434. 19 The trial court
noted that while the original copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa was not presented during trial, Barbosa presented
secondary evidence by submitting to the court a photocopy of said deed and the deed of sale in favor of his predecessor-in-interest
Therese Vargas, as well as his testimony. The RTC ruled that Barbosa was able to establish the existence and due execution of the
deeds of sale in his favor and that of Therese Vargas.
The Certification20 dated February 12, 2004 from the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC, Manila stated
that the page on which the Deed of Sale dated October 4, 1978 in favor of Barbosa might have been probably entered was tom.
This, however, did not discount the possibility that said deed was actually notarized and recorded in the missing notarial records
page. Moreover, the RTC found that Barbosa adduced evidence that proved the payment 21 of Therese Vargas to Jorge Vargas, as
well as the payment of Barbosa to Therese Vargas.
The RTC further observed that Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487 and Jorge Vargas Ill's TCT No. 223019 bear more or less
identical technical descriptions of Lot 644-C-5, except for their friar survey plan numbers. However, the Lands Management Bureau
and Land Survey Records Section of the DENR, NCR issued certifications attesting that their respective offices had no record of
FLS-2554-D, the land survey number in the certificates of title held by Jorge Vargas III and IVQ. On the other hand, Barbosa
presented a certified true copy of the subdivision survey plan FLS-2544-D from the Lands Management Bureau, thereby bolstering
his claim that the title of Therese Vargas was an authentic transfer of the title of Kawilihan Corporation.
Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487 was also issued earlier in time than Jorge Vargas Ill's TCT No. 223019. Not only was the original
of Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487 presented in court, but the same was also proven to have existed according to the Certification
from the LRA dated October 6, 2003 that Judicial Form No. 109-D with Serial No. 1793128 - pertaining to TCT No. 159487 - was
issued by an authorized officer of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
In contrast, the RTC noted that IVQ was not able to prove its claim of ownership over the subject property. The deed of sale in
favor of IVQ, which was supposedly executed in 1986, was inscribed only in 2003 on Jorge Vargas III's TCT No. RT-76391 that
was reconstituted back in 1993. Instead of substantiating their allegations, respondents in the court a quo opted to offer stipulations,
such as on the matter of Lisan Realty's assignment of its rights of ownership over the subject property in favor of IVQ. However,
the said assignment was not reflected in the title of Jorge Vargas III. The RTC likewise found it perplexing that when IVQ filed a
petition for cancellation of encumbrance in Jorge Vargas Ill's title, docketed as LRC No. Q-17499 (04), it alleged therein that it
acquired the subject property from Therese Vargas, not Jorge Vargas III.
The trial court added that while there is no record of tax declarations and payment of real estate taxes in the name of Jorge Vargas
III, Therese Vargas declared the subject property for taxation purposes in her name and, thereafter, Barbosa paid real estate taxes
thereon in her name. On the other hand, the only tax declaration that IVQ presented was for the year 2006. The RTC also opined
that while Barbosa was not able to sufficiently establish his possession of the subject property as he failed to put on the witness
stand the caretaker he had authorized to occupy the property, IVQ also did not gain control and possession of the subject property
because the same continued to be in the possession of squatters.
To impugn the above decision of the trial court, IVQ, alone, filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial/Reopening of
Triat22 under the representation of a new counsel.23 In its Motion for Reconsideration, IVQ argued that the RTC erred in concluding
that Barbosa's title is superior to its title. 24 IVQ alleged that Barbosa submitted forged and spurious evidence before the trial court.
On the other hand, in its Motion for New Trial, IVQ alleged that it was defrauded by its former counsel, Atty. Leovigildo Mijares,
which fraud prevented it from fully presenting its case in court. IVQ also averred that it found newly-discovered evidence, which
it could not have discovered and produced during trial.
In an Order25 dated November 28, 2007, the trial court denied IVQ's Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial/Reopening of Trial for
lack of merit.
IVO's Appeal in the Court of Appeals
IVQ interposed an appeal26 to the Court of Appeals. In its Appellant's Brief, IVQ first laid down its version of the facts, to wit:
On 12 March 1976, Kawilihan Corporation, represented by its President and Chairman of the Board Jorge B. Vargas, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale x x x, whereby he sold the subject property to appellant Vargas, III.
On 14 October 1976, TCT No. 71507 was cancelled and in lieu thereofTCT No. 223019 x x x was issued in the name of appellant
Vargas, III who on 23 December 1976 executed a Special Power of Attorney x x x in favor of appellant Benito C. Montinola, Jr.
with power among other things to mortgage the subject property for and in behalf of appellant Vargas, III.
On 25 December 1976, appellant Vargas, III mortgaged the subject property to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Victorias
Branch, Negros Occidental as security for a loan in the principal amount of ₱506,000.00.
On 04 October 1978, Therese Vargas executed a Deed of Absolute Sale x x x wherein she sold the subject property to appellee
Barbosa who however did not register the said sale with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. It appears that Therese Vargas was
able to secure TCT No. 159487 x x x in her name on 06 November 1970 covering the subject property.
Meanwhile, appellant Vargas, III executed another Special Power of Attorney x x x in favor of appellant Montinola, Jr. with power
among other things to sell the subject property for and in behalf of appellant Vargas, III. Thus, on 03 March 1986, during the
effectivity of the mortgage contract with PNB, appellant Montinola sold the subject property to af pellant IVQ for and in
consideration of the amount of ₱450,000.00.27
After the alleged sale of the subject property to IVQ, the following incidents transpired:
When appellant Vargas, III failed to pay his loan, PNB foreclosed the mortgage and in the public auction that followed, the subject
property was sold to PNB. A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB but the latter did not cause the registration of the
certificate of sale right away.
Sometime in 1991, appellant Montinola, Jr. caused the filing of a Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. 223019 which was granted
in 1993. Consequently, TCT No. RT-76391 was issued, in the name of appellant Vargas, III, in lieu of TCT No. 223019. On 13
July 1993, the Certificate of Sale in favor of PNB was inscribed on appellant Vargas, III' s new title.
On 17 February 1994, appellant Vargas, III executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage x x x wherein he sold to Lisan
Realty and Development Corporation (Lisan Realty) the subject property with the latter assuming the loan balance with PNB.
On 23 June 1994, appellant IVQ, for and in behalf of defendant Vargas, III, redeemed the subject property from PNB and on 24
June 1994, the Certificate of Redemption was annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. RT-76390.
On 21 August 2000, Lisan Realty caused the annotation of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim x x x on TCT No. RT-76390.
Thereafter, appellant IVQ filed a Petition for Cancellation of Encumbrance x x x with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 220, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-17499 (04).
On 06 August 2003, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled TCT No. RT-76390 and in lieu thereof TCT No. 253434 was
issued in the name of appellant IVQ.
On 11 February 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220 rendered a Decision x x x granting appellant IVQ's
Petition for Cancellation of Encumbrance and ordering the cancellation of the annotation of the adverse claim on TCT No. 253434.
In August 2004, appellant IVQ instituted [a] Complaint x x x for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 38 against several persons who were occupying the subject property without any right whatsoever. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 38-33264.
On 26 October 2004, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38 rendered a Decision x xx in favor of appellant IVQ
ordering the defendants therein to vacate the subject property.28
The Court of Appeals, however, paid no heed to IVQ's appeal as it affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The appellate court held that
Barbosa was able to prove his ownership over the subject property, while IVQ presented a rather flimsy account on the transfer of
the subject property to its name.
IVQ filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on the above judgment, but the Court of
Appeals denied the same in its assailed Resolution dated July 30, 2010.
IVQ's Petition for Review on Certiorari
IVQ instituted before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari on August 20, 2010, which prayed for the reversal of
the above rulings of the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution[[29]] dated September 29, 2010, the Court initially denied IVQ's petition
for its failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed rulings.
IVQ filed a Motion for Reconsideration30 on the denial of its petition. To prove that its title to the subject property is genuine, IVQ
averred that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Jorge Vargas III was notarized by Atty. Jejomar C. Binay, then a notary public
for Mandaluyong. IVQ attached to its motion for reconsideration, among others, a photocopy of a Certification 31 dated October 8,
2010 from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City that "ATTY. JEJOMAR C. BINA Y was appointed Notary
Public for and in the Province of Rizal for the year 1976" and that he "submitted his notarial reports for the period January, 1976
up to December, 1976." IVQ also attached a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Jorge Vargas III obtained from
the records of the National Archives on October 14, 2010.32
To prove that Barbosa's claim of ownership is spurious, IVQ attached to its motion for reconsideration the following documents:
(1) a photocopy of a Certification dated October 27, 2010 from the Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court that Espiridion
J. Dela Cruz, the notary public who supposedly notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Therese Vargas, is not a member
of the Philippine Bar;33
(2) a photocopy of the Certification dated October 19, 2010 from the National Archives of the Philippines that a copy of the Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of Therese Vargas is not extant in the files of said office; 34
(3) a Certification dated October 12, 2010 from the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Manila,
stating that the notarial entries of Atty. Santiago R. Reyes in the Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and Barbosa -
Doc. No. 1947, Page 92, Book No. XIV, Series of 1978 - actually pertained to a different deed of sale;35
(4) photocopies of pages 90, 91 and 92, Book XIV, Series of 1978 of Atty. Santiago R. Reyes's notarial records, which were
reproduced from the National Archives on October 14,2010, showing that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and
Barbosa was not found therein;36
(5) a photocopy of a Certification dated October 14, 2010 of the City Treasurer's Office of the City of Manila, stating that Residence
Certificate No. A-423263 - the residence certificate number of Therese Vargas in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa -
was not among those allotted to the City of Manila;37 and
(6) a letter dated October 20, 2010 from Director Porfirio R. Encisa, Jr. of the LRA Department on Registration, explaining that
the land survey number of FLS-2554-D in IVQ's TCT No. 253434 was a mere typographical error and it should have been FLS-
2544-D.38
In a Resolution39 dated December 15, 2010, the Court denied IVQ's Motion for Reconsideration.
Undaunted, IVQ filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration,40 arguing that it was able to submit new pieces of documentary
evidence that surfaced for the first time when its Motion for Reconsideration was submitted by its new counsel. IVQ entreated the
Court to consider the same in the higher interest of justice.
Barbosa opposed41 the above motion, countering that the same is a prohibited pleading. Barbosa maintained that it was impossible
for IVQ to acquire ownership over the subject property as the latter was only incorporated on June 5, 1998. Thus, IVQ could not
have bought the property from Jorge Vargas III on March 3, 1986 or subsequently redeemed the property in 1994.
In a Resolution42 dated June 6, 2011, the Court reinstated IVQ's petition and required Barbosa to comment thereon.
Barbosa moved for a reconsideration43 of the said resolution, citing IVQ's lack of legal personality when it supposedly purchased
the subject property and IVQ's inconsistent statements as to how it acquired the same. The Court treated the above motion of
Barbosa as his comment to IVQ's petition and required IVQ to file a reply thereto. 44
In its Reply,45 IVQ primarily argued that Barbosa did not bother to refute the allegations and the evidence on the spuriousness of
his title and instead sought to divert the issue by attacking IVQ's corporate existence.
The Court, thereafter, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 46
In its memorandum,47 IVQ avers that while the evidence supporting its case surfaced for the first time after its petition was filed
with this Court, peculiar circumstances involving the actuations of IVQ's former counsel and Barbosa' s introduction of spurious
documents warrant the suspension of procedural rules in the interest of justice. IVQ insists that Barbosa was not able to prove his
claim by preponderance of evidence.
Upon the other hand, Barbosa contends that IVQ could not legally claim ownership of the subject property as this claim is anchored
on a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Jorge Vargas III on March 3, 1986 while IVQ was incorporated only on June 5, 1998.
Barbosa also points out that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of IVQ was signed only by Jorge Vargas Ill's representative, Benito
Montinola. There is no corresponding signature on the part of the vendee. Barbosa adopts entirely the findings of the R TC and the
Court of Appeals that the sale in favor of Therese Vargas is the one to be legally sustained.
The Ruling of the Court
Without ruling on the merits of this case, the Court finds that there is a need to reassess the evidence adduced by the parties to this
case and thereafter reevaluate the findings of the lower courts.
To recall, Barbosa initiated this case before the trial court via a petition for cancellation and quieting of titles. As held in Secuya v.
De Selma,48
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs or complainants must demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to, or an interest in, the subject
real property. Likewise, they must show that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on their
title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. This point is clear from Article
476 of the Civil Code, which reads:
"Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title."
"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein." (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted.)
The Court also stressed in Santiago v. Villamor49 that in civil cases, the plaintiff must establish his cause of action by preponderance
of evidence; otherwise, his suit will not prosper.
In the instant case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals adjudicated the subject property in favor of Barbosa and directed the
cancellation of IV Q's certificate of title.
The trial court found that Barbosa was able to substantiate the transfer of ownership of the subject property from Kawilihan
Corporation to Therese Vargas and then to Barbosa. Specifically, Barbosa established the existence and execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 11, 1970 between Kawilihan Corporation and Therese Vargas, as well as the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated October 4, 1978 between Therese Vargas and Barbosa. In like manner, the trial court ruled that Barbosa adduced evidence
that purportedly proved the payment of Therese Vargas to Kawilihan Corporation, and the payment of Barbosa to Therese Vargas.
Also, the trial court found that Barbosa was able to prove the validity of Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487. Moreover, the friar
land survey number in Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487 - FLS-2544-D - was the one found to be extant in the records of Lands
Management Bureau, not FLS-2554-D, the survey number in the certificates of title of Jorge Vargas III and IVQ.
On the other hand, the trial court found that IVQ failed to establish its claim of ownership over the subject property, given the
inconsistent statements on how the property was transferred from Kawilihan Corporation to Jorge Vargas III and eventually to
IVQ.
Before this Court, however, IVQ adduced new pieces of documentary evidence that tended to cast doubt on the veracity of Barbosa's
claim of ownership.
To impugn the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Kawilihan Corporation and Therese Vargas, IVQ submitted a copy
of the Certification from the Office of the Bar Confidant that Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, the notary public who supposedly notarized
the said deed, is not a member of the Philippine Bar. IVQ also submitted a copy of the Certification from the National Archives,
stating that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Therese Vargas was not found in their records.
Anent the Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and Barbosa, IVQ presented a Certification from the Office of the Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Manila, stating that the notarial entries of Atty. Santiago R. Reyes in said deed, i.e.,
Doc. No. 1947, Page 92, Book No. XIV, Series of 1978, pertained to a deed of sale between other individuals. Also, the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa was not found in the photocopies of pages 90, 91, and 92 of the aforesaid notarial records of
Atty. Santiago R. Reyes, which pages were reproduced from the National Archives. IVQ also submitted a Certification from the
City Treasurer's Office of the City of Manila, stating that Therese Vargas's Residence Certificate No. A-423263 in the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa was not among those allotted to the City of Manila.
Furthermore, IVQ submitted a letter from Director Porfirio R. Encisa, Jr. of the LRA Department of Registration, stating that the
survey number FLS-2554-D in IVQ's TCT No. 253434 was a typographical error and the same should have been FLS-2544-D.
On the other hand, to bolster its claim of ownership over the subject property, IVQ presented a copy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale50 dated March 12, 197 6 between Kawilihan Corporation and Jorge Vargas III that was obtained from the records of the
National Archives. IVQ also submitted a copy of the Certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City
that Atty. Jejomar C. Binay, the officer who notarized the said deed, was indeed appointed as a notary public for the province of
Rizal for the year 1976 and the latter submitted his notarial reports for the said year.
Interestingly, despite the claim of both parties that their respective titles could be traced to TCT No. 71507 in the name of Kawilihan
Corporation, neither of them thought to submit a certified true copy of the cancelled TCT No. 71507, which would have indicated
to whom the subject property had in fact been transferred.
The parties likewise admit in their pleadings that there is an on-going investigation being conducted by the LRA on the authenticity
and genuineness of the certificates of title involved in the present case and to date, the LRA has not issued any official report
pertaining to said investigation.
After reviewing the factual and procedural antecedents of this case, the Court deems it appropriate that further proceedings be
undertaken in order to verify the authenticity and veracity of the parties' certificates of title and other documentary evidence.
For sure, the Court is aware that the aforesaid evidence belatedly introduced by IVQ are not technically newly-discovered evidence,
given that the same could have been discovered and produced at the trial of the case had IVQ exercised reasonable diligence in
obtaining them.51 Nonetheless, we find that the above evidence cannot simply be brushed aside on this ground alone. The same are
too material to ignore and are relevant in ultimately resolving the question of ownership of the subject property. In Mangahas v.
Court of Appeals, 52 we recognized the long line of jurisprudence that:
[I]t is always in the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it. This Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest opportunity for the determination
of their cases on the merits and of dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of
justice requires it. (Citations omitted.)
Indeed, the alleged defects in the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 11, 1970 between Kawilihan
Corporation and Therese Vargas and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 4, 1978 between Therese Vargas and Barbosa are
by no means trivial.
As the Court stressed in V da. De Rosales v. Ramos53 :
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.
xxxx
The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the necessary information regarding the document or
instrument notarized and retain a copy of the document presented to him for acknowledgment and certification especially when it
is a contract. The notarial registry is a record of the notary public's official acts. Acknowledged documents and instruments recorded
in it are considered public document. If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of
it therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and
cannot bolster any claim made based on this document.x x x. (Citations omitted.)
Furthermore, in Bitte v. Jonas,54 the Court had occasion to discuss the consequence of an improperly notarized deed of absolute
sale. Thus –
Article 1358 of the New Civil Code requires that the form of a contract transmitting or extinguishing real rights over immovable
property should be in a public document. x x x.
xxxx
Not having been properly and validly notarized, the deed of sale cannot be considered a public document. It is an accepted rule,
however, that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. It has been settled that a sale of real
property, though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing is, nevertheless, valid and binding among the parties, for
the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between the parties.
Not being considered a public document, the deed is subject to the requirement of proof under Section20,
Rule 132, which reads:
Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Accordingly, the party invoking the validity of the deed of absolute sale had the burden of proving its authenticity and due
execution.x x x. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In the instant case, should the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Therese Vargas and Barbosa, respectively, be found to be indeed
improperly notarized, the trial court would have erred in admitting the same in evidence without proof of their authenticity and in
relying on the presumption regarding the regularity of their execution. Barbosa would then have the additional burden of proving
the authenticity and due execution of both deeds before he can invoke their validity in establishing his claim of ownership.
Therefore, IVQ should be allowed to formally offer in evidence the documents it belatedly submitted to this Court and that Barbosa
should equally be given all the opportunity to refute the same or to submit controverting evidence.
Given that the Court is not a trier of facts and there still are factual matters that need to be evaluated, the proper recourse is to
remand the case to the Court of Appeals for the conduct of further proceedings.
In Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque,55 the Court explained the propriety of resorting to the above procedure in this wise:
At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok
title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotok's claim to title
is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or
otherwise structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to
undertake such function.
The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for reception of further evidence is not a novel idea. It has
been undertaken before - in Republic v. Court of Appeals and more recently in our 2007 Resolution in Manotok v. Court of Appeals.
Our following explanation in Manotok equally applies to this case:
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve
factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or
office. The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally
accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual
matters, including documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court
of Appeals, this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the
controversy, x x x. The Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's Report"
shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence
in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner
when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a
judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the
commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in
writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the
basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Aside from receiving and evaluating evidence relating to the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by IVQ to this Court, the
Court of Appeals may likewise receive any other additional evidence that the parties herein may submit on their behalf.
The Court, in particular, deems it necessary for the parties to submit a certified true copy of TCT No. 71507 that is registered in
the name of Kawilihan Corporation, if possible. As previously discussed, neither of the parties submitted the same before the trial
court and no explanation was likewise offered for this omission. As TCT No. 71507 is ultimately the title from which the certificates
of title of Therese Vargas and Jorge Vargas III supposedly emanated, the same may indicate which of the two subsequent titles
cancelled it.
It would likewise be expedient for the parties to submit evidence as to the character of their possession of the subject property,
given that the trial court ruled that neither of them were able to prove their possession thereof.1âwphi1
The Court further reiterates its directive to the parties to submit information as to the results of the investigation of the Task Force
Titulong Malinis of the LRA regarding the authenticity of TCT No. 159487 registered in the name of Therese Vargas and TCT No.
223019 registered in the name of Jorge Vargas III.
After the conclusion of its proceedings, the Court of Appeals is directed to submit to this Court a detailed Report on its findings
and conclusions within three months from notice of this Resolution. Said report, along with all the additional evidence that will be
offered by the parties, shall be thoroughly considered in order to determine with finality the issue of ownership of the subject
property.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the purpose of hearing and receiving evidence, including but
not limited to, those specifically required by the Court in this Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a Report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from notice
of this Resolution. The Court of Appeals is further directed to raffle this case immediately upon receipt of this Resolution.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
XERXES A. ABADIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES JESUS and LOLITA MARTIR, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 14, 2002 and its Resolution 2 dated November 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No.
51679. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental 3 declaring respondents
as the owners of the property in question.
The case stemmed from an action for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession 4 of a parcel of land filed by herein respondents
against Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montaño, and Quirico Mandaguit. Petitioner Xerxes A. Abadiano intervened in that case.
Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre consists of 34,281 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
20461 issued on November 19, 1923 in the name of the spouses Inocentes Bañares and Feliciana Villanueva. Before the issuance
of OCT No. 20461, however, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had predeceased her husband) executed an
Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over Lot No. 1318. The lot was partitioned and distributed as follows: (1) 14,976 sq m
denominated as Lot No. 1318-A, in favor of Demetrio Bañares; (2) 10,125 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-B, in favor
of Ramon and David Abadiano (grandchildren of Inocentes and Feliciana); and (3) 10,180 sq m denominated as Lot No.
1318-C, in favor of Amando Bañares. The partition is embodied in a Deed of Partition executed on June 1, 1922 and
notarized the following day by Notary Public Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions "Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III." 5
On September 30, 1939, David Abadiano, who was absent during the execution of the Agreement of Partition, executed a Deed of
Confirmation acknowledging and ratifying the document of partition. 6
OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted on February 15, 1962 and in lieu thereof OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) was issued
over Lot No. 1318, still in the name of Inocentes Bañares and Felicidad Villanueva. Annotated at the back of the
reconstituted title were the Agreement of Partition and the Deed of Confirmation. 7
On June 14, 1957 Demetrio Bañares sold his share of the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The same was annotated at the back
of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461).8
Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo Bañares filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental
an ex-parte petition praying for: first, the confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by David
Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale between him and his father; and second, the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in
lieu thereof, the issuance of a new certificate of title over the property. In an Order dated February 22, 1962, the court ordered the
cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Bañares,
Amando Bañares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31862
was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental.9
Petitioner insists that this is still the valid and subsisting title over Lot No. 1318 and that no sale of the portion pertaining to Ramon
and David Abadiano ever took place.10
On the other hand, respondent spouses alleged that, prior to the issuance of TCT No. T-31862, Ramon Abadiano, for himself and
on behalf of David Abadiano, had already sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C11 to Victor Garde. The sale was
allegedly evidenced by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922 and acknowledged before Notary Public Jose
Peralta and bearing notarial inscription "Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922." The sale was allegedly affirmed
by David Abadiano in a document dated September 30, 1939. 12
They further alleged that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his heirs were in continuous, public, peaceful, and
uninterrupted possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of Lot No. 1318-C.13 On December 29, 1961, the heirs of
Victor Garde sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C14 to Jose Garde, who immediately took possession thereof. Jose
Garde continuously planted sugarcane on the land until he sold the property to Lolita Martir in 1979. 15
After acquiring the property, respondent spouses continued to plant sugarcane on the land. Sometime in March 1982, after
respondent Jesus Martir harvested the sugarcane he had planted on Lot No. 1318-C, defendant below Roberto Abadiano (son of
Ramon) allegedly entered the property and cultivated the remaining stalks of sugarcane and refused to vacate despite demands to
do so. The following year, defendants Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montaño, and Quirico Mandaguit again harvested the
sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-C.16 Further, the defendants also entered the property and harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-
B,17 which by then had been acquired by Lolita B. Martir from her adoptive father, Amando Bañares.18
Thus, in April 1982, herein respondent-spouses filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of Possession with Damages before
the then CFI of Negros Occidental.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,19 defendants denied that the subject property was ever sold by Ramon and David Abadiano,
and that, consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from Ramon. They also alleged, by way of Special and
Affirmative Defenses, that the subject land still belonged to the estate of Ramon and David Abadiano and was never alienated.
They alleged further that the act of spouses Martir in planting sugarcane on the land was without Roberto’s consent; that Roberto
had demanded that the spouses Martir pay him reasonable rental for the land but that they had persistently refused to
do so; and that sometime in March 1981, Roberto and the spouses Martir came to an agreement whereby the defendant continued
to cultivate the remaining stalks of sugarcane left by plaintiffs and that until the harvest of said sugarcane, plaintiffs never posed
any objection thereto.
Xerxes Abadiano intervened in the proceedings before the trial court alleging likewise that his predecessor Ramon Abadiano never
sold their share of the property to Victor Garde.20
After trial, the court issued a Decision21 dated June 23, 1995, ruling in favor of the spouses Martir, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants declaring plaintiffs spouses Jesus
and Lolita Martir as the true and legitimate owners of portions of Lot No. 1318 Kabankalan Cadastre denominated as Lots 1318-B
and 1318-C and ordering:
(1) That the defendants Roberto Abadiano and the intervenor Xerxes Abadiano shall surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
31862 to the Registrar of Deeds of Negros Occidental who is directed to partially cancel said title and issue new Certificate of Title
corresponding to Lots 1318-B and 1318-C in the names of the spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir;
(2) That the defendants shall jointly and severally pay to the plaintiffs the amount of Twenty Thousand (₱20,000.00) Pesos
representing the value of the sugarcanes of plaintiffs which defendants harvested and milled with SONEDCO and;
(3) To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.22
The trial court rejected therein defendants’ contention that the Compra Y Venta was null and void because the co-owner,
David Abadiano, did not sign the same. It held that the Supreme Court has ruled to the effect that the sale by a co-
owner of the entire property without the consent of the other co-owners was not null and void but that only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, making the buyer a co-owner. The trial court also held that although the Compra Y Venta was not
annotated either on the OCT or on the reconstituted OCT, the validity of the sale was not vitiated. The registration or annotation is
required only to make the sale valid as to third persons. Thus, the trial court concluded that the Compra Y Venta was valid between
the parties, Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde.
The trial court also brushed aside the defendants’ contention that the Compra Y Venta contained the same notarial inscription
as the Deed of Partition. It said that assuming this to be true, this may be considered an error which did not nullify the
Compra Y Venta; at most, the document would be non-registrable but still valid.
On the contention that the alleged confirmation executed by David Abadiano was for the Deed of Partition and not for the Compra
Y Venta, the trial court agreed. It, however, interpreted the same to mean that David Abadiano must not have authorized his brother
to sell his share in Lot No. 1318-C. The effect was that David Abadiano continued to be one of the registered owners of the property
and his heirs stepped into his shoes upon his death.
However, the trial court found that the plaintiffs’ (respondents’) claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the property for more than sixty (60) years was duly established. In contrast, the court found that
defendants and intervenor, and their deceased parents, had not been in possession of their share in the property. It held that the
defendants and intervenor were guilty of laches for failing to avail of the many opportunities for them to bring an action to establish
their right over Lot No. 1318-C.
Defendants appealed to the CA. However, the same was summarily dismissed in a Resolution dated February 11, 1997 due to
defendants’ failure to pay the required docket fee within the period set. Nonetheless, the records were retained for the appeal
of Xerxes Abadiano, intervenor in the trial court.
On March 14, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of the RTC in toto. 23
Xerxes Abadiano now comes before this Court raising the following arguments:
A
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, BASED ON ITS MISAPPREHENSION AND/OR OMISSION OF THE
FACTS, IN DISREGARDING THE PRIMORDIAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE ("COMPRA Y
VENTA") IS A SPURIOUS DOCUMENT
B
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES OVER REGISTERED
LAND24
The Petition is impressed with merit. We believe the trial court and the CA erred in ruling for the respondents. Accordingly, we
reverse the assailed Decision and Resolution.
It is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of
respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on the Court. Further, it is not the
Court’s function under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the
probative value of the evidence presented. The jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing
only errors of law. Unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions, the rule shall not be disturbed. 25
However, this Court has consistently recognized the following exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.26
In the present case, we find that the trial court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts, as well as on the supposed absence
of evidence which is contradicted by the records.
In appreciating the alleged Compra Y Venta presented by respondents, the trial court concluded that "[t]he parties have no quarrel
on the existence of a Deed of Sale of a portion of Lot No. 1318 executed by Ramon Abadiano for himself and as representative of
David Abadiano, dated June 3, [1922] in favor of Victor Garde."27
The trial court erred in its conclusion.
Borne very clearly by the records is the defendants’ repudiation of the existence of the sale in their Answer with
Counterclaim. They stated:
2. That defendants admit plaintiffs’ allegation in paragraph 4 that there has been no particular designation of lot number
(sic) for each of the co-owner (sic) of Lot No. 1318 but specifically deny under oath the other allegations thereof the
truth being that the property referred to here as Lot No. 1318 remains undivided to this day that the owners thereof as shown by
the TCT No. 31862 co-own the same pro-indiviso;
3. That defendants have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 5 28 and therefore
specifically deny the same under oath the truth being that Ramon Abadiano and David Abadiano had not sold the land at bar to
anyone and that consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from the former; x x x.29 (emphasis supplied).
Likewise, petitioner specifically denied the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint. He alleged that the lot "had never been
sold or alienated and the same still remains intact as the property of the Intervenor and his co-owners by operation of law."30
This was testified to by Roberto Abadiano during the trial, thus:
Q: During the lifetime of your father, do you know if your father has ever sold to any party his share on Lot No. 1318?
A: He has not sold his share.31
These statements were enough to impugn the due execution of the document. While it is true that this Court had previously ruled
that mere denials would not have sufficed to impeach the document, in this case, there was an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law in accordance with our ruling that -
defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the
statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its
genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since
it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.32
It was error then for the RTC to have brushed aside this issue and then make so sweeping a conclusion in the face of such opposition.
In light of this challenge to the very existence of the Compra Y Venta, the trial court should have first resolved the issue of the
document’s authenticity and due execution before deciding on its validity. Unfortunately, the CA did not even discuss this issue.
We are cognizant, however, that it is now too late in the day to remand the case to the trial court for the determination of the
purported Compra Y Venta’s authenticity and due execution. Thus, we will resolve this very issue here and now in order to put an
end to this protracted litigation.
There is no denying that TCT No. 31862 is still the subsisting title over the parcel of land in dispute. It is also a fact that the
purported Compra Y Venta was not annotated on TCT No. 31862 until April 1982, shortly before the complaint was commenced,
even though the deed was allegedly executed in 1922.
Considering that the action is one for quieting of title and respondents anchored their claim to the property on the disputed Compra
Y Venta, we find it necessary to repeat that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have resolved first the issue of the document’s
due execution and authenticity, before determining its validity.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their complaint. According to respondent Lolita Martir, the
original of said document was in the office of the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office but their
request was refused. No other evidence but these bare assertions, however, was presented to prove that the original is indeed in the
custody of the Register of Deeds or that respondents’ due and diligent search for the same was unsuccessful.
The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.33
In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the document was made in accordance with any of
the exceptions allowed under the abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to
determine its validity based on such assumption.
The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document presented contained the same notarial inscription as
the Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed of Partition and the Compra Y Venta, though executed on different days, were
notarized on the same day, and both documents contained the signatures of the same witnesses and the same notarial inscription.
This notwithstanding, the court concluded, "Assuming this to be true, same could be considered an error which did not nullify, (sic)
the Deed of Sale or Compra Y Venta. At most, the document would be a non-registrable, but valid document."34
We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor
the presumption of regularity.35
In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have invalidated the sale – if indeed it took place –
the same error would have meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the
presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due
execution need not be proved.36
Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of the purported Compra Y Venta, the weight of
evidence preponderates in favor of petitioner.
Next, we determine if petitioner is guilty of laches. On this issue, we rule in the negative.
Under the Property Registration Decree,37 no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.38 Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land registration
proceedings. Barring any mistake or use of fraud in the procurement of the title, owners may rest secure on their ownership and
possession once their title is registered under the protective mantle of the Torrens system. 39
Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible,40 the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the
possession of his registered property by reason of laches.41
Laches has been defined as neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances
causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right which works
disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties. It
is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could
be a valid claim.42
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights,
the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held
to be barred.43
The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of
condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the
position of the parties will change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of
third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the
consequences of his own neglect.44
Though laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature and
cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.45
Based on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is not guilty of laches. The evidence on record does not support such finding.
Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still in the name of his predecessor in interest, continued to be
theirs, especially considering that the annotation of the purported sale was done only in 1982. According to petitioner, his father
had told him that his (the father’s) inheritance was in the possession of their uncle, Amando Bañares who knew likewise
that the property was theirs.
Thus, Roberto Abadiano testified:
Q: Before Amando Bañares died, did you know that your father is a part owner of Lot No. 1318?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And did you not complain to Amando Bañares that your father is a pert owner of that lot?
A: No, Sir. We did not complain because he was our grandfather and when he dies, the property will go back to us. 46
And herein petitioner testified:
Atty. Garaygay –
Q: Before the war who was occupying this lot which you claimed belonging (sic) to your father?
A: The uncle of my father, Amando Bañares, Sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, before and after the war and during the lifetime of Amando Bañares, he was the one in possession of
Lot No. 1318?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the condition of the lot under the possession of the lot under the possession of Amando Bañares – was it under
lease?
A: As far as I can remember, my father told me that his inheritance was with Amando Bañares, his uncle.47
From the testimonies of petitioner and the defendants during trial, it would appear that they were unaware of any of respondents’
actions in relation to the property until the death of their grandfather, Amando Bañares. When they did find out that
respondents were occupying the land, they immediately took action to occupy what they believed was still rightfully
theirs.
On this point, petitioner testified, thus:
Q: When did you initiate the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B as your inheritance from your late father?
A: It was shortly after the death of Amando Bañares.
Q: Who were these, who initiated the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B?
A: I advised my brothers here in Kabankalan to take action to possess the land which was then occupied before by our (sic) great
uncle, Amando Bañares.
Q: When was that, in what year, because we do not know when did your uncle (sic) die?
A: It was after the death of Amando Bañares sometime in 1973 or 1974.
Q: Why did it take you that long before you initiated the move to claim the inheritance?
A: Considering that relatives were involved and the fact we understand that our late parents revered our uncle so, we cautiously
tried to take action shortly after his death, so as not to antagonize our relatives.
Q: What did you do in order to claim your inheritance?
A: Now, after learning that it was being farmed by Lolita Martir, I advised my brothers here in Kabankalan to go to Bacolod City
to seek the intercession of the Philippine Constabulary Commander in order to thresh out the matter in a way that there will be no
hostility or adverse reaction.
Q: What other reactions did you take, if any?
A: Well, I told my brother that they have a confrontation in the Office of the PACLAP known as the Presidential Action
Commission on Land Problems.
Q: Besides that confrontation at the PACLAP, what other action did you personally take as an heir of Lot No. 1318-B?
A: After that confrontation, I advised my brothers to occupy the land in question to farm it because it belongs to us.
Q: With respect to the Transfer Certificate of Title, what action, if any, did you undertake?
A: Well, we drew out a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication and after it was approved by the Court, it was annotated at the
back of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862 and we were given a co-owner’s copy of the said title by the Register of
Deeds.
xxxx
Q: Mr. Witness, when did you and your co-owners executed (sic) this Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication over Lot 1318-B?
A: That was on July 17, 1976.
Q: Was that before or after the plaintiffs have filed this present case?
A: That was almost 6 or 7 years before this present case was filed.48
On the other hand, Roberto Abadiano testified:
Atty. Garaygay –
Q: Now, according to you, your father is the co-owner of Lot No. 1318. Prior to the death of your father, who was in possession of
Lot No. 1318?
Witness –
A: What I know is it was Amando Bañares.
Q: You mean to say that when your father was still alive, it was Amando Bañares who was in possession of Lot No. 1318?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And until when did you know that Amando Bañares has been in possession of Lot No. 1318?
A: Up to 1976 when he died.
Q: After his death in 1976, who was in possession of the said lot?
A: I made a verification in the Office of the Register of Deeds, and when I went to the said lot, it was vacant.
Q: When was that?
A: In 1976-1977, and I have it planted in 1978.49
That petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of Amando Bañares to try and occupy the land is understandable. They
had to be careful about the actions they took, lest they sow dissent within the family. Furthermore, they knew that their parents
revered Amando.50
The Court has recognized that this reaction cannot be characterized as such delay as would amount to laches, thus:
in determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence of a confidential relationship between
the parties is an important circumstance for consideration, a delay under such circumstances not being so strictly regarded as where
the parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that parties
are connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay. 51
In addition, several other factors militate against the finding of laches on the part of the petitioner.
When the Original Certificate of Title was reconstituted on February 15, 1962, no annotation therein was made of the Compra Y
Venta or of the Deed of Sale between Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde. Only the Agreement of Partition, the Confirmation by
David Abadiano, and the sale from Demetrio to Leopoldo Bañares were annotated therein.52 Neither does the Deed of Sale of
Demetrio’s share in favor of Leopoldo, executed in 1957, mention that the property belonged to anyone other than the parties to
the Deed of Partition.53
Likewise, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, which was issued in 1962 pursuant to an Order of the Kabankalan CFI, was
issued in the names of Leopoldo Bañares, Amando Bañares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Even at the time of the
issuance of said TCT, there was no annotation of the alleged sale to Victor Garde, which according to respondents took place
in 1922.
If respondents’ contention were true, the TCT should not have been issued in April 1962 in the name of Ramon and
David Abadiano, but in the name of Victor Garde or Jose Garde – who by then had supposedly acquired the property by
virtue of the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Sale executed on December 29, 1961. 54 As it is, neither respondents nor
any of their predecessors in interest participated in any of the proceedings for the issuance of the OCT, the reconstituted OCT, or
the TCT. The petitioner’s testimony on the matter is revealing:
Q: Based on your investigation, did you find records of the proceedings of the reconstitution of title of Lot 1318 or any evidence
as to the participation of the plaintiffs in this Reconstitution Petition?
A: Based on the existing records, they did not participate.
Q: How about in the Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. (sic) did the plaintiffs participate therein?
A: They did not also.
Q: How about in the issuance of the new Transfer Certificate of Title, did the plaintiffs participate therein?
A: No, sir.55
Again, the TCT bears out the fact that the purported Compra Y Venta to Victor Garde was annotated thereon only on April 23,
1982. On the other hand, several entries made in 1981 evince that petitioner and his co-heirs took steps after Amando’s death to
assert their rights over the property.56
In 1976, the heirs of David Abadiano executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Roberto Abadiano giving the latter authority
to act, sue, and/or represent them in any suit or action for recovery of possession or of whatever kind or nature.57 For their part, the
heirs of Ramon Abadiano executed a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication over the part of Lot No. 1318 pertaining to their
predecessor.58
Ranged against these positive steps, respondents only have their bare assertions to support their claim that they indeed had
possession of the land through their predecessors in interest, which are insufficient to overcome the testimony that it was Amando
Bañares – and not Victor Garde – who had possession of the property during the former’s lifetime, or that after Amando’s
death, the lot remained unoccupied.
In sum, we find that petitioner is not guilty of such neglect or inaction as would bar his claim to the property in question. In contrast,
it is most telling that respondents, who are claiming to have been in possession of the property by virtue of an alleged duly
constituted sale for almost 60 years, have themselves failed within that long period to have the same property transferred in their
name or even only to have the sale annotated on the title of the property.
Finally, we come to the issue of damages. Petitioner prays that respondents be made to pay actual damages of not less that
₱30,000.00 plus rentals on the property from the time of the latter’s occupation, moral damages amounting to ₱100,000.00,
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
The record shows that petitioner testified on the prevailing rate of rentals on the subject property from the time of Amando Bañares’
death in 1976 until the time of the trial. According to petitioner, the rental rate from 1976 until 1985 was ₱3,000.00 per
hectare, while from 1985 until the time of his testimony in 1994, the rental rate was ₱5,000.00 per hectare. We thus rule that
the actual damages that may be awarded shall be based only on these rates. 59
Considering, however, that petitioner’s co-heirs (defendants Roberto Abandiano, et al.) were able to enter the property
and harvest the sugarcane therein in 1981 and, thereafter, the land remained unoccupied, the rent must be reckoned
only from the time respondents actually occupied the land until March 1981.1avvphi1
The claims for moral damages must be anchored on a definite showing that the claiming party actually experienced emotional and
mental sufferings.60 In this case, we find that petitioner’s testimony that he suffered from sleepless nights from worrying
about this case and considering the great distance he had to travel from his home in Tacloban to see the case through
are enough bases to award him moral damages. With the award of moral damages, exemplary damages are likewise in order. 61
Attorney’s fees are recoverable when exemplary damages are awarded, or when the court deems it just and equitable. The grant
of attorney’s fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court.62 Given the
circumstances of this case, we grant the prayer for attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679 are reversed and set aside. A new one is entered:
(1) reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 1331;
(2) declaring the heirs of Ramon and David Abadiano as the lawful owners of Lot No. 1318-B, a portion of Lot No. 1318 covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, Kabankalan Cadastre, Negros Occidental; and
(3) ordering respondents to pay petitioner and his co-heirs rentals at the rate of ₱3,000.00 per hectare per year, from the time of
actual occupation of the land in 1976 until March 1981, moral damages in the amount of ₱100,00.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱30,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
LEONOR CAMCAM, JOSE, FORTUNATO, VIRGINIA, GLORIA, FLORENDO, DELFIN, RODRIGO, LEUTERIO,
NARCISO, ONOFRE, ZENAIDA, AURELIA, TEOFILA, FELICIDAD, MERCEDES, LYDIA, ALFREDO, BIENVENIDO,
EFREN, LILIA, ERLINDA, MELINDA, MARYLOU, MERIAM, all surnamed SALVADOR, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ARCADIO FRIAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Leonor Camcam (Leonor) and her husband Laureano Salvador (Laureano) were the registered owners of two parcels of
land, Lot Nos. 19554 and 18738 of the Cadastral Survey of San Carlos, Pangasinan, located in the Barrio of Basista, San Carlos,
Pangasinan.
Laureano died intestate on December 9, 1941. He was survived by his wife-petitioner Leonor; his brothers Agapito and petitioners
Jose and Fortunato, all surnamed Salvador; and the heirs of his deceased brother Luis Salvador (Luis), namely, petitioners Virginia,
Gloria, Florendo, Delfin, Rodrigo, Eleuterio, Narciso, Onofre, Zenaida, and Aurelia, all surnamed Salvador.
On February 9, 1983, Leonor, together with her brothers-in-law Agapito, Jose, Fortunato, and Luis’ heirs, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan a Complaint, 1 docketed as Civil Case No. SCC-833, against respondent
Arcadio Frias (Frias), for annulment of the following documents executed by Leonor in Frias’ favor covering Lot Nos. 19554
and 18738:
1. November 4, 1982 Deed of Adjudication with Sale of the entire Lot No. 19554 and ½ of Lot No. 18738, for a P11,000
consideration signed by Leonor (Exhibit "B"/"1");2
2. November 4, 1982 Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of "ONE-HALF (½) portion EACH [of the two lots] together
with [Leonor’s] conjugal share of ONE-HALF (½) EACH of the [two lots] with all the improvements thereon" for a P45,000
consideration, signed by Leonor (Exhibit "A"/"3");3 and
3. November 23, 1982 Deed of Absolute Sale of the other half of Lot No. 18738, for a consideration
of P3,000, signedby Leonor (Exhibit "C"/"2").4
Before the trial court, petitioners advanced the following version of the case:
In November 1982, Frias offered to purchase the two lots from Leonor. Leonor, however, was only willing to enter into a sale with
right of repurchase within five years. Frias agreed to Leonor’s condition but he deceived her into signing the Deed of
Adjudication-Exhibit "B"/"1," after which he paid her P9,000 out of the P11,000 consideration, he promising that he would settle
the balance of P2,000 before the end of the month.
In the latter part of November 1982, Frias, instead of delivering the balance of P2,000, again deceived Leonor into signing another
document, the Deed of Absolute Sale-Exhibit "C"/"2," he telling her that since two lots were involved, she had to sign another
instrument pertaining to the other lot.
Upon verification with Rodolfo Acosta (Acosta), the notary public who notarized Exhibits "B"/"1" and "C"/"2," petitioners
discovered that the deeds Leonor signed transferred ownership of the entire area covering the two lots. They also, upon inquiry
with the Register of Deeds at Lingayen, discovered that Original Certificate of Title Nos. 116345 and 120276 in the name of Leonor
and her husband covering the two lots were cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 143752 7 and 1437538 were in their
stead issued in Frias’ name. Further, they discovered that Frias registered the document-Exhibit "A"/"3," which had the
same date and notarial details as those of Exhibit "B"/"1."
Petitioners alleged that assuming that the documents are valid, it is void with respect to the shares of Leonor’s co-heirs-co-
petitioners as they were conveyed without their knowledge and participation.
They thus prayed for judgment
(1) Declaring null and void, the Deed of Adjudication with Sale dated November 4, 1982 [Exhibit "B"/"1"], and the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 23, 1982 [Exhibit "C"/"2"] on the ground that the said documents did not reflect the true intention
of the parties x x x, moreover, the shares of the plaintiffs, other than plaintiff Camcam, were included without their knowledge,
participation and consent x x x;
(2) Declaring null and void, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale dated November 4, 1982 [Exhibit "A"/"3"] based on the
fact that it is absolutely fictitious and simulated x x x;
(3) That as a consequence of the nullity of [Exhibit "A"/"3"], TCT Nos. 143752 and 143753 be declared null and void and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan to cancel said transfer certificates of titles issued in the name of defendant Frias
and the annotations on OCT Nos. 11634 and 12027 relative to the cancellation be cancelled; or, in the alternative, the defendant
Frias xxx be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance over the parcels subject of this suit in favor of the plaintiffs, in the following
proportion, to wit: one half (1/2) to plaintiff Camcam, and the other half shall pertain to the other plaintiffs, namely, Agapito, Jose,
Fortunato and the heirs of the late Luis, all surnamed Salvador, in equal proportion;
(4) Declaring plaintiffs Agapito, Jose, Fortunato, and the late Luis, all surnamed Salvador, the latter being represented in this suit
by his heirs, as the only legitimate heirs to inherit the estate of their deceased brother, Laureano Salvador who died on December
9, 1941, thereby excluding the widow from participating xxx;
(5) Declaring the defendant liable for actual, compensatory and moral damages to plaintiffs and litigation expenses, assessable in
terms of money in such amount as will be proved in court, and to pay exemplary damages as may be assessed by the court;
(6) Declaring the defendant liable for the attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and to pay the costs. 9(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
They likewise prayed for other just and equitable reliefs.10
Upon the other hand, Frias advanced the following version:
Leonor inherited the two lots, to the exclusion of her co-petitioners, under the old Civil Code11 and it was she who convinced him
to buy them.
Leonor later changed her mind and was willing to sell only the whole of the residential land, Lot No. 19554, and ½ of the mango
and coconut land, Lot No. 18739,12 as she was giving her brothers-in-law two weeks to buy the ½ remaining portion
thereof,13 hence, he and Leonor forged Exhibit "B"/"1." Leonor later informed him that her brothers-in-law could not buy the
remaining ½ portion of Lot No. 18739, hence, he and Leonor forged Exhibit "C"/"2." 14
After the execution of the two documents dated November 4, 1982, Frias brought them to the Municipal Building to pay taxes.
When asked by an employee of the then-Ministry of Agrarian Reform how much he paid for the lots, Frias confessed to not having
indicated the correct consideration on the documents because he wanted to "escape" paying taxes such as capital gains taxes. On
being informed of the consequences of not reflecting the true consideration of the two lots in the documents, he had the third
document, Exhibit "A"/"3," prepared which, after explaining to Leonor the reason beyond the necessity therefor, she signed in
notary public Acosta’s office.15
During the pendency of the proceedings before the trial court, Leonor’s brother-in-law Agapito died and was substituted by
his heirs, namely petitioners Teofila, Felicidad, Mercedes, Lydia, Alfredo, Bienvenido, Efren, Lilia, Erlinda, Melinda,
Marylou, and Meriam, all surnamed Salvador.16
By Decision17 of December 12, 1990, Branch 57 of the Pangasinan RTC, holding that:
xxxx
We cannot agree that Leonor Camcam signed [these] document[s] without reading them. She signed [them] and read [them] because
she was one who had enough learning. x x x Besides that, Evangeline Pira, and Gertrudes Calpo signed it themselves as [witnesses
according to] the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo Acosta.
xxxx
But this is true only with regards to ½ of the properties as [they are] conjugal in nature. As regards x x x the other half of
the property the rights of inheritance by x x x brothers and sisters under the old law is provided thus:
Article 948. If there are brothers and sisters and nephews, who are children of brothers and sisters of the whole blood, the former
shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Article 953. In case there are brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters, the widow or widower shall have a right to receive,
in concurrence with the former, the portion of the inheritance in usufruct granted him or her in Article 837.
Article 837. When the testator leaves no legitimate descendants or ascendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of
the inheritance also in usufruct18 (The old civil code) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE the other half [of the two lots] should be divided among the brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces by the
right of intestate succession; to brothers and sisters, per capita; and the nephews and nieces per stirpes; of one-half of the
property. The remaining one-half belong[s] to defendant [herein-respondent Frias].
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan to cancel TCT No. 143752 and 143753 and instead issue another title, one
half of the property to the brothers and sisters, per capita; and to the nieces and nephews per stirpes; the other half to the
defendants.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On appeal,20 the Court of Appeals, by Decision21 of April 30, 1992, affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision. Thus it
disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the lower court dated December 12, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. One-half of the properties in question belong to defendant-appellee Arcadio Frias, by virtue of the valid sale by
Leonor Camcam. The other half should be divided among the brothers, nephews and nieces of the late Laureano Salvador by right
of intestate succession: to brothers per capita and to the nephews and nieces per stirpes.
THE Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan is directed to cancel TCT Nos. 143752 and 143753 and issue the corresponding
titles in accordance with the above pronouncement. The expenses of the survey should be borne equally by plaintiffs-appellants
and defendant-appellee. Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Their Motion for Reconsideration23 having been denied,24 petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, 25faulting
the appellate court
1. . . . IN NOT DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE THREE (3) DEEDS X X X CONSIDERING THEIR PHYSICAL
APPEARANCE AND CONDITIONS INDICATING STRONGLY THE IRREGULARITIES OF THEIR EXECUTION.
2. [IN NOT DECLARING THAT] THE SALES WERE ILLEGAL, CONSIDERING THE OTHER PETITIONERS [,] BEING
OWNERS OF THE OTHER HALF, HAVE THE PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO PURCHASE THAT HALF PORTION INSTEAD
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.26
Petitioners contend as follows:
xxxx
From the appearance of these documents, particularly the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale (Annex "A" or Exh. "A"/"3")
and the Deed of Adjudication with Sale (Annex "B" or Exh. "B"/"1"), while both were notarized by the same notary public, yet
they have identical notarial documentary identification, i.e., the same documentary number to be 464, same page number 44, the
same book number X and the same series of 1982, and appeared to have been "sworn" before the notary public on the same date
– November 4, 1982.
xxxx
Aside from the anomalous situation created by the irregularly executed deeds and advantageously employed by the private
respondent, in order to conceal the apparent irregularities, the private respondent claimed that the Deed of Partition and Sale (Annex
"A" or Exh "A"/"3") dated November 4, 1982, was a consolidation deed of the Deed of Adjudication with Sale dated November 4,
1982 (Annex "B" or Exh. "B"/"1") and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 23, 1982 (Annex "C" or Exh "C"/"2").
However, summing up the consideration stated in Annex "B" of P11,000.00 and the consideration stated in Annex "C" of P3,000.00,
the total will naturally be P14,000.00, but the alleged [consolidation] deed (Annex "A" or Exh "A"/"3") shows the consideration is
not P14,000.00 but P45,000.00.27
xxxx
Assuming, without admitting, that petitioner Leonor Camcam regularly sold her one-half portion in the two parcels of land in favor
of private respondent Arcadio Frias, however, considering the preferential right of the other petitioners, who are admittedly the
owners of the other half portion in said parcels of land, and considering further the attendant circumstances of this case, as discussed
above, the petitioners, with the exception of petitioner Leonor Camcam, should be allowed to jointly exercise their right of
redemption, the consideration of which shall proportionately be based on that Deed (Annex "B" or Exh. "B"/"1") which was
published in the newspaper.28 (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is bereft of merit.
Without passing on the merits of Frias’ claim that Leonor originally sold to him ½ of Lot No. 18739 as reflected in the first
November 4, 1982 document but later conveyed the remaining ½ thereof, hence, the execution of the second document
bearing the same date, an irregular notarization merely reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private
document, which requires proof of its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence.29 The irregular notarization
– or, for that matter, the lack of notarization – does not thus necessarily affect the validity of the contract reflected in the
document. Tigno v. Aquino30 enlightens:
x x x [F]rom a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction
evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over
immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does
not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the
validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for convenience. We have even affirmed that a sale of real property
though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for the time-
honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces effects between the parties.31 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners alleged fraud on Frias’ part, hence, they had the burden of establishing the same by clear and convincing
evidence.32 This they failed to discharge.
By Leonor’s account, she signed the three documents relying on Frias’ word that they were deeds of "mortgage," and she
did not read them because she "[did] not know how to read,"33 When asked, however, on cross-examination about her
educational attainment, Leonor answered that she finished the third year of a nursing course at San Juan de Dios Hospital.34
Clarifying her statement that she did not know how to read, Leonor explained that she knew how to read but her eyesight was
blurred.35 Leonor’s granddaughter-witness Gertrudes Calpo (Gertrudes) who signed as witness in Exhibit "B"/"1" declared,
however, that she read the contents of Exhibit "B"/"1" to Leonor,36 thus belying petitioners’ claim that Leonor signed the same
without knowing its true contents.
As for Exhibit "A"/"3" which petitioners maintain is spurious, Leonor’s signature therein being allegedly forged,37 Leonor
herself admitted having signed the same,38 and this was corroborated by Gertrudes.39
As for Leonor’s co-petitioners’ invocation of their right of redemption of the share of Leonor in the lots sold to Frias,
points of law, theories, issues of fact, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ordinarily are not considered by
a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.40 Besides, given that petitioners already knew of the sale as
early as 1983, they are guilty of laches, having raised their right of redemption for the first time in 2000 when they filed the present
petition.41
At all events, even assuming that the invocation by Leonor’s co-petitioners of their right of redemption was timely made, it
cannot be considered a valid exercise thereof as it was not accompanied by a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase
price.42
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES LEHNER and LUDY MARTIRES, Petitioners,
vs.
MENELIA CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Amended Decision,1 as well as the Resolutions2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 30, 2005, July 5, 2006 and August
28, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388. The assailed Decision of the CA reversed and set aside its earlier Decision,
dated April 30, 2004, in favor of petitioners. The July 5, 2006 Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, while the
August 28, 2006 Resolution denied petitioners' Second Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Subject of the instant controversy are twenty-four memorial lots located at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Barangay Bagbag,
Novaliches, Quezon City. The property, more particularly described as "Lot: 24 lots, Block 213, Section: Plaza of Heritage-Reg.,"
is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 342914. Respondent, together with her mother, Florencia R. Calagos, own
the disputed property. Their co-ownership is evidenced by a Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care, denominated as
Contract No. 31760, which was executed on June 4, 1992. 3
On December 18, 1995, respondent borrowed from petitioner spouses the amount of ₱150,000.00. The loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage over the abovementioned property. Respondent committed to pay a monthly interest of 8% and an additional 10%
monthly interest in case of default.4
Respondent failed to fully settle her obligation.
Subsequently, without foreclosure of the mortgage, ownership of the subject lots were transferred in the name of petitioners via a
Deed of Transfer.5
On June 23, 1997, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Complaint against petitioners, Manila
Memorial Park Inc., the company which owns the Holy Cross Memorial Park, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, praying
for the annulment of the contract of mortgage between her and petitioners on the ground that the interest rates imposed are unjust
and exorbitant. Respondent also sought accounting to determine her liability under the law. She likewise prayed that the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City and Manila Memorial Park, Inc. be directed to reconvey the disputed property to her. 6
On November 20, 1998, respondent moved for the amendment of her complaint to include the allegation that she later discovered
that ownership of the subject lots was transferred in the name of petitioners by virtue of a forged Deed of Transfer and Affidavit of
Warranty. Respondent prayed that the Deed of Transfer and Affidavit of Warranty be annulled. 7 In their Manifestation dated
January 25, 1999, petitioners did not oppose respondent's motion. 8 Trial ensued.
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered against Menelia R. Chua and in favor of the Sps. Lehner Martires
and Ludy Martires; and Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. as follows:
1. The Complaint is denied and dismissed for lack of merit;
2. The counterclaims are granted as follows:
a. Menelia R. Chua is ordered to pay the Sps. Martires the amount of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; the amount of ₱50,000.00
as exemplary damages; and the amount of ₱30,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees plus costs of suit.
b. Menelia R. Chua is ordered to pay Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. the amount of ₱30,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees
plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
On appeal, the CA affirmed, with modification, the judgment of the RTC, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the trial court
dated 03 August 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the amount of moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. Plaintiff-appellant Menelia R. Chua is hereby ordered to pay the defendant-appellees Spouses Martires the amount
of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages; ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and attorney's fees of ₱10,000.00 plus costs of
suit.
Insofar as defendant-appellee Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. is concerned, the attorney's fees awarded is reduced to
₱10,000.00 plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA ruled that respondent voluntarily entered into a contract of loan and that the execution of the Deed of Transfer is sufficient
evidence of petitioners' acquisition of ownership of the subject property.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.11 Petitioners opposed it.12
On September 30, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed Amended Decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the movant's Motion for Reconsideration.
Accordingly, the decision of this Court dated April 30, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388, which had affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, in Civil Case No. Q-97-31408, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and it is hereby
declared that:
(1) The assailed decision dated August 3, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 221 in Civil Case No. Q-97-
31408 is hereby Reversed with the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) The Deed of Transfer dated July 3, 1996, as well as the Affidavit of Warranty, are hereby declared void ab initio;
(2) The loan of ₱150,000.00 is hereby subject to an interest of 12% per annum.
(3) The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City [are] hereby directed to cancel the
registration or annotation of ownership of the spouses Martires on Lot: 24 lots, Block 213, Section: Plaza Heritage – Regular,
Holy Cross Memorial Park, being a portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 342914 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, and revert registration of ownership over the same in the name of appellant Menelia R. Chua, and Florencia R.
Calagos.
(4) The movant, Menelia R. Chua, is hereby ordered to pay the spouses Martires the amount of ₱150,000.00 plus interest of 12%
per annum computed from December 18, 1995 up to the time of full payment thereof and, after deducting payments made in the
total amount of ₱80,000.00, the same shall be paid within ninety (90) days from the finality of this decision. In case of failure
to pay the aforesaid amount and the accrued interests from the period hereinstated, the property shall be sold at public auction to
satisfy the mortgage debt and costs, and if there is an excess, the same is to be given to the owner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.13
The CA reconsidered its findings and concluded that the Deed of Transfer which, on its face, transfers ownership of the subject
property to petitioners, is, in fact, an equitable mortgage. The CA held that the true intention of respondent was merely to provide
security for her loan and not to transfer ownership of the property to petitioners. The CA so ruled on the basis of its findings that:
(1) the consideration, amounting to ₱150,000.00, for the alleged Deed of Transfer is unusually inadequate, considering that the
subject property consists of 24 memorial lots; (2) the Deed of Transfer was executed by reason of the same loan extended by
petitioners to respondent; (3) the Deed of Transfer is incomplete and defective; and (4) the lots subject of the Deed of Transfer are
one and the same property used to secure respondent's ₱150,000.00 loan from petitioners.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,14 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated July 5, 2006.
On July 26, 2006, petitioners filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration, 15 but again, the CA denied it via its Resolution dated
August 28, 2006.
Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DEED OF TRANSFER EXECUTED BY
THE RESPONDENT IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS BY RULING THAT:
1. The Deed of Transfer executed by respondent in favor of petitioners over the subject property was not entered in the Notarial
Book of Atty. Francisco Talampas and reported in the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
2. The Deed of Transfer was not duly notarized by Atty. Francisco Talampas inasmuch as there was no convincing proof that
respondent appeared before Notary Public Atty. Talampas.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEED OF TRANSFER EXECUTED BETWEEN
THE RESPONDENT AND THE PETITIONERS CONSTITUTED AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE CONSIDERING THAT:
1. Said issue was not raised in any pleading in the appellate and trial courts.1âwphi1
2. Respondent herself admitted that a separate mortgage was executed to secure the loan. 16
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, the instant petition should be denied for being filed out of time. Petitioners admit in the instant petition that: (1) on
July 18, 2006, they received a copy of the July 5, 2006 Resolution of the CA which denied their Motion for Reconsideration of the
assailed Amended Decision; (2) on July 26, 2006, they filed a Motion to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration attaching
thereto the said Second Motion for Reconsideration; (3) on September 5, 2006, they received a copy of the August 28, 2006
Resolution of the CA which denied their Motion to Admit as well as their Second Motion for Reconsideration; and (4) they filed
the instant petition on October 20, 2006.
Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari under the said Rule "shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner's motion
for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment." Relative thereto, Section 2, Rule 52 of the same
Rules provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained."
Based on the abovementioned dates, the start f the 15-day period for the filing of this petition should have been reckoned from July
18, 2006, the time of petitioners' receipt of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration, and not on September 5,
2006, the date when they received the CA Resolution denying their Second Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioners should
have filed the instant petition not later than August 2, 2006. It is wrong for petitioners to reckon the 15-day period for the filing of
the instant petition from the date when they received the copy of the CA Resolution denying their Second Motion for
Reconsideration. Since a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing did not toll the running of
the period to file an appeal by certiorari.17 Petitioners made a critical mistake in waiting for the CA to resolve their second motion
for reconsideration before pursuing an appeal.
Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. 18 For this reason, petitioners'
failure to file this petition within the 15-day period rendered the assailed Amended CA Decision and Resolutions final and
executory, thus, depriving this Court of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal therefrom. 19On this ground alone, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
In any case, even granting, arguendo, that the present petition is timely filed, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the
findings and conclusions of the CA in its disputed Amended Decision.
Anent the first assigned error, petitioners are correct in pointing out that notarized documents carry evidentiary weight conferred
upon them with respect to their due execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so
clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity. 20 However, the presumptions that attach to notarized
documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. 21 A defective notarization will
strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument. 22 Consequently, when there is a defect in the
notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is
dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence. 23
In the present case, the CA has clearly pointed out the dubious circumstances and irregularities attendant in the alleged notarization
of the subject Deed of Transfer, to wit: (1) the Certification 24 issued by the Clerk of Court of the Notarial Section of the RTC of
Makati City which supposedly attested that a copy of the subject Deed of Transfer is on file with the said court, was contradicted
by the Certification25 issued by the Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the same office as well as by the testimony of
the court employee who prepared the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court, to the effect that the subject Deed of Transfer
cannot, in fact, be found in their files; (2) respondent's categorical denial that she executed the subject Deed of Transfer; and (3)
the subject document did not state the date of execution and lacks the marital consent of respondent's husband.
Indeed, petitioners' heavy reliance on the Certification issued by the notary public who supposedly notarized the said deed, as well
as the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City, is misplaced for the following
reasons: first, the persons who issued these Certifications were not presented as witnesses and, as such, they could not be cross-
examined with respect to the truthfulness of the contents of their Certifications; second, as mentioned above, these Certifications
were contradicted by the Certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City as
well as by the admission, on cross-examination, of the clerk who prepared the Certification of the Clerk of Court, that their office
cannot, in fact, find a copy of the subject Deed of Transfer in their files;26 and third, the further admission of the said clerk that the
Certification, which was issued by the clerk of court and relied upon by petitioners, was not based on documents existing in their
files, but was simply based on the Certification issued by the notary public who allegedly notarized the said Deed of Transfer.27
Assuming further that the notarization of the disputed Deed of Transfer was regular, the Court, nonetheless, is not persuaded by
petitioners' argument that such Deed is a sufficient evidence of the validity of the agreement between petitioners and respondent.
While indeed a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the
validity of its contents.28 The presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 29 In
the present case, the presumption cannot be made to apply, because aside from the regularity of its notarization, the validity of the
contents and execution of the subject Deed of Transfer was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was
subsequently overthrown by the questionable circumstances attendant in its supposed execution. These circumstances include: (1)
the alleged agreement between the parties that the ownership of the subject property be simply assigned to petitioners instead of
foreclosure of the contract of mortgage which was earlier entered into by them; (2) the Deed of Transfer was executed by reason
of the loan extended by petitioners to respondent, the amount of the latter's outstanding obligation being the same as the amount of
the consideration for the assignment of ownership over the subject property; (3) the inadequacy of the consideration; and (4) the
claim of respondent that she had no intention of transferring ownership of the subject property to petitioners.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA that the agreement between
petitioners and respondent is, in fact, an equitable mortgage.
An equitable mortgage has been defined as one which, although lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites
demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, there being no
impossibility nor anything contrary to law in this intent. 30
One of the circumstances provided for under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, where a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, is "where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of
a debt or the performance of any other obligation." In the instant case, it has been established that the intent of both petitioners and
respondent is that the subject property shall serve as security for the latter's obligation to the former. As correctly pointed out by
the CA, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the disputed Deed of Transfer would show that the said document was
executed to circumvent the terms of the original agreement and deprive respondent of her mortgaged property without the requisite
foreclosure.
With respect to the foregoing discussions, it bears to point out that in Misena v. Rongavilla, 31 a case which involves a factual
background similar to the present case, this Court arrived at the same ruling. In the said case, the respondent mortgaged a parcel of
land to the petitioner as security for the loan which the former obtained from the latter. Subsequently, ownership of the property
was conveyed to the petitioner via a Deed of Absolute Sale. Applying Article 1602 of the Civil Code, this Court ruled in favor of
the respondent holding that the supposed sale of the property was, in fact, an equitable mortgage as the real intention of the
respondent was to provide security for the loan and not to transfer ownership over the property.
Since the original transaction between the parties was a mortgage, the subsequent assignment of ownership of the subject lots to
petitioners without the benefit of foreclosure proceedings, partakes of the nature of a pactum commissorium, as provided for under
Article 2088 of the Civil Code.
Pactum commissorium is a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing given as guaranty for the fulfillment of the
obligation in the event the obligor fails to live up to his undertakings, without further formality, such as foreclosure proceedings,
and a public sale.32
In the instant case, evidence points to the fact that the sale of the subject property, as proven by the disputed Deed of Transfer, was
simulated to cover up the automatic transfer of ownership in petitioners' favor. While there was no stipulation in the mortgage
contract which provides for petitioners' automatic appropriation of the subject mortgaged property in the event that respondent fails
to pay her obligation, the subsequent acts of the parties and the circumstances surrounding such acts point to no other conclusion
than that petitioners were empowered to acquire ownership of the disputed property without need of any foreclosure.
Indeed, the Court agrees with the CA in not giving credence to petitioners' contention in their Answer filed with the RTC that
respondent offered to transfer ownership of the subject property in their name as payment for her outstanding obligation. As this
Court has held, all persons in need of money are liable to enter into contractual relationships whatever the condition if only to
alleviate their financial burden albeit temporarily.33
Hence, courts are duty-bound to exercise caution in the interpretation and resolution of contracts lest the lenders devour the
borrowers like vultures do with their prey.34 Aside from this aforementioned reason, the Court cannot fathom why respondent
would agree to transfer ownership of the subject property, whose value is much higher than her outstanding obligation to petitioners.
Considering that the disputed property was mortgaged to secure the payment of her obligation, the most logical and practical thing
that she could have done, if she is unable to pay her debt, is to wait for it to be foreclosed. She stands to lose less of the value of
the subject property if the same is foreclosed, rather than if the title thereto is directly transferred to petitioners. This is so because
in foreclosure, unlike in the present case where ownership of the property was assigned to petitioners, respondent can still claim
the balance from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, if there be any. In such a case, she could still recover a portion of the value
of the subject property rather than losing it completely by assigning its ownership to petitioners.
As to the second assigned error, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the issue of whether or not the subject
Deed of Transfer is, in fact, an equitable mortgage was not raised by the latter either in the RTC or the CA.
It is true that, as a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its
consideration.35 Higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the
proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. 36However, as with most
procedural rules, this maxim is subject to exceptions.37 In this regard, the Court's ruling in Mendoza v. Bautista38 is instructive, to
wit:
x x x Indeed, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of
errors and to consider errors not assigned. Section 8 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 8 Questions that may be decided. - No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of
the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered, unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely
related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and
clerical errors.
Thus, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in
these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of
justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court
and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court
ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.39
In the present case, petitioners must be reminded that one of the main issues raised by respondent in her appeal with the CA is the
validity and due execution of the Deed of Transfer which she supposedly executed in petitioners' favor. The Court agrees with
respondent that, under the factual circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the determination of the validity of the subject Deed
of Transfer would necessarily entail or involve an examination of the true nature of the said agreement. In other words, the matter
of validity of the disputed Deed of Transfer and the question of whether the agreement evidenced by such Deed was, in fact, an
equitable mortgage are issues which are closely related, which can, thus, be resolved jointly by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Amended Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 30, 2005, July 5, 2006 and August 28, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA.
TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from
the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are
all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the
inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita),
and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and
Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner
Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir
Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate
stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252)
to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering that there
was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and
approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only
personal properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of ₱32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth ₱20,000.00;
pieces of jewelry valued at ₱15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth ₱6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock
of Cebu Emerson worth ₱22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct
Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the order of
January 8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her inventory with copies of three
certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January
10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of ₱4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock
with total par value of ₱4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth ₱30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma)
be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita
had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined
to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.7
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be included in
or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue. 8
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the
inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby denies the administratrix’s motion for
approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are
supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties mentioned in
the last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of
this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado
which had come to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.9
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001
on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir
Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in
the name of Mervir Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration,
and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded from
the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as
administrator to include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her
stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for
certiorari, stating:
I
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE
LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION
OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION)
BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING
ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows: 13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated March
14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353
located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989
and the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the
revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned and affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new
inventory of properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the ownership of the
thing sold "shall be transferred to the vendee" upon its "actual and constructive delivery," and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to
the effect that the sale made through a public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio
and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on
November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had
assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 "for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with
the difference that in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were included"; that as
to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been "even at the losing end considering that such parcels of land,
subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration through shares of
stock"; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not
be included in the inventory "considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate planning scheme"; that the
RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property registered in the
name of third persons or corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed
settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped
from questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be included
in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction
considering that they have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be included
in or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not
questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for which they are not estopped, since that is their right,
considering that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties which were already
titled and in possession of a third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law possessed
a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court,
private respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of
corporate fiction because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established since it cannot be presumed.14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et al. 15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale
or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari to assail the
orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper.
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final
or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory
order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain
whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial
court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not
a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action
during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a
considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose
as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower
court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided
that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari
under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated May
18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the
inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant
determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to the effect that the order of
the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be changed or modified at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory
order "in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots." The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court declared that a "probate court, whether in a testate or
intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally," and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that
the "patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action." Indeed, in the cited case of
Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing
parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final
judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, 21 which also governs appeals in special
proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law "that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may be the subject of an appeal in due course.
The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the
trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally
determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances
in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from
an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or
judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of
the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or
guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from
the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order
granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are
permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for including properties in the inventory
notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration
of the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that
had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the
surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration
to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties
of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three
months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the
inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the
inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies
that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator.
Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be
excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in
revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate."23Hence, the RTC that presides over
the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory.
According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which
properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration
of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with
or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion." 25 As long as
the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent
and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties
is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such
determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap: 26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having
to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special
and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent
to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution
of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the inclusion of the properties in question
in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who,
upon her death, left several properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306-R
which are supposed to be divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the counsel for
the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said
estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Mercado
should be included in the inventory of properties required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court that she did not include in the
inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by her from money derived
from the taxicab business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake
of being conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her
husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account in her
name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being
conjugal in character, and so, one-half thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties constituting as estate of her
husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in Badian, Cebu
containing an area of 53,301 square meters as described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When it was the subject of Civil
Case No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be
the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was
admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be
included in the inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty
Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner
and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died on January 12,
1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has not long to live and made
in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977
provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the inventory
to be approved in this case should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in
contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at
least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31,
1991 (Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing
the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to include the properties in question
in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory because
Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their
property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable
for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property acquired
during that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must
prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. 30 In the absence of or pending the
presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the
real owners of the affected properties were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions
that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put
that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of
the estate of Emigdio, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name.1âwphi1 Indeed, the RTC noted in the order
of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB-12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB-
12692 was susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed
out their differences with the assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable considering that Mervir Realty, whose
business was managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other words, Mervir Realty
appeared to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not
sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction
under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention
nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any
binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining
the true nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio
would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death was a circumstance
that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having
been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the exchange as a form of
an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for
immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of
assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to
lands.1âwphi1However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the
mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to
third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to
the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. 35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should still be
included in the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue
on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might have constricted the determination
of the rights to the properties arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion
in the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special
and limited jurisdiction, was still "deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective."37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult
issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving
spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from
the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also
provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions
and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters
relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by
gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was well within
the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and
proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known
to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the
estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal
or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.39
In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu;
DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate
of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ AND MARIA CRISTINA CABARRUS, Petitioners
vs.
SPS. PETER L. PO AND VICTORIA L. PO, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208497
SPS. PETER L. PO AND VICTORIA L. PO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ AND MARIA CRISTINA CABARRUS, JOSE MARIA MORAZA, AND ERNESTO ABOITIZ AND
ISABEL ABOITIZ, Respondents
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Court of Appeals' October 31, 2012 Decision 2and its June
17, 2013 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 03803. The assailed decision affirmed the Regional Trial Court's Decision, 4 which
declared the spouses Peter Po and Victoria Po (Spouses Po) as the rightful owners of the parcel of land. However, the Court of
Appeals ruled that respondents Jose Maria Moraza (Jose), spouses Ernesto Aboitiz (Ernesto), and Isabel Aboitiz (Isabel) were
innocent buyers in good faith whose titles were entitled to protection. 5 The assailed resolution denied the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the spouses Roberto Aboitiz and Maria Cristina Cabarrus (Spouses Aboitiz). 6
The Spouses Aboitiz filed the Petition7 docketed as G.R. No. 208450. The Spouses Po filed the Petition 8 docketed as G.R. No.
208497. These cases are consolidated in the case at bar.
This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City, 9 initially registered as Original Certificate of Title No.
0-887, and titled under the name of Roberto Aboitiz (Roberto). 10 The land is referred to as Lot No. 2835. 11
This parcel of land originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno (Mariano). 12
On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno (Ciriaco), over a 1.0120-hectare
land in Cebu covered by Tax Declaration No. 43358. 13 This property included two (2)
lots: Lot No. 2807 and the land subject of this case, Lot No. 2835. 14
On May 5, 1978, Ciriaco sold the two (2) lots to Victoria Po (Victoria).15 The parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. 16
On July 15, 1982, Mariano died and was survived by his five (5) children (Mariano Heirs): Esperanza Seno V da. De Kuizon,
Ramon Seno, 17 Benita Seno Vda. De Lim, Simeon Seno,18 and Ciriaco.19
In 1990, Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco "had executed a [q]uitclaim dated August 7, 1989 renouncing [his] interest over
Lot [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner] Roberto."20 In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was "the declared owner of Lot [Nos.]
2835 and 2807."21
The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco.22 By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated
June 28, 1990 in which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration for
the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with after the quitclaim. 23
However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to Roberto.24 The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds
of absolute sale in favor of Roberto.25 Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of a subdivision called North
Town Homes.26
In 1991, the Spouses Po declared Lot No. 2835 for taxation purposes and was issued Tax Declaration No. 0634-A.27
In 1992, Roberto also declared Lot No. 2835 for taxation purposes and was issued Tax Declaration No. 1100, annotated with: "This
tax declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs. VICTORIA LEE PO married to PETER PO under [T]ax [Declaration] [N]o.
0634-A so that one may be considered a duplicate to the other. "28
On April 19, 1993, Roberto filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835 with the Mandaue City Regional Trial
Court, acting as land registration court. 29 The case was raffled to Branch 28 and docketed as LRC Case No. N-208.30
In its Decision dated October 28, 1993, the trial court granted the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name
of Roberto.31 The lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose. 32
On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of title with damages. 33
The complaint was docketed in Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. 34
The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Po in its Decision dated November 23, 2009:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs, and against defendants, declaring the plaintiffs as
owner of subject land and ordering the defendants reconvey and/or return to plaintiffs Lot No. 2835; declaring as absolute nullity
all the documents of sale involving Lot 283 5 executed by the Heirs of Mariano Seno in favor of defendant Roberto Aboitiz and
such other documents used in the improvident issuance of titles in the name of defendants, and to cancel the said titles. 35
The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 31, 2012, partially
affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land. However, it ruled that the titles issued
to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected.36
The Court of Appeals discussed the inapplicability of the rules on double sale and the doctrine of buyer in good faith since the land
was not yet registered when it was sold to the Spouses Po.37 However, it ruled in favor of the Spouses Po on the premise that
registered property may be reconveyed to the "rightful or legal owner or to the one with a better right if the title [was] wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another person's name."38 The Court of Appeals held that the Mariano Heirs were no longer the owners
of the lot at the time they sold it to Roberto in 1990 because Mariano, during his lifetime, already sold this to Ciriaco in 1973. 39
It found that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was duly notarized and was thus presumed regular on
its face.40 Their Memorandum of Agreement did not cancel or rescind the Deed of Absolute Sale but rather strengthened their claim
that they "entered into a contract of [s]ale. "41
It likewise ruled that, contrary to the assertion of the Spouses Aboitiz, there was no showing that Ciriaco merely held the property
in trust for the Mariano Heirs. 42
It held that the action of the Spouses Po had not yet prescribed because their complaint in 1996 was within the 10-year prescriptive
period as the title in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz was issued in 1994. 43
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the certificates of title of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel were valid as they were innocent
buyers in good faith.44
The Spouses Aboitiz thus filed their Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 208450.1âwphi1
45 They argue that the Decision of Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granting the complaint of the Spouses Po is

void for lack of jurisdiction over the matter.46 They claim that a branch of the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to nullify a
final and executory decision of a co-equal branch;47 it is the Court of Appeals that has this jurisdiction. 48
They likewise assert that the Spouses Po's cause of action has prescribed 49 and allegedly accrued when the Deed of Absolute Sale
between the Spouses Po and Ciriaco was executed on May 5, 1978.50 They maintain that more than 10 years had elapsed when the
complaint was filed on November 12, 1996, thus barring the action through prescription.51
The Spouses Aboitiz further insist that "estoppel and laches have already set in."52 They claim that they have been "in open, public,
continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful[,] and adverse possession" in the concept of owners over the property for "46 years as of 1993,"
without the Spouses Po acting on the Deed of Absolute Sale.53 They attest that the development of North Town Homes Subdivision
"was covered by utmost publicity," but the Spouses Po did not immediately question the development or interpose any objection
during the registration proceedings. 54
They posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is "clearly fake and fraudulent" 55 as evidenced by
certifications of its non-existence in the notarial books and the Spouses Po's failure to enforce their rights over the property until
18 years later. 56 They also affirm that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is inadmissible as no
documentary stamp was paid and affixed. 57
Lastly, they contend that the Mariano Heirs should have been impleaded in the action as they are indispensable parties. 58
The Spouses Po filed a Comment59 where they argued that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction when it granted their complaint
because the case filed by the Spouses Aboitiz was for the registration of the land, while the case they filed was for
reconveyance.60 They insisted that their action had not prescribed because an action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years from
the "date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property."61 They argued that "laches ha[d] not set in."62 They claimed that
the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between them and Ciriaco was not fake or fraudulent and was admissible in evidence63 whereas
the Spouses Aboitiz failed "to overcome [its] presumption of regularity and due execution."64 They asserted that "the documentary
stamps tax ha[d] been paid"65 and that the Mariano Heirs were not indispensable parties.66
Spouses Aboitiz filed a Reply67 reiterating their arguments in the Petition.
The Spouses Po also filed a Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 208497. They claim that respondents Jose,
Ernesto, and Isabel are not "innocent purchasers for value."68 They allegedly knew of the defective title of Roberto because his tax
declaration had the following annotation: "This tax declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs. VICTORIA LEE PO, married
to PETER PO under tax dec. No. 0634-A so that one may be considered a duplicate to the other. (Section 89 Paragraph H PD
464)."69
Spouses Aboitiz filed a Comment.70 Aside from reiterating their assertions in their Petition for Review in G.R No. 208450, they
argued that there was no evidence that they acted in bad faith as "subdivision lot buyers [were] not obliged to go beyond the
[T]orrens title."71
Spouses Po filed a Reply. 72
For resolution are the following issues:
First, whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po's complaint;
Second, whether the action is barred by prescription,
Third, whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply;
Fourth, whether the land registration court's finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the property in trust for the Mariano Heirs is
binding as res judicata in this case;
Fifth, whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po should be considered as
evidence of their entitlement to the property;
Sixth, whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are indispensable parties; and
Finally, whether the respondents Jose Maria Moraza, Ernesto Aboitiz, and Isabel Aboitiz are innocent purchasers in good faith.
I
The Spouses Aboitiz argue that Branch 55, Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to nullify the final and executory Decision
of Branch 28, Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. N-208.73 They claim that that it is the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction
to annul judgments of the Regional Trial Court.74
However, the instant action is not for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is a complaint for reconveyance,
cancellation of title, and damages.75
A complaint for reconveyance is an action which admits the registration of title of another party but claims that such registration
was erroneous or wrongful. 76 It seeks the transfer of the title to the rightful and legal owner, or to the party who has a superior
right over it, without prejudice to innocent purchasers in good faith. 77 It seeks the transfer of a title issued in a valid proceeding.
The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic fraud-fraud committed on the true owner instead of fraud committed
on the procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
An action for annulment of title questions the validity of the title because of lack of due process of law. There is an allegation of
nullity in the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that is issued.
The complaint of the Spouses Po asserted that they were the true owners of the parcel of land which was registered in the name of
the
Spouses Aboitiz.78 They alleged that they acquired the property from Ciriaco, who acquired it from Mariano. 79 They claimed that
the Spouses Aboitiz had the property registered without their knowledge and through fraud. 80 Thus, they sought to recover the
property and to cancel the title of the Spouses Aboitiz.81 Thus the prayer in their Complaint stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Honorable Court is respectfully prayed to render judgment in favor of plaintiffs and
against defendants, ordering the latter as follows:
1. To reconvey and/or return to plaintiffs Lot No. 2835 which is the subject matter of this complaint;
2. To declare as absolute nullity all the documents of sale involving Lot 2835 in favor of defendants and such other documents
used in the improvident issuance of the Title in the name of defendants, and to cancel said Title;
3. To pay jointly and severally the amount of ₱ 1,000,000.00 as moral damages; ₱500,000.00 as actual damages; ₱ 100,000.00
as attorneys fees and ₱ 20,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises. 82
Except for actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions involving "title to, or possession of, real property."83 Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts[.]
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title is an action involving the title to real property. 84
The complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for reconveyance and annulment of title. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction to hear the case.
The Spouses Aboitiz claim that it is the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction over the annulment of Regional Trial Court
judgments. 85
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is provided in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts[.]
While the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the Regional Trial Courts, the case at bar is not for the annulment
of a judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is for reconveyance and the annulment of title.
The difference between these two (2) actions was discussed in Toledo l 86 v. Court of Appeals:
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. An action for reconveyance, on the other hand, is a legal and equitable remedy granted to
the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling
the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. The Court of Appeals has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment
of judgments of Regional Trial Courts whereas actions for reconveyance of real property may be filed before the Regional Trial
Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts, depending on the assessed value of the property involved.
Petitioners allege that: first, they are the owners of the land by virtue of a sale between their and respondents' predecessors-in-
interest; and second, that respondents Ramoses and ARC Marketing illegally dispossessed them by having the same property
registered in respondents' names. Thus, far from establishing a case for annulment of judgment, the foregoing allegations clearly
show a case for reconveyance. 87 (Citations omitted)
As stated, a complaint for reconveyance is a remedy where the plaintiff argues for an order for the defendant to transfer its title
issued in a proceeding not otherwise invalid. The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic rather than extrinsic
fraud; that is, fraud committed on the real owner rather than fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
An action for annulment of title, on the other hand, questions the validity of the grant of title on grounds which amount to lack of
due process of law. The remedy is premised in the nullity of the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that is issued. Title
that is invalidated as a result of a successful action for annulment against the decision of a Regional Trial Court acting as a land
registration court may still however be granted on the merits in another proceeding not infected by lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic
fraud if its legal basis on the merits is properly alleged and proven.
Considering the Spouses Aboitiz's fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po's knowledge and the latter's assertion of their
ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to cancel the Spouses Aboitiz' s88 title, the action is for reconveyance
and annulment of title and not for annulment of judgment.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.
II
The Spouses Aboitiz argue that the Spouses Po's cause of action has prescribed. 89 They claim that prescription has set in because
the original complaint was filed only on November 12, 1996, after more than 10 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Ciriaco and Spouses Po was executed on May 5, 1978. 90
The Spouses Po's action has not prescribed.
"[A]n action for reconveyance ... prescribes in [10] years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property." 91The basis for
this is Section 53, Paragraph 392 of Presidential Decree No. 152993 in relation to Articles 145694 and 1144(2)95 of the Civil Code.96
Under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), the owner of a property may avail of legal remedies against a
registration procured by fraud:
SECTION 53. Presentation of Owner's Duplicate Upon Entry of New Certificate. - ...
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such
fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title ...
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring a property through fraud becomes an implied trustee of the property's
true and lawful owner.97
An implied trust is based on equity and is either (i) a constructive trust, or (ii) a resulting trust.98 A resulting trust is created by
implication of law and is presumed as intended by the parties.99 A constructive trust is created by force of law 100 such as when a
title is registered in favor of a person other than the true owner. 101
The implied trustee only acquires the right "to the beneficial enjoyment of [the] property." 102 The legal title remains with the true
owner. 103 In Crisostomo v. Garcia, J,r., .: 104
Art. 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
Thus, it was held that when a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title of property, a constructive trust is
created in favor of the defrauded party.
Constructive trusts are "created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal
right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold."
When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner. The
action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the title. 105 (Citations omitted)
Thus, the law creates a trust in favor of the property's true owner.
The prescriptive period to enforce this trust is 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. Article 1144 of the Civil Code
provides:
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
In an action for reconveyance, the right of action accrues from the time the property is registered . 106
In Crisostomo, 107 the petitioners were able to transfer the property under their names without knowledge of the respondent. 108 The
respondent filed an action for reconveyance. 109 In arguing that the action for reconveyance had prescribed, the petitioners claimed
that the cause of action of the respondent should be based on the latter's Deed of Sale and thus the respondent's right of action
should have accrued from its execution.110 This Court, however, ruled that the right of action accrued from the time the property
was registered because registration is the act that signifies that the adverse party repudiates the implied trust:
In the case at bar, respondent's action which is for Reconveyance and Cancellation of Title is based on an implied trust under Art.
1456 of the Civil Code since he averred in his complaint that through fraud petitioners were able to obtain a Certificate of Title
over the property. He does not seek the annulment of a voidable contract whereby Articles 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code would
find application such that the cause of action would prescribe in four years.
An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration
or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust
under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Art. 1144. This tenyear prescriptive period begins to run from the date
the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the
land. 111 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Likewise, in Duque v. Domingo: 112
The registration of an instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the whole world, and,
therefore, discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration. Such registration is deemed to be a
constructive notice that the alleged fiduciary or trust relationship has been repudiated. It is now settled that an action on an implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date the right of action accrued. The issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 7501 in 1931 to Mariano Duque commenced the effective assertion of adverse title for the purpose of the statute of
limitations. 113 (Citations omitted)
Registration of the property is a "constructive notice to the whole world."114 Thus, in registering the property, the adverse party
repudiates the implied trust. 115 Necessarily, the cause of action accrues upon registration. 116
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title does not seek to question the contract which allowed the adverse party to obtain
the title to the property. 117 What is put on issue in an action for reconveyance an d cancellation of title is the ownership of the
property and its registration. 118 It does not question any fraudulent contract. 119 Should that be the case, the applicable provisions
are Articles 1390120 and 1391 121 of the Civil Code. 122
Thus, an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title prescribes in 10 years from the time of the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property. 123
Considering that the Spouses Po's complaint was filed on November 19, 1996, less than three (3) years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the property on April 6, 1994, it is well within the 10-year prescriptive period imposed on an action for
reconveyance.
III
The Spouses Aboitiz insist that estoppel and laches have already set in. 124 They claim that they have been in "open, continuous,
public, peaceful, [and] adverse" possession in the concept of owners over the property for "46 years as of 1993," without the
Spouses Po acting on their Deed of Absolute Sale. 125 Moreover, the development of North Town Homes Subdivision "was covered
by utmost publicity" but the Spouses Po did not promptly question the development. 126 In fact, they did not interpose any objection
during the registration proceedings. 127
There is laches when a party was negligent or has failed "to assert a right within a reasonable time," thus giving rise to the
presumption that he or she has abandoned it. 128 Laches has set in when it is already inequitable or unfair to allow the party to assert
the right. 129 The elements of laches were enumerated in Ignacio v. Basilio:
There is laches when: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under whom he claims, gave rise to the situation complained of; (2)
there was delay in asserting a right after knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant had
no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4) there is injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant. 130 (Citation omitted)
"Laches is different from prescription."131 Prescription deals with delay itself and thus is an issue of how much time has
passed. 132 The time period when prescription is deemed to have set in is fixed by law. 133 Laches, on the other hand, concerns itself
with the effect of delay and not the period of time that has lapsed. 134 It asks the question whether the delay has changed "the
condition of the property or the relation of the parties" such that it is no longer equitable to insist on the original right. 135 In Nielson
& Co., Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.: 136
Appellee is correct in its contention that the defense of laches applies independently of prescription. Laches is different from the
statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay. Whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay.
Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being
founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches
applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, Laches is not. 137
The defense of laches is based on equity. 138 It is not based on the title of the party invoking it, but on the right holder's "long
inaction or inexcusable neglect" to assert his claim. 139
This Court rules that the Spouses Po is not barred by laches. There is no showing that they abandoned their right to the property.
The factual findings reveal that the Spouses Po had their rights over the property registered in the assessor's office. 140 They testified
that they introduced improvements by cultivating fruit trees after they purchased the lots. 141 When the Spouses Po discovered that
Ciriaco executed a quitclaim renouncing his interest over Lot No. 2807 in favor of Roberto, the Spouses Po executed a
Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco to protect their interest in Lot No. 2835.142
The Spouses Po also had the property declared for taxation purposes in their names and Tax Declaration No. 0634-A was
issued. 143 Thus, when the Spouses Aboitiz also had the property declared for taxation purposes, it had the annotation: "This tax
declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po, married to Peter Po under tax dee. no. 0634-A so that one may be
considered a duplicate to the other." 144
The Spouses Aboitiz only acquired their alleged rights over the property in 1990, when the Mariano Heirs executed the Deeds of
Sale in their favor. 145 Assuming the Spouses Aboitiz immediately took possession and began construction in 1990, it cannot be
said that the Spouses Po were in delay in asserting their right. In the Spouses Po's complaint, they asserted that they made demands
upon the Spouses Aboitiz to reconvey to them the property. 146 They also referred the matter to the barangay for conciliation:
11) That demands were made upon the defendants to reconvey to plaintiffs Lot 2835 unlawfully and feloniously acquired by
defendants, but to no avail, thereby compelling the plaintiffs to elevate the matter for barangay conciliation, and for failure of the
parties to effect a settlement, the proper Certification to file action was then issued, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
"L." 147
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the Spouses Aboitiz did not deny that demands were made upon them and that the matter was
elevated for barangay conciliation:
8. Par. 11 is denied as regards the all[e]gation that Lot 2835 was feloniously and un[l]awfully acquired by defendants, for being
false. The truth is that defendants were in good faith in acquiring same property. Defendants refused to meet the demands of
settlement by plaintiffs because they are strangers to the property in question. 148
When they discovered that the property was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz in 1993, the Spouses Po then filed the
instant complaint to recover the property sold to them by Ciriaco, alleging that it was done without their knowledge, through evident
bad faith and fraud. 149 The Spouses Po filed this case in less than three (3) years from the time of registration.
Based on these circumstances, the elements of laches are clearly lacking in this case. There was no delay in asserting their right
over the property, and the Spouses Aboitiz had knowledge that the Spouses Po would assert their right.
Thus, it cannot be said that they are barred by laches.
IV
The Spouses Aboitiz insist that there is already a finding by the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. N-208 that Ciriaco merely
held the property "in trust for the [Mariano Heirs]." 150 Thus, Ciriaco could not have validly sold the property to the Spouses
Po. 151 They claim that these findings are binding on the whole world because land registration proceedings are actions in rem. 152
In the Decision in LRC Case No. N-208, no one opposed the application for registration.153 Moreover, the Spouses Aboitiz
presented only one (I) witness, Gregorio Espina (Espina), an employee of Roberto, 154 whotestified:
That this parcel of land is covered by tax declarations, to wit: 1) Tax Dec. No. 43174 in the name of Ciriaco Seno for the year 1953
(Exh. "T");
11) Tax Dec. No. 2835 in the name of applicant, Roberto Aboitiz for the year 1991 (Exh. "DD").
That the tax declarations covering Lot No. 2835 are in the name of Ciriaco Seno because the heirs of Mariano Seno have agreed
that Lot No. 2835 be held in trust by Ciriaco Seno in favor of the heirs. 155
This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance.
Res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness of judgment, respectively covered under
Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (b) and (c): 156
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a
former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
Res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing of another action based on "the same claim, demand, or
cause of action."157 It applies when the following are present: (a) there is a final judgment or order; (b) it is a judgment or order on
the merits; (c) it was "rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties"; and (d) there is "identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action" between the first and second actions. 158
Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment applies when there is an identity of issues in two (2) cases between the
same parties involving different causes of action.159 Its effect is to bar "the relitigation of particular facts or issues" which have
already been adjudicated in the other case. 160 In Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City:161
The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there
judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far
as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of
action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can
be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue[s] be
identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second
if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues. 162
However, in Racoma v. Fortich, 163 this Court held that res judicata could not be a defense in an action for reconveyance based on
fraud where the complainant had no knowledge of the application for registration:
The other ground upon which the lower court dismissed the complaint is res judicata. It is stated in the order of dismissal that the
plaintiff had admitted that the property in controversy was applied for by defendant Maximina Fortich in a cadastral proceeding
and under Act 496; that the proceedings were in rem and, therefore, the whole world, including the plaintiff, were parties thereto
and bound by the judgment thereon ... [I]t is obvious that the lower court was referring to the legal effect of the conclusiveness
against all persons of the in rem decision in the cadastral case rather than the actual fact that the plaintiff was a claimant who
appeared in the said case, for he alleged in his complaint that he "has no knowledge whatsoever of the application for registration
filed by defendant Maximina Fortich and the order of decree of registration issued in favor of the defendant Maximina Fortich by
this Honorable Court until on February 25, 1967 ... " (Record on Appeal, page 30). Such being the case, then an action for
reconveyance is available to the plaintiff, the decree of registration notwithstanding, for ...
" ... , it is now a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that the existence of a decree of registration in favor of one party is no bar
to an action to compel reconveyance of the property to the true owner, which is an action in personam, even if such action be
instituted after the year fixed by Section 38 of the Land Registration Act as a limit to the review of the registration decree, provided
it is shown that the registration is wrongful and the property sought to be reconveyed has not passed to an innocent third party
holder for value.["] 164 (Emphasis supplied)
The reason for this rule is to prevent the unjust deprivation of rights over real property. As discussed in People v. Cainglet: 165
It is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding - a proceeding in rem - is binding and conclusive
upon the whole world.1âwphi1 Reason is that public policy and public order demand not only that litigations must terminate at
some definite point but also that titles over lands under the Torrens system should be given stability for on it greatly depends the
stability of the country's economy. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. However, this conclusiveness of judgment in the
registration of lands is not absolute. It admits of exception. Public policy also dictates that those unjustly deprived of their rights
over real property by reason of the operation of our registration laws be afforded remedies. Thus, the aggrieved party may file a
suit for reconveyance of property or a personal action for recovery of damages against the party who registered his property through
fraud, or in case of insolvency of the party who procured the registration through fraud, an action against the Treasurer of the
Philippines for recovery of damages from the Assurance Fund. Through these remedial proceedings, the law, while holding
registered titles indefeasible, allows redress calculated to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of other. Necessarily,
without setting aside the decree of title, the issues raised in the previous registration case are relit1ated, for purposes of
reconveyance of said title or recovery of damages. 166 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In this case, the Spouses Po allege that the registration was done through fraud. They contend that they were unaware and were
thus unable to contest the registration and prove their claim over the property. Aside from several tax receipts, the Spouses Po
formally offered as evidence, among others, the Deed of Sale executed by Mariano in Ciriaco's favor, the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Ciriaco in their favor, and the Tax Declaration under Victoria's name. Additionally, they also submitted their
Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco and the Quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz.167 These
documents were not considered by the land registration court when it issued the title in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz. The Spouses
Po also offered the Application of Original Registration of Title of the Spouses Aboitiz to prove that the Spouses Aboitiz only
submitted to the land registration court the cancelled tax declarations of Ciriaco, instead of the tax declaration of the Spouses Po. 168
Thus, the ruling of the land registration court cannot be so conclusive as to deny the Spouses Po the remedy afforded to them by
law. The action for reconveyance allows them to prove their ownership over the property. Hence, they are not precluded from
presenting evidence that is contrary to the findings in the land registration case.
The factual findings of the land registration court are not being questioned. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
seeks to compel the registered owner to transfer the property to its true owner. 169 In Hortizuela v. Tagufa: 170
[A]n action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not sought to be set
aside. It does not seek to set aside the decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer
or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has
not passed to an innocent third person for value.
There is no quibble that a certificate of title, like in the case at bench, can only be questioned through a direct proceeding. The
MCTC and the CA, however, failed to take into account that in a complaint for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected
as incontrovertible and is not being questioned. What is being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right. If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the
person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance
of the property. 171 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Likewise in Naval v. Court of Appeals:172
Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not operate to
vest ownership upon her of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title,
because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular
property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be coowned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it
may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still
be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set
aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration
is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right. 173 (Citations omitted,
emphasis supplied)
The rationale for allowing reconveyance despite the finality of the registration is that the issuance of a certificate of title does not
create or vest ownership to a person over the property. 174 Registration under the Torrens system "is not a mode of acquiring
ownership."175 A certificate is only a proof of ownership. 176 Thus, its issuance does not foreclose the possibility of having a
different owner, and it cannot be used against the true owner as a shield for fraud. 177
In an action for reconveyance, the parties are obliged to prove their ownership over the property. Necessarily, the parties may
present evidence to support their claims. The court must weigh these pieces of evidence and decide who between the parties the
true owner is. Therefore, it cannot be bound simply by the factual findings of the land registration court alone.
An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had the opportunity to prove his or her claim in the land
registration case. 178 In such a case, res judicata will then apply. 179 When an issue of ownership has been raised in the land
registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full opportunity to present his or her claim, the findings in the land
registration case will constitute a bar from any other claim of the adverse party on the property. 180
However, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able to prove their claim in the registration
proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to their action for reconveyance.
V
The Spouses Aboitiz posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is fake and fraudulent. 181 They
argue that this is evidenced by certifications of the document's non-existence in the notarial books and the Spouses Po's failure to
enforce their rights over the property until 18 years later. 182 They also claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale is inadmissible as no
documentary stamp was paid and affixed. 183
This Court notes that the Spouses Aboitiz are raising questions of fact which are not within the scope of a review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 184 An appeal under Rule 45 must raise only questions of law, unless the factual findings are not
supported by evidence or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. 185Absent these exceptions, the factual findings of
the lower courts are accorded respect and are beyond the review of this Court.186
The Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove that these exceptions exist in the case at bar. The Regional Trial Court lent credence to
documents presented by the Spouses Po, Peter's testimony about Mariano's sale of the property to Ciriaco, 187 Ciriaco's sale of the
property to the Spouses Po, and the issuance of a Tax Declaration in the name of Victoria. 188
During trial, Peter also testified that after they bought the land, they had a caretaker who cultivated the property by planting fruit
trees. 189 He claimed that when they subsequently discovered the quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz,
they executed a Memorandum of Agreement to protect their interests in the property. 190 He stated that they filed a complaint in
the barangay when the Spouses Aboitiz started cutting down their improvements and that they subsequently discovered that Ciriaco
was forced by the Mariano Heirs to sell the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. 191
The Spouses Aboitiz presented as their first witness Armando Avenido, who testified according to the records only. 192 He claimed
that he was familiar with the land which was being developed by Aboitiz Land. He testified that Roberto acquired the land through
separate Deeds of Sale from the Mariano Heirs, had the tax declaration transferred in his name, paid the taxes on the property,
applied for the property's registration, and developed the property into a subdivision. 193 During cross-examination it was revealed
that the tax declaration of the Spouses Po was issued before the tax declaration of the Spouses Aboitiz and that the Spouses Po
acquired from Ciriaco the entire land, while the Spouses Aboitiz purchased only one-fifth (1/5) of the property. 194
The Spouses Aboitiz's second witness, Bienvenido Escoton, testified that he was a mason working in the subdivision on the road
lot and that he knew no person claiming ownership of the land since 1989. 195
The Regional Trial Court thus held:
Analyzing the adduced and admitted evidence of both parties, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be aptly applied in the case at
bar, for reason that only the sale of Ciriaco Seno (Exh. "A" Exh. All" Exh. 2"/ A, A-1 and A-2) has the validating elements of sale,
whereas the rest of the Deeds of Sale (Exhs 1 to 5) executed by the Heirs of Mariano Seno in favor of the Defendants are void, for
containing untruthful statements as pleaded and proven. They are no longer the owners of the subject property when they executed
the several Deeds of Conveyance to defendant Roberto Aboitiz.
On the first issue on the identity and location of the land, the sale of Ciriaco Seno to Plaintiffs (Exh. "A") reflected in the Tax
Declarations that the Defendants used in their titling proceeding is the very same lot as certified by the Barangay Captain dated
July 28, 1999 under Plaintiff's Request for Admission. Concerning the second formulated issue, only the Deed of Sale executed by
Ciriaco Seno was valid with all the attending requisites of sale. It was sold by the legitimate owner of the land, Ciriaco Seno to the
Plaintiffs. The sale (Exh. A, Exhibit "X") enjoyed preferential date of execution, being dated or executed in 1978 by the lawful
owner Ciriaco Seno who was first to register the sale in the Registry of Property office, and due to such registration, the Tax
Declaration of Ciriaco Seno, was cancelled and a new Tax Declaration was issued in the name of Victoria Po for as shown in Exh.
E the said tax declaration succeeded in canceling the Tax Declaration of Mariano Seno (Exh. C) and was issued thereafter a Tax
Declaration in the name of C[i]riaco Seno (Exh. D). So, when the latter sold the subject land to plaintiffs in 1978, the same was
already owned by C[i]riaco Seno.
When Mariano Seno died in 1982, the subject land owned by C[i]riaco Seno, naturally, is not part of the estate of Mariano Seno,
for at that point in time, the subject land is now owned by plaintiffs Sps. Po, and the same was declared in their names (Exh. "D"
"E" & "E-1 ").
As to the issue whether defendant Roberto Aboitiz was a purchaser in good faith and for value, the Court holds that defendant
Roberto Aboitiz was not a purchaser in good faith and for value for he was already informed of the ownership of plaintiffs over the
subject land during the conciliation proceedings before the barangay official when plaintiffs filed a barangay case against him.
In this case, the Court believes that defendant Roberto Aboitiz is aware of the proprietary rights of the plaintiffs considering the
land was already declared for taxation purposes in plaintiffs' names after the tax declaration of said land, first in the name of
Mariano Seno was cancelled and another one issued in the name of C[i]riaco Seno when the latter bought the said land from his
father Mariano Seno, and after the said tax declaration in the name of C[i]riaco Seno was cancelled and another one issued in the
name of plaintiffs herein.
So, defendant Roberto Aboitiz purchased the subject land from the Heirs of Mariano Seno who are no longer the owners thereof
and the tax declaration of subject land was no longer in the name of Mariano Seno nor in the name of Heirs of Mariano Seno.
The City Assessor of Mandaue City even issued a Certification (Exh. X) to the effect that Tax Declaration No. 0634-A in the name
of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po married to Peter Po was issued prior to the issuance of T.D. No. 1100 in the name of Roberto Aboitiz
married to Maria Cristina Cabarruz.
Buyers of any untitled parcel of land for that matter, to protect their interest, will first verify from the Assessor's Office that status
of said land whether it has clean title or not. 196
With the exception of its ruling regarding respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel being purchasers in good faith, these factual findings
were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, there is no showing that the factual findings are not supported by evidence or that the judgment seems to be based on a
misapprehension of facts. Therefore, the factual findings of the lower courts are binding.
Furthermore, this Court finds that the Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove their claim of fraud. The Spouses Aboitiz attempted to prove
that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was fake and fraudulent by presenting certifications of its non-
existence in the notarial books of the notary public who notarized the document. 197
However, a review of the certifications does not even state that the document does not exist in the notarial books.
The Certification dated April 1, 1997 of the Records Management and Archives Office of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports states:
This is to certify that per records of this Office, Deed of Sale executed by and between Ciriaco Seno and Victoria Lee known as
Doc. No. 66; Page No. 14; Book No. I; Series of 1978 entered in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Jesus Pono is not among
the documents transferred by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for safekeeping. 198
Likewise, the Certification dated April 4, 1997 of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, 7th Judicial
Region, Cebu City provides:
This is to certify that as per notarial records on file with this office, available and found as of this date, Atty. Jesus M. Pono had
been issued a Notarial Commission for the term 1978-1979.
It is further certifie[d] that said Notary Public has not submitted his notarial reports for the year 1978-1979 in this office wherein
the Deed of Sale as stated on the letter dated March 31, 1997 designated as Doc. no. 66; Page no. 14; Book no. I and Series of 1978
is allegedly included. 199 (Emphasis supplied)
These Certifications do not declare that the Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist. They only state that at the time of their issuance,
the Notary Public had not submitted his notarial reports or that the document had not been transferred to the archives for
safekeeping. It cannot logically be concluded from these certifications that the document is inexistent, false, or fraudulent. In any
case, the Notary Public's failure to submit his or her notarial report does not affect the act of notarization. 200
Rule 132, Section 30 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. - Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may
be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of
the instrument or document involved.
When a private document is notarized, the document is converted to a public document which is presumed regular, admissible in
evidence without need for proof of its authenticity and due execution, and entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. 201
To overturn the presumption in favor of a notarized document, the party questioning it must present "clear, convincing, and more
than merely preponderant evidence."202
Thus, parties who appear before a Notary Public should not be prejudiced by the failure of the Notary Public to follow rules imposed
by the Notarial Law.203 They are not obliged to ensure that the Notary Public submits his or her notarial reports. 204
The Spouses Aboitiz failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption. The notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is, thus, presumed regular and authentic.
Consequently, this Court can affirm the finding that the property was sold to Ciriaco in 1973, and that Ciriaco, as the owner of the
property, had the right to sell it to the Spouses Po. Hence, the lot did not form part of the estate of Mariano, and the Mariano Heirs
did not have the capacity to sell the property to the Spouses Aboitiz later on.
VI
The Spouses Aboitiz argue that the Mariano Heirs are indispensable parties who should have been impleaded in this case.205
The Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
An indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary that "the action cannot be finally
determined" without him or her because his or her interests in the matter and in the relief "are so bound up with that of the other
parties."206
The property owners against whom the action for reconveyance is filed are indispensable parties. 207 No relief can be had, and the
court cannot render a valid judgment, without them. 208 The property has been sold to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.209 Thus,
they are indispensable parties.
However, the seller of the property is not an indispensable party. 210 In Spring Homes Subdivision Co., Inc. v. Spouses Tablada,
Jr.: 211
Similarly, by virtue of the second Deed of Absolute Sale between Spring Homes and the Spouses Lumbres, the Spouses Lumbres
became the absolute and registered owner of the subject property herein. As such, they possess that certain interest in the property
without which, the courts cannot proceed for settled is the doctrine that registered owners of parcels of land whose title is sought
to be nullified should be impleaded as an indispensable party. Spring Homes, however, which has already sold its interests in the
subject land, is no longer regarded as an indispensableparty, but is, at best, considered to be a necessary party whose presence is
necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in its
absence without affecting it. This is because when Spring Homes sold the property in question to the Spouses Lumbres, it practically
transferred all its interests therein to the said Spouses. In fact, a new title was already issued in the names of the Spouses
Lumbres. As such, Spring Homes no longer stands to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in the instant suit regardless
of whether the new title registered in the names of the Spouses Lumbres is cancelled in favor of the Spouses Tablada or not. Thus,
contrary to the ruling of the RTC, the failure to summon Spring Homes does not deprive it of jurisdiction over the instant case for
Spring Homes is not an indispensable party. 212 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied).
The Mariano Heirs, as the alleged sellers of the property, are not indispensable parties. They are at best necessary parties, which
are covered by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:
Section 8. Necessary Party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete
relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
Necessary parties may be joined in the case "to adjudicate the whole controversy," but the case may go on without them because a
judgment may be rendered without any effect on their rights and interests. 213
The Mariano Heirs may likewise be considered material witnesses to the action. A material matter to which a witness can testify
on can be a "main fact which was the subject of the inquiry" or any circumstance or fact "which tends to prove" the fact subject of
the inquiry, "which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to such inquiry," and "which legitimately affects the
credit of any witness who testifies."214
The validity of the Deeds of Sale allegedly executed by the parties in this case is a material matter in determining who the true
owner of the property is. Thus, the Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, may testify as to the Deeds of Sale they executed to prove
which sale is the valid one.
However, it is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already sold all their interests in the property
to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected, benefited, or injured byany ruling of this Court on the matter, whether it
grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this Court as to whether the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance
will not affect their rights. Their interest has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties.
VII
Despite these findings, the Spouses Po cannot recover the property. Respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are innocent purchasers
for value.
An innocent purchaser for value refers to the buyer of the property who pays for its full and fair price without or before notice of
another person's right or interest in it.215 He or she buys the property believing that "the [seller] [i]s the owner and could [transfer]
the title to the property."216
The Spouses Po argue that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are not innocent purchasers for value because the tax declaration
over the property has the following annotation:
This tax declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po, married to Peter Po under tax dee. no. 0634-A so that one
may be considered a duplicate to the other.
However, if a property is registered, the buyer of a parcel of land is not obliged to look beyond the transfer certificate of title to be
considered a purchaser in good faith for value.217
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529218 states:
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. - Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be
subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required to
appear ofrecord in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over the
land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period
from the delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof,
if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or
any other law or regulations on agrarian reform. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cruz v. Court of Appeals:219
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land and to put a stop to any question of legality of the title
except claims which have been recorded in the certificate of title at the time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto.
Every registered owner and every subsequent purchaser for value in good faith holds the title to the property free from all
encumbrances except those noted in the certificate. Hence, a purchaser is not required to explore further what the Torrens title on
its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property the
court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation
would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens
system would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the
evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Even
if a decree in a registration proceeding is infected with nullity, still an innocent purchaser for value relying on a Torrens title issued
in pursuance thereof is protected. 220
The rationale for this rule is the public's interest in sustaining "the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of the lawful
ownership of the land or of any encumbrance" on it.221 In Leong v. See:222
One need not inquire beyond the four comers of the certificate of title when dealing with registered property ...
The protection of innocent purchasers in good faith for value grounds on the social interest embedded in the legal concept granting
indefeasibility of titles.1âwphi1 Between the third party and the owner, the latter would be more familiar with the history and
status of the titled property. Consequently, an owner would incur less costs to discover alleged invalidities relating to the property
compared to a third party. Such costs are, thus, better borne by the owner to mitigate costs for the economy, lessen delays in
transactions, and achieve a less optimal welfare level for the entire society. 223 (Citations omitted)
Thus, respondents were not obliged to look beyond the title before they purchased the property. They may rely solely on the face
of the title.
The only exception to the rule is when the purchaser has actual knowledge of any defect or other circumstance that would cause "a
reasonably cautious man" to inquire into the title of the seller.224 If there is anything which arouses suspicion, the vendee is obliged
to investigate beyond the face of the title. 225 Otherwise, the vendee cannot be deemed a purchaser in good faith entitled to protection
under the law.226
In this case, there is no showing that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel had any knowledge of the defect in the title. Considering
that the annotation that the Spouses Po are invoking is found in the tax declaration and not in the title of the property, respondents
Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel cannot be deemed purchasers in bad faith.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' October 31, 2012 Decision227 and its June 17, 2013 Resolution228 in CA-G.R. CV No. 03803
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case
No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of
law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public, for
violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice Rules). 2
The Case
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint3 with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline,
charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification;
(3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission 4 to the Bar and receipt5 of his notarial commission, he
had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002.6 She also accused Atty. Zaide of making
false and irregular entries in his notarial registers.7
Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-
Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband and her parents-in-law.
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and violation of
RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against
a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients' interests. 9 Lastly, Gimeno
contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against
her.10 In another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone
suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in one of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these statements constitute
intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.
In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007,Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were superimposed over
the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this document. 13 Atty. Zaide claimed that
Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his admission to the Bar.
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use several notarial
registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their growing
number.14 This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers.
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged
the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment
of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners. 15 On this basis, the respondent should not be held liable
for representing conflicting clients' interests.
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his pleadings. 16
The IBP Proceedings
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory conference. 17 After this, both parties were required
to submit their position papers.
In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found
Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using abusive
and insulting language in his pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained several active
notarial registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide
for lawful inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered
papers" and to "keep only one active notarial register at any given time."19However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty.
Zaide should not be held administratively liable for usurping a notary public's office. The investigating commissioner noted that
the evidence presented on this issue is not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial
extrajudicial partition even after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission. 20
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno was indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He
disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend them in their annulment
of title case. The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its lawyers. 21But despite this previous attorney-client
relationship, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing conflicting interests
since the annulment of title case is totally unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno through
Atty. Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and abusive language when he called
Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.22 For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo
recommended that Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months for employing abusive and insulting
language.23
The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the evidence on record fully supports the
findings of the investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension
from being commissioned as a notary public.24
Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent
June 21, 2013 resolution.26
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and accordingly confirms them.
For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that the parties identified.
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules
a. Usurpation of a notarial office
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the
March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.
It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as notary public.1âwphi1 Atty. Zaide's
signature and notarial stamp that bears his name, roll number, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration date of his notarial
commission, were merely superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true information. However, he denied that he
personally stamped and signed the document. In fact, this document never appeared in his notarial register and was never included
in his notarial report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it
appear that he was the one who notarized it.
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public
had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures
pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date,
particularly on March 29, 2002.
 This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the alleged fictitious
notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt
of his notarial commission.
We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after his Bar admission, were stamped on the March
29, 2002 document. How this happened is not clear from the evidence before us.
b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices
We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers in several offices. Because
of this practice, the following notarized documents had been irregularly numbered and entered:
Document27 Date Doc. No. Page Book Year

Special Power of Attorney 6/20/05 273 55 18 2005

Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005

Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005

Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006

Affidavit of Two Disinterested 4/17/06 310 61 25 2006

Persons

Petition for Issuance of Owner's 4/17/06 72 15 25 2006

Duplicate copy

Affidavit of Parental Consent 4/19/06 461 93 23 2006

Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006

Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006

Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for
lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently
bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial
register at any given time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant
violation of Section 1, Rule VI.
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial register and ensure that the entries
in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several
notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer the notarial acts 29 that
the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary
public, should perform it.
On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant
practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations.
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to maintain several active notarial registers in separate
offices so he could accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial services.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers and duties are impressed with public
interest.30 A notary public's office is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been
privileged to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His flagrant violation of Section 1,
Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes."
Representing conflicting interests
The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients'
interests.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.1âwphi1
In Aniñon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting interests
between and among his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.32
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or previous employment.33
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's client.
The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where
Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any way connected to the complaint that
Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the annulment of a land title.
Somontan was never a party to this case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where Atty. Zaide
appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds
that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly,
the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan engaged his services, he had already left
ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information which he
acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the prohibition against the representation of
conflicting interests.
Use of intemperate, offensive and
abusive language in professional
dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the
courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis
supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious
extortionist."34 And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language in
presenting his comment against his opposing counsel:
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the
Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a
prosecutor...This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as regard her mandate as
an Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words - a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.36
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive personality and to refrain from
any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's
language even in his pleadings, must be dignified.37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and
for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the
practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint1 tiled by Fe A. Ylaya (complainant) against Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott
(respondent) who allegedly deceived the complainant and her late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory" Deed
of Sale that the respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.
After the submission of the respondent's comment to the complaint, the Court referred the complaint to the Commission on Bar
Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, evaluation and recommendation.
The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title ( TCT) Nos. 162632 and 162633 located at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the acquisition
of these properties, TCT No. 162632 (property) was already the subject of expropriation proceedings filed by the City Government
of Puerto Princesa (City Government) on May 23, 1996 against its former registered owner, Cirilo Arellano. The expropriation
case was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and was docketed as Civil Case
No. 2902. The RTC already fixed the price and issued an order for the City Government to deposit ₱6,000,000.00 as just
compensation for the property.2
The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation case as intervenors for being the new
registered owners of the property. The complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale"
for the sale of the property, but he left blank the space for the name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration. The respondent
further alleged that the deed would be used in the sale to the City Government when the RTC issues the order to transfer the
titles.3 The respondent then fraudulently – without their knowledge and consent, and contrary to their understanding –
converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001, 4 selling the subject property
to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos So for ₱200,000.00.5
The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the ₱200,000.00 purchase price or that they would sell the property "for
such a measly sum" when they stood to get at least ₱6,000,000.00 as just compensation.6
The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 even though Reynold
and Sylvia (his mother’s sister) are his uncle and his aunt, respectively.7
The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint.8
The respondent argued that the complainant’s greed to get the just Compensation9 caused her to file this "baseless, unfounded
and malicious" disbarment case.10 He claimed that the sale was their voluntary transaction and that he "simply ratified the
document."11 He also claimed that Reynold and Laurentino had originally jointly purchased the properties from Cirilo Arellano on
July 10, 2000; that they were co-owners for some time; and that Laurentino subsequently sold his share to Reynold under a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001.12
The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant and her late husband to execute any "preparatory deed of sale" in favor
of the City Government.13 He also denied that the Deed of Absolute Sale contained blanks when they signed it. 14 That he filed for
the spouses Ylaya and Reynold an opposition to the just compensation the RTC fixed proved that there was no agreement to use
the document for the expropriation case.15 He also argued that it was clear from the document that the intended buyer was a natural
person, not a juridical person, because there were spaces for the buyer’s legal age, marital status, and citizenship,16 and he was
even constrained to file a subsequent Motion to Intervene on behalf of Reynold because the complainant "maliciously retained" the
TCTs to the subject properties after borrowing them from his office.17 Lastly, he denied violating the Rules on Notarial Practice.18
On September 4, 2006, the respondent filed a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August 24, 2006 praying for the early
resolution of the complaint.19
On December 5, 2006, the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case
dated November 14, 2006.20
On February 28, 2008, the complainant executed an Affidavit21 affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness and due
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000; 22 the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated April 19,
2000;23 and the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.24 The respondent submitted this Affidavit to the IBP as an attachment to
his Motion for Reconsideration of April 21, 2008.25
The IBP’s Findings
In her Report and Recommendation dated November 19, 2007, IBP Commissioner Anna Caridad Sazon-Dupaya found the
respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice).26 She recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.27
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30228 dated December 14, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the IBP Commissioner’s
finding, but increased the penalty imposed to two (2) years suspension and a warning:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner [in] the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondent’s violations of Canon 1, [Rule] 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule IV,
Sec. 39(c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice), Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott is hereby SUSPENDED
from practice of law for two (2) years with a Warning that commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
[emphases supplied]
On May 8, 2008, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 21, 2008, attaching, among others, a copy of the
complainant’s Affidavit dated February 27, 2008, admitting the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale between Cirilo and Laurentino; the MOA between Laurentino and Reynold; the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Laurentino and Reynold; and the Compromise Agreement between Reynold and the complainant dated November 14,
2006 for the expropriation case.29
On September 4, 2008, the respondent filed a Manifestation with the Supreme Court, requesting that the IBP be directed to resolve
his Motion for Reconsideration.30
By Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,31 the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration for failing to raise any new substantial matter or any cogent reason to warrant a reversal or even a modification
of its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302.32
On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBP’s findings, as follows:33
a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was pre-signed and fraudulently notarized without requiring Fe Ylaya
to adduce evidence in a formal hearing thus, violated the respondent’s right to due process as he was not able to cross-
examine her. This is not to mention that the complainant failed to offer corroborative proof to prove her bare allegations;
b) In sweepingly and arbitrarily disregarded/skirted (sic) the public documents (MOA and 2 other DOAS) duly executed by the
parties therein and notarized by the respondent;
c) In totally ignoring the complainant’s Affidavit admitting the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale in issue;
d) In arbitrarily concluding the absence of co-ownership by Reynold So and Fe Ylaya of the subject lots despite the existence of a
notarized MOA clearly showing the co-ownership of Ylaya and So; and
e) In finding the respondent/appellant’s act of notarizing the DOAS as contrary to the notarial rules.
The Issues
From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the following issues:
(1) whether the IBP violated the respondent’s right to due process; and
(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
The Court’s Ruling
We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP Board of Governors finding the
respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.34
We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for being remiss in his
obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties. We likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for
representing conflicting interests without the written consent of the represented parties, thus, violating the rule on conflict
of interests; and (2) Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
a. Due process violation
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process means the total lack of opportunity to be heard
or to have one’s day in court. As a rule, no denial of due process takes place where a party has been given an opportunity
to be heard and to present his case;35 what is prohibited is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to due process because he was not given the "amplest opportunity to defend
himself, to cross examine the witness complainant, to object to the admissibility of documents or present controverting
evidence"36 when the IBP rendered its conclusion without requiring the complainant to adduce evidence in a formal hearing and
despite the absence of corroborative proof. He insists that these defects rendered the complainant’s allegations as hearsay, and
the IBP’s report, recommendation or resolution null and void.
Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face confrontation with the complainant when she failed to appear at the required
mandatory conference on October 6, 2005,37 the records reveal that the respondent fully participated during the entire proceedings
and submitted numerous pleadings, including evidence, before the IBP. He was even allowed to file a motion for reconsideration
supported by his submitted evidence, which motion the IBP considered and ruled upon in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated
October 8, 2010.38
In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma, 39 we held that due process, as applied to administrative
proceedings, is the opportunity to explain one’s side. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,40 due process in an administrative context
does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or through pleadings, is accorded, no denial of procedural due process takes place. The requirements of due process are
satisfied where the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Similarly, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President, 41 we held that "due process, as a constitutional precept, does not
always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations,
position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a
certain degree of latitude[, provided that] fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of due
process, for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties."42
In this case, the respondent’s failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient ground to support the claim that
he had not been afforded due process. The respondent was heard through his pleadings, his submission of alleged
controverting evidence, and his oral testimony during the October 6, 2005 mandatory conference. These pleadings, evidence and
testimony were received and considered by the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and recommendation, and were
the bases for the IBP Board’s Resolution.
Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. A denia of
due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
Undoubtedly in this case, the requirement of the law was afforded to the respondent." 43
We also note that the respondent, on a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August 24, 2006, submitted his case to the IBP
for its resolution without any further hearings. The motion, filed almost one year after the mandatory conference on October 6,
2005, significantly did not contain any statement regarding a denial of due process. In effect, the respondent himself waived his
cross-examination of the complainant when he asked the IBP Board of Governors to resolve the case based on the pleadings and
the evidence on record. To quote his own submission:
1. On June 30, 2004, a complaint was filed in this case;
2. On October 19, 2004, the respondent filed his comment with all its attachments denying all the allegations in the complaint;
3. On June 23, 2005, the respondent filed his position paper. On April 28, 2006, the respondent also filed his supplemental position
paper. By contrast, up to this date, the complainant/petitioner has not filed her verified position paper thus, waived her right to file
the same;
4. There being no other genuine issues to be heard in this case as all the defenses and counter-arguments are supported by
documentary evidence, it is most respectfully prayed that the instant case be resolved on its merits or be ordered dismissed for lack
of merit without further hearing;
5. Further, considering that there is an on-going case in Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan in Civil Case No. 2902
for Expropriation involving the same property, and such fact was deliberately omitted by the complainant in her Verified Complaint
as shown in the certification of non-forum shopping, the outright dismissal of this case is warranted, hence, this motion; and
6. This is meant to expedite the termination of this case.44 (underscore ours; italics supplied)
Finally, we note Section 11, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that:
No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator’s Report shall be considered as substantial
unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in
a miscarriage of justice, in which event the
Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.
In this case, the IBP Commissioner’s findings were twice reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors – the first review resulted
in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30245 dated December 14, 2007, affirming the IBP Commissioner’s findings, but modifying the
penalty; the second review resulted in Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,46denying the respondent’s motion
for reconsideration. In both instances, the IBP Board of Governors found no defect or miscarriage of justice warranting a
remedial action or the invalidation of the proceedings.
We emphasize that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal;
they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, 47 not the trial of an action or a suit.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. [emphases deleted]
The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the
Court.48 Flowing from its sui generis character, it is not mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant must adduce
evidence.
From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not indispensable to the disciplinary proceedings and her failure to appear
for cross-examination or to provide corroborative evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is important is whether, upon
due investigation, the IBP
Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the respondent’s misconduct to warrant the exercise of its disciplinary powers.
b. Merits of the Complaint
"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has
the burden to discharge."49 Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has a greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief compared
to the presented contrary evidence.
Under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in determining whether preponderance of evidence exists, the court may consider
the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, and
the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean
that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.50 By law, a lawyer enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of
the charges against him until the contrary is proven, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties
in accordance with his oath.51
The IBP Commissioner set out her findings as follows:
The undersigned, after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, finds that the charges of the complainant
against the respondent are worthy of belief based on the following:
First, the allegation of the respondent that Reynold So was actually co-owner of spouses Ylanas (sic) in the properties subject of
the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic) is hard to believe despite the presentation of the Memorandum
of Agreement.
It is elementary in Rules of Evidence that when the contents of a written document are put in issue, the best evidence would be the
document itself. In the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic), the buyer of the subject properties is only
Laurentino L. Ylaya married to Fe A. Ylaya. The document does not state that Reynold So was likewise a buyer together with
Laurentino Ylaya, or that the former paid half of the purchase price.
Also, it is hard for this Commission to believe that Reynold So, assisted by a lawyer at that and who allegedly paid half of the
purchase price, would not insist for the inclusion of his name in the Deed of Sale as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title
subsequently issued.
The Memorandum of Agreement between the spouses Ylaya and Reynold So produced by the respondent cannot overturn the belief
of this Commission considering that the Memorandum of Agreement was executed more than a month AFTER the Deed of Sale
between Felix Arellano and the Ylayas was notarized. This is not to mention the fact that the complainant denied ever having
executed the Memorandum of Agreement. A close examination of the signatories in the said Memorandum of Agreement would
reveal that indeed, the alleged signatures of the complainant and her husband are not the same with their signatures in other
documents.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Memorandum of Agreement is valid, thereby making Laurentino Ylaya and co-owner
Reynold So co-owners of the subject properties (Please see Annex "B" of respondent’s Comment), this Commission finds it
hard to believe Laurentino Ylaya would sell it to Reynold So for ₱200,000 x x x when his minimum expenses for the
purchase thereof is already ₱225,000.00 and he was expecting to receive ₱7,000,000.00, more or less. That would mean
that if Reynold So and the complainant were co-owners, the ₱7,000,000.00 would then be equally divided among them at
₱3,500,000.00 each, far above the ₱200,000.00 selling price reflected in the pre-signed Deed of Sale.
As to the second issue, this Commission believes that the respondent committed serious error in notarizing the Deed of Sale and
the Memorandum of Agreement between his uncle Reynold So and Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV, Section 3 (c) of A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC which provides as follows:
"Sec. 3. Disqualifications – a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
(a) x x x.
(b) x x x.
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth
civil degree."
The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the aforementioned Rule becausehis uncle Reynold So, the buyer is
not the principal in the Subject Deed of Sale but the seller Laurentino Ylaya (please see page 3 of the respondent’s Supplemental
Position Paper) is misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer and the seller in the instant case are considered principals in the
contract entered into.
Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that his uncle was not a principal so as to apply the afore-quoted
provision of the Rules, the respondent still violated the Rules when he notarized the subject Memorandum of Agreement between
Laurentino Ylaya and his uncle Reynold So. Clearly, both complainant and Reynold So were principal parties in the said
Memorandum of Agreement.52
The respondent argues that the IBP Commissioner’s findings are contrary to the presented evidence, specifically to the MOA
executed by Laurentino and Reynold acknowledging the existence of a co-ownership;53 to the complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to
Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006 where she stated that the parties
have entered into a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 2902, and that the disbarment complaint arose from a
misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts; 54to her Affidavit dated February 27, 200855 affirming
and confirming the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000; 56 and to
the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.57
In all, the respondent claims that these cited pieces of evidence prove that this administrative complaint against him is fabricated,
false and untrue. He also points to Atty. Robert Peneyra, the complainant’s counsel in this administrative case, as the hand
behind the complaint.58 According to the respondent, Atty. Peneyra harbors ill-will against him and his family after his father
filed several administrative cases against Atty. Peneyra, one of which resulted in the imposition of a warning and a reprimand on
Atty. Peneyra.59
Reynold, in his Affidavit dated October 11, 2004, confirms that there was a co-ownership between him and Laurentino; that
Laurentino decided to sell his half of the property to Reynold because he (Laurentino) had been sickly and in dire need of money
to pay for his medical bills; that Laurentino agreed to the price of ₱200,000.00 as this was almost the same value of his investment
when he and Reynold jointly acquired the property; and that the sale to Reynold was with the agreement and consent of the
complainant who voluntarily signed the Deed of Sale.60
After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and find the evidence insufficient to prove the charge
that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
Specifically, (1) the evidence against the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he has taken to mislead
the complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and the conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold; and (2) no prohibition exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the parties
interested is the notary’s relative within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that time the respondent notarized
the documents.
In her Report and Recommendation,61 the IBP Commissioner concluded that the respondent is liable for deceit and fraud because
he failed to prove the existence of a co-ownership between Laurentino and Reynold; in her opinion, the signatures of the
complainant and of her husband on the MOA "are not the same with their signatures in other documents."62
We do not agree with this finding. While the facts of this case may raise some questions regarding the respondent’s legal practice,
we nevertheless found nothing constituting clear evidence of the respondent’s specific acts of fraud and deceit. His failure
to prove the existence of a co-ownership does not lead us to the conclusion that the MOA and the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated June 4, 2001 are spurious and that the respondent was responsible for creating these spurious documents. We
are further persuaded, after noting that in disregarding the MOA, the IBP Commissioner failed to specify what differences she
observed in the spouses Ylaya’s signatures in the MOA and what documents were used in comparison.
Apart from her allegations, the complainant’s pieces of evidence consist of TCT Nos. 162632 and 162633;63 her Motion for
Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. 2902 dated May 17, 2000; 64 the RTC order in Civil Case No. 2902 dated November 6, 2000
fixing the price of just compensation;65 the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001;66the spouses Ylaya’s Verified Manifestation
dated September 2, 2002, filed with the RTC in Civil Case No. 2902, assailing the Motion to Deposit Just Compensation filed by
the respondent on behalf of Reynold and manifesting the sale between Laurentino and Reynold;67 the Provincial Prosecutor’s
Subpoena to the complainant in connection with the respondent’s complaint for libel;68 the respondent’s complaint for
libel against the complainant dated August 27, 2003; 69 the complainant’s Counter Affidavit dated March 26, 2004 against
the charge of libel;70 and the respondent’s letter to the Provincial Attorney of Palawan dated April 5, 2004, requesting for
"official information regarding the actual attendance of Atty. ROBERT Y. PENEYRA" at an MCLE seminar. 71
We do not see these documentary pieces of evidence as proof of specific acts constituting deceit or fraud on the respondent’s part.
The documents by themselves are neutral and, at the most, show the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship
between the respondent and the complainant. It is one thing to allege deceit and misconduct, and it is another to
demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting these allegations.72
We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant; the Court exercises its disciplinary power
only if the complainant establishes her case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. 73Preponderance of evidence means
that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other party. When the
pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence, the equipoise rule
dictates that the decision be against the party carrying the burden of proof. 74
In this case, we find that the complainant’s evidence and the records of the case do not show the respondent’s deliberate
fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such proof, the complaint for fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility must perforce be dismissed.
We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship with Reynold, whom the complainant alleges
to be the respondent’s uncle because Reynold is married to the respondent’s maternal aunt. 75However, this is of no moment
as the respondent cannot be held liable for violating Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated June 4, 200176 and the MOA dated April 19, 200077 were notarized by the respondent prior to the effectivity of A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6, 2004. The notarial law in force in the years 2000 - 2001 was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917) which did not contain the present prohibition against notarizing documents where the parties are
related to the notary public within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise dismiss the charge for
violation of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting
interests without the written consent of all concerned, particularly the complainant; under Canon 16 for being remiss in his
obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
[emphasis ours]
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. Necessity
and public interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyer’s duty to his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests.
He is duty bound to decline professional employment, no matter how attractive the fee offered may be, if its acceptance involves a
violation of the proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the rules of professional conduct. Thus, a lawyer may not accept
a retainer from a defendant after he has given professional advice to the plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept
employment from another in a matter adversely affecting any interest of his former client. It is his duty to decline employment in
any of these and similar circumstances in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.78
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies "even if the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for
one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated."79 The sole exception is provided in
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – if there is a written consent from all the parties after full
disclosure.
Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The facts of this case show that the respondent retained clients who had close dealings with each other.
The respondent admits to acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses Ylaya and Reynold at one point during the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 2902.80 Subsequently, he represented only Reynold in the same proceedings,81 asserting Reynold’s
ownership over the property against all other claims, including that of the spouses Ylaya. 82
We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved and we cannot give the respondent the benefit of the
doubt in this regard. We find it clear from the facts of this case that the respondent retained Reynold as his client and actively
opposed the interests of his former client, the complainant. He thus violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
We affirm the IBP Commissioner’s finding that the respondent violated Canon 16. The respondent admits to losing
certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his care by Reynold.83 According to the respondent, the complainant "maliciously
retained" the TCTs over the properties sold by Laurentino to Reynold after she borrowed them from his office. 84 Reynold confirms
that the TCTs were taken by the complainant from the respondent’s law office.85
The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession." Allowing a party to take the original TCTs of properties owned by another – an act that could result in
damage – should merit a finding of legal malpractice. While we note that it was his legal staff who allowed the
complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or present when the complainant
borrowed the TCTs,86 we nevertheless hold the respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to
exercise due diligence in caring for his client’s properties that were in his custody.
We likewise find the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him. Despite
the respondent’s admission that he represented the complainant and her late husband in Civil Case No. 2902 and that
he purportedly filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in their behalf, the records show that he never filed such a motion
for the spouses Ylaya. The complainant herself states that she and her late husband were forced to file the Motion for Leave to
Intervene on their own behalf. The records of the case, which include the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by the spouses Ylaya,
support this conclusion.87
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
[therewith] shall render him liable." What amounts to carelessness or negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to his client
is incapable of an exact formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the
obligations due his client is per se a violation.88
In Canoy v. Ortiz,89 we held that a lawyer’s failure to file a position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in this case in his duty to his client when, without any
explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Under the circumstances, we find
that there was want of diligence; without sufficient justification, this is sufficient to hold the respondent liable for violating Canon
18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
d. The Complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the Case and her Affidavit
We are aware of the complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated
November 14, 200690 and her Affidavit91 affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000.92 The complainant explains that the parties have entered into a compromise agreement
in Civil Case No. 2902, and that this disbarment complaint was filed because of a "misunderstanding, miscommunication and
improper appreciation of facts";93 she erroneously accused the respondent of ill motives and bad intentions, but after being
enlightened, she is convinced that he has no personal or pecuniary interests over the properties in Civil Case No. 2902; that such
misunderstanding was due to her unfamiliarity with the transactions of her late husband during his lifetime.94 The complainant now
pleads for the respondent’s forgiveness, stating that he has been her and her late husband’s lawyer for over a decade and affirms
her trust and confidence in him.95 We take note that under their Compromise Agreement dated November 14, 2006 for the
expropriation case,96 the complainant and Reynold equally share the just compensation, which have since increased to
₱10,000,000.00.
While the submitted Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the Case and the Affidavit appear to
exonerate the respondent, complete exoneration is not the necessary legal effect as the submitted motion and affidavit are immaterial
for purposes of the present proceedings. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, "No investigation shall be
interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same."
In Angalan v. Delante,97 despite the Affidavit of Desistance, we disbarred the respondent therein for taking advantage of his clients
and for transferring the title of their property to his name. In Bautista v. Bernabe,98 we revoked the lawyer’s notarial commission,
disqualified him from reappointment as a notary public for two years, and suspended him from the practice of law for one year for
notarizing a document without requiring the affiant to personally appear before him. In this cited case, we said:
Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an end to the
administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 99
In sum, in administrative proceedings against lawyers, the complainant’s desistance or withdrawal does not terminate the
proceedings. This is particularly true in the present case where pecuniary consideration has been given to the complainant as a
consideration for her desistance. We note in this regard that she would receive ₱5,000,000.00, or half of the just compensation
under the Compromise Agreement,100 and thus agreed to withdraw all charges against the respondent.101 From this perspective, we
consider the complainant’s desistance to be suspect; it is not grounded on the fact that the respondent did not commit
any actual misconduct; rather, because of the consideration, the complainant is now amenable to the position of the
respondent and/or Reynold.
e. Procedural aspect
We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely recommendatory and do not attain finality
without a final action from this Court. Section 12, Rule 139-B is clear on this point that:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –
xxxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.1âwphi1
The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. 102 It exercises such disciplinary functions
through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the IBP’s recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law or disbarment are always subject to this Court’s review and approval.
The Penalty
In Solidon v. Macalalad,103 we imposed the penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months from the practice of law on the respondent
therein for his violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Josefina
M. Aniñon v. Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr.,104 we suspended the respondent therein from the practice of law for one (1) year,
for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under the circumstances, we find a one (1) year
suspension to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we set aside Resolution No. XVIII-.2007-302 dated December 14, 2007 and Resolution No.
XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010 of the IBP Board of Governors, and find respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of
violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a penalty,
he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N. Jandoquile against respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla,
Jr.
The Facts of the case are not disputed.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit2 signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado.
Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr.
is disqualified to perform the notarial act3 per Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
xxxx
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal 4within the fourth
civil degree.
Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid
identification cards.
In his comment5 to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted Jandoquile’s material allegations. The
issue, according to Atty. Revilla, Jr., is whether the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth
civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid identification cards is a ground for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus,
he should be considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require
the affiants to present valid identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa
are sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family.
Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve the case instead of referring it to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation.
Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. We
agree with him, however, that his violation is not a sufficient ground for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond dispute. Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that
he notarized the complaint-affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Section 3(c), Rule IV of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act,
since two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of the
disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing the document. We cannot agree
with his proposition that we consider him to have acted more as counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the
complaint-affidavit. The notarial certificate6 at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a notary public, with a
notarial commission valid until December 31, 2012.
He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If the notary public knows the affiants
personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat"
under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public
or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of
the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. In this case, Heneraline
Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the
live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified in no
longer requiring them to show valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to indicate such fact
in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was included therein that he knows the three affiants personally. 7 Let it be
impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil
degree of affinity. While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the
disqualification rule.
As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice is not a sufficient ground to disbar him. To our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section 27, 8 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. We recall the case of Maria v. Cortez9 where we reprimanded Cortez and disqualified him from being commissioned as
notary public for six months. We were convinced that said punishment, which is less severe than disbarment, would already suffice
as sanction for Cortez’s violation. In Cortez, we noted the prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice that a person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not
in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through a competent evidence of identity. Cortez had notarized a special power of attorney without
having the alleged signatories appear before him. In imposing the less severe punishment, we were mindful that removal from the
Bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe such as reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would
accomplish the end desired.1âwphi1
Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed by Atty. Revilla, Jr., we are in agreement that a
punishment less severe than disbarment would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as
a notary public, or from performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary public, for a period of three (3)
months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his disqualification
has lapsed.
SO ORDERED.
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZMALIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-
Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an
officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Affidavit-Complaint1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1
March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as
its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money. She
claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the
market stall was government-owned. Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and
financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999 without the signature
of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy
and she asked for another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate
of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998.
Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period
within which it could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three Special Powers of Attorney
(SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs
were not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named attorneyin-fact, Florina B.
Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated complainant’s allegations against respondent.2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to submit her comment on
the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice. 3
In her Comment,4 respondent explained thatthe mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of complainant and that the latter
had read it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done.
It was only copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase "absolute and registered owner" was
inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the
subject public market stall under a "Build Operate and Transfer" contract with the local government unit and, technically, she could
be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in which complainant was
represented as the property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against
complainant was not the representation ofherself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was
free from all liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant and
her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the same market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually new.
She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus,
respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign it and
that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant was an experienced
realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement was
notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement
expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs
submitted by complainant as additional evidence wereproperly notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the documents that the
attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent; hence,the notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the
execution ofthe document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized in the
principal’s place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensuedafter respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent Ex-
ParteMotion for Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent,
including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact;
(2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete
signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6)
five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter
toa potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10)an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers.6 Notably, respondent’s Position
Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached to complainant’s Urgent Ex ParteMotion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate revocation
of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath as
such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He accepted
respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso.
However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent
liable for violation of Canon 187 and Rule 18.038of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended that she
besuspended from the practice of law for six months.9
The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the
additional documents submitted by complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the procedural
requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).13Moreover, the Urgent Ex
ParteMotion of complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the
Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating
commissioner should have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due course. Respondent also prayed
that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following: absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest
or selfish motive; personal and emotional problems; timely goodfaith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of
her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character or
reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, deniedrespondent’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBP’s findings.14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago – through a letter addressed
to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio – transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against
respondent.15
THE COURT’S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties’ submissions in this case, the Court
hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural matters raised
by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained
in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in Tolentino v.
Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence
of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it isrelevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The
only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having
been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the ruleon
confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does itstate that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render
said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence
if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable
searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we
explained that: The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill
of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by
any department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The
alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit
of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against
respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion
from evidence of the birth certificates inquestion, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken
into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent. 18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation
thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly consideredin evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional
evidence.
Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-ParteMotion of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading must fail as
well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary
pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject
matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
filed by complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is that the latter notarizedincomplete
documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from
submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she committed misconduct and grievously
violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedlystressed that notarization is not
an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is,
by law, entitled tofull faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document
would be undermined.20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be
notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the
circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined, and
public confidence in notarial documents diminished.21 In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of
the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contractdoes not make
respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s
conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant sometime in September
199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant
a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarityin respondent’s practice as a notary
public. Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were
either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for
it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her presence. 26
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed it and who
personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 27 Thus, in
acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01 28 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood. 29 Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue
enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to
be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will not
disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.31 The blatmt disregard by respondent of her basic
duties as a notary public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification
to be commissioned as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE BALATUCAN, MILDRED
BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, and MELINDA D. SIOTING, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by complainants Euprocina I. Crisostomo (Crisostomo), Marilyn L.
Solis (Solis), Evelyn Marquizo (Marquizo), Rosemarie Balatucan (Balatucan), Mildred Batang (Batang), Marilen Minerales
(Minerales), and Melinda D. Sioting (Sioting) against respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno (Atty. Nazareno), charging him with
making false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case in disregard of Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court, and malpractice as a notary public in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units (subject properties) in Patricia South Villa Subdivision,
Anabu-II, Imus, Cavite, from Rudex International Development Corp. (Rudex).2 In view of several inadequacies and construction
defects3 in the housing units and the subdivision itself, complainants sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the refund of the monthly amortizations they had paid. 4 The first
batch of rescission cases was filed by herein complainants Sioting5 on May 24, 2002, and Crisostomo6 and Marquizo7 on June 10,
2002, while the second batch of rescission cases was filed by complainants Balatucan 8 on March 3, 2003, Solis9 and Ederlinda M.
Villanueva10 (represented by Minerales) on May 12, 2003, and Batang11 on July 29, 2003. In all the foregoing rescission cases,
Rudex was represented by herein respondent Atty. Nazareno.
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of rescission cases.12 Sometime in August 2003,
Rudex filed three (3) petitions for review13 before the HLURB assailing the same. In the certifications against forum shopping
attached to the said petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes, and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not
commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal or
agency14 – this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under the representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an
ejectment case on September 9, 2002 against Sioting and her husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting), before the
Municipal Trial Court of Imus, Cavite (MTC).15
On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another complaint 16 against Sps. Sioting before the
HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and the latter’s ejectment, similar to its pending September 9, 2002
ejectment complaint. Yet, in the certification against forum shopping attached thereto executed by the Head of its Credit and
Collection department, Norilyn D. Unisan,17 Rudex declared that it has not commenced or is not aware of any action or proceeding
involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency. 18The said certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno
himself.19
On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints20 for rescission of contracts to sell and ejectment, plus damages for non-payment of
amortizations due, were filed by Atty. Nazareno, on behalf of Rudex, against the other complainants before the HLURB. The
certifications against forum shopping attached thereto likewise stated that Rudex has not commenced or has any knowledge of any
similar pending action before any court, tribunal or agency.21
On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno,
claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed
while Atty. Nazareno was its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings have been
commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any other court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings
for rescission had been filed by herein complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment
complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition, complainants asserted that Atty.
Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one (1) document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all
the certifications against forum shopping that were separately attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and
ejectment.22
Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute the administrative charges against him. 23
In the interim, the HLURB, in the Resolutions dated April 14, 2005 24 and May 12, 2005,25 dismissed Rudex’s complaints for
rescission and ejectment26 on the ground that its statements in the certifications against forum shopping attached thereto were
false due to the existence of similar pending cases in violation of Section 5,Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation27 dated March 8, 2012, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner
Oliver A. Cachapero recommended the suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a period of six (6) months for his administrative violations.
The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were unassailable proofs that the certification against forum
shopping attached to Rudex’s ejectment complaint against Sps. Sioting had been erroneously declared, considering that at the
time Rudex filed the said complaint in September 2002, Sps. Sioting’s rescission complaint against Rudex, filed on May 24,
2002, was already pending. Hence, it was incumbent upon Rudex to have declared its existence, more so, since both
complaints involve the same transaction and essential facts, and a decision on the rescission complaint would amount to res judicata
on the ejectment complaint.28 In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner observed that Atty. Nazareno cannot claim innocence
of his omission since he was not only Rudex’s counsel but the notarizing officer as well. Having knowingly made false entries
in the subject certifications against forum shopping, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Nazareno be held
administratively liable and thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension. 29
In a Resolution30 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation, but modified the recommended penalty from a suspension of six (6) months to only one
(1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable and accordingly suspended
for a period of one (1) month.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed.
Separate from the proscription against forum shopping31 is the violation of the certification requirement against forum shopping,
which was distinguished in the case of Sps. Ong v. CA32 as follows:
The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification requirement should by now be too elementary
to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of
the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the
certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also
in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the
complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for
direct contempt. x x x.33
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification against forum shopping constitutes
indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions, viz.:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphases supplied)
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) which read as follows:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping attached
to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be held administratively liable.
Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003, petitions for review assailing the
judgments of default rendered in the first batch of rescission cases without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping
the existence of the ejectment case it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue related to the complainants’ rescission
cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and ejectment against
Sps. Sioting without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of Sioting’s May 24, 2002 rescission
complaint against Rudex as well as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally,
on April 1, 2004,Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against the other complainants
in this case without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of complainants’ own complaints for
rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of Court
and more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases
in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering that Atty. Nazareno did
not even bother to refute the charges against him despite due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s
resolution on his administrative liability.1âwphi1 However, as for the penalty to be imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify
the IBP’s finding on this score.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,34 a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law was imposed against the lawyer therein
who was shown to have deliberately made false and untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s
infractions are of a similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned from the foregoing discussion,
had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby suspends him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public, considering that he assigned only one
document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints
for rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing
rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry
and page number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register.35 Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the
foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the aforementioned complaints, fully
aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was
not aware of any pending actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum. The administrative liability of an
erring notary public in this respect was clearly delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01,Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of
the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio,36 to wit:
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be
notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined
and public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.37 (Emphasis supplied)
In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false statements had his notarial commission revoked and
was disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a notary public, the
Court is wont to additionally impose the same penalties of such nature against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his
infractions on this front, coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the Court deems it proper to revoke his
existing commission and permanently disqualify him from being commissioned as a notary public. Indeed, respondent ought to be
reminded that:38
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon he acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
xxxx
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal he gives the document
the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition
to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given
without further proof of their execution and delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon
him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Failing in this, he must
accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making false declarations in the certifications against
forum shopping subject of this case, as well as malpractice as a notary public. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Further, he is PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned
as a notary public and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as
attorney.1âwphi1 Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated March 15, 2013, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by
complainant Joy T. Samonte (complainant) against respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil (respondent), praying that the latter be
disbarred for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and betrayal of trust.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch Xl, Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal case, i.e., NLRC Case RAB-XI-10-00586-
12, filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana plantation.2Consequently, complainant engaged the services
of respondent to prepare her position paper, and paid him the amount of ₱8,000.003 as attorney's fees.4 Despite constantly
reminding respondent of the deadline for the submission of her position paper, complainant discovered that he still failed to file the
same.5 As such, on January 25, 2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision6 based on the evidence on record, whereby complainant
was held liable to the workers in the total amount of ₱633,143.68.7 When complainant confronted respondent about the said ruling,
the latter casually told her to just sell her farm to pay the farm workers.8 Because of respondent's neglect, complainant claimed that
she was left defenseless and without any remedy to protect her interests against the execution of the foregoing judgment; 9 hence,
she filed the instant complaint.
In an Order10 dated March 26, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed respondent to submit his Answer
to the complaint.
In his Answer11 dated April 19, 2013, respondent admitted that he indeed failed to file a position paper on behalf of complainant.
However, he maintained that said omission was due to complainant's failure to adduce credible witnesses to testify in her favor. In
this relation, respondent averred that complainant instructed her to prepare an Affidavit 12 for one Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who
was intended to be her witness; nevertheless, respondent was instructed that the contents of Romeo's affidavit were not to be
interpreted in the Visayan dialect so that the latter would not know what he would be testifying on. Respondent added that
complainant's uncle, Nicasio Ticong, who was also an intended witness, refused to execute an affidavit and testify to her lies. Thus,
it was complainant who was deceitful in her conduct and that the complaint against him should be dismissed for lack of merit.13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation14 dated March 14, 2014, the IBPCBD found respondent administratively liable and, accordingly,
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Essentially, the IBP-CBD found respondent
guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.15
In a Resolution16 dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and
Recommendation, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however, as to the penalty in order to account for
his breach of the rules on notarial practice.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to
expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and accordingly, exercise the required degree of diligence in handling
their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all times, a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their
full attention, skill, and competence to their cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they accept them for a fee or for
free.17 To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. 18 These principles are
embodied in Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR, which respectively read as follows:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.1âwphi1
CANON 18 -A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between complainant and respondent when the latter agreed
to file a position paper on her behalf before the NLRC and, in connection therewith, received the amount of ₱8,000.00 from
complainant as payment for his services. Case law instructs that a lawyer-client relationship commences when a lawyer signifies
his agreement to handle a client's case and accepts money representing legal fees from the latter,19 as in this case. From then on, as
the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to "serve his client with competence and diligence," and in such regard, "not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him."
However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly failed to file the necessary position paper
before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against his client, i.e., herein complainant. To be sure, it is of
no moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce any credible witnesses in support of her position paper; clearly, this is
not a valid justification for respondent to completely abandon his client's cause. By voluntarily taking up complainant's case,
respondent gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend the latter's interest therein. Verily, he owes fidelity to such
cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.20 In A bay v. Montesino,21 it was explained that regardless
of a lawyer's personal view, the latter must still present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his
client's cause:
Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken
or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held administratively liable for violation
of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. Records show that he indeed indulged
in deliberate falsehood when he admittedly prepared23 and notarized24 the affidavit of complainant's intended witness, Romeo,
despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,25the Court highlighted the oath undertaken
by every lawyer to not only obey the laws of the land, but also to refrain from doing any falsehood, viz. :
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or
out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that
the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In
this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."26 (Emphases
supplied)
Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Section 4 (a),
Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person requesting
such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined."27
Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty.
The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v. Capistrano,28 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to
perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client. Similarly, in Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,29 the same penalty
was imposed on a lawyer for his inexcusable negligence in failing to file the required pleading to the prejudice of his client. Hence,
consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by the IBP and accordingly suspends respondent
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, as in the case of Dela Cruz v. Zabala,30 where the notary public
therein notarized an irregular document, the Court hereby revokes respondent's notarial commission and further disqualifies him
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUILY of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year, effective upon
his receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, his notarial commission,
if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
(2) years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as a member
of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
EFIGENIA M. TENOSO Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Etigenia M. Tenoso (complainant) tiled a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez (respondent) alleging that respondent was
engaged in practice as a notary public in Cordon, lsabela, without having been properly commissioned by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela. This is the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the Municipality of Cordon.
This alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC). To support her allegations,
complainant attached the following documents to her pleadings:
a. Two (2) documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian bearing the names of
commissioned notaries public within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Santiago City for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to
2008.1 Respondent's name does not appear on either list;
b. Copies of ten (10) documents that appear to have been notarized by respondent in the years 2006, 2007, and 2008; and
c. A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a joint-affidavit notarized by respondent in 2008 could not be
"authenticated as to respondent's seal and signature as NO Notarial Commission was issued upon him at the time of the document's
notarization."2
In his two-page Answer, respondent denied the allegations saying, "I have never been notarizing any document or pleadings" 3 and
added that he has "never committed any malpractice, nor deceit nor have violated thelawyers (sic) oath".4 He dismissed such
allegations as being "preposterous, full of lies, politically motivated and x x x meant to harass or intimidate him".5
Also, he surmised that the documents annexed to the Affidavit-Complaint were "tampered and adulterated," or that "somebody
might have forged his signature."6 He failed to attend the mandatory conference and likewise failed to file his Position Paper.
In his Report and Recommendation dated 29 September 2008, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and disqualified from being commissioned
as a notary public for two (2) years for violating Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
In a Resolution dated 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but
increased the penalty of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year. Respondent did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or
any other subsequent pleading.
On 12 August 2009, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to the Supreme Court for its action following Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court.8
The Court modifies the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution.
Complainant presented evidence supporting her allegation that respondent had notarized various documents in Cordon, Isabela
from 2006 to 2008 and that respondent's name does not appear on the list of notaries public commissioned by the RTC of Santiago
City, Isabela for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2008.
Respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.1âwphi1 Per Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,9 the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave
Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez, 10where a party resorts to bare denials
and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is sustained.
Respondent merely posited that the notarized documents presented by complainant were "tampered and adulterated" or were results
of forgery, but he failed to present any proof.11 Respondent also resorted to a sweeping and unsupported statement that he never
notarized any document. Accordingly, the reasonable conclusion is that respondent repeatedly notarized documents without the
requisite notarial commission.
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of the court."12 Accordingly, '"lawyers are bound
to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."13
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. 14"Notarization is not a
routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution."15
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other lawyers and the general public to
the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. As noted by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed
acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently,
respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from
lawyers. It is proper that he be sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission, and
accordingly, We SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years and DISQUALIFY him from being commissioned as a
notary public for two (2) years. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
sanction.
SO ORDERED.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-
LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a
high school student filed before the Prosecutor’s Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers,
Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of
misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC,
Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:
In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then
Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the
Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was subsequently annulled for being bigamous.
On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and notarized certain legal documents
on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of respondent’s notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A
Certification1 dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that
respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent
performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Ownership2 dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela
Cruz;
2. Affidavit3 dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
3. Affidavit4 dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
4. Affidavit5 dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
5. Absolute Date of Sale6 dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando
Dela Cruz;
6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties7 dated 5 March 1994, executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
7. Sworn Statement8 dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
8. Deed of Sale9 dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela
Cruz;
9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties10 dated 1 June 1994, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
10. Absolute Deed of Sale11 dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale12 dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando
Dela Cruz;
12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties13 dated 17 April 1996, executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
13. Conditional Deed of Sale14 dated 27 February 1997, executed by Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
14. Memorandum of Agreement15 dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC
Construction represented by Mr. George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal deduction of salary and others which are
still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutor’s Office.
He did not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second marriage and malpractice in
notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred16 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their allegations in their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage, and the subsequent
nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period when his notarial commission
had already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in
doing the complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be administratively penalized for the
following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled first, he be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission, he be suspended
from the practice of law for another one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years. 17
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent
contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and for notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the
expiration of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one (1)
year, for a total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law. 18
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the penalty contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior, and he can be deprived
of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without
invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend,
based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It
must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a person
whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and,
thus, to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney. Elaborating on
this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,19 that the Bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty
and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney
may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because
a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. 20 Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the
profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.21
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Possession of such moral
character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be continuous. Otherwise, "membership in the bar
may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct."22
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge
Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial
recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera
since he had lost all forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter, respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane
Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary
Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second
marriage was entered into, respondent’s prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action having been
initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of respondent’s prior marriage to Teresita
Rivera or a judicial declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage in 1989, having been admitted to
the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a second marriage may be validly
contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate court. The second marriage was annulled only
on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after respondent contracted his second marriage. The
annulment of respondent’s second marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier
emphasized, the annulment came after the respondent’s second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re:
Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the judgment of
annulment of respondent’s second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the
quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability
attaches.23
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis-à-vis, grossly immoral conduct.
Immoral conduct is "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community" and what is "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."24
Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while the first
marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. 25
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondent’s act as grossly immoral. This finds
support in the following recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the high moral standard of the legal
profession, to wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been
romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent
person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.26
In the case of Terre v. Terre,27 respondent was disbarred because his moral character was deeply flawed as shown by the following
circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she was
legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through
law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent’s parents. After respondent had
finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and
without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely to a hospital.
In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,28 respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral acts such as: first, he abandoned
his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he mispresented himself
as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainant’s resources by
securing a plane ticket from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s daughter. He did this without complainant’s
knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant that "everything is legal."
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself acknowledged and declared his abject apology
for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to his wife and
child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh. The power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish
the end desired.29 In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of
one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-1997 after his commission as notary
public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer had
authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private
document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined.30
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has
characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission to do so as "reprehensible, constituting as
it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents." 31
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time
when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a
notarial act without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law.
Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do
so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,32 a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized five documents after his commission
as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to
sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances.
Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents33without the requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondent’s misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by
him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutor’s Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by
the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by
SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need
not be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in
favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another two (2) years for
notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office
of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, 1respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary commission more than twenty years ago be
disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue presented for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of
Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial
law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and
forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the
9th of January 1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to December 31st 1987 and January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989
but the records fail to show any entry at the Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December 31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his commission in December 1989.2
...
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics from Judge Santos or any agency and or public
servants involved in this administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the premises. 3
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental,
which contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary public in the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents under the name Atty. Anthony Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty. Anthony Santos was on January 6, 1988 until December
31, 1989.4
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied the charges against him. He also submitted a
certification5 from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in
the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial register. The respondent further averred as
follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted by the respondent before the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said notarized documents
and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait
Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The undersigned resolved the case in favor of the
plaintiffs.6
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the need to resort to a full-blown investigation to
determine the veracity of the parties’ assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a)
treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of
Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.7
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de
Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied the request but upon the complainant’s insistence, the matter was forwarded to the
Court, which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002. 8 The complainant presented his evidence in
Cagayan de Oro City before retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo. 9
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a)
notarizing documents without commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his notarial
register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be suspended from the
practice of law and barred from being commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his present commission, if any, be
revoked.10
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in his defense, while the complainant presented
documentary evidence to support the charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983
nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. He merely alleged that "there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers
in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." And, as already observed, he presented
no evidence, particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so commissioned) and submission
of notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there were only two Record Books available in the notarial section" of the
RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and that the "(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains items
on the Name, Date Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of the notary public. First entry appearing was made on
December 1982."
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the "first book" would disclose so (at least, for the years 1982 and 1983).
However, he did not present said book. Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis Oriental,
or documents from his files showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of
appointment for all those years. Under Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and forwarded by the
Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General, together with the oath of office of the notary public. 11
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by the complainant, that the respondent notarized
documents in 1980 and 1983 without being commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his earliest commission of
record was on January 9, 1984.12
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief backgrounder.
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts;
and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of
the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent
justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the
Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise
members of the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the CA
and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases. The
Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall
apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13,
2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A Retired Judge For Acts Committed While He Was Still A
Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the
acts constituting the ground for disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer, before his
appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member
of the bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio,
or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly, and
concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the
instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service:
Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly
charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and Judges before
the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication.14
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections
2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings
when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided
in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the
investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a
report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together with the record and all the evidence presented in the
investigation for the final action of the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is
not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor General, any
officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will thereafter base its final action. 15
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not
immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 16of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore,
at the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent
is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court. 17
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing Thereafter Of An Administrative Charge Against Him
For Which He Shall Still Be Held Answerable If Found Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the
bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:18
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent, had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent
public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant
with dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as
he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and
a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.19
However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against members of the
judiciary for purposes of harassment," we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC20 which took effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator, an administrative complaint against any Justice
of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in court is shown to be
clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a finding should be included in the report and
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or affirmed by the Court, the
complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may
further be required to show cause why he or she should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer
of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of
action that occurred at least a year before such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must
forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent
to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not
later than 30 days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement
of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the
retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action
alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or
justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint
was intended to harass the respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by the Office of the Court Administrator on March
26, 2001.21 The respondent retired compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground
for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the respondent did not occur a year before the respondent’s
separation from the service. Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown to be
without merit and intended merely to harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the
foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. 22 In fact, even the new Rule
itself recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges
against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown
that the respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the
charge on the respondent, considering the gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be continuing in order for the respondent judge to be
disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,24 the respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a practicing lawyer. The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of
his client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even after he was appointed as a judge. However, the Court also stated in
this case that the respondent’s subsequent appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from taking responsibility for the
consequences of his acts as an officer of the court.25
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for administrative discipline
against a judge if he is not charged with immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could
never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A lawyer who
aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor - his private
and official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. ... 27
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by substantial evidence. 28 The complainant therein
presented evidence pertaining to the respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence was,
however, adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being appointed to the bench. Thus,
the respondent was exonerated in this case because the complainant failed to present evidence that the indiscretion continued
even after the respondent was appointed to the judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to control and regulate
it in order to promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this Court.29 The Supreme
Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a
bounden duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.30
Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of Falsification
Of Public Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. 31Notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution.32
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. 33 The Court has
characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents."34 For such reprehensible
conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission
and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment. 35
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."37
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity
of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that function.38
The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice to decide the
case on the basis of the pleadings filed.39 Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to
1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent merely alleged in his answer that "there was no proper
recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial
Register." Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent presented no evidence of his commission as notary
public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register.40
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against him.41
The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the documents so notarized, and as such was not
prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an
attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 138 42 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen
to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the
duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. 43
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.
This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to
maintain one’s good standing in the profession. It is a continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does
not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning one’s mental or moral
fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has
all the qualifications to become a lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement
to the practice of law.45
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases.46 As we held in the leading case of In re Almacen:47
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of
an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They]
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. ....48
In a case involving a mere court employee49 the Court disregarded the Court Administrator’s recommendation that the charge
for immorality against the respondent be dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to adduce evidence that the
respondent’s immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit conduct, the respondent was also
found guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth to show that her paramour was the father. The
complaint in this case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after the illicit affair ended. 50 The Court held that
administrative offenses do not prescribe.51
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was
thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by
prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the
integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot
escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar,
to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the
Lawyer’s Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of the matter involved - the
respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative
complaint, will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely Mitigate The Respondent’s Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a
member of the bar.52 By his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such standards;53 he undermined the confidence of the
public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The respondent also violated
Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 54 In representing
that he was possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so authorized, the respondent also violated
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case, considering that the complaint against the respondent was filed
twenty-four years after the commission of the act complained of;56 that there was no private offended party who came forward and
claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a
retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits.57 The Court finds that a fine of
P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the requisite notarial
commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
MILA VIRTUSIO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GRENALYN V. VIRTUSIO, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who failed to use the money given by another to fund the checks she issued as
accommodation party in payment for the property that was purchased by such person and performed a notarial act without
commission.
The Facts and the Case
On June 14, 2005, Mila Virtusio (Mila) filed with this Court a Complaint1 for disbarment against her husband's distant relative,
Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio.Mila alleged that sometime in 1999 Atty. Virtusio convinced her to buy a house and lot at North
Olympus Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon City, from its developer, Stateland Investment Corporation (Stateland). Mila agreed
for Atty. Virtusio to use her personal checks in paying the seller with Mila reimbursing her. Under this arrangement, Mila gave
Atty. Virtusio the following amounts: ₱ 95,000.00, ₱ 25,000.00, ₱ 65,000.00, ₱ 64,000.00 and ₱ 64,000.00. All of these
were properly receipted except for the ₱ 95,000.00 for which she got a receipt from her for only ₱ 90,000.00.2 On October 25
and November 24, 1999, Mila deposited identical amounts of ₱ 64,000.00 each in Atty. Virtusio’s checking account with
Equitable Bank.3 In all, Mila gave her ₱ 441,000.00.
To her surprise, however, Mila began receiving letters from Stateland, demanding that she make good the dishonored checks that
it got. When she confronted Atty. Virtusio regarding this, the latter assured her that she would take care of the problem. But the
demand letters persisted.
For fear of losing the property, Mila directly dealt with Stateland in January 2000. She then found out that her arrearages had come
close to ₱ 200,000.00, inclusive of penalty and interest. In order not to lose the property, Mila and her husband decided to settle
their overdue obligation with money they borrowed at high interest. 4 In turn, Stateland turned over to her three checks of Atty.
Virtusio, each for ₱ 71,944.97, with the notation "DAIF."5
Mila further alleged that Atty. Virtusio declined to return to her the money the latter misappropriated despite demand. Only when
Mila threatened to file a case against her did Atty. Virtusio agree to pay her on February 20, 2001 by executing a deed of sale in
her favor covering her Mazda car. Despite the sale, however, Atty. Virtusio pleaded with Mila and her husband to let her keep the
car meanwhile since she needed it in her work. When she refused to give up the car, Mila filed a replevin case against Atty. Virtusio
that the court eventually decided in Mila’s favor.6 But, as it turned out, Atty. Virtusio had managed to register the car in her
children’s name and sold it to a third person. Mila filed a case of estafa against Atty. Virtusio 7 apart from the present
disbarment case.
Mila claimed that Atty. Virtusio evaded the return of money she misappropriated, impeded the execution of a final judgment, and
engaged in conduct that discredits the legal profession, all in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, rendering her
unfit to remain a member of the bar.8
In a July 27, 2005 Resolution,9 the Court required Atty. Virtusio to comment on the complaint. She asked for extension of time to
comply but did not file her comment just the same.10 On Mila’s motion,11 the Court again required Atty. Virtusio to file her
comment and to show cause why she had not complied with its previous orders. 12 Still, she did not file any comment, prompting
the Court to impose on her on November 15, 2006 a ₱ 500.00 fine. The court again reiterated its order for her to file her comment. 13
With no response, on August 1, 2007, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to resend its November 15, 2006 Resolution to Atty.
Virtusio14 but this was returned unserved with the notation, "RTS-Person moved out." On December 3, 2007 the Court ordered the
resending of the May 3 and November 15, 2006 Resolutions to Atty. Virtusio, this time at an address in Sta. Mesa that Mila
furnished. When this last resolution was returned unserved with the notation, "RTS-Unclaimed," the Court issued a Resolution15 on
April 30, 2008 that considered Atty. Virtusio to have waived her right to file a comment considering that she filed none despite
having sought an extension from the Court. The Court also referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner directed Atty. Virtusio to file a position paper. She filed a motion for extension of time to file
the same but did not.16
Based on the pleadings on hand, the IBP Investigating Commissioner reported having found that Atty. Virtusio appropriated
portions of the money that Mila gave her for payment to Stateland, thus evidencing her moral unfitness to practice the profession.
The Commissioner recommended the imposition of the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law 17 with a two-year
disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public, given that she had notarized documents despite the expiration of her notarial
commission.18 The IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation. 19
Atty. Virtusio filed a motion for reconsideration of the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s action on April 30, 2009.20 She
explained that her failure to file her position paper was brought about by her belief that she needed to wait for the IBP’s action on
her motion for extension of time to file the same. Thus, she prayed that her attached position paper be admitted and
considered in resolving her motion for reconsideration.21
In her version of the facts, Atty. Virtusio wants to convince the Court that she committed no intentional wrongs and that she was
but a victim of circumstances. Although she admitted using Mila’s money rather than pay Stateland with it, she explained
that, having been busy attending to her sick son in Manila, she failed to monitor her check disbursements, entrusting it to
an office staff. Only in December 1999 was she able to audit the same and discover the mismanagement of her funds and its co-
mingling with office funds, resulting in overlapping of accountabilities and non-funding of the checks for Stateland when they fell
due.22
On becoming aware of the lapses, however, Atty. Virtusio borrowed ₱ 165,000.00 from Engr. Marciano de Guzman so she could
pay Mila but, having failed to pay him as well, he went after Mila who was co-maker of the loan. When Atty. Virtusio tried to
make further arrangements to pay what she owed Mila, the latter refused to negotiate and did not acknowledge the past payments
she had already made. When Atty. Virtusio refused to yield to Mila’s demand for payment of the entire ₱ 165,000.00, she
filed a replevin case, a complaint for estafa, and disbarment charge against her. 23
Atty. Virtusio averred that in October 2006 she and Mila entered into a verbal agreement whereby she would pay her ₱ 200,000.00,
with ₱ 87,500.00 up front, in exchange for Mila’s dismissal of all her actions. Notwithstanding that the compromise
agreement had not been formalized, Atty. Virtusio claimed that it obliterated her liabilities, given that she substantially
settled her obligations to Mila.24
Atty. Virtusio also pointed out, that the charges against her were not born of some professional relation between Mila and her. She
had acted as an accommodation party, allowing Mila to make use of her personal checks to facilitate the purchase of a property
from Stateland. And, assuming that the predicament she finds herself in has a bearing on her professional conduct, the same does
not amount to grossly immoral conduct since she owned up to her responsibilities and exerted tireless effort to settle her accounts.25
Further, Atty. Virtusio claimed that she should not be penalized for violation of the notarial law since this offense did not form part
of the original complaint to which she was required to respond. At any rate, she merely committed an oversight. She had religiously
renewed her notarial commission yearly since May 1995. When she notarized the questioned documents, she believed in good faith
that she had renewed her notarial commission for 2006 and 2007 just as before. She asked not to be punished for her mistake since
it was brought about by her sincere commitment to extend free legal service to the disadvantaged. 26
Lastly, Atty. Virtusio asked the Court to reconsider the harsh penalty imposed on her in the light of the peculiar circumstances of
her case and the good faith she showed.27
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution XIX-2011-47728 denying the motion despite an affidavit of
desistance that Mila filed in the meantime.29 As provided in Section 12(b),30 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the IBP forwarded
the instant case to this Court for final action.
Questions Presented
The questions presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP erred in finding Atty. Virtusio guilty of grave misconduct in her dealings with Mila and in notarizing
documents without a renewed commission; and
2. Assuming Atty. Virtusio was guilty of some offenses, whether or not the IBP imposed the appropriate penalties on her.
Rulings of the Court
Lawyers are, as officers of the court and instruments for the administration of justice, expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, and fair dealing. A lawyer’s gross misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, is ground for suspension or disbarment under the principle that, since good moral
character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law, maintaining such trait is a condition for keeping
the privilege.31
By her own account, Atty. Virtusio admitted misusing the money that Mila entrusted to her for payment to Stateland. Her excuse
is that she lost track of her finances and mixed up her office funds with her personal funds. But this excuse is too thin. She admitted
misusing ₱ 165,000.00 of Mila’s money, which is not petty cash. Indeed she tried to borrow money from a third person to cover
it up rather than just offer her shallow excuse to Mila. Atty. Virtusio’s use for personal purpose of money entrusted to her
constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility. It provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Atty. Virtusio cannot absolve herself of liability by claiming that she failed to attend to her finances because she had to look after
a sick child at that time. Assuming she had such a child, the fact is that it was not by mere oversight that she failed to finance the
checks for Stateland. For, if this were so, she could have easily rectified her mistake by using her other funds. In truth, she spent
the money that Mila entrusted to her because she had no other funds. Indeed, she had to borrow money from a third party later to
remedy her financial problems.
What is more, supposedly to cover up for her fault, Atty. Virtusio executed a deed of sale covering her car in Mila’s favor rather
than return the money she defalcated. But, again acting with guile, she withheld possession of the car and transferred its
registration in the name of her children.
Atty. Virtusio is guilty by her above acts of gross misconduct that warrants her suspension for one year from the practice of law
following Section 27,32 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The Court cannot also countenance Atty. Virtusio’s notarization of documents after her notarial commission had expired.
Although the IBP discovered this violation of the notarial law only in the course of the proceedings and was not a subject matter
of Mila’s complaint, it cannot close its eyes to the same. Besides, Atty. Virtusio had an opportunity to defend herself
against this additional charge.33 Her defense is that she thought that she had renewed her commission.
Again, Atty. Virtusio’s defense is unsubstantial. She did not renew her notarial commission for two years, 2006 and 2007,
not just one. She could not have missed that fact considering that, as she said, she had been renewing her commission yearly from
1995 to 2005.
A lawyer who notarizes a document without a proper commission violates his lawyer’s oath to obey the law.1âwphi1 He makes
it appear that he is commissioned when he is not. He thus indulges in deliberate falsehood that the lawyer’s oath forbids. This
violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 7 as well.34 A
proper sanction is authorized.35
Considering, however, that based on the evidence Atty. Virtusio had notarized only two documents without a proper notarial
commission, the Court finds her suspension from notarial practice for one year adequate.36
That Mila had agreed after some financial settlement to withdraw her complaint against Atty. Virtusio cannot exempt the latter
from the prescribed sanction. She has outraged the country’s professional code and this demands a measure of justice. As
the Court said in Spouses Soriano v. Atty. Reyes,37 disbarment is a disciplinary action taken for the public good. Consequently,
it is as a rule not subject to some compromise entered into with the complainant. Besides, Mila's evidence is already a matter of
record and the Court cannot simply ignore the same. 38
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and IMPOSES on her the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one year, effective
immediately. In addition, the Court REVOKES any Notarial Commission she may presently have and DISQUALIFIES her from
applying for it for one year also effective immediately. Further, she is WARNED of a more severe penalty should she commit a
similar infraction in the future.
Let cop1es of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office
of the Bar Confidant. Finally, let this judgment be made part of Atty. Virtusio's personal record 1n the latter office.
SO ORDERED.

VICTORINA BAUTISTA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Complaint1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16,
2004, complainant Victorina Bautista2 prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice
and unethical conduct in the performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer.
Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and notarized a Magkasanib na Salaysay3purportedly executed
by Donato Salonga and complainant’s mother, Basilia de la Cruz.4 Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her
mother could not have executed the joint affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28, 1961. 5
In his Answer,6 respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilia’s
death. He alleged that before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilia’s presence and in her absence, he allowed
a certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on
top of the name of Basilia. Respondent maintained that there was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilia’s name
was the signature of Pronebo.
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation 7 attaching thereto the affidavit of desistance8 of complainant which reads in
part:
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay malaya at kusang loob na
nagpapahayag ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan
ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmahan lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng
kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si
Abogado CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang pangalan nitong
si Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko
laban sa nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner 9 recommended that:
1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal profession for one (1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be revoked; and
3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year. 10
In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and his notarial
commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two years.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the joint affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998.
Respondent’s alleged lack of knowledge of Basilia’s death does not excuse him. It was his duty to require the personal
appearance of the affiant before affixing his notarial seal and signature on the instrument.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the
deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.11
Respondent’s act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the affiants is in violation of Rule
1.01,12 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law. 13 By affixing his signature and notarial seal on
the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents
of the affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondent’s conduct is fraught with dangerous
possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord
on notarized documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function as a notary
public and to comply with the mandates of the law.14
Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf of Basilia. A member of the bar who performs
an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are
facts of which they have personal knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not through any representative.
Otherwise, their representative’s name should appear in the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is
the only time the representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of
the said document. Simply put, the party or parties who executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear before the
notary public to acknowledge the document.15
Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an end to the
administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 16
We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,17respondent
lawyer was found guilty of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial
commission was revoked and he was disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended
from the practice of law for one year.
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 2 18 of complainant’s affidavit of desistance, she alluded that Atty.
Carlitos C. Villarin notarized her Sinumpaang Salaysay19 dated November 12, 2004 which was attached to the complaint filed
with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, without requiring her to personally appear before him in violation of the Notarial
Law. This allegation must likewise be investigated.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He
is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this
Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty.
Carlitos C. Villarin notarized the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated November 12, 2004 without requiring the
latter’s personal appearance.lavvph!1.net
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all
over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES CLARO and NIDA BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
BERLINDA F. SILVA, Represented by HERMES J. DORADO, in his capacity as Attorney-In-Fact, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the
seller need only show that he relied on the face of the seller's certificate of title. 1 But for a person dealing with land registered in
the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 2 and 1733 of the Civil Code or
Article 1244 of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter's capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a
buyer for value in good faith.5 The extent of his inquiry depends on the proof of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity
consists of a special power of attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of such public document already constitutes
sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is one but there appear flaws in its notarial
acknowledgment mere inspection of the document will not do; the buyer must show that his investigation went beyond the
document and into the circumstances of its execution.
Appealed by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the November 21, 2001 Decision 6 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 487677 which affirmed in toto the January 10, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. 3091-V-89, and the February 27, 2003 CA Resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Civil Case No. 3091-V-89 is a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-
2765, Reconveyance and Damages filed with the RTC, Branch 171, Valenzuela, Metro Manila by Berlina F. Silva (Berlina),
through Hermes Dorado (Dorado) as Attorney-in-Fact, against Spouses Claro and Nida Bautista (Spouses Bautista). Spouses
Bautista filed their Answer8 and a Third-Party Complaint against Berlina's husband, Pedro M. Silva (Pedro). 9 In an Order dated
August 6, 1991, the RTC declared third-party defendant Pedro in default for failure to file an answer to the Third-Party Complaint.10
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the RTC, are as follows:
1. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 of the Registry of Deeds for xxx Metro Manila District III over a parcel of land
(Lot 42, Block 10, of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-210217, Sheet 2, being a portion of Lot 903, Malinta Estate, LRC Record
No. 5941) situated in xxx Barrio of Parada, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, containing an area of 216 square meters, more or less, was
registered in the names of Spouses Berlina F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva on August 14, 1980;
2. That on March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina F. Silva, thru a Special Power of
Attorney purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by Berlina F. Silva in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the said parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista
and Nida Bautista; and
3. That as a consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. V-2765 of the Registry of Deeds for the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida
Bautista on March 4, 1988.11
Based on the evidence presented, the RTC also found that the signature appearing on the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) as that
of Berlina Silva is a forgery, and that consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses Bautista is
not authorized by Berlina.12
The RTC rendered judgment on January 10, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1988 executed by Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of
Berlina F. Silva, in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista over the parcel of land, described and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 Metro Manila District III, null and void and the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title No.
V-2765 of Valenzuela Registry in the name of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista cancelled and that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. B-37189 reinstated.
2. Ordering defendants to reconvey the property covered by the said Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 together with the
improvements thereon to the plaintiff.
3. Condemning the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 in the concept of reasonable attorney's fees and the costs
of suit.
Defendants' counterclaim is dismissed.
Judgment on default is hereby entered in favor of the third-party plaintiffs Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista against third-
party defendants Pedro M. Silva, condemning the third-party defendant Pedro Silva to indemnify/pay third-party plaintiffs Spouses
Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) the contract price of the sale of the property,
with interest at the legal rate from the date of the execution of the said document on March 3, 1988 until the amount is fully paid
and for whatever amount that the third–party plaintiffs were adjudged and paid to the plaintiff by reason of this decision and
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Spouses Bautista filed an appeal with the CA which, in its November 21, 2001 Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC decision;14 and,
in a Resolution
dated February 27, 2003, denied the Motion for Reconsideration. 15
Hence, the herein petition filed by Spouses Bautista praying that the CA Decision and Resolution be annulled and set aside on the
following grounds:
I. Respondent as represented by Hermes Dorado in his capacity as attorney-in-fact has no legal authority to file action against
spouses petitioners.
II. The petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith and for value having relied upon a Special Power of Attorney which
appears legal, valid and genuine on its face.
III. Gratia argumenti that the special power of attorney is a forgery and the deed of sale executed by the husband is null and void,
the nullity [thereof] does not include the one half share of the husband.16
The petition fails for lack of merit.
As to the first ground, petitioners argue that for lack of authority of Dorado to represent respondent, the latter's Complaint failed to
state a cause of action and should have been dismissed.17
The argument holds no water.
True, there was no written authority for Dorado to represent respondent in the filing of her Complaint. However, no written
authorization of Dorado was needed because the Complaint was actually filed by respondent, and not merely through Dorado as
her attorney-in-fact. As correctly observed by the CA, respondent herself signed the verification attached to the Complaint. 18 She
stated therein that she is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3091-V-89 and that she caused the preparation of the
Complaint.19 Respondent also personally testified on the facts alleged in her Complaint. 20 In reality, respondent acted for and by
herself, and not through any representative, when she filed the Complaint. Therefore, respondent being the real party in interest, by
virtue of the then prevailing Articles 16621 and 17322 of the Civil Code, the Complaint she filed sufficiently stated a cause of action.
The sufficiency of the Complaint was not affected by the inclusion of Dorado as party representative for this was an obvious error
which, under Section 11 of Rule 3,23 is not a ground for dismissal, as it may be corrected by the court, on its own initiative and at
any stage of the action, by dropping such party from the complaint.24
Anent the second ground, there is no merit to petitioners' claim that they are purchasers in good faith.
That the SPA is a forgery is a finding of the RTC and the CA on a question of fact.25 The same is conclusive upon the
Court, 26 especially as it is based on the expert opinion of the NBI which constitutes more than clear, positive and convincing
evidence that respondent did not sign the SPA, and on the uncontroverted Certification of Dorado that respondent was in Germany
working as a nurse when the SPA was purportedly executed in 1987.
The SPA being a forgery, it did not vest in Pedro any authority to alienate the subject property without the consent of respondent.
Absent such marital consent, the deed of sale was a nullity.27
But then petitioners disclaim any participation in the forgery of the SPA or in the unauthorized sale of the subject property. They
are adamant that even with their knowledge that respondent was in Germany at the time of the sale, they acted in good faith when
they bought the subject property from Pedro alone because the latter was equipped with a SPA which contains a notarial
acknowledgment that the same is valid and authentic.28 They invoke the status of buyers in good faith whose registered title in the
property is already indefeasible and against which the remedy of reconveyance is no longer available.29 In the alternative,
petitioners offer that should respondent be declared entitled to reconveyance, let it affect her portion only but not that of Pedro.30
Whether or not petitioners are buyers for value in good faith is a question of fact not cognizable by us in a petition for review.31 We
resolve only questions of law; we do not try facts nor examine testimonial or documentary evidence on record. We leave these to
the trial and appellate courts to whose findings and conclusions we accord great weight and respect, especially when their findings
concur.32 We may have at times reversed their findings and conclusions but we resort to this only under exceptional circumstances
as when it is shown that said courts failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.33 No such exceptional circumstance obtains in the present case for we find the conclusions of the RTC and
CA supported by the established facts and applicable law. However, we do not fully subscribe to some of their views on why
petitioners cannot be considered in good faith, as we will discuss below.
A holder of registered title may invoke the status of a buyer for value in good faith as a defense against any action questioning his
title.34 Such status, however, is never presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it. 35
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest
in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he
receives the thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it. 36
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of the title to the property. He
need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title. 37 Such degree of
proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the
land; 38 second, the latter is in possession thereof;39 and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or
interest of some other person in the property,40 or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey
title to the property.41
Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer on notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher
degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances in order to determine the seller's
title and capacity to transfer any interest in the property.42 Under such circumstance, it is no longer sufficient for said buyer to
merely show that he relied on the face of the title; he must now also show that he exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring
beyond the title.43 Failure to exercise such degree of precaution makes him a buyer in bad faith. 44
In the present case, petitioners were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who had title to and possession of the land but, as indicated on
the face of his title, whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the marital consent of respondent is required before he could
convey the property. To prove good faith then, petitioners must show that they inquired not only into the title of Pedro but also into
his capacity to sell.
According to petitioners, to determine Pedro's capacity to sell, they conducted the following forms of inquiry: first, they inspected
the photocopy of the SPA presented to them by Pedro;45 second, they brought said copy to Atty. Lorenzo Lucero (the notary public
who prepared the deed of sale) and asked whether it was genuine;46 and third, they inspected the original copy of the SPA after
they advanced payment of Php55,000.00 to Pedro. 47 Essentially, petitioners relied on the SPA, specifically on its notarial
acknowledgment which states that respondent appeared before the notary public and acknowledged having executed the SPA in
favor of Pedro.
The RTC and CA, however, found such inquiry superficial. They expected of petitioners an investigation not only into the
whereabouts of respondent at the time of the execution of the SPA48 but also into the genuineness of the signature appearing on
it.49
We find such requirements of the RTC and CA too stringent that to adopt them would be to throw commerce into madness where
buyers run around to probe the circumstances surrounding each piece of sales document while sellers scramble to produce evidence
of its good order. Remember that it is not just any scrap of paper that is under scrutiny but a SPA, the execution and attestation of
which a notary public has intervened.
To what extent, therefore, should an inquiry into a notarized special power of attorney go in order for one to qualify as a buyer for
value in good faith?
We agree with one author who said:
x x x To speak of "notice", as applied to the grantee, is to follow the language of the Statue of Elizabeth. Its proviso protects the
man who purchases "upon good consideration and bona fide * * * not having at the time * * * any manner of notice or knowledge."
The term "notice", however, is really but an approach to the test of good faith, and all modern legislation tends toward that point.
Thus, some present day statutes (outside of the Uniform Law) may speak of notice, actual and constructive, and define both terms,
but they should be "liberally construed, so as to protect bona fide purchaser for value." They may require the grantee to have
"knowledge" of the debtor's intent, but save for technical purposes of pleading, the term is read in the light of the rules we are
studying. It comes always to a question of the grantee's good faith as distinct from mere negligence. 50
There must, indeed, be more than negligence. There must be a conscious turning away from the subject x x x. As put by the Supreme
Court, the grantee must take the consequences if he "chooses to remain ignorant of what the necessities of the case require him to
know." The search, therefore, is described by the question, did the grantee make a choice between not knowing and finding out the
truth; or were the circumstances such that he was not faced with that choice? (Emphasis ours)
This means that no automatic correlation exists between the state of forgery of a document and the bad faith of the buyer who relies
on it. A test has to be done whether the buyer had a choice between knowing the forgery and finding it out, or he had no such choice
at all.
When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we know it to be a public document where
the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution. 51 A buyer presented with such a document
would have no choice between knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial
acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and replaced it with a presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared
before the notary public and acknowledged that he executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is
deprived of such choice not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial system, he has been
given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that
because it is precisely that fiction of regularity which holds together commercial transactions across borders and time.
In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has possession and title to the property but whose capacity to sell
is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter's
capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special power
of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to establish the
appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity. 52
Note that we expressly made the foregoing rule applicable only under the operative words "duly notarized" and "all things being
equal." Thus, said rule should not apply when there is an apparent flaw afflicting the notarial acknowledgment of the special power
of attorney as would cast doubt on the due execution and authenticity of the document; or when the buyer has actual notice of
circumstances outside the document that would render suspect its genuineness.
In Domingo v. Reed,53 we found that the special power of attorney relied upon by the buyers contained a defective notarial
acknowledgment in that it stated there that only the agent-wife signed the document before the notary public while the principal-
husband did not. Such flaw rendered the notarial acknowledgment of no effect and reduced the special power of attorney into a
private document. We declared the buyer who relied on the private special power of attorney a buyer in bad faith.
In Lao v. Villones-Lao,54 and Estacio v. Jaranilla,55 we found that the buyers knew of circumstances extrinsic to the special power
of attorney which put in question the actual execution of said document. In Domingo Lao, the buyer knew that the agent-wife was
estranged from the principal-husband but was living within the same city. In the Estacio case, we found admissions by the buyers
that they knew that at the time of the purported execution of the special power of attorney, the alleged principal was not in the
Philippines. In both cases we held that the buyers were not in good faith, not because we found any outward defect in the notarial
acknowledgment of the special powers of attorney, but because the latter had actual notice of facts that should have put them on
deeper inquiry into the capacity to sell of the seller.
In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time they were buying the property and the SPA relied
upon by petitioners has a defective notarial acknowledgment. The SPA was a mere photocopy56 and we are not convinced that
there ever was an original copy of said SPA as it was only this photocopy that was testified to by petitioner Nida Bautista and
offered into evidence by her counsel.57 We emphasize this fact because it was actually this photocopy that was relied upon by
petitioners before they entered into the deed of sale with Pedro. As admitted to by petitioner Nida Bautista, upon inspection of the
photocopy of the SPA, they gave Pedro an advanced payment of Php55,000.00; this signifies that, without further investigation on
the SPA, petitioners had agreed to buy the subject property from Pedro.
But then said photocopy of the SPA contains no notarial seal. A notarial seal is a mark, image or impression on a document which
would indicate that the notary public has officially signed it.58 There being no notarial seal, the signature of the notary public on
the notarial certificate was therefore incomplete. The notarial certificate being deficient, it was as if the notarial acknowledgment
was unsigned. The photocopy of the SPA has no notarial acknowledgment to speak of. It was a mere private document which
petitioners cannot foist as a banner of good faith.
All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely relied on the photocopy of the SPA as this turned out
to be a mere private document. They should have adduced more evidence that they looked beyond it. They did not. Instead, they
took no precautions at all. They verified with Atty. Lucero whether the SPA was authentic but then the latter was not the notary
public who prepared the document. Worse, they purposely failed to inquire who was the notary public who prepared the SPA.
Finally, petitioners conducted the transaction in haste. It took them all but three days or from March 2 to 4, 1988 to enter into the
deed of sale, notwithstanding the restriction on the capacity to sell of Pedro.59 In no way then may petitioners qualify as buyers for
value in good faith.
That said, we come to the third issue on whether petitioners may retain the portion of Pedro Silva in the subject property. Certainly
not. It is well-settled that the nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the husband without the marital consent of the
wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife. 60 We see no reason to deviate from this rule.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated November 21, 2001 and Resolution dated February 27, 2003
of the Court of Appeal are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
GUERRERO v. BIHIS

JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, CJ.:
This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana) stemmed from a letter 1 addressed to the Court filed by
Executive Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato requesting
that proper disciplinary action be imposed on him for performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission, and for allowing his wife to do notarial acts
in his absence.
In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, executive judges are required to closely monitor
the activities of notaries public within the territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to see to it that notaries public shall not extend
notarial functions beyond the limits of their authority. Hence, she wrote a letter 2 to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop notarizing
documents within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato (which is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission for Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao)
since certain documents3 notarized by him had been reaching her office.
However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato as evidenced by: (1)
the Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card4 executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Driver’s License5 executed by
Elenita D. Ballentes.
Under Sec. 11, Rule III6 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana could not extend his notarial acts beyond Cotabato
City and the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap, Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or the Province of Maguindanao.
Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. The City within the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not Cotabato City.
Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it was discovered that it was Atty. Quintana’s wife
who performed notarial acts whenever he was out of the office as attested to by the Joint Affidavit7executed by Kristine C. Guro
and Elenita D. Ballentes.
In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006,8 we required Atty. Quintana to comment on the letter of Judge Laquindanum.
In his Response,9 Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial commission before Branch 18, Regional Trial Court,
Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for three weeks. He alleged that the reason
for Judge Laquindanum’s inaction was that she questioned his affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Cotabato City Chapter, and required him to be a member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a Certification of
Payments from the latter chapter. Because of this, he opted to withdraw his petition. After he withdrew his petition, he claimed that
Judge Laquindanum sent a clerk from her office to ask him to return his petition, but he did not oblige because at that time he
already had a Commission for Notary Public10 issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Cotabato City.
Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge Laquindanum, because the latter immediately issued notarial
commissions to other lawyers without asking for so many requirements. However, when it came to him, Judge Laquindanum even
tracked down all his pleadings; communicated with his clients; and disseminated information through letters, pronouncements, and
directives to court clerks and other lawyers to humiliate him and be ostracized by fellow lawyers.
Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at Midsayap, Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of the Province of
Cotabato. He contended that he did not violate any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because he was equipped with
a notarial commission. He maintained that he did not act outside the province of Cotabato since Midsayap, Cotabato, where he
practices his legal profession and subscribes documents, is part of the province of Cotabato. He claimed that as a lawyer of good
moral standing, he could practice his legal profession in the entire Philippines.
Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue such directive, because only Executive Judge
Reno E. Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and the Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in the Province
of Cotabato.
In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006,11 we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
In the February 28, 2007 Hearing12 before the OBC presided by Atty. Ma. Crisitina B. Layusa (Hearing Officer), Judge
Laquindanum presented a Deed of Donation,13 which was notarized by Atty. Quintana in 2004.14 Honorata Rosil appears as one of
the signatories of the document as the donor’s wife. However, Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown by the
Certificate of Death15 issued by the Civil Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.
Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize documents in the years 2006 to 2007 despite the fact that
his commission as notary public for and in the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City had already expired on December 31,
2005, and he had not renewed the same.16 To support her claim, Judge Laquindanum presented the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss
[of] Title17 executed by Betty G. Granada with subscription dated April 8, 2006 at Cotabato City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy18 of
Mr. Elias Diosanta Arabis with subscription dated July 18, 2006; (3) Affidavit of Loss [of] Driver’s License19 executed by Anecito
C. Bernabe with subscription dated February 20, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit of Loss 20 executed by Santos V.
Magbanua with subscription dated February 22, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato.
For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing in the documents marked as exhibits of Judge Laquindanum
were his except for the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card 21 executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) Affidavit of Loss of
Driver’s License22 executed by Elenita D. Ballentes; and (3) Affidavit of Loss23 executed by Santos V. Magbanua. He explained
that those documents were signed by his wife and were the result of an entrapment operation of Judge Laquindanum: to let
somebody bring and have them notarized by his wife, when they knew that his wife is not a lawyer. He also denied the he authorized
his wife to notarize documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to stop doing it as it would ruin his profession.
Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his petition, because he did not comply with her requirements
for him to transfer his membership to the Kidapawan Chapter, wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP President.
On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that she was only performing her responsibility and had nothing against Atty.
Quintana. The reason why she did not act on his petition was that he had not paid his IBP dues, 24which is a requirement before a
notarial commission may be granted. She told his wife to secure a certification of payment from the IBP, but she did not return.
This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he enclosed in his Response the certification of good standing and payments
of his IBP dues. However, when the same was examined, there were no documents attached thereto. Due to oversight, Atty.
Quintana prayed that he be given time to send them later which was granted by the Hearing Officer.
Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done and promised not to repeat the same. He also asked that he be
given another chance and not be divested of his privilege to notarize, as it was the only bread and butter of his family.
On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC the documents 25 issued by the IBP Cotabato City Chapter to prove that
he had paid his IBP dues.
In a Manifestation26 dated March 9, 2007, Judge Laquindanum submitted a Certification 27 and its entries show that Atty. Quintana
paid his IBP dues for the year 2005 only on January 9, 2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 610381. Likewise, the arrears of his
IBP dues for the years 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1998 to 2003 were also paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No. 610387. Hence,
when he filed his petition for notarial commission in 2004, he had not yet completely paid his IBP dues.
In its Report and Recommendation,28 the OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana be disqualified from being appointed as a notary
public for two (2) years; and that if his notarial commission still exists, the same should be revoked for two (2) years. The OBC
found the defenses and arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be without merit, viz:
Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan, Cotabato, which is already outside his territorial
jurisdiction to perform as Notary Public.
Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus:
"Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the
year in which the commissioning court is made, unless earlier revoked [or] the notary public has resigned under these Rules and
the Rules of Court.
Under the rule[,] respondent may perform his notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning Executive Judge
Concha, which is in Cotabato City and the [P]rovince of Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his commission as
notary public in Midsayap or Kabacan and in any place of the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat to do such
act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of Maguindanao but part of the province of North
Cotabato. Thus, the claim of respondent that he can exercise his notarial commission in Midsayap, Cotabato because Cotabato City
is part of the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of merit.
xxxx
Further, evidence on record also shows that there are several documents which the respondent’s wife has herself notarized.
Respondent justifies that he cannot be blamed for the act of his wife as he did not authorize the latter to notarize documents in
his absence. According to him[,] he even scolded and told his wife not to do it anymore as it would affect his profession.
In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm. Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the Court held, thus:
"A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register; He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by
passing the buck to their (sic) secretaries"
A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. Respondent
cannot take refuge claiming that it was his wife’s act and that he did not authorize his wife to notarize documents. He is
personally accountable for the activities in his office as well as the acts of his personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary.
Likewise, evidence reveals that respondent notarized in 2004 a Deed of Donation (Rollo, p. 79) wherein, (sic) Honorata Rosel
(Honorata Rosil) one of the affiants therein, was already dead at the time of notarization as shown in a Certificate of Death (Rollo,
p.80) issued by the Civil Registrar General of Libungan, Cotabato.
Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus[:]
"A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary’s
presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules."
Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation without even determining the presence or qualifications of affiants therein, respondent
only shows his gross negligence and ignorance of the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
xxxx
Furthermore, respondent claims that he, being a lawyer in good standing, has the right to practice his profession including notarial
acts in the entire Philippines. This statement is barren of merit.
While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice of law in the Philippines.(sic) However, not
every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial functions without having been commissioned as notary public as
specifically provided for under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He must have submitted himself to the commissioning court
by filing his petition for issuance of his notarial (sic) Notarial Practice. The commissioning court may or may not grant the said
petition if in his sound discretion the petitioner does not meet the required qualifications for [a] Notary Public. Since respondent
herein did not submit himself to the procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial commission, he has no reason at all to claim
that he can perform notarial act[s] in the entire country for lack of authority to do so.
Likewise, contrary to the belief of respondent, complainant being the commissioning court in Midsayap, Cotabato has the authority
under Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice to monitor the duties and responsibilities including liabilities, if any, of a
notary public commissioned or those performing notarial acts without authority in her territorial jurisdiction. 29
xxxx
We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months and
revocation and suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial commission for two (2) years more appropriate considering the gravity and
number of his offenses.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he notarized documents outside the area of
his commission as a notary public; (2) he performed notarial acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents
in his absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time.
The act of notarizing documents outside one’s area of commission is not to be taken lightly. Aside from being a violation of
Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. 30Notarizing documents
with an expired commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he has been duly commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate
falsehood, which the lawyer's oath proscribes.31 Notarizing documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a
violation of Sec. 2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, 32 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the lawyer’s oath which unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare any falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana
is personally accountable for the documents that he admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by
passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires
lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of income for his family will not serve to lessen the penalty
that should be imposed on him. On the contrary, we feel that he should be reminded that a notarial commission should not be treated
as a money-making venture. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest.
As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and
the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into
a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. 33
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt
with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when
his suspension shall take effect.1avvphi1
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice endorsed to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action. The first letter-complaint,1 dated March 2, 2009, was filed by the commissioned notaries
public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty.
Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC-Lingayen) against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents without a
commission.

In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial office along Alvear Street East, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, and was performing notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the requisite notarial
commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City. Instead, he applied and was commissioned to perform notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony
Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial commission, however,
was never renewed upon expiration. Complainants presented evidence supporting their allegations such as the pictures of Atty.
Siapno’s law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum to Loan and Mortgage Agreement 2 showing that the Promissory
Note was notarized before Atty. Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale, 3 dated January 24, 2008,
notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons Re: Given Name and Date of Birth, 4 dated
January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt, 5dated January 24, 2008, notarized in Dagupan
City.

Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial authority to his secretaries, Mina Bautista (Bautista) and
Mary Ann Arenas (Arenas), who wrote legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.

On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)6 which,
in turn, indorsed the same to the OBC.

The second letter-complaint7 was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that
in 2008, Espelita lost his driver’s license and he executed an affidavit of loss which was notarized by Atty. Santos. The
said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication when presented before the Notarial Section in Manila because
Atty. Santos was not commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila.

The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room
402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing documents for and on behalf of
several lawyers.

In its Resolution,9 dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC-Lingayen to conduct a formal
investigation on the complaint against Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to
conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial Law by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain
Atty. Evelyn, and thereafter, to submit a report and recommendation thereon.

Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno

With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge conducted a hearing wherein the complainants affirmed the
allegations in their letter-complaint. For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the accusations and averred that the law office in Lingayen,
Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and Arenas were not his secretaries. 10

In her Report and Recommendation,11 the Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial commission within the
jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006.
His commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not issued another commission thereafter. The Executive
Judge found Atty. Siapno to have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed notarial functions without
commission and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the recommended penalty.

A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law office in
Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that Atty.
Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the
year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules
of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and
Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform such act.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive
public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.12 It must be emphasized that the act of
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason,
notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.

By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the
laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes
all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, at all times.13

In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing documents outside their territorial
jurisdiction or with an expired commission. In the case of Nunga v. Viray,14 a lawyer was suspended by the Court for three (3)
years for notarizing an instrument without a commission. In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,15 the respondent was likewise suspended from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years and was permanently barred from being commissioned as a notary public for
notarizing several documents after the expiration of his commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v. Quintana,16 the
Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two
(2) years because he notarized documents outside the area of his commission, and with an expired commission.

Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan City in the
province of Pangasinan without the requisite commission, the Court finds the recommended penalty insufficient. Instead, Atty.
Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years.

Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn

In a letter,17 dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he could not have complied with the June 9, 2009 and August
4, 2009 orders of the Court because he was no longer the Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila at that time. To date, no formal
investigation has been conducted on the alleged violation of Atty. Santos and the reported illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET the
same as separate administrative cases.

The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting capacity, is ordered to conduct a formal
investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of copy of this
decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years
and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the personal files of the respondent.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-
DOCKET them as separate administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to conduct a
formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of
this decision.

SO ORDERED.
FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG, DEXTER
R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR
G. IBAÑEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A. AGATEP, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public
in Cagayan.
In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as "Doc. No.
1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998".
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as "Doc.
No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was
Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and
1214 on December 10, 1998.
In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on
December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli,
whose affidavit was attached to his comment.
The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service Commission.
Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants. They filed with this Court a
"Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondent's Comment." They maintain that Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to
inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.1 On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.2
Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe the utmost
care to comply with the formalities and the basic requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA
318).
Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary
shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register,
and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left
between entries" (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by
law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his
notarial register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua
cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of
duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200
on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213
and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in
maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his
part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own
secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a disinterested witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingo's affidavit
(Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This
circumstance lends credence to the submission of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint
making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence then that
both documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.
A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his
office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court has
invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their
duties.
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period
of one year for notarizing a document without affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he
was one of the signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duties as a notary
public.
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of
the vendors were dead was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction
would be dealt with more severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the
respondent's first offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, after being found guilty of
notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The Court considered the seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for
which he was suspended for six months from the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months may
be considered enough penalty for him as a lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial
commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if
still existing, be REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months."3
After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the
Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial
Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.
"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.4 The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. 5
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.
In Arrieta v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already
dead, this Court held that such wrongful act "constitutes misconduct" and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,7 we revoked the
notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial
Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty
of one month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the
document she notarized.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension
from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the
same should also be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial
commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,1 spouses Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent
Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyer’s oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale
was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No.
III, Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that about six years after the date of notarization, they had a dispute with one
Danilo German over the ownership of the land. The case was estafathrough falsification of a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by respondent denying the authenticity of his signature
on the deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said deed.2
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of sale contained all the legal formalities of a
duly notarized document, including an impression of respondent’s notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in
the technicalities surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have forged the signature of herein
respondent. They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have made any imprint
of respondent’s seal or signature on the subject deed of sale or elsewhere. 3
In his answer4 to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He denied having notarized any deed of sale covering
the disputed property. According to respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where
he was asked to apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several documents in that office, these,
however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny
by the senior lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that notarization was done. He claimed that, in some occasions,
the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on documents relating to cases
handled by the law firm. Respondent added that he normally required the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates and
made them personally acknowledge the documents before him as notary public. He would have remembered complainants had
they actually appeared before him. While he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latter’s husband
and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale.
Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the
strokes were smooth and mild.l^vvphi1.net He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized,
on December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He surmised that complainants must have gone to the law office and enticed one of the
secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme
motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a
report5 it submitted to the Court, the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was different
from his signatures in other documents he submitted during the investigation of the present case. 6 However, it ruled that respondent
was also negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his
notarial dry seal and notarial register.7 It thus recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent’s commission as notary public be
revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a commission as notary public for two
(2) years upon receipt hereof.8
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically state that they appeared before
respondent to have the deed of sale notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent
signed the document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants themselves were not sure if
respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature appeared thereon. They had no
personal knowledge as well as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.1awphi1.nét
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent’s contention that he only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years
after the alleged notarization of the deed of sale. Respondent’s assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an
affidavit executed on November 17, 20019 wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her
house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant
Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale
concerning another property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxx xxx xxx.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should have been more discreet and cautious
in the execution of his duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not
have been commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the secretary there can be a
possibility that even the respondent’s signature which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or
anybody for that matter as had been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries
to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have
relied on somebody else.10
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his duties as
notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned,
or if he is not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for a period of two years from finality of this resolution,
with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO AGADAN, EDEN MOLLEJON, ARSENIO IGME, JOSE NUMBAR, CECILIA LANGAWAN, PABLO PALMA,
JOSELITO CLAVERIA, MIGUEL FLORES, and ALBERT GAYDOWEN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RICHARD BALTAZAR KILAAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On September 12, 2005, complainants Mariano Agadan, Eden Mollejon, Arsenio Igme, Jose Numbar, Cecilia Langawan, Pablo
Palma, Joselito Claveria, Miguel Flores and Albert Gaydowen filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Baguio Benguet
Chapter (IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter) a Complaint1 against respondent Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan (Atty. Kilaan) for
falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit. They alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated certain entries in the application for
issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate public utility jeepney filed before the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board – Cordillera Administrative Region (LTFRB-CAR) and docketed as Case No. 2003-
CAR-688 by substituting the name of the applicant from Gary Adasing (Adasing) 2 to that of Joseph Batingwed
(Batingwed);3 that Atty. Kilaan submitted false and/or insufficient documentary requirements in support of Batingwed s application
for CPC; that Atty. Kilaan prepared a Decision based on the Resolution of the LTFRB Central Office which dismissed the
Opposition filed by the complainants; and that the said Decision granted the application of Batingwed which was adopted by the
LTFRB-CAR.
On February 27, 2006, the IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter formally endorsed the Complaint to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) for appropriate action.4 Acting on the Complaint, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Kilaan to submit his Answer.5
In his Answer6 dated April 8, 2006, Atty. Kilaan denied violating the Lawyer s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He disclaimed any pat1icipation in the preparation of the Decision with respect to the application of Batingwed for CPC. He
explained that it is the Regional Director of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)-CAR who approves
the application and who drafts the Decision after the LTFRB-CAR signifies its favorable recommendation. He denied exercising
any influence over the DOTC-CAR or the LTFRB. He claimed that Batingwed had decided to abandon his application hence he
no longer submitted the necessary requirements therefor. He also disavowed any knowledge that Batingwed s application had been
forwarded to the LTFRB Central Office for approval. Atty. Kilaan claimed that he knew about the favorable Decision only when
Batingwed showed him the same. He narratted that considering the incomplete documents, the LTFRB mistakenly approved
Batingwed s application. Thus, when it discovered its error, the LTFRB immediately revoked the grant of CPC to Batingwed.
He denied intercalating the entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed. He averred that once an application has been filed, the
application and all accompanying records remain with the LTFRB and could no longer be retrieved by the applicant or his counsel;
as such, it is highly improbable for him to intercalate the entries therein. Atty. Kilaan further explained that it was Adasing who
paid the filing fee in behalf of Batingwed but the cashier erroneously indicated Adasing instead of Batingwed as payor. Atty. Kilaan
lamented that Adasing who is not in the Philippines could not corroborate his explanation. Finaliy, Atty. Kilaan noted that
complainants filed the instant suit in retaliation for the dismissal of their Opposition to the application for CPCs which he filed on
behalf of his other clients.
The case was set for mandatory conference7 after which the parties submitted their respective Position Papers. 8 In their Position
Paper, complainants further alleged that the Verification in Batingwed's application for CPC was notarized by Atty. Kilaan as Doc.
No: 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty. Kilaan's Notarial Registry submitted to
the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court in Baguio City, the said notarial entry actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not the
Verification of Batingwed's application. Also, complainants belied Atty. Kilaan's allegation that Adasing is 'presently abroad by
presenting the Affidavit of Adasing claiming that he never left the country.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner9 found complainants to have miserably failed to prove that
Atty. Kilaan intercalated the entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed. Their allegation was based on mere suspicion devoid
of any credible proof, viz:
At the onset, it is very difficult to prove that it was respondent himself who was responsible for any intercalation, particularly the
substitution of Joseph Batingwed's application folder in lieu of Gary Odasing's. Indeed, that is a grave charge, and based on the
evidence presented by complainants, all that they can muster is a suspicion that cannot be confirmed. Of course, this has to be
pointed out - anyone who had access to the case folder could have possibly been responsible for whatever intercalation that may
have occurred. That being said, this Office is not prepared to make that leap into conjecture and conclude that it was respondent's
doing.
Besides, the Certification of the Receiving Clerk of the DOTC CAR dated 18 October 2006 -which notably was submitted by
complainants -stated that the application of Gary Odasing was continued by Joseph Batingwed. Complainants have not alleged that
the same constitutes a violation of the rules and procedures of LTFRB. Thus, it may be presumed to have been done in the regular
course of business.10
However, the Investigating Commissioner did not totally absolve Atty. Kilaan as he found him liable for violating the Notarial Law
considering that the Verification of Batingwed's application which he notarized and denominated as Doc. No. 253, Page No. 51,
Book No. VIII, Series of 2003 was actually recorded as a Deed of Sale in his Notarial Register. In addition, the Investigating
Commissioner noted that Atty. Kilaan lied under oath when he alleged that Adasing was abroad as this was squarely belied by
Adasing in his Affidavit. The Investigating Commissioner held thus:
Respondent must be punished for making it appear that he notarized a document the Verification-when in truth and in fact, the
entry in his Notatial Registry shows a different document. Thus, it is but proper to suspend respondent s privilege of being
commissioned as a Notary Public.
Not only that. Despite knowing that the Verification was not properly notarized, respondent, as counsel for the applicant, proceeded
to file the defectively verified Petition with the LTFRB-Baguio City. Clearly, there was falsehood committed by him, as there can
be no other conclusion except that respondent antedated the Verification.
xxxx
Lastly, this cannot end without this being said. Respondent made matters worse by alleging in his Answer to the instant
administrative complaint that Gary Odasing was abroad -which seemingly was drawn up more out of convenience than for truth.
Now, that allegation had been completely rebuffed and found to be untrue by the execution of an Affidavit by Gary Odasing
himself. x x x It is therefore an affront to this Office that respondent would attempt to defend himself by pleading allegations,
which were seemingly made deliberately, and which were later found to be untrue. Clearly, respondent tried, albeit vainly, to
deceive even this Office.11
The Investigating Commissioner recommended, viz:
WHEREFORE, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that respondent s notarial commission, if still existing, be REVOKED
immediately and that he be further PROHIBITED from being commissioned as a notary public for TWO (2) YEARS.
Moreover, it is likewise recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of TWO (2)
MONTHS.12
In its September 19, 2007 Resolution No. XVIII-2007-82, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Kilaan’s Notarial Commission be revoked
and that he be disqualified from being appointed as Notary Public for two years, thereby deleting the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law. Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No.
XX-2012-41 dated January 15, 2012.
After a careful review of the records, we find that Atty. Kilaan committed the following infractions: 1) violation of the Notarial
Law; 2) violation of the Lawyer s Oath; and 3) violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his Motion for Reconsideration tiled before the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Kilaan passed on the blame to his secretary for
the inaccuracies in the entries in his Notarial Register. He asserted that being a private practitioner, he is burdened with cases thus
he delegated to his secretary the job of recording the documents which he notarized in his Notarial Register. He argued that the
revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification for two years is too harsh. a penalty considering that he is a first-time
offender; he prayed for leniency considering that his family depended on his income for their collective needs.
It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the accuracy of the entries in his Notarial Register. The
Court is not persuaded by respondent s explanation that he is burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording
of his notarial acts in his Notarial Register to his secretary. In tact, this argument has already been rebuffed by this Court in Lingan
v. Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga,13 viz:
Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:
SEC. 245. Notarial Register.--Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial register, wherein record shall
be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a ce1tified copy of such record, or any part thereof: to any person
applying for it and paying the legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to or acknowledging the instrument,
the witnesses, if any to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by him
for his services as notary in connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a connect copy thereof as
part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof and shall give to each entry
a consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page
or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
SEC. 249. Grounds fix revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in
the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notatial acts in the manner
required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his
notarial register. Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to
their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open condemnation. Respondents. especially
Calubaquib. a self-proclaimed "prominent legal practitioner should have known better than to give us such a simple-minded excuse.
We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one invested with substantive
public interest such that only those who are qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The protection of that
interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from inflicting themselves upon the
public the courts and the administrative offices in general.
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. Notaries public must therefore observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties.
In Gemina v. Atty. Madamba,14 we have also ruled that –
x x x The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register entitles and his failure to enter the documents that he admittedly notarized constitute
dereliction of duty as a notary public. He cannot escape liability by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer himself, not
merely his secretary, should be held accountable for these misdeeds.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement and
affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the
significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument,
after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution.1âwphi1 Thus, notarization
should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public exercises duties calling for caretl1lness and
faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take pmt or allow
themselves to be pmt of illegal transactions.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land,
and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly commissioned notary public to make the
proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or any act which may serve as cause for the
revocation of his commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent s failure to make the proper entry or entries in his Notarial Register of
his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal
on the basis of personal knowledge by competent evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyer s commission as a notary
public.
Indeed, Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public to keep and maintain a Notarial
Register wherein he will record his every notarial act. His failure to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
concerning his notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial commission. 15 As mentioned, respondent failed to make the
proper entries in his Notarial Register; as such, his notarial commission may be properly revoked.
Aside from violating the Notarial Law, respondent also violated his Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
by committing falsehood in the pleadings he submitted before the IBP. His claim that Adasing was abroad hence could
not corroborate the explanation made by Batingwed was proved to be untruthful when complainants submitted the Affidavit of
Adasing insisting that he never left the country. Canon 10,
Rule 10.0 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. In the same vein, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 mandates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent failed to observe
these Rules and hence must be sanctioned.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Kilaan s suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months and the revocation and
disqualification of his notarial commission for a period of one (1) year appropriate.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of one (1) year. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with
more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his
suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
CARLITO ANG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 139-B, Section 12(c) of the Rules of Court assailing Resolution Nos. XVII-2005-
1411 and XVIII-2008-6982 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP Board of Governors
found respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana administratively liable and imposed on him the penalty of suspension for one year
from the practice of law and the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as notary public
for two years.
The case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint3 filed by complainant Carlito Ang against respondent. Ang alleged that on May 31,
1991, he and the other heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante and William Magpayo, executed an
Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition4 involving Lot No. 2066-B-2-B which had an area of 6,258 square meters and was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-22409)-6433. He was given his share of 2,003 square meters designated as
Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4, together with all the improvements thereon.5 However, when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found
out that said TCT No. (T-22409)-6433 had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs6 had been issued in the names of
William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita D. Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct participation in the commission of forgeries and
falsifications because he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss7 and Deed of Absolute Sale8 that led to the
transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Ang pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed by Candelaria
Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was antedated and Candelaria Magpayo’s signature was forged as clearly shown by the
Certification9 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu. Further, the certified true copy
of page 37, Book No. XII, Series of 1989 of respondent’s Notarial Report indubitably showed that Doc. No. 181 did not refer
to the Deed of Absolute Sale, but to an affidavit.10 As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was allegedly executed by the late
Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994, it could not have been executed by her as she Died 11 three years prior to the execution of
the said affidavit of loss.
Ang further alleged that on September 22, 1995, respondent made himself the attorney-in-fact of William Magpayo, Antonio
Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero, and pursuant to the Special Power of
Attorney in his favor, executed a Deed of Sale12 selling Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4 to Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. on October 10, 1995.
Ang complained that the sale was made even though a civil case involving the said parcel of land was pending before the RTC of
Mandaue City, Cebu.13
In his Comment,14 respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is merely using the present administrative complaint as
a tool to force the defendants in a pending civil case and their counsel, herein respondent, to accede to his wishes. Respondent
averred that Ang had filed Civil Case No. Man-2202 before Branch 55 of the Mandaue City RTC. He anchored his claim on the
Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition and sought to annul the deed of sale and prayed for reconveyance of the subject
parcel of land. During the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. Man-2202, Ang admitted that he is not an heir of the late Candelaria
Magpayo but insisted on his claim for a share of the lot because he is allegedly the son of the late Isaias Ang, the common-law
husband of Candelaria Magpayo. Because of his admission, the notice of lis pendens annotated in the four certificates of title of
the land in question were ordered cancelled and the land effectively became available for disposition. Ang sought reconsideration
of the order, but a compromise was reached that only one TCT (TCT No. 34266) will be annotated with a notice of lis pendens.
Respondent surmised that these developments in Civil Case No. Man-2202 meant that Ang would lose his case so Ang resorted to
the filing of the present administrative complaint. Thus, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case for being devoid of any
factual or legal basis, or in the alternative, holding resolution of the instant case in abeyance pending resolution of Civil Case No.
Man-2202 allegedly because the issues in the present administrative case are similar to the issues or subject matters involved in
said civil case.
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, to whom the case was referred for
investigation, report and recommendation, submitted her Report and Recommendation 15 finding respondent administratively liable.
She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held that respondent committed an
unethical act when he allowed himself to be an instrument in the disposal of the subject property through a deed of sale executed
between him as attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is the subject
of a pending litigation before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu. The Investigating Commissioner additionally found that respondent
"delegated the notarial functions to the clerical staff of their office before being brought to him for his signature." This, according
to the commissioner, "must have been the reason for the forged signatures of the parties in the questioned document…as well as
the erroneous entry in his notarial register…." 16 Nonetheless, the Investigating Commissioner merely reminded respondent to
be more cautious in the performance of his duties as regards his infraction of his notarial duties. She held, Respondent should have
been more cautious in his duty as notary public which requires that the party subscribing to the authenticity of the document should
personally appear and sign the same before respondent’s actual presence. As such notary public respondent should not delegate
to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in accordance
with Rule 9.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.18
On November 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-141,19 adopting the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner but modifying the recommended penalty. Instead of suspension for three months, the Board
recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year and revocation of respondent’s notarial commission
and disqualification from reappointment as notary public for two years.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,20 arguing that it was neither illegal nor unethical for a lawyer to accept appointment
as attorney-in-fact of a client to sell a property involved in a pending litigation and to act as such. He further contended that granting
that his act was unethical, the modified penalty was evidently too harsh and extremely excessive considering that the act complained
of was not unlawful and done without malice.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVIII-2008-69821 denying respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2005-141. Hence, this petition for review.
Respondent reiterates that being commissioned by his own clients to sell a portion of a parcel of land, part of which is involved in
litigation, is not per se illegal or unethical. According to him, his clients got his help to sell part of the land and because they were
residing in different provinces, they executed a Special Power of Attorney in his favor. 22
We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent administratively liable.
After reviewing the records of the case, the Court finds that respondent did not act unethically when he sold the property in dispute
as the sellers’ attorney-in-fact because there was no more notice of lis pendens annotated on the particular lot sold. Likewise,
the Court finds no sufficient evidence to show that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989
was antedated.
However, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require the personal
presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly executed on April 29, 1994.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:
Sec. 1. x x x
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official
seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.23 In the case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria
subscribed to the affidavit before respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since
March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. Indeed, respondent averred in his position
paper before the IBP that he did not in fact know Candelaria personally before, during and after the notarization 24 thus admitting
that Candelaria was not present when he notarized the documents.
Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. 25 Thus, in Bernardo v. Atty.
Ramos,26 the Court emphasized the significance of the act of notarization, to wit:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.
For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who xecuted and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act and
deed.
A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are
impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.27 It devolves upon respondent to act with due care and diligence in
stamping fiat on the questioned documents. Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Hence, he should be liable for
his infraction, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office,
such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.1âwphi1 Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon
respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. 28 As the Court
has held in Flores v. Chua,29
Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the
laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar
in good standing." Respondent averred in his position paper that it had been his consistent practice to course through clerical staff
documents to be notarized. Upon referral, said clerical staff investigates whether the documents are complete as to the fundamental
requirements and inquires as to the identity of the individual signatories thereto. If everything is in order, they ask the parties to
sign the documents and forward them to him and he again inquires about the identities of the parties before affixing his notarial
signature.30 It is also his clerical staff who records entries in his notarial report. As aforesaid, respondent is mandated to observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties as a notary and to ascertain that the persons who signed
the documents are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. In merely relying on his clerical staff to determine the completeness of documents brought to him for
notarization, limiting his participation in the notarization process to simply inquiring about the identities of the persons appearing
before him, and in notarizing an affidavit executed by a dead person, respondent is liable for misconduct. Under the facts and
circumstances of the case, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public
for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in order. 31
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana is found administratively liable for misconduct and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one year. Further, his notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is disqualified from reappointment
as Notary Public for a period of two years, with a stem warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all
over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY,
BATAAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution 1 or the IBP Board of Governors which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner xxx and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial
duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,2 dated June 11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr.
(Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at
the time he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The notarized documents were as follows:
1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida C. Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized
on April 3, 2008;
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy Margaret L. Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro married to Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and Gina
Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;
4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March 17, 2008;
5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and Luisa Rodriguez Jorgensen, notarized on April 8, 2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by the wife and sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized March
19, 2008;
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia Francisco and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April
3, 2008;
8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and Carmelita Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008;
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona Limcumpao, notarized on March 27, 2008;
10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and Libertad Bacricio and Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa
Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S. Consengco and Sps. Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized
March 18, 2008;
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of Pilar and Mila Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008;
13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco and Sps. Jay and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March 18,
2008;
14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago, notarized on April 1, 2008;
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and Development Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008;
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano, Luzviminda Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes Silva,
notarized on March 18, 2008;
17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon married to Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and Crystal
Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008; and
18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan and Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March
14, 2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were
notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the
affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see
respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents cameout of the office
already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from
the country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration
was also attached to the letter.3
The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the latter endorsed the same to the IBP National Office
for appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to formalize the complaint, the latter replied
on September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11, 2008 Letter was not intended to be a formal complaint but rather "a
report on, and endorsement of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the country," 4 and that any advice on how to
consider or treat the documents concerned would be welcome.
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action. 5
This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated September 30,2008,
and require respondent to comment on the said letter. In his comment,7 dated 27 March 2009, respondent claimed that he was not
aware that those were documents notarized using his name while he was out of the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out
that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his knowledge and authority. The said secretary notarized the
documents without realizing the import of the notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred that
he had terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.
The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. When the case was called for mandatory
conference on September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a manifestation reiterating his original position
and requesting that his attendance be excused.8 The mandatory conference was terminated and the parties were directed to file their
respective position papers. Only respondent submitted a position paper, 9 to which he added that for 21 years that he had been
practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the law profession and
notarial practice.
The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III)as Investigating Commissioner found that the
letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008, was not verified, that most of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies
and that the comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that respondent’s signature
on his comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the attached documents which he admitted
were notarized in his absence by his office secretary.He admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he
was abroad and his signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own
admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing an office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal
and records especially pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the standard
required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his office secretary the opportunity to
abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of
respondent’s commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of two (2)
years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its Resolution,11 dated September 28, 2013.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution of the IBP. He contended that by admitting and owning up
to what had happened, but without any wrongful intention, he should be merited with leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only
committed simple negligence which did not warrant such harsh penalty.
On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of respondent stating:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed
out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby affirmed.13
On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to the
Office of the Chief Justice for appropriate action.
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of
the country constituted negligence.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal
by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible
for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform
the official acts of a notary public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did not
authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his office open to the public while
leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary
could use these items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this Court
and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere
afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full
responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register.14 He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his
secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he
acted as a notary public without any blemish and this was his first and only infraction. His experience, however, should have placed
him on guard and could have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents were
notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated by
this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for
two (2) years is appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those directly affected by the notarized
documents but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held
liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. 15Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any.16 Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an
unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge,
he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the
activity being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later
found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons
whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was
eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months is in order.
Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only
to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act
must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. 17
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries pub! ic must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of pub! ic instruments
would be undermined.18
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will not take lightly complaints of unauthorized
acts of notarization, especially when the trust and confidence reposed by the public in our legal system hang in the balance.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with
MODIFICATION.1âwphi1Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the Court REVOKES
his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. The
Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the
repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension
shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Renato C. Bagay's personal record;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stems from a complaint1 filed by complainant Atty. Benigno T. Bartolome (Bartolome) on May 19, 2009
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against respondent Atty. Christopher A. Basilio (Basilio) for violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice2 (Notarial Rules).
The Facts
In the complaint, Bartolome alleged that Basilio, a notary public in Tarlac City, notarized a document entitled "Joint Affidavit of
Non-Tenancy and Aggregate Landholdings"3 (Joint Affidavit) purportedly subscribed and sworn to before him by Loreto M.
Tañedo (Tañedo) and Ramon T. Lim on January 15, 2006, and supposedly recorded as Doc. No. 375, Page No. 75,
Book No. X, Series of 2007 in his notarial register,4 despite the fact that Tañedo had already passed away as early as
December 1, 2003.5
In his Answer/Comment6 dated June 24, 2009, Basilio admitted having notarized the Joint Affidavit but claimed that, prior to the
notarization, he verified the identities of the persons who appeared before him through their respective Social Security System
(SSS) identification cards and driver’s licenses. He further denied any knowledge that the one who appeared before him
misrepresented himself as Tañedo and that the latter was already dead as of December 1, 2003. 7
During the clarificatory hearing, Basilio, who undisputedly notarized the Joint Affidavit, admitted his failure to: (a) record the
subject document in his notarial book; (b) submit a copy of the same to the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City (RTC); and (c) have
the notarization revoked or recalled.8
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated June 10, 2010 submitted by IBP Investigating Commissioner Randall C. Tabayoyong
(Investigating Commissioner), Basilio was found to have manifested gross negligence and a complete disregard of the Notarial
Rules. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that contrary to Section 8, in relation to Section 6, Rule II of the Notarial Rules,
Basilio failed to indicate in the Joint Affidavit the details of the SSS identification card and driver’s license which were allegedly
shown as competent evidence of identity of the persons who appeared before him. Thus, his claim that he verified the identities
of the persons who subscribed the Joint Affidavit could not be given credence. Basilio also failed to record in his notarial register
his notarial act on the Joint Affidavit in violation of Section 2 (a), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules. Lastly, the Investigating
Commissioner found that Basilio failed to submit a copy of the Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC, contrary to Section
2 (h), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules.10 Accordingly, he recommended that Basilio’s notarial commission, if still existing, be
revoked; he be disqualified from obtaining a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year and suspended from the practice
of law for six (6) months.11
In a Resolution12 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation. Dissatisfied, Basilio filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a
Resolution13 dated September 27, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly found Basilio liable for violation of the Notarial
Rules.
The Court’s Ruling
The act of notarization is impressed with public interest.14 As such, a notary public must observe the highest degree of care in
complying with the basic requirements in the performance of his duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the
integrity of the notarial system.15 In the present case, Basilio, as duly found by the IBP, failed to faithfully comply with his duties
as a notary public.1âwphi1
Section 5 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules clearly states that:
SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. — A notary public shall not:
xxxx
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete. (Emphases supplied)
A notarial certificate, as defined in Section 8, Rule II of the Notarial Rules, requires a statement of the facts attested to by the notary
public in a particular notarization, viz.:
SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. — "Notarial Certificate" refers to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized instrument or
document that is completed by the notary public, bears the notary’s signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by
the notary public in a particular notarization as provided for by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, a jurat is, among others, an attestation that the person who presented the instrument or document to be notarized is
personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by the
Notarial Rules:16
SEC. 6. Jurat. — "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. (Emphasis supplied)
As the records bear out, Basilio affixed his official signature and seal on the notarial certificate of the Joint Affidavit without
properly identifying the person/s who signed the same. His claim that he verified the identities of the affiants through their
respective SSS identification cards and driver’s licenses cannot be given any credence considering the ostensible lack of
their details on the face of the certificate. Neither was he able to provide the fact of identification in any way. On the other
hand, it has been established that one of the named signatories to the Joint Affidavit was already dead when he notarized the
aforesaid document. Hence, it is sufficiently clear that Basilio had indeed affixed his official signature and seal on an incomplete,
if not false, notarial certificate.
Moreover, by the same account, Basilio violated Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules which prohibits the notarization of a
document if the person involved is not personally known to the notary public or has not identified himself through competent
evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. – x x x
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity
as defined by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
To add, Basilio himself admitted that he failed to record his notarial act on the Joint Affidavit in his notarial register, contrary to
Section 2 (a), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, which states:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. — (a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of
notarization the following:
(1) the entry number and page number;
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) the type of notarial act;
(4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5) the name and address of each principal;
(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not personally known to the notary;
(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person’s identity;
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary’s regular place of work or business; and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Since the notarial register is a record of the notary public’s official acts, he is charged with recording therein the necessary
information regarding the document or instrument notarized. If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial
records, doubt as to its nature arises so that the alleged notarized document cannot be considered a public document.17Considering
the evidentiary value given to the notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in his notarial register
is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when, in fact, it was not, 18 as in this case.
It should be clarified, however, that while Basilio had also failed to submit a copy of the Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of
the RTC, and to retain a copy thereof for his own records, the requirement therefor, as stated under Section 2 (h), 19 Rule VI of the
Notarial Rules, applies only to instruments acknowledged before the notary public. Documents like the Joint Affidavit which
contain a jurat and not an acknowledgment are not required to be forwarded to the Clerk of Court. Hence, there should be no
administrative infraction on this score. Nevertheless, Basilio’s aforediscussed violations of the Notarial Rules are grave
enough to warrant sanctions from the Court.
A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness.20 Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify
to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions. 21 In line with this mandate, a
notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very person who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. 22 By failing in this regard, the notary public
permits a falsehood which does not only transgress the Notarial Rules but also Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."23 Verily, a
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face; and it is for this reason that a notary public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of a
notarized document would be undermined.
As herein discussed, Basilio’s failure to properly perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damage to those
directly affected by the notarized document, but also in undermining the integrity of the office of a notary public and in
degrading the function of notarization. In fine, he should be meted out with the modified penalty of disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. Although
there is no showing that Basilio prepared the document in question, his utter disregard of the Notarial Rules as exhibited during the
proceedings before the IBP, together with his admitted failure to revoke or recall his notarization despite his knowledge of its
irregularity, warrants the same treatment as the errant lawyer in Agbulos v. Viray:24
[T]he Court finds the need to increase that recommended by the IBP which is one month suspension as a lawyer and six months
suspension as notary public, considering that respondent himself prepared the document, and he performed the notarial act without
the personal appearance of the affiant and without identifying her with competent evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion,
he allowed the use of a CTC by someone who did not own it. Worse, he allowed himself to be an instrument of fraud. Based on
existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is meted the penalties
of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years,
and suspension from the practice of law for one year. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
SO ORDERED.
ORLANDO S. CASTELO, ELENA C. CAMA, OSWALDO CASTELO, JOCELYN LLANILLO, AND BENJAMIN
CASTELO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RONALD SEGUNDINO C. CHING, Respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
A notarized document is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Thus, a notary public should observe utmost care in performing
his duties to preserve public confidence in the integrity of notarized documents. 1
The salient facts, as borne by the records, are:
Sometime in late 2013, Complainants Orlando S. Castelo, Elena C. Cama, Oswaldo Castelo, Jocelyn Llanillo, and Benjamin Castelo
(Castelo heirs) received summons from the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 22, Manila (MeTC) for an ejectment case 2 filed
against them by Leonida Delen and Spouses Nestor Delen and Julibel Delen (the Delens), who alleged that they were the owners
of the house and lot located at 2511 A. Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila (subject property). The subject property was then the residence
of the Castelo heirs,3 and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 291223 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of
Manila (RD) in the name of the Delens.4
Upon verifying the authenticity of TCT No. 291223 with the RD, the Castelo heirs discovered that the previous title covering the
subject property, TCT No. 240995, which was in the name of the Castelo heirs' parents, Spouses Benjamin Castelo and Perzidia5 S.
Castelo (Spouses Castelo), had been cancelled6 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24, 2010 (Deed).7 The Deed was
purportedly executed by the Spouses Castelo and the Delens, and was notarized by Respondent Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching
(Atty. Ching), despite the fact that Perzidia S. Castelo died on May 4, 2009, 8 as shown in her Death Certificate.9 The Castelo heirs
also learned that the acknowledgment page of the Deed showed that only community tax certificates had been presented to Atty.
Ching, and not valid government-issued identification cards as required by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. 10
With this discovery, the Castelo heirs filed on June 2, 2014 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) this administrative case
against Atty. Ching based on the latter's gross negligence in notarizing the Deed. 11
Atty. Ching, for his part, denied having notarized the Deed. He countered that he did not know the Spouses Castelo and the Delens,
and that the Deed presented by the Castelo heirs had been falsified. Atty. Ching continued that his purported signature in the Deed
was forged. 12 To prove the alleged forgery, Atty. Ching presented specimens of his signatures that he used in signing pleadings
and notarizing documents. 13
At the scheduled mandatory conference on September 1, 2014, 14 the Castelo heirs and Atty. Ching were present. 15The Castelo
heirs moved for the issuance of an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum16 to Atty.
Jennifer H. Dela Cruz-Buendia, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, or any of
her duly authorized records officers, to appear at the next scheduled mandatory conference with Books No. 16 and 17, Series of
2010 of the Notarial Register (Atty. Ching's notarial books), which allegedly contained the original copy of the Deed. The IBP
issued the subpoena, 17 and the mandatory conference was reset to November 13, 2014. 18
In the November 13, 2014 resetting of the mandatory conference which was the last, 19 Atty. Ching's notarial books were
presented.20 However, Atty. Ching failed to attend the said conference and refute the authenticity of the Deed.Upon verification,
the IBP concluded that the copy of the Deed presented by the Castelo heirs in their Complaint was indeed a faithful machine copy
of the original contained in Atty. Ching's notarial books.21 Thereafter, the Castelo heirs submitted their position paper.22 Atty.
Ching, however, failed to submit his.
After due proceedings, Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles (Commissioner Robles) rendered a Report and Recommendation 23 on
December 3, 2014, finding that Atty. Ching was grossly negligent in notarizing the Deed.24The dispositive portion reads:
UPON THE FOREGOING, considering the seriousness of the consequences of respondent's gross negligence, it is recommended
that respondent's notarial commission be cancelled immediately, and that he be disqualified from ever being commissioned again
as notary public. 25
In its Resolution26 dated February 21, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the said
Report and Recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A",
for gross negligence in Respondent's notarial service. Hence, Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching's notarial commission if presently
commissioned is immediately REVOKED. Further, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as Notary
Public and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.27
After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, the Court has no compelling reason to diverge from the
factual findings of Commissioner Robles and the recommended penalty of the IBP Board of Governors.
Gross negligence on the part of a notary public encompasses the failure to observe any of the requirements of a notarial act under
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which would result in putting the rights of a person to his liberty or property in jeopardy. This
includes, among others, failing to require the presence of the signatories to a notarial instrument and ascertaining their identities
through competent evidence thereof, 28 and allowing, knowingly or unknowingly, people, other than the notary public himself, to
sign notarial documents, affix the notarial seal therein, and make entries in the notarial register.29
In Spouses Santuyo v. Hidalgo, 30the Court ruled that Atty. Hidalgo was grossly negligent not only in the supposed notarization of
a deed of sale of a parcel of land purchased by the Spouses Santuyo, but also in allowing his office secretaries to make the necessary
entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone. This resulted in an ownership dispute between
the Spouses Santuyo and a certain Danilo German which led to the filing of a case of estafa through falsification of a public
document against the Spouses Santuyo, thus:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically state that they appeared before
respondent to have the deed of sale notarized.1avvphi1 Their appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that
respondent signed the document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants themselves were
not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature appeared thereon. They
had no personal knowledge as well as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent's contention that he only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after
the alleged notarization of the deed of sale. Respondent's assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed
on November 17, 2001 wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house on November 5,
1997 to meet her husband since the two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo
and respondent was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another
property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxxx
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should have been more discreet and cautious
in the execution of his duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not
have been commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the secretary there can be a
possibility that even the respondent's signature which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for
that matter as had been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries
to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have
relied on somebody else.31
In this case, Commissioner Robles observed that while Atty. Ching denied having notarized the Deed 32 by showing the discrepancy
between his purported signature therein33 and the specimen signatures34 he submitted in his Answer, he miserably failed to explain
how the Deed ended up in his notarial books. Commissioner Robles concluded that while it would not be fair to conclude that Atty.
Ching actually signed the Deed, he was nonetheless grossly negligent for failing to give a satisfactory reason why a supposedly
forged Deed was duly recorded in his notarial books. 35
The Court completely agrees with Commissioner Robles' observation. While there may be reasons to give Atty. Ching the benefit
of the doubt as to who signed the Deed, the Court does not and cannot lose sight of the fact that Atty. Ching still failed in ensuring
that only documents which he had personally signed and sealed with his notarial seal, after satisfying himself with the completeness
of the same and the identities of the parties who affixed their signatures therein, would be included in his notarial register. This
also means that Atty. Ching failed to properly store and secure his notarial equipment in order to prevent other people from
notarizing documents by forging his signature and affixing his notarial seal, and recording such documents in his notarial books,
without his knowledge and consent. This is gross negligence.
Such gross negligence on the part of Atty. Ching in letting another person notarize the Deed had also unduly put the Castelo heirs
in jeopardy of losing their property. To make matters worse, the real property subject of the Deed was the residence, nay, the family
home of the Castelo heirs, a property that their parents had worked hard for in order to provide them and their children a decent
shelter and the primary place where they could bond together as a family - a property which had already acquired sentimental value
on the part of the Castelo heirs, which no amount of money could ever match. One can just imagine the pain and anguish of losing
a home to unscrupulous people who were able to transfer title to such property and file a case in court in order to eject them - all
because of the negligence of a notary public in keeping his notarial books and instruments from falling into the wrong hands.
This is not to say, however, that the Court has ruled on whether or not the Deed in this case was indeed forged.1âwphi1Such issue
is civil, and perhaps criminal, in nature which should be passed upon in a proper case, and not in an administrative or disciplinary
proceeding such as this case. 36
As for the penalty to be imposed, and taking into account the possible undue deprivation of property on the part of the Castelo heirs
as a result of Atty. Ching's gross negligence, the Court agrees with, and hereby adopts, the recommended penalty of the IBP.
As a final note, this case should serve as a reminder for notaries public, as well as for lawyers who are applying for a commission,
that the duty to public service and to the administration of public justice is the primary consideration in the practice of law.37 This
duty to public service is made more important when a lawyer is commissioned as a notary public. Like the duty to defend a client's
cause within the bounds of law, a notary public has the additional duty to preserve public trust and confidence in his office38 by
observing extra care and diligence in ensuring the integrity of every document that comes under his notarial seal, and seeing to it
that only documents that he personally inspected and whose signatories he personally identified are recorded in his notarial books.
In addition, notaries public should properly secure the equipment they use in performing notarial acts, in order for them not to fall
into the wrong hands, and be used in acts that would undermine the public's trust and confidence in the office of the notary public.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching is found GUILTY of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as notary
public. His existing notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is also PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
being commissioned as a notary public. Moreover, he is hereby SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR SIX (6)
MONTHS. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Ching is also DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision to determine the reckoning point of
the effectivity of his suspension.
Let a copy of this Decision be made part of Atty. Ching's records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and copies be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
DR. BASILIO MALVAR, Complainant
vs
ATTY. CORA JANE P. BALEROS, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment1 filed on June 30, 2014 by Dr. Basilio Malvar (complainant) against Atty. Cora Jane
P. Baleros (respondent) for acts amounting to grave misconduct consisting of falsification of public document, violation of
Administrative Matter No. 02-8-13-SC or the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules) and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Antecedent Facts
The complainant is the owner of a parcel of lana located .in Barangay Pagudpud, San Fernando City, La Union. 2 On January 7,
2011, the complainant executed a Deed of Absolute Sale3 in favor of Leah Mallari (Mallari) over the said lot for the amount of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00). This transaction was acknowledged by the children of the complainant through a
document denominated as Confirmation of Sale.4
The process of conveying the title of the lot in the name of Mallari spawned the legal tussle between the parties. According to the
complainant, an agreement was made between him and Mallari wherein he unde1iook to facilitate the steps in order to have the
title of the lot transferred under Mallari's name.5 However, without his knowledge and consent, Mallari who was not able to
withstand the delay in the delivery of the title of the land sold to her allegedly filed an Application for Certification of Alienable
and Disposable Land6 as a preliminary step for the segregation and titling of the same before the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), San Fernando City, La Union using
the complainant's name and signing the said application.7 A civil case for collection of sum of money was instituted by Mallari
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Aringay, La Union seeking reimbursement for the expenses she incurred by reason of
the transfer and titling of the property she purchased.8 A compromise agreement9 was forged between the parties which failed
because two out of the four checks issued by the complainant were unfunded. 10 This prompted Mallari to file a criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law, against the complainant before the MTC
of Aringay, La Union.11
Ultimately, a criminal case for falsification of public document against Mallari was filed before the Office of the Prosecutor and
now pending before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 1. 12 The complainant
alleged that it was through the conspiracy of Mallari and the respondent that the crime charged was consummated. 13
Notwithstanding the Office of the Prosecutor's determination that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish conspiracy
between Mallari and the respondent, thereby dropping the latter's name from the indictment, the complainant remained unfazed
and thus, initiated the present petition for disbarment seeking the imposition of disciplinary sanction against the respondent. 14 The
complainant claimed that the respondent, by notarizing the assailed Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land,
made it appear that he executed the same when the truth of the matter was he never went to the office of the respondent for he was
in Manila at the time of the alleged notarization and was busy performing his duties as a doctor. 15
On August 19, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a Notice of
Mandatory
Conference16 requiring both parties to appear before it on November 18, 2014. However, the scheduled mandatory conference was
reset to December 2, 201417 where the complainant personally appeared while the respondent was represented by her attorney-in-
fact and counsel.18
The complainant buttressed in his position paper that the respondent consummated the crime of falsification of public document as
delineated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and thus, the presumption of regularity in the notarization of the contested
document has been overthrown and cannot work in her favor. 19 He recapped that he never appeared before the respondent to have
the subject document notarized.20 The complainant stressed that the respondent made a mockery of the Notarial Rules by notarizing
the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land in his absence.
In her Position Paper,21 the respondent refuted the allegations against her by narrating that Benny Telles, the complainant and his
sons came to her office to have the subject document notarized and that she is certain as to the identity of the
complainant.22 Moreover, she argued that the charges filed against her were all part of the complainant's scheme to avoid his
obligations to Mallari as the buyer of his lot.23
Ruling of the IBP
On June 15, 2015, Commissioner Maria Angela Esquivel (Commissioner Esquivel) found that the respondent was negligent in the
perfonnance of her duties as a notary public and violated the Notarial Rules, thereby recommending disciplinary imposition against
her.1avvphi1 The pertinent portion of the Report and Recommendation 24 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent's commission as a notary public be
revoked; that she be disqualified for being a notary public for two (2) years with a stem warning that a repetition of similar offense
shall be dealt with more severe 1y .25
In a Resolution26 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Esquivel's report and
recommendation with modification, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A",
for failure of Respondent to observe due diligence in the performance of her duties and obligations as a Notary Public specifically
Rule VL Section 2 of the Notarial Law. Thus, [the respondent's] notarial commission, if presently commissioned, is immediately
REVOKED. Furthermore, [she] is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a Notary Public for two (2) years and
SUSPENDED from tile practice of law for six (6) months.27 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
The Issues
Whether administrative liability should attach to the respondent by reason of the following acts alleged to have been committed by
her:
1. Falsification of the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land;
2. Notarization of the aforesaid document in the absence of the complainant; and
3. Double Entries in the Notarial Registry.
Ruling of the Court
After a close scrutiny of the facts of the case, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors.
With regard to the imputation of falsification of public document, the Court hall not inquire into the merits of the said criminal case
pending adjudication before the MTCC and make a ruling on the matter. Commissioner Esquivel orrectly declined to resolve the
falsification case pending resolution before the regular court to which jurisdiction properly pertains. Though disbarment roceedings
are sui generis as they belong to a class of their own and are distinct from that of civil or criminal actions, it is judicious for an
administrative body ike IBP-CBD not to pre-empt the course of action of the regular courts in order to avert contradictory findings.28
The Court concurs with the conclusion of Commissioner Esquivel that the respondent violated several provisions of the Notarial
Rules.1âwphi1 The complainant insists that the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land was notarized sans
his presence. An affidavit requiring a jurat which the respondent admittedly signed and notarized on August 18, 2010 forms part
of the subject document. The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to before
her, thus, making the notarial certification essential.29 The unsubstantiated claim of the respondent that the complainant appeared
before her and signed the contested document in her presence cannot prevail over the evidence supplied by the complainant pointing
that it was highly improbable if not impossible for him to appear before the respondent on the date so alleged that the subject
document was notarized. The complainant furnished in his Sworn Judicial Affidavit submitted before the court patients' record
cards showing that he attended to a number of them on August 18, 2010 in De Los Santos Medical Center, E. Rodriguez, Sr.
Avenue, Quezon City.30
Ajurat as sketched in jurisprudence lays emphasis on the paramount requirements of the physical presence of the affiant as well as
his act of signing the document before the notary public.31 The respondent indeed transgressed Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the
Notarial Rules by affixing her official signature and seal on the notarial certificate of the affidavit contained in the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land in the absence of the complainant and for failing to ascertain the identity of the
affiant. The thrust of the said provision reads:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions.
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document-
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules.
The physical presence of the affiant ensures the proper execution of the duty of the notary public under the law to determine whether
the former's signature was voluntarily affixed.32 Aside from forbidding notarization without the personal presence of the affiant,
the Notarial Rules demands the submission of competent evidence of identity such as an identification card with photograph and
signature which requirement can be dispensed with provided that the notary public personally knows the affiant. Competent
evidence of identity under Section 12 of Rule II of the Notarial Rules is defined as follows:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an individual
based on:
a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual;
or
b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to
the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
Granting that the complainant was present before the notary public at the time of the notarization of the contested document on
August 18, 2010, the respondent remained unjustified in not requiring him to show a competent proof of his identification. She
could have escaped administrative liability on this score if she was able to demonstrate that she personally knows the complainant.
On the basis of the very definition of a jurat under Section 6 of Rule II of the Notarial Rules, case law echoes that the non-
presentation of the affiant's competent proof of identification is permitted if the notary public personally knows the
former.33 A 'jurat' refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or
affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.34
Further, the respondent displayed lack of diligence by the nonobservance of the obligations imposed upon her under Section 2 of
Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, to wit:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register.
(a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of notarization the following:
(1) the entry number and page number;
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) the type of notarial act;
(4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5) the name and address of each principal;
(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules if the signatory is not personally known to the notary;
(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of business; and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.
xxxx
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the
same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The same notarial details were assigned by the respondent to two distinct documents. In an order of the MTCC where the criminal
case for falsification of document was pending, Clerk of Court Atty. Raquel Estigoy-Andres (Atty. Estigoy-Andres) was directed
to transmit the original document of the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land which was notarized by
the respondent.35 A similar order was issued by the MTCC requiring the DENR for the production of the impugned document.36 The
DENR issued a certification that despite diligent efforts they could not locate the said document but which they were certain was
received by their office.37 Meanwhile, upon Atty. Estigoy-Andres' certification,38 it was discovered that as per the respondent's
notarial register submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Document No. 288, Page No. 59, Book No. LXXIII, Series of 2010
does not pertain to the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land but to a notarized document denominated
as Joint Affidavit of Adjoining Owners39 executed by Ricardo Sibayan and Cecilia Flores. Undoubtedly, the document entitled
Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land nowhere appears in the respondent's notarial register. The
respondent further exposed herself to administrative culpability when she regretfully offered plain oversight as an excuse for the
non-inclusion of the challenged document in her notarial register and by stating that it is her office staff who usually fills it up. To
reiterate, the respondent admitted having signed and notarized the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land
but based from the foregoing, she indubitably failed to record the assailed document in her notarial book. It is axiomatic that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is converted
into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution. 40 "If the
document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the
document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on
this document."41 The respondent's delegation of her notarial function of recording entries in her notarial register to her staff is a
clear contravention of the explicit provision of the Notarial Rules dictating that such duty be fulfilled by her and not somebody
else. This likewise violates Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the CPR which provides that:
A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
In addition to the above charges, Commissioner Esquivel noted that the respondent failed to retain an original copy in her records
and to submit the duplicate copy of the document to the Clerk of Court. However, in a previous case, the Court ruled that the
requirement stated under Section 2(h) of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules applies only to an instrument acknowledged before the
notary public and not to the present document which contains a jurat.42 "A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment."43 It
is that part of an affidavit in which the notary certifies that before him or her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the
executor; while an acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed.44Hence, no liability can be ascribed to the respondent relative to such ground.
The Court finds unacceptable the respondent's defiance of the Notarial Rules. Under the circumstances, the respondent should be
made liable not only as a notary public who failed to discharge her duties as such but also as a lawyer who exhibited utter disregard
to the integrity and dignity owing to the legal profession. The acts committed by the respondent go beyond being mere lapses in
the fulfilment of her duties under the Notarial Rules, they comprehend a parallel breach of the CPR particularly Canon 9, Rule
9.01, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" and
the Lawyer's Oath which amplifies the undertaking to do no. falsehood and adhere to laws and the legal system being one of their
primordial tasks as officers of the court. Given the evidentiary value accorded to notarized documents, the failure of the notary
public to record the document in her notarial register corresponds to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized
when, in fact, it was not.45 It cannot be veremphasized that notaries public are urged to observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds
will be undermined .46
In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers who were remiss in their duties as notaries public to disciplinary sanction.
Failure to enter the notarial acts in one's notarial register, notarizing a document without the personal presence of the affiants and
the failure to properly identify the person who signed the questioned document constitute dereliction of a notary public's duties
which warrants the revocation of a lawyer's commission as a notary public. 47 Upholding the role of notaries public in deterring
illegal or immoral arrangements, the Court in the case of Dizon v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.48 prohibited the respondent for a period of
two (2) years from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing a compromise agreement without the presence of all the
parties. In the case of Atty. Benigno T Bartolome v. Atty. Christopher A. Basilio,49 which factual milieu is similar to the present
case, the Court meted out against therein respondent the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification for two
(2) years from being appointed as a notary public and suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law due to various
infringement of the Notarial Rules such as failure to record a notarized document in his notarial register and notarizing a document
without the physical presence of the affiant.
Following jurisprudential precedents and as a reminder to notaries public that their solemn duties which are imbued with public
interest are not to be taken lightly, the Court deems it proper to revoke the notarial register of the respondent if still existing and to
disqualify her from appointment as a notary public for two (2) years. She is also suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months. Contrary to the complainant's proposition to have the respondent disbarred, the Court is of the belief that her acts do not
merit such a grave penalty and the sanctions so imposed suffice. The Court held in an array of cases that "removal from the Bar
should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary suspension or fine - would accomplish the
end desired."50
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros is GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and she is
hereby DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years. She is likewise SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately. Further, she is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
JUDGE GERVACIO A. LOPENA, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. ARTEMIO P. CABATOS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos (respondent) was administratively charged1 by Judge Gervacio A. Lopena (complainant) of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tagbilaran-Clarin, Bohol of SERIOUS BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS and GRAVE
MISCONDUCT allegedly committed as follows:
1) Respondent knowingly falsified a Deed of Donation2 purportedly executed by one Crispina Panis by notarizing the same on June
24, 1981 when the donor had died on January 15, 1981, and
2) Respondent "showed a grave disrespect to the courts and the administration of justice" by holding, together with his followers,
a parade/rally on September 21, 1984 around the principal streets of Tagbilaran City, directed against complainant who had
convicted respondent’s close relatives in three criminal cases and denied the applications for probation of two of the
convicts.
Acting on this Court’s Resolution of February 14, 1990,3 respondent submitted his COMMENT, by letter of April 19,
1990,4 claiming that he had been away from his place of birth, Panaytayon, Tubigon, Bohol since 1958, hence, when he notarized
the questioned deed of donation, he "really did not recognize the person of Cristina Panis," but he was led by one Gregorio Ricafort
to believe that "the old woman before him at the time was the said Crispina Panis."
Respondent informed that his notarization of the questioned document in fact resulted to his indictment in court for reckless
imprudence resulting in falsification of public document, which case was pending trial.
As for the charge of having conducted a rally/parade, respondent claimed that the same was staged by PDP Laban and BAYAN of
Bohol as a protest against complainant who showed bias in presiding over the trial of the criminal cases against members of the
Cabatos family and "disregarding the evidence in convicting them."
By Comment/Reply5 to respondent’s COMMENT, complainant countered that one of the witnesses to the questioned document
was respondent’s father, Geronimo Cabatos,6 a permanent resident of Panaytayon who knew as he was related by blood to
Crispina Panis,7 hence, it is incredible for respondent not to know of Panis’ death on January 15, 1981 or that "he did not know
the person of . . . Panis [even if] he ha[d] been away from his place of birth since 1958."
This Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by Resolution of June 4, 1990. 8
The rollo shows that complainant had been manifesting his zeal in pursuing the case, but until March 19, 2002 when a
Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued a Notice of Hearing9 directing the parties to appear at the IBP
Building on April 19, 2002, the case appears to have in the interim remained dormant.
Due to the unavailability of complainant and the IBP Investigating Commissioner on the scheduled hearings on April 19, 200210 and
June 7, 2002, respectively, they were reset to June 28, 2002. 11
Before the June 28, 2002 scheduled hearing, complainant filed before the IBP a MANIFESTATION COUPLED WITH MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING12 wherein he expressed "wonder . . . why it took the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
IBP over ten (10) long years to set th[e] case for hearing."
In the same Manifestation cum Motion, complainant informed that his two witnesses, Aniceta P. Tarle, a daughter of the deceased
Crispina Panis, and Ricafort (who, as reflected above, respondent claimed to have led him to believe that "the old woman" presented
before him was Panis) had died.
Complainant further informed that he and respondent were principal sponsors at a wedding, hence, he had not pressed for the early
investigation of the case.
Nonetheless, complainant prayed that the case be decided on the basis of the pleadings.
Respondent, whose comment on complainant’s above-said Manifestation cum Motion was sought by the IBP by Order of June
28, 2002,13 filed a Motion to Dismiss14 manifesting that he was joining complainant’s motion to have the case resolved on the
basis of the pleadings, and informing that the criminal complaint lodged against him in connection with his notarization
of the questioned document was dismissed, he having proved
i) that when he notarized the subject Deed of Donation – one among six similar documents executed in favor of Barangay
Panaytayon, Tubigon, Bohol, for purposes of a school site – someone represented to respondent as "Crispina Panis;"
ii) that she turned [out] to be the daughter of Crispina Panis, and that she ha[d] been instructed by Gregorio Ricafor[t] who prepared
the document to affix the same Crispina Panis in the document;
iii) that the donation turned out to be the will and resolve of the heirs of Crispina Panis[.]
Respondent accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the case.
IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline Victoria O. de los Reyes, to whom the case was reassigned, issued a Notice of
Hearing15 setting the case for hearing on October 10, 2002 but not one of the parties showed up. While the IBP received on October
4, 2002 complainant’s Reiterative Manifestation dated September 30, 2002,16 it resolved to deny the Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, by Order of October 10, 200217 upon its finding of a need for complainant to substitute his charges.
The IBP later received on October 6, 2002 a REITERATIVE MANIFESTATION (RE: COMPLAINANT’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS)18 alleging, among other things,
b) that respondent never personally knew the late Crispina Panis nor his relationship to her, considering that from 1958 (when
respondent set foot on secondary education) respondent left his native place and resided in a convent with a parish priest (now
Msgr. Saturnino Felicitas) as an altar boy and convent helper, until respondent graduated from two (2) college courses;
c) that, in fact, the fact of death of said Crispina Panis was known to respondent only when he became one of the accused in a
complaint for "falsification of public document" filed with the MCTC of Tubigon-Clarin, Bohol[.]
The case was set anew for complainant to present evidence on November 11, 2002 during which, again, none of the parties
appeared, drawing the Commission to consider the case submitted for resolution by Order of even date. 19
Commissioner de los Reyes submitted her REPORT and RECOMMENDATION20 the pertinent portion of which read:
xxx
In view of the failure of the complainant to substantiate his serious charges against the respondent, it is respectfully recommended
that this charge for disbarment be dismissed. There is no question that the complainant waived his right to present his evidence
despite the opportunity given him by this Commission and in effect deprived the respondent the right to confront him and his
witnesses.
However, this Commission would like to point out that there is no issue that respondent Atty. Cabatos did not exercise that degree
of diligence required of him as a Notary Public.
It has been held in the case entitled Flores v. Chua, 306 SCRA 465, that where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility
is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
And in the case Nunga v. Viray, 306 SCRA 487, the Honorable Court ruled that notaries public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
In the case before us, the respondent himself admitted that he did not exert any effort to find out if the person who acknowledged
to have executed the Deed of Donation was really Crispina Panis. He merely relied on the assurance of Mr. Gregorio Ricafort that
the person who appeared before him as Notary Public was the real Crispina Panis. Considering that Tubigon, Bohol is a small town,
it would have been easy to determine the real identity of the person claiming to have executed the document.
Moreover, it was easy for the respondent to require the person who claimed to have executed the questioned Deed of Donation to
produce his Community Tax Certificate (formerly Residence Certificate) and any other documents to identify him or her. This he
did not do.
It can therefore be validly concluded that respondent Atty. Cabatos failed to exercise with utmost care and diligence his duties as
Notary Public.
For these reasons, it is recommended that respondent Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos be reprimanded, with a warning that a graver penalty
will be recommended to be imposed on him in the event he again fails to exercise that high degree of diligence required of a Notary
Public in the performance of his duties as such. (Emphasis and italization in the original)
By Notice of RESOLUTION,21 the IBP National Secretary quoted the IBP Resolution No. XVI-2003-89 adopting and approving
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,22 which notice of Resolution, along with the records of the
case, was transmitted by letter of September 29, 2002 of the IBP Director for Bar Discipline and received on October 9, 2003 by
the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court.23
When will the incidence of violations, by lawyers commissioned as notaries public, of their oath of office decline if not abate?
Why do notaries public seem to be impervious to the call by this Court to faithfully discharge their sacred duties which are dictated
by public policy and impressed with public interest?
Why did respondent rely on Ricafort’s alleged leading him to believe that the "old woman" before him was theCrsipina Panis who
purportedly executed the document for notarization, when one of the witnesses 24 to the execution of the document was his
(respondent’s) father, Geronimo Cabatos, from whom he could have verified the identity of Crispina Panis, if indeed he
did not know her?
That respondent was, if true, exonerated from the criminal case filed against him in connection with his notarization of the
questioned document does not exonerate him from the present administrative case.
Nor does, if respondent’s information in his Motion to Dismiss25 is true, that the person who had been instructed by Ricafort to
affix the signature of Crispina Panis was the latter’s daughter exonerate him. By such information, he in fact impliedly admits
that the document had already been signed when it was brought to him for notarization.
That a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents of the truth of what are stated therein bears reiterating. On pain of sounding
like a broken record, this Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of the injunction is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party – in this case Crispina Panis – and to ascertain that the document is
the party’s free act of deed.26
Respondent having thus failed to faithfully discharge his sacred duties as a notary public, under the facts and circumstances of the
case, the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for a period of One
(1) Year is in order.
As for the charge against respondent of showing "grave disrespect to the courts and the administration of justice" by holding a
parade/rally, along with his followers, during which he imputed bias to complainant whom he branded as "worse than President
Marcos," it has not been sufficiently substantiated.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of respondent, Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED and he is
hereby DISQUALIFIED to be commissioned as a notary public for a period of One (1) Year, and WARNED that a similar violation
by him shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the country, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Bar Confidant.
Let this Resolution be also made of record in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

CHITA PANTOJA-MUMAR, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JANUARIO C. FLORES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by Chita Pantoja-Mumar charging respondent Atty. Januario C.
Flores with fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, falsification of document, breach of duty and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Complainant is one of the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. It appears that respondent had prepared an Extrajudicial
Partition with Absolute Sale1 for her and 11 other co-heirs covering a three-hectare property in Pangdan, Cambanay, Danao City.
The deed was executed in favor of the spouses Filomena and Edilberto Perez, who were later able to secure a torrens title2 over the
property under their names.
In the verified Complaint3 dated March 17, 2001, complainant alleged that respondent had prepared the Extrajudicial Partition with
Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1987, but averred that the transaction did not push through, and the deed was not notarized. She
further narrated, thus:
8. [Respondent], knowing fully well that there actually was no transaction between the Pantojas and the Perezes, notarized the same
document apparently in violation of his oath as a lawyer and a breach of his duty as a notary public. Worst was the fact that [the]
spouses Perez and the respondent had the document thumbmarked by [a person other than] Maximina Pantoja as appearing above
in the same typewritten name. Attached is an enlarged Machine Copy of Maximina Pantoja’s true and genuine thumbmark as
Annex "C" while an enlarged machine copy of the thumbmark appearing above her typewritten name in the said
document is attached as Annex "D" for comparison;
9. Moreover, the respondent x x x made it appear in the falsified/fabricated and forged document that the same was acknowledged
before him on December 29, 1987, when in truth and in fact, he and [the] spouses Perez prepared, falsified, fabricated and forged
the said document after June 13, 1988, when they were able to fraudulently secure the first page thereof from Lucresia P. Awe, not
to mention the fact that neither of the parties to the said document appeared before him as required under the notarial law. This is
supported by the written declaration of [the] spouses Perez dated June 25, 1988 that they bought the property on June 13, 1988 for
₱40,000.00, a photocopy of which is attached as Annex "E" hereof.
10. On the basis of such falsified, fabricated and forged document denominated as Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale, [the]
spouses Perez with the help of respondent attorney, were able to effect the issuance of a title over the above-described property in
their names to the damage and prejudice of complainant and the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. Attached as Annex
"F" is a photocopy of the title;4
Respondent denies the charges against him. His version of what transpired during the signing and notarization of the document is
as follows:
9. x x x [D]uring the signing of the document at the ancestral home of the Pantojas on December 29, 1987, by surviving spouse
Celedonia Lumen Pantoja and all the children (except Mrs. Mumar), the respondent called the attention of Mrs. Pantoja to the fact
that Mrs. Mumar was not a signatory to the document because she was absent. Mrs. Pantoja pleaded with the respondent to proceed
with the notarization of the document because she badly needed the money. She promised to have the document signed by Mrs.
Mumar as soon as she would come to Danao City;
10. But Mrs. Pantoja did not make good her promise. So, on February 24, 1989, Edilberto Perez (vendee) sent a registered letter to
Mrs. Chita P. Mumar at her address at Talibon, Bohol, informing her of the sale of their 3.3526 hectare property located in Pandan,
Cambanay, Danao City, covered by Tax Dec. 008-0895, a copy of the letter is hereto attached as Annex "F." The letter was received
by her son Odelio Mumar on March 2, 1989, per postal registry return card hereto attached as Annex "G";
11. Obviously, as early as March 2, 1989, complainant Mumar already knew of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale.
Therefore, her right of action, whether civil, criminal or administrative, is barred by prescription. She is also guilty of laches in
failing to assert her right for an unreasonable length of time;
12. Lastly, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale was published in the Sun Star Daily, a newspaper of general circulation in
the cities and province of Cebu in its issues of March 18, 23 and 31, 1989, as shown by an Affidavit of Publication by its Editor-
in-Chief Pacheco Seares, a copy of said affidavit is hereto attached as Annex "H."5
He alleged that no criminal charges for falsification were filed against him, and it was only on January 11, 2000 that seven of the
ten heirs of Jose Pantoja, Sr. filed a civil case for Recovery of Ownership, Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Sale, Accounting and Damages.6
The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 26, 2001. The case was assigned to
Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa. A mandatory conference was held on October 15, 2003, where only the complainant appeared
and manifested that she was willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings submitted. She requested for
additional time to file a verified position paper.
For his part, respondent filed a Manifestation that he received the notice of mandatory conference, but requested to be excused
therefrom. He stated that he was also willing to submit the case on the basis of the pleadings.
In her Position Paper, complainant reiterated the allegations in her complaint. She insisted that respondent forged her signature,
which originally did not appear on the first page of the document before it was borrowed. She added that respondent had also
falsified a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to make it appear that one of her co-heirs had authorized another to sign the deed for
her. According to the complainant, respondent dated the questioned document "December 29, 1987," when in fact the first page
containing all the signatures of the heirs was borrowed only on June 13, 1988. Even the spouses Perez declared in writing that they
had bought the subject property on June 13, 1988. The complainant stressed that the spouses Perez were able to secure a certificate
of title to the subject property because of the forged document.
In his Comment on the Position Paper, respondent alleged that the allegations in the complaint are self-serving and not supported
by evidence. To prove his point, respondent enclosed the original duplicate of the SPA which was notarized on November 4, 1987,
and the transcript of stenographic notes in Civil Case No. DNA-574, particularly the testimony of Clarita Manulat, who testified
on the circumstances surrounding the execution of the SPA and handcarried it to Pasig on June 20, 1987.
Regarding Maximina’s thumbmark, respondent recalled that on December 29, 1987, he, Clarita Manulat, and vendee
Filomena Perez went to the residence of Celedonia Pantoja as previously agreed upon. Only the complainant was not present. After
the other heirs finished signing the document, Mrs. Pantoja asked permission from respondent if she could bring the document
inside the bedroom because she would be coaxing her daughter to affix her thumbmark. Mrs. Pantoja told them that Maximina was
"reclusive and suffering from mental imbalance."
According to respondent, the so-called thumbmark of Maximina which appears on the cedula is the fake one. He surmised that this
thumbmark was probably affixed on the cedula by one of her sisters, since Maximina would not come out of her room and had to
be coaxed by her mother to affix her thumbmark on the document. Respondent also enclosed a copy of the transcript of his testimony
in Civil Case No. DNA-574.
In reply, complainant pointed out that respondent had admitted that he did not see Maximina affix her thumbmark on the assailed
Deed, yet he notarized it; respondent had also admitted that he had committed a breach of his office as a notary public on cross-
examination in Civil Case No DNA-574. Respondent’s belief that Maximina Pantoja was suffering from some mental ailment
and yet still notarized it only proves his misconduct.
In her Report dated January 16, 2006, the Investigating Commissioner found that while the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale is yet to be resolved in the civil case, the acts and omissions of respondent as notary public have been duly
established. According to the Investigating Commissioner:
1. The document, although already signed by some of the co-heirs/co-owners on or before December 29, 1987, was not finalized
because the transaction was not pursued; however, the date of notarization was indicated therein to be December 29, 1987;
2. Respondent notarized the document on or after June 13, 1988, without the authority and/or in the absence of some of the supposed
signatories;
3. Respondent did not see one of the co-heirs, Maximina Pantoja, actually affix her thumbmark to the document; and
4. Respondent notarized the document even if Complainant, also a co-heir, did not sign it.7
The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that these acts and omissions were established through respondent’s own admission
that he notarized the document even if Maximina Pantoja did not affix her thumbmark in his presence, and that
complainant did not appear before him to sign the deed. The Investigating Commissioner also considered respondent’s
testimony in Civil Case No. DNA-574.8 Citing Gonzales v. Ramos,9 Commissioner Herbosa recommended that the notarial
commission of respondent be revoked; and that he be disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period of two years
and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
In a Resolution dated May 26, 2006, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline approved Resolution No.
XVII-2006-281, worded as follows:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A;"
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent was remiss in his duties as notaries public, Atty. Januario C. Flores is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years and Respondent’s notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment for two (2) years.
It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It is through the act of
notarization that a private document is converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary
proof of authenticity and due execution.10 Indeed, a notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and
for this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the elementary formalities in the performance of their
duties.11 Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 12 A notary public is duty-bound to
require the person executing a document to be personally present, to swear before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he
has voluntarily and freely executed the same.13
As correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent admitted he did not actually see one of the signatories to the
subject deed sign, and that he notarized the deed despite the absence of the complainant’s signature:
Q. In other words, you were not present when Maximina Pantoja affixed her thumbmark on Exhibit "2"?
A. I was present, but I did not see Maximina Pantoja affixed (sic) her thumbmark on Exhibit "2." I just presumed that it was her
thumbmark because I relied on the statement and representation of Mrs. Celedonia Pantoja that she was going to coax her daughter,
Maximina Pantoja, to affix her thumbmark. Right after, when she came out from her bedroom, the document had already a
thumbmark of Maximina Pantoja (TSN, August 16, 2004, Civil Case No. DNA-570, pp. 20-21).
xxxx
Q. Even without the signature of Chita Mumar [complainant], you notarized the document?
A. There is nothing wrong. What would have been a gross mistake on my part if somebody [else affixed] the signature of Chita
Mumar when I notarized it.
Q. But you correctly notarized the document even without the signature of Chita Mumar, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And do you think that is proper, legal and ethical on the part of the Notary Public?
A. No. (TSN, August 16, 2004, Civil Case No. DNA-574, pp. 28-29).14
Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that all the vendors-signatories thereto were the very same
persons who executed it and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein, respondent
undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents; he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always
be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed
where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end
desired.15 Considering that this is the respondent’s first administrative offense, the Court modifies the IBP’s recommendation
of a two-year suspension from the practice of law to one year.16
The Court also finds it unnecessary to discuss the other matters raised by the parties, since they involve the merits of Civil Case
No. DNA-574, best left for the trial court to decide.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Januario C. Flores is GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two (2) years. He is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective
immediately. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his
suspension shall have taken effect.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged
respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it appear that
Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and
Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and
engineering designs amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For the services of the
consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez
Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed by the latter by virtue of the
authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by
making it appear that certain persons participated in an act or proceeding when in fact they did not.
In his Comment,2 respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due
to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January
4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12,
2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public
document that existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping since similar charges
had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the
complaints were later dismissed based on findings that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing rules and
regulations of PD 1594,3 PD 1445,4 RA 71605 and other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no
criminal and administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,6 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its investigation report:
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito
C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident that respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not
know Mr. Benitez was already dead at the time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and Awards Committee of
the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before the Committee a number of times. It is
evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality
of Cainta of money which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing said Special Power of Attorney helped said
parties succeed in their plans.7
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one year.8
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainant's accusation that he notarized the SPA
purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was
already dead. His act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a
lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, 9 not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to
act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also bring
reproach upon an honorable profession.10
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,11 where the respondent notarized certain documents and made it appear
that the deceased father of complainant executed them, the Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.12 The Court was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries public should
not authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally
appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries public must observe
utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of
notarized deeds and documents will be undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly
bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement
of respondent declared that Benitez "appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his free and voluntary act."
Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routinary act.13 It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.14
Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him
of accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal
profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he
should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A public office is a
public trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act that would deceive
them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not have
encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a spurious contract ― all to the extreme
prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator. According to the COA Special Task Force:
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code were evident in the transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for the
consultancy services in the conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed Construction
of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to
misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and
counterfeiting or imitating signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit perpetrated
against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the
absence of the required outputs. x x x15
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty recommended by the IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent,
and brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
MANUEL MALLARI and MILLIE MALLARI, Petitioners,
vs.
REBECCA ALSOL, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 9 August 2001 Decision2 and 12 November 2001 Resolution3of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52681. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 8 November 1995 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 27 ("trial court") in Civil Case No. 870-AF.
The Antecedent Facts
Stalls No. 7 and 8 of the Supermarket Section of the Cabanatuan City Public Market were awarded to and occupied by Abelardo
Mallari ("Abelardo"), father of Manuel Mallari ("Manuel") and Rebecca Alsol ("respondent"). Before Abelardo’s death on 16
July 1986, he gave the stalls to Manuel and respondent. Manuel and his wife Millie Mallari ("petitioners") occupied Stall No.
7 while respondent and her husband Zacarias Alsol occupied Stall No. 8.
In July 1988, respondent’s daughter became sick and the Alsol family had to stay in Manila for two months for the medical
treatment. They returned to Cabanatuan City in September 1988 only to find out that petitioners were already occupying Stall No.
8. The partition between Stalls No. 7 and 8 had been removed and respondent’s merchandise and things were already gone.
Petitioners refused respondent’s demand to vacate Stall No. 8.
Respondent sought the help of the City Market Committee ("Committee"). On 5 May 1989, the Committee passed Kapasiyahan
Blg. 1, s-1989 granting Stall No. 7 to Manuel and Stall No. 8 to respondent. On 4 June 1990, respondent and the City Government
of Cabanatuan ("City Government"), represented by City Mayor Honorato C. Perez ("Mayor Perez"), executed a Contract of Lease
("Lease Contract"). The Lease Contract granted respondent the right to occupy Stall No. 8 for a monthly rental of P316 subject to
increase or decrease in accordance with the rules and ordinances of the City Government.
However, petitioners still refused to vacate Stall No. 8. Instead, they filed an action for annulment of the Lease Contract before the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 ("Branch 29"). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 789-AF. In its Order
of 25 May 1990, Branch 29 dismissed the case for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and on the additional ground that the
Committee is not the proper party to the case.5
On 17 October 1990, respondent filed an action for recovery and possession before the trial court. On 8 November 1995, the trial
court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, by:
a) Declaring the plaintiff as the rightful awardee of Stall No. 8, Building A, Cabanatuan Public Market and ordering the defendants,
or any person acting in their behalf, to vacate said Stall No. 8 and relinquish the possession thereof to the plaintiff;
b) Condemning the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P18,000.00, representing the value of the merchandize [sic] and
items taken by the defendants from said Stall No. 8;
c) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the following amounts:
(1) P10,000.00 - as attorney’s fees; and
(2) P20,000.00 - as exemplary and punitive damages; and
d) Awarding costs in favor of the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners appealed the trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 9 August 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s Decision with
modification. The Court of Appeals sustained respondent’s right to occupy Stall No. 8 by virtue of the Lease Contract she
entered with the City Government. However, the Court of Appeals deleted the award of actual damages amounting
to P18,000 in favor of respondent on the ground that there was no sufficient proof of the loss. The Court of Appeals also deleted
the award of exemplary damages to respondent amounting to P20,000.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’s Decision. In its 12 November 2001 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether respondent is the proper awardee of Stall No. 8.
2. Whether the Lease Contract executed between respondent and the City Government is valid.
3. Whether respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees.
The Ruling of This Court
The petition has no merit.
Ruling on Whether Respondent is the Proper Awardee of
Stall No. 8 is Premature
The Court of Appeals pointed out that when the Committee awarded Stall No. 8 to respondent, petitioners filed an appeal before
the Secretary of Finance questioning the award. In their appeal, petitioners alleged that respondent failed to comply with the
conditions set by the Committee. The appeal was still pending when the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision.
Petitioners admitted in their Memorandum the pendency of the appeal. 7 Hence, the Court may not at this time rule on whether
respondent is the proper awardee of Stall No. 8. Any resolution on this question will preempt whatever ruling the Secretary of
Finance may issue on the pending appeal.
Validity of the Lease Contract
Respondent and the City Government executed the Lease Contract on 4 June 1990 prior to petitioners’ filing of appeal before the
Secretary of Finance. The pendency of the appeal does not affect the validity of the lease. As the Court of Appeals
ruled, the Lease Contract remains valid until revoked by the City Government or annulled by the proper court in a proper action.
Petitioners insist that the Lease Contract is not valid because the City Treasurer should have signed the Lease Contract and not
Mayor Perez. Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Republic Act No. 71608("RA 7160"), otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992 or long after the execution of the Lease Contract on
4 June 1990. Petitioners further allege that granting Mayor Perez has the authority to sign the Lease Contract, Mayor Perez did not
appear before the notary public who notarized the Lease Contract. Hence, the Lease Contract did not produce any right in favor of
respondent.
The Court agrees with petitioners that RA 7160 is not the applicable law. Instead, the Court of Appeals should have applied Batas
Pambansa Blg. 3379 ("BP 337") or the old Local Government Code. Still, even under BP 337, city mayors have the authority to
sign contracts on behalf of city governments.
Under Section 171(2), Article One, Chapter 3 of BP 337, the powers and duties of the city mayor are as follows:
Sec. 171. Chief Executive; Compensation, Powers and Duties.
xxxx
(2) The city mayor shall:
(a) Take care that the laws of the Philippines and the ordinances and resolutions of the city are duly observed and enforced;
(b) Maintain peace and order in the city, and in pursuance thereof, he shall be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearms
within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to existing rules and regulations on the possession and carrying of firearms;
(c) Prepare and submit to the sangguniang panlungsod the annual budget of the city for the ensuing calendar year on the date and
in the manner provided and prescribed by law;
(d) See to it that executive officers and employees of the city faithfully discharge their respective duties, and for the purpose, cause,
if necessary, the institution and filing of appropriate criminal or administrative action;
(e) Furnish the sangguniang panlungsod from time to time, such information and recommend such measures as he shall deem
appropriate or necessary;
(f) Examine the books, records, and papers of all offices, officers, agents or employees of the city;
(g) Represent the city in its business transactions, and sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury and all bonds, contracts and
obligations of the city;
(h) Appoint, in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulations, all officers and employees of the city, whose appointments
are not otherwise provided in this Code;
(i) Cause to be instituted judicial proceedings to recover property and funds of the city wherever found, and cause to be defended
all suits against the city, or otherwise protect its interests;
(j) As soon as possible but not later than March 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Ministry of Local Government an annual
report covering the operation of the city government during the preceding calendar year;
(k) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the city are collected, and the city funds applied in accordance with law or ordinance
to the payment and settlement of the city expenses and obligations;
(l) Exempt, upon the recommendation of the superintendent of city schools, deserving but financially disadvantaged students from
the payment of tuition and other school fees or any part thereof;
(m) Take such emergency measures as may be necessary to protect the public from fires, prevent and mitigate the effects of floods,
storms, earthquakes and other public calamities;
(n) Grant or refuse to grant, pursuant to law, city licenses or permits, and revoke the same for violation of law or ordinance or the
conditions upon which they are granted;
(o) Require owners of houses, buildings or other structures constructed without the necessary permit or in violation of existing law
or ordinance, to remove or demolish such houses, buildings or structures within thirty days, or cause its removal or demolition at
the expense of the owner;
(p) Grant permits to hold benefits, excepting prohibited games of chance, for public and charitable purposes without requiring
approval of the Ministry of Social Services and Development;
(q) Act on the commutation of vacation, sick and maternity leaves and of trips outside the city of chiefs of offices appointed by
him;
(r) Initiate appropriate action or proceedings against any national government official or employee rendering service within the city
to draw the attention of the corresponding superior officer to the dereliction of the official or employee involved;
(s) Authorize payment of medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence, and hospital fees of officials and employees
of the city who suffer any injury arising out of or in the course of their employment. Absence in such cases shall not be charged
against any leave credit;
(t) Approve the commutation of such transportation allowances as may be authorized by law for chiefs of offices;
(u) Direct the preparation and formulation of the development plan and program of the city, and upon approval of the sangguniang
panlungsod, direct and supervise the implementation and execution of the same;
(v) Call a meeting of any or all of the officers and employees of the city; and
(w) Perform such other duties and exercise such other powers as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the powers and duties of the city treasurer are enumerated under Section 181(4), Article Five, Chapter 3 of BP
337, thus:
Sec. 181. Appointment, Qualifications, Compensation, Powers and Duties. x x x x
(4) The city treasurer shall:
(a) Advise the city mayor, the sangguniang panlungsod, other city officials, and the national officers concerned with the disposition
of property of the city government;
(b) Collect taxes throughout the city, including national, provincial and municipal taxes and other revenues authorized by law;
(c) Take custody of and exercise supervision over all city funds and property, including city buildings and grounds and, subject to
the approval of the city mayor, assign rooms to city officers and other public officials who by law are entitled to office space in the
city buildings;
(d) Make annual reports to the mayor of all income disbursements, and acquisition and disposition of all assets of the city during
the period, and furnish copies thereof to the sangguniang panlungsod and to all department heads of the city government;
(e) Take charge of the disbursement of all city and other funds the custody of which may be entrusted to him by law or other
competent authority;
(f) Upon designation by the Minister of Finance, act as treasury fiscal examiner in the city under the administrative authority of the
Treasurer of the Philippines in accordance with pertinent rules and regulations;
(g) Inspect, under the authority of the sangguniang panlungsod, the operation of public utilities belonging to, leased or operated by,
the city government, such as telegraph and telephone, land and water transportation, waterworks, electric-light plants, irrigation
systems, bonded warehouses, ferries, slaughterhouses, and other commercial and industrial enterprises of the city and all private
commercial and industrial establishments within the city in relation to city tax ordinances; and
(h) Perform such other duties as may be required by law or ordinance.
Applying BP 337, there is nothing in the powers and functions of the city treasurer that gives the city treasurer authority to sign
contracts for the city government. Instead, Paragraph (g), Section 171(2), Article One, Chapter 3 of BP 337 clearly provides that
the city mayor shall represent the city in its business transactions and sign contracts of the city. Hence, Mayor Perez has the authority
to sign the Lease Contract on behalf of the City Government. Even under the Revenue Code of Cabanatuan City of 1974, the
authority of the city treasurer is limited to direct and immediate supervision, administration and control over the Cabanatuan public
markets and its personnel.10 The city treasurer has the authority to designate spaces and stalls to vendors, 11 but the authority does
not include signing of contracts on behalf of the City Government.
Petitioners also allege that the Lease Contract is not valid because Mayor Perez did not appear before the notary public who
notarized the document.
We cannot sustain this argument.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document.12 However, the non-appearance of the parties before the notary
public who notarized the document does not necessarily nullify nor render the parties’ transaction void ab initio.13 Thus:
x x x Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. Failure to follow the proper form does not invalidate a contract. Where a contract is not in the form prescribed by
law, the parties can merely compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This is consistent with
the basic principle that contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all essential requisites
are present.14
Hence, the Lease Contract is valid despite Mayor Perez’s failure to appear before the notary public.
Award of Attorney’s Fees
Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable
claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the award of attorney’s fees is justified. Petitioners refused to vacate and turn over
Stall No. 8 to respondent despite respondent’s repeated demands and the existence of the Lease Contract between respondent
and the City Government. Respondent was left with no recourse but to litigate to protect her interest. Hence, we sustain the award
of attorney’s fees amounting to P10,000 to respondent.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 9 August 2001 Decision and 12 November 2001 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52681.
SO ORDERED.
ST. MARY'S FARM, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES, INC., RODOLFO A. AGANA, JR., and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, METRO
MANILA, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 254, Las Piñas City, which dismissed for lack of merit the complaint for annulment of sale.
The factual antecedents of the case, as narrated by the RTC, are as follows:
[I]t appears that herein plaintiff was the registered owner of an originally twenty-five thousand five hundred ninety-eight (25,598)
square meters of land situated at Bo. Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas City under Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A)
of the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
In compliance with a final court decision in Civil Case No. 87-42915 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XL of Manila, plaintiff
passed and approved on 27 June 1988 a board resolution authorizing defendant Rodolfo A. Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision
four thousand (4,000) square meters of the land covered by the aforecited Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A).
Allegedly, after the consummation of this transaction, defendant Rodolfo A. Agana did not return to plaintiff the borrowed
aforementioned title and[,] instead, allegedly forged a board resolution of the plaintiff corporation supposedly to the effect that
plaintiff had authorized him to sell the remaining twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety-eight (21,598) square meters of the
subject property. A series of transactions thereafter took place between defendant Rodolfo A. Agana and defendant Prima Real
Properties, Inc. (Prima) which transactions culminated to the signing on 5 September 1988 of an absolute deed of sale transferring
the ownership of the subject land from herein plaintiff to herein defendant Prima. After the consummation of the sale, defendant
Prima effected the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) in the name of plaintiff and in lieu thereof
another Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 in the name of defendant Prima was issued by defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva
in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
Subsequent developments had it that on 6 October 1988, defendant Prima duly purchased from T.S. Cruz Subdivision the
aforementioned four thousand (4,000) square meters portion of the subject property which development thereafter led to the
cancellation of the aforementioned Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 and the issuance by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas
City of two separate titles both in the name of defendant Prima, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7863 covering the
aforementioned four thousand square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7864 covering the herein twenty-one thousand
five hundred ninety-eighty (21,598) square meter subject property.
In its complaint which was amended twice, the second amendment even needed the intervention of the Court of Appeals in a
petition for certiorari and mandamus after the same was denied admission by Hon. N.C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the then
Assisting Court of Makati, [Muntinlupa], Metro Manila, herein plaintiff alleged inter alia that the authorization certified to by
Antonio V. Agcaoili, Corporate Secretary of the plaintiff and used by defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in selling the subject property
to defendant Prima was a forgery as the board of directors of the plaintiff never enacted a resolution authorizing herein defendant
Rodolfo A. Agana to sell herein subject property to defendant Prima or to anyone else for that matter. Plaintiff further claimed that
defendant Prima in collusion with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana acted maliciously and in bad faith in relying on the forged authority
without taking any step to verify the same with the plaintiff as owner of the subject property. According to plaintiff, the deed of
absolute sale entered into between defendants Prima and Rodolfo A. Agana being the result of fraudulent transaction was void
thereby, among others, causing damage to the plaintiff. For canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) knowing
fully well that the authorization to sell [to] defendant Rodolfo A. Agana was a forgery, defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva was
likewise made liable for damages.
On the other hand, defendant Prima separately with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in their respective answers, sought and insisted
constantly on the dismissal of the complaint based solidly on the ground that Venice B. Agana and Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta
who filed in behalf of the plaintiff the original complaint and the amended and the second amended complaints as well, respectively,
lacked legal capacity to sue because they were not authorized therefor by the board of directors of the plaintiff. Furthermore,
defendant Prima argued that it acted in good faith when it relied solely on the face of the purported authorization of defendant
Rodolfo A. Agana and entered into the deed of absolute sale and paid in full the purchase price of PhP2,567,760.00 of the subject
property. This fact, according to defendant Prima, made it a buyer in good faith and for value. To cap its argument, defendant Prima
in adopting the defense of defendant Rodolfo A. Agana asserted that even assuming that the authorization of defendant Rodolfo A.
Agana was forged when plaintiff, through its President, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr. (brother of Rodolfo) accepted/received part of the
aforestated purchase price knowing fully well the same to be the proceeds of the sale of the subject property, plaintiff has been
precluded as it is now estopped from asking for rescission of the deed of absolute sale and reconveyance of the subject property.3
After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment on April 7, 2000, dismissing the complaint for annulment of sale with damages
filed by the petitioner.4
The trial court found that the respondent was a buyer in good faith and for value, relying on the authority of Rodolfo A. Agana to
sell the property in behalf of the petitioner company, as evidenced by a notarized board resolution. As such, the trial court ruled
that the petitioner was bound by the acts of its agent and must necessarily bear whatever damage may have been caused by this
alleged breach of trust.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto.
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following errors:
I
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Respondent Agana was duly authorized by Petitioner under the Certification
dated June 30, 1988 (Exhibits "D" and "3") to enter into the sale of the subject property with Respondent Prima Real.
(A) There is no proof of the Certification’s authenticity and due execution;
(B) There is clear and convincing evidence that the Certification was forged.
(C) Even assuming that the Certification was authentic and duly executed, it was not sufficient in form and by its terms to authorize
Respondent Agana to sell the subject property or receive payment on behalf of Petitioner.
II
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Respondent Prima Real was the author of its own damage by not making
reasonable and prudent inquiries into the fact, nature and extent of Respondent Agana’s authority, and by causing the issuance
of checks in the name of Respondent Agana.
The petition must fail.
A cursory reading of the issues reveals that these are factual matters which are not within the province of the Court to look into,
save only in exceptional circumstances which are not present in the case at bar. Well settled is the rule that in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law must be raised.5 As a matter of procedure, the Court defers and accords finality
to the factual findings of trial courts, especially when, as in the case at bar, such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. This
factual determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal.
It is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of the factual holding of
the lower courts.6
Petitioner insists that "the sale of the realty entered into between respondent Agana, purportedly on behalf of the petitioner, and
respondent Prima is null and void for lack of authority on the part of respondent Agana to sell the property."7 The board resolution
allegedly granting Rodolfo Agana the authority to sell in behalf of the company, as certified by Corporate Secretary Atty. Antonio
V. Agcaoili, is alleged to be a forgery. Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta, who served as assistant to Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., the President
of St. Mary’s Farm, Inc., in 1988 testified that the board of directors did not hold any meeting on June 27, 1988; that, in fact,
the signature of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili was not genuine; and that said document was merely presented to the notary public for
notarization without Atty. Agcaoili appearing before him.
Despite this insistence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the respondent court affirming
those of the trial court on this matter. Anent the forged signature of Atty. Agcaoili, the CA did not err in not giving evidentiary
weight to the findings of the Document Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the ground that the findings
were not really conclusive. In the first place, the procedure for the investigation of questionable handwriting was not properly
followed. There is nothing on record that will conclusively show that the alleged standard sample signatures of Atty. Antonio
Agcaoili, which were submitted to the NBI and made the basis of comparison, were the genuine signatures of the same Atty.
Antonio Agcaoili. Moreover, the examiner testified that it was possible to have variations in the standard signatures of Atty.
Agcaoili, caused by certain factors such as passage of time, pressure and physical condition of the writer which may have decisive
influences on his handwriting’s characteristics.8 Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be concluded that a particular signature
appearing in those documents is not genuine for lack of proper identification and a more accurate comparison of signatures. Mere
allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies in the party making the allegation. 9 Unfortunately, in the case at
bar, the petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution bearing the Secretary’s Certification, petitioner wants us to
consider the same as inadmissible on the ground that Atty. Agcaoili did not appear before a notary public for notarization. We
do not agree, because in the past, we have already held that the non-appearance of the party before the notary public who notarized
the deed does not necessarily nullify or render the parties’ transaction void ab initio.10 However, the non-appearance of the party
exposes the notary public to administrative liability which warrants sanction by the Court. This fact notwithstanding, we agree with
the respondent court that it is not enough to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the board
resolution. To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable
controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.11 In the absence of such proof, the document must be upheld. Notarization converts
a private document into a public document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. 121avvphi1
On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana’s authority to sell the
subject property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an innocent purchaser for value in good faith. Our pronouncement
in Bautista v. Silva13 is instructive:
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest
in such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he
receives the thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of the title to the property. He
need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of
proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the
land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest
of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the
property.14
All the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned case are present in the case at bar, enough for us to consider Prima as a buyer
in good faith. Prima Real Properties, Inc. is a company engaged in the buying and selling of real properties. As borne out by the
records, respondent exerted efforts to verify the true background of the subject property. Rodolfo Agana presented to respondent
the (1) notarized board resolution which stated that at a special meeting held on June 27, 1988, the board of directors authorized
Mr. Rodolfo A. Agana, Treasurer, to sell the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-1648;15 (2) a
separate Certification by the petitioner’s president, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., authorizing its Treasurer, Rodolfo Agana, to
sell said property;16 and, (3) TCT No. T-1648 of the subject property. Convinced that Rodolfo Agana had the authority to sell on
behalf of the company after being presented all these documents, the sale between the parties was thereby consummated. A deed
of sale was executed on September 5, 198817 and the full consideration of ₱2,567,760.00 for the subject property was paid.18
It is of no moment that the checks were made payable to Rodolfo Agana and not to the company which, according to the petitioner,
should have alerted the respondent to inquire further into the extent of Agana’s authority to transfer the subject property. This
was no longer necessary considering that respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana’s authority to sell,
evidenced by the notarized Certification. As explained in the Bautista case:
When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we know it to be a public document where
the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented with such a document
would have no choice between knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial
acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and replaced it with a presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared
before the notary public and acknowledged that he executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is
deprived of such choice not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial system, he has been
given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that
because it is precisely that fiction of regularity which holds together commercial transactions across borders and time.
In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has [in his] possession title to the property but whose capacity to
sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter’s
capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller’s duly notarized
special power of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to
establish the appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity. 19
Aside from the pertinent documents presented, respondent also relied on the confirmation and certification of the Register of Deeds
of Las Piñas City and Mr. Timoteo S. Cruz, owner of the land likewise sold by Rodolfo Agana for the petitioner, with
similar authorization by the petitioner and signed by the corporate secretary Atty. Agcaoili. Agana acted as petitioner’s authorized
agent and had full authority to bind the company in that transaction with Cruz.
Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner that respondent Agana’s authority was only limited to negotiate and not to sell the
subject property, suffice it to state that the board resolution further averred that he was "authorized and empowered to
sign any and all documents, instruments, papers or writings which may be required and necessary for this purpose to bind the
Corporation in this undertaking."20 The certification of the President, Marcelino Agana, Jr. also attests to this fact. With this
notarized board resolution, respondent Agana, undeniably, had the authority to cede the subject property, carrying with it all the
concomitant powers necessary to implement said transaction. On the strength of the deed of absolute sale executed pursuant to such
authority, title over the land in petitioner’s name was cancelled and a new certificate of title – TCT No. T-617521 – was
already issued in the name of Prima Real Properties, Inc.
Thus, it is too late in the day to have the sale voided, notwithstanding the retraction made by Rodolfo Agana in his Comment 22 on
the Petition filed with this Court. Therein, he admits that he acted solely and without proper authority of the corporation. Agana
states that he wishes to end once and for all the rift that had occurred in the corporation; and in order to buy peace for all the parties
and for himself, he is willing to return the money paid by Prima so that ownership of the property can be returned to the petitioner.
In light of this admission that Agana had no authority, petitioner posits that there is justifiable reason for the Court to re-visit or
evaluate the facts of the case anew.
Unfortunately, the Court cannot give weight to this magnanimous gesture of Agana; neither will the Court lend credence to Agana’s
assertion that he acted solely and without proper authority from the corporation, inasmuch as it was raised for the very first time
in this Court and only after 8 years from the inception of the case. In all the pleadings filed by respondent Agana in court, he was
steadfast in his position that he had authority to sell the subject property. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making
it. He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not require
proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made.23 In the instant case, there is no proof of these exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the retraction was merely an
afterthought on the part of respondent Agana with the intention to end the rift in the family corporation.
Considering all the foregoing, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent Prima is an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
SERVANDO ARGUELLES (Deceased) & CLAUDIO ARGUELLES and MARILOU TRINIDAD, for herself and as guardian ad
litem of her minor children namely, LLOYD, MARK, ADRIAN, and GEORGIA, all surnamed TRINIDAD, TRISTAN
TRINIDAD and EDGARDO TRINIDAD, JR., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 179131
MARILOU TRINIDAD, for herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor children LLOYD, MARK, ADRIAN & GEORGIA, all
surnamed TRINIDAD, EDGARDO TRINIDAD, JR. and TRISTAN TRINIDAD, Petitioners,
vs.
SERVANDO ARGUELLES (Deceased) and CLAUDIO ARGUELLES, and METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These cases involve an action for the annulment of a transfer certificate of title (TCT) over a parcel of land on the basis of an
allegedly falsified deed of sale transferring title over the property.
The Facts and the Case
Respondent brothers, Servando and Claudio Arguelles (the Arguelleses ), were registered owners of a parcel of land in Imus, Cavite,
under TCT T-115897. On November 23, 1983 the Arguelleses entered into a conditional sale of the land to Edgardo Trinidad and
his wife Marilou (the Trinidads). In accordance with the terms of the sale, the Trinidads gave the Arguelleses ₱ 50,000.00 as down
payment. The balance ofl!396,720.00 was to be paid in monthly installments.
The Trinidads occupied and began developing the property in 1986. They paid the real estate taxes due on it from 1987 to 1997.
With a deed of sale in their favor, the Trinidads eventually had the land titled in their names on August 15, 1991 under TCT T-
316427. In that same year, they applied with Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank) for a loan, offering the land as
collateral. Satisfied that the Trinidads owned the property, Metrobank accepted it as collateral and lent them money. Subsequently,
Metrobank granted the couple several more loans, totaling more than ₱ 11 million, all secured by the land.
On January 7, 1997 the Arguelleses filed a complaint against the Trinidads with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite1 for
the cancellation of TCT T-316427 in the latter’s names. Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Metrobank
and sought the cancellation of the real estate mortgages over the property in its favor.
The Arguelleses denied having executed a deed of sale in favor of the Trinidads. They alleged that they entrusted their owner’s
duplicate copy of title to Atty. Alejandro Saulog, Sr., who assisted the parties in executing a conditional sale covering
the land. The Trinidads used a fictitious deed of sale, notarized by a certain Atty. Saulog, Jr. to effect the transfer of title in their
names.
In answer, the Trinidads claimed that they paid for the land by installments, completing the payment on June 24, 1986 with the
result that the Arguelleses executed the deed of sale in their favor. For its part, Metrobank filed a cross-claim against the Trinidads
for litigation expenses, alleging that the Trinidads were answerable for such expenses under the mortgage contracts.
In its decision of December 27, 2005 the RTC ruled in favor of the Arguelleses and cancelled both the title in the name of the
Trinidads and the mortgages in Metrobank’s favor. The primordial issue, said the RTC, was whether or not the Trinidads
paid the balance of the agreed purchase price by installments. It found that they did not since they could not present proof of the
payments they supposedly made. When asked on cross-examination, Marilou Trinidad could not even remember when they made
those installment payments.
Two handwriting experts testified during the trial on the authenticity of the Arguelleses’ signatures appearing on the deed of
sale: 1) Atty. Desiderio Pagui whom the Arguelleses hired and 2) Rogelio Azores of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). Their opinions differed. Atty. Pagui concluded that the signatures were forged, while Azores maintained that the signatures
were authentic. The RTC adopted the conclusion of Atty. Pagui, finding that he presented a more thorough and detailed analysis.
He compared both similarities and differences between the questioned signatures and specimen signatures; whereas, Azores gave
emphasis to the similarities.
In addition to annulling the Trinidads’ title, the RTC awarded the Arguelleses moral damages of ₱ 1,000,000.00 and
attorney’s fees of ₱ 200,000.00. It denied Metrobank’s cross-claim against the Trinidads, holding that Metrobank was a
mortgagee in bad faith, having had prior notice of the irregularity in the Trinidads’ title. The defendants appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).2
In its decision of March 6, 2007,3 the CA affirmed that of the RTC but reduced the award of moral damages to ₱ 50,000.00 each
in favor of Servando and Claudio Arguelles. As for Metrobank, the CA held that it was not a mortgagee in good faith as it appears
that Metrobank compelled the Trinidads to acquire title over the property before the initial loan could be approved.
The Trinidads filed their motion for reconsideration while Metrobank appealed the CA Decision to this Court. Upon the denial of
their motion, the Trinidads filed their own petition with this Court as well. Both cases were then consolidated on November 21,
2007. During the pendency of these cases, Servando Arguelles passed away and was substituted by his heirs.
The Issues Presented
The issues in these cases are:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the deed of sale, which the Arguelleses supposedly executed and that the Trinidads
used for the transfer of the property in their names, was a falsified document; and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the real estate mortgages that the Trinidads executed in favor of Metrobank are not
binding on the Arguelleses.
The Court’s Rulings
The key question in these cases is the authenticity of the deed of sale that the Arguelleses supposedly executed in favor of the
Trinidads and that the latter used in transferring the property title in their names. Both the RTC and the CA held that the deed was
not authentic. Ordinarily, being a question of fact, the RTC’s finding, affirmed by the CA, carries great weight. But, here,
since such finding appears to be based on a flawed drawing of conclusions from the facts, the Court is justified in taking a second
look.4
The courts below concluded that the subject deed of sale is not authentic based on the following:
1. The notary public who notarized the document could not recall if the Arguelleses personally appeared and signed the deed of
sale before him;
2. Two copies of the deed of sale, one dated 1986 and the other 1991, were presented;
3. The Trinidads failed to prove that they paid the Arguelleses the full purchase price mentioned in the conditional sale; and
4. The testimony of the expert witness for the Arguelleses sufficiently proved that the two brothers’ signatures were forged.
First. Both the RTC and the CA held that the presumption of regularity of a public document 5 did not attach to the subject deed of
sale, given that the notary public, Atty. Saulog, Jr. failed to establish the authenticity of the signatures on it. He could not remember
if the Arguelleses, present in court as he testified, were the same persons who appeared and acknowledged the document before
him.
But it is too much to expect a notary public who had but a brief time with the Arguelleses during the notarial ceremony to remember
their faces 12 years later. What matters is Atty. Saulog, Jr.’s testimony respecting the ritual of notarization that he invariably
followed. He gave unbending assurance that he ascertained the identities of the parties to documents who appeared before him,
including the Arguelleses, by requiring them to show documentary proofs of the same6 and to sign the documents in his presence.7
Besides, the theory of the Arguelleses is that it was Atty. Saulog, Jr. who facilitated the preparation of the falsified deed of sale for
the benefit of the Trinidads. But, if this were so, it would have made more sense for Atty. Saulog, Jr. to testify in defense of the
genuineness of the transaction by claiming that he recalled the faces of those who appeared before him 12 years ago and that they
were no other than the Arguelleses.
Second. The Arguelleses point out that the residence certificates on the acknowledgment portion of the deed of sale did not belong
to them since these did not tally with their 1991 residence certificates. Further, they presented evidence that Atty. Saulog, Jr. did
not have a notarial commission in 1991.
But two copies of the deed of sale were presented in this case, identical in every way except that the first, the Trinidad’s original
copy of the deed of sale, Exhibit "4," carried the date June 24, 1986 while the second, a certified copy of the deed of
sale from the Register of Deeds, Exhibit "D" of the Arguelleses, bore the date June 24, 1991. Evidently, it is the first document,
original, unblemished, and bearing the year 1986 that is the correctly dated copy. On the other hand, the year typewritten on the
second document, the certified copy, had been crudely altered by erasure with the digits "91" superimposed to make the year read
"1991." In other words, the deed of sale was executed in 1986, not 1991.
The Arguelleses merely claim that their residence certificate numbers on the copies of the deed of sale did not reflect their 1991
residence certificates. They do not state, however, that those numbers do not represent their 1986 residence certificates, the correct
year when the deed of sale was executed. Further, they do not also claim that Atty. Saulog, Jr. did not have a notarial commission
in 1986 the year that the clean deed of sale was actually notarized.
Third. Both the RTC and the CA held that what is crucial in determining the authenticity of the deed of sale is the question of
whether or not the Trinidads paid the balance of the purchase price after November 23, 1983. The two courts point out that the
Trinidads not only failed to present proof of payment, but Marilou Trinidad was also unable to say specifically when they paid their
installments to the Arguelleses.
But, firstly, the fact that Marilou Trinidad did not have any receipt evidencing payment of the balance of the price cannot give rise
to the assumption that they had not paid the same. Marilou testified that she in fact asked the Arguelleses to issue receipts for the
payments made but the latter declined, saying that they would be executing a deed of sale upon full payment and that this would
be better proof of payment than ordinary receipts.8 That the Trinidads trusted the Arguelleses sufficiently to waive the receipts is
evidenced by Claudio Arguelles’ own admission that they also did not issue any receipt for the ₱ 50,000.00 down payment
that the Trinidads made.9
Secondly, while the conditional sale contained an undertaking by the Trinidads to pay the balance of the purchase price in
installments, such payment may be assumed to have been made from the fact that the Trinidads were subsequently found in
possession of a deed of sale that the Arguelleses executed in their favor. Not only this, unquestionably, the Arguelleses gave up
possession of their owner’s duplicate copy of the title and this subsequently found its way into the hands of the Trinidads.
There can be no better proof than these that the Trinidads had already paid their obligation to the Arguelleses. Indeed,
in 1991 the Trinidads succeeded in registering the title to the land in their names.
Actually, as plaintiffs, the Arguelleses carried the burden of proving the affirmative of their claims (1) that the Trinidads had not
fully paid for the land and (2) that they caused the falsification of a deed of sale supposedly executed by the Arguelleses in their
favor and used it to transfer the title to the property in their names. Further, by the nature of their action, the Arguelleses must rely
on the strength of their evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendants. 10
The Court finds it difficult to believe the Arguelleses’ version that the Trinidads did not pay even one centavo of the ₱
396,720.00 balance of the purchase price that they undertook to pay by installments. Consider the following:
a. If the Arguelleses were to be believed, they endured the fact that the Trinidads did not bother to pay them even one installment
after the down payment made in November 1983.11 The Arguelleses supposedly contented themselves with just waiting for when
the payment would come.12 And they did not bother to make any demand from 1983 to 1996 on the Trinidads for what was due
them.13 Indeed, it was only after some 13 years that Claudio Arguelles went to the Registry of Deeds to check on the standing of
their title.14 Incredible!
b. According to the Arguelleses, they turned over their owner’s duplicate copy of the title to Atty. Saulog, Sr. who assisted
them in 1983 in preparing the conditional sale they entered into with the Trinidads. But it makes no sense for the
Arguelleses to entrust their original title to Atty. Saulog, Sr. who was practically a stranger to them. And, although the Trinidads
supposedly failed for 13 years to pay the monthly installment due, they made no effort to demand from the lawyer the return of
their duplicate owner’s copy of the title.
c. The Arguelleses had all along been aware that the Trinidads took possession of the land as early as 1983 after supposedly making
a mere down payment. Claudio Arguelles who lived about half a kilometer from the property, passed by it almost every day, and
observed the presence of the Trinidads on it15 and the fact they had built improvements.16 Yet, Claudio never bothered to drop in
and demand payments of what was due him and his brother or ask the Trinidads to leave the property. Claudio’s mere excuse
was that he was very busy.17
d. Further, the Arguelleses ceased paying real estate taxes on the property after 1986.1âwphi1 The Trinidads were the ones who
paid those taxes from 1987 to 1996. Only in 1997 when the Arguelleses filed their action to recover the property did they begin to
pay the taxes.18
Fourth. Of two handwriting experts who examined the questioned signatures, Atty. Desiderio Pagui and Rogelio Azores, both the
RTC and the CA gave more credence to the opinion of the first because he identified both the similarities and the differences and
gave more details. Pagui was a private handwriting expert that the Arguelleses presented. Azores was an expert from the NBI.
In essence, Atty. Pagui gave the opinion that, whereas the specimen signatures were clumsily written, the questioned signatures
were done with greater dexterity. He imputed the similarities between the two sets of signatures to simulation through practice.19
Azores found, on the other hand, significant similarities between the questioned signatures and the specimen: the structural pattern
of elements, the directions of strokes, and the manner of execution. He also observed allowable natural variations between the sets
of signatures. Finally, he held the view that there were no indications or symptoms of forgery, such as hesitations and tremors in
writing, and that the questioned signatures were written with free and spontaneous strokes, made unconsciously without attention
given to the act of writing.20
The RTC gave greater weight to the report of Atty. Pagui because it gave more details and extensively discussed both differences
and similarities between the questioned signatures and specimen; whereas Azores focused mainly on the similarities.
But, while the trial court generally has discretion to determine the weight to be given to an expert testimony, it erroneously
disregarded Azores’ findings. Azores, as government handwriting expert, was a neutral source of opinion. The Chief of
the Questioned Documents Division of the
NBI concurred in his findings. Azores’ findings should be treated as an official act performed with accepted competence
and cloaked with the mantle of impartiality and neutrality.21 Atty. Pagui, on the other hand, was a private practitioner paid for
by the Arguelleses. It was but natural for him to support the position of his client, bringing up tiny details to make up for lack of
substance.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Arguelleses have failed to overcome the presumed validity of the Trinidads’
title over the property in dispute.
Fifth. With the Court’s above conclusion, there is no further need to determine whether or not the real estate mortgages that
the Trinidads executed in favor of Metrobank are binding on the Arguelleses. They are, based on such conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 6, 2007 and resolution dated August 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV 86714 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite in Civil Case 1465-97 dated December 27, 2005, and DENIES the action for the annulment of Transfer Certificate of
Title T-316427 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite and of the real estate mortgages entered into by the Trinidad
spouses and Metrobank and the cross-claim of Metrobank.
SO ORDERED.

MARY JANE D. VELASCO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE DOROIN ATTY. HECTOR CENTENO, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case refers to a disbarment complaint filed by Mary Jane D. Velasco on March 31, 1999, against respondent lawyers for
forgery and falsification constitutive of malpractice.1
On June 21, 1999, the Court’s Second Division required the respondent lawyers to comment on the complaint within (10)
days from notice.2
On August 24, 1999, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, counsel for respondents, filed a Motion for Extension to File Comment praying that
an extension of sixty (60) days from August 16, 1999 be given to them to file their comment. 3
On October 4, 1999, the Court granted the Motion for Extension with a warning that the same shall be the last and no further
extension will be given.4
The respondent lawyers failed to file their comment.
On June 20, 2001, the Court ordered respondent lawyers and their counsel to show cause why they should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution requiring the comment. Copies of the resolution
dated June 20, 2001 were returned unserved from Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno with notations "party out/unknown at/party moved
out" and "moved out." Atty. Doroin received the said resolution on July 27, 2001. 5
On April 17, 2002, complainant was required to submit the correct addresses of Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno, while Atty. Charlie
Doroin was fined Php 500.00 for failure to comply with the show cause resolution dated June 20, 2001 and was ordered to submit
his comment.6
Complainant failed to comply with the directive of the Court.
On July 23, 2003, the Court required the complainant to show cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for her non-
compliance with the said directive and to submit her compliance within ten (10) days from notice. In the same resolution, the fine
imposed on Atty. Charlie Doroin was increased from Php 500.00 to Php 1,000.00 for his failure to file his comment on the complaint
as required by the Court, or to suffer imprisonment of five (5) days in case he fails to pay and to submit his comment on the
complaint within ten (10) days from notice.7
In a report dated August 2, 2004, the Clerk of Court informed the Court that respondent Atty. Doroin paid the fine of Php 1,000.00.
However, Atty. Doroin still failed to submit the comment on the administrative complaint required of him and has not complied
with the show cause resolution dated April 17, 2002 by submitting the correct addresses of Atty. Quintin P. Alcid and respondent
Atty. Hector Centeno.8
In a Manifestation submitted June 23, 2005, the complainant submitted the addresses of Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector
Centeno as well as a copy of a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Mr. Juanito C. Perez to prosecute the instant case. 9
On July 27, 2005, the Court issued a resolution noting the compliance of the complainant as well as the latter’s manifestation and
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from
receipt of the record.10
On October 3, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala issued a Notice of
Mandatory Conference/Hearing to the parties to the case scheduled on October 26, 2005 with a strict note that "[n]on-appearance
by any of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in further proceedings." 11
On October 26, 2005, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the complainant, together with his counsel Atty. Andres Villaruel,
Jr. appeared. As respondents Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno had not filed their comment, they were directed to
submit it within (10) days from receipt of notice. The hearing of the case was reset on November 30, 2005. 12
On November 30, 2005, again, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the complaint, together with his counsel, Atty. Villaruel,
appeared. The notices sent to respondents were returned to the Commission on Bar Discipline with a notation "RTS-Moved." As
respondents had not filed their comment on the complaint, they were declared in default. In an Order dated November 30, 2005,
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala submitted her report and recommendation, viz.13
The Commission on Bar Discipline reported that:
xxx xxx xxx
In her Affidavit-Complaint, complaint alleged that she was appointed as Administratrix in Special Proceedings Case No. Q-96-
27628 pending consideration before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 87, entitled "In the matter of the Settlement of
the Estate of the Late Eduardo Doroin, Monina E. Doroin, petitioner." The deceased, Eduardo Doroin, died on 21 January 1996, in
Papua New Guinea. In this Special Proceedings case, respondents were collaborating counsels for Oppositor, Josephine Abarquez.
On 21 March 1996, Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by deceitful means into making her sign an Extra-Judicial Settlement and
Deed of Partition, allotting complainant the sum of ₱1,216,078.00 giving the paramour of complainant’s father, Josephine
Abarquez, the share of ₱7,296,468.00 and also allotting complainant’s two (2) alleged illegitimate brothers and an alleged
illegitimate sister, a similar sum of ₱1,216,075.00 each alleging that such sharing is in accordance with law. But no
share was assigned to complainant’s mother, who was the legal wife of Dr. Eduardo Doroin.
To partially satisfy complainant’s share of Php 1,216,078.00, Atty. Doroin required complainant to sign a paper which was
an alleged Confirmation of Authority to Sell the property of complainant’s father located at Kingspoint subdivision,
Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 34885, Complainant told Atty. Doroin that she will first consult
a lawyer regarding the legality of the said Confirmation of Authority to Sell before she signs the same. Eventually, she was
not able to sign the said Confirmation because complainant’s lawyer, Atty. Marapao, failed to confer and negotiate with Atty.
Doroin regarding the same.
When the complainant visited the lot situated at Kingspoint Subdivision sometime in June 1996, there was no house constructed
thereon, but when she visited it again on January 1999, there was already a four-door townhouse constructed. Complainant was
informed by the caretaker at the site that the owner is one Evangeline Reyes-Tonemura. Complainant also learned later on that the
property, which was one of the properties submitted to the Court handling the Special Proceedings case in the Inventory of Property
dated 3 April 1996, was sold by Atty. Doroin to Evangeline Reyes-Yonemura [sic], by forging the signature of complainant’s late
father. Atty. Hector B. Centeno, a Notary Public of Quezon City, knowing that complainant’s father was already dead
as of 21 January 1996, made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute Sale, that complainant’s father appeared before him
in Quezon City on 17 January 1997.1avvphi1
Records show that a case for Falsification of Public Document was filed against respondent Atty. Hector Centeno before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 39, docketed as Criminal Case No. 104869. Atty. Centeno was arraigned on 12
September 2001 and pleaded "not guilty." After the arraignment, Atty. Centeno did not anymore appeared [sic] in court and jumped
bail.14
The Commission found that respondents violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when they caused
"extreme and great damage to the complainant."15 The Commissioner also noted that the failure of the respondents to answer the
complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several occasions and to appear on the scheduled hearing set showed "flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary
sanction."16 The Commissioner recommended that the respondent lawyers be disbarred.
On November 18, 2006, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline with the modification that respondent lawyers be suspended indefinitely
instead of being disbarred.
The Notice of Resolution and the Report and Recommendation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, were submitted to the
Court, through the Director for Bar Discipline, in a transmittal letter dated January 22, 2007.
The issue before us is whether Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno are guilty of violating their lawyer’s oath and Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which would merit their disbarment.
We agree with the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP, but modify the penalty to be imposed on respondent Atty. Hector
Centeno.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." 17
Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at
large,18 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.19 In Marcelo v. Javier,20 we reminded the members of the legal profession that:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public.
The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer
can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this
end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice
law during good behaviour and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney’s right to practice
law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license
or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. 21
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof generally rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 22
In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers forged the deed of sale and forced her to sign the deed of extrajudicial
settlement by explaining to her that it was "in accordance with law."
The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers constitute a blatant violation of the lawyer’s oath to uphold the law and
the basic tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility that no lawyer shall engage in dishonest conduct.
Elementary it is in succession law that compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse shall have a share in the estate by way of
legitimes23 and no extrajudicial settlement can deprive the spouse of said right except if she gives it up for lawful consideration,
but never when the spouse is not a party to the said settlement.24 And the Civil Code reminds us, that we must "give every man his
due."25
The guilt of the respondent lawyers is beyond dispute. They failed to answer the complaint filed against them. Despite due notice,
they failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainant remain
uncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade,26 we ruled that "[a lawyer’s] failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to
appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his
oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court." 27
The Court is mindful that disbarment is a grave penalty. Considering that the license to practice law, though it is not a property
right, sustains a lawyer’s primary means of livelihood and to strip someone of such license amounts to stripping one of a
career and a means to keep himself alive, we agree with the modification submitted by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that an indefinite suspension would be the more appropriate penalty on Atty. Charlie Doroin. However, we cannot
be as lenient with Atty. Hector Centeno who, aside from committing a dishonest act by depriving a person of her rightful
inheritance, also committed a criminal offense when he falsificated a public document and thereafter absconded from the criminal
proceeding against him after having posted bail.
We also take this opportunity to remind the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and their regional and city chapters to maintain an
updated record of the office and residence addresses of their members to help facilitate looking for lawyers. As officers of the court,
lawyers should be readily available upon the Court’s beckoning.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Charlie Doroin is suspended indefinitely, and Atty. Hector Centeno is hereby DISBARRED.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and also be placed on the
personal records of the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
SUSAN LOBERES-PINTAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMONCITO B. BAYLOSIS, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
This case stemmed from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Susan Loberes-Pintal (complainant) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against respondent Atty. Ramoncito B. Baylosis (Atty. Baylosis) for gross violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
The Antecedents:
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Baylosis for committing perjury, falsification of public documents and
the use of falsified documents. She alleged that Roldan C. Pintal (Roldan) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
entitled Roldan C. Pintal v. Susan Loberes-Pintal, docketed as Civil Case No. C-22815 (2011) before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City (RTC); that Atty. Baylosis conspired with Roldan by making it appear in the petition that he was a resident of
Caloocan City when, in truth and in fact, he was a resident of Quezon City; and that Atty. Baylosis notarized the verification and
certification against non-forum shopping of the petition on May 13, 2011, but, at that time, Roldan was out of the country.
Complainant submitted a Certification2from the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 12, Zone 1, District II of Caloocan City, attesting
that Roldan was not a resident thereof and a Certification 3 from the Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the country
from April 10, 2011 to September 8, 2011.
In his Answer,4 Atty. Baylosis denied the accusation and insisted that when Roldan went to his office in January 2011, he personally
interviewed him and asked him to submit documents such as his marriage certificate, birth certificate and a personal write-up
narrating his personal history, courtship history and marital history; that Roldan provided him a Certification 5 from the Chairman
of Barangay 12, Zone 1, District II of Caloocan City, attesting that he was a resident thereof for six (6) years; that after the interview,
he referred Roldan to a clinical psychologist for evaluation and testing; that due to financial difficulties, it was only in March 2011
that Roldan was able to pay his acceptance fee; that it was also around that time that Roldan read and reviewed the allegations in
the petition and affixed his signature in the Verification and Certification portion thereof; that Roldan personally appeared before
him, swore in accordance with law and verified his petition in accordance with the Rules of Court; that due to typographical errors
in the psychological report, Atty. Baylosis returned the report for correction; that it was only on May 13, 2011, that the corrected
report was returned to his office; and that he immediately gave the final draft of the petition together with the report and other
documents to his secretary for filing. Atty. Baylosis further averred that the date of recording on May 13, 2011 of the Verification
and Certification of the petition was an honest mistake and excusable error on the part of his staff but his claim that Roldan
personally appeared before him to attest to the truthfulness of the verification and certification was true.
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) set the case for mandatory conference but before its conclusion, on September 7, 2012,
complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance 6 manifesting that she was no longer interested in continuing with the complaint and
that she was withdrawing it.
For said reason, the CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, 7 recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Atty. Baylosis.
In its Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-610,8 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP-Board of Governors reversed and set aside the
report and recommendation of the CBD. In its Extended Resolution, 9 the IBP-Board of Governors found Atty. Baylosis guilty of
violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice when he made it appear that Roldan was present during the notarization of the petition
on May 13, 2011 and recommended the immediate revocation of his notarial commission and his disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public for two (2) years.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP except as to its recommended penalty.
Rule IV, Section 2(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice specifically provides:
Section 2. Prohibitions. - (a) x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity
as defined by these Rules.1âwphi1
Without a quibble, Atty. Baylosis was negligent in the performance of his duty as a notary public when he notarized the petition
for declaration of the nullity of marriage without the presence of Roldan. This was evidenced by the Certification) issued by the
Bureau of Immigration that Roldan was not in the Philippines on May 13, 2011 as he had left the Philippines on April 10, 2011
and came back only on September 8, 2011. Atty. Baylosis' contention that he personally interviewed Roldan when the latter went
into his office and personally read and signed the petition cannot be accorded a shred of credence.
In notarizing a document in the absence of a party, Atty. Baylosis violated not only the rule on notarial practice but also the Code
of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. 10 By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the document, he attested that Roldan personally appeared before him on
the day it was notarized and verified the contents thereof. His conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the
conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord to notarized documents. 11
It must be emphasized that a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, is mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. 12 It is for this reason that
a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the public's
confidence in the integrity of the document would be undermined. 13 In Gonzales v. Atty. Ramos, 14 it was written:
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary
public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of the document
would be undermined.15
Following the pronouncement in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice, 16 Atty. Baylosis should be permanently barred from
being commissioned a notary public.
The Court would like to stress the prevailing ruling that desistance of the complainant or withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily warrant the dismissal of an administrative proceeding. In Bautista v. Bernabe, 17 the Court wrote:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This
rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for
the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called
to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens
may have in the proper administration of justice. 18
WHEREFORE, finding Atty. Ramoncito B. Baylosis GUILTY of violating the Rule on Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01 and Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby imposes the penalty of being PERMANENTLY BARRED from
being commissioned as a Notary Public with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
This order is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to the personal record of Atty. Ramoncito
B. Baylosis; the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all lower courts; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
for proper guidance and information.
SO ORDERED.
CHARLES B. BAYLON, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by the complainant at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
charging the respondent with fraud and deceit for notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) bearing the forged signature of the
complainant as the supposed principal thereof.
Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late wife, Rosemarie Baylon, conspired in preparing an
SPA1 authorizing his wife to mortgage his real property located in Signal Village, Taguig. He said that he was out of the country
when the SPA was executed on June 17, 1996, and also when it was notarized by the respondent on June 26, 1996. To support his
contention that he was overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a certification 2 from the Government of Singapore showing that
he was vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and (2) a certification3 from the Philippine Bureau of Immigration showing
that he was out of the country from March 21, 1995 to January 28, 1997. To prove that his signature on the SPA was forged, the
complainant presented a report4 from the National Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that the questioned signature on the
SPA was not written by him.
The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real property was mortgaged to Lorna Express Credit Corporation
and that it was subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of his wife to settle her mortgage obligations.
In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued that he initially refused to notarize it when the
complainant's wife first came to his office on June 17, 1996, due to the absence of the supposed affiant thereof. He said that he only
notarized the SPA when the complainant's wife came back to his office on June 26, 1996, together with a person whom she
introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He further contended that he believed in good faith that the person introduced to him was the
complainant because said person presented to him a Community Tax Certificate bearing the name Charles Baylon. To corroborate
his claims, the respondent attached the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.
The respondent likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to commit fraud, deceit or falsehood. 5
After due proceedings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline recommended to the IBP-Board of Governors that the respondent
be strongly admonished for notarizing the SPA; that his notarial commission be revoked; and that the respondent be barred from
being granted a notarial commission for one year.6
In justifying its recommended sanctions, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline stated that
In this instance, reasonable diligence should have compelled herein respondent to ascertain the true identity of the person seeking
his legal services considering the nature of the document, i.e., giving a third party authority to mortgage a real property owned by
another. The only saving grace on the part of respondent is that he relied on the fact that the person being authorized under the SPA
to act as agent and who accompanied the impostor, is the wife of the principal mentioned therein.7
On October 22, 2005, the IBP-Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-109 which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent's failure to properly ascertain the true identity of the person seeking his legal services considering the nature of the
document, Atty. Jose A. Almo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and Respondent's notarial
commission is Revoked and Disqualified (sic) from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.8
In our Resolution9 dated February 1, 2006, we noted the said IBP Resolution.
We agree with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed been negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary
public in this case.
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. In Santiago v. Rafanan,10 we explained,
. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their
performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their
duties, which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest. 11
Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of the SPA which in this case authorized the complainant's
wife to mortgage the subject real property, the respondent should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity
of the person who represented himself and was represented to be the complainant. 12 He should not have relied on the Community
Tax Certificate presented by the said impostor in view of the ease with which community tax certificates are obtained these
days.13 As a matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability of a community tax certificate in proving the identity of a
person who wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries
public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized. 14
Moreover, considering that respondent admitted15 in the IBP hearing on February 21, 2005 that he had already previously notarized
some documents16 for the complainant, he should have compared the complainant's signatures in those documents with the
impostor's signature before he notarized the questioned SPA.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission, if still extant, of respondent Atty. Jose A. Almo is hereby REVOKED. He is
likewise DISQUALIFIED to be reappointed as Notary Public for a period of two years.
To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of
this Decision to this Court.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the courts all
over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA FATIMA JAPITANA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SYLVESTER C. PARADO, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
This refers to the September 27, 2014 Resolution1 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), which
adopted and approved with modification, the Report and Recommendation 2 of the Investigating Commissioner.
In her verified complaint,3 dated April 6, 2009, which was indorsed by the Court to the IBP, complainant Maria Fatima
Japitana (Fatima) accused respondent Atty. Sylvester C. Parado (Atty. Parado) of performing notarial acts without authority to do
so, knowingly notarizing forged documents, and notarizing documents without requiring sufficient identification from the
signatories.
The Complaint
On June 22, 2006, Atty. Parado notarized the Real Estate Mortgage4 between RC Lending Investors, Inc. (RC Lending), as
mortgagee, and Maria Theresa G. Japitana (Theresa) and Ma. Nette Japitana (Nette), as mortgagors. It was supposedly witnessed
by Maria Sallie Japitana (Sallie) and Maria Lourdes Japitana-Sibi (Lourdes) and her husband Dante Sibi (Dante), Fatima's sisters
and brother-in-law, respectively. The mortgage covered a parcel of land on which the family home of the Japitanas was constituted.
On the same date, Atty. Parado notarized the Affidavit5 allegedly executed by Theresa, Nette, Lourdes, Dante, and Sallie to show
their conformity to the Real Estate Mortgage over the land where their family home was situated.
On October 23, 2006, RC Lending, through Cristeta G. Cuenco (Cuenco), filed its Petition for ExtraJudicial Foreclosure of Real
Estate Mortgage.6 Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under the name of RC Lending. On February
3, 2009, it filed an ex-parte motion7 for the issuance of a break-open order, for RC Lending to effectively take the possession of
the subject property as it was gated and nobody would answer in spite of the sheriffs repeated knocking.
Fatima, however, assailed that the signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage as well as in the Affidavit, both notarized on June 22,
2006, were forgeries. She asserted that Atty. Parado did not require the persons who appeared before him to present any valid
identification. Fatima alleged that Atty. Parado manually forged the signatures of Sallie, Lourdes and Dante, as witnesses to the
Real Estate Mortgage. She added that her sister, Theresa, was a schizophrenic since 1975. More importantly, Fatima averred that
Atty. Parado had no notarial authority, as certified8by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (RTC).
Proceedings before the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CED) issued the order,9 dated September 17, 2009, directing Atty. Parado to submit his
answer to the verified complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the said order. On February 17, 2001, the IBP CBD issued
the Notice of Mandatory Conference,10 requiring both parties to attend the mandatory conference set on March 16, 2011. On the
said date, The IBP CBD issued another order,11 resetting the mandatory conference to April 6, 2011 because Atty. Parado failed to
appear before the commission.
On April 6, 2011, Atty. Parado again failed to appear. The IBP CBD then issued the order12 terminating the mandatory conference
and directing both parties to submit their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of the order.
In her position paper,13 Fatima reiterated that Atty. Parado was guilty of unethical conduct for performing notarial acts without the
necessary authority, and that he knowingly notarized forged documents. Atty. Parado, on the other hand, failed to submit his
position paper.
Report and Recommendation
In his October 31, 2011 Report and Recommendation,14 Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner
Cachapero) noted that Atty. Parado had previously testified in court that the mortgagors and the witnesses personally appeared
before him and that it was he who required them to affix their thumb marks and their signatures - which the parties and the witnesses
in the Real Estate Mortgage did. Commissioner Cachapero opined that there was no evidence to support that Atty. Parado lied as
the court had not set aside his testimonies. Consequently, he concluded that it was not proven that Atty. Parado forged the assailed
documents and notarized the same.
Commissioner Cachapero, however, found that Atty. Parado was dishonest when he testified that he was issued a notarial
commission effective until 2008. His claim was belied by the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that
Atty. Parado had not been issued a notarial commission for 2006. As such, he recommended that Atty. Parado be suspended from
the practice of law for one (1) year.
On September 27, 2014, the IBP-BOG resolved to revoke Atty. Parado's notarial commission, if presently commissioned, for
testifying that he had a notarial commission valid until 2008, contrary to the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC
and for ignoring the notices sent by the Commission on Bar Discipline. Likewise, the Board of Governors disqualified Atty. Parado
from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years and suspended him from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Specifically, Resolution No. XXI-2014-616, reads:
xxx for testifying in Court that Respondent himself was issued notarial commission up to the year 2008 which was belied by the
Certificate of the Clerk of Court VII of Cebu City pointing out that Respondent was not issued a Notarial Commission for the year
2006, and for ignoring the notices of the Commission, Atty. Sylvester C. Parado's notarial commission if presently commissioned
is immediately REVOKED.
FURTHER, he is DISQUALIFIED from being Commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) 1ears and SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months.15
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP BOG but modifies the penalty imposed.
A close perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Parado had no existing notarial commission when he notarized the documents in
question in 2006. This is supported by the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that based on the Notarial
Records, Atty. Parado had not been issued a notarial commission for the year 2006. He failed to refute the same as he neither
appeared during the mandatory conference nor filed his position paper.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,16 a person commissioned as a notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of
the year in which the commissioning is made. Commission either means the grant of authority to perform notarial or the written
evidence of authority.17
Without a commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to perform any of the notarial acts. A lawyer who acts as a notary public without
the necessary notarial commission is remiss in his professional duties and responsibilities. In Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial
Practice,18 the Court emphasized that notaries public must uphold the requirements in acting as such, to wit:
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and
Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform such act.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive
public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity.1âwphi1 A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for
this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the
laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes
all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, at all times.
In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing documents outside their territorial
jurisdiction or with an expired commission. xxxx [Emphases Supplied]
Atty. Parado knowingly performed notarial acts in 2006 in spite of the absence of a notarial commission for the said period. Further,
he was dishonest when he testified in court that he had a notarial commission effective until 2008, when, in truth, he had none.
Atty. Parado's misdeeds run afoul of his duties and responsibilities, both as a lawyer and a notary public.
Moreover, even if Atty. Parado had a valid notarial commission, he still failed to faithfully observe the Rules on Notarial Practice
when he notarized the Real Estate Mortgage and the Affidavit of Conformity with the persons who executed the said documents
merely presenting their Residence Certificate or Community Tax Certificate (CTC) before him.
Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires the presentation of a competent evidence of identity, if the
person appearing before the notary public is not personally known by him. Section 12, Rule II of the same Rules defines competent
evidence of identity as: (a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual; or (b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction, who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses
neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public a documentary identification.
Atty. Parado did not claim to personally know the persons who executed the said documents. Hence, the presentation of their CTCs
was insufficient because those cannot be considered as competent evidence of identity, as defined in the Rules. Reliance on the
CTCs alone is a punishable indiscretion by the notary public.19
Doubtless, Atty. Parado should be held accountable for failing to perform his duties and responsibilities expected of him. The
penalty recommended, however, should be increased to put premium on the importance of the duties and responsibilities of a notary
public. Pursuant to the pronouncement in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice,20Atty. Parado should be suspended for two
(2) years from the practice of law and forever barred from becoming a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sylvester C. Parado is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years
and PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as Notary Public.
This order is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all courts in the country and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and
guidance. Let a copy of this decision be also appended to the personal record of Atty. Sylvester C. Parado as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
In Re: Decision dated September 26, 2012 in OMB-M-A-10-023-A, etc. against Atty. Robelito* B. Diuyan
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) furnished the Court a copy of its September 26, 2012 Decision 1 in Case No. OMB-M-
A-10-023-A (Andrea M. Camilo v. Raul C. Brion, Agrarian Reform Program Technologist (SG-10), Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office, Mati, Davao Oriental). In the said Decision, the Office of the Ombudsman noted, viz.:
On a final note, this Office finds it unsettling that the Deed of Partition submitted before the DAR was notarized by Atty. Robellito
B. Diuyan on 23 July 2003, when one of the signatories therein, Alejandro F. Camilo, had earlier died on 23 August 2001. On this
matter, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Supreme Court of the Philippines for its information and appropriate action.
In a Resolution2 dated July 24, 2013, this Court treated the September 26, 2012 Decision in OMB-M-A-10-023-A and the Deed of
Partition as an administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan and required the latter to file a comment
thereon.3
In a letter4 dated October 30, 2013, and by way of comment, respondent admitted notarizing the Deed of Partition in his capacity
as District Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office in Mati City and all of Davao Oriental. He claimed that:
[The] signature as Notary Public in that [July 23, 2003] Deed of Partition subject matter of the complaint was indeed mine. I was
still connected with the Public Attorney's Office as District Public Attorney at that time. I retired on April 20, 2008. My function
[included] the execution and/or notarization of a document xx x.
In the case at bar, eight (8) persons appeared before me with the document deed of partition prepared by them subject matter of the
complaint. I asked them one by one if the document is true and correct [and] with their Community Tax Certificates, they answered
me in the affirmative and after being satisfied with their answer I notarized the document for free as they are considered as indigents.
Of course, they signed it one by one in front of me. 5 <<
In a Resolution6 dated February 3, 2014, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
A mandatory conference was set on May 29, 20147 in Pasig City; however, respondent was unable to attend the same since he had
not fully recovered from a debilitating stroke that he suffered in 2012; he cannot stand or walk unassisted; has difficulty speaking;
and only relies on his meager monthly pension of ₱12,000.00. Thus, in an Order8 dated May 29, 2014, the mandatory conference
was terminated and respondent was required to submit his Position Paper.
By way of explanation, respondent narrated in his Position Paper9 that:
x x x I have nothing to do with present [charge]. [A]s public officer[,] I [enjoy] the presumption of good faith and regularity in [the
discharge] of my function as Chief Public Attorney in Mati and all in Davao Oriental xx x; there is no showing that, I have
committed any wrong since x x x becoming a lawyer and member of x x x the [l]ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as [during
my] 22 years of x x x service in [the Public Attorney's Office] and in my private life x x x.
With regard to the deed of partition x x x there is no showing that it was done with irregularity x x x.
On July 23, 2003 the parties in the document appeared and requested to have their document notarized for free[. A]s Public Attorney
I am bound to do so [since the a:ffiants were indigents] I x x x then read the said document and asked them if this is true and [they]
answered in the positive. Then having been satisfied of their answer I let them [sign] one by one in front of me after which I
notarized the same for free. [The] parties [were] personally present and acknowledged that they [were the] same parties to the
document and [they showed] to me their respective CTC.10
In a Report and Recommendation 11 dated September 24, 2014, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found respondent
guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. While it found no deceit or malice on the part of the respondent, and even
considered the fact that respondent was a former public official with no previous record of misconduct, as well as the fact that the
affiants in the subject Deed of Partition were farmers who did not have any IDs and only had Community Tax Certificates (CTCs)
to present and prove their identities, the IBP-CBD nonetheless found him grossly negligent in the performance of his functions.
The IBP-CBD thus recommended as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned finds respondent guilty of breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice and accordingly, recommends revocation of his notarial commission, if any, for one (1) year, effective immediately. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts; in the future shall be dealt with more severely. 12
In a Resolution13 dated December 14, 2014, the IBP-Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the IBP-CBD's Report and
Recommendation but increased the recommended penalty, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as AnPex "A'',
and finding Respondent [guilty] for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Robellito R. Diuyan's notarial
commission if presently commissioned is immediately REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned for
two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. 14
The case is now before us for final disposition.
Issue
Whether respondent should he held administratively liable for notarizing a Deed of Partition on the basis of the affiants' CTCs.
Our Ruling
This Court finds nothing irregular with respondent's act of notarizing. the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003 on the basis of the
affiants' CTCs. The law applicable at the time of the notarization only required the presentation of the CTCs.
In Mabini v. Atty. Kintanar, 15 this Court dismissed the administrative complaint filed against the lawyer therein because the lawyer
complied with the notarial law extant at the time of notarizing the contested document, to wit:
It is a truism that the duties pe1fonned by a Notary Public are not just plain ministerial acts. They are so impressed with public
interest and dictated by public policy. Such is the case since notarization makes a private document into a public one; and as a
public document, it enjoys full credit on its face. However, a lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation of his duties as Notary
Public whenthe law in effect at the time of his complained act does not provide any prohibition to the same, as in the case at bench.
(Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)
Similarly, respondent notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003, or prior to the effectivity of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice,16 of which he is being held accountable by the IBP. However, when the Deed was notarized on July 23, 2003, the
applicable law was the notarial law w1der Title N, Chapter 11, Article VII of the Revised Administrative Code, 17 Section 251 of
which states:
SECTION 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of (cedula) residence tax. - Every contract, deed, or other document
acknowledged before a notary public shall haw certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper (cedula)
residence certificates or are exempt from the (cedula) residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such
certification the number, place of issue, and date of each (cedula) residence certificate as aforesaid.
In addition, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 46518 also reiterated the need to present a residence certificate when acknowledging
documents before a notary public, viz.:
Section 6. Presentation of residence certificate upon certain occasions. - When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act
acknowledges any document before a notary public, x x x it shall be the duty of such person or officer of such corporation with
whom such transaction is had or business done or from whom any salary or wage is received to require the exhibition of the
residence certificates showing the payment of the residence, taxes by such person: Provided, however, That the presentation of the
residence certificate shall not be required in connection with the registration of a voter.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, it was incorrect for the IBP to have applied the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in holding respondent liable for notarizing
the Deed of Partition. To reiterate, the Deed was notarized on July 23, 2003. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice were not yet in
effect at that time.
Here, respondent was then the District Public Attorney in Mati, Davao Oriental when affiants, who were indigent fanners and who
did not have any personal identification card or any other form of competent evidence save for their CTCs, 19 requested the
notarization of the Deed of Partition. These eight individuals who approached him presented themselves to be the affiants of the
said Deed and signed the same in respondent's presence. There was nothing irregular on the face of the Deed that would have
alerted respondent to ask probing questions or inquire about the circumstances behind the execution of the said instrument. On the
contrary, the Deed was a valid exercise of the fanners' right to divide the title in their favor as beneficiaries. The Ombudsman
affirmed this when it dismissed the administrative case filed against an agrarian reform officer concen1ing the Deed. In fact, the
Ombudsman ruled that "[t]he eventual breaking of TCT20 CLOA21 No. 454 into individual titles in favor of the farmer beneficiaries
named in said collective CLOA is not irregular as it is, in fact, provided by DAR 22 rules and regulations."23
In fine, respondent did not violate any of his duties as Notary Public when he notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the Complainant against respondent Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan is DISMISSED for lack of merit
SO ORDERED.
AQUILES RIOSA, Petitioner,
vs.
TABACO LA SUERTE CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the May 30 2012 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals CA), and its September 20 2012 Resolution 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96459 reversing the September 30 2010
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 15 Tabaco City Albay RTC), which granted the complaint for annulment/declaration
of nullity of the deed of absolute sale and transfer certificate of title reconveyance and damages.
The Facts
On February 26, 2002, petitioner Aquiles Riosa (Aquiles) filed his Complaint for Annulment/Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tabaco La Suerte Corporation (La
Suerte) before the RTC.
In his complaint, Aquiles alleged that he was the owner and in actual possession of a 52-square meter commercial lot situated in
Barangay Quinale, Tabaco City, Albay; that he acquired the said property through a deed of cession and quitclaim executed by his
parents, Pablo Riosa, Sr. and Sabiniana Biron; that he declared the property in his name and had been religiously paying the realty
tax on the said property; that thereafter, his daughter, Annie Lyn Riosa Zampelis, renovated the commercial building on the lot and
introduced improvements costing no less than ₱300,000.00; that subsequently, on three (3) occasions, he obtained loans from Sia
Ko Pio in the total amount of ₱50,000.00; that as a security for the payment of loans, Sia Ko Pio requested from him a photocopy
of the deed of cession and quitclaim; that Sia Ko Pio presented to him a document purportedly a receipt for the ₱50,000.00 loan
with an undertaking to pay the total amount of ₱52,000.00 including the ₱2,000.00 attorney’s fees; that without reading the
document, he affixed his signature thereon; and that in September 2001, to his surprise, he received a letter from La
Suerte informing him that the subject lot was already registered in its name.
Aquiles claimed that by means of fraud, misrepresentation and deceit employed by Sia Ko Pio, he was made to sign the document
which he thought was a receipt and undertaking to pay the loan, only to find out later that it was a document of sale. Aquiles averred
that he did not appear before the notary public to acknowledge the sale, and that the notary public, a municipal judge, was not
authorized to notarize a deed of conveyance. He further claimed that he could not have sold the commercial building on the lot as
he had no transmissible right over it, as it was not included in the deed of cession and quitclaim. He, thus, prayed for the nullification
of the deed of sale and certificate of title in the name of La Suerte and the reconveyance of the subject property to him. 4
In its Answer, La Suerte averred that it was the actual and lawful owner of the commercial property, after purchasing it from
Aquiles on December 7, 1990; that it allowed Aquiles to remain in possession of the property to avoid the ire of his father from
whom he had acquired property inter vivos, subject to his obligation to vacate the premises anytime upon demand; that on February
13, 1991, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-80054 covering the subject property in
its name; that Aquiles necessarily undertook the cost of repairs and did not pay rent for using the premises; that Aquiles transacted
with it, through Sia Ko Pio, now deceased, who was then its Chief Executive Officer; that his opinion that only the land was sold
was absurd because the sale of the principal included its accessories, not to mention that he did not make any reservation at the
time the deed was executed; that it repeatedly asked Aquiles to vacate the premises but to no avail; that, instead, he tried to renovate
the building in 2001 which prompted it to lodge a complaint with the Office of the Mayor on the ground that the renovation work
was without a building permit; and that Aquiles’ complaint was barred by prescription, laches, estoppel and indefeasibility
of La Suerte’s title.5
During the trial, Aquiles and his daughter, Anita Riosa Cabanele, testified to prove his causes of action. To defend its rightful claim,
La Suerte presented the testimony of Juan Pielago Sia (Juan), the son of Sia Ko Pio and a member of the board. Aquiles also
presented his wife, Erlinda, as rebuttal witness.
On September 30, 2010, the RTC ruled in favor of Aquiles, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Ordering the annulment of sale of the subject lot purportedly executed by plaintiff Aquiles Riosa in favor of defendant
corporation;
2. Annulling the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80054 in the name of defendant corporation;
3. Ordering defendant corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) as Attorney’s fees;
4. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of Twenty Thousand (₱20,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
5. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) as Attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of Aquiles that he was made to sign an instrument of sale without his knowledge because
he trusted Sia Ko Pio and he was of the belief that what he had signed was merely an instrument of indebtedness. It cited, as legal
basis, Article 1330 of the Civil Code which provides that a contract where the consent is given thru violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud is voidable. Inasmuch as the property was acquired thru fraud, the person who obtained it by force of law was
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property came. Thus, according to the RTC,
La Suerte was bound to reconvey to Aquiles the subject property.
With its motion for reconsideration denied, La Suerte appealed to the CA. In its May 30, 2012 Decision, the CA reversed the RTC
decision and upheld the validity of the subject deed of sale in favor of La Suerte. It declared La Suerte as the lawful owner of the
subject lot and improvements thereon, subject to the right of reimbursement for the renovation expenses. The CA held that tax
declarations or realty tax payments by Aquiles were not conclusive evidence of ownership, citing Spouses Camara v. Spouses
Malabao,7 where it was ruled that a party’s declaration of real property and his payment of realty taxes could not defeat a
certificate of title which was an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person
whose name appeared thereon. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The September 30, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 15, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered:
1. DISMISSING the complaint for annulment of deed of sale and transfer certificate of title, without prejudice to the right of
plaintiff-appellee’s daughter to a reimbursement for the renovation works she made on the structure/building on the lot;
and
2. GRANTING defendant-appellant’s counterclaim although in the reduced amount of ₱100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.8
Aquiles filed his Motion for Reconsideration9 of the CA decision, but the same was denied by the CA in its September 20, 2012
Resolution. Hence, Aquiles filed the present petition before this Court raising the following
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error in reversing the decision of the Trial Court disregarding
the conclusion and findings of the Trial court;
2. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error of law in holding that the personal loan of petitioner obtained
and granted by Sia Ko Pio is a consideration of sale of the property in favor of the respondent corporation La Suerte Corporation;
3. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was a valid and perfected contract of sale of real property
between petitioner and respondent corporation La Suerte Corporation;
4. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and applicable jurisprudence in resolving petitioner’s
actual physical possession of the property in question; and 5. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed
serious error of law by awarding damages to the respondent. 10
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether there was a perfected and valid contract of sale for the subject property between
Aquiles and La Suerte, through its Chief Executive Officer, Sia Ko Pio.
Aquiles argues that there was no perfected contract to sell because (1) there was no transaction between La Suerte and Aquiles for
the sale of the property in question; (2) there was no board resolution authorizing Sia Ko Pio to purchase the property; (3) there
was no evidence that the money received by Aquiles from Sia Ko Pio came from La Suerte; and (4) he did not appear before the
notary public for notarization of the instrument of sale. Moreover, there was a discrepancy in the date appearing in the deed of sale
and the date in the acknowledgment and the notarial reference.
La Suerte, in its Comment,11 argued that Aquiles’ petition should be dismissed because it raised only questions of fact as only
pure question of law is allowed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. It counters that the notarized deed of sale was the very
evidence of the agreement between them. According to it, said deed of sale was binding and enforceable between them, albeit there
was a discrepancy in the dates, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale of real estate produces legal effect
between the parties. La Suerte adds that the absence of a board resolution for the purchase of the property has no controlling
consequence as La Suerte had ratified the act of Sia Ko Pio.
The Court’s Ruling
Notably, the issues raised in the petition are factual in nature. Essentially, Aquiles asks the Court to review the factual determination
of the CA. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of
facts and is not to review or calibrate the evidence on record.12 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact by the
CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions.13 An acceptable exception is where there is a conflict between the factual determination of the trial court and that of
the appellate court. In such a case, it becomes imperative to digress from this general rule and revisit the factual circumstances
surrounding the controversy.14
In this case, although the RTC and the CA were one in ruling that the prescriptive period of reconveyance did not run against
Aquiles because he remained in possession of the subject property, they differred in their findings of fact and conclusions on the
question of whether there was a perfected and valid contract of sale.
The RTC annulled the sale of the subject properties on the ground of fraud as Aquiles was made to sign an instrument which he
believed to be a receipt of indebtedness. On the contrary, the CA ruled that the contract of sale was valid. The CA wrote:
Nevertheless, We rule that the subject deed of sale is valid. We are not convinced of Aquiles’ bare assertion that the said
document was executed through fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, and that his wife’s signature thereon was forged. The
rule is that for an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and
convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. It must be stressed that mere allegations of fraud are not enough.
Intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner, injure him, must be specifically alleged and proved.15
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court holds otherwise.
The Court agrees with the finding of the RTC that there was no perfected contract of sale. It is a hornbook doctrine that the findings
of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons,
because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. 16
The elements of a contract of sale are: a] consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for
the price; b] determinate subject matter; and c] price certain in money or its equivalent.17
In this case, there was no clear and convincing evidence that Aquiles definitely sold the subject property to La Suerte, nor was there
evidence that La Suerte authorized its chief executive officer, Sia Ko Pio, to negotiate and conclude a purchase of the property.
Aquiles’ narration in open court is clear that he did not intend to transfer ownership of his property. The pertinent parts
of his testimony read:
Q – How much is your debt to the father of Jhony known as Pia Wo?
ATTY. GONZAGA: The question refers to Sia Ko Pio?
ATTY. BROTAMONTE: Pia Wa.
A – At first I borrowed ₱3,000.00.
Q – Thereafter is there any additional amount?
A – Then, he give me ₱10,000.00.
Q – Thereafter, is there any additional amount?
A – After the money was exhausted, I borrowed ₱10,000.00.
Q – After that ₱10,000.00, did you borrow another loan? A – The next amount I borrowed from him is ₱20,000.00.
Q – Now did you sign any document showing receipt of that amount you received from Pia Wa? A – The last time that I borrowed
from him he wants to buy the property but I told him that I will not sell it.
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
Q – What happened when you did not like to sell the property?
A – He did not say anything but he made me sign a paper evidencing my debt from him.
Q – Were you able to read the papers you signed if there is wording or statement?
A – I did not read it anymore because I trust him.
Q – What happened thereafter?
A – After several years we come to know that our property is already in their name. 18 [Emphases supplied]
The foregoing testimony negates any intention on the part of Aquiles to sell the property in exchange for the amounts borrowed.
Evidently, it was a series of transactions between Aquiles and Sia Po Ko, but not between the parties. The transactions were between
Aquiles, as borrower, and Sia Ko Pio, as lender. It was not a sale between Aquiles, as vendor, and La Suerte, as vendee. There was
no agreement between the parties. As the first element was wanting, Aquiles correctly argued that there was no contract of sale.
Under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds on the thing which
is the object of the contract and on the price.
Aquiles acknowledged that he signed the receipt for the total loan amount of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱2,000.00 as attorney’s fees. There
is, however, no proof that it came from La Suerte as the consideration of the sale. Accordingly, there is no basis for a
holding that the personal loan of Aquiles from Sia Ko Pio was the consideration for the sale of his property in favor of
La Suerte. As to La Suerte’s contention that a deed of absolute sale was purportedly executed by Aquiles in its favor, it
failed to adduce convincing evidence to effectively rebut his consistent claim that he was not aware that what he had
signed was already an instrument of sale, considering his trust and confidence on Sia Ko Pio who was his long-time friend and
former employer.
The fact that the alleged deed of sale indubitably bore Aquiles’ signature deserves no evidentiary value there being no consent
from him to part with his property. Had he known that the document presented to him was an instrument of sale, he would not have
affixed his signature on the document. It has been held that the existence of a signed document purporting to be a contract of sale
does not preclude a finding that the contract is invalid when the evidence shows that there was no meeting of the minds between
the seller and buyer.19
Indeed, if Aquiles sold the property in favor of La Suerte, he would not have religiously and continuously paid the real property
taxes. Also of note is the fact that his daughter spent ₱ 300,000.00 for the renovation of improvements. More important, La Suerte
did not earlier ask him to transfer the possession thereof to the company. These uncontroverted attendant circumstances bolster
Aquiles’ positive testimony that he did not sell the property.
And for said reasons, the CA should not have favorably considered the validity of the deed of absolute sale absent any written
authority from La Suerte’s board of directors for Sia Ko Pio to negotiate and purchase Aquiles property on its behalf and
to use its money to pay the purchase price. The Court notes that when Sia Ko Pio’s son, Juan was presented as an officer
of La Suerte, he admitted that he could not find in the records of the corporation any board resolution authorizing his
father to purchase disputed property.20 In Spouses Firme v. Bukal Enterprises and Development Corporation, 21 it was written:
It is the board of directors or trustees which exercises almost all the corporate powers in a corporation. Thus, the Corporation Code
provides:
SEC. 23. The board of directors or trustees. — Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers of all
corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all property of such corporations controlled
and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stock, or where there is no stock, from among
the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year and until their successors are elected and qualified. x x x
SEC. 36. Corporate powers and capacity. — Every corporation incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity:
xxxx
7. To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease, pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with such real and personal
property, including securities and bonds of other corporations, as the transaction of a lawful business of the corporation may
reasonably and necessarily require, subject to the limitations prescribed by the law and the Constitution.
xxxx
Under these provisions, the power to purchase real property is vested in the board of directors or trustees. While a corporation may
appoint agents to negotiate for the purchase of real property needed by the corporation, the final say will have to be with the board,
whose approval will finalize the transaction. A corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its business through its board
of directors and through its officers and agents when authorized by a board resolution or its by-laws. As held in AF Realty &
Development, Inc. v. Dieselman Freight Services, Co.:
Section 23 of the Corporation Code expressly provides that the corporate powers of all corporations shall be exercised by the board
of directors. Just as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts in his behalf, so may the board of directors of a
corporation validly delegate some of its functions to individual officers or agents appointed by it. Thus, contracts or acts of a
corporation must be made either by the board of directors or by a corporate agent duly authorized by the board. Absent such valid
delegation/authorization, the rule is that the declarations of an individual director relating to the affairs of the corporation, but not
in the course of, or connected with, the performance of authorized duties of such director, are held not binding on the
corporation.22 [Emphases supplied]
In the case at bench, Sia Ko Pio, although an officer of La Suerte, had no authority from its Board of Directors to enter into a
contract of sale of Aquiles’ property. It is, thus, clear that the loan obtained by Aquiles from Sia Ko Pio was a personal loan from
the latter, not a transaction between Aquiles and La Suerte. There was no evidence to show that Sia Ko Pio was clothed with
authority to use his personal fund for the benefit of La Suerte. Evidently, La Suerte was never in the picture.
The CA also failed to consider the glaring material discrepancies on the dates appearing in the purported deed of absolute sale
notarized by Judge Arsenio Base, Municipal Court Presiding Judge of Tabaco City (Judge Base).
An examination of the alleged contract of sale shows three (3) dates:
1. In witness whereof, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 8th day of December 1999 in Tabaco, Albay, Philippines;
2. Before me, this 7th day of December, 1990 in Tabaco, Albay; and
3. Doc. No. 587;
Page No. 12;
Book No. 4;
Series of 1990.
The document was dated 1999, but the date in the acknowledgment and notarial reference was an earlier date, 1990. The ex-oficio
notary public, Judge Base, was not presented to explain the apparent material discrepancy of the dates appearing on the questioned
document. This only confirms the claim of Aquiles that he signed the receipt representing his loan at the bodega of Sia Ko Pio
sometime in 1990, and not at the office of Judge Base in 1999.
La Suerte insists that the discrepancy on the dates was a mere clerical error that did not invalidate the deed of sale. It is worthy to
stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. While it is true that an error in the notarial inscription does not generally invalidate a sale, if indeed it
took place, the same error can only mean that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the
presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due
execution need not be proved.23
An even more substantial irregularity raised by Aquiles pertains to the capacity of the notary public, Judge Base, to notarize the
deed of sale. Judge Base, who acted as ex-oficio notary public, is not allowed under the law to notarize documents not connected
with the exercise of his official duties. The case of Tigno v. Aquino 24 is enlightening:
There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public
ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided that certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no
lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies. The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Cariño's
improper notarial activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put
to accept the veracity of its contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city, was even then not an isolated backwater
town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.25
In this case, no such certification was attached to the alleged notarized document.1âwphi1 Also, the Court takes note of Aquiles’
averment that there were several lawyers commissioned as notary public in Tabaco City. With Judge Base not being
authorized to notarize a deed of conveyance, the notarized document cannot be considered a valid registrable
document in favor of La Suerte.
Moreover, Aquiles wife, Erlinda, who appeared to have affixed her signature as a witness to the purported document of sale,
categorically stated that she never signed such an instrument and never appeared before a notary public.
Although it is true that the absence of notarization of the deed of sale would not invalidate the transaction evidenced therein, 26 yet
an irregular notarization reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private : document, which requires proof of its
due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence.27
It should be noted that the deed of sale was offered in evidence as authentic by La Suerte, hence, the burden was upon it to prove
its authenticity and due execution. La Suerte unfortunately failed to discharge this burden. Accordingly, the preponderance of
evidence is in favor of Aquiles.
In fine, considering the irregularities or defects in the execution and notarization of the deed of sale, the Court finds Itself unable
to stamp its seal of approval on it. The R TC was correct in ordering its annulment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 30, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96459 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The September 30, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 Tabaco City, Albay, is
REINSTATED.
This disposition is without prejudice to any valid claim of the heirs of Sia Ko Pio against Aquiles. SO ORDERED.
REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code
of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.1
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly
solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation 2 and issued them to the
contracting parties.3 He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage.4 These "package marriages" are allegedly
common in Bacolod City.5
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were notarized on
the day of the contracting parties’ marriages.6 The affidavits contained the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.
(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge7
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-
90 dated February 26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize
documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected
with a judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer.9 Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to present their competent pieces
of evidence of identity as required by law.
These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple and elementary to ignore."10
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn
has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a
complaint against Judge Rojo to delay Frialyn’s case.12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was connected
with his official functions and duties as a judge.13 The Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary14 does not prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will
solemnize.15 Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was
not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. 16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their competent pieces of evidence of
identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who
executed the affidavit.17 The parties’ identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage they solemnized.19 He pleaded "not to make him [complainant Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag and chopping
block"20 since other judges also notarized affidavits of cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. The
Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined ₱9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating the same
offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal trial court
judges’ official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary,21 a judge’s duty is to personally examine the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing the
marriage ceremony.22 Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
they will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended
a fine of ₱1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized.23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex
officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions
and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the function of notaries
public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and
Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of this
power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents connected only with the exercise of
their official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment
of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions
as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize
the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule
5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction.
They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio:
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries
public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the
capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all
notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos,
Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to
the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. 24
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions
and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public
were lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among
these formal requisites is a marriage license.26
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of the legal
disqualifications to contract marriage.27 Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the marriage
license presented.28
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry, they
are exempt from the marriage license requirement.29 Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal
impediment to marry each other.31 The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties’
qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage. 32 Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal ratification of cohabitation. — In the
case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally interview the
contracting parties to determine their qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties
as to the fact of having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of any legal impediments to
marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a) and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the
contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have
indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge
can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the
solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s
statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he solemnized their marriages]."33 He
notarized documents not connected with his official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular
No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not expressly
prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.
To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the solemnizing officer’s duties to examine the affidavit of cohabitation and
to issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been complied with redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot
objectively examine a document he himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary assume that "the person authorized by law to administer oaths" who notarizes the affidavit
of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who performs the marriage ceremony are two different persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from notarizing "private documents x x x
[bearing] no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges."34 Since a marriage license is a public document, its
"counterpart," the affidavit of cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he
notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity."35 The affidavit of cohabitation,
even if it serves a "public purpose," remains a private document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents. As discussed, affidavits of
cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official duty to solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is to "eliminate competition between judges and private lawyers in
transacting legal conveyancing business."36 He cited Borre v. Judge Moya37 where this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty of
violating Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing a deed of sale. Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation,
he did "not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business."38 Thus, he did
not violate Circular No. 1-90.
In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context in which this court stated that "[judges] should not compete
with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business."39
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal conveyancing business." So
long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-
90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate of candidacy. In Ellert v.
Judge Galapon, Jr.,41 this court fined Judge Galapon for notarizing the verification page of an answer filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The documents involved in these cases were not used to transact "legal conveyancing
business." Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were not connected with his official function and duty to solemnize
marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in Bacolod City.
Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the municipality or circuit of the judge’s court constitutes violation
of Circular No. 1-90.42
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the practice
legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the contrary. 43
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary
public must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. – x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity
as defined by these Rules.
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the instrument
or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not personally know the signatory, he must require the signatory to present
a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their affidavits
before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent
pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They personally appeared before him to
subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also interviewed them on their qualifications to contract marriage. Thus, the parties
to the affidavit of cohabitation need not present their competent pieces of evidence of identity.44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties personally known to him. The
parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at
least be acquainted with them.45 Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary
public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v. Judge How 46where this court
held that "[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations x x x"47were defenses against gross
ignorance of the law charges. His good faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold him administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres] only within the parameters of
tolerable judgment x x x."48 Good faith "does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident
and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error."49
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction before
notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires notaries public to personally know the signatory to the
document they will notarize or require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. These are basic legal principles
and procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine times is not good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity,50 "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer."51 If the law involved is basic, ignorance constitutes "lack of
integrity."52 Violating basic legal principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a serious charge: 53
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations;54
b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; 55 or
c. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.56
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of the law.
However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges’ practice of notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City
and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months
sufficient sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law.1âwphi1 They should act with caution with
respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical requirements as in this case will be dealt with strictly.
WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His suspension is effective
upon service on him of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.
SO ORDERED.
UWE MATHAEUS, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ERIC and GENEVIEVE MEDEQUISO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1seeks to set aside the September 14, 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R CEB SP No. 04236 dismissing petitioner Uwe Mathaeus' Petition for Review, as well as the CA's April 6, 2011
Resolution3 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
In Civil Case No. 5579, the Tagbilaran Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1 issued a January 12, 2007
Decision5 ordering petitioner to pay respondents spouses Eric and Genevieve Medequiso, the amount of P30,000.00 with legal
interest, attorney's fees, and costs.
Petitioner interposed an appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 7269, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 48. On
September 30, 2008, the RTC issued a Decision6 affirming the MTCC judgment.
Petitioner moved to reconsider,7 but the RTC – in an April 13, 2009 Order8 – upheld its judgment.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review9 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 04236. However, in its assailed September
14, 2009 Resolution, the CA dismissed the Petition, decreeing thus:
Perusal of the instant petition filed by the petitioner within the period prayed for discloses that the required Verification and
Certification on Non-Forum Shopping was sworn to not before a notary public but before a clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court in Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
Although Section 242 of Article III of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes clerks of court to act as notaries public ex-
officio, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that clerks of court may notarize or administer oaths only when the matter is
related to the exercise of their official functions.10 A Verification in an appeal via a Petition for Review is not within the scope of
the matters wherein clerks of court are at liberty to notarize or administer oath. Hence, the same is considered improperly verified
and treated as unsigned and dismissible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,12 but in its assailed Resolution, the CA stood its ground.
Hence, the instant Petition.
In a December 4, 2013 Resolution,13 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A PROPER VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
UNDER RULE 42 THAT WARRANTS A DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.
II
WHETHER OR NOT A STRICT ADHERENCE TO SECTION 6 OF THE REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE IS
TO BE RESORTED [TO] TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE ANSWER OF THE PETITIONER WAS NOT
EXPUNGED FROM THE RECORDS OF THE MTCC CASE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PECULIARITY OF THE MTCC CASE AND THE ADVENT OF A.M. 08-9-7-SC (RULE OF
PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES) ENTITLES A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES TO GIVE THE
PETITIONER HIS DAY IN COURT AND ALLOW HIM TO PRESENT HIS EVIDENCE DURING A FULL BLOWN TRIAL.14
Petitioner’s Arguments
In his Petition and Reply15 seeking reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and the RTC’s September 30, 2008 Decision, as
well as the remand of the case to the MTCC for further proceedings, petitioner argues that – contrary to the CA’s
pronouncement that a clerk of court’s administration of an oath in a verification contained in a petition for review is not within
the scope of his official functions – Atty. Romulo T. Puagang (Clerk of Court of the Bohol RTC) may validly notarize the
verification in the CA petition, as it is merely a continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 5579; that the Astorga16case
refers to documents that are alien to a clerk of court’s functions – the CA petition cannot be said to be alien to the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 5579; that his filing of an unverified Answer in Civil Case No. 5579 – which led the MTCC to discard the
same and render judgment against him – should not be taken against him, because as a non-lawyer and foreigner who
prepared and filed the same without furnishing copies to the opposing party, he did not know the judicial rules of procedure; that
therefore, his Answer in Civil Case No. 5579 should be admitted; that with the admission of his Answer, proceedings in the MTCC
should be reopened and continued; that liberality in the application of the rules on summary procedure is underscored by the
subsequent issuance of the rules of procedure on small claims cases, which prohibit the appearance of attorneys; and that the case
should be reopened in order that the parties may present their respective evidence.
Respondent’s Arguments
In their Comment17 seeking denial of the Petition, respondents plainly point out that the Petition is frivolous and dilatory; that in
deciding the case, the MTCC, RTC and CA unanimously rendered judgment against petitioner; and that petitioner’s arguments
deserve no merit.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
We have held that "Clerks of Court are notaries public ex-officio, and may thus notarize documents or administer oaths but
only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. x x x [C]lerks of court should not, in their ex-
officio capacity, take part in the execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to their official functions." 18
Even if it is to be conceded that the CA Petition for Review in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 04236 is merely a continuation of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 5579, this Court cannot agree with petitioner’s argument that the notarization of verifications
and certifications on non-forum shopping constitutes part of a clerk of court’s daily official functions. We are not prepared to rule
in petitioner’s favor on this score; as it is, the workload of a clerk of court is already heavy enough. We cannot add to
this the function of notarizing complaints, answers, petitions, or any other pleadings on a daily or regular basis; such a
responsibility can very well be relegated to commissioned notaries public. Besides, if the practice – specifically the notarization
by clerks of court of pleadings filed in cases pending before their own salas or courts – is allowed, unpleasant consequences
might ensue; it could be subject to abuse, and it distracts the clerks of court’s attention from the true and essential work
they perform.
Petitioner’s procedural misstep forms part of a series of lapses committed in the prosecution of his case.1âwphi1 In the
MTCC level, he failed to file a verified Answer to respondents’ Complaint. Secondly, he did not furnish a copy thereof to
respondents. As a result, the MTCC expunged his responsive pleading and rendered judgment against him. This time, at the
level of the CA, he committed another mistake; that is, he caused his Petition for Review to be notarized by the RTC Clerk of Court
where his case is pending. At this point, petitioner and his counsel are expected to be more circumspect in their actions, avoiding
the commission of questionable acts that jeopardize their case.
Under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the CA, submitting together with
the petition a certification on non-forum shopping. Under Section 3 of the same Rule, "[t]he failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service
of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof''
Specifically with respect to certifications against forum-shopping, we have repeatedly held that "non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or presence of 'special circumstances or compelling
reasons."'19 Taking the foregoing circumstances and considerations to mind, the Court is not inclined to relax the rules for the
petitioner's benefit; it perceives no compelling reasons or circumstances to rule in his favor. Quite the contrary, the CA
pronouncement ordering the dismissal of his Petition for Review is just, and thus should stand.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2009 and April 6, 2011 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R CEB SP No. 04236 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant) against Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña
(respondent) for dishonesty and grave misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts

In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for "deliberately and repeatedly making
falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent
refers to a different complaint, that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was
no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his
client Fortunato Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals. Complainant claimed that she could
not properly defend herself without a copy of the title. She further claimed that the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To
support such claim, complainant presented Certifications from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file in their offices of OCT No. 1730.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of the lot owned by
complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation respondent
notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch 16 Judge Enrique
C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor. Complainant narrated the outcomes in the
"cases of Estrellers which were filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."

Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge.
Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern Philippines
College of Law, which is a government institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal
which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office.

In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against him. Respondent alleged that "the
[Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9,
2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No. B-1118 and he furnished
a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was not furnished, respondent wondered why he raised
this matter only upon filing of the instant complaint.

Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed against the occupants of the lot.
Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to his clients should be addressed to Judge
Asis himself.

As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from the service, respondent admitted
that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law,
which is a government institution. However, respondent countered that he was no longer connected with the NIT College of Law;
and thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent further claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and
he had not received any salary except honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were no objections, he proceeded to perform
the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the administrative case
against him, who interposed no objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed before this Court.

Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20 February 2008.
Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All these submissions basically reiterated the
respective arguments of the parties and denied each other's allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the IBP

In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz noted the foul
language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent described complainant's counsel as "silahis"
and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died." According to the IBP
Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct that seriously affect his
standing and character as an officer of the court."

With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that respondent is guilty of the same
"as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings she has submitted." Respondent committed
acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct (1) for using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a complaint filed by
complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is respondent's client; (2) for not furnishing complainant's
counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the Comment respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals; and (3) for accepting the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines
College of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of prohibition on reemployment in any
government office as a result of his dismissal as a judge.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP Commissioner's recommendation. The
Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding
Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and complexion"10 and accused complainant of
"cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained that
such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the
administrative case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case. While respondent
is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using improper language in his pleadings.
In Saberon v. Larong,13 we stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive
and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the parties in the barangay, is a pre-
condition for the filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is no such certificate in the complaint filed by
respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in the
complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato Jadulco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x x x was the certification
x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."

Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC on 18 October 2000. The
Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was
issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement
did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation
that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action
was issued prior to the filing of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action when
there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title

With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent title, we find that it
does not constitute dishonesty.

Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of the title exists. There is no
showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The remedy of complainant
should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title so she and
her counsel could examine the same.

Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding an examination of the
parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this administrative case, absent any clear and
convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated such fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do not
prove that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their
official records.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Conflict of interest

Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of donation of a parcel of land
executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to litigate as
counsel for the opposing parties who are occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the notarial acts authorized by
the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy
certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and conspiring with the latter to
render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply narrated the
outcomes of the proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed
by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to present any concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between
respondent and Judge Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed against the
judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the judge.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte and
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of which is the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College of
Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor.

Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to his designation except for
honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of x x
x respect, courtesy and approval from the Supreme Court." He further avers that complainant in the administrative case against him
(as a judge) posed no objection to his petition for clemency.
Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between permanent and temporary
appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of
his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment
in a government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous administrative case did not object to his petition for
clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have declined from accepting the
designation and desisted from performing the functions of such positions.17Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the prohibition
on reemployment in a public office imposed upon him by the Court.

In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice despite the
five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's suspension or even disbarment.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Gross Misconduct

In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to file action issued by the
Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in
Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in his pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on
reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper
or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment." 19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of
law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND him
from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and all courts in the
Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

ROLANDO T. CATUNGAL, JOSE T. CATUNGAL, JR., CAROLYN T. CATUNGAL and ERLINDA CATUNGAL-
WESSEL, Petitioners,
vs.
ANGEL S. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 40627 consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 27565: (a) the August 8, 2000 Decision,1 which affirmed the Decision2 dated May
30, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27 of Lapu-lapu City, Cebu in Civil Case No. 2365-L, and (b) the January 30,
2001 Resolution,3 denying herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the August 8, 2000 Decision.
The relevant factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
This controversy arose from a Complaint for Damages and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order 4filed on
December 10, 1990 by herein respondent Angel S. Rodriguez (Rodriguez), with the RTC, Branch 27, Lapu-lapu City, Cebu,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2365-L against the spouses Agapita and Jose Catungal (the spouses Catungal), the parents of petitioners.
In the said Complaint, it was alleged that Agapita T. Catungal (Agapita) owned a parcel of land (Lot 10963) with an area of 65,246
square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1055 in her name situated in the Barrio of Talamban, Cebu City.
The said property was allegedly the exclusive paraphernal property of Agapita.
On April 23, 1990, Agapita, with the consent of her husband Jose, entered into a Contract to Sell 6 with respondent Rodriguez.
Subsequently, the Contract to Sell was purportedly "upgraded" into a Conditional Deed of Sale 7 dated July 26, 1990 between the
same parties. Both the Contract to Sell and the Conditional Deed of Sale were annotated on the title.
The provisions of the Conditional Deed of Sale pertinent to the present dispute are quoted below:
1. The VENDOR for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY[-]FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱25,000,000.00) payable as follows:
a. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00) downpayment upon the signing of this agreement, receipt of which sum
is hereby acknowledged in full from the VENDEE.
b. The balance of TWENTY[-]FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱24,500,000.00) shall be payable in
five separate checks, made to the order of JOSE Ch. CATUNGAL, the first check shall be for FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱4,500,000.00) and the remaining balance to be paid in four checks in the amounts of FIVE MILLION
PESOS (₱5,000,000.00) each after the VENDEE have (sic) successfully negotiated, secured and provided a Road Right of
Way consisting of 12 meters in width cutting across Lot 10884 up to the national road, either by widening the existing Road Right
of Way or by securing a new Road Right of Way of 12 meters in width. If however said Road Right of Way could not be negotiated,
the VENDEE shall give notice to the VENDOR for them to reassess and solve the problem by taking other options and should the
situation ultimately prove futile, he shall take steps to rescind or cancel the herein Conditional Deed of Sale.
c. That the access road or Road Right of Way leading to Lot 10963 shall be the responsibility of the VENDEE to secure and any
or all cost relative to the acquisition thereof shall be borne solely by the VENDEE. He shall, however, be accorded with enough
time necessary for the success of his endeavor, granting him a free hand in negotiating for the passage.
BY THESE PRESENTS, the VENDOR do hereby agree to sell by way of herein CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE to VENDEE,
his heirs, successors and assigns, the real property described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 105 x x x.
xxxx
5. That the VENDEE has the option to rescind the sale. In the event the VENDEE exercises his option to rescind the herein
Conditional Deed of Sale, the VENDEE shall notify the VENDOR by way of a written notice relinquishing his rights over the
property. The VENDEE shall then be reimbursed by the VENDOR the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱500,000.00) representing the downpayment, interest free, payable but contingent upon the event that the VENDOR shall have
been able to sell the property to another party.8
In accordance with the Conditional Deed of Sale, Rodriguez purportedly secured the necessary surveys and plans and through his
efforts, the property was reclassified from agricultural land into residential land which he claimed substantially increased the
property’s value. He likewise alleged that he actively negotiated for the road right of way as stipulated in the contract. 9
Rodriguez further claimed that on August 31, 1990 the spouses Catungal requested an advance of ₱5,000,000.00 on the purchase
price for personal reasons. Rodriquez allegedly refused on the ground that the amount was substantial and was not due under the
terms of their agreement. Shortly after his refusal to pay the advance, he purportedly learned that the Catungals were offering the
property for sale to third parties.10
Thereafter, Rodriguez received letters dated October 22, 1990,11 October 24, 199012 and October 29, 1990,13 all signed by Jose
Catungal who was a lawyer, essentially demanding that the former make up his mind about buying the land or exercising his
"option" to buy because the spouses Catungal allegedly received other offers and they needed money to pay for personal obligations
and for investing in other properties/business ventures. Should Rodriguez fail to exercise his option to buy the land, the Catungals
warned that they would consider the contract cancelled and that they were free to look for other buyers.
In a letter dated November 4, 1990,14 Rodriguez registered his objections to what he termed the Catungals’ unwarranted demands
in view of the terms of the Conditional Deed of Sale which allowed him sufficient time to negotiate a road right of way
and granted him, the vendee, the exclusive right to rescind the contract. Still, on November 15, 1990, Rodriguez
purportedly received a letter dated November 9, 199015 from Atty. Catungal, stating that the contract had been cancelled and
terminated.
Contending that the Catungals’ unilateral rescission of the Conditional Deed of Sale was unjustified, arbitrary and
unwarranted, Rodriquez prayed in his Complaint, that:
1. Upon the filing of this complaint, a restraining order be issued enjoining defendants [the spouses Catungal], their employees,
agents, representatives or other persons acting in their behalf from offering the property subject of this case for sale to third persons;
from entertaining offers or proposals by third persons to purchase the said property; and, in general, from performing acts in
furtherance or implementation of defendants’ rescission of their Conditional Deed of Sale with plaintiff [Rodriguez].
2. After hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued upon such reasonable bond as may be fixed by the court enjoining
defendants and other persons acting in their behalf from performing any of the acts mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
3. After trial, a Decision be rendered:
a) Making the injunction permanent;
b) Condemning defendants to pay to plaintiff, jointly and solidarily:
Actual damages in the amount of ₱400,000.00 for their unlawful rescission of the Agreement and their performance of acts in
violation or disregard of the said Agreement;
Moral damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00;
Exemplary damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00; Expenses of litigation and attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱100,000.00;
and
Costs of suit.16
On December 12, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and set the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction for hearing on December 21, 1990 with a directive to the spouses Catungal to show cause within five days from notice
why preliminary injunction should not be granted. The trial court likewise ordered that summons be served on them. 17
Thereafter, the spouses Catungal filed their opposition18 to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and later filed a motion
to dismiss19 on the ground of improper venue. According to the Catungals, the subject property was located in Cebu City and thus,
the complaint should have been filed in Cebu City, not Lapu-lapu City. Rodriguez opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground
that his action was a personal action as its subject was breach of a contract, the Conditional Deed of Sale, and not title to, or
possession of real property.20
In an Order dated January 17, 1991,21 the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the complaint involved a personal
action, being merely for damages with a prayer for injunction.
Subsequently, on January 30, 1991, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by
Rodriguez of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to answer for damages that the defendants may sustain by reason of the
injunction.
On February 1, 1991, the spouses Catungal filed their Answer with Counterclaim22 alleging that they had the right to rescind the
contract in view of (1) Rodriguez’s failure to negotiate the road right of way despite the lapse of several months since the
signing of the contract, and (2) his refusal to pay the additional amount of ₱5,000,000.00 asked by the Catungals, which
to them indicated his lack of funds to purchase the property. The Catungals likewise contended that Rodriguez did not have an
exclusive right to rescind the contract and that the contract, being reciprocal, meant both parties had the right to rescind. 23 The
spouses Catungal further claimed that it was Rodriguez who was in breach of their agreement and guilty of bad faith which justified
their rescission of the contract.24 By way of counterclaim, the spouses Catungal prayed for actual and consequential damages in
the form of unearned interests from the balance (of the purchase price in the amount) of ₱24,500,000.00, moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00, attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱200,000.00 and costs of suits and litigation
expenses in the amount of ₱10,000.00.25 The spouses Catungal prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the grant of their
counterclaim.
The Catungals amended their Answer twice,26 retaining their basic allegations but amplifying their charges of contractual breach
and bad faith on the part of Rodriguez and adding the argument that in view of Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the power to rescind
reciprocal obligations is granted by the law itself to both parties and does not need an express stipulation to grant the same to the
injured party. In the Second Amended Answer with Counterclaim, the spouses Catungal added a prayer for the trial court to order
the Register of Deeds to cancel the annotations of the two contracts at the back of their OCT. 27
On October 24, 1991, Rodriguez filed an Amended Complaint,28 adding allegations to the effect that the Catungals were guilty of
several misrepresentations which purportedly induced Rodriguez to buy the property at the price of ₱25,000,000.00. Among others,
it was alleged that the spouses Catungal misrepresented that their Lot 10963 includes a flat portion of land which later turned out
to be a separate lot (Lot 10986) owned by Teodora Tudtud who sold the same to one Antonio Pablo. The Catungals also allegedly
misrepresented that the road right of way will only traverse two lots owned by Anatolia Tudtud and her daughter Sally who were
their relatives and who had already agreed to sell a portion of the said lots for the road right of way at a price of ₱550.00 per square
meter. However, because of the Catungals’ acts of offering the property to other buyers who offered to buy the road lots for
₱2,500.00 per square meter, the adjacent lot owners were no longer willing to sell the road lots to Rodriguez at ₱550.00 per
square meter but were asking for a price of ₱3,500.00 per square meter. In other words, instead of assisting Rodriguez in
his efforts to negotiate the road right of way, the spouses Catungal allegedly intentionally and maliciously defeated
Rodriguez’s negotiations for a road right of way in order to justify rescission of the said contract and enable them to offer
the property to other buyers.
Despite requesting the trial court for an extension of time to file an amended Answer,29 the Catungals did not file an amended
Answer and instead filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss30 again invoking the ground of improper venue. In the meantime, for failure
to file an amended Answer within the period allowed, the trial court set the case for pre-trial on December 20, 1991.
During the pre-trial held on December 20, 1991, the trial court denied in open court the Catungals’ Urgent Motion to Dismiss for
violation of the rules and for being repetitious and having been previously denied. 31 However, Atty. Catungal refused to
enter into pre-trial which prompted the trial court to declare the defendants in default and to set the presentation of the plaintiff’s
evidence on February 14, 1992.32
On December 23, 1991, the Catungals filed a motion for reconsideration 33 of the December 20, 1991 Order denying their Urgent
Motion to Dismiss but the trial court denied reconsideration in an Order dated February 3, 1992. 34Undeterred, the Catungals
subsequently filed a Motion to Lift and to Set Aside Order of Default35 but it was likewise denied for being in violation of the rules
and for being not meritorious.36 On February 28, 1992, the Catungals filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition37 with the Court
of Appeals, questioning the denial of their motion to dismiss and the order of default. This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27565.
Meanwhile, Rodriguez proceeded to present his evidence before the trial court.
In a Decision dated May 30, 1992, the trial court ruled in favor of Rodriguez, finding that: (a) under the contract it was complainant
(Rodriguez) that had the option to rescind the sale; (b) Rodriguez’s obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price arises only
upon successful negotiation of the road right of way; (c) he proved his diligent efforts to negotiate the road right of way; (d) the
spouses Catungal were guilty of misrepresentation which defeated Rodriguez’s efforts to acquire the road right of way; and (e)
the Catungals’ rescission of the contract had no basis and was in bad faith. Thus, the trial court made the injunction
permanent, ordered the Catungals to reduce the purchase price by the amount of acquisition of Lot 10963 which they
misrepresented was part of the property sold but was in fact owned by a third party and ordered them to pay ₱100,000.00 as
damages, ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs.
The Catungals appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, asserting the commission of the following errors by the trial court in
their appellants’ brief38 dated February 9, 1994:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING OF (SIC) THE CASE ON THE GROUNDS OF IMPROPER VENUE
AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE CASE AS A PERSONAL AND NOT A REAL ACTION.
III
GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT VENUE WAS PROPERLY LAID AND THE CASE IS A PERSONAL ACTION,
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THE DEFENDANTS IN DEFAULT DURING THE PRE-TRIAL WHEN AT
THAT TIME THE DEFENDANTS HAD ALREADY FILED THEIR ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE DEFENDANTS AS HAVING LOST THEIR LEGAL STANDING IN
COURT WHEN AT MOST THEY COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS IN DEFAULT AND STILL ENTITLED TO
NOTICES OF ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ESPECIALLY AFTER THEY HAD FILED THE MOTION TO LIFT THE
ORDER OF DEFAULT.
V
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ISSUING THE WRIT [OF] PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION RESTRAINING THE EXERCISE
OF ACTS OF OWNERSHIP AND OTHER RIGHTS OVER REAL PROPERTY OUTSIDE OF THE COURT’S TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION AND INCLUDING PERSONS WHO WERE NOT BROUGHT UNDER ITS JURISDICTION, THUS THE
NULLITY OF THE WRIT.
VI
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT RESTRAINING ITSELF MOTU PROP[R]IO FROM CONTINUING WITH THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE AND IN RENDERING DECISION THEREIN IF ONLY FOR REASON OF COURTESY AND
FAIRNESS BEING MANDATED AS DISPENSER OF FAIR AND EQUAL JUSTICE TO ALL AND SUNDRY WITHOUT
FEAR OR FAVOR IT HAVING BEEN SERVED EARLIER WITH A COPY OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
QUESTIONING ITS VENUE AND JURISDICTION IN CA-G.R. NO. SP 27565 IN FACT NOTICES FOR THE FILING OF
COMMENT THERETO HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT OUT BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND
DIVISION, AND THE COURT A QUO WAS FURNISHED WITH COPY OF SAID NOTICE.
VII
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE WHICH ARE IMAGINARY, FABRICATED, AND DEVOID OF TRUTH,
TO BE STATED IN DETAIL IN THE DISCUSSION OF THIS PARTICULAR ERROR, AND, THEREFORE, THE DECISION
IS REVERSIBLE.39
On August 31, 1995, after being granted several extensions, Rodriguez filed his appellee’s brief,40 essentially arguing the
correctness of the trial court’s Decision regarding the foregoing issues raised by the Catungals. Subsequently, the Catungals filed
a Reply Brief41 dated October 16, 1995.
From the filing of the appellants’ brief in 1994 up to the filing of the Reply Brief, the spouses Catungal were represented by
appellant Jose Catungal himself. However, a new counsel for the Catungals, Atty. Jesus N. Borromeo (Atty. Borromeo), entered
his appearance before the Court of Appeals on September 2, 1997.42 On the same date, Atty. Borromeo filed a Motion for Leave
of Court to File Citation of Authorities43 and a Citation of Authorities.44 This would be followed by Atty. Borromeo’s filing of an
Additional Citation of Authority and Second Additional Citation of Authority both on November 17, 1997. 45
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Agapita Catungal passed away and thus, her husband, Jose, filed on
February 17, 1999 a motion for Agapita’s substitution by her surviving children.46
On August 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. CV No. 40627 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 27565,47 affirming the trial court’s Decision.
In a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 21, 2000,48 counsel for the Catungals, Atty. Borromeo, argued for the first time that
paragraphs 1(b) and 549 of the Conditional Deed of Sale, whether taken separately or jointly, violated the principle of mutuality of
contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil Code and thus, said contract was void ab initio. He adverted to the cases mentioned in his
various citations of authorities to support his argument of nullity of the contract and his position that this issue may be raised for
the first time on appeal.
Meanwhile, a Second Motion for Substitution50 was filed by Atty. Borromeo in view of the death of Jose Catungal.
In a Resolution dated January 30, 2001, the Court of Appeals allowed the substitution of the deceased Agapita and Jose Catungal
by their surviving heirs and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit
Hence, the heirs of Agapita and Jose Catungal filed on March 27, 2001 the present petition for review, 51 which essentially argued
that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that paragraphs 1(b) and/or 5 of the Conditional Deed of Sale, violated the principle
of mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil Code. Thus, said contract was supposedly void ab initio and the Catungals’
rescission thereof was superfluous.
In his Comment,52 Rodriguez highlighted that (a) petitioners were raising new matters that cannot be passed upon on appeal; (b)
the validity of the Conditional Deed of Sale was already admitted and petitioners cannot be allowed to change theories on appeal;
(c) the questioned paragraphs of the Conditional Deed of Sale were valid; and (d) petitioners were the ones who committed fraud
and breach of contract and were not entitled to relief for not having come to court with clean hands.
The Court gave due course to the Petition53 and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.
The issues to be resolved in the case at bar can be summed into two questions:
I. Are petitioners allowed to raise their theory of nullity of the Conditional Deed of Sale for the first time on appeal?
II. Do paragraphs 1(b) and 5 of the Conditional Deed of Sale violate the principle of mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of
the Civil Code?
On petitioners’ change of theory
Petitioners claimed that the Court of Appeals should have reversed the trial courts’ Decision on the ground of the alleged nullity
of paragraphs 1(b) and 5 of the Conditional Deed of Sale notwithstanding that the same was not raised as an error in their
appellants’ brief. Citing Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals,54 petitioners argued in the Petition that this case falls
under the following exceptions:
(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing
on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
(6) Matters not assigned as errors but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent. 55
We are not persuaded.
This is not an instance where a party merely failed to assign an issue as an error in the brief nor failed to argue a material point on
appeal that was raised in the trial court and supported by the record. Neither is this a case where a party raised an error closely
related to, nor dependent on the resolution of, an error properly assigned in his brief. This is a situation where a party completely
changes his theory of the case on appeal and abandons his previous assignment of errors in his brief, which plainly should not be
allowed as anathema to due process.
Petitioners should be reminded that the object of pleadings is to draw the lines of battle between the litigants and to indicate fairly
the nature of the claims or defenses of both parties.56 In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 57 we
held that "[w]hen a party adopts a certain theory in the trial court, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to
permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process."58
We have also previously ruled that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue. Thus, a
judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only
irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play." 59
During the proceedings before the trial court, the spouses Catungal never claimed that the provisions in the Conditional Deed of
Sale, stipulating that the payment of the balance of the purchase price was contingent upon the successful negotiation of a road
right of way (paragraph 1[b]) and granting Rodriguez the option to rescind (paragraph 5), were void for allegedly making the
fulfillment of the contract dependent solely on the will of Rodriguez.
On the contrary, with respect to paragraph 1(b), the Catungals did not aver in the Answer (and its amended versions) that the
payment of the purchase price was subject to the will of Rodriguez but rather they claimed that paragraph 1(b) in relation to 1(c)
only presupposed a reasonable time be given to Rodriguez to negotiate the road right of way. However, it was petitioners’ theory
that more than sufficient time had already been given Rodriguez to negotiate the road right of way. Consequently, Rodriguez’s
refusal/failure to pay the balance of the purchase price, upon demand, was allegedly indicative of lack of funds and a
breach of the contract on the part of Rodriguez.
Anent paragraph 5 of the Conditional Deed of Sale, regarding Rodriguez’s option to rescind, it was petitioners’ theory in the
court a quo that notwithstanding such provision, they retained the right to rescind the contract for Rodriguez’s breach
of the same under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
Verily, the first time petitioners raised their theory of the nullity of the Conditional Deed of Sale in view of the questioned provisions
was only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision, affirming the trial court’s judgment. The previous
filing of various citations of authorities by Atty. Borromeo and the Court of Appeals’ resolutions noting such citations
were of no moment. The citations of authorities merely listed cases and their main rulings without even any mention of
their relevance to the present case or any prayer for the Court of Appeals to consider them.1âwphi1 In sum, the Court of Appeals
did not err in disregarding the citations of authorities or in denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the assailed
August 8, 2000 Decision in view of the proscription against changing legal theories on appeal.
Ruling on the questioned provisions of the Conditional Deed of Sale
Even assuming for the sake of argument that this Court may overlook the procedural misstep of petitioners, we still cannot uphold
their belatedly proffered arguments.
At the outset, it should be noted that what the parties entered into is a Conditional Deed of Sale, whereby the spouses Catungal
agreed to sell and Rodriguez agreed to buy Lot 10963 conditioned on the payment of a certain price but the payment of the purchase
price was additionally made contingent on the successful negotiation of a road right of way. It is elementary that "[i]n conditional
obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the
happening of the event which constitutes the condition."60
Petitioners rely on Article 1308 of the Civil Code to support their conclusion regarding the claimed nullity of the aforementioned
provisions. Article 1308 states that "[t]he contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to
the will of one of them."
Article 1182 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Art. 1182. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void.
If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall take effect in conformity with the provisions of
this Code.
In the past, this Court has distinguished between a condition imposed on the perfection of a contract and a condition imposed
merely on the performance of an obligation. While failure to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a contract,
failure to comply with the second merely gives the other party the option to either refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the
condition.61 This principle is evident in Article 1545 of the Civil Code on sales, which provides in part:
Art. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party
may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition x x x.
Paragraph 1(b) of the Conditional Deed of Sale, stating that respondent shall pay the balance of the purchase price when he has
successfully negotiated and secured a road right of way, is not a condition on the perfection of the contract nor on the validity of
the entire contract or its compliance as contemplated in Article 1308. It is a condition imposed only on respondent’s obligation to
pay the remainder of the purchase price. In our view and applying Article 1182, such a condition is not purely potestative
as petitioners contend. It is not dependent on the sole will of the debtor but also on the will of third persons who own the
adjacent land and from whom the road right of way shall be negotiated. In a manner of speaking, such a condition is likewise
dependent on chance as there is no guarantee that respondent and the third party-landowners would come to an agreement regarding
the road right of way. This type of mixed condition is expressly allowed under Article 1182 of the Civil Code.
Analogous to the present case is Romero v. Court of Appeals,62 wherein the Court interpreted the legal effect of a condition in a
deed of sale that the balance of the purchase price would be paid by the vendee when the vendor has successfully ejected the
informal settlers occupying the property. In Romero, we found that such a condition did not affect the perfection of the contract
but only imposed a condition on the fulfillment of the obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price, to wit:
From the moment the contract is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated
but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Under the
agreement, private respondent is obligated to evict the squatters on the property. The ejectment of the squatters is a condition the
operative act of which sets into motion the period of compliance by petitioner of his own obligation, i.e., to pay the balance of the
purchase price. Private respondent's failure "to remove the squatters from the property" within the stipulated period gives petitioner
the right to either refuse to proceed with the agreement or waive that condition in consonance with Article 1545 of the Civil Code.
This option clearly belongs to petitioner and not to private respondent.
We share the opinion of the appellate court that the undertaking required of private respondent does not constitute a "potestative
condition dependent solely on his will" that might, otherwise, be void in accordance with Article 1182 of the Civil Code but a
"mixed" condition "dependent not on the will of the vendor alone but also of third persons like the squatters and government
agencies and personnel concerned." We must hasten to add, however, that where the so-called "potestative condition" is imposed
not on the birth of the obligation but on its fulfillment, only the condition is avoided, leaving unaffected the obligation
itself.63 (Emphases supplied.)
From the provisions of the Conditional Deed of Sale subject matter of this case, it was the vendee (Rodriguez) that had the obligation
to successfully negotiate and secure the road right of way. However, in the decision of the trial court, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, it was found that respondent Rodriguez diligently exerted efforts to secure the road right of way but the spouses
Catungal, in bad faith, contributed to the collapse of the negotiations for said road right of way. To quote from the trial court’s
decision:
It is therefore apparent that the vendee’s obligations (sic) to pay the balance of the purchase price arises only when the
road-right-of-way to the property shall have been successfully negotiated, secured and provided. In other words, the obligation to
pay the balance is conditioned upon the acquisition of the road-right-of-way, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 1181 of the
New Civil Code. Accordingly, "an obligation dependent upon a suspensive condition cannot be demanded until after the condition
takes place because it is only after the fulfillment of the condition that the obligation arises." (Javier v[s] CA 183 SCRA) Exhibits
H, D, P, R, T, FF and JJ show that plaintiff [Rodriguez] indeed was diligent in his efforts to negotiate for a road-right-of-way to
the property. The written offers, proposals and follow-up of his proposals show that plaintiff [Rodriguez] went all out in his efforts
to immediately acquire an access road to the property, even going to the extent of offering ₱3,000.00 per square meter for the road
lots (Exh. Q) from the original ₱550.00 per sq. meter. This Court also notes that defendant (sic) [the Catungals] made
misrepresentation in the negotiation they have entered into with plaintiff [Rodriguez]. (Exhs. F and G) The misrepresentation of
defendant (sic) [the Catungals] as to the third lot (Lot 10986) to be part and parcel of the subject property [(]Lot 10963) contributed
in defeating the plaintiff’s [Rodriguez’s] effort in acquiring the road-right-of-way to the property. Defendants [the
Catungals] cannot now invoke the non-fulfillment of the condition in the contract as a ground for rescission when
defendants [the Catungals] themselves are guilty of preventing the fulfillment of such condition.
From the foregoing, this Court is of the considered view that rescission of the conditional deed of sale by the defendants is without
any legal or factual basis.64 x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
In all, we see no cogent reason to disturb the foregoing factual findings of the trial court.
Furthermore, it is evident from the language of paragraph 1(b) that the condition precedent (for respondent’s obligation to pay
the balance of the purchase price to arise) in itself partly involves an obligation to do, i.e., the undertaking of respondent
to negotiate and secure a road right of way at his own expense.65 It does not escape our notice as well, that far from disclaiming
paragraph 1(b) as void, it was the Catungals’ contention before the trial court that said provision should be read in relation to
paragraph 1(c) which stated:
c. That the access road or Road Right of Way leading to Lot 10963 shall be the responsibility of the VENDEE to secure and any
or all cost relative to the acquisition thereof shall be borne solely by the VENDEE. He shall, however, be accorded with enough
time necessary for the success of his endeavor, granting him a free hand in negotiating for the passage.66 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Catungals’ interpretation of the foregoing stipulation was that Rodriguez’s obligation to negotiate and secure a road
right of way was one with a period and that period, i.e., "enough time" to negotiate, had already lapsed by the time they
demanded the payment of ₱5,000,000.00 from respondent. Even assuming arguendo that the Catungals were correct that the
respondent’s obligation to negotiate a road right of way was one with an uncertain period, their rescission of the Conditional
Deed of Sale would still be unwarranted. Based on their own theory, the Catungals had a remedy under Article 1197 of the Civil
Code, which mandates:
Art. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was
intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.
In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the
parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.
What the Catungals should have done was to first file an action in court to fix the period within which Rodriguez should accomplish
the successful negotiation of the road right of way pursuant to the above quoted provision. Thus, the Catungals’ demand for
Rodriguez to make an additional payment of ₱5,000,000.00 was premature and Rodriguez’s failure to accede to such
demand did not justify the rescission of the contract.
With respect to petitioners’ argument that paragraph 5 of the Conditional Deed of Sale likewise rendered the said contract
void, we find no merit to this theory. Paragraph 5 provides:
5. That the VENDEE has the option to rescind the sale. In the event the VENDEE exercises his option to rescind the herein
Conditional Deed of Sale, the VENDEE shall notify the VENDOR by way of a written notice relinquishing his rights over the
property. The VENDEE shall then be reimbursed by the VENDOR the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱500,000.00) representing the downpayment, interest free, payable but contingent upon the event that the VENDOR shall have
been able to sell the property to another party.67
Petitioners posited that the above stipulation was the "deadliest" provision in the Conditional Deed of Sale for violating the principle
of mutuality of contracts since it purportedly rendered the contract subject to the will of respondent.
We do not agree.
It is petitioners’ strategy to insist that the Court examine the first sentence of paragraph 5 alone and resist a correlation
of such sentence with other provisions of the contract. Petitioners’ view, however, ignores a basic rule in the interpretation
of contracts – that the contract should be taken as a whole.
Article 1374 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly." The same Code further sets down the rule that "[i]f some
stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate
to render it effectual."68
Similarly, under the Rules of Court it is prescribed that "[i]n the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions
or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all" 69 and "for the proper construction of an
instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may
be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret." 70
Bearing in mind the aforementioned interpretative rules, we find that the first sentence of paragraph 5 must be taken in relation
with the rest of paragraph 5 and with the other provisions of the Conditional Deed of Sale.
Reading paragraph 5 in its entirety will show that Rodriguez’s option to rescind the contract is not absolute as it is subject
to the requirement that there should be written notice to the vendor and the vendor shall only return Rodriguez’s
downpayment of ₱500,000.00, without interest, when the vendor shall have been able to sell the property to another
party. That what is stipulated to be returned is only the downpayment of ₱500,000.00 in the event that Rodriguez exercises
his option to rescind is significant. To recall, paragraph 1(b) of the contract clearly states that the installments on the balance of the
purchase price shall only be paid upon successful negotiation and procurement of a road right of way. It is clear from such provision
that the existence of a road right of way is a material consideration for Rodriguez to purchase the property. Thus, prior to him being
able to procure the road right of way, by express stipulation in the contract, he is not bound to make additional payments to the
Catungals. It was further stipulated in paragraph 1(b) that: "[i]f however said road right of way cannot be negotiated, the VENDEE
shall give notice to the VENDOR for them to reassess and solve the problem by taking other options and should the situation
ultimately prove futile, he [Rodriguez] shall take steps to rescind or [cancel] the herein Conditional Deed of Sale." The intention
of the parties for providing subsequently in paragraph 5 that Rodriguez has the option to rescind the sale is undeniably only limited
to the contingency that Rodriguez shall not be able to secure the road right of way. Indeed, if the parties intended to give Rodriguez
the absolute option to rescind the sale at any time, the contract would have provided for the return of all payments made by
Rodriguez and not only the downpayment. To our mind, the reason only the downpayment was stipulated to be returned is that the
vendee’s option to rescind can only be exercised in the event that no road right of way is secured and, thus, the vendee has
not made any additional payments, other than his downpayment.
In sum, Rodriguez’s option to rescind the contract is not purely potestative but rather also subject to the same mixed
condition as his obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price – i.e., the negotiation of a road right of way. In the event
the condition is fulfilled (or the negotiation is successful), Rodriguez must pay the balance of the purchase price. In the
event the condition is not fulfilled (or the negotiation fails), Rodriguez has the choice either (a) to not proceed with the sale and
demand return of his downpayment or (b) considering that the condition was imposed for his benefit, to waive the condition and
still pay the purchase price despite the lack of road access. This is the most just interpretation of the parties’ contract that gives
effect to all its provisions.
In any event, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the grant to Rodriguez of an option to rescind, in the manner provided
for in the contract, is tantamount to a potestative condition, not being a condition affecting the perfection of the contract, only the
said condition would be considered void and the rest of the contract will remain valid. In Romero, the Court observed that "where
the so-called ‘potestative condition’ is imposed not on the birth of the obligation but on its fulfillment, only the condition
is avoided, leaving unaffected the obligation itself." 71
It cannot be gainsaid that "contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith."72 We have also previously ruled that "[b]eing the primary law between the parties, the contract governs the adjudication of
their rights and obligations. A court has no alternative but to enforce the contractual stipulations in the manner they have been
agreed upon and written."73 We find no merit in petitioners’ contention that their parents were merely "duped" into accepting
the questioned provisions in the Conditional Deed of Sale. We note that although the contract was between Agapita Catungal and
Rodriguez, Jose Catungal nonetheless signed thereon to signify his marital consent to the same. We concur with the trial court’s
finding that the spouses Catungals’ claim of being misled into signing the contract was contrary to human experience
and conventional wisdom since it was Jose Catungal who was a practicing lawyer while Rodriquez was a non-
lawyer.74 It can be reasonably presumed that Atty. Catungal and his wife reviewed the provisions of the contract, understood and
accepted its provisions before they affixed their signatures thereon.
After thorough review of the records of this case, we have come to the conclusion that petitioners failed to demonstrate that the
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in deciding the present controversy. However, having made the observation that
it was desirable for the Catungals to file a separate action to fix the period for respondent Rodriguez’s obligation to negotiate a
road right of way, the Court finds it necessary to fix said period in these proceedings. It is but equitable for us to make a
determination of the issue here to obviate further delay and in line with the judicial policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits.
If still warranted, Rodriguez is given a period of thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision to negotiate a road right of way.
In the event no road right of way is secured by Rodriquez at the end of said period, the parties shall reassess and discuss other
options as stipulated in paragraph 1(b) of the Conditional Deed of Sale and, for this purpose, they are given a period of thirty (30)
days to agree on a course of action. Should the discussions of the parties prove futile after the said thirty (30)-day period,
immediately upon the expiration of said period for discussion, Rodriguez may (a) exercise his option to rescind the contract, subject
to the return of his downpayment, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1(b) and 5 of the Conditional Deed of Sale or
(b) waive the road right of way and pay the balance of the deducted purchase price as determined in the RTC Decision dated May
30, 1992.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 8, 2000 and the Resolution dated January 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 40627 consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 27565 are AFFIRMED with the following modification:
If still warranted, respondent Angel S. Rodriguez is given a period of thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision to negotiate
a road right of way. In the event no road right of way is secured by respondent at the end of said period, the parties shall reassess
and discuss other options as stipulated in paragraph 1(b) of the Conditional Deed of Sale and, for this purpose, they are given a
period of thirty (30) days to agree on a course of action. Should the discussions of the parties prove futile after the said thirty (30)-
day period, immediately upon the expiration of said period for discussion, Rodriguez may (a) exercise his option to rescind the
contract, subject to the return of his downpayment, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1(b) and 5 of the Conditional
Deed of Sale or (b) waive the road right of way and pay the balance of the deducted purchase price as determined in the RTC
Decision dated May 30, 1992.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR WILSON

UY, Complainant, v. ATTY. PACIFICO M. MAGHARI III, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Complaint1 for disbarment directly filed before this court by complainant Wilson Uy, the designated administrator
of the estate of Jose Uy. This Complaint charges respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III (Maghari) with engaging in deceitful
conduct and violating the Lawyer's Oath. Specifically, Maghari is charged with the use of information that is false and/or
appropriated from other lawyers in signing certain pleadings.2

On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a Petition before the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court praying that
she be designated administratrix of the estate of her common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. This was docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. 97-241.3

Hofileña was initially designated administratrix.4 However, a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order designating Hofileña
as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy's children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other children. 5 In its
Order6 dated June 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy's estate.

Subsequently, Hofileña's claims in the settlement of Jose Uy's estate were granted.7 Hence, she filed a Motion for
Execution8 dated September 14, 2007.

In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofileña was
represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El (Atty. Natu-el). In a pleading filed in the course of these proceedings (i.e.,
in the Comment dated May 27, 2009 filed before the Court of Appeals9), Atty. Natu-El indicated the following details:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597010 (Emphasis supplied)

There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy and the other heirs of Jose Uy.11 In the course of the proceedings, Wilson
Uy prayed that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was alleged to have been the treasurer of several
businesses owned by Jose Uy.12 In its Order13dated April 20, 2010, the Regional Trial Court granted Wilson Uy's Motion that a
Subpoena ad Testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy.

Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative
Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy.14 In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLECompl. 0015970 1/14/0915 (Emphasis supplied)

On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash. 16

Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply17 to Wilson Uy's Opposition. This Reply was dated December 8, 2010. In signing
this Reply, Maghari indicated the following details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 0015970 1/14/0918 (Emphasis supplied)

The Regional Trial Court subsequently denied Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash. 19 Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a
Motion for Reconsideration20 dated July 15, 2011. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. IH-0000762 1/14/0921(Emphasis supplied)

As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied,22 Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad
Testificandum23 dated March 8, 2012. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B.C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/0924 (Emphasis supplied)

At this point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari appeared to
have only recently passed the bar examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy to check the records of Spec. Proc No. 97-241. Upon
doing so, he learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the professional details indicated in the pleadings he has signed
and has been copying the professional details of Atty. Natu-El.25cralawred

Wilson Uy then filed a Motion26 to declare Magdalena Uy in indirect contempt (as by then she had still not complied with the
Subpoena ad Testificandum) and to require Maghari to explain why he had been usurping the professional details of another lawyer.

In its Order27 dated February 16, 2012, the Regional Trial Court declined from citing Magdalena Uy in contempt as no verified
petition asking that she be so cited had been filed.28

On July 31, 2014, Wilson Uy filed before this court the present Complaint for disbarment. 29 Pointing to Maghari's act of repeatedly
a changing and using another lawyer's professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer's Oath and acted
in a deceitful manner.

In the Resolution30 dated November 12, 2014, this court directed Maghari to file his Comment on Wilson Uy's Complaint.

This court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, received Maghari's Comment 31 on March 2, 2015.

For resolution are the issues of whether respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III engaged in unethical conduct and of what proper
penalty may be meted on him.
I

Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant entries indicated by complainant. However, he insists that he did not incur
disciplinary liability. He claims that these entries were mere overlooked errors:
For true indeed that after the draft of a particular motion or pleading had been printed and ready for signature, all what [sic] he did
after cursorily going over it was to affix his signature thereon, specifically, atop his printed name, without giving any special or
particular attention to details as the "IBP, PTR, and MCLE Numbers", considering that these are matters of record and are easily
verifiable, thus he gains nothing by "the usurpation of professional details of another lawyer" and has no sinister motive or ill-
purpose in so doing[.]32

He attempts to diminish the significance of the dubious entries and instead ascribes ill motive to complainant. He faults complainant
for "nitpicking"33 and calls him a "sore loser"34 and a "disgruntled litigant"35 who is merely "making a mountain out of a
molehill"36 and is predisposed to "fault-finding."

He adds that "for the satisfaction of complainant,"37 he has provided what are supposedly his correct professional details:
2009

IBP OR No. 765868 - Dec. 22, 2008 - Bacolod City

PTR No. 3408746 - Jan. 5, 2009 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762-Jan. 14, 2009

2010

IBP OR No. 766304 - Dec. 9, 2009 - Bacolod City

PTR No. 3793872 - Jan. 4, 2010 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009

2011

IBP OR No. 815530 -Jan. 4, 2011 -Bacolod City

PTRNo. 4190929 - Jan. 4, 2011 - Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009

2012

IBP OR No. 848630-Dec. 27, 2011 - Bacolod City

PTR No. 4631737 - Jan. 2, 2012 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 200938ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

II

Respondent's avowals, protestations, and ad hominem attacks on complainant fail to impress.

The duplicitous entries speak for themselves. The errors are manifest and respondent admits their existence. This court would
perhaps be well counseled to absolve respondent of liability or let him get away with a proverbial slap on the wrist if all that was
involved were a typographical error, or otherwise, an error or a handful of errors made in an isolated instance or a few isolated
instances. So too, if the error pertained to only ' one of the several pieces of information that lawyers are required to indicate when
signing pleadings.

None of these can be said of this case. Respondent did not merely commit errors in good faith. The truth is far from it. First,
respondent violated clear legal requirements, and indicated patently false information. Second, the way he did so demonstrates that
he did so knowingly. Third, he did so repeatedly. Before our eyes is a pattern of deceit. Fourth, the information he used was shown
to have been appropriated from another lawyer. Not only was he deceitful; he was also larcenous. Fifth, his act not only of usurping
another lawyer's details but also of his repeatedly changing information from one pleading to another demonstrates the intent to
mock and ridicule courts and legal processes. Respondent toyed with the standards of legal practice.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for deceit as a ground for disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath entails commitment
to, among others, obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, conducting one's self as a lawyer to the best of one's capacity,
and acting with fidelity to both court and client:
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same;
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion,
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

No amount of feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks on complainant can negate the gravity of respondent's actions. His insolent
and mocking violation of statutory and regulatory requirements is a violation of his duties to society and to courts. His swiping of
another lawyer's information is a violation of his duties to the legal profession. The unnecessary risks that he foiled on his client as
a possible result of deficiently signed pleadings violate his duties to his client. Thus, respondent did not only act in a deceitful
manner and violate the solemn oath he took to be admitted into the legal profession; he also violated every single chapter of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

It is as clear as the entries themselves that respondent acted in a manner that is woefully unworthy of an officer of the court. He
was not even a good citizen. As respondent has fallen short of the ethical standards apropos to members of the legal profession, we
find it proper to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years.
III

The requirement of a counsel's signature in pleadings, the significance of this requirement, and the consequences of non-compliance
are spelled out in Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in
either case his address which should not be a post office box.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if
it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to
the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)

A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere means for identification. Through his or her
signature, a party's counsel makes a positive declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he or she has read the
pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence, credibility,
and ethics. Signing a pleading is such a solemn component of legal practice that this court has taken occasion to decry the delegation
of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is
counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the
members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one
who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something the law strongly
proscribes.39 (Citations omitted)

A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply with this requirement reduces a pleading to a mere
scrap of paper totally bereft of legal effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of satisfying a duty
to a court but is as much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A deficiency in this respect can be fatal to a client's cause.

Apart from the signature itself, additional information is required to be indicated as part of a counsel's signature:
(1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel's address must be stated;
(2) In Bar Matter No. 1132,40 this court required all lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys number;
(3) In Bar Matter No. 287,41 this court required the inclusion of the "number and date of their official receipt indicating payment
of their annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year"; in lieu of this, a lawyer may
indicate his or her lifetime membership number;
(4) In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government Code,42 a lawyer must indicate his professional tax receipt number;
(5) Bar Matter No. 192243 required the inclusion of a counsel's Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; and
(6) This court's Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC44 required the inclusion of a counsel's contact details.

As with the signature itself, these requirements are not vain formalities.

The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number, professional tax receipt number, and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
receipt (or lifetime membership) number is intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice. They seek to ensure that
only those who have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to engage in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties
can readily verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer has, in fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar. 45 With the professional tax
receipt number, they can verify if the same person is qualified to engage in a profession in the place where he or she principally
discharges his or her functions. With the IBP receipt number, they can ascertain if the same person remains in good standing as a
lawyer. These pieces of information, in the words of Galicto v. Aquino III, "protect the public from bogus lawyers."46 Paying
professional taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is likewise compliance with a revenue mechanism that has been
statutorily devolved to local government units.

The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for "keep[ing]
abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the profession[,] and enhancing] the standards of the practice of
law."47

Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details is designed to facilitate the dispensation of justice. These pieces of
information aid in the service of court processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due process, and facilitate better
representation of a client's cause. In Juane v. Garcia,48this court took occasion to expound on the significance of putting on record
a counsel's address:

The time has come, we believe, for this Court to remind the members of the Bar that it is their inescapable duty to make of record
their correct address in all cases in which they are counsel for a suitor. For, instances there have been in the past when, because of
failure to inform the court of the change of address, litigations were delayed. And this, not to speak of inconvenience caused the
other parties and the court. Worse still, litigants have lost their cases in court because of such negligence on the part of their counsel.
It is painful enough for a litigant to surfer a setback in a legal battle. It is doubly painful if defeat is occasioned by his attorney's
failure to receive notice because the latter has changed the place of his law office without giving the proper notice therefor. It is
only when some such situation comes about that the negligent lawyer comes to realize the grave responsibility that he has incurred
both to his client and to the cause of justice. It is then that the lawyer is reminded that in his oath of office he solemnly declared
that he "will conduct" himself "as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion." Too late. Experience indeed is
a good teacher. To a lawyer, though, it could prove very expensive. 49

These requirements are not mere frivolities. They are not mere markings on a piece of paper. To willfully disregard them is, thus,
to willfully disregard mechanisms put in place to facilitate integrity, competence, and credibility in legal practice; it is to betray
apathy for the ideals of the legal profession and demonstrates how one is wanting of the standards for admission to and continuing
inclusion in the bar. Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but to feign compliance only, in truth, to make a mockery of them
reveals a dire, wretched, and utter lack of respect for the profession that one brandishes.
IV

We underscore several facts. These demonstrate that respondent acted in manifest bad faith, thereby exhibiting a pattern of
insubordination, dishonesty, deceit, and intent to make a mockery of courts and legal processes.

In signing the Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Altenative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy,
respondent appropriated four of the five details (i.e., IBP official receipt number, professional tax receipt number, Roll of Attorneys
number, and MCLE compliance number) that Atty. Natu-el indicated in the Comment dated May 27, 2009, which the latter signed
and filed before the Court of Appeals. Atty. Natu-el's details are reproduced as follows:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597050 [Emphasis supplied]ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The details that respondent indicated are reproduced as follows:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBPO.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0951 (Emphasis supplied)

In signing the Reply dated December 8, 2010, respondent used what was supposedly his correct IBP official receipt number and
professional tax receipt number:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0952 (Emphasis supplied)

The same pleading, however, still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, which respondent
previously appropriated for himself.

In signing the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 15, 2011, respondent used what was supposedly his correct IBP official receipt
number and professional tax receipt number. However, he still used Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/09 53(Emphasis supplied)

It was only in signing the Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum54 dated March 8, 2012, that all the professional details that
respondent indicated are supposedly his own:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B. C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. 111-0000762 1/14/09 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the erroneous details he indicated on his pleadings are products of mere
inadvertence.

To begin with, details were copied from a pleading submitted by another lawyer. These details somehow found their way into
respondent's own pleadings. Certainly, these details could not have written themselves, let alone transfer themselves from a pleading
prepared by one lawyer to those prepared by another. Someone must have actually performed the act of copying and transferring;
that is, someone must have intended to copy and transfer them. Moreover, the person responsible for this could have only been
respondent or someone acting under his instructions; the pleadings on which they were transferred are, after all, respondent's
pleadings.

Second, these details were not merely copied, they were modified. "B.C." was added to the IBP official receipt and professional
tax receipt numbers copied from Atty. Natu-el. The facts of modification and addition show active human intervention to make
something more out of markings that could otherwise have simply been reproduced.

Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from Atty. Natu-el were discarded while some were retained. The December
8, 2010 Reply still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, but no longer his IBP official
receipt number and professional tax receipt number. The July 15, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration only bore Atty. Natu-el's MCLE
compliance number. This gradual act of segregating information—discarding some while retaining others, and retaining less
over time—reveals that the author of these markings must have engaged in a willful exercise that filtered those that
were to be discarded from those that were to be retained.

Respondent is rightly considered the author of these acts. Any claim that the error was committed by a secretary is inconsequential.
As this court has stated in Gutierrez v. Zulueta:55
The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect that the failure is attributable to the negligence of his secretary is
devoid of merit. A responsible lawyer is expected to supervise the work in his office with respect to all the pleadings to be filed in
court and he should not delegate this responsibility, lock, stock and barrel, to his office secretary. If it were otherwise, irresponsible
members of the legal profession can avoid appropriate disciplinary action by simply disavowing liability and attributing the problem
to the fault or negligence of the office secretary. Such situation will not be countenanced by this Court. 56

In the first place, it is doubtful that respondent has complied with the requirements of paying his dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, paying his annual professional tax, and completing the necessary units for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education in
the periods concerned. To put it plainly, there would be no need for him to use incorrect information if he had complied with all
pertinent regulations.

In his Comment, respondent provided what are supposedly his correct professional details. We emphasize, however, that he failed
to attach to his Comment copies of the pertinent official receipts, certifications, and other supporting documents. All that he relies
on is a self-serving recital of numbers and dates. None but respondent, himself, was in a better position to produce the documents
that could prove his claims. His failure to do so is, at the very least, suspicious. It can very well mean that they do not exist, or that
he willfully desisted from producing them. The latter would be more damaging to respondent, as it calls into operation the basic
presumption "[t]hat evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced." 57

Even assuming that the details provided by respondent in his Comment are correct, it still remains that he (1) used a false IBP
official receipt number, professional tax receipt number, Roll of Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance number a total of seven
(7) times; and (2) used another lawyer's details seven (7) times.

In failing to accurately state his professional details, respondent already committed punishable violations. An isolated inaccuracy,
regardless of the concerned lawyer's lack of bad faith, already merits a penalty of relative severity. In Bumactao v.
Fano,58 respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano was suspended from the practice of law for the singular violation of indicating wrong
MCLE compliance details:
Here, it is established that respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano falsely indicated "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308". . . . . The
admitted falsity notwithstanding, respondent endeavors to douse his culpability by shifting the blame to the MCLE providers -
PLM and IBP Quezon City Chapter — and insisting that he acted in good faith. He likewise attributes the indication of "MCLE
Compliance No. III-0018308" to his secretary / liaison, an "honest mistake . . . because of the pressure of his many duties."

We are not impressed.

Bar Matter No. 1922, dated June 3, 2008, requires "practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts
or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as
may be applicable. . . ." It further provides that "[f]ailure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case
and the expunction of the pleadings from the records."

At the very least, respondent was negligent in failing to monitor his own MCLE compliance. This is a sort of negligence that is
hardly excusable. As a member of the legal profession, respondent ought to have known that non-compliance would have resulted
in the rendering inutile of any pleading he may file before any tribunal. The grave consequence of non-compliance notwithstanding,
respondent (by his own account) admits to having complacently relied on the statements of MCLE providers. His negligence,
therefore risked harm not only upon himself - he being now burdened with the present complaint as a direct consequence - but
worse, upon his clients, the reliefs they seek through their pleadings being possibly rendered inoperative.59

This court has never shied away from disciplining lawyers who have willfully engaged in acts of deceit and falsehood.

In Flores v. Chua,60 respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua was disbarred on this court's finding of "a habit, attitude, and mindset not
only to abuse one's legal knowledge or training, but also to deliberately defy or ignore known virtues and values which the legal
profession demands from its members."61 Atty. Enrique S. Chua was found to have notarized a document that he knew to have
been falsified so as to make it appear that a person had personally appeared before him; this was part of a bigger design to defraud
another.

In Nunga v. Viray,62 respondent Atty. Venancio Viray was suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years after having been
found to have notarized a document despite the lapse of his commission as a notary public.

In Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Flores,63 respondent Atty. Ernesto B. Flores was suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years after being found to have falsely stated that he did not pursue an appeal so as to absolve himself of the charge of forum
shopping when, in fact, he had perfected an appeal.

Here, respondent violated Bar Matter No. 287, Section 139(e) of the Local Government Code, Bar Matter No. 1132, and Bar Matter
No. 1922, a total of seven (7) times. The sheer multiplicity of instances belies any claim that we are only dealing with isolated
errors. Regardless whether isolated or manifold, these inaccuracies alone already warrant disciplinary sanctions. However, as shall
be discussed, respondent also acted with dishonest, deceitful, and even larcenous intent.

Respondent is not only accountable for inaccuracies. This case is far from being a matter of clerical errors. He willfully used false
information. In so doing, he misled courts, litigants—his own client included— professional colleagues, and all others who
may have relied on the records and documents on which these false details appear.

Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is a mockery of courts, chief of which is this
court, considering that this court is the author of all but one of the regulations that respondent violated. It is this court that requires
respondent to indicate his Roll of Attorneys number, IBP official receipt number, and MCLE compliance number.

Having also violated a requirement spelled out in the Local Government Code, respondent similarly made a mockery of an act of
the legislature.

Respondent's profligacy does not stop here. He also appropriated for himself another lawyer's professional details in seven (7)
separate instances.

In seven distinct instances, respondent is accountable for three constituent acts of larceny, taking, use, and profiting.

Seven times, respondent took for himself professional details that belonged to another. In these seven instances, he used the same
swiped details in his own pleadings. So too, in these seven instances he personally benefited. In these instances, respondent
succeeded in making it appear that he filed valid pleadings and avoided the fatal consequences of a deficiently signed pleading. He
was able to pursue reliefs in court and carry on litigation that could have been terminated as soon as his deficient pleadings were
recognized.

All these instances of falsity, dishonesty, and professional larceny are similarly acts of deceit. In using false information taken from
another, respondent misled courts, parties, and colleagues into believing that he was faithfully, truthfully, and decently discharging
his functions.

Respondent's acts reek of malicious intent to deceive courts. He was not only insubordinate and disobedient of regulations; he was
also dishonest, deceitful and duplicitous. Worse, he was mocking and contemptuous.
VI
The totality of respondent's actions demonstrates a degree of gravity that warrants suspension from the practice of law for an
extended period.

This case involves anything but trivial non-compliance. It is much graver. The confluence of: (1) respondent's many violations; (2)
the sheer multiplicity of rules violated; (3) the frequency—nay, pattern—of falsity and deceit; and (4) his manifest intent to bring
courts, legal processes, and professional standards to disrepute brings to light a degree of depravity that proves respondent worthy
of being sanctioned. Having flagrantly disobeyed, deceived, and ridiculed courts, respondent rightly stands to be at the receiving
end of disciplinary action.

Respondent's circumstances are well within the grounds for disciplining lawyers as specified by Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules
of Court. His deception is well demonstrated. He ran afoul of every single word, save perhaps his name, in the Lawyer's Oath. Then
again, it was his own signature, his own name, that respondent Pacifico M. Maghari, III had disgraced.

Respondent's acts also demonstrate a violation of every single chapter of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pronounces a lawyer's foremost duty "to uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land V and promote respect for law and legal processes" Rule 1.01 of the same Code requires lawyers to "not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Per Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" Rule 10.01
requires lawyers to "not do any falsehood . . . or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Rule 10.03 imposes upon lawyers
the duty of faithfully "observ[ing] the rules of procedure [and] not misusing] them to defeat the ends of justice." Canon 11 exhorts
lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts."

Respondent did not merely violate a statute and the many issuances of this court as regards the information that members of the
bar must indicate when they sign pleadings. He did so in a manner that betrays intent to make a mockery of courts, legal processes,
and professional standards. By his actions, respondent ridiculed and toyed with the requirements imposed by statute and by this
court. He trampled upon professional standards established not only by this court, in its capacity as overseer of the legal profession,
but by the Republic itself, through a duly enacted statute. In so doing, he violated his duty to society and to the courts.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to "conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues."

In appropriating information pertaining to his opposing counsel, respondent did not only fail to observe common courtesy. He
encroached upon matters that, ultimately, are personal to another. This encroachment is, therefore, not only an act of trickery; it is
also act of larceny. In so doing, he violated his duty to the legal profession.

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes upon a lawyer "fidelity to the cause of his client," while Canon 18
requires a lawyer to "serve his client with competence and diligence."

In using false information in his pleadings, respondent unnecessarily put his own client at risk. Deficiencies in how pleadings are
signed can be fatal to a party's cause as unsigned pleadings produce no legal effect. In so doing, respondent violated his duty to his
clients.

It is tempting to think that the only thing respondent did was to deviate from required formalities. Respondent was, himself, quite
dismissive, stating that he did nothing more than "cursorily [go] over . . . without giving any ... attention to details . . . that. . . are
matters of record and are easily verifiable."64 It is equally tempting to think it would be excessive of this court to engage in an
overly rigid, pedantic emphasis on formalistic niceties.

However, we have demonstrated that what can otherwise be dismissed as empty formalities are, in fact, necessary solemnities.
They are not ends in themselves but crucial means to enhance the integrity, competence and credibility of the legal profession.
They are vital to the dispensation of justice. The significance of these solemnities, along with the legal profession's "high standard
of legal proficiency, . . . morality, honesty, integrity[,] and fair dealing[,]"65 put in contrast with how respondent has fallen dismally
and disturbingly short of the high standards that his profession demands, demonstrates the propriety of momentarily suspending
respondent from engaging in legal practice.

It is unsettling that respondent engaged in the mockery and ridicule that he did of the very same badges—his place in the Roll of
Attorneys, his membership in the Integrated Bar, his recognition as a practicing professional, his continuing training and
competence—that are emblematic of his being a lawyer. Seeing as how he manifested such contempt for these badges,
we find that there is every reason for preventing him, at least temporarily, from engaging in the profession these badges
signify.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, having clearly violated his Lawyer's Oath and the Canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari,
III's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SOUTH COTABATO COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION and GAUVAIN J. BENZONAN, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ROLANDO FABRIGAR, MERLYN
VELARDE, VINCE LAMBOC, FELIPE GALINDO, LEONARDO MIGUEL, JULIUS RUBIN, EDEL RODEROS, MERLYN
COLIAO and EDGAR JOPSON, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with application for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction seeking to set aside the Resolution1 dated July 20, 2005 as well as its related Resolution2 dated May
22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN. In essence, the same petition likewise seeks to set aside the
Order3 dated November 8, 2004 and the Order4 dated February 24, 2005 of public respondent Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) as well as the Order5 dated May 20, 2004 of the Regional Director, DOLE
Regional XII Office.
The facts of this case, as culled from the Order dated November 8, 2004 of DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas, are as follows:
On the basis of a complaint, an inspection was conducted at the premises of appellant DXCP Radio Station on January 13, 2004,
where the following violations of labor standards laws were noted:
1. Underpayment of minimum wage;
2. Underpayment of 13th month pay;
3. Non-payment of five (5) days service incentive leave pay;
4. Non-remittance of SSS premiums;
5. Non-payment of rest day premium pay of some employee;
6. Non-payment of holiday premium pay; and
7. Some employees are paid on commission basis aside from their allowances.
A copy of the Notice of Inspection Results was explained to and received by Tony Ladorna for appellants. Later on, or on January
16, 200[4], another copy of the Notice of Inspection Results was received by Felipe S. Galindo, Technical Supervisor of appellant
DXCP. The Notice of Inspection Results required the appellants to effect restitution and/or correction of the above violations within
five (5) calendar days from receipt of the Notice. Likewise, appellants were informed that any questions on the findings should be
submitted within five (5) working days from receipts of the Notice.
A summary investigation was scheduled on March 3, 2004, where only appellees appeared, while appellants failed to appear despite
due notice. Another hearing was held on April 1, 2004, where appellees appeared, while a certain Nona Gido appeared in behalf of
Atty. Thomas Jacobo. Ms. Gido sought to re-schedule the hearing, which the hearing officer denied.
On May 20, 2004, the Regional Director issued the assailed Order, directing appellants to pay appellees the aggregate amount of
Seven Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Two Pesos (Php759,752.00). 6
The dispositive portion of the Order dated May 20, 2004 of the Regional Director of the DOLE Region XII Office reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent DXCP Radio Station and/or Engr. Gauvain Benzonan, President, is hereby
ordered to pay the seven (7) affected workers of their Salary Differential, Underpayment of 13th Month Pay, Five (5) days Service
Incentive Leave Pay, Rest Day Premium Pay and Holiday Premium Pay in the total amount of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS (₱759,752.00), Philippine Currency as indicated in the Annex "A" hereof
and to submit proof of compliance to the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of this Order.7
Petitioners appealed their case to then DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas. However, this appeal was dismissed in an Order dated
November 8, 2004 wherein the Secretary ruled that, contrary to their claim, petitioners were not denied due process as they were
given reasonable opportunity to present evidence in support of their defense in the administrative proceeding before the Regional
Director of DOLE Region XII Office. The dispositive portion of the said Order follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal by DXCP Radio Station and Engr. Gauvain Benzonan is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The Order dated May 24, 2004 of the Regional Director, directing appellants to pay the nine (9) appellees the
aggregate amount of Seven Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos (Php759,752.00), representing their
claims for wage differentials, 13th month pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, holiday premium and rest day premium, is
AFFIRMED.8
Undeterred, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the DOLE Secretary but this was denied in an Order dated February
24, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by DXCP Radio Station and Engr. Gauvain Benzonan,
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Our Order dated November 8, 2004, affirming the Order dated May 20, 2004 of the OIC-
Director, Regional Office No. 12, directing appellants to pay Rolando Fabrigar and eight (8) others, the aggregate amount of Seven
Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos (Php759,752.00), representing their claims for wage and 13th
month pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and rest day premium, is AFFIRMED. 9
In light of this setback, petitioners elevated their case to the Court of Appeals but their petition was dismissed in the assailed Court
of Appeals Resolution dated July 20, 2005 because of several procedural infirmities that were explicitly cited in the same, to wit:
1. The petition was not properly verified and the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was not executed by the plaintiff or principal
party in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the affiant therein was not duly authorized
to represent the corporation. Such procedural lapse renders the entire pleading of no legal effect and is dismissible. Sections 4 and
5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of
his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information
and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. x x x.
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith:
xxxx
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. x x x.
2. Annexes A, B, C, E and its attachments and F are not certified true copies contrary to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. – x x x
xxxx
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. x x x.
3. Petitioner’s counsel failed to indicate the date of issue of his IBP Official Receipt. As provided for under Bar Matter
287 dated September 26, 2000:
"All pleadings, motions and papers filed in court whether personally or by mail shall bear counsel’s current IBP official receipt
number and date of issue otherwise, such pleadings, motions and paper may not be acted upon by the court, without
prejudice to whatever disciplinary action the court may take against the erring counsel who shall likewise be required to
comply with the such (sic) requirement within five (5) days from notice. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be ground
for further disciplinary sanction and for contempt of court." x x x.10
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the Court of Appeals ruled in its assailed Resolution dated May 22, 2006
that petitioners’ subsequent submission made them substantially comply with the second and third procedural errors that
were mentioned in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated July 20, 2005. However, the Court of Appeals also ruled that, with regard
to the first procedural error, petitioners’ justification does not deserve merit reasoning that "[w]hile it may be true that there are
two (2) petitioners and that petitioner Gauvain Benzonan signed the verification and the certificate of non-forum shopping of the
petition, the records show that petitioner Gauvain Benzonan did not initiate the petition in his own capacity to protect his personal
interest in the case but was, in fact, only acting for and in the corporation’s behalf as its president."11 Thus, the Court of Appeals
noted that "[h]aving acted in the corporation’s behalf, petitioner Benzonan should have been clothed with the corporation’s
board resolution authorizing him to institute the petition."12
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that petitioners’ attachment of a "Secretary’s Certificate" to their Motion for
Reconsideration (purportedly to remedy the first procedural mistake in their petition for certiorari under Rule 65) was
insufficient since their submission merely authorized petitioner Benzonan "to represent the corporation and cause the preparation
and filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals."13
Consequently, petitioners filed the instant petition wherein they raised the following issues:
a. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari and denied the Motion for Reconsideration on its finding that the petition was not properly verified and
the certification of non-forum shopping was not executed by the principal party allegedly in violation of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure?
b. Whether petitioners were denied due process of law in the proceedings before the Regional Director and the Office of the
Secretary, both of the Department of Labor and Employment?
c. Whether there was sufficient basis in the Order issued by the Regional Director, DOLE, Regional Office No. XII, dated May 20,
2004?14
Anent the first procedural issue, the Court had summarized the jurisprudential principles on the matter in Cagayan Valley Drug
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.15 In said case, we held that a President of a corporation, among other enumerated
corporate officers and employees, can sign the verification and certification against of non-forum shopping in behalf of the said
corporation without the benefit of a board resolution. We quote the pertinent portion of the decision here:
It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers
are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and
distinct personality from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus,
it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without
authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.
In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager
or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity
of a verification signed by an "employment specialist" who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the
company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority
from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the
Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s
authorization.
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without
need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager
or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by
the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing
cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against
forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition." 16 (Emphases
supplied.)lawp++il
It must be stressed, however, that the Cagayan ruling qualified that the better procedure is still to append a board resolution to the
complaint or petition to obviate questions regarding the authority of the signatory of the verification and certification.17
Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, it bears reiterating that the requirement of the certification of non-forum shopping
is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice
is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure. However, the Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring
the submission of such certification considering that, although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. Not being jurisdictional, it
can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.18
In the case at bar, the Court holds that there has been substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure on the petitioners’ part in consonance with our ruling in the Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v.
WMC Resources International PTY LTD.19 that we laid down in 2003 with the rationale that the President of petitioner-corporation
is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Petitioner Benzonan clearly satisfies the
aforementioned jurisprudential requirement because he is the President of petitioner South Cotabato Communications Corporation.
Moreover, he is also named as co-respondent of petitioner-corporation in the labor case which is the subject matter of the special
civil action for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.
Clearly, it was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to dismiss petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari despite substantial
compliance with the rules on procedure. For unduly upholding technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case, normal
procedure dictates that the Court of Appeals should be tasked with properly disposing the petition, a second time around, on the
merits.
The Court is mindful of previous rulings which instructs us that when there is enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the
merits can be made, we may dispense with the time-consuming procedure in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of
the case.20 However, based on the nature of the two remaining issues propounded before the Court which involve factual issues
and given the inadequacy of the records, pleadings, and other evidence available before us to properly resolve those questions, we
are constrained to refrain from passing upon them.
After all, the Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the findings of fact complained of are devoid of support by the evidence
on record, or the assailed judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN.
SO ORDERED.
EMMANUEL BABAS, DANILO T. BANAG, ARTURO V. VILLARIN, SR., EDWIN JAVIER, SANDI BERMEO, REX
ALLESA, MAXIMO SORIANO, JR., ARSENIO ESTORQUE, and FELIXBERTO ANAJAO, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners Emmanuel Babas, Danilo T. Banag, Arturo V. Villarin, Sr., Edwin Javier, Sandi Bermeo, Rex Allesa, Maximo Soriano,
Jr., Arsenio Estorque, and Felixberto Anajao appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the October 10, 2008
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 103804, and the January 21, 2009 Resolution, 2 denying its
reconsideration.
Respondent Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (LSC) is a duly organized domestic corporation engaged in the shipping industry; it
owns several equipment necessary for its business. On September 29, 1997, LSC entered into a General Equipment Maintenance
Repair and Management Services Agreement3 (Agreement) with Best Manpower Services, Inc. (BMSI). Under the Agreement,
BMSI undertook to provide maintenance and repair services to LSC’s container vans, heavy equipment, trailer chassis, and
generator sets. BMSI further undertook to provide checkers to inspect all containers received for loading to and/or
unloading from its vessels.
Simultaneous with the execution of the Agreement, LSC leased its equipment, tools, and tractors to BMSI. 4 The period of lease
was coterminous with the Agreement.
BMSI then hired petitioners on various dates to work at LSC as checkers, welders, utility men, clerks, forklift operators, motor
pool and machine shop workers, technicians, trailer drivers, and mechanics. Six years later, or on May 1, 2003, LSC entered into
another contract with BMSI, this time, a service contract.5
In September 2003, petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for regularization against LSC and BMSI. On October
1, 2003, LSC terminated the Agreement, effective October 31, 2003. Consequently, petitioners lost their employment.
BMSI asserted that it is an independent contractor. It averred that it was willing to regularize petitioners; however, some of them
lacked the requisite qualifications for the job. BMSI was willing to reassign petitioners who were willing to accept reassignment.
BMSI denied petitioners’ claim for underpayment of wages and non-payment of 13th month pay and other benefits.
LSC, on the other hand, averred that petitioners were employees of BMSI and were assigned to LSC by virtue of the Agreement.
BMSI is an independent job contractor with substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, and machinery
necessary in the conduct of its business. The Agreement between LSC and BMSI constituted legitimate job contracting. Thus,
petitioners were employees of BMSI and not of LSC.
After due proceedings, the LA rendered a decision6 dismissing petitioners’ complaint. The LA found that petitioners were
employees of BMSI. It was BMSI which hired petitioners, paid their wages, and exercised control over them.
Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), arguing that BMSI was engaged in labor-only
contracting. They insisted that their employer was LSC.
On January 16, 2008, the NLRC promulgated its decision.7 Reversing the LA, the NLRC held:
We find from the records of this case that respondent BMSI is not engaged in legitimate job contracting.
First, respondent BMSI has no equipment, no office premises, no capital and no investments as shown in the Agreement itself
which states:
xxxx
VI. RENTAL OF EQUIPMENT
[6.01.] That the CLIENT has several forklifts and truck tractor, and has offered to the CONTRACTOR the use of the same by way
of lease, the monthly rental of which shall be deducted from the total monthly billings of the CONTRACTOR for the services
covered by this Agreement.
6.02. That the CONTRACTOR has agreed to rent the CLIENT’s forklifts and truck tractor.
6.03. The parties herein have agreed to execute a Contract of Lease for the forklifts and truck tractor that will be rented by the
CONTRACTOR. (p. 389, Records)
True enough, parties signed a Lease Contract (p. 392, Records) wherein respondent BMSI leased several excess equipment of LSC
to enable it to discharge its obligation under the Agreement. So without the equipment which respondent BMSI leased from
respondent LSC, the former would not be able to perform its commitments in the Agreement.
In Phil. Fuji Xerox Corp. v. NLRC (254 SCRA 294) the Supreme Court held:
x x x. The phrase "substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other
materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business," in the Implementing Rules clearly contemplates tools, equipment,
etc., which are directly related to the service it is being contracted to render. One who does not have an independent business for
undertaking the job contracted for is just an agent of the employer. (underscoring ours)
Second, respondent BMSI has no independent business or activity or job to perform in respondent LSC free from the control of
respondent LSC except as to the results thereof. In view of the absence of such independent business or activity or job to be
performed by respondent BMSI in respondent LSC [petitioners] performed work that was necessary and desirable to the main
business of respondent LSC. Respondents were not able to refute the allegations of [petitioners] that they performed the same work
that the regular workers of LSC performed and they stood side by side with regular employees of respondent LSC performing the
same work. Necessarily, the control on the manner and method of doing the work was exercised by respondent LSC and not by
respondent BMSI since the latter had no business of its own to perform in respondent LSC.
Lastly, respondent BMSI has no other client but respondent LSC. If respondent BMSI were a going concern, it would have other
clients to which to assign [petitioners] after its Agreement with LSC expired. Since there is only one client, respondent LSC, it is
easy to conclude that respondent BMSI is a mere supplier of labor.
After concluding that respondent BMSI is engaged in prohibited labor-only contracting, respondent LSC became the employer of
[petitioners] pursuant to DO 18-02.
[Petitioners] therefore should be reinstated to their former positions or equivalent positions in respondent LSC as regular employees
with full backwages and other benefits without loss of seniority rights from October 31, 2003, when they lost their jobs, until actual
reinstatement (Vinoya v. NLRC, 324 SCRA 469). If reinstatement is not feasible, [petitioners] then should be paid separation pay
of one month pay for every year of service or a fraction of six months to be considered as one year, in addition to full backwages.
Concerning [petitioners’] prayer to be paid wage differentials and benefits under the CBA, We have no doubt that
[petitioners] would be entitled to them if they are covered by the said CBA. For this purpose, [petitioners] should first
enlist themselves as union members if they so desire, or pay agency fee. Furthermore, only [petitioners] who signed the appeal
memorandum are covered by this Decision. As regards the other complainants who did not sign the appeal, the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter dismissing this case became final and executory.8
The NLRC disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of [petitioners] is GRANTED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REVERSED, and a NEW
ONE rendered finding respondent Best Manpower Services, Inc. is engaged in prohibited labor-only-contracting and finding
respondent Lorenzo Shipping Corp. as the employer of the following [petitioners]:
1. Emmanuel B. Babas
2. Danilo Banag
3. Edwin L. Javier
4. Rex Allesa
5. Arturo Villarin, [Sr.]
6. Felixberto C. Anajao
7. Arsenio Estorque
8. Maximo N. Soriano, Jr.
9. Sandi G. Bermeo
Consequently, respondent Lorenzo Shipping Corp. is ordered to reinstate [petitioners] to their former positions as regular employees
and pay their wage differentials and benefits under the CBA.
If reinstatement is not feasible, both respondents Lorenzo Shipping Corp. and Best Manpower Services are adjudged jointly and
solidarily to pay [petitioners] separation pay of one month for every year of service, a fraction of six months to be considered as
one year.
In addition, respondent LSC and BMSI are solidarily liable to pay [petitioners’] full backwages from October 31, 2003 until
actual reinstatement or, if reinstatement is not feasible, until finality of this Decision.
Respondent LSC and respondent BMSI are likewise adjudged to be solidarily liable for attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10%)
of the total monetary award.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
LSC went to the CA via certiorari. On October 10, 2008, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision,10 reversing the NLRC. In
holding that BMSI was an independent contractor, the CA relied on the provisions of the Agreement, wherein BMSI warranted
that it is an independent contractor, with adequate capital, expertise, knowledge, equipment, and personnel necessary for the
services rendered to LSC. According to the CA, the fact that BMSI entered into a contract of lease with LSC did not ipso facto
make BMSI a labor-only contractor; on the contrary, it proved that BMSI had substantial capital. The CA was of the view that the
law only required substantial capital orinvestment. Since BMSI had substantial capital, as shown by its ability to pay rents to LSC,
then it qualified as an independent contractor. It added that even under the control test, BMSI would be the real employer of
petitioners, since it had assumed the entire charge and control of petitioners’ services. The CA further held that BMSI’s
Certificate of Registration as an independent contractor was sufficient proof that it was an independent contractor. Hence,
the CA absolved LSC from liability and instead held BMSI as employer of petitioners.
The fallo of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision and resolution of public
respondent NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated September 29, 2004
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on January 21, 2009. 12
Hence, this appeal by petitioners, positing that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF RECORD THAT
RESPONDENT WAS ENGAGED IN LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING TO DEFEAT PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO SECURITY
OF TENURE.13
Before resolving the petition, we note that only seven (7) of the nine petitioners signed the Verification and
Certification.14 Petitioners Maximo Soriano, Jr. (Soriano) and Felixberto Anajao (Anajao) did not sign the Verification and
Certification, because they could no longer be located by their co-petitioners.15
In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA), et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 16citing Loquias
v. Office of the Ombudsman,17 we stated that the petition satisfies the formal requirements only with regard to the petitioner who
signed the petition, but not his co-petitioner who did not sign nor authorize the other petitioner to sign it on his behalf. Thus, the
petition can be given due course only as to the parties who signed it. The other petitioners who did not sign the verification and
certificate against forum shopping cannot be recognized as petitioners and have no legal standing before the Court. The petition
should be dismissed outright with respect to the non-conforming petitioners.
Thus, we dismiss the petition insofar as petitioners Soriano and Anajao are concerned.
Petitioners vigorously insist that they were employees of LSC; and that BMSI is not an independent contractor, but a labor-only
contractor. LSC, on the other hand, maintains that BMSI is an independent contractor, with adequate capital and investment. LSC
capitalizes on the ratiocination made by the CA.
In declaring BMSI as an independent contractor, the CA, in the challenged Decision, heavily relied on the provisions of the
Agreement, wherein BMSI declared that it was an independent contractor, with substantial capital and investment.
De Los Santos v. NLRC18 instructed us that the character of the business, i.e., whether as labor-only contractor or as job contractor,
should
be measured in terms of, and determined by, the criteria set by statute. The parties cannot dictate by the mere expedience of a
unilateral declaration in a contract the character of their business.
In San Miguel Corporation v. Vicente B. Semillano, Nelson Mondejas, Jovito Remada, Alilgilan Multi-Purpose Coop (AMPCO),
and Merlyn N. Policarpio,19 this Court explained:
Despite the fact that the service contracts contain stipulations which are earmarks of independent contractorship, they do not make
it legally so. The language of a contract is neither determinative nor conclusive of the relationship between the parties. Petitioner
SMC and AMPCO cannot dictate, by a declaration in a contract, the character of AMPCO's business, that is, whether as labor-only
contractor, or job contractor. AMPCO's character should be measured in terms of, and determined by, the criteria set by statute.
Thus, in distinguishing between prohibited labor-only contracting and permissible job contracting, the totality of the facts and the
surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered.
Labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies, or places
workers to perform a job, work, or service for a principal. In labor-only contracting, the following elements are present: (a) the
contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its
own account and responsibility; and (b) the employees recruited, supplied, or placed by such contractor or subcontractor perform
activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal. 20
On the other hand, permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or
farm out with the contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work, or service within a definite or
predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work, or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the
premises of the principal. 21
A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
(a) The contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on his account under his own
responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all
matters connected with the performance of his work except as to the results thereof;
(b) The contractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and the contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees' entitlement to all
labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social
welfare benefits.22
Given the above standards, we sustain the petitioners’ contention that BMSI is engaged in labor-only contracting.
First, petitioners worked at LSC’s premises, and nowhere else. Other than the provisions of the Agreement, there was no
showing that it was BMSI which established petitioners’ working procedure and methods, which supervised petitioners in
their work, or which evaluated the same. There was absolute lack of evidence that BMSI exercised control over them
or their work, except for the fact that petitioners were hired by BMSI.
Second, LSC was unable to present proof that BMSI had substantial capital. The record before us is bereft of any proof pertaining
to the contractor’s capitalization, nor to its investment in tools, equipment, or implements actually used in the performance
or completion of the job, work, or service that it was contracted to render. What is clear was that the equipment used by BMSI were
owned by, and merely rented from, LSC.
In Mandaue Galleon Trade, Inc. v. Andales,23 we held:
The law casts the burden on the contractor to prove that it has substantial capital, investment, tools, etc. Employees, on the other
hand, need not prove that the contractor does not have substantial capital, investment, and tools to engage in job-contracting.
Third, petitioners performed activities which were directly related to the main business of LSC. The work of petitioners as checkers,
welders, utility men, drivers, and mechanics could only be characterized as part of, or at least clearly related to, and in the pursuit
of, LSC’s business. Logically, when petitioners were assigned by BMSI to LSC, BMSI acted merely as a labor-only
contractor.
Lastly, as found by the NLRC, BMSI had no other client except for LSC, and neither BMSI nor LSC refuted this finding, thereby
bolstering the NLRC finding that BMSI is a labor-only contractor.
The CA erred in considering BMSI’s Certificate of Registration as sufficient proof that it is an independent contractor. In San
Miguel Corporation v. Vicente B. Semillano, Nelson Mondejas, Jovito Remada, Alilgilan Multi-Purpose Coop (AMPCO), and
Merlyn N. Policarpio,24 we held that a Certificate of Registration issued by the Department of Labor and Employment is not
conclusive evidence of such status. The fact of registration simply prevents the legal presumption of being a mere labor-only
contractor from arising.251avvphi1
Indubitably, BMSI can only be classified as a labor-only contractor. The CA, therefore, erred when it ruled otherwise.
Consequently, the workers that BMSI supplied to LSC became regular employees of the latter. 26 Having gained regular status,
petitioners were entitled to security of tenure and could only be dismissed for just or authorized causes and after they had been
accorded due process.
Petitioners lost their employment when LSC terminated its Agreement with BMSI. However, the termination of LSC’s Agreement
with BMSI cannot be considered a just or an authorized cause for petitioners’ dismissal. In Almeda v. Asahi Glass Philippines.
Inc. v. Asahi Glass Philippines, Inc.,27 this Court declared:
The sole reason given for the dismissal of petitioners by SSASI was the termination of its service contract with respondent. But
since SSASI was a labor-only contractor, and petitioners were to be deemed the employees of respondent, then the said reason
would not constitute a just or authorized cause for petitioners’ dismissal. It would then appear that petitioners were summarily
dismissed based on the aforecited reason, without compliance with the procedural due process for notice and hearing.
Herein petitioners, having been unjustly dismissed from work, are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalents computed from
the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. Their earnings elsewhere during the periods of their
illegal dismissal shall not be deducted therefrom.
Accordingly, we hold that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in its decision. Conversely, the CA committed a
reversible error when it set aside the NLRC ruling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 103804
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Emmanuel Babas, Danilo T. Banag, Arturo V. Villarin, Sr., Edwin Javier, Sandi
Bermeo, Rex Allesa, and Arsenio Estorque are declared regular employees of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation. Further, LSC is
ordered to reinstate the seven petitioners to their former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to pay
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time compensation
was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRINCE TRANSPORT, Inc. and Mr. RENATO CLAROS, Petitioners,
vs.
DIOSDADO GARCIA, LUISITO GARCIA, RODANTE ROMERO, REX BARTOLOME, FELICIANO GASCO, JR., DANILO
ROJO, EDGAR SANFUEGO, AMADO GALANTO, EUTIQUIO LUGTU, JOEL GRAMATICA, MIEL CERVANTES,
TERESITA CABANES, ROE DELA CRUZ, RICHELO BALIDOY, VILMA PORRAS, MIGUELITO SALCEDO, CRISTINA
GARCIA, MARIO NAZARENO, DINDO TORRES, ESMAEL RAMBOYONG, ROBETO*MANO, ROGELIO BAGAWISAN,
ARIEL SNACHEZ, ESTAQULO VILLAREAL, NELSON MONTERO, GLORIA ORANTE, HARRY TOCA, PABLITO
MACASAET and RONALD GARCITA Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying for the annulment of the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 20, 2004 and February 24, 2005, respectively, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 80953. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated May 30, 20033 and September 26, 20034 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in CA No. 029059-01,while the disputed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration.
The present petition arose from various complaints filed by herein respondents charging petitioners with illegal dismissal, unfair
labor practice and illegal deductions and praying for the award of premium pay for holiday and rest day, holiday pay, service leave
pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Respondents alleged in their respective position papers and other related pleadings that they were employees of Prince Transport,
Inc. (PTI), a company engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land; respondents were hired either as drivers,
conductors, mechanics or inspectors, except for respondent Diosdado Garcia (Garcia), who was assigned as Operations Manager;
in addition to their regular monthly income, respondents also received commissions equivalent to 8 to 10% of their wages; sometime
in October 1997, the said commissions were reduced to 7 to 9%; this led respondents and other employees of PTI to hold a series
of meetings to discuss the protection of their interests as employees; these meetings led petitioner Renato Claros, who is the
president of PTI, to suspect that respondents are about to form a union; he made known to Garcia his objection to the formation of
a union; in December 1997, PTI employees requested for a cash advance, but the same was denied by management which resulted
in demoralization on the employees' ranks; later, PTI acceded to the request of some, but not all, of the employees; the foregoing
circumstances led respondents to form a union for their mutual aid and protection; in order to block the continued formation of the
union, PTI caused the transfer of all union members and sympathizers to one of its sub-companies, Lubas Transport (Lubas);
despite such transfer, the schedule of drivers and conductors, as well as their company identification cards, were issued by PTI; the
daily time records, tickets and reports of the respondents were also filed at the PTI office; and, all claims for salaries were transacted
at the same office; later, the business of Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of PTI to maintain and repair the units being used
therein, which resulted in the virtual stoppage of its operations and respondents' loss of employment.
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the complaints contending that herein respondents were no longer
their employees, since they all transferred to Lubas at their own request; petitioners have nothing to do with the management and
operations of Lubas as well as the control and supervision of the latter's employees; petitioners were not aware of the existence of
any union in their company and came to know of the same only in June 1998 when they were served a copy of the summons in the
petition for certification election filed by the union; that before the union was registered on April 15, 1998, the complaint subject
of the present petition was already filed; that the real motive in the filing of the complaints was because PTI asked respondents to
vacate the bunkhouse where they (respondents) and their respective families were staying because PTI wanted to renovate the
same.
Subsequently, the complaints filed by respondents were consolidated.
On October 25, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, 5 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaints for Unfair Labor Practice, non-payment of holiday pay and holiday premium, service incentive leave
pay and 13th month pay;
Dismissing the complaint of Edgardo Belda for refund of boundary-hulog;
2. Dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondents Prince Transport, Inc. and/or Prince Transport Phils.
Corporation, Roberto Buenaventura, Rory Bayona, Ailee Avenue, Nerissa Uy, Mario Feranil and Peter Buentiempo;
3. Declaring that the complainants named below are illegally dismissed by Lubas Transport; ordering said Lubas Transport to pay
backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the following amount:
Complainants Backwages Separation Pay

(1) Diosdado Garcia ₱222,348.70 ₱79,456.00

(2) Feliciano Gasco, Jr. 203,350.00 54,600.00

(3) Pablito Macasaet 145,250.00 13,000.00

(4) Esmael Ramboyong 221,500.00 30,000.00

(5) Joel Gramatica 221,500.00 60,000.00

(6) Amado Galanto 130,725.00 29,250.00

(7) Miel Cervantes 265,800.00 60,000.00

(8) Roberto Mano 221,500.00 50,000.00

(9) Roe dela Cruz 265,800.00 60,000.00

(10) Richelo Balidoy 130,725.00 29,250.00

(11) Vilma Porras 221,500.00 70,000.00

(12) Miguelito Salcedo 265,800.00 60,000.00

(13) Cristina Garcia 130,725.00 35,100.00

(14) Luisito Garcia 145,250.00 19,500.00

(15) Rogelio Bagawisan 265,800.00 60,000.00

(16) Rodante H. Romero 221,500.00 60,000.00

(17) Dindo Torres 265,800.00 50,000.00

(18) Edgar Sanfuego 221,500.00 40,000.00

(19) Ronald Gacita 221,500.00 40,000.00

(20) Harry Toca 174,300.00 23,400.00

(21) Amado Galanto 130,725.00 17,550.00

(22) Teresita Cabañes 130,725.00 17,550.00

 (23) Rex Bartolome 301,500.00 30,000.00

(24) Mario Nazareno 221,500.00 30,000.00

(25) Eustaquio Villareal 145,250.00 19,500.00

(26) Ariel Sanchez 265,800.00 60,000.00

(27) Gloria Orante 263,100.00 60,000.00

(28) Nelson Montero 264,600.00 60,000.00

(29) Rizal Beato 295,000.00 40,000.00

(30) Eutiquio Lugtu 354,000.00 48,000.00

(31) Warlito Dickensomn 295,000.00 40,000.00

(32) Edgardo Belda 354,000.00 84,000.00

(33) Tita Go 295,000.00 70,000.00

(34) Alex Lodor 295,000.00 50,000.00

(35) Glenda Arguilles 295,000.00 40,000.00

(36) Erwin Luces 354,000.00 48,000.00

(37) Jesse Celle 354,000.00 48,000.00

(38) Roy Adorable 295,000.00 40,000.00

(39) Marlon Bangcoro 295,000.00 40,000.00

(40)Edgardo Bangcoro 354,000.00 36,000.00

4. Ordering Lubas Transport to pay attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) of the total monetary award; and
6. Ordering the dismissal of the claim for moral and exemplary damages for lack merit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners are not guilty of unfair labor practice in the absence of evidence to show that they violated
respondents’ right to self-organization. The Labor Arbiter also held that Lubas is the respondents’ employer and that it
(Lubas) is an entity which is separate, distinct and independent from PTI. Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter found that
Lubas is guilty of illegally dismissing respondents from their employment.
Respondents filed a Partial Appeal with the NLRC praying, among others, that PTI should also be held equally liable as Lubas.
In a Resolution dated May 30, 2003, the NLRC modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision appealed from
is SUSTAINED subject to the modification that Complainant-Appellant Edgardo Belda deserves refund of his boundary-hulog in
the amount of ₱446,862.00; and that Complainants-Appellants Danilo Rojo and Danilo Laurel should be included in the
computation of Complainants-Appellants claim as follows:
Complainants Backwages Separation Pay

41. Danilo Rojo ₱355,560.00 ₱48,000.00

42. Danilo Laurel ₱357,960.00 ₱72,000.00

As regards all other aspects, the Decision appealed from is SUSTAINED.
SO ORDERED.7
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it in its Resolution8 dated September 26, 2003.
Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC.
On December 20, 2004, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision which granted respondents' petition. The CA ruled that
petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice; that Lubas is a mere instrumentality, agent conduit or adjunct of PTI; and that
petitioners’ act of transferring respondents’ employment to Lubas is indicative of their intent to frustrate the efforts of
respondents to organize themselves into a union. Accordingly, the CA disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the subject decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and another one ENTERED finding the respondents guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them to reinstate the
petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages.
With respect to the portion ordering the inclusion of Danilo Rojo and Danilo Laurel in the computation of petitioner's claim for
backwages and with respect to the portion ordering the refund of Edgardo Belda's boundary-hulog in the amount of ₱446,862.00,
the NLRC decision is affirmed and maintained.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it via its Resolution 10 dated February 24, 2005.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds:
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RESPECTED THE FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND AFFIRMED
BY THE NLRC
2. ONLY ONE PETITIONER EXECUTED AND VERIFIED THE PETITION
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION WITH RESPECT TO
RESPONDENTS REX BARTOLOME, FELICIANO GASCO, DANILO ROJO, EUTIQUIO LUGTU, AND NELSON
MONTERO AS THEY FAILED TO FILE AN APPEAL TO THE NLRC
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. AND
MR. RENATO CLAROS AND LUBAS TRANSPORT ARE ONE AND THE SAME CORPORATION AND THUS, LIABLE
IN SOLIDUM TO RESPONDENTS.
C
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF
RESPONDENTS TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION WHEN IT IS NOT ONE OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN RESPONDENTS'
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.11
Petitioners assert that factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions like the NLRC are accorded not only respect
but even finality; that the CA should have outrightly dismissed the petition filed before it because in certiorari proceedings under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court it is not within the province of the CA to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the NLRC
based its determination, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not said tribunal has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners assert that the CA can only pass upon the factual findings of the NLRC if
they are not supported by evidence on record, or if the impugned judgment is based on misapprehension of facts — which
circumstances are not present in this case. Petitioners also emphasize that the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter concurred in their factual
findings which were based on substantial evidence and, therefore, should have been accorded great weight and respect by the CA.
Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the CA neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor committed error in re-evaluating the NLRC’s
factual findings since such findings are not in accord with the evidence on record and the applicable law or jurisprudence.
The Court agrees with respondents.
The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has been settled
as early as this Court’s decision in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.12 In said case, the Court held that the proper vehicle
for such review is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules, and that the case should be filed with the CA
in strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA — pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari — is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual
issues.13 Section 9 clearly states:
xxxx
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant
and conduct new trials or further proceedings. x x x
However, equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters
within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial
evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.14 But
these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on
record, they may be examined by the courts.15 The CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed
decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. 16 It is within the jurisdiction of the CA, whose
jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the findings of the NLRC. 17
In this case, the NLRC sustained the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, these findings are generally binding on the
appellate court, unless there was a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. In
respondents' petition for certiorari with the CA, these factual findings were reexamined and reversed by the appellate court on the
ground that they were not in accord with credible evidence presented in this case. To determine if the CA's reexamination of factual
findings and reversal of the NLRC decision are proper and with sufficient basis, it is incumbent upon this Court to make its own
evaluation of the evidence on record.18
After a thorough review of the records at hand, the Court finds that the CA did not commit error in arriving at its own findings and
conclusions for reasons to be discussed hereunder.
Firstly, petitioners posit that the petition filed with the CA is fatally defective, because the attached verification and certificate
against forum shopping was signed only by respondent Garcia.
The Court does not agree.
While the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature
of only one of them is insufficient, the Court has stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective.19 Strict compliance with the provision regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.20 It does
not, however, prohibit substantial compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances, considering especially that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.21
In a number of cases, the Court has consistently held that when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with
the rules.22 In the present case, there is no question that respondents share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action.
Hence, the signature of respondent Garcia is a sufficient compliance with the rule governing certificates of non-forum shopping.
In the first place, some of the respondents actually executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Garcia as their attorney-in-
fact in filing a petition for certiorari with the CA.23
The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioners' argument that the CA should not have given due course to the petition filed
before it with respect to some of the respondents, considering that these respondents did not sign the verification attached to the
Memorandum of Partial Appeal earlier filed with the NLRC. Petitioners assert that the decision of the Labor Arbiter has become
final and executory with respect to these respondents and, as a consequence, they are barred from filing a petition for certiorari
with the CA.
With respect to the absence of some of the workers’ signatures in the verification, the verification requirement is deemed
substantially complied with when some of the parties who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth
of the allegations in the petition had signed the same. Such verification is deemed a sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Moreover, respondents' Partial Appeal
shows that the appeal stipulated as complainants-appellants "Rizal Beato, et al.", meaning that there were more than one appellant
who were all workers of petitioners.
In any case, the settled rule is that a pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be verified, may be given due course even
without a verification if the circumstances warrant the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice. 24 Indeed, the absence of a
verification is not jurisdictional, but only a formal defect, which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and act on a
case.25 Hence, the failure of some of the respondents to sign the verification attached to their Memorandum of Appeal filed with
the NLRC is not fatal to their cause of action.
Petitioners also contend that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil with respect to Lubas, because the
said doctrine is applicable only to corporations and Lubas is not a corporation but a single proprietorship; that Lubas had been
found by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to have a personality which is separate and distinct from that of PTI; that PTI had no
hand in the management and operation as well as control and supervision of the employees of Lubas.
The Court is not persuaded.
On the contrary, the Court agrees with the CA that Lubas is a mere agent, conduit or adjunct of PTI. A settled formulation of the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same
parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that these two
entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one and the same. 26 In the present case, it may be true that Lubas is a single
proprietorship and not a corporation. However, petitioners’ attempt to isolate themselves from and hide behind the supposed
separate and distinct personality of Lubas so as to evade their liabilities is precisely what the classical doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate entity seeks to prevent and remedy.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observations of the CA, to wit:
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, if Lubas were truly a separate entity, how come that it was Prince Transport who made the
decision to transfer its employees to the former? Besides, Prince Transport never regarded Lubas Transport as a separate entity. In
the aforesaid letter, it referred to said entity as "Lubas operations." Moreover, in said letter, it did not transfer the employees; it
"assigned" them. Lastly, the existing funds and 201 file of the employees were turned over not to a new company but a "new
management."27
The Court also agrees with respondents that if Lubas is indeed an entity separate and independent from PTI why is it that the latter
decides which employees shall work in the former?
What is telling is the fact that in a memorandum issued by PTI, dated January 22, 1998, petitioner company admitted that Lubas is
one of its sub-companies.28 In addition, PTI, in its letters to its employees who were transferred to Lubas, referred to the latter as
its "New City Operations Bus."29
Moreover, petitioners failed to refute the contention of respondents that despite the latter’s transfer to Lubas of their daily time
records, reports, daily income remittances of conductors, schedule of drivers and conductors were all made, performed, filed
and kept at the office of PTI. In fact, respondents’ identification cards bear the name of PTI.
It may not be amiss to point out at this juncture that in two separate illegal dismissal cases involving different groups of employees
transferred by PTI to other companies, the Labor Arbiter handling the cases found that these companies and PTI are one and the
same entity; thus, making them solidarily liable for the payment of backwages and other money claims awarded to the complainants
therein.30
Petitioners likewise aver that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered petitioners to reinstate
respondents to their former positions, considering that the issue of reinstatement was never brought up before it and respondents
never questioned the award of separation pay to them.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is clear from the complaints filed by respondents that they are seeking reinstatement. 31
In any case, Section 2 (c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading shall specify the relief sought, but may add a
general prayer for such further or other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable. Under this rule, a court can grant the relief
warranted by the allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the injured party; the inclusion of a general prayer
may justify the grant of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in the complaint
and the evidence introduced so warrant.321avvphi1
Moreover, in BPI Family Bank v. Buenaventura,33 this Court ruled that the general prayer is broad enough "to justify extension of
a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought." Even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief
may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. The court shall grant relief
warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable
and just in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for.34 In the instant case, aside from their
specific prayer for reinstatement, respondents, in their separate complaints, prayed for such reliefs which are deemed just and
equitable.
As to whether petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA
that respondents’ transfer of work assignments to Lubas was designed by petitioners as a subterfuge to foil the former’s right to
organize themselves into a union. Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of unfair labor
practice if it interferes with, restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or if it
discriminates in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
Indeed, evidence of petitioners' unfair labor practice is shown by the established fact that, after respondents' transfer to Lubas,
petitioners left them high and dry insofar as the operations of Lubas was concerned. The Court finds no error in the findings and
conclusion of the CA that petitioners "withheld the necessary financial and logistic support such as spare parts, and repair and
maintenance of the transferred buses until only two units remained in running condition." This left respondents virtually jobless.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is denied. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated December 20,
2004 and February 24, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 80953, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANDREW D. FYFE, RICHARD T. NUTTALL, AND RICHARD J. WALD, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,
INC., Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the order issued by the Regional Trial Court granting the respondent's application to vacate the adverse arbitral
award of the panel of arbitrators, and the propriety of the recourse from such order.
The Case

Under review are the resolutions promulgated in C.A.-G.R. No. 71224 entitled Andrew D. Fyfe, Richard T. Nuttall and Richard J.
Wald v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. on May 30, 20031 and September 19, 2003,2whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively
granted the respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal (without Prejudice to the Filing of Appellee's Brief), and denied the petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration.
Antecedents

In 1998, the respondent underwent rehabilitation proceedings in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 3 which issued
an order dated July 1, 1998 decreeing, among others, the suspension of all claims for payment against the respondent. 4 To convince
its creditors to approve the rehabilitation plan, the respondent decided to hire technical advisers with recognized experience in the
airline industry. This led the respondent through its then Director Luis Juan K. Virata to consult with people in the industry, and in
due course came to meet Peter W. Foster, formerly of Cathay Pacific Airlines.5 Foster, along with Michael R. Scantlebury,
negotiated with the respondent on the details of a proposed technical services agreement. 6 Foster and Scantlebury subsequently
organized Regent Star Services Ltd. (Regent Star) under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.7 On January 4, 1999, the respondent
and Regent Star entered into a Technical Services Agreement (TSA) for the delivery of technical and advisory or management
services to the respondent,8 effective for five years, or from January 4, 1999 until December 31, 2003. 9 On the same date, the
respondent, pursuant to Clause 6 of the TSA,10 submitted a Side Letter," the relevant portions of which stated:
For and in consideration of the services to be faithfully performed by Regent Star in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the Agreement, the Company agrees to pay Regent Star as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1.1 Upon execution of the Agreement, Four Million Seven Hundred Thousand US Dollars (US$4,700,000.00), representing
advisory fees for two (2) years from the date of signature of the Agreement, with an additional amount of not exceeding One
Million Three Hundred Thousand US Dollars (US$1,300,000.00) being due and demandable upon Regent Star's notice to the
Company of its engagement of an individual to assume the position of CCA under the Agreement;

x x x x

In addition to the foregoing, the Company agrees as follows:

x x x x

In the event of a full or partial termination of the Agreement for whatever reason by either the Company or a Senior Technical
Adviser/Regent Star prior to the end of the term of the Agreement, the following penalties are payable by the terminating party:

A. During the first 2 years

1. Senior Company Adviser (CCA) - US$800,000.00

2. Senior Commercial Adviser (SCA) - 800,000.00

3. Senior Financial Adviser (FSA) - 700,000.00

4. Senior Ground Services and Training Adviser (SAG) - 500,000.00

5. Senior Engineering and Maintenance Adviser (SAM) - 500,000.00

x x x x

For the avoidance of doubt, it is understood and agreed that in the event that the terminating party is an individual Senior Technical
Adviser the liability to pay such Termination Amount to the Company shall rest with that individual party, not with RSS. Similarly,
if the terminating party is the Company, the liability to the aggrieved party shall be the individual Senior Technical Adviser, not to
RSS.12

Regent Star, through Foster, conformed to the terms stated in the Side Letter.13 The SEC approved the TSA on January 19, 1999.14

In addition to Foster and Scantlebury, Regent Star engaged the petitioners in respective capacities, specifically: Andrew D. Fyfe as
Senior Ground Services and Training Adviser; Richard J. Wald as Senior Maintenance and Engineering Adviser; and Richard T.
Nuttall as Senior Commercial Adviser. The petitioners commenced to render their services to the respondent, immediately after the
TSA was executed.15

On July 26, 1999, the respondent dispatched a notice to Regent Star terminating the TSA on the ground of lack of confidence
effective July 31, 1999.16 In its notice, the respondent demanded the offsetting of the penalties due to the petitioners with the two-
year advance advisory fees it had paid to Regent Star, thus:
The side letter stipulates that "[i]n the event of a full or partial termination of the Agreement for whatever reason by either the
Company or a Senior Technical Adviser/Regent Star prior to the end of the term of the Agreement, the following penalties are
payable by the terminating party:"

During the first 2 years:

Senior Company Adviser - US$800,000.00

Senior Commercial Adviser - 800,000.00

Senior Financial Adviser - 700,000.00

 Senior Ground Services and Training Adviser - 500.000.00

Senior Engineering and Maintenance Adviser - 500,000.00

TOTAL US$3,300,000.00

There is, therefore, due to RSS from PAL the amount of US$3,300,000.00 by way of stipulated penalties.

However, RSS has been paid by PAL advance "advisory fee for two (2) years from date of signature of the Agreement" the amount
of US$5,700,000. Since RSS has rendered advisory services from 4 January to 31 July 1999, or a period of seven months, it is
entitled to retain only the advisory fees for seven months. This is computed as follows:
US$5,700.000 - US$237,500/month x7 = US$1,662,500
24 months

The remaining balance of the advance advisory fee, which corresponds to the unserved period of 17 months, or US$4,037,500,
should be refunded by RSS to PAL.

Off-setting the amount of US$3,300,000 due from PAL to RSS against the amount of US$4,037,500 due from RSS to PAL, there
remains a net balance of US$737,500 due and payable to PAL. Please settle this amount at your early convenience, but not later
than August 15, 1999.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On June 8, 1999, the petitioners, along with Scantlebury and Wald, wrote to the respondent, through its President and Chief
Operating Officer, Avelino Zapanta, to seek clarification on the status of the TSA in view of the appointment of Foster, Scantleburry
and Nuttall as members of the Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver (PRR) for the respondent. 18 A month later, Regent Star sent to
the respondent another letter expressing disappointment over the respondent's ignoring the previous letter, and denying the
respondent's claim for refund and set-off. Regent Star then proposed therein that the issue be submitted to arbitration in accordance
with Clause 1419 of the TSA.20

Thereafter, the petitioners initiated arbitration proceedings in the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center, Inc. (PDRCI) pursuant to
the TSA.
Ruling of the PDRCI

After due proceedings, the PDRCI rendered its decision ordering the respondent to pay termination penalties, 21viz.:
On issue No. 1 we rule that the Complainants are entitled to their claim for termination penalties.

When the PAL, terminated the Technical Services Agreement on July 26, 1999 which also resulted in the termination of the services
of the senior technical advisers including those of the Complainants it admitted that the termination penalties in the amount of
US$3,300,000.00 as provided in the Letter dated January 4, 1999 are payable to the Senior Technical Advisers by PAL. Xxx. PAL's
admission of its liability to pay the termination penalties to the complainants was made also in its Answer. PAIAs counsel even
stipulated during the hearing that the airline company admits that it is liable to pay Complainants the termination penalties.xxx.

However, PAL argued that although it is liable to pay termination penalties the Complainants are not entitled to their respective
claims because considering that PAL had paid RSS advance "advisory fees for two (2) years" in the total amount of
US$5,700,000.00 and RSS had rendered advisory services for only seven (7) months from January 4, 1999 to July 31, 1999 that
would entitle RSS to an (sic) advisory fees of only US$1,662,500.00 and therefore the unserved period of 17 months equivalent to
US$4,037,500.00 should be refunded. And setting off the termination penalties of US$3,300,000.00 due RSS from PAL against
the amount of US$4,037,500.00 still due PAL from RSS there would remain a net balance of US$737,500.00 still due PAL from
RSS and/or the Senior Technical Advisers which the latter should pay pro-rata as follows: Peter W. Forster, the sum of
US$178,475.00; Richard T. Nuttall, the sum of US$178,475.00; Michael R. Scantlebury; the sum of US$156,350.00, Andrew D.
Fyfe, the sum of US$111,362.50; and Richard J. Wald the sum of US$111,362.50. RSS is a special company which the Senior
Technical Advisers had utilized for the specific purpose of providing PAL with technical advisory services they as a group had
contracted under the Agreement. Hence when PAL signed the Agreement with RSS, it was for all intents and purposes an
Agreement signed individually with the Senior Technical Advisers including the Complainants. The RSS and the five (5) Senior
Technical Advisers should be treated as one and the same,

The Arbitration Tribunals is not convinced.

x x x x
PAL cannot refuse to pay Complainants their termination penalties by setting off against the unserved period of seventeen (17)
months of their advance advisory fees as the Agreement and the Side Letter clearly do not allow refund. This Arbitration Tribunal
cannot read into the contract, which is the law between the parties, what the contract docs not provide or what the parties did not
intend. It is basic in contract interpretation that contracts that are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their literal
meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment. x x x. The penalties work as security for the Complainants
against the uncertainties of their work at PAL whose closure was a stark reality they were facing. (TSN Hearing on April 27, 2000,
pp. 48-49) This would not result in unjust enrichment for the Complainants because the termination of the services was initiated
by PAL itself without cause. In feet, PAL admitted that at the time their services were terminated the Complainants were performing
well in their respective assigned works,22 x x x.

PAL also presented hypothetical situations and certain computations that it claims would result to an "injustice" to PAL which
would then "lose a very substantial amount of money" if the claimed refund is not allowed. PAL had chosen to prc-terminate the
services of the complainants and must therefore pay the termination penalties provided in the Side Letter. If it finds itself losing
"substantial" sums of money because of its contractual commitments, there is nothing this Arbitration Tribunal can do to remedy
the situation. Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable
contract that he or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of its consequences. (Opulencia vs.
Cowl of Appeals, 293 SCRA 385 (1998)23

Decision of the RTC

Dissatisfied with the outcome, the respondent filed its Application to Vacate Arbitral Award in the Regional Trial Court, in Makati
City (RTC), docketed as SP Proc. M-5147 and assigned to Branch 57,24arguing that the arbitration decision should be vacated in
view of the July 1, 1998 order of the SEC placing the respondent under a state of suspension of payment pursuant to Section 6(c)
of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended by P.D. No. 1799.25cralawred

The petitioners countered with their Motion to Dismiss,26 citing the following grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
persons of the petitioners due to the improper service of summons; (b) the application did not state a cause of action; and (c) the
application was an improper remedy because the respondent should have filed an appeal in the CA pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court.27cralawred

On March 7, 2001, the RTC granted the respondent's Application to Vacate Arbitral Award,28 disposing:
WHEREFORE, the subject arbitral award dated September 29, 2000 is hereby vacated and set aside, without prejudice to the
complainants' filing with the SEC rehabilitation receiver of PAL their subject claim for appropriate adjudication. The panel of
arbitrators composed of lawyers Beda Fajardo, Arturo de Castro and Bienvenido Magnaye is hereby ordered discharged on the
ground of manifest partiality.

No pronouncement as to cost and attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Anent jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners, the RTC opined:
On the objection that the Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the complainants because summonses were not
issued and served on them, the Court rules that complainants have voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court
by praying the Court to grant them affirmative relief, i.e., that the Court confirm and declare final and executory the subject arbitral
award. Moreover, under Sections 22 and 26 of the Arbitration Law (R.A. 876), an application or petition to vacate arbitral award
is deemed a motion and service of such motion on the adverse party or his counsel is enough to confer jurisdiction upon the Court
over the adverse party.

It is not disputed that complainants were duly served by personal delivery with copies of the application to vacate. In feet, they
have appeared through counsel and have filed pleadings. In line with this ruling, the objection that the application to vacate does
not state a cause of action against complainants must necessarily fall inasmuch as this present case is a special proceeding (Sec. 22,
Arbitration Law), and Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is inapplicable here.30

On whether or not the application to vacate was an appropriate remedy under Sections 24 and 26 of the Arbitration Law, and
whether or not the July 1, 1998 order of the SEC deprived the Panel of Arbitrators of the authority to hear the petitioners' claim,
the RTC held:
The rationale for the suspension is to enable the rehabilitation receiver to exercise his powers without any judicial or extra-judicial
interference that might unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed corporation, x x x. PD No. 902-A does not provide for the duration
of the suspension; therefore, it is deemed to be effective during the entire period that the corporate debtor is under SEC receivership.

There is no dispute that PAL is under receivership (Exhibits "1" and "2"). In its Order dated 1 July 1998, the SEC declared that "all
claims for payment against PAL are deemed suspended."' This Order effectively deprived all other tribunals of jurisdiction to hear
and decide all actions for claims against PAL for the duration of the receivership.

x x x x

Unless and until the SEC lifts the Order dated 1 July 1998, the Panel of Arbitrators cannot take cognizance of complainant' claims
against PAL without violating the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. The law has granted SEC the exclusive jurisdiction to pursue
the rehabilitation of a private corporation through the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver (Sec 6 (d), PD No. 902-A, as amended
by PD 1799). "exclusive jurisdiction precludes the idea of co-existence and refers to jurisdiction possessed to the exclusion of
others, x x x. Thus, "(I)nstead of vexing the courts with suits against the distressed firm, they are directed to file their claims with
the receiver who is the duly appointed officer of the SEC.

x x x.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

After their motion for reconsideration32 was denied,33 the petitioners appealed to the CA by notice of appeal.
Resolution of the CA

The respondent moved to dismiss the appeal,34 arguing against the propriety of the petitioners' remedy, and positing that Section
29 of the Arbitration Law limited appeals from an order issued in a proceeding under the Arbitration Law to a review
on certiorari upon questions of law.35

On May 30, 2003, the CA promulgated the now assailed resolution granting the respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal. 36 It
declared that the appropriate remedy against the order of the RTC vacating the award was a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, viz.:
The term "certiorari" in the aforequoted provision refers to an ordinary appeal under Rule 45, not the special action of certiorari
under Rule 65. As Section 29 proclaims, it is an "appeal." This being the case, the proper forum for this action is, under the old and
the new rules of procedure, the Supreme Court. Thus, Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that,
"In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. "
Furthermore, Section 29 limits the appeal to "questions of law," another indication that it is referring to an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 which, indeed, is the customary manner of reviewing such issues.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that complainants-in-arbitration/appellants filed the wrong action with the wrong forum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss Appeal (Without Prejudice to the Filing of Appellee's Brief)
is GRANTED and the instant appeal is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.37ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The petitioners moved for reconsideration,38 but the CA denied their motion.39

Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.

Issues

The petitioners anchor this appeal on the following grounds, namely:

I

SECTION 29 OF THE ARBITRATION LAW, WHICH LIMITS THE MODE OF APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF A
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN A PROCEEDING MADE UNDER THE ARBITRATION LAW TO A PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR UNDULY EXPANDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WITHOUT THIS HONORABLE COURT'S CONCURRENCE;
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CA APPEAL BECAUSE:

A.

THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY UPHELD THE EXERCISE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
JURISDICTION OVER AN APPEAL INVOLVING QUESTIONS OF FACT OR OF MIXED QUESTIONS OF FACT AND
LAW FROM A REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER VACATING AN ARBITRAL AWARD
B.

WHERE, AS IN THIS CASE, TFIE ISSUES ON APPEAL CONCERNED THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AND LACK OF
LEGAL BASIS TO SUPPORT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER VACATING THE ARBITRAL AWARD, GRAVE
MISCHIEF WOULD RESULT IF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S BASELESS FINDINGS OF FACT OR MIXED
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE PLACED BEYOND APPELLATE REVIEW; AND
C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DISMISSAL OF THE CA APPEAL V/OULD IN EFFECT RESULT IN THE AFFIRMATION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION, OVER PERSONS UPON WHOM IT FAILED TO
VALIDLY ACQUIRE SUCH JURISDICTION AND OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE PDRCI ARBITRAL
AWARD EVEN IF SUCH APPELLATE POWER IS EXCLUSIVELY LODGED WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER
RULE 43 OF THE RULES

III

INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE CA APPEAL OUTRIGHT, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE SHORTENED
THE PROCEEDINGS AND EXPEDITED JUSTICE BY EXERCISING ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE
APPLICATION TO VACATE PURSUANT TO RULE 43 OF THE RULES, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THAT THE
PARTIES HAD IN FACT ALREADY FILED THEIR RESPECTIVE BRIEFS AND THE COMPLETE RECORDS OF BOTH
THE RTC APPLICATION TO VACATE AND THE PDRCI ARBITRATION WERE ALREADY IN ITS POSSESSION; AND
IV

IN THE EVENT THAT AN APPEAL FROM AN ORDER VACATING AN ARBITRAL AWARD MAY BE MADE ONLY
IN CERTIORARI PROCEEDINGS AND ONLY TO THE SUPREME COURT, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT
HAVE DISMISSED THE CA APPEAL, BUT IN THE HIGHER INTEREST OF JUSTICE, SHOULD HAVE INSTEAD
ENDORSED THE SAME TO THIS HONORABLE COURT, AS WAS DONE IN SANTIAGO V. GONZALES.40

The petitioners contend that an appeal from the order arising from arbitration proceedings cannot be by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because the appeal inevitably involves mixed questions of law and fact; that their
appeal in the CA involved factual issues in view of the RTC's finding that the panel of arbitrators had been guilty of evident
partiality even without having required the respondent to submit independent proof thereon; that the appropriate remedy was either
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, or an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, conformably
with the rulings in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals41 and Adamson v. Court of Appeals,42 respectively; and that the
CA erroneously upheld the RTC's denial of their Motion To Dismiss Appeal on the basis of their counsel's voluntary appearance
to seek affirmative relief because under Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court their objection to the personal jurisdiction of the
court was not a voluntary appearance even if coupled with other grounds for a motion to dismiss.

In riposte, the respondent avers that the petition for review on certiorari should be denied due course because of the defective
verification/certification signed by the petitioners' counsel; and that the special powers of attorney (SPAs) executed by the
petitioners in favor of their counsel did not sufficiently vest the latter with the authority to execute the verification/certification in
their behalf.

On the merits, the respondent maintains that: (a) the term certiorari used in Section 29 of the Arbitration Law refers to a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; (b) the constitutional challenge against Section 29 of the Arbitration Law was
belatedly made; (c) the petitioners' claim of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC should fail because an application to vacate
an arbitral award under Sections 22 and 26 of the Arbitration Law is only required to be in the form of a motion; and (d) the
complete record of the arbitration proceedings submitted to the RTC sufficiently proved the manifest partiality and grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the panel of arbitrators.

To be resolved are: (a) whether or not the petition for review should be dismissed for containing a defective
verification/certification; and (b) whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners for being an inappropriate
remedy.
Ruling of the Court

We deny the petition for review on certiorari.

I
There was sufficient compliance with the rule on
verification and certification against forum shopping

The respondent insists that the verification/certification attached to the petition was defective because it was executed by the
petitioners' counsel whose authority under the SPAs was only to execute the certification of non-forum shopping; and that the
signing by the counsel of the certification could not also be allowed because the Rules of Court and the pertinent circulars and
rulings of the Court require that the petitioners must themselves execute the same.

The insistence of the respondent is unwarranted. The SPAs individually signed by the petitioners vested in their counsel the
authority, among others, "to do and perform on my behalf any act and deed relating to the case, which it could legally do and
perform, including any appeals or further legal proceedings." The authority was sufficiently broad to expressly and specially
authorize their counsel, Atty. Ida Maureen V. Chao-Kho, to sign the verification/certification on their behalf.

The purpose of the verification is to ensure that the allegations contained in the verified pleading are true and correct, an d are not
the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation; and that the pleading is filed in good faith.43 This purpose was met by the
verification/certification made by Atty. Chao-Kho in behalf of the petitioners, which pertinently stated that:
2. Petitioners caused the preparation of the foregoing Petition for Review on Certiorari, and have read and understood all the
allegations contained therein. Further, said allegations are true and correct based on their own knowledge and authentic records in
their and the Finn's possession.44

The tenor of the verification/certification indicated that the petitioners, not Atty. Chao-Kho, were certifying that the allegations
were true and correct based on their knowledge and authentic records. At any rate, a finding that the verification was defective
would not render the petition for review invalid. It is settled that the verification was merely a formal requirement whose defect
did not ne gate the validity or efficacy of the verified pleading, or affect the jurisdiction of the court. 45

We also uphold the efficacy of the certification on non-forum shopping executed by Atty. Chao-Kho on the basis of the
authorization bestowed under the SPAs by the petitioners. The lawyer of the party, in order to validly execute the certification,
must be "specifically authorized" by the client for that purpose. 46 With the petitioners being non-residents of the Philippines, the
sworn certification on non-forum shopping by Atty. Chao-Kho sufficiently complied with the objective of ensuring that no similar
action had been brought by them or the respondent against each other, to wit:
5. Significantly, Petitioners are foreign residents who reside and are presently abroad. Further, the Firm is Petitioners' sole legal
counsel in the Philippines, and hence, is in a position to know that Petitioners have no other cases before any court o[r] tribunal in
the Philippines;47

In this regard, we ought not to exact a literal compliance with Section 4, Rule 45, in relation to Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, that only the party himself should execute the certification. After all, we have not been shown by the respondent any intention
on the part of the petitioners and their counsel to circumvent the requirement for the verification and certification on non-forum
shopping.48
II
Appealing the RTC order
vacating an arbitral award

The petitioners contend that the CA gravely erred in dismissing their appeal for being an inappropriate remedy, and in holding that
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was the sole remedy under Section 29 of the Arbitration Law. They argue that the
decision of the RTC involving arbitration could be assailed either by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as held in Asset
Privatization Trust, or by an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, as opined in Adamson.

The petitioners are mistaken.

Firstly, the assailed resolution of the CA did not expressly declare that the petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 was the
sole remedy from the RTC's order vacating the arbitral award. The CA rather emphasized that the petitioners should have filed the
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 considering that Section 29 of the Arbitration Law has limited the ground of review
to "questions of law." Accordingly, the CA correctly dismissed the appeal of the petitioners because pursuant to Section 2, 49Rule
41 of the Rules of Court an appeal of questions of law arising in the courts in the first instance is by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.

It is noted, however, that since the promulgation of the assailed decision by the CA on May 30, 2003, the law on the matter
underwent changes. On February 4, 2004. Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004) was passed by
Congress, and was approved by the President on April 2, 2004. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9285, the Court promulgated on
September 1, 2009 in A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which are now the
present rules of procedure governing arbitration. Among others, the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution requires an appeal by petition for review to the CA of the final order of the RTC confirming, vacating,
correcting or modifying a domestic arbitral award, to wit:
Rule 19.12 Appeal to the Court of Appeals. - An appeal to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under this Special
Rule shall only be allowed from the following orders of the Regional Trial Court:
Granting or denying an interim measure of protection;
Denying a petition for appointment of an arbitrator;
Denying a petition for assistance in taking evidence;
Enjoining or refusing to enjoin a person from divulging confidential information;
Confirming, vacating or correcting/modifying a domestic arbitral award;
Setting aside an international commercial arbitration award;
Dismissing the petition to set aside an international commercial arbitration award even if the court does not decide to recognize or
enforce such award;
Recognizing and/or enforcing an international commercial arbitration award;
Dismissing a petition to enforce an international commercial arbitration award;
Recognizing and/or enforcing a foreign arbitral award;
Refusing recognition and/or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award;
Granting or dismissing a petition to enforce a deposited mediated settlement agreement; and
Reversing the ruling of the arbitral tribunal upholding its jurisdiction.

Although the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution provides that the appropriate remedy from an order of the
RTC vacating a domestic arbitral award is an appeal by petition for review in the CA, not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, the Court cannot set aside and reverse the assailed decision on that basis because the decision was in full accord
with the law or rule in force at the time of its promulgation.

The ruling in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals50 cannot be the governing rule with respect to the order of the RTC
vacating an arbitral award. Asset Privatization Trust justified the resort to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 only upon finding
that the RTC had acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in confirming the arbitral award. Nonetheless, it is
worth reminding that the petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.51

Also, the petitioners have erroneously assumed that the appeal filed by the aggrieved party in Adamson v. Court of Appeals52 was
an ordinary one. Adamson concerned the correctness of the ruling of the CA in reversing the decision of the trial court, not the
propriety of the remedy availed of by the aggrieved party. Nor did Adamson expressly declare that an ordinary appeal could be
availed of to assail the RTC's ruling involving arbitration. As such, the petitioners' reliance on Adamson to buttress their resort to
the erroneous remedy was misplaced.

We remind that the petitioners cannot insist on their chosen remedy despite its not being sanctioned by the Arbitration Law. Appeal
as a remedy is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and strictly in accordance
with the provisions of the law.53
III
Panel of Arbitrators had no jurisdiction
to hear and decide the petitioners' claim

The petitioners' appeal is dismissible also because the arbitration panel had no jurisdiction to hear their claim. The RTC correctly
opined that the SEC's suspension order effective July 1, 1998 deprived the arbitration panel of the jurisdiction to hear any claims
against the respondent. The Court has clarified inCastillo v. Uniwide Warehouse Club, Inc.54 why the claim for payment brought
against a distressed corporation like the respondent should not prosper following the issuance of the suspension order by the SEC,
regardless of when the action was filed, to wit:
Jurisprudence is settled that the suspension of proceedings referred to in the law uniformly applies to all actions for claims filed
against a corporation, partnership or association under management or receivership, without distinction, except only those expenses
incurred in the ordinary course of business. In the oft-cited case of Rubberworld (Phils.) Inc. v. NLRC, the Court noted that aside
from the given exception, the law is clear and makes no distinction as to the claims that are suspended once a management
committee is created or a rehabilitation receiver is appointed. Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should this
Court. Ubi lex non dislinguit nee nos distinguere debemos. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Zamora declares that the automatic
suspension of an action for claims against a corporation under a rehabilitation receiver or management committee embraces all
phases of the suit, that is, the entire proceedings of an action or suit and not just the payment of claims.

The reason behind the imperative nature of a suspension or stay order in relation to the creditors claims cannot be downplayed, for
indeed the indiscriminate suspension of actions for claims intends to expedite the rehabilitation of the distressed corporation by
enabling the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or
extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the rescue of the debtor company. To allow such other actions to
continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources
would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation, instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.

At this juncture, it must be conceded that the date when the claim arose, or when the action was filed, has no bearing at all in
deciding whether the given action or claim is covered by the stay or suspension order. What matters is that as long as the corporation
is under a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver, all actions for claims against it, whether for money or otherwise,
must yield to the greater imperative of corporate revival, excepting only, as already mentioned, claims for payment of obligations
incurred by the corporation in the ordinary course of business. 55 (Bold emphasis supplied)

IV
The requirement of due process was observed
The petitioners' challenge against the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground of the absence of the service of the summons on them
also fails.

Under Section 2256 of the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding, by virtue of which any application should
be made in the manner provided for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Arbitration
Law.

The RTC observed that the respondent's Application to Vacate Arbitral Award was duly served personally on the petitioners, who
then appeared by counsel and filed pleadings. The petitioners countered with their Motion to Dismiss vis-a-vis the respondent's
application, specifying therein the various grounds earlier mentioned, including the lack of jurisdiction over their persons due to
the improper service of summons. Under the circumstances, the requirement of notice was fully complied with, for Section 26 57of
the Arbitration Law required the application to be served upon the adverse party or his counsel within 30 days after the award was
filed or delivered "as prescribed by law for the service upon an attorney in an action."
V
Issue of the constitutionality of the
Arbitration Law is devoid of merit

The constitutionality of Section 29 of the Arbitration Law is being challenged on the basis that Congress has thereby increased the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and concurrence, as required by Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.

The challenge is unworthy of consideration. Based on the tenor and text of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
prohibition against increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and concurrence applies
prospectively, not retrospectively. Considering that the Arbitration Law had been approved on June 19, 1953, and took effect under
its terms on December 19, 1953, while the Constitution was ratified only on February 2, 1987, Section 29 of the Arbitration Law
could not be declared unconstitutional.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit; AFFIRMS the resolution promulgated on
May 30, 2003 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71224; and ORDERSthe petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, ROXAS CITY, Petitioner, v. JESUS A. ARROJADO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated September 8, 2011 and April 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 04540. The assailed Decision affirmed the
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 16, dated July 2, 2009 and July 23, 2009 in Criminal Case No.
C-75-09, while the questioned Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In an Information dated March 23, 2009, herein respondent was charged with the crime of murder by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz. The case was docketed as Criminal case No. C-75-09 and was raffled off to Branch 16 of the
Regional Trial COurt of Roxas City, Iloilo (RTC of Roxas City).

On June 16, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss3 the Information fiked against him on the ground that the investigating
prosecutor who filed the said Information failed to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922 (B.M. No. 1922) which was promulgated
by this Court via an En Banc Resolution dated June 3, 2008. 4

Herein petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition5 to respondent's Motion to Dismiss contending that: (1) the Information sought to
be dismissed is sufficient in form and substance; (2) the lack of proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and
signed the Information should not prejudice the interest of the State in filing charges against persons who have violated the law;
and (3) and administrative edict cannot prevail over substantive or precedural law, by imposing additional requirements for the
sufficiency of a criminal information.

On July 2, 2009, the RTC of Roxas City issued an Order6 dismissing the subject Information without prejudice. respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration.7 but the trial court denied it in its Order8 dated July 23, 2009

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus with the CA assailing the July 2, 2009 and July 23, 2009 Orders
of the RTC of Roxas City.

In its presently assailed Decision, the CA denied respondent's petition and affirmed the questioned RTC Orders. Respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its disputed Resolution.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising a sole Assignment of Error, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE FAILURE OF THE INVESTIGATING
PROSECUTOR TO INDICATE HER MCLE COMPLIANCE NUMBER AND DATE OF ISSUANCE THEREOF IN THE
INFORMATION AGAINST RESPONDENT JESUS A. ARROJADO WARRANTED THE DISMISSAL OF THE
SAME.9cralawlawlibrary

Petitioner contends that: (1) the term "pleadings" as used in B.M. No. 1922 does not include criminal Informations filed in court;
(2) the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the Information the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate
of Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to dismiss the subject Information which is otherwise complete in
form and substance.

The petition lacks merit.

Pertinent portions of B.M. No. 1922, provide as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x x

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE
practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date
of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding
compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records.

x x x10cralawlawlibrary

Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines pleadings as the written statements of the respective claims and
defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. Among the pleadings enumerated under Section 2 thereof
are the complaint and the answer in a civil suit. On the other hand, under Section 4, Rule 110 of the same Rules, an information is
defined as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. In
accordance with the above definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which charge a
person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which alleges a plaintiffs cause or cause of action. In
this respect, the Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA on the matter, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x

[A]n information is, for all intents and purposes, considered an initiatory pleading because it is a written statement that contains
the cause of action of a party, which in criminal cases is the State as represented by the prosecutor, against the accused. Like a
pleading, the Information is also filed in court for appropriate judgment. Undoubtedly then, an Information falls squarely within
the ambit of Bar Matter No. 1922, in relation to Bar Matter 850. 11cralawlawlibrary

Even under the rules of criminal procedure of the United States, upon which our rules of criminal procedure were patterned, an
information is considered a pleading. Thus, Rule 12(a), Title IV of the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, states
that: "[t]he pleadings in a criminal proceeding are the indictment, the information, and the pleas of not guilty, guilty, and nolo
contendere." Thus, the Supreme Court of Washington held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
An information is a pleading. It is the formal statement on the part of the state of the facts constituting the offense which the
defendant is accused of committing. In other words, it is the plain and concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action.
It bears the same relation to a criminal action that a complaint does to a civil action; and, when verified, its object is not to satisfy
the court or jury that the defendant is guilty, nor is it for the purpose of evidence which is to be weighed and passed upon, but is
only to inform the defendant of the precise acts or omissions with which he is accused, the truth of which is to be determined
thereafter by direct and positive evidence upon a trial, where the defendant is brought face to face with the
witnesses.12cralawlawlibrary

In a similar manner, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that "[a]n indictment in a criminal case is a pleading, since it accomplishes
the same purpose as a declaration in a civil suit, pleading by allegation the cause of action in law against [a] defendant." 13

As to petitioner's contention that the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the subject Information the number and
date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to dismiss such Information,
suffice it to state that B.M. No. 1922 categorically provides that "[f]ailure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records." In this regard, petitioner must be reminded that it
assailed the trial court's dismissal of the subject Information via a special civil action for certiorari filed with the CA. The writ
of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 14 Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.15 To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of
discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.16 Since the trial court's
dismissal of the subject Information was based on a clear and categorical provision of a rule issued by this Court, the court a
quocould not have committed a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment nor did it exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or
despotic manner. Thus, the CA did not commit error in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari.

In harping on its contention that the ends of justice would be best served if the criminal case would be allowed to proceed in order
to determine the innocence or culpability of the ciccused, petitioner sounds as if the dismissal of the Information left the prosecution
with no other recourse or remedy so as to irreversibly jeopardize the interests of the State and the private offended party. On the
contrary, the Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the Information, without prejudice, did not leave the prosecution
without any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. To avoid undue delay in the disposition of the subject criminal case and to
uphold the parties' respective rights to a speedy disposition of their case, the prosecution, mindful of its duty not only to prosecute
offenders but more importantly to do justice, could have simply re-filed the Information containing the required number and date
of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of Compliance, instead of resorting to the filing of various petitions in
court to stubbornly insist on its position and question the trial court's dismissal of the subject Information, thereby wasting its time
and effort and the State's resources.

The Court is neither persuaded by petitioner's invocation of the principle on liberal construction of procedural rules by arguing that
such liberal construction "may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance
with the Rules." The prosecution has never shown any reasonable attempt at compliance with the rule enunciated under B.M. No.
1922. Even when the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dismissing the subject Information was filed, the required
number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of Compliance was still not included nor indicated.
Thus, in the instant case, absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural
rules appear to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted.

In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's failure to indicate in his or her
pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane Resolution,
dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the
required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory
Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate
of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless,
such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.

In light of the above amendment, while the same was not yet in effect at the time that the subject Information was filed, the more
prudent and practical thing that the trial court should have done in the first place, so as to avoid delay in the disposition of the case,
was not to dismiss the Information but to simply require the investigating prosecutor to indicate therein the number and date of
issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 8, 2011
and April 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. SPNo. 04540 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND PHILIPPINE BAPTIST S.B.C., INC., Petitioners, v.FAITH IN CHRIST
JESUS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND REYNALDO GALVAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated March
5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97292.
The facts follow.
The instant petition originated from a Complaint2 for unlawful detainer and damages filed by Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc.
(BFBC) and Philippine Baptist S.B.C., Inc. (PBSBC) against Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc. (FCJBC) and Reynaldo
Galvan (Galvan) before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2, Angeles City, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-388. The
complaint sought the ejectment of FCJBC from the subject parcel of land with improvements, known as Lot 3, Blk. 35 of (LRC)
PCS-2364, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 82587,3 and located at 35-3 Sarita St., Diamond Subdivision,
Balibago, Angeles City, and owned by PBSBC.

On March 7, 1990, a contract of loan was entered into between PBSBC and BFBC where the latter borrowed money from the
former to enable it to purchase the subject property. Thereafter, respondent BFBC took possession of the subject property and held
therein their religious activities.

While BFBC was still in possession of the subject property, Galvan and his companions began attending BFBC's religious activities
at the subject property. BFBC alleged that Galvan apparently was interested on the property because after some time Galvan formed
and incorporated FCJBC and took control of the subject property.

Galvan's actuations came to the attention of the Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist Churches, Inc. (LCSBC). Thus, in a
Letter4 dated September 5, 2001, LCSBC upheld BFBC's right over the subject property and recognized BFBC's pastor, Rev.
Rolando T. Santos, as its legitimate pastor.

However, FCJBC continued to occupy the subject property, thus, in a Demand Letter 5 dated September 4, 2002, BFBC demanded
that FCJBC vacate the property within five (5) days from notice and to pay the amount of P10,000.00 per month beginning October
2001 as reasonable compensation for its use.

Due to non-compliance with its demand, on September 24, 2003, BFBC and PBSBC filed a Complaint 6 for unlawful detainer and
damages against FCJBC and Galvan.

In its Answer, FCJBC and Galvan contend that it has been in existence since 1984. Allegedly, it was formerly known as "Faith
Baptist Church" (FBC) and held services at the Tacipit family residence at 31-1 Dona Maria St., Diamond Subdivision, Angeles
City. FBC eventually moved to a building along MacArthur Highway in the same subdivision. Sometime in 1990, some of the
members of the FBC availed of the loan from the Church Loan Fund of Foreign Mission Board, SBC, Philippine Baptist Mission
for the purpose of purchasing the subject property. This was embodied in a Contract of Simple Loan or Mutuum dated March 7,
1990.

Rolando Santos was the pastor of FBC from 1993 to 2000. Due to a misunderstanding within the church group, Santos left FBC,
together with some of its members. In February 2001, Santos' group formed BFBC, an organization which was duly registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Meanwhile, FBC continued to occupy the subject property and, on January 9, 2001, organized themselves into FCJBC.

On May 30, 2001, FCJBC paid installments due on the subject property in the sum of P10,000.00, leaving a balance of P240,615.53.
FCJBC alleged that since June 2001, they were willing and able to pay the installments due on the subject property, however,
PBSBC refused to accept any payment from it. By September 9, 2002, the installments due had reached P47,232.00.

FCJBC further averred that, prior to BFBC's filing of the present complaint, a Petition for Consignation of Payment was already
filed on October 9, 2002 with the RTC, Branch 62, Angeles City entitled "Carlos Gelacio, et al. v. Foreign Mission Board, S.B.C.
Philippine Baptist Mission, now Philippine Baptist, S.B.C, Inc." docketed as Civil Case No. 10713. FCJBC prayed that PBSBC be
required to accept the amount of P240,615.53 as full payment of the Contract of Simple Loan or Mutuum.

On October 29, 2002, FCJBC filed a Motion seeking the suspension of proceedings in Civil Case No. 02-388 pending resolution
of the petition for consignation.

On February 9, 2004, the MTC rendered its Decision7 in favor of respondent BFBC in Civil Case No. 02-388. The MTC ruled that
the case was one of forcible entry and not unlawful detainer. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryWHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Balibago Faith
Baptist Church, Inc. and against the defendants Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc., Reynaldo Galvan and all persons claiming
rights under them, ordering the latter the following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to plaintiff within three (3) months from receipt of this Decision;
To pay the sum of P20,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees; and cralawlawlibrary
To pay the costs of the suit.

Defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.8
Both parties filed their respective appeal memoranda with the RTC. On April 19, 2006, the RTC issued the assailed Decision 9 which
affirmed the Decision of the MTC. FCJBC moved for reconsideration, but was denied on November 24, 2006. Thus, FCJBC filed
a petition for review on certiorari before the appellate court. 10chanrobleslaw

In the disputed Decision11 dated March 5, 2010, the appellate court granted the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
57, Angeles City, dated April 19, 2006 and November 24, 2006, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for unlawful
detainer is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Undaunted, BFBC and PBSBC filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
following issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND
RULING THAT THE MTC HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
II

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RAISING ISSUES ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT AND
THE MTC JURISDICTION WHICH WERE NOT BROUGHT OUT BY THE PARTIES.
III

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT INSTEAD OF
DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS IN LIGHT OF SECTION 8, RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
In a nutshell, the main issue before us is whether the instant case is one of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

In Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,,13 the Court differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entryvis-a-vis unlawful detainer,
to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of ;. action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In
forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue
is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the
expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the
defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue
in possession.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the foregoing, it is then clear that unlawful detainer and forcible entry are entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action
to recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning - forcible entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful
detention by a person who originally acquired possession lawfully - unlawful detainer.

The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court. 15 The cause
of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint
define and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it
is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.16 The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer
or forcible entry if the complaint filed was for unlawful detainer, or forcible entry, respectively. It cannot be made to depend on
the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration. 17chanrobleslaw

It should then be stressed that what determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants' entry into the land. If entry is illegal,
then the cause of action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer which must be filed within one year from
the date of the last demand.18chanrobleslaw

Indeed, to vest the court of jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody
such a statement of facts which brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court's jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.19 This is where petitioners' cause of action fails.

In Cabrera, et al. v. Getaruela, et al. ,20 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer
if it recites the following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and cralawlawlibrary

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, BFBC presented the following allegations in support of its unlawful detainer complaint:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x x

2. Plaintiff Philippine Baptist S.B.C., Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements under Lot 3 Blk. 35 of
(LRC) Pcs-2364 described under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 82587 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City,
located at 35-3 Sarita St., Diamond Subd., Balibago, Angeles City, which is the subject matter of this case and hereinafter referred
to as subject premises. A copy of the title is hereto attached as Annex "A" and to form an integral part hereof;

3. On March 7, 1990, plaintiff PBSBC granted a contract of simple loan to plaintiff BFBC for the latter's purchase of the subject
premises and plaintiff BFBC started to possess the same and hold their religious activities thereat;

4. While plaintiff BFBC was in possession of the subject premises, defendant Reynaldo Galvan and his companions joined the
regular religious services of plaintiff BFBC at the subject premises;

5. It turned out that defendants have an interest in the subject premises and defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed and incorporated
the defendant FCJBC and took control of the subject premises;

6. The take-over of the defendants was brought to the attention of the Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist Churches, Inc.,
(LCSBC) and the latter, in letter dated September 5, 2001, has affirmed the right of the plaintiff BFBC, headed by Rev. Rolando
T. Santos, to occupy the subject premises. A copy of LCSBC's letter dated September 5, 2001 is hereto attached as Annex "B";

7. Despite [LCSBC's] letter and plaintiffs peaceful overtures for the defendants to turn over to plaintiffs the subject premises,
defendants ignored the same;

8. Due to exhaustion, expense and exasperation, plaintiffs were

constrained to refer this matter to the undersigned counsel and, accordingly, on September 4, 2002, a demand letter was
sent to the defendants for them to pay the reasonable compensation of TEN THOUSAND (PI0,000.00) PESOS per month
beginning October 2001 for the use of the subject premises and to vacate the same within five (5) [days upon] their receipt thereof.
A copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as Annex "C" and to form an integral part hereof;

9. Despite plaintiffs' lawyer's demand letter, defendants failed and refused to pay the reasonable compensation for the subject
premises and to vacate the subject premises;

x x x.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A perusal of the above-quoted allegations in the complaint would show that it contradicts the requirements for unlawful detainer.
In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the defendant was originally legal and its possession was tolerated or permitted
by the owner through an express or implied contract.

In this case, paragraphs 5 and 6 make it clear that FCJBC's occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or
legal basis. There was, likewise, no allegation that BFBC and PBSBC tolerated FCJBC's possession of the subject property. Neither
was there any averment in the complaint which shows any overt act on the part of BFBC and PBSBC indicative of permission to
occupy the land. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant's possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiffs demand for the
defendant to vacate the property and the defendant's subsequent refusal. Here, paragraphs 7 and 8 characterize the defendant's
occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand letters were written by the petitioner's counsel. Given these allegations, the
unlawful withholding of possession should not be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged unlawful act had
taken place at an earlier unspecified date.

This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry as it has been long settled that in forcible entry cases, no force is
really necessary. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of
force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.23 However, while BFBC sufficiently alleged that they had prior physical
possession of the subject property, nothing has been said on how FCJBC's entry was effected or when dispossession started. It is
in this light that we rule that the present complaint is similarly defective even if we are to treat the same as forcible entry as it failed
to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation of BFBC that "[i]t turned out that defendants have an interest in
the subject premises and defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed and incorporated the defendant FCJBC and took control of the subject
premises," would not suffice since it only shows that FCJBC entered the land and occupied the house thereon without BFBC and
PBSBC's consent or permission which are constitutive of forcible entry. Unfortunately, BFBC and PB SBC's failure to allege when
the dispossession took place and how it was effected leaves the complaint wanting in jurisdictional ground.

Suffice it to say, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual
entry on the land, except that when entry was made through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff
learned thereof.24 If the dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70, as in this case, the proper
recourse is to file a plenary action to recover possession with the Regional Trial Court. 25cralawred Consequently, the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case.

We likewise reiterate that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment
on the action. Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can
never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void. 26chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated March
5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97292 is AFFIRMED in toto.

FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ARTURO LOO PO, Respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to reverse and set aside the October 31, 2014 Decision 2and the March 6, 2015
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 134701 which affirmed the September 16, 2013 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC) in SCA Case No. 3831. The RTC decision, in turn, sustained the March 21,
2013 Decision5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig City (MeTC), which dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed
by petitioner Fairland Knitcraft Corporation (Fairland) against respondent Arturo Loo Po (Po) for failure to prove its case by
preponderance of evidence.

The Antecedents

In a complaint6 for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 19429, filed before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that it was the
owner of Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City. The said unit was leased by Fairland
to Po by verbal agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a month, to be paid by Po at the beginning of each month. From March
2011, Po had continuously failed to pay rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to renew the lease agreement anymore.

On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter7 to Po demanding that he pay the amount of P220,000.00, representing the rental
arrears, and that he vacate the leased premises within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the letter. Despite receipt of the demand
letter and the lapse of the said 15-day period to comply, Po neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the premises.
Thus, on December 12, 2012, Fairland was constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po had until
January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he failed to do so. Hence, on February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to render judgment. 8

In its February 21, 2013 Order,9 the MeTC considered the case submitted for decision.

On March 1, 2013, Po's counsel filed his Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition to
Motion to Render Judgment.10 In the attached Comment/Opposition, Po denied the allegations against him and commented that
there was no supporting document that would show that Fairland owned the property; that there was no lease contract between
them; that there were no documents attached to the complaint which would show that previous demands had been made and
received by him; that the alleged unpaid rental was P220,000.00, but the amount of damages being prayed for was P440,000.00;
that the issue in the case was one of ownership; and that it was the RTC which had jurisdiction over the case.

The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po's answer to the complaint. Considering, however, that the case fell under the
Rules of Summary Procedure, the same was deemed filed out of time. Hence, the motion was denied. 11

The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

In its March 21, 2013 Decision, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland's failure to prove its claim by
preponderance of evidence. The MeTC explained that although the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action, Fairland failed
to prove that it was entitled to the possession of the subject property. There was no evidence presented to support its claim against
Po either.

Aggrieved, Fairland seasonably filed its appeal before the RTC under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Being an appealed case, the
RTC required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

In its memorandum,12 Fairland argued that an unlawful detainer case was a special civil action governed by summary procedure.
In cases where a defendant failed to file his answer, there was no need for a declaration of default. Fairland claimed that the Rules
stated that in such cases, judgment should be based on the "facts alleged in the complaint,"13 and that there was no requirement that
judgment must be based on facts proved by preponderance of evidence. Considering that the presentation of evidence was not
required when a defendant in an ejectment case failed to appear in a preliminary conference, the same should be applied when no
answer had been filed.

Fairland continued that the failure to file an answer in an ejectment case was tantamount to an admission by the defendant of all
the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. There was no more need for evidence in such a situation as every allegation of ultimate
facts in the complaint was deemed established by the defendant's acquiescence.

On July 18, 2013, Po filed his memorandum14 and countered that there was no merit in Fairland's insistence that evidence was
unnecessary when no answer had been filed. The facts stated in the complaint did not warrant a rendition of judgment in the
plaintiffs favor. The court had the discretion to rule on the pleadings based on its evaluation of the allegation of facts.

Further, all the statements in the complaint were mere allegations which were not substantiated by any competent evidence. Po
asserted that there was no proof presented to show that the subject property was indeed owned by Fairland; that there was no lease
contract between the parties; that he never received the demand letter, dated January 30, 2012; and that the amount stated in the
prayer of the complaint did not coincide with the amount of unpaid rent. Po also reiterated that the case involved an issue of
ownership over the condominium unit he was occupying.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 16, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling and agreed that Fairland failed to establish its case by preponderance
of evidence. There was nothing on record that would establish Fairland's right over the property subject of the complaint. Though
it had been consistently ruled that the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case was the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party-litigants, the court may go beyond the question of
physical possession provisionally. The RTC concluded that even assuming that Po was not the lawful owner, his actual physical
possession of the subject property created the presumption that he was entitled to its possession thereof.

Fairland filed a motion for reconsideration15 attaching its condominium certificate of title16 over the subject property, but it was
denied by the RTC in its Order,17 dated February 24, 2014.

Undaunted, Fairland filed a petition for review18 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In the assailed Decision, dated October 31, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition and ruled that an action for unlawful detainer would
not lie against Po. Notwithstanding the abbreviated proceeding it ordained and the limited pleadings it allowed, the Rules on
Summary Procedure did not relax the rules on evidence. In order for an action for recovery of possession to prosper, it was
indispensable that he who brought the action should prove not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed. The
CA concluded, however, that Fairland failed to discharge such bounden duty.

Fairland filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution, dated March 6, 2015.

Hence, this petition.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS
I
IN AN EJECTMENT CASE WHEREIN NO ANSWER WAS SEASONABLY FILED, IT IS AN ERROR OF LAW TO BASE
JUDGMENT ON PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
II
HOLDING THAT EVIDENCE IN AN EJECTMENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT IS
AN ERROR OF LAW.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Fairland argues that in ejectment cases, presentation of evidence was undertaken through the submission of position papers but the
same was dispensed with when the defendant failed to file an answer or when either party failed to appear during the preliminary
conference. In an ejectment case, the scope of inquiry should be limited to the sufficiency of the cause of action stated in the
complaint when no seasonable answer was filed. The attachment of documentary evidence to the Complaint was not a requirement
and was even proscribed by law.

In his Comment,20 Po countered that the present petition raised a question of fact. Although couched in different words, the issues
raised here were substantially the same as the issues raised before the CA. There was no legal basis in Fairland's assertion that
evidence was dispensed with when no answer to the complaint had been filed. Such argument would undermine the inherent
authority of the courts to resolve legal issues based on the facts of the case and on the rules on evidence. Contrary to Fairland's
position, the court decided the case on the basis of the complaint which was found wanting in preponderance of evidence.

In its Reply,21 Fairland posited that the petition did not raise mere questions of fact but one of law as what was being sought for
review was the erroneous dismissal of the ejectment case for lack of preponderance of evidence. Since no answer was filed and the
complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer, it became the duty of the MeTC to decide the case in its
favor.
The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Complaint has a valid cause of action for Unlawful Detainer

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:
Section 1. - Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived
of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (l) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring
an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may be filed
by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person from whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. The possession of the
defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between
them. The defendant's possession, however, became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject
property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed such
demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of possession.22

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of the
property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained
in possession of the property, and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year from the last demand
on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 23

There is no question that the complaint filed by Fairland adequately alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The pertinent
portion of the said complaint reads:
x x x

3. Plaintiff is the owner of, and had been leasing to the defendant, the premises mentioned above as the residence of the latter;

4. There is no current written lease contract between plaintiff and the defendant, but the latter agreed to pay the former the amount
of Php2o,ooo.oo as rent at the beginning of each month. Thus, the term of the lease agreement is renewable on a month-to-month
basis;

5. Since March 2011, defendant has not been paying the aforesaid rent despite plaintiffs repeated demands;

6. Due to defendant's continuous failure to pay rent, plaintiff reached a decision not to renew the lease agreement. It sent a formal
letter, x x x demanding defendant to pay the amount of Php220,000.00, representing defendant's twelve month rental arrears
beginning January 2011, and to vacate the leased premises, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said letter;
7. Despite receipt of the aforesaid demand letter and lapse of the fifteen day period given to comply with plaintiffs demand,
defendant neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the leased premises. Worse, defendant has not been paying rent
up to now;

x x x24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently alleged that Fairland was the owner of the subject property being leased to
Po by virtue of an oral agreement. There was a demand by Fairland for Po to pay rent and vacate before the complaint for unlawful
detainer was instituted. The complaint was seasonably filed within the one-year period prescribed by law. With all the elements
present, there was clearly a cause of action in the complaint for unlawful detainer.

Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of evidence is not considered when a judgment is rendered based on the
complaint

The question now is whether the MeTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of preponderance of evidence. Fairland posits that
judgment should have been rendered in its favor on the basis of the complaint itself and not on its failure to adduce proof of
ownership over the subject property.

The Court agrees with Fairland's position.

The summons, together with the complaint and its annexes, was served upon Po on December 28, 2012. This presupposes that the
MeTC found no ground to dismiss the action for unlawful detainer. 25Nevertheless, Po failed to file his answer on time and the
MeTC had the option to render judgment motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff. In relation thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of the
Rules on Summary Procedure provide:
Sec. 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a
copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered
barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in
which they are pleaded.

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court,
motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for
being excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if
there are two or more defendants.
[Emphasis supplied]
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon
plaintiffs motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant
to timely file his answer and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the
complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation 26 except to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint.27

Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the rules for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the
defendant fails to answer the complaint within the period provided, the court has no authority to declare the defendant in default.
Instead, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for.28

This has been enunciated in the case of Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino,29citing Bayog v.
Natino,30 where the Court held that there was no provision for an entry of default under the Rules of Summary Procedure if the
defendant failed to file his answer.

In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper service of summons. He also failed to provide a sufficient
justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment must be rendered by the court as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint.

Failure to attach annexes is not fatal if the complaint alleges a sufficient cause of action; evidence need not be attached to the
complaint

The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland simply on the ground that it failed to establish by preponderance
of evidence its ownership over the subject property. As can be gleaned above, the rules do not compel the plaintiff to attach his
evidence to the complaint because, at this inception stage, he only has to file his complaint to establish his cause of action. Here,
the court was only tasked to determine whether the complaint of Fairland alleged a sufficient cause of action and to render judgment
thereon.

Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint because the allegations therein constituted a sufficient cause
of action for unlawful detainer. Only when the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to form a cause of action shall the
attachment become material in the determination thereof. Even under Section 4 of the Rules of Summary Procedure, 31 it is not
mandatory to attach annexes to the complaint.

In the case of Lazaro v. Brewmaster32 (Lazaro), where judgment was rendered based on the complaint due to the failure of the
defendant to file an answer under the Rules of Summary Procedure, it was written that:
x x x To determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, all documents attached thereto may, in fact, be considered,
particularly when referred to in the complaint. We emphasize, however, that the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of
the material allegations in the complaint. Thus, consideration of the annexed documents should only be taken in the context of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.
[Emphasis supplied]
In Lazaro, the assailed invalid invoices attached to the complaint were not considered because the complaint already alleged a
sufficient cause of action for collection of sum of money. Those assailed documents were not the bases of the plaintiffs action for
sum of money, but were only attached to the complaint to provide evidentiary details on the alleged transactions.

Similarly, in the case at bench, there was no need for documentary attachments to prove Fairland's ownership over the subject
property. First, the present action is an action for unlawful detainer wherein only de facto or material possession is required to be
alleged. Evidently, the attachment of any deed of ownership to the complaint is not indispensable because an action for unlawful
detainer does not entirely depend on ownership.

Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and superior right of possession over the subject property. These allegations were
evidently manifest in the complaint as Fairland claimed to have orally agreed to lease the property to Po. The Court is of the view
that these allegations were clear and unequivocal and did not need supporting attachments to be considered as having sufficiently
established its cause of action. Even the MeTC conceded that the complaint of Fairland stated a valid cause of action for unlawful
detainer.33 It must be stressed that inquiry into the attached documents in the complaint is for the sufficiency, not the veracity, of
the material allegations in the complaint.

Third, considering that Po failed to file an answer within the prescribed period, he was deemed to have admitted all the allegations
in the complaint including Fairland's claim of ownership. To reiterate, the failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and
controvert the claim against him constituted his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint.

In the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment, which
was belatedly filed and so was denied by the MeTC, Po merely denied the allegations against him without even bothering to aver
why he claimed to have a superior right of possession of the subject property. 34

Fourth, it is only at the later stage of the summary procedure when the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence on factual issues
shall be presented before the court. Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. - Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall
issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, x x x

Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. - Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order,
together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
[Emphasis supplied]
Again, it is worth stressing that these provisions are exactly Sections 9 and 10 under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Accordingly, it is only at this part of the proceedings that the parties will be required to present and offer their evidence before the
court to establish their causes and defenses. Before the issuance of the record of preliminary conference, the parties are not yet
required to present their respective evidence.

These specific provisions under the Rules of Summary Procedure which are also reflected in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, serve
their purpose to immediately settle ejectment proceedings. "Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings
designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. It
does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a 'time procedure' designed to remedy the situation. 35 Thus, as a
consequence of the defendant's failure to file an answer, the court is simply tasked to render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.

As the complaint contains a valid cause of action, a judgment can already be rendered
In order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of unlawful detainer cases, a remand of this case to the lower
courts is no longer necessary and the case can be determined on its merits by the Court.

To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer on time, judgment shall be rendered based only on the complaint of Fairland without
the need to consider the weight of evidence. As discussed above, the complaint of Fairland had a valid cause of action for unlawful
detainer.

Consequently, there is no more need to present evidence to establish the allegation of Fairland of its ownership and superior right
of possession over the subject property. Po's failure to file an answer constitutes an admission of his illegal occupation due to his
non-payment of rentals, and of Fairland's rightful claim of material possession. Thus, judgment must be rendered finding that
Fairland has the right to eject Po from the subject property.

The Judicial Affidavit Rule

On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the relevance of the Judicial Affidavit Rule or A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, where
documentary or object evidence are required to be attached. To begin with, the rule is not applicable because such evidence are
required to be attached to a judicial affidavit, not to a complaint. Moreover, as the rule took effect only on January 1, 2013, it cannot
be required in this case because this was earlier filed on December 12, 2012.

Granting that it can be applied retroactively, the rule being essentially remedial, still it has no bearing on the ruling of this Court.

In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of documentary or object evidence to the affidavits is required when there would be
a pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing. As stated earlier, where a defendant fails to file an answer, the court
shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiffs motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited
to what is prayed for. Thus, where there is no answer, there is no need for a pre-trial, preliminary conference or hearing. Section 2
of the Judicial Affidavit Rule reads:
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court and
serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary
conference or the scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:

(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and

(2) The parties' documentary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and marked as
Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the
case of the respondent or the defendant.

(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his possession, he may, after the same
has been identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to
such affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring the original document
or object evidence for comparison during the preliminary conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing
which the latter shall not be admitted.

This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when allowed by existing rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 31, 2014 Decision and the March 6, 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134701 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Arturo Loo Po is ORDERED TO
VACATE Condominium Unit No. 205 located in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.

Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears, as well as the rentals accruing in the interim until he vacates
the property. The unpaid rentals shall incur a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from January 30, 2012, when the demand
to pay and to vacate was made, up to the finality of this decision. Thereafter, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
imposed on the total amount due until full payment is made.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary